{
    "datestamp": "Wed Apr 14 22:32:13 EDT 2021",
    "title": "Replication data for: The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation: Comment",
    "creator": "<NAME>",
    "identifier": [
        "112563",
        "112563",
        "https://doi.org/10.3886/E112563V1"
    ],
    "description": "Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson's (2001) seminal article argues property-rights institutions powerfully affect national income, using estimated mortality rates of early European settlers to instrument capital expropriation risk. However, 36 of the 64 countries in the sample are assigned\nmortality rates from other countries, often based on mistaken or conflicting evidence. Also, incomparable mortality rates from populations of laborers, bishops, and soldiers\u2014often on campaign\u2014are combined in a manner that favors the hypothesis. When these data issues are controlled for, the relationship between mortality and expropriation risk lacks robustness, and\ninstrumental-variable estimates become unreliable, often with infinite confidence intervals. (JEL D02, E23, F54, I12, N40, O43, P14)",
    "subject": [
        "D02 Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact",
        "E23 Macroeconomics: Production",
        "F54 Colonialism; Imperialism; Postcolonialism",
        "I12 Health Behavior",
        "N40 Economic History: Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation: General, International, or Comparative",
        "O43 Institutions and Growth",
        "P14 Capitalist Systems: Property Rights"
    ]
}