Sergei Korolev
Space program

Korolev was keenly aware of the orbital possibilities of the rockets being designed as ICBMs, ideas that were shared by Tikhonravov then working at NII -4. On 26 May 1954, six days after being tasked to lead the R-7 ballistic missile program, Korolev submitted a proposal to use the R-7 to launch a satellite into space, naming a technical report from Tikhonravov and mentioning similar work being carried out by Americans. After receiving lukewarm support from the Soviet leadership, Korolev initiated a modest satellite research project in coordination with Tikhonravov. To intensify his lobbying efforts, Korolev, along with other like-minded engineers, began writing speculative articles for Soviet newspapers on space flight. They were picked up by the press in the United States and the CIA, influencing American authorities to start their own satellite programs. On 29 July 1955, the Eisenhower administration announced the intention of the United States to launch "small Earth-circling satellites" for the International Geophysical Year. While the US government debated the idea of spending millions of dollars on this concept, Korolev suggested the international prestige of launching a satellite before the United States. On 5 August, he sent another proposal with American newspaper articles about the US program attached. Three days later, the Soviet leadership approved his plan. On 30 August, Korolev met with members of the Soviet defense and scientific communities. As a result, he was allowed to use the R-7 rocket to launch satellites, and his project also gained support from the Soviet Academy of Sciences. On 30 January 1956, the USSR Council of Ministers officially approved the satellite project in its decree number 149-88ss.

The original plan for the satellite called for a sophisticated scientific laboratory. Nicknamed " Object D ", it would be the fifth type of payload built for the R-7 missile. Despite earlier work done by Tikhonravov, much of its design, such as pressurized equipment, long-range communications systems, automated switches, and a metal construct to work in space, had little precedent. By mid-1956, Korolev had finalized the modifications to the R-7 ICBM for a satellite launch, but the project as a whole was falling behind schedule. He feared that the United States would launch a satellite before he could. This was heightened by reports of the American Project Vanguard and a secret 1956 missile launch from Patrick Air Force Base, Florida. Meanwhile, testing of the R-7 rocket engine showed that its specific impulse would be lower than projected and thus insufficient for Object D's specifications. Korolev sent a revised plan calling for a simpler payload of approximately 100 kilograms. It was approved on 25 January 1957 as ' Object PS '.

Despite having achieved one successful flight of the R-7 rocket, Korolev still faced opposition from some officials to his plan of launching a satellite. In August 1957, he proposed letting the Central Committee make the call. Because no one wanted to risk losing the prestige to the United States, Korolev's satellite launch was finally approved. In September, a second successful flight of the R-7 was made, and 6 October was established as the target date for launching PS-1, the first of the Object PS-type satellites.

The lead designer of Object PS was Mikhail S. Khomyakov, and its deputy designer was Oleg G. Ivanovskiy. It was constructed in less than a month by the Tikhonravov group, while Korolev personally managed the assembly at a hectic pace. The satellite was a simple polished metal sphere no bigger than a beach ball, containing batteries that powered a transmitter using four external communication antennas. Korolev moved the launch date two days early, fearing a last minute launch of its own by the United States. PS-1 was successfully launched into space on 4 October 1957 as Sputnik 1, becoming the first artificial satellite of the Earth.

For security reasons, the names of chief individuals in the Soviet space program became a secret. They were allowed to prepare a report detailing the design and construction of Sputnik 1, however, which was published anonymously by Pravda on 9 October. Korolev also began writing other articles under the pseudonym "Professor K. Sergeyev".

The Soviet government initially had a low-key response to the success of the launch. International reaction was electrifying and tumultuous, however, which the Soviets later capitalized on. Political ramifications of the accomplishment continued for decades. Nikita Khrushchev —initially bored with the idea of another Korolev rocket launch—was pleased with this success after the wide recognition, and encouraged launch of a more sophisticated satellite less than a month later, in time for the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution on 3 November.

Korolev and close associate Mstislav Keldysh wished to up the ante of building a second, larger satellite by proposing the idea of putting a dog on board, which sufficiently caught the interest of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. This new Sputnik 2 spacecraft had six times the mass of the Sputnik 1, and carried the dog Laika as a payload. The entire vehicle was designed from scratch within four weeks, with no time for testing or quality checks. It was successfully launched on 3 November and Laika was placed in orbit. There was no mechanism to bring the dog back to Earth; the dog died from heat exhaustion after five hours in space.

The instrument-laden Sputnik 3 spacecraft was launched initially on 27 April 1958, but the satellite had a failure with the engine which caused the satellite to fall back down to Earth in separate pieces. On 15 May 1958, Sputnik 3 was successfully launched into orbit. The tape recorder that was to store the data failed after launch. As a result, the discovery and mapping of the Van Allen radiation belts was left to the United States' Explorer 3 and Pioneer 3 satellites. Sputnik 3 left little doubt with the American government about the Soviets' pending ICBM capability.
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