conversations.from: human
conversations.value: Give me a plot for a book about British, Britain, German entitled The Battle of Britain.
conversations.from: assistant
conversations.value: The Battle of Britain: The narrator describes the fall of France, leaving Britain almost defenceless.\nBritish forces are vastly outnumbered, but the British people are calm.\nThe narrator explains that this is because in a democracy the people as a whole are involved in the decision to fight.\nHitler\'s masterplan to subjugate Britain is described.\nHitler begins by attacking convoys and ports, but fails to destroy them.\nThe RAF are outnumbered "6 - 8 - 10 to one", but knock out far more planes than the Germans do.\nBailed out British pilots are also able to return to the air, but German pilots are lost.\nUnlike the Dutch and Polish airforce Britain does not "make the mistake of bunching its planes on the runways".\nLosses force Hitler to "take time out".\nHe tells Goering to change tactics, so the Luftwaffe attack factories.\nBritain deploys "improved listening posts" to identify coming attacks.\nIn August and September German losses are far more severe.\nThe Nazis now aim to "crush the British spirit" by attacking London, destroying homes, hospitals and churches.\nBut the people adapt and survive.\nEnraged, Goering takes personal command, sending a massive attack on September 15, to which the British respond with "everything they had".\nIn the battle the Germans suffer severe losses.\nDespite many losses, and destruction of historic buildings, the Germans cannot break Britain.\nThey switch to night attacks, hoping to terrorise the people and make them "cry for mercy".\nBut the people show great resilience.\nThe British also counter-attack, bombing key German factories.\nHitler takes revenge by destroying Coventry.\nAfter a brief respite at Christmas Hitler sends fire bombs to London, creating "the greatest fire in recorded history".\nMore bombings and firestorms are created, but Britain\'s defences hold up, giving a year of precious time to other countries threatened by the Nazis.\nThe film ends with Winston Churchill\'s statement that "never in the field of human conflict has so much been owed by so many to so few".
conversations.from: human
conversations.value: Add another sentence about \nHowever, German, free, overwhelming.
conversations.from: assistant
conversations.value: The Battle of Britain: The narrator describes the fall of France, leaving Britain almost defenceless. \nBritish forces are vastly outnumbered, but the British people are calm. \nThe narrator explains that this is because in a democracy the people as a whole are involved in the decision to fight. \nHitler\'s masterplan to subjugate Britain is described. \nHitler begins by attacking convoys and ports, but fails to destroy them. \nThe RAF are outnumbered "6 - 8 - 10 to one", but knock out far more planes than the Germans do. \nBailed out British pilots are also able to return to the air, but German pilots are lost. \nUnlike the Dutch and Polish airforce Britain does not "make the mistake of bunching its planes on the runways". \nLosses force Hitler to "take time out". \nHe tells Goering to change tactics, so the Luftwaffe attack factories. \nBritain deploys "improved listening posts" to identify coming attacks. \nIn August and September German losses are far more severe. \nHowever the "German mind" cannot understand why "free people fight on against overwhelming odds". \nThe Nazis now aim to "crush the British spirit" by attacking London, destroying homes, hospitals and churches. \nBut the people adapt and survive. \nEnraged, Goering takes personal command, sending a massive attack on September 15, to which the British respond with "everything they had". \nIn the battle the Germans suffer severe losses. \nDespite many losses, and destruction of historic buildings, the Germans cannot break Britain. \nThey switch to night attacks, hoping to terrorise the people and make them "cry for mercy". \nBut the people show great resilience. \nThe British also counter-attack, bombing key German factories. \nHitler takes revenge by destroying Coventry. \nAfter a brief respite at Christmas Hitler sends fire bombs to London, creating "the greatest fire in recorded history". \nMore bombings and firestorms are created, but Britain\'s defences hold up, giving a year of precious time to other countries threatened by the Nazis. \nThe film ends with Winston Churchill\'s statement that "never in the field of human conflict has so much been owed by so many to so few".
conversations.from: human
conversations.value: Give me the first four paragraphs for this book.
