document: China's economy is heavily dependent on global trade and investment flows. In 2007, China overtook the United States to become the world's second-largest merchandise exporter after the European Union (EU). China's net exports (exports minus imports) contributed to one-third of its GDP growth in 2007. China's exports of goods and services as a share of GDP rose from 9.1% in 1985 to 37.8% in 2008 (see Figure 1 ). The Chinese government estimates that the foreign trade sector employs more than 80 million people, of which 28 million work in foreign-invested enterprises. Foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to China have been a major factor behind its productivity gains and rapid economic growth. FDI flows to China in 2007 totaled $75 billion, making it the largest FDI recipient among developing countries and the third largest overall, after the EU and the United States; FDI flows to China in 2008 were $92 billion. The current global economic slowdown (especially among its major export markets—the United States, the EU, and Japan) is having a significant negative impact on China's export sector and industries that depend on FDI flows. The Chinese economy slowed sharply in 2008 and early 2009. China's fourth-quarter 2008 real GDP growth (year-on-year basis) was 6.8%, and its 1 st quarter 2009 growth (year-on-year basis) was 6.1% (reportedly, the slowest quarterly growth in 10 years). Some analysts contend annual economic growth of less than 8% could lead to social unrest in China, given that an estimated 20 million people seek jobs every year (including migrant workers who move to urban centers and high school and college graduates). According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), China was the single most important contributor to world economic growth in 2007. Thus, a Chinese economic slowdown (or recovery) could also have significant global implications. The extent of China's exposure to the current global financial crisis, in particular from the fallout of the U.S. sub-prime mortgage problem, is unclear. On the one hand, China places numerous restrictions on capital flows, particularly outflows, in part so that it can maintain its managed float currency policy. These restrictions limit the ability of Chinese citizens and many firms to invest their savings overseas, compelling them to invest those savings domestically, (such as in banks, the stock markets, real estate, and business ventures), although some Chinese attempt to shift funds overseas illegally. Thus, the exposure of Chinese private sector firms and individual Chinese investors to sub-prime U.S. mortgages is likely to be small. Moreover, Chinese government entities, such as the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, the China Investment Corporation (a $200 billion sovereign wealth fund created in 2007), state banks, and state-owned enterprises, may have been more exposed to troubled U.S. mortgage securities. Chinese government entities account for the lion's share of China's (legal) capital outflows, much of which derives from China's large and growing foreign exchange reserves. These reserves rose from $403 billion in 2003 (year end) to $2.1 trillion as of June 2009. In order to earn interest on these holdings, the Chinese government invests in overseas assets. A large portion of China's reserves are believed to be invested in U.S. securities, such as long-term (LT) Treasury debt (used to finance the federal deficit), LT U.S. agency debt (such as Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae mortgage-backed securities), LT U.S. corporate debt, LT U.S. equities, and short-term (ST) debt. The Treasury Department estimates that, as of June 2008, China's holdings of U.S. securities totaled $1,205 billion (up from $922 billion in June 2007), making it the second-largest foreign holder of such securities (after Japan). Of this total, $527 billion were in LT U.S. agency securities, $522 billion were in LT Treasury securities, $100 billion in LT equities, $26 billion in LT corporate securities, and $30 billion in ST debt. If China held troubled sub-prime mortgage backed securities, they would likely be included in the corporate securities category and certain U.S. equities (which include investment company share funds, such as open-end funds, closed-end funds, money market mutual funds, and hedge funds) which may have been invested in real estate. However, these were a relatively small share of China's total U.S. securities holdings. China's holdings of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac securities (though not their stock) were likely to have been more substantial, but less risky (compared to other mortgage-backed securities), especially after these two institutions were placed in conservatorship by the Federal Government in September 2008 and thus have government backing. The Chinese government generally does not release detailed information on the holdings of its financial entities, although some of its banks have reported on their level of exposure to sub-prime U.S. mortgages. Such entities have generally reported that their exposure to troubled sub-prime U.S. mortgages has been minor relative to their total investments, that they have liquidated such assets and/or have written off losses, and that they (the banks) continue to earn high profit margins. For example, the Bank of China (one of China's largest state-owned commercial banks) reported in March 2008 that its investment in asset-backed securities supported by U.S. sub-prime mortgages totaled $10.6 billion in 2006 (accounting for 3.5% of its investment securities portfolio). In October 2008, it reported that it had reduced holdings of such securities to $3.3 billion (1.4% of its total securities investments) by the end of September 2008, while its holdings of debt securities issued or backed by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae were at $10 billion. Fitch Ratings service reported that the Bank of China's exposure to U.S. sub-prime-related investments was the largest among Asian financial