Free-rider problem
Altruistic social sanctions

Other research finds that social sanctions cannot be generalized as strategic in the context of public goods. Preferences between secret sanctions and standard sanctions on free riders did not vary significantly. Rather, some individuals preferred to sanction others regardless of secrecy. Other research built on the findings of behavioral economics finds that, in a dilemmatic donation game, donors are motivated by the fear of loss. In the game, donors' deposits were only refunded if the donors always punish free-riding and non-commitment among other individuals. Pool-punishment, in which everyone loses their deposit if one donor does not punish the free rider, provided more stable results than punishment without consideration of the consensus of the group. Individual-to-individual peer punishment led to less-consistently-applied social sanctions. Although this research is experimental in nature, it may collectively prove useful when applied in public policy decisions seeking to improve free-rider problems within society.
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