information:extraction, information:highlighting, linguistic:voice_change
Ideational definition

A thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic camps, "the pure people" versus "the corrupt elite", and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people.

The ideational definition of populism used by Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser

A common approach to defining populism is known as the ideational approach. This emphasises the notion that populism should be defined according to specific ideas which underlie it, as opposed to certain economic policies or leadership styles which populist politicians may display. In this definition, the term populism is applied to political groups and individuals who make appeals to "the people" and then contrast this group against "the elite".

Adopting this approach, Albertazzi and McDonnell define populism as an ideology that "pits a virtuous and homogeneous people against a set of elites and dangerous 'others' who are together depicted as depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity, and voice". Similarly, the political scientist Carlos de la Torre defined populism as "a Manichean discourse that divides politics and society as the struggle between two irreconcilable and antagonistic camps: the people and the oligarchy or the power block."

In this understanding, note Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, "populism always involves a critique of the establishment and an adulation of the common people", and according to Ben Stanley, populism itself is a product of "an antagonistic relationship" between "the people" and "the elite", and is "latent wherever the possibility occurs for the emergence of such a dichotomy". The political scientist Manuel Anselmi proposed that populism be defined as featuring a "homogeneous community-people" which "perceives itself as the absolute holder of popular sovereignty" and "expresses an anti-establishment attitude." This understanding conceives of populism as a discourse, ideology, or worldview. These definitions were initially employed largely in Western Europe, although later became increasingly popular in Eastern Europe and the Americas.

According to this approach, populism is viewed as a "thin ideology" or "thin-centred ideology" which on its own is seen as too insubstantial to provide a blueprint for societal change. It thus differs from the "thick-centred" or "full" ideologies such as fascism, liberalism, and socialism, which provide more far-reaching ideas about social transformation. As a thin-centred ideology, populism is therefore attached to a thick-ideology by populist politicians. Thus, populism can be found merged with forms of nationalism, liberalism, socialism, federalism, or conservatism. According to Stanley, "the thinness of populism ensures that in practice it is a complementary ideology: it does not so much overlap with as diffuse itself throughout full ideologies."

Populism is, according to Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, "a kind of mental map through which individuals analyse and comprehend political reality". Mudde noted that populism is "moralistic rather than programmatic". It encourages a binary world-view in which everyone is divided into "friends and foes", with the latter being regarded not just as people who have "different priorities and values" but as being fundamentally "evil". In emphasising one's purity against the corruption and immorality of "the elite", from which "the people" must remain pure and untouched, populism prevents compromise between different groups.

The incredible rise in research and discussion about populism, both academic and social, stems largely from efforts by ideational scholars to place centre stage the significance of appeals to the people beyond ideological differences, and to conceptualise populism as a discursive phenomenon. Nevertheless, the ideational school's approach to populism is problematic for the amount of substantive assumptions it imposes on how populism actually works as a discursive phenomenon, such as the idea that it is of a moral register, that vindications always refer to a homogeneous/pure people, or that it takes shape socially as an ideology. These assumptions can be counter-productive to the study of populism which has arguably become excessively conceptually deductive. Still, this does not mean we cannot come to a more minimal, formal definition of what populism is that can consensually group scholars and open up research to a broader scope, as indicated by Stavrakakis and De Cleen in defining populism as a type of discourse ‘characterized by a people/elite distinction and the claim to speak in the name of "the people."’