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conversations.value: a title for a book about History, British, Professor with the genre: New, Used & Rental Textbooks, Humanities
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conversations.value: A title for this book could be 'British Counterinsurgency'
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conversations.value: Give me the first five paragraphs for the book.
conversations.from: assistant
conversations.value: British Counterinsurgency
  The Argylls were not, of course, the only troops involved in such conduct. Inevitably, the Parachute Regiment worked along similar lines. One senior Para officer subsequently complained of the squeamishness of 'those in high places' who did not approve of what he described as 'vigorous interrogation'. 'Word came down', he recalled, 'that if any more prisoners were "shot trying to escape" or "fell downstairs", there would be a full investigation and dire consequences.'
  Meanwhile, the withdrawal from the hinterland had been accomplished. Ostensibly the British handed over to the Federal rulers and the SAA but, in fact, as they withdrew the NLF came out into the open and took control. The Radfan guerrillas finally triumphed, occupying Dhala on 20 June and imprisoning the Amir in his own jail. After Dhala they took Lower Yafai, Audhali, Lahej, Dathina and Fahdli. By the end of August they controlled 12 of the Federal states and in early September they established a revolutionary government in Zinjibar, just 25 miles from Aden. The only serious fighting to accompany this astonishing success was between the NLF and FLOSY, and this was decided when the South Arabian Army finally declared their support for the NLF.
  With fighting between the rival guerrilla forces continuing, the British withdrew into Aden and then began to abandon the colony district by district. On 13 September troops pulled out of Little Aden, and on 24 September Sheikh Othman was abandoned as the British retreated towards Steamer Point. Only on 13 November did the High Commissioner acknowledge the NLF government, finally bringing attacks on British troops to an end. The last British personnel were helicoptered out on 29 November. The struggle to free South Yemen from British rule was over.
  British defeat was complete, a humiliating withdrawal, leaving the country in the hands of self-proclaimed Marxist revolutionaries who promptly proclaimed the People's Republic of South Yemen. The conflict had cost the lives of 92 British soldiers with another 500 wounded. Subsequently most commentators have put the responsibility for the debacle on the Labour government. It has been argued that the security forces could have put down the insurgency without too much difficulty if only they had been freed from political restraints and the government had made clear its determination to support the Federation until victory was complete. What this neglects is the complete absence of any popular support for the Federation either in Aden or in the interior. The Federation was a transparent attempt to make use of the traditional rulers of the hinterland states in order to defeat the forces of Arab nationalism, but unfortunately these men themselves were completely dependent on British support. They were not allies, they were puppets. In these circumstances, the British, using the counterinsurgency methods they had developed in Malaya and Cyprus, might well have been able to contain the insurgency but only for a while. Even this would have involved an open-ended commitment and the certainty that the conflict would intensify over time. The continuing cost and casualties, together with the international political embarrassment of sustaining a puppet regime, was too much. As the Labour Secretary of State for Defence, Denis Healy, subsequently observed: 'The cost of trying to stay in Aden... was out of all proportion to the gain.' This, combined with the strategic reassessment forced by Britain's economic problems, made defeat inevitable. From this point of view, claims that the army could have defeated the rebels, kept the sultans in power and saved the Federation are simplistic. Guy Arnold supplies what is the best summing up of the experience:
  Aden represents a classic example of a colonial possession treated by the imperial power solely as an imperial convenience. Not only were few if any efforts made to improve the conditions of the people, but by and large they were treated with contempt, and even when nationalism was sweeping through the Arab world in the 1950s the British still behaved as though they only had to manipulate a few backward Arab tribes. They learnt their lesson in one of the most humiliating 'end of empire' defeats which they were to suffer.
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conversations.value: Give me another paragraph.
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conversations.value: The Provisional IRA were the immediate beneficiaries of this. While this sort of harassment of the Catholic working class was regarded as a necessary feature of the policy of repression in the early days of the conflict, it was increasingly to be seen as counterproductive. The intelligence acquired by these methods was, moreover, no substitute for that gathered by an effective Special Branch, through interrogation, the recruitment of informers and the running of agents. Another drawback was that intensive patrolling was actually found to be providing the Provisionals with more opportunities for carrying out attacks on the security forces.
conversations.from: human
conversations.value: Reverse the sentences.
conversations.from: assistant
conversations.value: Another drawback was that intensive patrolling was actually found to be providing the Provisionals with more opportunities for carrying out attacks on the security forces.. The intelligence acquired by these methods was, moreover, no substitute for that gathered by an effective Special Branch, through interrogation, the recruitment of informers and the running of agents. While this sort of harassment of the Catholic working class was regarded as a necessary feature of the policy of repression in the early days of the conflict, it was increasingly to be seen as counterproductive.The Provisional IRA were the immediate beneficiaries of this
conversations.from: human
conversations.value: Give me the last five paragraphs.. End with the sentence ' With British forces and their commanders out of their depth, it was only the intervention of a powerful US force of marines that brought some level of control to the situation.'.
conversations.from: assistant
conversations.value: The British were worn down by a process of attrition in Helmand, with the level of casualties threatening to turn a passive hostility to the war back home into an active hostility. After all the sacrifice, the Taliban still 'effectively controlled 60 per cent of Helmand'. All the British had achieved was described by one senior officer as 'mowing the grass', clearing the Taliban from an area only for them to return as soon as the troops were withdrawn. In 2009, 108 British soldiers were killed, with many more suffering serious life-changing injuries. At a time when the United States had initiated a 'Surge' in Afghanistan, the British had reached exhaustion point. By the summer of 2010, the British press was reporting that the death rate for British soldiers in Afghanistan was four times that of the Americans. The government wanted the United States to step in and relieve the pressure, but it did not want the humiliation of actually asking them. Instead, the Americans were privately asked without any paper trail if they would offer help unsolicited so that the British could save face. Despite a widespread belief that the British had 'made a mess of things in Helmand', the Americans agreed. John Kael Weston, a US diplomat, told the journalist Rajiv Chandrasekaran: 'We couldn't have a situation that made Basra look like child's play. Helmand was much more important in terms of British self-respect and the US-UK partnership. We had to help our best friends in the world.' Weston
  The British handed over Helmand to the Americans. At last, it had been recognised that the task was beyond anything the British Army could accomplish. By the spring of 2010 there were 20 000 US troops in Helmand. What difference did the US 'Surge' make? Clearly, it has been a holding operation, similar to the Iraqi 'Surge', but less successful because there has been no Afghan 'Awakening' to accompany it. With the announcement by President Barack Obama that the US commitment would come to an end in 2014, followed by a similar British announcement, the war has been, in effect, abandoned, with the Taliban undefeated. This was always the most likely outcome. Rory Stewart brutally summed up the situation in 2009 when he wrote that:
  It is unlikely that we will be able to defeat the Taliban. The ingredients of successful counter-insurgency campaigns in places like Malaya - control of the borders, large numbers of troops in relation to the population, strong support from the majority ethnic groups, a long-term commitment and a credible local government - are lacking in Afghanistan.
  But what did the British achieve? Frank Ledwidge argues that after all the expenditure of blood and treasure,
  Britain's efforts have resulted in the 'stabilization' (ie. The temporary pacification) of three of the 14 districts that make up the province of Helmand - just one of the 34 provinces in a country with a population that is half that of the UK. In terms of overall political significance, this might be the equivalent of three large market towns in rural Lincolnshire... After three years of British presence, the province was the most savage combat zone in the world. With British forces and their commanders out of their depth, it was only the intervention of a powerful US force of marines that brought some level of control to the situation.