document: This report provides a chronology of events relevant to U.S. relations with North Korea in 2005 and is a continuation of CRS Report RL32743, North Korea: A Chronology of Events, October 2002-December 2004 , by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]. The chronology includes significant meetings, events, and statements that shed light on the issues surrounding North Korea's nuclear weapons program. An introductory analysis highlights the key developments and notes other significant regional dynamics. Particular attention is paid to the Six-Party Talks, inter-Korean relations, key U.S. officials in charge of North Korean policy, Chinas leadership in the negotiations, Japans relationship with its neighbors, and contact with North Korea outside of the executive branch, including a Congressional delegation. In the chronology, key events are marked by bold text. The year 2005 saw little progress in resolving the North Korea nuclear issue. Although adjustments were made, such as changes to senior U.S. officials in charge of policy in East Asia and the addition of human rights and criminal activities to the agenda of items to cover with North Korea, overall relationships and regional trends saw no major reversals or breakthroughs. In the first half of 2005, North Korea escalated the security situation on the Korean peninsula through words and actions. On February 10, Pyongyang officials announced that North Korea had nuclear weapons and would indefinitely suspend its participation in the Six-Party Talks, the multilateral negotiation forum dedicated to the peaceful denuclearization of North Korea made up of the United States, China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, and Russia. North Korean officials followed up in April with the assertion that the focus of the negotiations should adjust to regional disarmament talks given its status as a nuclear weapons state. Reports of preparations for a possible nuclear test in April further escalated the sense of urgency. In May, North Korea announced that it had removed 8,000 fuel rods from the Yongbyon reactor for reprocessing; experts estimate that the reprocessed plutonium could provide enough material for an additional six to eight nuclear bombs. Later that month, North Korea launched a short-range missile into the East Sea. After nearly a year without meeting, negotiators from the six nations re-convened in Beijing in late July 2005 for a fourth round of talks. The outcome, a joint statement of principles agreed to in September by all parties, was hailed as a major breakthrough. The key statement committed North Korea to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning at any early date to the treaty on the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. In exchange, North Korea was provided with security assurances; South Korea committed to provide 2 million kilowatts of electricity; and the U.S. and Japan pledged to take steps toward normalization of relations with Pyongyang. A crucial disagreement during the talks involved North Korea's right to develop peaceful nuclear energy programs; as a compromise, the United States and North Korea agreed to discuss Pyongyangs right to such a program and its demand for light-water reactors (LWRs) at an appropriate time. The accomplishment proved to be short-lived, however, as, just a day after the statement was issued, a North Korean spokesman asserted that North Korea would return to the IAEAs Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) only after it received an LWR from the United States. Secretary Rice dismissed the claim, but the sense of significant progress diminished, and additional talks were not held in 2005. After the Six-Party Talks stalled again, hostile rhetoric between Washington and Pyongyang intensified. Incoming U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Alexander Vershbow labeled North Korea a criminal regime and likened the state to Nazi Germany for its criminal activities. The same week, Jay Lefkowitz, the Special Envoy for Human Rights in North Korea appointed under the North Korean Human Rights Act, visited North Korea and called it a deeply oppressive nation while attending a human rights conference in Seoul. The escalated attacks were met with a torrent of hostile responses from North Korean sources. At a brief reconvening of the Six-Party Talks in November, the counterfeiting issue became the main focus: the North Koreans insisted that the imposition of sanctions on a Macau bank for its alleged role in helping North Korea launder counterfeit U.S. dollars constituted a hostile action that made implementation of the Beijing joint statement impossible. Criticism of North Korea's human rights record became more prominent on the U.S. agenda in 2005. Jay Lefkowitz was appointed as the Special Envoy for Human Rights in North Korea, a position created by the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004. His public statements on the situation facing refugees and North Korean citizens, paired with a high-profile meeting in the White House between President Bush and a prominent North Korean defector and author, amplified the Administrations concern about North Korea's human rights record. Emphasizing this record drew attention to the gap between the United States and South Korea in dealing with the Norths human rights abuses: in order to avoid provoking Pyongyang, Seoul abstained from voting on resolutions condemning North Korea at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights conference and the United Nations General Assembly meeting in 2005. In addition to human rights, North Korea's criminal activities began receiving heightened attention in late 2005. In September, American officials imposed penalties on Banco Delta Asia, a Macau bank that allegedly allowed the laundering of U.S. dollars counterfeited by North Korea. Noting the chilling effect on the Six-Party Talks, some analysts question the timing of the announcement, but Treasury officials insist that the issue is a law-enforcement activity and in no way related to the multilateral negotiations. South Korea has distanced itself from the U.S. accusations and reiterated its stance that raising such matters causes unnecessary friction with Pyongyang and jeopardizes the resolution of the nuclear issue. China, warned by the United States to crack down on illegal North Korean transaction in its banks, has taken some steps to curb such activity, but U.S. officials say it is unclear how aggressively Chinese authorities are moving. Beijing has also urged Pyongyang not to use the issue as