conversations.from: human
conversations.value: What could be a title for a story about with the genre: History, Asia?
conversations.from: assistant
conversations.value: A title for this story could be 'The Essence of War'
conversations.from: human
conversations.value: Give me the first five paragraphs for this story.
conversations.from: assistant
conversations.value: The Essence of War
  Until the advent of hot weapons and their gradual, often blundering adoption by the world's armies, China's military science was, as in many other areas, whether for better or worse, virtually light-years ahead of Western practices. When the Greeks were struggling to escape the confining nature of the phalanx and its single tactic of the mass collision, China had already perfected numerous formations and methods of deployment, as well as an underlying hierarchical organization based upon the "squad of five" that, when coupled with precise training methods, allowed articulation, segmentation, and the execution of both orthodox and unorthodox tactics. Only centuries of Confucian domination as the orthodox state philosophy perhaps prevented the development and acceptance of the advanced firepower that characterized the West subsequent to the longbow at Agincourt and the powerful but slow-firing crossbow that itself did not appear in an effective role until a great many centuries after its first use in China during the Warring States period. However, China's comparative stagnation or decline in the military sphere remains a question much debated, certainly one deeply related to its approach to science and technology in general and the prevailing doctrine of cultural superiority that entailed the ideal of subjugating external enemies solely by Virtue, even when the latter was vividly absent.
  The Tao (or Way) of the martial delimited its own inner realm and made equal, if not more rigorous, demands upon its students because they had to perfect themselves not only in the theories of their art, frequently from texts and other writings, but also in physical training and combat skills. Even the early Confucians—progenitors of what might be termed the pristine form of Confucianism—adopted a realistic attitude while loudly espousing the new virtues of righteousness and benevolence for all cultivated men. Confucius himself, generally considered the first teacher, would have all men practice the six arts—propriety, music, archery, charioteering, composition, and mathematics—and stated that when the perfected man was compelled to extirpate evil and restore order, once having donned his armor his visage would be terrible and his stature awesome. Moreover, he repeatedly emphasized the courage and demeanor of the perfect man, the highest ideal of Confucianism, in selflessly pursuing the true path, in sustaining others and disciplining himself to the Good. Even the pedantic Mencius, who followed a century later and significantly spread the doctrine of Confucianism, also accepted the need for campaigns of rectification to eliminate evil and nurture the people, just as advocated in the section entitled "History of Warfare."
  Despite incessant barbarian incursions and major military threats throughout their history, except during the ill-fated expansionistic policies of the Former Han dynasty, or under dynamic young rulers such as T'ang T'ai-tsung during a dynasty's founding reign, Imperial China was little inclined to pursue military solutions to external aggression. Ethnocentric rulers and ministers instead preferred to believe in the myth of cultural attraction, whereby their vastly superior Chinese civilization, founded upon virtue and reinforced by opulent material achievements, would simply overwhelm the hostile tendencies of the uncultured. Frequent gifts of the embellishments of civilized life, coupled with music and women, would distract and enervate even the most warlike peoples. If they were unable to either overawe them into submission or bribe them into compliance, other mounted nomadic tribes could be employed against the troublemakers, following the time-honored tradition of "using barbarian against barbarian."
  According to Confucian thought, which became the orthodox philosophy and prescribed state view in the Former Han, the ruler need only cultivate his Virtue, accord with the seasons, and implement benevolent policies to successfully attract universal support and foster stability. Although there were dissenting views, except under rulers such as Sui Yang-ti (reigned 605–617 CE) who sought to impose Chinese suzerainty on external regions (and thereby impoverished the nation), military affairs were pressed unwillingly, with most of the bureaucracy inclined to disdain anything associated with them and the profession of arms.
