text: Efficient, reliable trapping of execution in a program at the desired location is a hot area of research for security professionals. The progression of debuggers and malware is akin to a game of cat and mouse - each are constantly in a state of trying to thwart one another. At the core of most efficient debuggers today is a combination of virtual machines and traditional binary modification breakpoints (int3). In this paper, we present a design for Virtual Breakpoints, a modification to the x86 MMU which brings breakpoint management into hardware alongside page tables. We demonstrate the fundamental abstraction failures of current trapping methods, and rebuild the mechanism from the ground up. Our design delivers fast, reliable trapping without the pitfalls of binary modification.
  @cite_0: Until recently, the x86 architecture has not permitted classical trap-and-emulate virtualization. Virtual Machine Monitors for x86, such as VMware ® Workstation and Virtual PC, have instead used binary translation of the guest kernel code. However, both Intel and AMD have now introduced architectural extensions to support classical virtualization.We compare an existing software VMM with a new VMM designed for the emerging hardware support. Surprisingly, the hardware VMM often suffers lower performance than the pure software VMM. To determine why, we study architecture-level events such as page table updates, context switches and I O, and find their costs vastly different among native, software VMM and hardware VMM execution.We find that the hardware support fails to provide an unambiguous performance advantage for two primary reasons: first, it offers no support for MMU virtualization; second, it fails to co-exist with existing software techniques for MMU virtualization. We look ahead to emerging techniques for addressing this MMU virtualization problem in the context of hardware-assisted virtualization.
summary: Overshadow implemented a shadow page table containing multiple mappings (encrypted and unencrypted) of a guest's physical memory, and actively tracks the identity'' of the guest process attempting to read a page. When the accessing process does not have the correct identity, an encrypted page is presented (on read) or the machine is terminated (on write). When the accessing process does have the correct identity, an unencrypted page is presented with the permissions originally granted to the page. Unfortunately, its dependence on shadow page tables means it's likely to be insufficiently efficient @cite_0 for modern operating systems and heavy load systems.