institutions, and that further losses from these investments were likely, but went on to state that the Bank of China would be able to absorb any related losses "without undue strain." However, China's economy has not been immune to effects of the global financial crisis, given its heavy reliance on trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) for its economic growth. Numerous sectors were hard hit. To illustrate: The real estate market in several Chinese cities experienced a sharp slowdown in construction, falling prices and growing levels of unoccupied buildings. This increased pressure on the banks to lower interest rates further to stabilize the market. The value of China's main stock market index, the Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index, lost nearly two-thirds of its value from December 31, 2007, to December 31, 2008. China's trade and FDI plummeted sharply, as indicated in Figure 2 . Exports and imports from January-July 2009 were down 22.0% and 23.6%, respectively on a year-on-year basis; they declined 10 straight months beginning in November 2008. FDI flows to China from January-July 2009 were down 20.4%; they declined for 10 consecutive months beginning in October 2008 (year-on-year basis). The Chinese government in January 2009 estimated that 20 million migrant workers alone had lost their jobs in 2008 because of the global economic slowdown. During the first four months of 2009, industrial output rose by 5.5% year-on-year, well below the 12.9% growth rate in 2008. China has taken a number of steps to respond to the global financial crisis. On September 27, 2008, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao reportedly stated that "what we can do now is to maintain the steady and fast growth of the national economy, and ensure that no major fluctuations will happen. That will be our greatest contribution to the world economy under the current circumstances." In addition to cutting interest rates and boosting bank lending, China has implemented a number of policies to stimulate and rebalance the economy, increase consumer spending, restructure and subsidize certain industries, and boost incomes for farmers and rural poor. On November 9, 2008, the Chinese government announced it would implement a two-year, 4 trillion yuan ($586 billion) stimulus package (equivalent to 13.3% of China's 2008 GDP), largely dedicated to infrastructure projects. The package would finance public transport infrastructure (including railways, highways, airports, and ports) affordable housing, rural infrastructure (including irrigation, drinking water, electricity, and transport), environmental projects, technological innovation, health and education, and rebuilding areas hit by disasters (such as areas that were hit by the May 12, 2008 earthquake, primarily in Sichuan province). China's stimulus, if fully implemented, would likely constitute one of the largest economic stimulus packages (both in spending levels and as a percent of GDP) that have been announced by the world's major economies to date, although it is unclear to what extent the stimulus package represents new spending versus projects that were already in the works before the economic downturn hit China. Table 1 provides a breakdown of the stimulus program spending priorities. The Chinese stimulus program includes steps the government intends to take to assist 10 pillar industries (i.e., industries deemed by the government to be vital to China's economic growth) to promote their long-term competitiveness. These industries include autos, steel, shipbuilding, textiles, machinery, electronics and information, light industry (such as consumer products), petrochemicals, non-ferrous metals, and logistics. Government support policies for the 10 industries are expected to include tax cuts and incentives (including export tax rebates), industry subsidies and subsidies to consumers to purchase certain products (such as consumer goods and autos), fiscal support, directives to banks to provide financing, direct funds to support technology upgrades and the development of domestic brands, government procurement policies, the extension of export credits, and funding to help firms invest overseas. On April 7, 2009, the Chinese government announced plans to spend $124 billion over the next three years to create a universal health care system. The plan would attempt to extend basic coverage to most of the population by 2011, and would invest in public hospitals and training for village and community doctors. A number of efforts have been made to boost rural incomes and spending levels and to narrow the gap in living standards between rural and urban citizens (as well as between coastal and western regions of the country). For example, since February 2009, an estimated 900 million Chinese rural residents have been eligible to receive a 13% rebate for purchase of home appliances. Public housing projects, education, and infrastructure projects are largely targeted to rural areas. The government has also announced plans to boost agricultural subsidies to farmers. On June 24, 2009, China's State Council launched a new pilot rural pension program that will initially cover 10 percent of China's counties beginning in October 2009 (Currently most rural farmers are not covered by pension system). Chinese officials contend that their economic policy efforts are beginning to produce results. They note a number of positive developments: GDP in the second quarter of 2009 grew by 7.9%, compared to 6.1% growth in the first quarter 2009, on a year-on-year basis. Several economic forecasting firms have recently predicted a strong Chinese economic recovery. For example, Global Insight in August 2009, predicted China's real GDP would grow 8.0% in 2009 and 10.1% in 2010, while the Economist Intelligence Unit projected real growth at 8.0% for both years. China's Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index has risen by 67.3% since the beginning of the year (through August 14, 2009. A number of sectors have enjoyed healthy growth during the first seven