Instruct: Identify the main and secondary category of Arxiv papers based on the titles and abstracts
Query: Optimal Auctions vs. Anonymous Pricing: Beyond Linear Utility   The revenue optimal mechanism for selling a single item to agents with
independent but non-identically distributed values is complex for agents with
linear utility (Myerson,1981) and has no closed-form characterization for
agents with non-linear utility (cf. Alaei et al., 2012). Nonetheless, for
linear utility agents satisfying a natural regularity property, Alaei et al.
(2018) showed that simply posting an anonymous price is an e-approximation. We
give a parameterization of the regularity property that extends to agents with
non-linear utility and show that the approximation bound of anonymous pricing
for regular agents approximately extends to agents that satisfy this
approximate regularity property. We apply this approximation framework to prove
that anonymous pricing is a constant approximation to the revenue optimal
single-item auction for agents with public-budget utility, private-budget
utility, and (a special case of) risk-averse utility.

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The categories of this paper are: nlin
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The categories of this paper are: ao-sci
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The categories of this paper are: econ
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The categories of this paper are: supr-con
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The categories of this paper are: stat
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The categories of this paper are: bayes-an
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The categories of this paper are: funct-an
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The categories of this paper are: cmp-lg
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The categories of this paper are: hep-lat
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The categories of this paper are: plasm-ph
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The categories of this paper are: gr-qc
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The categories of this paper are: physics
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The categories of this paper are: q-fin
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The categories of this paper are: alg-geom
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The categories of this paper are: chao-dyn
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The categories of this paper are: dg-ga