conversations.from: human
conversations.value: Give me a description for a book titled Why Smart People Can Be So Stupid about [P]rovides, James, Crawford with the genre: Science & Math, Behavioral Sciences.
conversations.from: assistant
conversations.value: [P]rovides valuable insight into a subject that eludes, but that intrigues as well. -- James A. Crawford, The Harvard Crimson
conversations.from: human
conversations.value: Give me the first five paragraphs for this book.
conversations.from: assistant
conversations.value: Why Smart People Can Be So Stupid
  Bentler, P. M. (1995). EQS Structural Equations Program Manual. Encino, Calif.: Multivariate Software Inc.
  The stupid should wear signs so we know not to rely on them. It's like before my wife and I moved from Texas to California, our house was full of boxes and there was a U-Haul truck in our driveway. My neighbor comes over and says, "Hey, you moving?" "Nope. We just pack our stuff up once or twice a week just to see how many boxes it takes. Here's your sign."
  A couple of months ago I went fishing with a buddy. We pulled his boat into the dock, I lifted up this big ol' stringer of bass and this idiot on the dock says, "Hey, y'all catch all them fish?" "Nope. Here's your sign."
  Language is used literally by some and more figuratively by others. When we ask a person "How are you?" we may care to know or we may simply want to signal that we are polite. If the person takes the question literally, discord may result when we barely wait for an answer. The person may then feel stupid for thinking that we care. Perhaps we do, but that is not what the interaction was about for us. As demonstrated in the opening lines of this chapter, words spoken by the "stupid" are not meant literally. They are meant to convey a friendly nod.
  Stupidity is an unkind but not infrequent attribution made by observers of behavior. Our behavior makes sense to us or else we would not engage in it. Nevertheless, when we consider our behavior in retrospect or when others observe us and they do not see the sense the behavior made to us at the time, the conclusion is that it was senseless and we should have known better. Some people are slower to grasp concepts than others, but it is difficult to know whether this is because they are processing the same information less well or because they are processing different information or the same information differently. This chapter considers these latter instances, wherein people process information using different models from those of their interlocutors.
conversations.from: human
conversations.value: Add another sentence about Talked, Talked, giving.
conversations.from: assistant
conversations.value: Why Smart People Can Be So Stupid
  Bentler, P. M. (1995). EQS Structural Equations Program Manual. Encino, Calif. : Multivariate Software Inc. 
  The stupid should wear signs so we know not to rely on them. It's like before my wife and I moved from Texas to California, our house was full of boxes and there was a U-Haul truck in our driveway. My neighbor comes over and says, "Hey, you moving?" "Nope. We just pack our stuff up once or twice a week just to see how many boxes it takes. Here's your sign. "
  A couple of months ago I went fishing with a buddy. We pulled his boat into the dock, I lifted up this big ol' stringer of bass and this idiot on the dock says, "Hey, y'all catch all them fish?" "Nope. Talked 'em into giving up. Here's your sign. "
  Language is used literally by some and more figuratively by others. When we ask a person "How are you?" we may care to know or we may simply want to signal that we are polite. If the person takes the question literally, discord may result when we barely wait for an answer. The person may then feel stupid for thinking that we care. Perhaps we do, but that is not what the interaction was about for us. As demonstrated in the opening lines of this chapter, words spoken by the "stupid" are not meant literally. They are meant to convey a friendly nod. 
  Stupidity is an unkind but not infrequent attribution made by observers of behavior. Our behavior makes sense to us or else we would not engage in it. Nevertheless, when we consider our behavior in retrospect or when others observe us and they do not see the sense the behavior made to us at the time, the conclusion is that it was senseless and we should have known better. Some people are slower to grasp concepts than others, but it is difficult to know whether this is because they are processing the same information less well or because they are processing different information or the same information differently. This chapter considers these latter instances, wherein people process information using different models from those of their interlocutors.
conversations.from: human
conversations.value: Give me five more paragraphs.
conversations.from: assistant
conversations.value: At any point in the above adventure, the protagonist could have harmed himself by losing faith in his own cognitive ability to cope with the situation. "I am stupid," he could have said to himself when the loud bell rang. "I am stupid," he could have argued to himself when the front door opened. "I am stupid for thinking I was stupid," he could say to himself at the end of the whole, frightening sequence. While the failure of our expectations in the face of events in the world is sometimes terrifying—and frequent—the attributions we make on the basis of these failed expectations are not determined by the failures themselves.
  How do we end up calling ourselves stupid, especially given the very high subsequent costs in individual performance of doing so? The literature on self-attribution and self-efficacy (Bandura 1997) contains many examples in which self-attributions of stupidity result from failed expectations about one's own behavior or performance. Having once failed at ice-skating, one might deduce that one is a poor ice-skater—rather than that one did not have the right instructor or the right ice conditions or the right skating partner. Such self-disparaging reactions are common when one is outperformed by others on a task at which one considers oneself competent (Bandura & Jourden 1991).
  Saying "I'm stupid" is often a consequence of performing poorly on tests of cognitive skill in relation to others. People's beliefs about their own cognitive efficacy can—not surprisingly—be raised or lowered by presenting them with information about the cognitive performance of other people (Davis & Yates 1982). Thus, despite the famous propensity of people to make "situational" attributions for their own failures and dispositional attributions for the failures of others (Nisbett & Ross 1980), they also readily take in the "verdicts" of the external world when it comes to interpreting performance results on tasks that are meaningful to them.
