Instruct: Identify the main and secondary category of Arxiv papers based on the titles and abstracts
Query: Hybrid Mechanisms: Trading off Strategyproofness and Efficiency of
  Random Assignment Mechanisms   Severe impossibility results restrict the design of strategyproof random
assignment mechanisms, and trade-offs are necessary when aiming for more
demanding efficiency requirements, such as ordinal or rank efficiency. We
introduce hybrid mechanisms, which are convex combinations of two component
mechanisms. We give a set of conditions under which such hybrids facilitate a
non-degenerate trade-off between strategyproofness (in terms of partial
strategyproofness) and efficiency (in terms of dominance). This set of
conditions is tight in the sense that trade-offs may become degenerate if any
of the conditions are dropped. Moreover, we give an algorithm for the mechanism
designer's problem of determining a maximal mixing factor. Finally, we prove
that our construction can be applied to mix Random Serial Dictatorship with
Probabilistic Serial, as well as with the adaptive Boston mechanism, and we
illustrate the efficiency gains numerically.

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The categories of this paper are: cmp-lg
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The categories of this paper are: ao-sci
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The categories of this paper are: quant-ph
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The categories of this paper are: econ
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The categories of this paper are: hep-ex
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The categories of this paper are: nucl-th
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The categories of this paper are: math-ph
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The categories of this paper are: supr-con
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The categories of this paper are: plasm-ph
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The categories of this paper are: hep-ph
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The categories of this paper are: nucl-ex
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The categories of this paper are: astro-ph
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The categories of this paper are: physics
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The categories of this paper are: q-bio
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The categories of this paper are: patt-sol
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The categories of this paper are: adap-org