text: Motivated by the difficulty of effecting fundamental change in the architecture of the Internet, in this paper, we study from a theoretical perspective the question of how individuals can join forces toward collective ventures. To that end, we draw on an elementary concept in Internet systems engineering, namely, that of incremental deployability, which we study mathematically and computationally. For example, we show that incremental deployability is at least as general a concept as the Nash equilibrium (in that the latter can be derived from the former). We then draw on this foundation to design and analyze institutional mechanisms that are not only promising to bootstrap emerging Internet architectures but they also have broader applications in social organization beyond its predominant market (and finance)-based character.
  @cite_39: With a cryptographic root-of-trust for Internet routing(RPKI [17]) on the horizon, we can finally start planning the deployment of one of the secure interdomain routing protocols proposed over a decade ago (Secure BGP [22], secure origin BGP [37]). However, if experience with IPv6 is any indicator, this will be no easy task. Security concerns alone seem unlikely to provide sufficient local incentive to drive the deployment process forward. Worse yet, the security benefits provided by the S*BGP protocols do not even kick in until a large number of ASes have deployed them. Instead, we appeal to ISPs' interest in increasing revenue-generating traffic. We propose a strategy that governments and industry groups can use to harness ISPs' local business objectives and drive global S*BGP deployment. We evaluate our deployment strategy using theoretical analysis and large-scale simulations on empirical data. Our results give evidence that the market dynamics created by our proposal can transition the majority of the Internet to S*BGP.
summary: For example, @cite_39 show that the deployment of Secure-BGP can be facilitated by a pair of mechanisms, namely, (i) routing policies that prefer Internet paths safeguarded by Secure-BGP in partial deployment and (ii) offloading cryptography from autonomous systems without a customer (known as stub autonomous systems) to their providers. These techniques improve the incremental deployability of Secure-BGP, however, the incentive structure these techniques induce remains akin to the stag hunt, and, in fact, Gill propose concentrating peer pressure and regulatory efforts to a small fraction of core autonomous systems for their techniques to be effective in driving the growth of Secure-BGP. Our point, therefore, that, although such line of effort is certainly helpful to the adoption of emerging technologies it is not in general conclusive, remains.