As commander of Army Air Forces in Hawaii, Major General Martin coordinated with his Navy counterpart, Admiral Patrick N. L. Bellinger to plan the defense of Hawaii in case of Japanese attack. The two wrote the (then classified) "Martin-Bellinger Report" that both correctly assessed the most likely Japanese course-of-action should they attack and that the US did not have sufficient patrol planes to reliably detect an attack. They warned "in a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start."United States Congress Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Pearl Harbor Attack: Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress…, vol. 24, 40 vols. (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1946), 1630–04. Martin requested additional aircraft both in this report and in a follow-up through Army Air Corps channels a few months later, but what planes he did receive were ordered on to forward bases expected to bear the brunt of any fighting.United States Congress Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Pearl Harbor Attack: Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress…, vol. 24, 40 vols. (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1946), 2147–60.
