text: With the increasing connectivity enabled by the Internet of Things (IoT), security becomes a critical concern, and users should invest to secure their IoT applications. Due to the massive devices in the IoT network, users cannot be aware of the security policies taken by all its connected neighbors. Instead, a user makes security decisions based on the cyber risks that he perceives by observing a selected number of nodes. To this end, we propose a model which incorporates the limited attention or bounded rationality nature of players in the IoT. Specifically, each individual builds a sparse cognitive network of nodes to respond to. Based on this simplified cognitive network representation, each user then determines his security management policy by minimizing his own real-world security cost. The bounded rational decision-makings of players and their cognitive network formations are interdependent and thus should be addressed in a holistic manner. We establish a games-in-games framework and propose a Gestalt Nash equilibrium (GNE) solution concept to characterize the decisions of agents and quantify their risk of bounded perception due to the limited attention. In addition, we design a proximal-based iterative algorithm to compute the GNE. With case studies of smart communities, the designed algorithm can successfully identify the critical users whose decisions need to be taken into account by the other users during the security management.
  @cite_18: In this paper, we aim to establish a holistic framework that integrates the cyber-physical layers of a cloud-enabled Internet of Controlled Things (IoCT) through the lens of contract theory. At the physical layer, the device uses cloud services to operate the system. The quality of cloud services is unknown to the device, and hence the device designs a menu of contracts to enable a reliable and incentive-compatible service. Based on the received contracts, the cloud service provider (SP) serves the device by determining its optimal cyber defense strategy. A contract-based FlipCloud game is used to assess the security risk and the cloud quality of service (QoS) under advanced persistent threats. The contract design approach creates a pricing mechanism for on-demand security as a service for cloud-enabled IoCT. By focusing on high and low QoS types of cloud SPs, we find that the contract design can be divided into two regimes (regimes I and II) with respect to the provided cloud QoS. Specifically, the physical devices whose optimal contracts are in regime I always request the best possible cloud security service. In contrast, the device only asks for a cloud security level that can stabilize the system when the optimal contracts lie in regime II. We illustrate the obtained results via case studies of a cloud-enabled smart home.
  @cite_14: Cyber insurance is a valuable approach to mitigate further the cyber risk and its loss in addition to the deployment of technological cyber defense solutions, such as intrusion detection systems and firewalls. An effective cyber insurance policy can reduce the number of successful cyber attacks by incentivizing the adoption of preventative measures and the implementation of best practices of the users. To study cyber insurance in a holistic manner, we first establish a bi-level game-theoretic model that nests a zero-sum game in a moral-hazard type of principal-agent game to capture complex interactions between a user, an attacker, and the insurer. The game framework provides an integrative view of the cyber insurance and enables a systematic design of incentive compatible and attack-aware insurance policy. The framework is further extended to study a network of users and their risk interdependencies. We completely characterize the equilibrium solutions of the bi-level game. Our analytical results provide a fundamental limit on insurability, predict the Peltzman effect, and reveal the principles of zero operating profit and the linear insurance policy of the insurer. We provide analytical results and numerical experiments to corroborate the analytical results and demonstrate the network effects as a result of the strategic interactions among the three types of players.
  @cite_4: In this paper, we design a secure, robust and resilient cyber-physical wind energy system (WES) from a cross-layer perspective. We establish a system-of-systems framework for the large-scale wind farm which includes the cyber and physical components. For the cyber layer, we use a game-theoretic model to capture the strategic behaviors of the network defender and the cyber attacker, and compute its mixed strategy Nash equilibria. For the physical layer, we design a robust and resilient switching controller using a Markov jump linear system model. Due to the interdependence between the cyber and physical systems, their performances are coupled and need to be designed in a holistic manner. To address this challenge, we propose an iterative algorithm to study the system-of-systems performance under the equilibrium design which jointly takes the cyber and physical layers into account. Case studies are provided to illustrate the interdependent design principles of cyber-physical WES.
  @cite_22: Network connectivity plays an important role in the information exchange between different agents in the multi-level networks. In this paper, we establish a game-theoretic framework to capture the uncoordinated nature of the decision-making at different layers of the multi-level networks. Specifically, we design a decentralized algorithm that aims to maximize the algebraic connectivity of the global network iteratively. In addition, we show that the designed algorithm converges to a Nash equilibrium asymptotically and yields an equilibrium network. To study the network resiliency, we introduce three adversarial attack models and characterize their worst-case impacts on the network performance. Case studies based on a two-layer mobile robotic network are used to corroborate the effectiveness and resiliency of the proposed algorithm and show the interdependency between different layers of the network during the recovery processes.
