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conversations.value: What could be a title for a book about Korean, War with the genre: History, Asia?
conversations.from: assistant
conversations.value: A title for this book could be 'The Korean War'
conversations.from: human
conversations.value: the first five paragraphs for this book
conversations.from: assistant
conversations.value: The Korean War
  Memorandum, Pushkin, October 30, 1952, APRF, f. 3, op. 65, d. 830, 33–34. Decision, Presidium Bureau, Central Committee, CPSU, November 3, 1952, Ibid., 31–32. There is also a Tass announcement.
  Razuvaev to Sokolovskii, Kim Il Sung's letter to Stalin is attached, January 3, 1953, APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 348, 83–87.
  Joseph Stalin's stroke was announced first in the Soviet Union on March 4, 1953, at 6:20. It was 0:20 Korean time. In North Korea the news also became known in the morning of March 4. His death two days later must have shocked Kim Il Sung. At a memorial in Pyongyang, eulogies to Stalin were given by the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly Kim Tu-bong, Chief of the Propaganda section of the KWP Pak Chang-ok, Deputy Prime Minister Hong Myong-hui, and Defense Minister Choe Yong-gon.[1] Foreign Minister Pak Hon-yong joined the ceremony, but did not speak. Apparently he was arrested shortly afterwards. His arrest was part of Kim Il Sung's agenda to end the fighting in Korea, which Pak sought to continue.
  Zhou Enlai was sent to Moscow to attend Stalin's funeral and was in the Soviet Union from March 8 to 17. During the funeral ceremony in Red Square, Zhou heard Stalin's successor as Soviet premier, Georgii Malenkov, call for the relaxation of international tensions and peaceful coexistence. Two days later, Zhou met with the new Soviet leadership: Malenkov, Vice-Premier Lavrentii Beria, Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, Party Secretary Nikita Khrushchev, Commerce Minister Anastas Mikoyan, and Vice-Foreign Minister Vasilii Kuznetsov.[2] The war in Korea was probably the main topic, and the collective Kremlin leadership must have urged Zhou to end it quickly. But the conventional view that Stalin's death precipitated an armistice is mistaken. Stalin had already been moving toward a ceasefire, though he did not force that course of action on China or North Korea.
  In his meeting with the new Soviet leadership, Zhou Enlai presumably conferred mainly with his counterpart Molotov, who had replaced Andrei Vyshinsky as Soviet minister of foreign affairs. They agreed to respond to the proposal from UN Commander Gen. Mark Clark the previous month for the immediate exchange of sick and wounded prisoners. But if Molotov asked China to change its position on prisoners of war, Zhou would have balked, though he would have been inclined to agree to Clark's proposal.
conversations.from: human
conversations.value: three more paragraphs. Start with the sentence 'The guns were silent, but a complete victory had not been won, Kim Il Sung also cautioned'.
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conversations.value: The guns were silent, but a complete victory had not been won, Kim Il Sung also cautioned. The American imperialists had not been driven from the fatherland and were planning to use Japan in their aggressive wars in Asia. Planes from US bases in Japan had turned peaceful Pyongyang and farming villages across the North into charred ashes, Kim said. The United States had fought the war from depots and rear area bases in Japan.
  While shrilly threatening to attack the North, the Rhee administration had begun negotiations with Japan to normalize diplomatic relations, Kim continued. He warned that a US-ROK mutual security treaty would increase the danger of another war. North Korea must strengthen the KPA's war-fighting power, improve "revolutionary vigilance," and rebuild the economy, he said. Not a single spy or saboteur could be allowed to operate in the republic. The "completion of national territory" was now linked to "peaceful unification of the fatherland." Kim did not mention unification by military force. The people's patriotic duty during the armistice was to develop the national economy and make the DPRK a stronger democratic base, he exhorted the crowd.[124] Kim's speech was broadcast nationwide and followed by an artillery salute and a parade of 110,000 citizens that lasted several hours. North Koreans were openly joyful at peace.[125]
  The day before the armistice was signed, UN Commander Clark asked Rhee to reassure the nonrepatriate North Korean prisoners of war that they would not be forced to return to the North. At first Rhee said that he intended to make a public announcement that his administration would "cooperate with the armistice."[127] However, South Korean press reports on July 29 headlined the president's strident determination to "Accomplish Unification" and his appeal to North Koreans not to despair. Rhee said he had opposed the armistice from a conviction that it would bring greater suffering and destruction and be the prelude to another Communist attack. Now that an armistice had been signed, Rhee said he hoped his assessment was wrong. To achieve the liberation of northern Korea and national unification peacefully the South would not obstruct a political conference, he said. The United States and the Republic of Korea were in accord on effective cooperation and assistance. Rhee urged North Koreans not to abandon hope and promised not to forget their plight. The Republic of Korea remained determined to rescue the North and the United Nations had promised to help, he stated.[128]
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conversations.value: the last four paragraphs
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conversations.value: Yi Won-dok. "Nihon no sengo shori gaiko no ichi kenkyu—Nikkan kokko seijoka kosho (1951–65) o chushin ni shite" [An aspect of Japan's diplomacy to settle postwar issues—negotiations to normalize relations between Japan and the ROK]. PhD diss., University of Tokyo, 1994.
  See also ceasefire agreement See also ceasefire negotiations See also Chinese intervention See also Chinese-Korean forces See also North Korean attack See also United Nations Command
  See also border clashes See also Korean War See also North Korean attack See also North Korean-Chinese forces
  U.S. military and economic support for, , , 3.1-3.2 , , , 6.1-6.2 , , 8.1-8.2 , , 10.1-10.2 , 11.1-11.2 , , , 14.1-14.2 , ,
conversations.from: human
conversations.value: Swap the first and the last sentence.
conversations.from: assistant
conversations.value: 2 , ,. "Nihon no sengo shori gaiko no ichi kenkyu—Nikkan kokko seijoka kosho (1951–65) o chushin ni shite" [An aspect of Japan's diplomacy to settle postwar issues—negotiations to normalize relations between Japan and the ROK]. PhD diss., University of Tokyo, 1994.
  See also ceasefire agreement See also ceasefire negotiations See also Chinese intervention See also Chinese-Korean forces See also North Korean attack See also United Nations Command
  See also border clashes See also Korean War See also North Korean attack See also North Korean-Chinese forces
  U.S. military and economic support for, , , 3.1-3.2 , , , 6.1-6.2 , , 8.1-8.2 , , 10.1-10.2 , 11.1-11.2 , , , 14.1-14.Yi Won-dok.