  This chapter has focused on identifying the ways in which the attribution of stupidity gets constructed, both interpersonally and intrapersonally. To show that a characteristic is socially constructed (rather than given, or objectively "there"), we have followed a particular strategy. First, we proposed a plausible interpersonal or intraperson model or theory that explains how people can think of themselves or of each other as "stupid," and then we showed how the premises on which the model rests can be invalidated by interventions aimed at increasing mindfulness in the actors. We argued that stupidity is essentially an observer's phenomenon. It can become an actor's phenomenon as well through internalization of someone else's perspective, through well-documented processes of self-attribution and self-criticism. It can be made to disappear by changing the processes of (1) interpersonal attribution or (2) self-attribution.
  According to the "linear" conception of intelligence, the intelligent individual assumes there exists a pre-set, always-already-there correspondence between word and object (or word and perception, or word and event) and proceeds to calculate an optimally adaptive solution or plan that will link the current state of the world to a desired state of the world. This, indeed, is the algorithmic structure of all plans and problem-solving sequences, and is the classical model of problem-solving skill used by cognitive psychologists such as Herbert Simon and Alan Newell (Newell 1990). It is important to note that the categories in which perceptions are organized are assumed to be constant and unchanging. Herein lies the Platonist heritage of the classical view of intelligence.
conversations.from: human
conversations.value: Swap the first and the last sentence.
conversations.from: assistant
conversations.value: Herein lies the Platonist heritage of the classical view of intelligence. "I am stupid," he could have said to himself when the loud bell rang. "I am stupid," he could have argued to himself when the front door opened. "I am stupid for thinking I was stupid," he could say to himself at the end of the whole, frightening sequence. While the failure of our expectations in the face of events in the world is sometimes terrifying—and frequent—the attributions we make on the basis of these failed expectations are not determined by the failures themselves.
  How do we end up calling ourselves stupid, especially given the very high subsequent costs in individual performance of doing so? The literature on self-attribution and self-efficacy (Bandura 1997) contains many examples in which self-attributions of stupidity result from failed expectations about one's own behavior or performance. Having once failed at ice-skating, one might deduce that one is a poor ice-skater—rather than that one did not have the right instructor or the right ice conditions or the right skating partner. Such self-disparaging reactions are common when one is outperformed by others on a task at which one considers oneself competent (Bandura & Jourden 1991).
  Saying "I'm stupid" is often a consequence of performing poorly on tests of cognitive skill in relation to others. People's beliefs about their own cognitive efficacy can—not surprisingly—be raised or lowered by presenting them with information about the cognitive performance of other people (Davis & Yates 1982). Thus, despite the famous propensity of people to make "situational" attributions for their own failures and dispositional attributions for the failures of others (Nisbett & Ross 1980), they also readily take in the "verdicts" of the external world when it comes to interpreting performance results on tasks that are meaningful to them.
  This chapter has focused on identifying the ways in which the attribution of stupidity gets constructed, both interpersonally and intrapersonally. To show that a characteristic is socially constructed (rather than given, or objectively "there"), we have followed a particular strategy. First, we proposed a plausible interpersonal or intraperson model or theory that explains how people can think of themselves or of each other as "stupid," and then we showed how the premises on which the model rests can be invalidated by interventions aimed at increasing mindfulness in the actors. We argued that stupidity is essentially an observer's phenomenon. It can become an actor's phenomenon as well through internalization of someone else's perspective, through well-documented processes of self-attribution and self-criticism. It can be made to disappear by changing the processes of (1) interpersonal attribution or (2) self-attribution.
  According to the "linear" conception of intelligence, the intelligent individual assumes there exists a pre-set, always-already-there correspondence between word and object (or word and perception, or word and event) and proceeds to calculate an optimally adaptive solution or plan that will link the current state of the world to a desired state of the world. This, indeed, is the algorithmic structure of all plans and problem-solving sequences, and is the classical model of problem-solving skill used by cognitive psychologists such as Herbert Simon and Alan Newell (Newell 1990). It is important to note that the categories in which perceptions are organized are assumed to be constant and unchanging.At any point in the above adventure, the protagonist could have harmed himself by losing faith in his own cognitive ability to cope with the situation.
conversations.from: human
conversations.value: Give me the last four paragraphs.
conversations.from: assistant
conversations.value: The costs of foolishness can be very high. In order to avoid it, we first need to understand it. Such an understanding can be achieved by viewing foolishness as an imbalance that results from feelings of omniscience, omnipotence, and invulnerability.
  Preparation of this article was supported by Grant REC-9979843 from the National Science Foundation and by a grant under the Javits Act Program (Grant No. R206R000001) as administered by the Office of Educational Research and Improvement, U.S. Department of Education. Grantees undertaking such projects are encouraged to express freely their professional judgment. This article, therefore, does not necessarily represent the position or policies of the National Science Foundation, Office of Educational Research and Improvement, or U.S. Department of Education, and no official endorsement should be inferred.
  Clinton-Lewinsky scandal, , , ; changing nature of evidence and, –16; Clinton's view of, ; lies and denials in, –21; machismo of United States presidency and, –12; mindlessness and, ; moral issues of, ; public office in post-Watergate era and, –15; Starr spotlight and, –20; US social mores and, –13
  Langer, Ellen, , , , ; on mindfulness, ; on mindlessness, ; perceptual disorder testing by, ; scripted social behavior and mindlessness, –22