Instruct: Identify the main and secondary category of Arxiv papers based on the titles and abstracts
Query: Beyond Equilibria: Mechanisms for Repeated Combinatorial Auctions   We study the design of mechanisms in combinatorial auction domains. We focus
on settings where the auction is repeated, motivated by auctions for licenses
or advertising space. We consider models of agent behaviour in which they
either apply common learning techniques to minimize the regret of their bidding
strategies, or apply short-sighted best-response strategies. We ask: when can a
black-box approximation algorithm for the base auction problem be converted
into a mechanism that approximately preserves the original algorithm's
approximation factor on average over many iterations? We present a general
reduction for a broad class of algorithms when agents minimize external regret.
We also present a new mechanism for the combinatorial auction problem that
attains an $O(\sqrt{m})$ approximation on average when agents apply
best-response dynamics.

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The categories of this paper are: astro-ph
15
The categories of this paper are: nucl-ex
35
The categories of this paper are: mtrl-th
23
The categories of this paper are: solv-int
3
The categories of this paper are: physics
28
The categories of this paper are: alg-geom
2
The categories of this paper are: math
25
The categories of this paper are: patt-sol
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The categories of this paper are: econ
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The categories of this paper are: q-fin
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The categories of this paper are: comp-gas
31
The categories of this paper are: ao-sci
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The categories of this paper are: hep-ex
34
The categories of this paper are: chem-ph
37
The categories of this paper are: supr-con
20
The categories of this paper are: acc-phys