  @cite_31: The emerging Internet of Things (IoT) applications that leverage ubiquitous connectivity and big data are facilitating the realization of smart everything initiatives. IoT-enabled infrastructures have naturally a multi-layer system architecture with an overlaid or underlaid device network and its coexisting infrastructure network. The connectivity between different components in these two heterogeneous networks plays an important role in delivering real-time information and ensuring a high-level situational awareness. However, IoT- enabled infrastructures face cyber threats due to the wireless nature of communications. Therefore, maintaining the network connectivity in the presence of adversaries is a critical task for the infrastructure network operators. In this paper, we establish a three-player three-stage game-theoretic framework including two network operators and one attacker to capture the secure design of multi- layer infrastructure networks by allocating limited resources. We use subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPE) to characterize the strategies of players with sequential moves. In addition, we assess the efficiency of the equilibrium network by comparing with its team optimal solution counterparts in which two network operators can coordinate. We further design a scalable algorithm to guide the construction of the equilibrium IoT-enabled infrastructure networks. Finally, we use case studies on the emerging paradigm of Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT) to corroborate the obtained results.
  @cite_21: In this paper, we introduce a distributed dynamic routing algorithm in multi-hop cognitive radio (CR) networks, in which secondary users (SUs) want to minimize their interference to the primary users (PUs) while keeping the delay along the route low. We employ a cognitive pilot channel (CPC) for SUs to be able to access the information about PUs, including PUs' locations and channel conditions. Medial axis with a relaxation factor is used as a reference path for the routing, along which we develop a hierarchical structure for multiple sources to reach their destinations. We introduce a temporal and spatial dynamic non-cooperative game to model the interactions among the SUs as well as their influences on the PUs, and obtain by backward induction a set of mixed (behavioral) Nash equilibrium strategies. We also employ a multi-stage fictitious play learning algorithm for distributed routing, which minimizes the overall interference from the SUs to the PUs, as well as the average packet delay along the route from the SU nodes to their destinations. Simulation results show that our proposed algorithm can avoid congestion in the CR network and minimize delay while keeping the interference level low.
  @cite_42: The increasing integration of autonomous systems with publicly available networks exposes them to cyber attackers. An adversary can launch a man-in-the-middle attack to gain control of the system and inflict maximum damages with collision and suicidal attacks. To address this issue, this work establishes an integrative game and control framework to incorporate security into the automatic designs, and take into account the cyber-physical nature and the real-time requirements of the system. We establish a cyber-physical signaling game to develop an impact-aware cyber defense mechanism and leverage model-predictive control methods to design cyber-aware control strategies. The integrative framework enables the co-design of cyber-physical systems to minimize the inflicted systems, leading to online updating the cyber defense and physical layer control decisions. We use unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to illustrate the algorithm, and corroborate the analytical results in two case studies.
  @cite_3: Emerging Internet of Things (IoTs) technologies provide many benefits to the improvement of eHealth. The successful deployment of IoTs depends on ensuring security and privacy that need to adapt to their processing capabilities and resource use. IoTs are vulnerable to attacks since communications are mostly wireless, unattended things are usually vulnerable to physical attacks, and most IoT components are constrained by energy, communications, and computation capabilities necessary for the implementation of complex security-supporting schemes. This paper describes a risk-based adaptive security framework for IoTs in eHealth that will estimate and predict risk damages and future benefits using game theory and context-awareness techniques. The paper also describes the validation case study.
  @cite_39: A collaborative security detection method is investigated for the Internet of Things (IoT) systems. Consensus protocol is utilized to implement the information sharing and fusion in a collaborative manner. A game theoretical analysis framework is developed for the collaborative security detection by considering the confrontation between the defender and the attacker. The objective is to achieve the maximum security protection for the entire IoT systems. The existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium of game model with complete consensus are analyzed. Then an iteration learning based calculation method is presented to determine the Nash equilibrium. Quantitative analysis is provided for the relationship between the Nash equilibriums of the game models in the cases of complete and incomplete consensus with infinite and finite number of iterations. Simulation results by considering DDoS attack are also provided to verify our theoretical results.
  @cite_24: 
  @cite_0: In this paper, we consider a delegated dynamic systemic cyber risk management problem between a resource owner (principal) and a risk manager (agent). The principal can only observe cyber risk outcomes of the network rather than the efforts that the agent spends on protecting the resources. Under this asymmetric information, the principal aims to minimize the systemic cyber risks by designing a dynamic contract that specifies the compensation flows and the anticipated efforts of the manager by taking into account his incentives and rational behaviors. We formulate a bi-level mechanism design problem for dynamic contract design which can be seen as a special class of differential game. We show that the principal has rational controllability of the systemic risk by designing an incentive compatible estimator of the agent's hidden efforts. We characterize the optimal mechanism design by reformulating the problem into a stochastic optimal control program and derive the solution explicitly. We further reveal a separation principle for dynamic risk management where the effort estimation and the compensation design can be achieved separately.
  @cite_23: Cloud computing is an evolving paradigm with tremendous momentum, but its unique aspects exacerbate security and privacy challenges. This article explores the roadblocks and solutions to providing a trustworthy cloud computing environment.
