- the fraction of ill-informed consultants in the set of consultants (fii),
- the speed with which new information enters the system and becomes available to consultants (∆Narg), and
- the profit margin of the consultants (δ).
In our simulations, a high α and a high fii made it generally less profitable for consultants to be well-informed. The observation that an increasing fractions of ii-consultants increases their payoff, raises the problem of consultants that follow the crowd, even if this means to stay ill-informed.

The simulated model in this work is certainly simplifying the complexity of reality. There are many ways for making it more realistic. For instance, the price computation given by eq.

8 is purely reactive; it does not exploit the fact that a lower prices would attract more clients and so could be used in a proactive manner. Still, since all consultants computed their price in the same way, it is not clear whether a more complex approach would make the ii-strategy less profitable. This is subject to future research. Also, our consultants pursued two basic strategies (acquiring all arguments becoming available, and acquiring only as needed); this can be extended to more sophisticated strategies, e.g. to be a wi-consultant for a certain time to boost the reputation, and then become ii-consultant. Furthermore, the impact of publicity campaigns is completely ignored and would be an interesting continuation of our research.

## References

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