text: We design an expected polynomial-time, truthful-in-expectation, (1-1 e)-approximation mechanism for welfare maximization in a fundamental class of combinatorial auctions. Our results apply to bidders with valuations that are m matroid rank sums (MRS), which encompass most concrete examples of submodular functions studied in this context, including coverage functions, matroid weighted-rank functions, and convex combinations thereof. Our approximation factor is the best possible, even for known and explicitly given coverage valuations, assuming P != NP. Ours is the first truthful-in-expectation and polynomial-time mechanism to achieve a constant-factor approximation for an NP-hard welfare maximization problem in combinatorial auctions with heterogeneous goods and restricted valuations. Our mechanism is an instantiation of a new framework for designing approximation mechanisms based on randomized rounding algorithms. A typical such algorithm first optimizes over a fractional relaxation of the original problem, and then randomly rounds the fractional solution to an integral one. With rare exceptions, such algorithms cannot be converted into truthful mechanisms. The high-level idea of our mechanism design framework is to optimize directly over the (random) output of the rounding algorithm, rather than over the input to the rounding algorithm. This approach leads to truthful-in-expectation mechanisms, and these mechanisms can be implemented efficiently when the corresponding objective function is concave. For bidders with MRS valuations, we give a novel randomized rounding algorithm that leads to both a concave objective function and a (1-1 e)-approximation of the optimal welfare.
  @cite_3: In most of microeconomic theory, consumers are assumed to exhibit decreasing marginal utilities. This paper considers combinatorial auctions among such buyers. The valuations of such buyers are placed within a hierarchy of valuations that exhibit no complementarities, a hierarchy that includes also OR and XOR combinations of singleton valuations, and valuations satisfying the gross substitutes property. While we show that the allocation problem among valuations with decreasing marginal utilities is NP-hard, we present an efficient greedy 2-approximation algorithm for this case. No such approximation algorithm exists in a setting allowing for complementarities. Some results about strategic aspects of combinatorial auctions among players with decreasing marginal utilities are also presented.
  @cite_23: Combinatorial allocation problems require allocating items to players in a way that maximizes the total utility. Two such problems received attention recently, and were addressed using the same linear programming (LP) relaxation. In the Maximum Submodular Welfare (SMW) problem, utility functions of players are submodular, and for this case Dobzinski and Schapira [SODA 2006] showed an approximation ratio of 1 - 1 e. In the Generalized Assignment Problem (GAP) utility functions are linear but players also have capacity constraints. GAP admits a (1 - 1 e)- approximation as well, as shown by Fleischer, Goemans, Mirrokni and Sviridenko [SODA 2006]. In both cases, the approximation ratio was in fact shown for a more general version of the problem, for which improving 1 - 1 e is NPhard. In this paper, we show how to improve the 1 - 1 e approximation ratio, both for SMW and for GAP. A common theme in both improvements is the use of a new and optimal Fair Contention Resolution technique. However, each of the improvements involves a different rounding procedure for the above mentioned LP. In addition, we prove APX-hardness results for SMW (such results were known for GAP). An important feature of our hardness results is that they apply even in very restricted settings, e.g. when every player has nonzero utility only for a constant number of items.
  @cite_20: In the Submodular Welfare Problem, m items are to be distributed among n players with utility functions wi: 2[m] → R+. The utility functions are assumed to be monotone and submodular. Assuming that player i receives a set of items Si, we wish to maximize the total utility ∑i=1n wi(Si). In this paper, we work in the value oracle model where the only access to the utility functions is through a black box returning wi(S) for a given set S. Submodular Welfare is in fact a special case of the more general problem of submodular maximization subject to a matroid constraint: max f(S): S ∈ I , where f is monotone submodular and I is the collection of independent sets in some matroid. For both problems, a greedy algorithm is known to yield a 1 2-approximation [21, 16]. In special cases where the matroid is uniform (I = S: |S| ≤ k) [20] or the submodular function is of a special type [4, 2], a (1-1 e)-approximation has been achieved and this is optimal for these problems in the value oracle model [22, 6, 15]. A (1-1 e)-approximation for the general Submodular Welfare Problem has been known only in a stronger demand oracle model [4], where in fact 1-1 e can be improved [9]. In this paper, we develop a randomized continuous greedy algorithm which achieves a (1-1 e)-approximation for the Submodular Welfare Problem in the value oracle model. We also show that the special case of n equal players is approximation resistant, in the sense that the optimal (1-1 e)-approximation is achieved by a uniformly random solution. Using the pipage rounding technique [1, 2], we obtain a (1-1 e)-approximation for submodular maximization subject to any matroid constraint. The continuous greedy algorithm has a potential of wider applicability, which we demonstrate on the examples of the Generalized Assignment Problem and the AdWords Assignment Problem.
  @cite_12: We provide tight information-theoretic lower bounds for the welfare maximization problem in combinatorial auctions. In this problem, the goal is to partition m items among k bidders in a way that maximizes the sum of bidders' values for their allocated items. Bidders have complex preferences over items expressed by valuation functions that assign values to all subsets of items. We study the "black box" setting in which the auctioneer has oracle access to the valuation functions of the bidders. In particular, we explore the well-known value query model in which the permitted query to a valuation function is in the form of a subset of items, and the reply is the value assigned to that subset of items by the valuation function. We consider different classes of valuation functions: submodular,subadditive, and superadditive. For these classes, it has been shown that one can achieve approximation ratios of 1 -- 1 e, 1 √m, and √ m m, respectively, via a polynomial (in k and m) number of value queries. We prove that these approximation factors are essentially the best possible: For any fixed e > 0, a (1--1 e + e)-approximation for submodular valuations or an 1 m1 2-e-approximation for subadditive valuations would require exponentially many value queries, and a log1+e m m-approximation for superadditive valuations would require a superpolynomial number of value queries.
  @cite_11: 
summary: Without incentive-compatibility constraints, the welfare maximization problem with submodular bidder valuations is completely solved. Vondr 'a k @cite_20 gave a @math -approximation algorithm for the problem, improving over the @math -approximation given in @cite_3 . The algorithm in @cite_20 works in the value oracle model, where each valuation @math is modeled as a black box'' that returns the value @math of a queried set @math in a single operation. The approximation factor of @math is unconditionally optimal in the value-oracle model (for polynomial communication) @cite_12 , and is also optimal (for polynomial time) for certain succinctly represented submodular valuations, assuming @math @cite_11 . The result of @cite_11 implies that @math is the optimal approximation factor in our model as well, assuming @math . We show in Appendix that our oracle model is no more powerful than polynomial-time computation in the special case of explicitly represented coverage functions, for which @math is optimal assuming @math @cite_11 . In contrast, the work of @cite_23 improves on the approximation factor of @math by using , which can not be simulated in polynomial time for explicit coverage functions.