When it comes to interpreting statutes, judges are expected to abide by the rules set out by the Legislature. On 26 February 1993, the Interpretation (Amendment) Act 1993No. 11 of 1993, in force on 16 April 1993. was passed to reform the law relating to statutory interpretation. The amending Act inserted section 9A into the Interpretation Act,Now the ("IA"). For commentary on s. 9A, see . which mandates that judges take a purposive approach to interpreting written law by requiring that an interpretation that promotes the purpose or object underlying the law be preferred to one that does not promote the purpose or object.IA, s. 9A(1). In determining the meaning of a provision of written law, the court may consider extrinsic materials, that is, materials not forming part of the written law.IA, s. 9A(2). Such materials include the speech made in Parliament by a minister during the Second Reading of a bill containing the provision, and other relevant material in any official record of Parliamentary debates.IA, ss. 9A(3)(c) and (d). Through section 9A, Parliament requires judges to determine the meaning of written law by understanding the Parliamentary intention underlying the law and its purpose. Therefore, judges' freedom when it comes to statutory interpretation is somewhat restricted. However, it may be said that this deference to Parliament is quintessential to uphold the certainty of law and to avoid defeating the Parliament's intention in enacting statutes.
