text: We study the envy free pricing problem faced by a seller who wishes to maximize revenue by setting prices for bundles of items. If there is an unlimited supply of items and agents are single minded then we show that finding the revenue maximizing envy free allocation pricing can be solved in polynomial time by reducing it to an instance of weighted independent set on a perfect graph. We define an allocation pricing as if no agent wishes to replace her allocation with the union of the allocations of some set of other agents and her price with the sum of their prices. We show that it is -hard to decide if a given allocation pricing is multi envy free. We also show that revenue maximization multi envy free allocation pricing is hard. Furthermore, we give efficient algorithms and hardness results for various variants of the highway problem.
  @cite_13: 
  @cite_6: We prove semi-logarithmic inapproximability for a maximization problem called unique coverage: given a collection of sets, find a subcollection that maximizes the number of elements covered exactly once. Specifically, we prove O(1 logσ(e)n) inapproximability assuming that NP n BPTIME(2ne) for some e > 0. We also prove O(1 log1 3-e n) inapproximability, for any e > 0, assuming that refuting random instances of 3SAT is hard on average; and prove O(1 log n) inapproximability under a plausible hypothesis concerning the hardness of another problem, balanced bipartite independent set. We establish matching upper bounds up to exponents, even for a more general (budgeted) setting, giving an Ω(1 log n)-approximation algorithm as well as an Ω(1 log B)-approximation algorithm when every set has at most B elements. We also show that our inapproximability results extend to envy-free pricing, an important problem in computational economics. We describe how the (budgeted) unique coverage problem, motivated by real-world applications, has close connections to other theoretical problems including max cut, maximum coverage, and radio broad-casting.
  @cite_4: We consider the problem of pricing n items to maximize revenue when faced with a series of unknown buyers with complex preferences, and show that a simple pricing scheme achieves surprisingly strong guarantees. We show that in the unlimited supply setting, a random single price achieves expected revenue within a logarithmic factor of the total social welfare for customers with general valuation functions, which may not even necessarily be monotone. This generalizes work of Guruswami et. al [18], who show a logarithmic factor for only the special cases of single-minded and unit-demand customers. In the limited supply setting, we show that for subadditive valuations, a random single price achieves revenue within a factor of 2O(√(log n loglog n) of the total social welfare, i.e., the optimal revenue the seller could hope to extract even if the seller could price each bundle differently for every buyer. This is the best approximation known for any item pricing scheme for subadditive (or even submodular) valuations, even using multiple prices. We complement this result with a lower bound showing a sequence of subadditive (in fact, XOS) buyers for which any single price has approximation ratio 2Ω(log1 4 n), thus showing that single price schemes cannot achieve a polylogarithmic ratio. This lower bound demonstrates a clear distinction between revenue maximization and social welfare maximization in this setting, for which [12,10] show that a fixed price achieves a logarithmic approximation in the case of XOS [12], and more generally subadditive [10], customers. We also consider the multi-unit case examined by [1111] in the context of social welfare, and show that so long as no buyer requires more than a 1 -- e fraction of the items, a random single price now does in fact achieve revenue within an O(log n) factor of the maximum social welfare.
summary: Much of the work on envy free revenue maximization is on item pricing rather than on subset pricing. @cite_13 give an @math -approximation for the general single minded problem, where @math is the number of items and @math is the number of agents. This result was extended by @cite_4 to an @math -approximation for arbitrary valuations and unlimited supply using single fixed pricing which is basically pricing all bundles with the same price. @cite_6 show that the general item pricing problem with unlimited availability of items is hard to approximate within a (semi-)logarithmic factor.