The performance of regional fisheries management organizations is shaped by the perspectives and decisions made by their member states. RFMOs are formed by states with various fishing interests ranging from economic interests to conservationist approaches to fishery management. As decision-making processes in RFMO Commissions are generally based on consensus or majority voting, lack of political will of some member states tends to result in weak and inefficient conservation and management measures reflecting the lowest common denominator agreement. For example, RFMO Commissions have delayed the implementation of bottom fisheries closures by requesting further information on the state of the marine ecosystem before adopting closures, which is inconsistent with the precautionary approach urging states to act on suspicion of negative impacts of fishing activities. Other studies find that strong fishing interests of leading member states in the RFMO governing the South Ocean (CCAMLR) have contributed significantly to the opposition against establishing marine protected areas in the Southern Ocean. Conservation measures of CCAMLR are generally weighted towards fishing interests with approximately 76% being focused on fisheries management against 14% focusing on the protection of species, habitats, and ecosystems. Scholars have also argued that the implementation of effective bycatch measures is significantly depending on the political will of RFMO members to prioritize long-term gains such as food security and poverty alleviation over short-term reductions in the economic profitability of target species. In the words of scholars, member states blocking progress pose a risk to RFMO measures and the whole ecosystem.