months of 2009. Although they have not achieved levels that occurred before the global economic crisis, they could signify that a recovery is taking place. For example, retail sales were up 15% (6.7 percentage points lower than in the previous, urban fixed-asset investment rose 32.9% (0.7% percentage points lower), and industrial output rose by 7.5% (8.6 percentage points lower). Real estate prices in major cities have also begun to rise over the past few months. Although there are many indicators of a Chinese economic recovery (with the exception of trade and FDI flows), there are numerous concerns over long-term growth prospects. Many analysts note that much of the recent economic growth that has occurred has resulted from large-scale bank lending and infrastructure spending projects, rather than consumer spending. In addition, many analysts have raised concerns that the large level of borrowing by local governments and state-owned enterprises could lead to a sharp rise in non-performing loans on the balance sheets of China's major banks, and could cause local governments to be become heavily indebted. Many analysts are also concerned that the stimulus policies that China has implemented to date could slow efforts to further reform the economy, especially in regards to state-owned enterprises and the banking system. Some have charged that China has rolled backed some it its economic reforms by boosting industrial subsidies and increasing trade and investment barriers, in order to assist firms deemed by the government to be vital to future development. China has also imposed "buy China" regulations to prevent participation by foreign firms and ensure that stimulus money benefit only Chinese firms. Many economists contend that China's long-term economic growth prospects will likely depend on the ability of the government to rebalance the economy by promoting greater domestic consumption and to deepen market-oriented economic reforms. Thus, China's current economic recovery could be short-lived. Analysts debate what role China might play in responding to the global financial crisis, given its huge foreign exchange reserves (at over $2 trillion) but its relative reluctance to become a major player in global economic affairs and its tendency to be cautious with its reserves. Some have speculated that China may, in order to help stabilize its most important trading partner (the United States), boost purchases of U.S. securities (especially Treasury securities) in order to help fund the hundreds of billions of dollars that are expected to be spent by the U.S. government to purchase troubled assets and stimulate the economy. Additionally, China might try to shore up the U.S. economy by buying U.S. stocks (or might do so to take advantage of relatively low prices). During her visit to China on February 21, 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton stated that she appreciated "greatly the Chinese government's continuing confidence in the United States Treasuries," and she urged the government to continue to buy U.S. debt. Some contend that taking an active role to help the United States (and other troubled economies) would boost China's image as a positive contributor to world economic stability, similar to what occurred during the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis when it offered financial aid to Thailand and pledged not to devalue its currency. On the other hand, there are a number of reasons why China might be reluctant to significantly increase its investments of U.S. assets. One concern could be whether increased Chinese investments in the U.S. economy would produce long-term economic benefits for China. Some Chinese investments in U.S. financial companies have fared poorly, and Chinese officials could be reluctant to put additional money into investments that were deemed to be too risky. Secondly, a sharp economic downturn of the Chinese economy would likely increase pressure to invest money at home, rather than overseas. Many analysts (including some in China) have questioned the wisdom of China's policy of investing a large volume of foreign exchange reserves in U.S. government securities (which offer a relatively low rate of return) when China has such huge development needs at home. China's holdings of U.S. securities at the end of 2008 are estimated to have been roughly equivalent to over $1,000 per person in China, a significant figure for a country with a per capita GDP of about $3,190 (2008). On March 13, 2009, Wen Jiabao at a news conference stated that he was "a little bit worried" about the safety of Chinese assets in the United States On March 24, 2009, the governor of the People's Bank of China, Zhou Xiaochuan, published a paper calling for the replacing the U.S. dollar as the international reserve currency with a new global system controlled by the International Monetary Fund. Many analysts (including some in China) have questioned the wisdom of China's policy of investing a large level of foreign exchange reserves in U.S. government securities, which offer a relatively low rate of return when China has such huge development needs at home. While additional large-scale Chinese purchases of U.S. securities might provide short-term benefits to the U.S. economy and may be welcomed by some policymakers, they could also raise a number of issues and concerns. Some U.S. policymakers have expressed concern that China might try to use its large holdings of U.S. securities as leverage against U.S. policies it opposes. For example, various Chinese government officials reportedly suggested on a number of occasions in the past that China could dump (or threaten to dump) a large share of its holdings in order to counter U.S. pressure (such as threats of trade sanctions) on various trade issues (such as China's currency policy). In exchange for new purchases of U.S. debt, China would likely want U.S. policymakers to lower expectations that China will move more rapidly to reform its financial sector and/or allow its currency to appreciate more substantially against the dollar. Some