conversations.from: assistant
conversations.value: The Battle of Britain
  Warwicker, John, Churchill's Underground Army: A History of the Auxiliary Units in World War II (Frontline Books, 2008)
  Webster, Sir Charles, and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany 1939–1945, Vol. I: Preparation (HMSO, 1961)
  Wells, Mark K., Courage and Air Warfare: The Allied Aircrew Experience in the Second World War (Frank Cass, 1997)
  Wheatley, Ronald, Operation Sea Lion: German Plans for the Invasion of England, 1939–1942 (Oxford University Press, 1958)
conversations.from: human
conversations.value: Give me two more paragraphs.
conversations.from: assistant
conversations.value: Andrew, Wing Commander Dean, 'Strategic Culture in the Luftwaffe – Did It Exist in World War II and Has it Transitioned into the Air Force?', Defence Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Autumn 2004)
  Caddick-Adams, Peter, 'Anglo-French Co-operation during the Battle of France', in Brian Bond (ed.), The Battle for France & Flanders Sixty Years On (Pen & Sword, 2001)
conversations.from: human
conversations.value: Give me the last five paragraphs.
conversations.from: assistant
conversations.value: Reynolds, David, 'Churchill and the British "Decision" to Fight on in 1940: Right Policy, Wrong Decisions', in Richard Langhorne, Diplomacy and Intelligence during the Second World War (Cambridge University Press, 1985)
  Roodhouse, Mark, 'Feeding Britain: Food Control, 1939–45', Everyone's War, No. 15 (Spring/Summer 2007)
  Schmider, Klaus, 'The Last of the First: Veterans of the Jagdwaffe Tell Their Story', Journal of Military History, Vol. 73, No. 1 (January 2009)
  Various, July–October 1940: Extracts from the Imperial War Museum's Collection of Recorded Interviews (Imperial War Museum)
  The index that appeared in the print version of this title does not match the pages in your eBook. Please use the search function on your eReading device to search for terms of interest. For your reference, the terms that appear in the print index are listed below.
conversations.from: human
conversations.value: Give me the first five paragraphs for this book.
conversations.from: assistant
conversations.value: The Battle of Britain
  Three days later Hitler delivered his peace offer. Goebbels' Propaganda Ministry made elaborate technical preparations to have the speech broadcast worldwide. The deputies assembled in the Kroll Opera House, home to the German parliament since the fire-raising of the Reichstag building in February 1933. Overhead, German fighter aircraft flew on patrol to prevent a sudden bomb attack. Hitler spoke without the usual wild oratory, and received none of the usual bays of approval and stamping of feet. Above him sat row upon row of bemedalled soldiers. In the chair sat Hermann Goering, commander-in-chief of the German Air Force and Reichstag president, writing out his vote of thanks as Hitler talked. Count Ciano sat with an Italian text of the speech, and jumped up to salute in all the wrong places. The peace offer constituted no more than a fraction of what was in effect a celebration of German victory. Its wording was haughty and condescending. Hitler blamed the war on the Jews, Freemasons and armament kings who kept the Allied peoples in thrall; he had no desire to destroy the British Empire, but would bring it down in ruins if war went on; he appealed to British common sense to end the war, but he appealed 'as a conqueror'.
  It was a clever speech. The continuation of the war was placed entirely at the British door; Hitler basked in the unaccustomed role of the magnanimous victor. It was sincerely meant, if only in the sense that German leaders did want Britain to sue for peace on their terms. Hitler made no secret of his disappointment when the British rejected his offer. German officials and soldiers sat listening to the British reaction on the BBC German service later on the evening of 19 July. William Shirer, a young American newsman, sat with them and listened to their howls of disbelief: ' "Can you understand those British fools? To turn down peace now? They're crazy." ' In London Hitler's speech caused scarcely a ripple. Lord Halifax gave a formal rejection over the radio on the evening of 22 July, which was widely criticized in Britain not only for the lame delivery, but for the seventeen references to God. When the War Cabinet next assembled, the peace offer was not even discussed. The same day, 23 July, at the daily press conference in Berlin, reporters were told by an angry official: 'Gentlemen, there will be war.'