a reason to boycott the Six-Party Talks. In December, the U.S. Treasury Department also put out an advisory warning U.S. financial institutions to be wary of financial relationships with North Korea that could be exploited for the purposes of illicit activities. In August 2005, the North Korean government announced it would no longer need humanitarian assistance from the United Nations, including from the World Food Program (WFP), the primary channel for U.S. food aid. In response, the WFP shut down its operations in December 2005 and the United States suspended its shipments of food aid. North Korea also asked all resident foreigners from the dozen or so aid NGOs operating in Pyongyang to leave the country. In November 2005, Pyongyang decided to reject aid from the European Union (EU) after the EU proposed a U.N. resolution on human rights in North Korea. Part of Pyongyangs motivation appears to be have been a desire to negotiate a less intrusive foreign presence, particularly the WFPs fairly extensive monitoring system. Officially, the North Korean government has attributed its decisions to an improved harvest, the decline in WFP food shipments, a desire to end dependence on food assistance, and its unhappiness with the United States and EUs raising the human rights issue. Apparently, North Korea will continue to accept direct food shipments from South Korea and China, and many have accused these countries with undermining the WFPs negotiating leverage with Pyongyang. China, which provides all of its assistance directly to North Korea, is widely believed to have provided even more food than the United States. Since 2001, South Korea has emerged as a major provider of food assistance, perhaps surpassing China in importance in some years. Almost 90% of Seouls food shipments from 2001-2005 have been provided bilaterally to Pyongyang. Notably, China apparently does not monitor its food assistance, and South Korea has a small monitoring system. Several key officials in charge of U.S. policy toward North Korea were reshuffled in 2005. Critics of earlier U.S. policy were optimistic that Condoleezza Rices confirmation as Secretary of State in January would bring a greater degree of coherence to U.S. policy because of her reputation as one of President Bushs most trusted confidantes. U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Christopher Hill, a career foreign service officer with a reputation as a strong negotiator, was selected to be Assistant Secretary for East Asia and the Pacific, as well as the chief envoy for the Six-Party Talks. As Rice began her post at the State Department, policy analysts studied her language for clues about the U.S. approach to North Korea. During her confirmation hearing, Rice included North Korea among the list of outposts of tyranny, thereby appearing to signal a tough approach to the North. However, her declaration during a March swing through Asia that North Korea was a sovereign state was interpreted as a willingness to negotiate with Pyongyang. Apparently operating with more authority than his predecessor, Hill engaged the North Koreans in bilateral meetings and, eventually, in the Six-Party Talks. Two figures that appeared later in the year, however, were seen by many in the policy community as delivering a more hardline message to the North Koreans: Alexander Vershbow, the incoming U.S. Ambassador to South Korea, and Jay Lefkowitz, Special Envoy for Human Rights in North Korea. (See statements above.) Pyongyang-Seoul relations, though typically moving in fits and starts, overall definitively advanced toward stronger cooperation. Major progress was achieved in developing the Kaesong Industrial Zone, an inter-Korean project of 15 South Korean firms employing about 6,000 North Korean workers. South Korea started electricity flows to firms operating in the zone, located in North Korea territory north of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Tourism numbers ballooned (although all from South Korea to North Korea, and only in controlled areas), and inter-Korean trade topped $1 billion in 2005. Ministerial talks, the first in over a year, were held in June, a military hotline was established, and a variety of negotiations, if not concrete results, on joint river surveys, fishing, farming, and transportation went forward. Significantly, the South Korean Defense White Paper decided not to label North Korea as its main enemy, and instead designated it as substantial military threat. North Korea demanded 500,000 tons of fertilizer from the South, but Seoul officials only provided 200,000 tons because of Pyongyangs refusal to return to the Six-Party Talks. Ties between Washington and Seoul were often strained by the capitals different approaches to North Korea, despite official declarations that they shared the same goal of eliminating North Korea's nuclear weapons program through a diplomatic process. The Roh Administrations public embrace of a framework aimed at balancing the nuclear issue with North-South reconciliation contributed to the impression in many corners that South Korea was asserting a distinctly independent foreign policy stance, sometimes at odds with stated U.S. goals. A disagreement between the U.S. military command in Korea and the South Korean Defense Ministry on the contingency plan, known as OPLAN 5029, to respond to an internal crisis in North Korea, was diffused, if not fully resolved. Despite these tensions, Presidents Bush and Roh held a summits in June and November in which they reiterated their shared strategic goal but declined to work out tactical differences. Indicating a need to strengthen the bilateral relationship, the two leaders announced a new strategic dialogue and the intention to move forward with possible Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations at their meeting preceding the November Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Busan, Korea. Though the North Korea nuclear issue remains unresolved, China has burnished its leadership credentials as host of the process. Beijing was praised as an effective broker and drafter of the breakthrough joint statement issued at the fourth round of Six-Party Talks. As the party viewed with having the most leverage over Pyongyang, China was called upon to re-engage North Korea after the February 10 announcement that it possessed nuclear weapons. Beijing officials have carefully timed their high-level visits to the Koreas, with an eye on balancing their interests with both. Chinese President Hu Jintaos visit to Pyongyang in October highlighted the consolidation of strong political