Operation Phiboonpol had ended in an indecisive standoff, despite heavy Communist casualties. Military Region 4's (MR 4) Commanding Officer General Phasouk Somly was hesitant to try another attack because of the poor fighting qualities of his troops. However, on 1 July 1971, King Sisavang Vatthana paid a royal visit to Pakse and demanded another offensive.Ahern, p. 416. Thus it was that Pakse Unit of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) planned an offensive into communist territory on the eastern Bolovens Plateau designed to block one of the supply arteries of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, Route 23. It would also retake two airstrips while occupying the Bolovens Plateau. The plan was for a two phase operation involving not just troops from Pakse's (MR 4), but also from adjoining Military Region 3 (MR 3). As projected, the Royalist force of 11 battalions numbered 4,000 strong; the opposing three Communist battalions could muster barely 1,100 troops. In phase one, MR 3's guerrillas would be airlifted to capture the Pakse 47 airfield southwest of Salavan at UTM coordinates XC5237. Phase two would be a squeeze play; a mobile force would be airlifted to a position northwest of Paksong, while a column probed eastward toward it along Route 23. The Royal Lao Air Force (RLAF) would supply close air support at the rate of two AC-47 and 35 T-28 sorties daily. Belatedly, the planners realized that RLAF support would be insufficient. Three days before the operation's scheduled start, they requested and received a commitment for 12 daily sorties of tactical air for the next month. The U.S. Air Force (USAF) would fly interdiction strikes on the communist lines of communication with fighter-bombers by day and gunships by night. However, USAF support would not be on a dedicated basis; instead it would be diverted as needed. Logistical air support would come from USAF helicopters, RLAF transports, and Air America under contract.Conboy, Morrison, p. 304.Hukle, et al, pp. 1–5.Anthony, Sexton, p. 346. Not taken into account was the fact that the Royalist columns were not mutually supportive. General Minh, commander of the PAVN battalions, would use this flaw to defeat the Royalists in detail by using his interior lines of communication.Anthony, Sexton, pp. 346–347.