  The British rejection needs little explanation. Though it is sometimes argued that Britain would have lost less by reaching a compromise in 1940, rejection was, under the circumstances, an entirely rational decision. Nothing in Hitler's record could give any serious grounds for the British to expect Hitler to honour any pledges entered into. The treatment of the other conquered peoples was evident to the whole world; even unconquered, Britain was expected by the German side to make very substantial concessions and to pay extensive reparation. Only days after the rejection of Hitler's offer, harsh terms were finally revealed for the territorial dismemberment of defeated France. At the same time a 'New Order' for the European economy was announced, with a privileged Germany at its core. British interests were, under such circumstances, fundamentally incompatible with German hegemony across Europe.
  Such evidence has been used to suggest that the war in the west was continued only to lull Soviet suspicions, and that invasion was never seriously contemplated. This is to distort the reality. The campaigns against Britain and the Soviet Union were not alternatives. Hitler was genuinely uncertain about how to bring about either a political or military settlement with Britain, and kept several strings to his bow. He was willing to seize opportunities as they arose. He hoped that blockade and air attack might so reduce British resolve and undermine the capacity to fight that invasion would be little more than a mopping-up operation. The preparations made for the campaign were far too extensive for a mere feint. If the campaign did not work, and there was no certainty that it would, an assault on the Soviet Union, he told his commanders, would remove Britain's last hope of continuing the war, even with American assistance. Either way, the object was sooner or later to destroy British power. If the RAF could be defeated, it might be sooner.
  The situation as it presents itself for our Air Force for the decisive struggle against Britain is as favourable as it can be... What will happen when the German Air Force employs its whole strength against England? The game looks bad for England and her geographical and military isolation. We can face with confidence the great decision to come!
conversations.from: human
conversations.value: Add another sentence about Germany.
conversations.from: assistant
conversations.value: The Battle of Britain
  Three days later Hitler delivered his peace offer. Goebbels' Propaganda Ministry made elaborate technical preparations to have the speech broadcast worldwide. The deputies assembled in the Kroll Opera House, home to the German parliament since the fire-raising of the Reichstag building in February 1933. Overhead, German fighter aircraft flew on patrol to prevent a sudden bomb attack. Hitler spoke without the usual wild oratory, and received none of the usual bays of approval and stamping of feet. Above him sat row upon row of bemedalled soldiers. In the chair sat Hermann Goering, commander-in-chief of the German Air Force and Reichstag president, writing out his vote of thanks as Hitler talked. Count Ciano sat with an Italian text of the speech, and jumped up to salute in all the wrong places. The peace offer constituted no more than a fraction of what was in effect a celebration of German victory. Its wording was haughty and condescending. Hitler blamed the war on the Jews, Freemasons and armament kings who kept the Allied peoples in thrall; he had no desire to destroy the British Empire, but would bring it down in ruins if war went on; he appealed to British common sense to end the war, but he appealed 'as a conqueror'. 
  It was a clever speech. The continuation of the war was placed entirely at the British door; Hitler basked in the unaccustomed role of the magnanimous victor. It was sincerely meant, if only in the sense that German leaders did want Britain to sue for peace on their terms. Hitler made no secret of his disappointment when the British rejected his offer. German officials and soldiers sat listening to the British reaction on the BBC German service later on the evening of 19 July. William Shirer, a young American newsman, sat with them and listened to their howls of disbelief: ' "Can you understand those British fools? To turn down peace now? They're crazy. " ' In London Hitler's speech caused scarcely a ripple. Lord Halifax gave a formal rejection over the radio on the evening of 22 July, which was widely criticized in Britain not only for the lame delivery, but for the seventeen references to God. When the War Cabinet next assembled, the peace offer was not even discussed. The same day, 23 July, at the daily press conference in Berlin, reporters were told by an angry official: 'Gentlemen, there will be war. '
  The British rejection needs little explanation. The decision to continue the fight against Germany had already been made some weeks before. Though it is sometimes argued that Britain would have lost less by reaching a compromise in 1940, rejection was, under the circumstances, an entirely rational decision. Nothing in Hitler's record could give any serious grounds for the British to expect Hitler to honour any pledges entered into. The treatment of the other conquered peoples was evident to the whole world; even unconquered, Britain was expected by the German side to make very substantial concessions and to pay extensive reparation. Only days after the rejection of Hitler's offer, harsh terms were finally revealed for the territorial dismemberment of defeated France. At the same time a 'New Order' for the European economy was announced, with a privileged Germany at its core. British interests were, under such circumstances, fundamentally incompatible with German hegemony across Europe. 
