text: Traditional regulatory methods for spectrum licensing have been recently identified as one of the causes for the under-utilization of the valuable radio spectrum. Governmental agencies such as the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) are seeking ways to remove stringent regulatory barriers and facilitate broader access to the spectrum resources. The goal is to allow for an improved and ubiquitous sharing of the precious radio spectrum between commercial service providers. In this paper, we propose a novel noncooperative game theoretic approach, to show how to foster more sharing of the radio spectrum via the use of regulatory power. We define a two stage game in which the government regulators move first, followed by the providers. The providers are incentivized by lower spectrum allocation fees from the regulators in return for proof-of-sharing. The providers are offered discounted spectrum bands, potentially at different locations, but will be asked to provide coverage to users that are not subscribed to them so as to maintain their subsidy incentives from the government. In a simplification of the model, analytical expressions for the providers' perfect equilibrium strategies are derived, and we argue for the existence of the government's part of a perfect equilibrium. Our analysis shows that through subsidization, the government can provide small service providers a fair chance to compete with the large providers, thereby avoiding monopolization in the market.
  @cite_24: 
  @cite_18: Abstract We introduce international capital mobility into the Harris-Todaro model and examine the effectiveness of some policy tools. The main message is such that a wage subsidy in manufacturing and a tariff are no longer effective to improve welfare, while a wage subsidy in agriculture remains valid under the assumption of international capital mobility. This is in sharp contrast to the result obtained for the original Harris-Todaro model.
  @cite_25: The need to measure and evaluate transit system performance has led to the development of numerous performance indicators. However, depending upon the indicator, we oftentimes reach different conclusions regarding transit system performance. The research reported in this paper uses factor analytic methods to generate a set of underlying attributes (factors) that capture the performance of public transit systems in Indiana. Similar to what is reported in the literature, this study finds three attributes that best describe transit system performance: efficiency, effectiveness, and overall performance. Based upon systemsO factor scores, the study finds that systems scoring highly on one attribute generally perform well on the remaining attributes. Further, there is an inverse relationship between system performance and subsidies, a finding that supports performance based subsidy allocations.
summary: Regulatory practice has been part of the wireless market since its inception as the resource being shared was soon recognized to be very valuable. Governmental agencies establish regulatory policies to increase the efficiency of the spectrum market while preserving an acceptable level of fairness in sharing the precious spectrum. The concept of subsidization is one way to involve the government so as to incentivize various long-term goals in the market being regulated. Typically, subsidy regulations are used for markets serving the larger good'' (i.e., the benefit of the whole society) and involving a significant amount of cost producers cannot bare individually. Transportation @cite_25 , agriculture @cite_18 and telecommunications @cite_24 are examples of such markets where new initiatives require significant infrastructure investments, and hence the government's involvement is justified. However, subsidization is known to have negative effects on the efficiency of the market. Thus, subsidization is preferred if at all possible.