conversations.from: human
conversations.value: What could be a title for a book about Theory, Moral, Sentiments with the genre: Politics & Social Sciences, Philosophy?
conversations.from: assistant
conversations.value: A title for this book could be 'The Theory of Moral Sentiments'
conversations.from: human
conversations.value: Provide the first five paragraphs for this book.
conversations.from: assistant
conversations.value: The Theory of Moral Sentiments
  Aristotle: and character analysis; and character of virtue; and Epicureanism; and magnanimity; and Platonic system of virtue; and prudence; and rules of justice; and rules of morality; and social customs; and temperance; and vanity
  Christianity: and benevolence; and compassion; and duty; and the Eclectics; and ethics; and rules of morality
  God: and benevolence; and duty; and irregularity of sentiments; and justice; and laws of the Deity; and rules of morality
  Plato: and Aristotelian system of virtue; and character analysis; and character of virtue; and courage; and the Eclectics; and Epicureanism; and justice; and moral relativism; and public spirit; and social customs; system of virtue
  Roman culture: and the arts; and friendships; and patriotism; and public spirit; and rules of morality; and self-command; and social customs; and social status; and suicide; and utility
conversations.from: human
conversations.value: Provide five more paragraphs.
conversations.from: assistant
conversations.value: God: and benevolence; and duty; and irregularity of sentiments; and justice; and laws of the Deity; and rules of morality
  Plato: and Aristotelian system of virtue; and character analysis; and character of virtue; and courage; and the Eclectics; and Epicureanism; and justice; and moral relativism; and public spirit; and social customs; system of virtue
  Roman culture: and the arts; and friendships; and patriotism; and public spirit; and rules of morality; and self-command; and social customs; and social status; and suicide; and utility
  Stoicism; and divine order; and ends of life; and Epicureanism; and fortune; and happiness; and human nature; and licentiousness; maxims of; and misfortune; and moral worth; and natural desire; paradoxes of; and propriety; and self-command; and self-interest, command; and self-interest; and suicide
  It has been objected to me that as I found the sentiment of approbation, which is always agreeable, upon sympathy, it is inconsistent with my system to admit any disagreeable sympathy. I answer, that in the sentiment of approbation there are two things to be taken notice of; first, the sympathetic passion of the spectator; and, secondly, the emotion which arises from his observing the perfect coincidence between this sympathetic passion in himself, and the original passion in the person principally concerned. This last emotion, in which the sentiment of approbation properly consists, is always agreeable and delightful. The other may either be agreeable or disagreeable, according to the nature of the original passion, whose features it must always, in some measure, retain.
conversations.from: human
conversations.value: Delete the last sentence.
conversations.from: assistant
conversations.value: God: and benevolence; and duty; and irregularity of sentiments; and justice; and laws of the Deity; and rules of morality
  Plato: and Aristotelian system of virtue; and character analysis; and character of virtue; and courage; and the Eclectics; and Epicureanism; and justice; and moral relativism; and public spirit; and social customs; system of virtue
  Roman culture: and the arts; and friendships; and patriotism; and public spirit; and rules of morality; and self-command; and social customs; and social status; and suicide; and utility
  Stoicism; and divine order; and ends of life; and Epicureanism; and fortune; and happiness; and human nature; and licentiousness; maxims of; and misfortune; and moral worth; and natural desire; paradoxes of; and propriety; and self-command; and self-interest, command; and self-interest; and suicide
  It has been objected to me that as I found the sentiment of approbation, which is always agreeable, upon sympathy, it is inconsistent with my system to admit any disagreeable sympathy. I answer, that in the sentiment of approbation there are two things to be taken notice of; first, the sympathetic passion of the spectator; and, secondly, the emotion which arises from his observing the perfect coincidence between this sympathetic passion in himself, and the original passion in the person principally concerned. This last emotion, in which the sentiment of approbation properly consists, is always agreeable and delightful.
conversations.from: human
conversations.value: Provide the last four paragraphs.
conversations.from: assistant
conversations.value: Before I conclude this note, I must take notice of a difference between the approbation of propriety and that of merit or beneficence. Before we approve of the sentiments of any person as proper and suitable to their objects, we must not only be affected in the same manner as he is, but we must perceive this harmony and correspondence of sentiments between him and ourselves. Thus, though upon hearing of a misfortune that had befallen my friend, I should conceive precisely that degree of concern which he gives way to; yet till I am informed of the manner in which he behaves, till I perceive the harmony between his emotions and mine, I cannot be said to approve of the sentiments which influence his behaviour. The approbation of propriety therefore requires, not only that we should entirely sympathize with the person who acts, but that we should perceive this perfect concord between his sentiments and our own. On the contrary, when I hear of a benefit that has been bestowed upon another person, let him who has received it be affected in what manner he pleases, if, by bringing his case home to myself, I feel gratitude arise in my own breast, I necessarily approve of the conduct of his benefactor, and regard it as meritorious, and the proper object of reward. Whether the person who has received the benefit conceives gratitude or not, cannot, it is evident, in any degree alter our sentiments with regard to the merit of him who has bestowed it. No actual correspondence of sentiments, therefore, is here required. It is sufficient that if he was grateful, they would correspond; and our sense of merit is often founded upon one of those illusive sympathies, by which, when we bring home to ourselves the case of another, we are often affected in a manner in which the person principally concerned is incapable of being affected. There is a similar difference between our disapprobation of demerit, and that of impropriety.
  The distributive justice of Aristotle is somewhat different. It consists in the proper distribution of rewards from the public stock of a community. See Aristotle Ethic. Nic. l. v. c. 2.
  Inquiry concerning virtue, sect. ii. art. 4; also Illustrations on the moral sense, sect. v. last paragraph.
  Origine de l'Inegalité. Partie Premiere, p. 376, 377. Edition d'Amsterdam des Oeuvres diverses de J. J. Rousseau.