Throughout the 1980s and 1990s scholars published studies arguing that commercial bank affiliate underwriting during the 1920s was no worse, or was better, than underwriting by securities firms not affiliated with banks and that commercial banks were strengthened, not harmed, by securities affiliates.Benston 1990, pp. 32-34. . . More generally, researchers attacked the idea that "integrated financial services firms" had played a role in creating the Great Depression or the collapse of the US banking system in the 1930s.Vietor 1987, pp. 38-39. If it was "debatable" whether Glass–Steagall was justified in the 1930s, it was easier to argue that Glass–Steagall served no legitimate purpose when the distinction between commercial and investment banking activities had been blurred by "market developments" since the 1960s.Garten 1989, pp. 512-513. .
