John von Neumann
Proof theory

With the contributions of von Neumann to sets, the axiomatic system of the theory of sets avoided the contradictions of earlier systems and became usable as a foundation for mathematics, despite the lack of a proof of its consistency. The next question was whether it provided definitive answers to all mathematical questions that could be posed in it, or whether it might be improved by adding stronger axioms that could be used to prove a broader class of theorems.

By 1927, von Neumann was involving himself in discussions in Göttingen on whether elementary arithmetic followed from Peano axioms. Building on the work of Ackermann, he began attempting to prove (using the finistic methods of Hilbert's school) the consistency of first-order arithmetic. He succeeded in proving the consistency of a fragment of arithmetic of natural numbers (through the use of restrictions on induction). He continued looking for a more general proof of the consistency of classical mathematics using methods from proof theory.

A strongly negative answer to whether it was definitive arrived in September 1930 at the Second Conference on the Epistemology of the Exact Sciences, in which Kurt Gödel announced his first theorem of incompleteness: the usual axiomatic systems are incomplete, in the sense that they cannot prove every truth expressible in their language. Moreover, every consistent extension of these systems necessarily remains incomplete. At the conference, von Neumann suggested to Gödel that he should try to transform his results for undecidable propositions about integers.

Less than a month later, von Neumann communicated to Gödel an interesting consequence of his theorem: the usual axiomatic systems are unable to demonstrate their own consistency. Gödel replied that he had already discovered this consequence, now known as his second incompleteness theorem, and that he would send a preprint of his article containing both results, which never appeared. Von Neumann acknowledged Gödel's priority in his next letter. However, von Neumann's method of proof differed from Gödel's, and he was also of the opinion that the second incompleteness theorem had dealt a much stronger blow to Hilbert's program than Gödel thought it did. With this discovery, which drastically changed his views on mathematical rigor, von Neumann ceased research in the foundations of mathematics and metamathematics and instead spent time on problems connected with applications.
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