conversations.from: human
conversations.value: Provide a description for a book titled China Airborne about Chinas, China, Starred with the genre: Politics & Social Sciences, Politics & Government.
conversations.from: assistant
conversations.value: *Starred Review* Atlantic correspondent the author dives into this most timely subject and, in brisk yet erudite language, takes readers on a tour of Chinas burgeoning aviation industry. Along the way, he provides an in-depth look at a place where general aviation is nearly nonexistent, multimillion dollar airports are built before airline traffic is approved, and the military holds ultimate control over all of the airspace. This economic and political narrative includes a great deal of history as well, including that of the American aircraft company Cirrus (now owned by the Chinese government, a subject that the author hints is worthy of a book of its own) and a significant look at the shadow Boeing casts worldwide. the author prescient look at society, culture, and business is based on his conversations with numerous individuals in China who spoke to him about the hard shift required to change gears and embrace open and accessible aviation, and the epic hurdles that stand in the way. Paired with Chinas Wings (2012), readers will acquire an unparalleled view of China in the air past, present, and future. Highly readable and significant, the author book should not be missed by those seeking to understand Americas relationship with this global power. --Colleen Mondor
conversations.from: human
conversations.value: Provide the first five paragraphs for this book.
conversations.from: assistant
conversations.value: China Airborne
  One recent video that attracted millions of views on the Chinese Internet showed a young student at Dezhou University, a provincial school in Shandong province, being picked up by her boyfriend—in his family's helicopter, which landed on the school grounds. Even at the snootiest Swiss or New England boarding school this would draw a second glance; at a second-tier university in a Chinese coal-mining province, with a beau known to be from a politically connected family, it opened a vein. The video of the girl being picked up received 3,300 comments in the first twelve hours it was posted, many to the effect of "this is what China has become."
  Part of the appeal and flexibility of Chinese society involves precisely the malleability of rules that, when abused, create the impression of a system that is rigged. People get around rules; they find ways to live with them; no one wants them to be applied too rigidly. But as the momentum has shifted back to the big state enterprises; as the penalty for violating the rules has increased; as the progress toward a more rules-based system has slowed and perhaps reversed; the larger question of whether China can become the best version of itself has returned.
  When I first arrived in China, I wrote the one and only "I've just arrived, and here is what I'm wondering" article that journalistic convention permits each writer on first immersion in a country. Among the questions I said I wanted to answer was, What is the Chinese dream?
  Nearly six years later, I realize that it's a silly or meaningless question, since for the foreseeable future the country's ambitions will be fully satisfied by allowing hundreds of millions of people to realize their individual and family dreams. Grandparents who can live in reasonable health and security to an old age? Great. Students whose education makes the most of their abilities and who have the chance to do their best around the world? Better still. After China's centuries of seeming to move backward as a society and its more recent decades of tragedy and turmoil, the simple bourgeois comforts are much of what the modern Chinese miracle could and should provide.
conversations.from: human
conversations.value: Add another sentence about China's, including.
conversations.from: assistant
conversations.value: China Airborne
  One recent video that attracted millions of views on the Chinese Internet showed a young student at Dezhou University, a provincial school in Shandong province, being picked up by her boyfriend—in his family's helicopter, which landed on the school grounds. Even at the snootiest Swiss or New England boarding school this would draw a second glance; at a second-tier university in a Chinese coal-mining province, with a beau known to be from a politically connected family, it opened a vein. The video of the girl being picked up received 3,300 comments in the first twelve hours it was posted, many to the effect of "this is what China has become. "
  Part of the appeal and flexibility of Chinese society involves precisely the malleability of rules that, when abused, create the impression of a system that is rigged. People get around rules; they find ways to live with them; no one wants them to be applied too rigidly. But as the momentum has shifted back to the big state enterprises; as the penalty for violating the rules has increased; as the progress toward a more rules-based system has slowed and perhaps reversed; the larger question of whether China can become the best version of itself has returned. 
  These are the signals we will watch in all of China's most ambitious pursuits, including in the skies. 
  When I first arrived in China, I wrote the one and only "I've just arrived, and here is what I'm wondering" article that journalistic convention permits each writer on first immersion in a country. Among the questions I said I wanted to answer was, What is the Chinese dream?
  Nearly six years later, I realize that it's a silly or meaningless question, since for the foreseeable future the country's ambitions will be fully satisfied by allowing hundreds of millions of people to realize their individual and family dreams. Grandparents who can live in reasonable health and security to an old age? Great. Students whose education makes the most of their abilities and who have the chance to do their best around the world? Better still. After China's centuries of seeming to move backward as a society and its more recent decades of tragedy and turmoil, the simple bourgeois comforts are much of what the modern Chinese miracle could and should provide.
conversations.from: human
conversations.value: Provide five more paragraphs.
conversations.from: assistant
conversations.value: Modern America's power is often calculated in material terms, from the size and strength of its military to the scale of its corporate assets. But everything I have learned convinces me that these are finally reflections of the country's success in attracting and enabling human talent. That success, in turn, has depended on the fortunate interaction of many different circumstances, rules, and decisions. For the United States these have included immigration policies that made it attractive for ambitious people to migrate and realize their ambitions within American institutions and companies. Persecuted Jews, Hungarians, Cubans, Vietnamese, Iranians, Ethiopians, Chinese, in periods of turmoil in their respective countries; highly motivated Indians, Mexicans, Dominicans, Russians, Nigerians, Irish, Poles, Pakistanis, and many others through the decades. At their best, the levels of America's public-education system, from grade school through Ph.D. programs, created opportunities for the ambitious. A research establishment leveraged their work for public and private benefit; an American pop culture kept renewing itself with outside stimulus until it became for better and worse the pop culture of the world.
