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U.S.

Early in 1944, William Boyd, president of the American Petroleum Institute and chairman of the Petroleum Industry War Council said: "The Allies may have floated to victory on a wave of oil in World War I, but in this infinitely greater World War II, we are flying to victory on the wings of petroleum". In December 1941 the U.S. had 385,000 oil wells producing 1.6 billion barrels (0.25 × 10 m; 9.0 × 10 cu ft) barrels of oil a year and 100-octane aviation gasoline capacity was at 40,000 barrels (6,400 m; 220,000 cu ft) a day. By 1944, the U.S. was producing over 1.5 billion barrels (0.24 × 10 m; 8.4 × 10 cu ft) a year (67 percent of world production) and the petroleum industry had built 122 new plants for the production of 100-octane aviation gasoline and capacity was over 400,000 barrels (64,000 m; 2,200,000 cu ft) a day – an increase of more than ten-fold. It was estimated that the U.S. was producing enough 100-octane aviation gasoline to permit the dropping of 16,000 metric tons (18,000 short tons; 16,000 long tons) of bombs on the enemy every day of the year. The record of gasoline consumption by the Army prior to June 1943 was uncoordinated as each supply service of the Army purchased its own petroleum products and no centralized system of control nor records existed. On 1 June 1943, the Army created the Fuels and Lubricants Division of the Quartermaster Corps, and, from their records, they tabulated that the Army (excluding fuels and lubricants for aircraft) purchased over 9.1 billion liters (2.4 × 10 U.S. gal) of gasoline for delivery to overseas theaters between 1 June 1943 through August 1945. That figure does not include gasoline used by the Army inside the U.S. Motor fuel production had declined from 701 million barrels (111.5 × 10 m; 3,940 × 10 cu ft) in 1941 down to 208 million barrels (33.1 × 10 m; 1,170 × 10 cu ft) in 1943. World War II marked the first time in U.S. history that gasoline was rationed and the government imposed price controls to prevent inflation. Gasoline consumption per automobile declined from 2,860 liters (755 U.S. gal) per year in 1941 down to 2,000 liters (540 U.S. gal) in 1943, with the goal of preserving rubber for tires since the Japanese had cut the U.S. off from over 90 percent of its rubber supply which had come from the Dutch East Indies and the U.S. synthetic rubber industry was in its infancy. Average gasoline prices went from a record low of $0.0337 per liter ($0.1275/U.S. gal) ($0.0486 ($0.1841) with taxes) in 1940 to $0.0383 per liter ($0.1448/U.S. gal) ($0.0542 ($0.2050) with taxes) in 1945.

Even with the world's largest aviation gasoline production, the U.S. military still found that more was needed. Throughout the duration of the war, aviation gasoline supply was always behind requirements and this impacted training and operations. The reason for this shortage developed before the war even began. The free market did not support the expense of producing 100-octane aviation fuel in large volume, especially during the Great Depression. Iso-octane in the early development stage cost $7.9 per liter ($30/U.S. gal), and, even by 1934, it was still $0.53 per liter ($2/U.S. gal) compared to $0.048 ($0.18) for motor gasoline when the Army decided to experiment with 100-octane for its combat aircraft. Though only three percent of U.S. combat aircraft in 1935 could take full advantage of the higher octane due to low compression ratios, the Army saw that the need for increasing performance warranted the expense and purchased 100,000 gallons. By 1937, the Army established 100-octane as the standard fuel for combat aircraft and by 1939 production was only 20,000 barrels (3,200 m; 110,000 cu ft) a day. In effect, the U.S. military was the only market for 100-octane aviation gasoline and as war broke out in Europe this created a supply problem that persisted throughout the duration.

With the war in Europe a reality in 1939, all predictions of 100-octane consumption were outrunning all possible production. Neither the Army nor the Navy could contract more than six months in advance for fuel and they could not supply the funds for plant expansion. Without a long-term guaranteed market, the petroleum industry would not risk its capital to expand production for a product that only the government would buy. The solution to the expansion of storage, transportation, finances, and production was the creation of the Defense Supplies Corporation on 19 September 1940. The Defense Supplies Corporation would buy, transport and store all aviation gasoline for the Army and Navy at cost plus a carrying fee.

When the Allied breakout after D-Day found their armies stretching their supply lines to a dangerous point, the makeshift solution was the Red Ball Express. But even this soon was inadequate. The trucks in the convoys had to drive longer distances as the armies advanced and they were consuming a greater percentage of the same gasoline they were trying to deliver. In 1944, General George Patton's Third Army finally stalled just short of the German border after running out of gasoline. The general was so upset at the arrival of a truckload of rations instead of gasoline he was reported to have shouted: "Hell, they send us food, when they know we can fight without food but not without oil." The solution had to wait for the repairing of the railroad lines and bridges so that the more efficient trains could replace the gasoline-consuming truck convoys.