text: Representing defeasibility is an important issue in common sense reasoning. In reasoning about action and change, this issue becomes more difficult because domain and action related defeasible information may conflict with general inertia rules. Furthermore, different types of defeasible information may also interfere with each other during the reasoning. In this paper, we develop a prioritized logic programming approach to handle defeasibilities in reasoning about action. In particular, we propose three action languages AT ^ 0 , AT ^ 1 and AT ^ 2 which handle three types of defeasibilities in action domains named defeasible constraints, defeasible observations and actions with defeasible and abnormal effects respectively. Each language with a higher superscript can be viewed as an extension of the language with a lower superscript. These action languages inherit the simple syntax of A language but their semantics is developed in terms of transition systems where transition functions are defined based on prioritized logic programs. By illustrating various examples, we show that our approach eventually provides a powerful mechanism to handle various defeasibilities in temporal prediction and postdiction. We also investigate semantic properties of these three action languages and characterize classes of action domains that present more desirable solutions in reasoning about action within the underlying action languages.
  @cite_11: 
  @cite_10: The need to make default assumptions is frequently encountered in reasoning about incompletely specified worlds. Inferences sanctioned by default are best viewed as beliefs which may well be modified or rejected by subsequent observations. It is this property which leads to the non-monotonicity of any logic of defaults. In this paper we propose a logic for default reasoning. We then specialize our treatment to a very large class of commonly occuring defaults. For this class we develop a complete proof theory and show how to interface it with a top down resolution theorem prover. Finally, we provide criteria under which the revision of derived beliefs must be effected.
  @cite_21: Ginsberg and Smith [6, 7] propose a new method for reasoning about action, which they term a possible worlds approach (PWA). The PWA is an elegant, simple, and potentially very powerful domain-independent technique that has proven fruitful in other areas of AI [13, 5]. In the domain of reasoning about action, Ginsberg and Smith offer the PWA as a solution to the frame problem (What facts about the world remain true when an action is performed?) and its dual, the ramification problem [3] (What facts about the world must change when an action is performed?). In addition, Ginsberg and Smith offer the PWA as a solution to the qualification problem (When is it reasonable to assume that an action will succeed?), and claim for the PWA computational advantages over other approaches such as situation calculus. Here and in [16] I show that the PWA fails to solve the frame, ramification, and qualification problems, even with additional simplifying restrictions not imposed by Ginsberg and Smith. The cause of the failure seems to be a lack of distinction in the PWA between the state of the world and the description of the state of the world. I introduce a new approach to reasoning about action, called the possible models approach, and show that the possible models approach works as well as the PWA on the examples of [6, 7] but does not suffer from its deficiencies.
  @cite_2: Recent research on reasoning about action has shown that the traditional logic form of domain constraints is problematic to represent ramifications of actions that are related to causality of domains. To handle this problem properly, as proposed by some researchers, it is necessary to describe causal relations of domains explicitly in action theories. In this paper, we address this problem from a new point of view. Specifically, unlike other researchers viewing causal relations as some kind of inference rules, we distinguish causal relations between defeasible and non-defeasible cases. It turns out that a causal theory in our formalism can be specified by using Reiter's default logic. Based on this idea, we propose a causality-based minimal change approach for representing effects of actions, and argue that our approach provides more plausible solutions for the ramification and qualification problems compared with other related work. We also describe a logic programming approximation to compute causal theories of actions which provides an implementational basis for our approach.
summary: An early effort on handling defeasible causal rules in reasoning about action was due to the author's previous work @cite_2 , in which the author identified the restriction of McCain and Turner's causal theory of actions @cite_11 and claimed that in general a causal rule should be treated as a defeasible rule in order to solve the ramification problem properly. In @cite_2 , constraints ) and ) simply correspond to defaults @math and @math respectively. By combining Reiter's default theory @cite_10 and Winslett's PMA @cite_21 the author developed a causality-based minimal change principle for reasoning about action and change which subsumes McCain and Turner's causal theory.