Paul von Hindenburg
Military reputation

"Victory comes from movement " was Schlieffen's principle for war. Hindenburg expounded on Schlieffen's ideas as an instructor and later applied them during World War I. By employing such tactics, retreats and mobile defenses commanded by Hindenburg proved effective, and his Schwerpunkt attacks broke through the trench barrier on the Western Front. However, they failed to produce decisive victories because penetrating forces proved too slow to capitalize on their breakthroughs.

Hindenburg has undergone a historical revalution: his teaching of tactics and years on the General Staff have been less emphasised while he is remembered as a commander in Ludendorff's shadow. Winston Churchill in 1923, depicted Hindenburg as a figurehead awed by the mystique of the General Staff, concluding that "Ludendorff throughout appears as the uncontested master." Parkinson stated that he is a "beloved figurehead", while to Stallings he is "an old military booby". These judgements stem from Ludendorff, who was famous during the war and immediately thereafter wrote his comprehensive memoir with himself center stage. Hindenburg's less detailed memoir never disputed his colleague's claims, military decisions were made collectively not individually, and it is less useful to historians because it was written for general readers. Ludendorff continued emphasising his preeminence in print, which Hindenburg never disputed publicly.

Others did though, the OHL officers who testified before the Reichstag committee investigating the collapse of 1918 agreed that Hindenburg was always in command. He managed by setting objectives and appointing capable people to do their jobs, for instance "giving full scope to the intellectual powers" of Ludendorff. These subordinates often felt he did little, even though he was setting the overall course. Ludendorff may have overrated himself, repressing repeated demonstrations that he lacked resilience essential to command. Postwar he displayed poor judgment and an attraction to unusual ideas, contrasting with his former commander's adaptation to changing times.

Most of their conferences were in private, but on 26 July 1918 the chief of staff of the Seventh Army, Fritz von Lossberg traveled to OHL to request permission to withdraw to a better position

Without knocking I entered Ludendorff's office and found him loudly arguing with the field marshal. I assumed it was over the situation at the Seventh Army. In any case as soon as I entered the field marshall asked me to give my assessment of the situation at the Seventh Army. I described it in short terms and emphasized especially that based on my own observations I thought the condition of the troops was cause for serious concern. For the past few days the Seventh Army commanding general, the staff, and I had all been recommending a withdrawal from the increasingly untenable front lines. I told Hindenburg that I had come to Avesenes with the concurrence of the Seventh Army commanding general to secure such an order. The field marshall turned to Ludendorff, saying something to the effect of 'Now Ludendorff, make sure that the order goes out immediately. ' He then left Ludendorff's office rather upset.

Hindenburg's record as a commander starting in the field at Tannenberg, then leading four national armies, culminating with breaking the trench deadlock in the west, and then holding a defeated army together, is unmatched by other soldiers in World War I. However, military skill is only one component of the record: "... in general, the maladroit politics of Hindenburg and Ludendorff led directly to the collapse of 1918...."
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