David Edgerton has emphasized the success story in producing munitions at home and using the Empire and the U.S. to build a very large high quality stock of weapons.David Edgerton, Warfare State: Britain, 1920–1970 (Cambridge UP, 2005). Industrial production was reoriented toward munitions, and output soared. In steel, for example, the Materials Committee of the government tried to balance the needs of civilian departments and the War Department, but strategic considerations received precedence over any other need.Peter Howlett, "Resource allocation in wartime Britain: The case of steel, 1939-45," Journal of Contemporary History, (July 1994) 29#3 pp 523-44 Highest priority went to aircraft production as the RAF was under continuous heavy German pressure. The government decided to concentrate on only five types of aircraft in order to optimize output. They received extraordinary priority. Covering the supply of materials and equipment and even made it possible to divert from other types the necessary parts, equipment, materials and manufacturing resources. Labour was moved from other aircraft work to factories engaged on the specified types. Cost was not an object. The delivery of new fighters rose from 256 in April to 467 in September 1940—more than enough to cover the losses—and Fighter Command emerged triumphantly from the Battle of Britain in October with more aircraft than it had possessed at the beginning.Postan (1952), Chapter 4. Starting in 1941 the U.S. provided munitions through Lend lease that totalled $15.5 billionHancock, British War Economy online p 353