  Such evidence has been used to suggest that the war in the west was continued only to lull Soviet suspicions, and that invasion was never seriously contemplated. This is to distort the reality. The campaigns against Britain and the Soviet Union were not alternatives. Hitler was genuinely uncertain about how to bring about either a political or military settlement with Britain, and kept several strings to his bow. He was willing to seize opportunities as they arose. He hoped that blockade and air attack might so reduce British resolve and undermine the capacity to fight that invasion would be little more than a mopping-up operation. The preparations made for the campaign were far too extensive for a mere feint. If the campaign did not work, and there was no certainty that it would, an assault on the Soviet Union, he told his commanders, would remove Britain's last hope of continuing the war, even with American assistance. Either way, the object was sooner or later to destroy British power. If the RAF could be defeated, it might be sooner. 
  The situation as it presents itself for our Air Force for the decisive struggle against Britain is as favourable as it can be... What will happen when the German Air Force employs its whole strength against England? The game looks bad for England and her geographical and military isolation. We can face with confidence the great decision to come!
conversations.from: human
conversations.value: Give me two more paragraphs.
conversations.from: assistant
conversations.value: The attack on Lympne on 13 August was particularly heavy, with 400 bombs falling on the landing ground alone. Repairs were slow because construction workers had been sent to Manston to help with the attacks of the previous day. The Air Ministry sent 100 of its own building workers to help, and 150 men were found from firms in the surrounding district. When Lympne was attacked once more, on 15 August, the local men were so upset that they left, with only a small landing strip yet clear. They were induced back only to be hit by a third raid on 30 August. This time five local workers were killed when a bomb hit a slit trench; work was once more delayed. Park took the opportunity of this unfortunate history to press the Air Ministry to supply at least one bulldozer and one excavator at each aerodrome, and to allocate repair parties of 150 men from a central pool of government workers.
  German Air Intelligence suggested at the end of August that at least eight airfields had been knocked out entirely and the rest of the system severely depleted. The truth was quite different. Fighter Command adapted itself quickly to the new phase of attack. Park was able to move aircraft to aerodromes further inland and to prepared satellite fields. The inland circle of airfields was then protected by the aircraft of 10 and 12 Groups, while 11 Group fighters fought the raiding aircraft. New tactics were issued to the squadrons on 19 August to cope with the airfield campaign. Fighters were told to engage the enemy over land and not risk combat over the sea, where clusters of enemy fighters waited to escort the bombers back to safety and to destroy any unwary pursuers. Pilots were encouraged to attack bombers first and avoid combat with enemy fighters, while at first notice of incoming aircraft, stations were ordered to send up a squadron to patrol below cloud cover over the airfield to minimize risk of a surprise attack. Once airborne, Spitfires were encouraged to engage enemy fighters, while Hurricanes hunted down German bombers, which may help to explain their different loss rates.
conversations.from: human
conversations.value: Give me the last five paragraphs.
conversations.from: assistant
conversations.value: The lack of any clear sense that a great battle had been won was reflected in the treatment of those who had won it. The fighter aces for the most part remained anonymous because the RAF wanted to avoid the pitfalls of glamorizing a few heroes at the expense of the rest of the force. Once the daylight battles were over, the commanders who brought victory were dispensed with. Throughout the battle a backstairs intrigue was conducted against Newall and Dowding, involving, among others, the veteran airman Lord Trenchard and the Minister of Aircraft Production, Lord Beaverbrook. A whispering campaign against Newall's alleged incompetence, begun by a junior officer in the Air Ministry, reached Sinclair and Churchill. Enough of the mud stuck. On 2 October it was decided that Newall should be replaced by Air Marshal Sir Charles Portal. Dowding in the meantime found himself once again at odds with the Air Staff, who believed that he was not taking effective action against German night-bombing. Despite Churchill's support for him earlier in the year, the political pressure to get rid of the man who had just led Fighter Command to victory became irresistible. Dowding was finally replaced in December by Sholto Douglas. He departed under a cloud; he was posted to America to help promote Britain's campaign for economic aid, but he was not a success. He retired in 1941 to indulge his enthusiasm for paranormal phenomena.