  In its pluses and its minuses, everything about this approach—the approach that has created the world's reigning power of the moment—is fundamentally different from the principles behind the rise of the aspirant great power, China.
  America's challenge is strangely conservative: Somehow it has to avoid destroying the cultural conditions that have been so important to its growth. China's challenge is more complicated—which, of course, doesn't mean that it is insurmountable. The country's successes over the past three decades arise mainly from allowing more and more of its people to apply ideas, ambitions, and energies in ways that benefit themselves and their families, and that build the national economy at the same time. To take the next step in its development, it will have to alter that equation in subtle but significant ways, by granting broader scope to individual ambition than has been possible through the Communist Party's decades in control. The institutions at the heart of such "soft" success have until now been areas of signal weakness for China.
  At an individual level, and as an accumulation of daily interactions over the years, my experience is of the great permeability of Chinese culture. People are easy to meet, to get to know, to laugh or argue with. And in its vastness, today's China contains people who belong to a variety of universalist faiths, including Islam, Christianity, Baha'i, and Buddhism.
  But in its international dealings as well as in most of its domestic operations, today's China gives more weight to duties and ethics based on personal relations than on abstract principles of how people in general should be treated. It is too pat to put the ethical system the way one Chinese friend did: "Everything for my family and friends; nothing for anyone else." But a variant of these sentiments goes through many aspects of Chinese life. Early in my stay in Shanghai I was amused to see that the first occupant of an elevator would instantly push the "close door" button. Then, for a while, I was annoyed; ultimately I acclimated. When my wife and I had been away from China for several months and returned for a stay, my wife saw a charming young boy walking with his mother on a street in a little enclosed neighborhood. He was eating a bag of potato chips. This was itself a sign of a different trend: the obesity epidemic now affecting China. The country is already dealing with one actuarial consequence of its one-child policy of the past generation—that its population will soon become on average so old. It is just beginning to cope with another, the long-term public-health problems, especially diabetes, coming from the rising rate of obesity in people under twenty, especially the often-favored "little emperor" boys.
conversations.from: human
conversations.value: Provide the last four paragraphs.
conversations.from: assistant
conversations.value: From the Chinese government's point of view, soft power has so far boiled down to using money to win other people's goodwill or acquiescence. Chinese-built roads in Africa and Latin America; Chinese investment and interaction in Europe and the United States. The public-opinion elements of the soft-power campaign have often backfired, since they have been crudely propagandistic in the fashion of the government's internal news management.
  Even before the bad publicity China suffered with the jailing of Liu Xiaobo and the Jasmine crackdowns, a scholar from the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Johan Lagerkvist, argued that China would likely lose more and more international support unless the government fundamentally reconceived its connections with the rest of the world. "China's internal stability/security and survival of the Communist Party will always be more important to China's leaders than the image it projects for outside consumption," he contended. A choice between maintaining domestic order and pleasing outside critics was no choice at all. "Pouring money into Chinese equivalents to CNN and Al-Jazeera won't help [without] reform initiatives," he said.
  In every country, internal interests come first. With more time on the world stage, China's leaders may learn to do what their American, British, French, and other counterparts also had to learn: at least feigning awareness of the interest of mankind. China's predicament is more difficult because its emergence is so rapid, and so much is unclear about other ways in which it will change.
  As part of this testimony he also said, "The aviation industry has more than 130 large and medium-sized factories and research institutes employing 250,000 workers scattered across the country, especially in the deep interior, and often possessing the same manufacturing and research attributes. But intense rivalry, local protectionism, and huge geographical distances mean that there is little cooperation or coordination among these facilities, preventing the ability to reap economies of scale, engage in innovation clustering, and also hampering efforts at consolidation."
conversations.from: human
conversations.value: Reverse the sentences.
conversations.from: assistant
conversations.value: ". But intense rivalry, local protectionism, and huge geographical distances mean that there is little cooperation or coordination among these facilities, preventing the ability to reap economies of scale, engage in innovation clustering, and also hampering efforts at consolidation.
  As part of this testimony he also said, "The aviation industry has more than 130 large and medium-sized factories and research institutes employing 250,000 workers scattered across the country, especially in the deep interior, and often possessing the same manufacturing and research attributes. China's predicament is more difficult because its emergence is so rapid, and so much is unclear about other ways in which it will change. With more time on the world stage, China's leaders may learn to do what their American, British, French, and other counterparts also had to learn: at least feigning awareness of the interest of mankind.
  In every country, internal interests come first. "Pouring money into Chinese equivalents to CNN and Al-Jazeera won't help [without] reform initiatives," he said. A choice between maintaining domestic order and pleasing outside critics was no choice at all. "China's internal stability/security and survival of the Communist Party will always be more important to China's leaders than the image it projects for outside consumption," he contended.
  Even before the bad publicity China suffered with the jailing of Liu Xiaobo and the Jasmine crackdowns, a scholar from the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Johan Lagerkvist, argued that China would likely lose more and more international support unless the government fundamentally reconceived its connections with the rest of the world. The public-opinion elements of the soft-power campaign have often backfired, since they have been crudely propagandistic in the fashion of the government's internal news management. Chinese-built roads in Africa and Latin America; Chinese investment and interaction in Europe and the United States.From the Chinese government's point of view, soft power has so far boiled down to using money to win other people's goodwill or acquiescence