The deterrent value of the nuclear weapons in Ukraine was also questionable: Ukraine had taken "administrative control" of the weapon delivery systems and implemented measures to prevent Russia from using them, but would have had to spend 12 to 18 months to establish full operational control over its nuclear arsenal. The ICBMs also had a range of 5,000–10,000 km (initially targeting the United States), which meant that they could only have been re-targeted to hit Russia's far east. The Soviet air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) had been disabled by the Russian military during the collapse of the Soviet Union, but even if they had been reconfigured and made to work by the Ukrainians, it is unlikely that they would have had a deterrent effect. Had Ukraine decided to establish full operational control of its nuclear weapons, it would have faced sanctions by the West and perhaps even a withdrawal of diplomatic recognition by the United States and other NATO allies. Ukraine would also likely have faced retaliatory action by Russia. Ukraine would also have struggled with replacing the nuclear weapons once their service life expired, as Ukraine did not have a nuclear weapons program. In exchange for giving up its nuclear weapons, Ukraine received financial compensation, as well as the security assurances of the Budapest Memorandum.