  One of the purposes in producing the pamphlet was for propaganda, particularly in the United States where the battle had attracted less attention than the Blitz. The images of blazing London filed by American journalists, along with poignant eye-witness accounts of the bombing, stirred popular opinion, though it did not bring the United States any nearer to belligerency. The battle had less resonance abroad, in part because it was just one corner of a larger canvas of war. The American public maintained a lively scepticism over the claims made about German aircraft losses, and Churchill in August 1940 thought about banning American journalists altogether from the field of battle. The American public was more interested in the Japanese war with China and the war at sea, and leaders and led alike were absorbed in Roosevelt's efforts to be elected president for an unprecedented third term. Many influential Americans came to favour giving Britain economic assistance, but in government circles the view still circulated that Britain might well be defeated as France had been, and American goods fall into the wrong hands. In August, at the height of the air battle, the most important issue in Anglo-American relations was the argument over the precise terms of the deal to give Britain 50 destroyers in exchange for American bases on British colonial territory. Even a lifeline as slender as this was interpreted at home and abroad as a symbol of America's willingness to support the efforts of an embattled sister democracy. Yet in the long run, as Churchill rightly recognized, Britain's successful defiance of Germany made possible American's later entry into Europe, without which Britain's hope of victory was slight.
  Even civilians enjoyed the sense that they, too, could contribute directly to the war effort through their own sacrifices and endeavours. There emerged an evident mood of exhilaration when the population found itself fighting at last after months of inactivity. Men flocked in thousands to join the Local Defence Volunteers, though they were poorly organized and scarcely armed by the time invasion was likely: many would have been treated, as the German side made clear at the time, as irregular militia, subject to summary execution. and the Blitz that followed contributed to the growing sense that this was a people's war. There is more than a touch of irony that the battle was actually won by a tiny military elite, and at the cost of only 554 aircrew in four months. The heroic defences on the eastern front, of Moscow and Sevastopol and Stalingrad, cost the defender, soldier and civilian, millions of war dead. The efficiency of Britain's defensive effort in 1940 was one of its most remarkable features. The 'few' did indeed save the many from a terrible ordeal.
  The air battles were necessary to rouse the self-belief and staying power of a people demoralized by the sudden collapse of democratic Europe in the summer of 1940. No one pretends that the Battle of Britain decided the war, or that it papered over all the cracks that appeared in British morale and outlook in 1940. With hindsight it might have been fought more effectively, though British air defences were manifestly better organized than most other areas of Britain's war effort. The cost of losing the battle would have spelt national disaster. No appeasing peace with Hitler could have masked the reality of defeat. was the first point since 1931, when Japan occupied Manchuria, that the forces of violent revision in world affairs were halted. In a radio broadcast in 1942, George Orwell reminded his listeners that Trafalgar Day had just been celebrated. He suggested that Trafalgar played the same part in the Napoleonic wars 'as the Battle of Britain in 1940 occupied in this one'. In both cases invasion and defeat would have meant a Europe 'given over to military dictatorship'. After Trafalgar the invasion scare subsided 'and though it took another ten years to win the war, it was at any rate certain that Britain could not be conquered at one blow'. To the British people, then and now, that was sufficient.
  Table 2: C. Webster and N. Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany (4 vols, London, 1961), vol. 4, p. 501; W. Murray, Luftwaffe: Strategy for Defeat 1933–1945 (London, 1985), p. 54. For September, Webster and Frankland give a figure of 688 operational pilots.
conversations.from: human
conversations.value: Delete the first sentence.
