linguistic:translation
Transparency

There is disagreement among theorists of experience concerning whether the subjective character of an experience is entirely determined by its contents. This claim has been called the "transparency of experience". It states that what it is like to undergo an experience only depends on the items presented in it. This would mean that two experiences are exactly alike if they have the same contents. Various philosophers have rejected this thesis, often with the argument that what matters is not just what is presented but also how it is presented. For example, the property of roundness can be presented visually, when looking at a sphere, or haptically, when touching the sphere. Defenders of the transparency-thesis have pointed out that the difference between the experiences in such examples can be explained on the level of content: one experience presents the property of visual-roundness while the other presents felt-roundness. Other counterexamples include blurry vision, where the blurriness is seen as a flawed representation without presenting the seen object itself as blurry. It has been argued that only the universals present in the experience determine the subjective character of the experience. On this view, two experiences involving different particulars that instantiate exactly the same universals would be subjectively identical.