text: Moral responsibility is a major concern in automated decision-making, with applications ranging from self-driving cars to kidney exchanges. From the viewpoint of automated systems, the urgent questions are: (a) How can models of moral scenarios and blameworthiness be extracted and learnt automatically from data? (b) How can judgements be computed tractably, given the split-second decision points faced by the system? By building on deep tractable probabilistic learning, we propose a learning regime for inducing models of such scenarios automatically from data and reasoning tractably from them. We report on experiments that compare our system with human judgement in three illustrative domains: lung cancer staging, teamwork management, and trolley problems.
  @cite_29: Humans are adept at inferring the mental states underlying other agents’ actions, such as goals, beliefs, desires, emotions and other thoughts. We propose a computational framework based on Bayesian inverse planning for modeling human action understanding. The framework represents an intuitive theory of intentional agents’ behavior based on the principle of rationality: the expectation that agents will plan approximately rationally to achieve their goals, given their beliefs about the world. The mental states that caused an agent’s behavior are inferred by inverting this model of rational planning using Bayesian inference, integrating the likelihood of the observed actions with the prior over mental states. This approach formalizes in precise probabilistic terms the essence of previous qualitative approaches to action understanding based on an ‘‘intentional stance” [Dennett, D. C. (1987). The intentional stance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press] or a ‘‘teleological stance” [Gergely, G., Nadasdy, Z., Csibra, G., & Biro, S. (1995). Taking the intentional stance at 12 months of age. Cognition, 56, 165–193]. In three psychophysical experiments using animated stimuli of agents moving in simple mazes, we assess how well different inverse planning models based on different goal priors can predict human goal inferences. The results provide quantitative evidence for an approximately rational inference mechanism in human goal inference within our simplified stimulus paradigm, and for the flexible nature of goal representations that human observers can adopt. We discuss the implications of our experimental results for human action understanding in real-world contexts, and suggest how our framework might be extended to capture other kinds of mental state inferences, such as inferences about beliefs, or inferring whether an entity is an intentional agent.
  @cite_12: When modeling a decision problem using the influence diagram framework, the quantitative part rests on two principal components: probabilities for representing the decision maker's uncertainty about the domain and utilities for representing preferences. Over the last decade, several methods have been developed for learning the probabilities from a database. However, methods for learning the utilities have only received limited attention in the computer science community.A promising approach for learning a decision maker's utility function is to take outset in the decision maker's observed behavioral patterns, and then find a utility function which (together with a domain model) can explain this behavior. That is, it is assumed that decision maker's preferences are reflected in the behavior. Standard learning algorithms also assume that the decision maker is behavioral consistent, i.e., given a model of the decision problem, there exists a utility function which can account for all the observed behavior. Unfortunately, this assumption is rarely valid in real-world decision problems, and in these situations existing learning methods may only identify a trivial utility function. In this paper we relax this consistency assumption, and propose two algorithms for learning a decision maker's utility function from possibly inconsistent behavior; inconsistent behavior is interpreted as random deviations from an underlying (true) utility function. The main difference between the two algorithms is that the first facilitates a form of batch learning whereas the second focuses on adaptation and is particularly well-suited for scenarios where the DM's preferences change over time. Empirical results demonstrate the tractability of the algorithms, and they also show that the algorithms converge toward the true utility function for even very small sets of observations.
  @cite_23: Objective—To evaluate the pharmacokinetics of a novel commercial formulation of ivermectin after administration to goats. Animals—6 healthy adult goats. Procedure—Ivermectin (200 μg kg) was initially administered IV to each goat, and plasma samples were obtained for 36 days. After a washout period of 3 weeks, each goat received a novel commercial formulation of ivermectin (200 μg kg) by SC injection. Plasma samples were then obtained for 42 days. Drug concentrations were quantified by use of high-performance liquid chromatography with fluorescence detection. Results—Pharmacokinetics of ivermectin after IV administration were best described by a 2-compartment open model; values for main compartmental variables included volume of distribution at a steady state (9.94 L kg), clearance (1.54 L kg d), and area under the plasma concentration-time curve (AUC; 143 [ng•d] mL). Values for the noncompartmental variables included mean residence time (7.37 days), AUC (153 [ng•d] mL), and clearance (1.43 L kg d). After ...
summary: An important part of learning a model of moral decision-making is in learning a utility function. This is often referred to as (IRL) @cite_23 or @cite_29 . Our current implementation considers a simple approach for learning utilities (similar to @cite_12 ), but more involved paradigms such as those above could indeed have been used.