  @cite_2: The development of advanced wireless communication technologies and smart embedded control devices makes everything connected, leading to an emerging paradigm of the Internet of Controlled Things IoCT. IoCT consists of two layers of systems: cyber layer and physical layer. This work aims to establish a holistic framework that integrates the cyber-physical layers of the IoCT through the lens of contract theory. For the cyber layer, we use a FlipIt game to capture the cloud security. We focus on two types of cloud, high-type and low-type, in terms of their provided quality of service QoS. The cloud's type is of private information which is unknown to the contract maker. Therefore, the control system administrator CSA at the physical layer needs to design a menu of two contracts for each type of service provider SP due to this asymmetric information structure. According to the received contract, SP decides his cyber defense strategy in the FlipIt game of which the Nash equilibrium determines the QoS of the cloud, and further influences the physical system performance. The objective of CSA is to minimize the payment to the cloud SP and the control cost jointly by designing optimal contracts. Due to the interdependence between the cyber and physical layers in the cloud-enabled IoCT, we need to address the cloud security and contract design problems in an integrative manner. We find that CSA always requires the best QoS from two types of cloud. In addition, under the optimal contracts, the utilities of both SPs are constants. Furthermore, no contracts will be offered to the cloud if the resulting service cannot stabilize the physical system.
  @cite_15: 
  @cite_25: Access to the cloud has the potential to provide scalable and cost effective enhancements of physical devices through the use of advanced computational processes run on apparently limitless cyber infrastructure. On the other hand, cyber-physical systems and cloud-controlled devices are subject to numerous design challenges; among them is that of security. In particular, recent advances in adversary technology pose Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) which may stealthily and completely compromise a cyber system. In this paper, we design a framework for the security of cloud-based systems that specifies when a device should trust commands from the cloud which may be compromised. This interaction can be considered as a game between three players: a cloud defender administrator, an attacker, and a device. We use traditional signaling games to model the interaction between the cloud and the device, and we use the recently proposed FlipIt game to model the struggle between the defender and attacker for control of the cloud. Because attacks upon the cloud can occur without knowledge of the defender, we assume that strategies in both games are picked according to prior commitment. This framework requires a new equilibrium concept, which we call Gestalt Equilibrium, a fixed-point that expresses the interdependence of the signaling and FlipIt games. We present the solution to this fixed-point problem under certain parameter cases, and illustrate an example application of cloud control of an unmanned vehicle. Our results contribute to the growing understanding of cloud-controlled systems.
  @cite_12: Infrastructure networks are vulnerable to both cyber and physical attacks. Building a secure and resilient networked system is essential for providing reliable and dependable services. To this end, we establish a two-player three-stage game framework to capture the dynamics in the infrastructure protection and recovery phases. Specifically, the goal of the infrastructure network designer is to keep the network connected before and after the attack, while the adversary aims to disconnect the network by compromising a set of links. With costs for creating and removing links, the two players aim to maximize their utilities while minimizing the costs. In this paper, we use the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) to characterize the optimal strategies of the network defender and attacker. We derive the SPE explicitly in terms of system parameters. Finally, we use a case study of UAV-enabled communication networks for disaster recovery to corroborate the obtained analytical results.
  @cite_11: With the remarkable growth of the Internet and communication technologies over the past few decades, Internet of Things (IoTs) is enabling the ubiquitous connectivity of heterogeneous physical devices with software, sensors, and actuators. IoT networks are naturally two-layer with the cloud and cellular networks coexisting with the underlaid device-todevice (D2D) communications. The connectivity of IoTs plays an important role in information dissemination for missioncritical and civilian applications. However, IoT communication networks are vulnerable to cyber attacks including the denialof- service (DoS) and jamming attacks, resulting in link removals in IoT network. In this work, we develop a heterogeneous IoT network design framework in which a network designer can add links to provide additional communication paths between two nodes or secure links against attacks by investing resources. By anticipating the strategic cyber attacks, we characterize the optimal design of secure IoT network by first providing a lower bound on the number of links a secure network requires for a given budget of protected links, and then developing a method to construct networks that satisfy the heterogeneous network design specifications. Therefore, each layer of the designed heterogeneous IoT network is resistant to a predefined level of malicious attacks with minimum resources. Finally, we provide case studies on the Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT) to corroborate and illustrate our obtained results
summary: Security management has been investigated in various research fields including computer networks @cite_14 , communications @cite_21 , cloud computing @cite_23 and infrastructures @cite_22 . With the advances in ICTs, a growing number of works have focused on the emerging critical issue of IoT security @cite_39 @cite_3 . Due to the interconnectivity between different agents, the security of one agent is also dependent on its connected ones which gives rise to the notion of interdependent security'' @cite_24 . The authors in @cite_42 @cite_25 @cite_4 @cite_15 have further investigated the security interdependencies in multilayer cyber-physical systems. The authors in @cite_2 @cite_18 @cite_0 have developed optimal contracts to address the cyber-physical security issues in IoT. In @cite_31 @cite_12 @cite_11 , the authors proposed optimal schemes for designing secure and resilient multi-layer IoT networks through graph-theoretical approaches.