and economic relations between the nations, and provided a significant counterweight to his visit to Seoul for the APEC summit the following month. Many analysts view Chinas strategy as largely successful in serving its national interests: avoiding major diplomatic crises, preventing the collapse of North Korea, strengthening its economic relations with South Korea, deflecting potential U.S. criticism on other issues such as human rights because of its leverage over North Korea, and enhancing its own reputation as a major diplomatic power. Apart from the dynamics surrounding the on-again, off-again Six-Party Talks, historical issues continued to simmer in Northeast Asia, generally at Japans expense. Early in the year, a dispute over the historical claims to the Tokdo/Takeshima islands, a set of small uninhabited rocks now controlled by South Korea, erupted between Seoul and Tokyo. Most observers saw the controversy as inflamed by domestic politics on both sides; as a result, a relatively minor issue derailed major diplomatic initiatives. Japanese Prime Minister Koizumis fifth visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in October prompted outraged responses from both Beijing and Seoul, and both canceled upcoming summits with Tokyo in protest. Japans attempts at moving the normalization process forward with North Korea also faltered. The appointment of Taro Aso as foreign minister and Shinzo Abe as chief cabinet secretary, both known as conservative figures who support the Yasukuni visits, was viewed by many in the region as an indication of Japans drift toward the right. Regional leaders voiced opposition to Japans bid for a permanent place on the United Nations Security Council. On the whole, Japans relations with the region declined as long-standing historical resentments and ascendant suspicions of Japans intentions hurt bilateral relationships with its neighbors. U.S.-Japan relations, meanwhile, continued to advance as leaders announced a major revamping of the military alliance that calls for Japan to take a more active role in contributing to regional stability. North Korea continued to allow periodic visits by non-Administration officials and specialists; some observers viewed the receptions as part of Pyongyangs strategy of creating divisions and distractions within the U.S. policy community. In January, Representative Curt Weldon led a congressional delegation to Pyongyang. After trying to assure senior North Korean officials that the United States was sincere about wanting to peacefully resolve the nuclear weapons issue, Weldon reported back that North Korea was ready to rejoin the Six-Party Talks. He also revealed that the North Koreans claimed to have nuclear weapons, a claim that later was announced publicly and which contributed to an increase in tension and delayed return to the Talks. High-level North Korean officials also received Selig Harrison, a North Korea specialist known for his pro-engagement views, and impressed upon him that Pyongyang was unwilling to dismantle its nuclear weapons program until the United States moved to normalize relations. This message from the North Koreans reinforced their repeated demand that they receive assurances and assistance at the front end of any exchange, while the United States maintained that any deal was predicated on first the elimination of all nuclear programs in North Korea. Stanford University professor John Lewis and former Los Alamos National Lab Director Sig Hecker also visited Pyongyang and delivered messages about the status of North Korea's nuclear program back to the Administration. Finally, former Clinton Administration official and New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson met with officials in Pyongyang in October in between sessions of the Six-Party Talks. CRS Report RL32743, North Korea: A Chronology of Events, October 2002-December 2004 , by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]. CRS Issue Brief IB98045, Korea: U.S.-Korean Relations Issues for Congress , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Issue Brief IB91141, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RL31696, North Korea: Economic Sanctions Prior to Removal from Terrorism Designation , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RS21834, U.S. Assistance to North Korea: Fact Sheet , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RL31785, Foreign Assistance to North Korea , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RL32493, North Korea: Economic Leverage and Policy Analysis , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RS21391, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: Latest Developments , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RS21473, North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RL32167, Drug Trafficking and North Korea: Issues for U.S. Policy , by [author name scrubbed]. DMZ - demilitarized zone dividing North and South Korea DPRK - Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea EU - European Union GNP - gross national product HEU - highly enriched uranium IAEA - International Atomic Energy Agency KCNA - Korea Central News Agency (North Korea's official news agency) KEDO - Korea Peninsula Energy Development Organization NGO - non-governmental organization NLL - Northern Limit Line NPT - Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty PRC - Peoples Republic of China PSI - Proliferation Security Initiative ROK - Republic of Korea TCOG - Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (United States, Japan, and South Korea)
summary: This report provides a chronology of events relevant to U.S. relations with North Korea in 2005 and is a continuation of CRS Report RL32743, North Korea: A Chronology of Events, October 2002-December 2004, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]. The chronology includes significant meetings, events, and statements that shed light on the issues surrounding North Korea's nuclear weapons program. An introductory analysis highlights the key developments and notes other significant regional dynamics. Particular attention is paid to the Six-Party Talks, inter-Korean relations, key U.S. officials in charge of North Korean policy, China's leadership in the negotiations, Japan's relationship with its neighbors, and contact with North Korea outside of the executive branch, including a Congressional delegation. Information for this report came from a variety of news articles, scholarly publications, government materials, and other sources, the accuracy of which CRS has not verified. This report will not be updated.