text: [Context.] The success of deep learning makes its usage more and more tempting in safety-critical applications. However such applications have historical standards (e.g., DO178, ISO26262) which typically do not envision the usage of machine learning. We focus in particular on of software artifacts, i.e., code modules, functions, or statements (depending on the desired granularity). [Problem.] Both code and requirements are a problem when dealing with deep neural networks: code constituting the network is not comparable to classical code; furthermore, requirements for applications where neural networks are required are typically very hard to specify: even though high-level requirements can be defined, it is very hard to make such requirements concrete enough, that one can qualify them of low-level requirements. An additional problem is that deep learning is in practice very much based on trial-and-error, which makes the final result hard to explain without the previous iterations. [Proposed solution.] We investigate which artifacts could play a similar role to code or low-level requirements in neural network development and propose various traces which one could possibly consider as a replacement for classical notions. We also propose a form of traceability (and new artifacts) in order to deal with the particular trial-and-error development process for deep learning.
  @cite_31: Rapid progress in machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI) has brought increasing attention to the potential impacts of AI technologies on society. In this paper we discuss one such potential impact: the problem of accidents in machine learning systems, defined as unintended and harmful behavior that may emerge from poor design of real-world AI systems. We present a list of five practical research problems related to accident risk, categorized according to whether the problem originates from having the wrong objective function ("avoiding side effects" and "avoiding reward hacking"), an objective function that is too expensive to evaluate frequently ("scalable supervision"), or undesirable behavior during the learning process ("safe exploration" and "distributional shift"). We review previous work in these areas as well as suggesting research directions with a focus on relevance to cutting-edge AI systems. Finally, we consider the high-level question of how to think most productively about the safety of forward-looking applications of AI.
  @cite_13: As machine learning systems become ubiquitous, there has been a surge of interest in interpretable machine learning: systems that provide explanation for their outputs. These explanations are often used to qualitatively assess other criteria such as safety or non-discrimination. However, despite the interest in interpretability, there is very little consensus on what interpretable machine learning is and how it should be measured. In this position paper, we first define interpretability and describe when interpretability is needed (and when it is not). Next, we suggest a taxonomy for rigorous evaluation and expose open questions towards a more rigorous science of interpretable machine learning.
summary: There has been attempts to set grounds for a rigorous science'' of machine learning @cite_13 , again very useful, but not related to traceability. Finally, many safety-related problems have been identified for AI, especially for reinforcement learning @cite_31 . The identified challenges are relevant and the paper proposes a few attempts of solutions. Most of them are a source of inspiration to identify sources of problem and to analyze whether those sources can be tackled with traceability (even though it turns out not to be really the case for solutions identified in the present paper).