<gh_stars>1-10
{
    "id": 27062,
    "citation_title": "Pandemic Lockdown: The Role of Government Commitment",
    "citation_author": [
        "<NAME>",
        "<NAME>"
    ],
    "citation_publication_date": "2020-04-27",
    "issue_date": "2020-04-23",
    "revision_date": "2020-10-19",
    "topics": [
        "Macroeconomics",
        "Fiscal Policy",
        "Public Economics",
        "Health, Education, and Welfare",
        "Health"
    ],
    "program": [
        "Economic Fluctuations and Growth",
        "Health Economics",
        "Political Economy"
    ],
    "projects": null,
    "working_groups": null,
    "abstract": "\n\nThis paper studies optimal lockdown policies in a dynamic economy without government commitment. A lockdown imposes a cap on labor supply, which lowers economic output but improves health prospects. A government would like to commit to limit the extent of future lockdowns in order to increase investment by supporting a more optimistic economic outlook. However, such a commitment may not be credible since investment decisions are sunk at the time when the government decides on lockdowns. Rules that limit a government\u2019s future policy discretion can improve the efficiency of lockdowns, even in the presence of noncontractible information.\n\n",
    "acknowledgement": "\nWe thank <NAME>, Andr\u00e9<NAME>, \u00c9milien Gouin-Bonenfant, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, and seminar participants at Columbia University and the CEPR/IHEID Webinar for helpful comments. <NAME> provided excellent research assistance. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, the Federal Reserve System, or the National Bureau of Economic Research. Any errors are our own.\n\n\n"
}