John von Neumann
Post-war work

In 1950, von Neumann became a consultant to the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, whose function was to advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the United States Secretary of Defense on the development and use of new technologies. He also became an adviser to the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, which was responsible for the military aspects on nuclear weapons. Over the following two years, he became a consultant across the US government. This included the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), a member of the influential General Advisory Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission, a consultant to the newly established Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and a member of the Scientific Advisory Group of the United States Air Force During this time he became a "superstar" defense scientist at the Pentagon. His authority was considered infallible at the highest levels of the US government and military.

During several meetings of the advisory board of the US Air Force, von Neumann and Edward Teller predicted that by 1960 the US would be able to build a hydrogen bomb light enough to fit on top of a rocket. In 1953 Bernard Schriever, who was present at the meeting, paid a personal visit to von Neumann at Princeton to confirm this possibility. Schriever enlisted Trevor Gardner, who in turn visited von Neumann several weeks later to fully understand the future possibilities before beginning his campaign for such a weapon in Washington. Now either chairing or serving on several boards dealing with strategic missiles and nuclear weaponry, von Neumann was able to inject several crucial arguments regarding potential Soviet advancements in both these areas and in strategic defenses against American bombers into government reports to argue for the creation of ICBMs. Gardner on several occasions brought von Neumann to meetings with the US Department of Defense to discuss with various senior officials his reports. Several design decisions in these reports such as inertial guidance mechanisms would form the basis for all ICBMs thereafter. By 1954, von Neumann was also regularly testifying to various Congressional military subcommittees to ensure continued support for the ICBM program.

However, this was not enough. To have the ICBM program run at full throttle they needed direct action by the President of the United States. They convinced President Eisenhower in a direct meeting in July 1955, which resulted in a presidential directive on September 13, 1955. It stated that "there would be the gravest repercussions on the national security and on the cohesion of the free world" if the Soviet Union developed the ICBM before the US and therefore designated the ICBM project "a research and development program of the highest priority above all others." The Secretary of Defense was ordered to commence the project with "maximum urgency". Evidence would later show that the Soviets indeed were already testing their own intermediate-range ballistic missiles at the time. Von Neumann would continue to meet the President, including at his home in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, and other high-level government officials as a key advisor on ICBMs until his death.
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