  In contrast to the Confucians and Taoists who envisioned warfare as having evolved from a period of sagely government in some lost antiquity through human actions and misdeeds, many thinkers in the Warring States period concluded that violence and conflict are inherent in the human condition, whether simply innate or brought about by unconstrained desire resulting in fierce competition for limited material goods. Accordingly, to alleviate suffering and ensure a semblance of order so that "All under Heaven" might pursue their lives in security and tranquility, the Virtuous had to create and then employ the principles of warfare in the service of humanity. Unfortunately, despite cherished ideals, rulers in the Warring States period were consumed by the ever more tortured quest to survive and major conflicts were waged to avenge insults, expand territory, or greedily acquire riches. Had they succeeded in their humanitarian approach to the challenges of conflict resolution, the unrealized ideal of the military strategists might have fashioned a far different world.
conversations.from: human
conversations.value: Give me five more paragraphs.
conversations.from: assistant
conversations.value: In general, in warfare: it is not forming a battle array that is difficult, it is reaching the point that the men can be ordered into formation that is hard. It is not attaining the ability to order them into formation that is difficult, it is reaching the point of being able to employ them that is hard. It is not knowing what to do that is difficult, it is putting it into effect that is hard. Men from each of the four quarters have their own nature. Character differs from region to region. Through teaching they come to have regional habits, the customs of each state thus being different. Only through the Tao are their customs transformed.
  Now men constantly perish from their inabilities, and are defeated by the unfamiliar. Thus among the methods for using the military, training and causing them to be alert are first. One man who has been trained in warfare can instruct ten men. Ten men who have studied warfare can train a hundred men. And a hundred such men can train a thousand. A thousand, ten thousand; and ten thousand who have been trained in warfare can train the entire body of the Three Armies.
  Today, if the people turn their backs to the border gates and decide the issue of life and death, if they have been taught to die without hesitation, there is a reason. Training and instructions have caused the defenders to inevitably be solid; those engaged in battle to inevitably fight; perverse plans not to be put into action; perverse people not to speak; orders to be effected without any changes; the army to advance without doubt; and the light units to be like a clap of thunder, to rush at the enemy like the terrified. Raise those of merit, distinguish those of virtue, making their distinction as clear as black and white. Cause the people to follow the orders of their superiors just as the four limbs respond to the mind.
  If the forward units break up the enemy's ranks, throw their formation into chaos, and crush their hardness like water bursting through, there is a basis for it. This is termed the Army's Instructions. They provide the means to open sealed borders, preserve the altars of state, eliminate disaster and harm, and complete Martial Virtue.
  A campaign army takes measure as its prime concern so that the people's strength will be adequate. Then, even when the blades clash, the infantry will not run and the chariots will not gallop. When pursuing a fleeing enemy the troops will not break formation, thereby avoiding chaos. The solidarity of a campaign army derives from military discipline that maintains order in formation, does not exhaust the strength of men or horses, and whether moving slowly or rapidly, does not exceed the measure of the commands.
conversations.from: human
conversations.value: Give me the last four paragraphs.
conversations.from: assistant
conversations.value: There are five types of incendiary attack: The first is to incinerate men, the second to incinerate provisions, the third to incinerate supply trains, the fourth to incinerate armories, and the fifth to incinerate formations.
  In general, in incendiary warfare you must respond to the five changes of fire: If fires are started within their camp, then you should immediately respond with an attack from outside. If fires are ignited but their army remains quiet, then wait; do not attack. When they flare into a conflagration, if you can follow up, then do so; if you cannot, then desist. If the attack can be launched from outside without relying on inside assistance, initiate it at an appropriate time. If fires are ignited upwind, do not attack downwind.
  The tactics for incendiary warfare: if the enemy is downwind in an area abundant with dry grass where the soldiers of their Three Armies would not have anywhere to escape, then you can mount an incendiary attack. When there is a frigid fierce wind, abundant vegetation and undergrowth, and firewood and grass for fuel already piled up while their earthworks have not yet been prepared, in such circumstances you can mount an incendiary attack. Use the flames to confuse them, loose arrows like rain. Beat the drums and set up a clamor to motivate your soldiers. Assist the attack with strategic power. These are the tactics for incendiary warfare.
  In addition to translating this "eighth military classic," Sawyer has prepared insightful chapter-by-chapter commentaries and a vivid general introduction that describes Sun Pin's life and times, analyzes in detail Sun Pin's tactics in important battles, and compares Sun-tzu's strategic thinking with Sun Pin's.