analysts have suggested that China could choose to utilize its reserves to buy stakes in various distressed U.S. industries. However, this could also raise concerns in the United States that China was being allowed to buy equity or ownership in U.S. firms at rock bottom prices, that technology and intellectual property from acquired firms could be transferred to Chinese business entities (boosting their competitiveness vis-a-vis U.S. firms), and that becoming a large stakeholder in major U.S. companies could give the Chinese government increased political influence in the United States. U.S. policymakers in the past have sometimes opposed attempts by Chinese firms to acquire shares or ownership of U.S. firms. While attending the G-20 summit in London on the global financial crisis on April 1, 2009, President Obama and President Hu met and pledged "to work together to resolutely support global trade and investment flows, "resist protectionism," and to resume high-level cooperation on long-term economic issues under the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED). The first round of the S&ED was held in Washington, D.C. on July 27-28, 2009. The two sides agreed to continue cooperation on a number of economic fronts, including promoting balanced economic growth and financial reforms. It is unclear to what extent the global financial crisis will affect U.S.-Chinese economic ties. Prior to the crisis, U.S. officials urged China to adopt economic reforms, especially in terms of the financial system, in ways that would emulate the U.S. economic model. Once the economic crisis hit, China was quick to blame U.S. economic policies for the crisis, and thus, U.S. influence with China on economic issues may have waned somewhat. China's increased use of subsides, "buy China" procurement regulations, and trade and investment barriers could increase pressure in the United States to utilize U.S. trade laws against unfair trade practices and/or to provide temporary relief to U.S. firms and workers injured by import surges from China. Chinese officials have countered with their own complaints over rising U.S. "protectionism." Although China has attempted to diversify its large foreign exchange holdings and to make its currency more convertible in international exchange markets (such as through currency swap arrangements with various countries), it is unlikely ( at least in the near term) to make major changes to its heavy reliance on the dollar as its main source of foreign exchange reserves (and investments in dollar-denominated assets), nor is China in a position to make its currency fully convertible in international exchange rate markets (due to the relative weakness of its banking system). However, Chinese officials are deeply concerned over the security of their dollar holdings if the dollar undergoes a sharp depreciation against major currencies in the future (possibly arising from rising U.S. public debt). Such concerns may also spur the Chinese government to take more steps to promote domestic consumption, and lessen dependence on trade and FDI flows, as a source of economic growth.
summary: Over the past several years, China has enjoyed one of the world's fastest-growing economies and has been a major contributor to world economic growth. However, the current global financial crisis has significantly slowed China's economy; real gross domestic product (GDP) fell from 13.0% in 2007 to 8.0% in 2008. Several Chinese industries, particularly the export sector, have been hit hard by crisis, and millions of workers have reportedly been laid off. This situation is of great concern to the Chinese government, which views rapid economic growth as critical to maintaining social stability. China is a major economic power and holds huge amounts of foreign exchange reserves, and thus its policies could have a major impact on the global economy. The Chinese government has stated that it plans to rebalance the economy by lessening its dependence on exports for economic growth while boosting domestic demand. In November 2008, the Chinese government announced a $586 billion spending package to help stimulate the domestic economy, largely geared towards new infrastructure projects. In addition, the government ordered banks to sharply expand loans to local governments and businesses to expand investment. The government has also offered a number of programs to stimulate domestic consumption of consumer products (such as cars and appliances), especially in the rural areas. As a result, China's economy has shown some improvement. For example, its GDP in the second quarter of 2009 grew by 7.9%, compared to 6.1% growth in the first quarter 2009, on a year-on-year basis. However, from January to July 2009, China's trade was down 23% over the same period in 2008, while foreign direct investment fell 18%. Some analysts have criticized various aspects of China's economic stimulus policies. Some contend that China, in an effort to assist firms impacted by the global economic slowdown, has imposed numerous new trade-distorting policies, such as extensive industrial subsidies and trade and investment restrictions on foreign firms. In addition, many analysts warn that the easy lending policies of Chinese state-owned banks may later lead to a sharp increase in the level of non-performing loans by these banks if loans go to investments that fail to produce long-term returns. China's efforts to stabilize its economy are of major concern to U.S. policy makers. If successful, such policies could boost Chinese demand for U.S. products. In addition, China is a major purchaser of U.S. Treasury securities, which help fund the Federal Government's borrowing needs, and thus its decision whether or not to continue to purchase U.S. debt could impact the U.S. economy. U.S. policy makers also want to ensure that, despite the sharp downturn in the Chinese economy from the effects of current global economic downturn, China will continue to reform its economy and liberalizes its trade regime and refrain from imposing policies that restrict or distort trade.