conversations.from: assistant
conversations.value: The fighter aces for the most part remained anonymous because the RAF wanted to avoid the pitfalls of glamorizing a few heroes at the expense of the rest of the force. Once the daylight battles were over, the commanders who brought victory were dispensed with. Throughout the battle a backstairs intrigue was conducted against Newall and Dowding, involving, among others, the veteran airman Lord Trenchard and the Minister of Aircraft Production, Lord Beaverbrook. A whispering campaign against Newall's alleged incompetence, begun by a junior officer in the Air Ministry, reached Sinclair and Churchill. Enough of the mud stuck. On 2 October it was decided that Newall should be replaced by Air Marshal Sir Charles Portal. Dowding in the meantime found himself once again at odds with the Air Staff, who believed that he was not taking effective action against German night-bombing. Despite Churchill's support for him earlier in the year, the political pressure to get rid of the man who had just led Fighter Command to victory became irresistible. Dowding was finally replaced in December by Sholto Douglas. He departed under a cloud; he was posted to America to help promote Britain's campaign for economic aid, but he was not a success. He retired in 1941 to indulge his enthusiasm for paranormal phenomena.
  One of the purposes in producing the pamphlet was for propaganda, particularly in the United States where the battle had attracted less attention than the Blitz. The images of blazing London filed by American journalists, along with poignant eye-witness accounts of the bombing, stirred popular opinion, though it did not bring the United States any nearer to belligerency. The battle had less resonance abroad, in part because it was just one corner of a larger canvas of war. The American public maintained a lively scepticism over the claims made about German aircraft losses, and Churchill in August 1940 thought about banning American journalists altogether from the field of battle. The American public was more interested in the Japanese war with China and the war at sea, and leaders and led alike were absorbed in Roosevelt's efforts to be elected president for an unprecedented third term. Many influential Americans came to favour giving Britain economic assistance, but in government circles the view still circulated that Britain might well be defeated as France had been, and American goods fall into the wrong hands. In August, at the height of the air battle, the most important issue in Anglo-American relations was the argument over the precise terms of the deal to give Britain 50 destroyers in exchange for American bases on British colonial territory. Even a lifeline as slender as this was interpreted at home and abroad as a symbol of America's willingness to support the efforts of an embattled sister democracy. Yet in the long run, as Churchill rightly recognized, Britain's successful defiance of Germany made possible American's later entry into Europe, without which Britain's hope of victory was slight.
  Even civilians enjoyed the sense that they, too, could contribute directly to the war effort through their own sacrifices and endeavours. There emerged an evident mood of exhilaration when the population found itself fighting at last after months of inactivity. Men flocked in thousands to join the Local Defence Volunteers, though they were poorly organized and scarcely armed by the time invasion was likely: many would have been treated, as the German side made clear at the time, as irregular militia, subject to summary execution. and the Blitz that followed contributed to the growing sense that this was a people's war. There is more than a touch of irony that the battle was actually won by a tiny military elite, and at the cost of only 554 aircrew in four months. The heroic defences on the eastern front, of Moscow and Sevastopol and Stalingrad, cost the defender, soldier and civilian, millions of war dead. The efficiency of Britain's defensive effort in 1940 was one of its most remarkable features. The 'few' did indeed save the many from a terrible ordeal.
  The air battles were necessary to rouse the self-belief and staying power of a people demoralized by the sudden collapse of democratic Europe in the summer of 1940. No one pretends that the Battle of Britain decided the war, or that it papered over all the cracks that appeared in British morale and outlook in 1940. With hindsight it might have been fought more effectively, though British air defences were manifestly better organized than most other areas of Britain's war effort. The cost of losing the battle would have spelt national disaster. No appeasing peace with Hitler could have masked the reality of defeat. was the first point since 1931, when Japan occupied Manchuria, that the forces of violent revision in world affairs were halted. In a radio broadcast in 1942, George Orwell reminded his listeners that Trafalgar Day had just been celebrated. He suggested that Trafalgar played the same part in the Napoleonic wars 'as the Battle of Britain in 1940 occupied in this one'. In both cases invasion and defeat would have meant a Europe 'given over to military dictatorship'. After Trafalgar the invasion scare subsided 'and though it took another ten years to win the war, it was at any rate certain that Britain could not be conquered at one blow'. To the British people, then and now, that was sufficient.
  Table 2: C. Webster and N. Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany (4 vols, London, 1961), vol. 4, p. 501; W. Murray, Luftwaffe: Strategy for Defeat 1933–1945 (London, 1985), p. 54. For September, Webster and Frankland give a figure of 688 operational pilots.