text: To achieve general intelligence, agents must learn how to interact with others in a shared environment: this is the challenge of multiagent reinforcement learning (MARL). The simplest form is independent reinforcement learning (InRL), where each agent treats its experience as part of its (non-stationary) environment. In this paper, we first observe that policies learned using InRL can overfit to the other agents' policies during training, failing to sufficiently generalize during execution. We introduce a new metric, joint-policy correlation, to quantify this effect. We describe an algorithm for general MARL, based on approximate best responses to mixtures of policies generated using deep reinforcement learning, and empirical game-theoretic analysis to compute meta-strategies for policy selection. The algorithm generalizes previous ones such as InRL, iterated best response, double oracle, and fictitious play. Then, we present a scalable implementation which reduces the memory requirement using decoupled meta-solvers. Finally, we demonstrate the generality of the resulting policies in two partially observable settings: gridworld coordination games and poker.
  @cite_88: This exciting and pioneering new overview of multiagent systems, which are online systems composed of multiple interacting intelligent agents, i.e., online trading, offers a newly seen computer science perspective on multiagent systems, while integrating ideas from operations research, game theory, economics, logic, and even philosophy and linguistics. The authors emphasize foundations to create a broad and rigorous treatment of their subject, with thorough presentations of distributed problem solving, game theory, multiagent communication and learning, social choice, mechanism design, auctions, cooperative game theory, and modal logics of knowledge and belief. For each topic, basic concepts are introduced, examples are given, proofs of key results are offered, and algorithmic considerations are examined. An appendix covers background material in probability theory, classical logic, Markov decision processes and mathematical programming. Written by two of the leading researchers of this engaging field, this book will surely serve as THE reference for researchers in the fastest-growing area of computer science, and be used as a text for advanced undergraduate or graduate courses.
  @cite_66: We investigate methods for planning in a Markov Decision Process where the cost function is chosen by an adversary after we fix our policy. As a running example, we consider a robot path planning problem where costs are influenced by sensors that an adversary places in the environment. We formulate the problem as a zero-sum matrix game where rows correspond to deterministic policies for the planning player and columns correspond to cost vectors the adversary can select. For a fixed cost vector, fast algorithms (such as value iteration) are available for solving MDPs. We develop efficient algorithms for matrix games where such best response oracles exist. We show that for our path planning problem these algorithms are at least an order of magnitude faster than direct solution of the linear programming formulation.
summary: The double oracle (DO) algorithm @cite_66 solves a set of (two-player, normal-form) subgames induced by subsets @math at time @math . A payoff matrix for the subgame @math includes only those entries corresponding to the strategies in @math . At each time step @math , an equilibrium @math is obtained for @math , and to obtain @math each player adds a best response @math from the full space @math , so for all @math , @math . The algorithm is illustrated in Figure . Note that finding an equilibrium in a zero-sum game takes time polynomial in @math , and is PPAD-complete for general-sum @cite_88 .