Instruct: Identify the main and secondary category of Arxiv papers based on the titles and abstracts
Query: undeSErVed trust: Exploiting Permutation-Agnostic Remote Attestation   The ongoing trend of moving data and computation to the cloud is met with
concerns regarding privacy and protection of intellectual property. Cloud
Service Providers (CSP) must be fully trusted to not tamper with or disclose
processed data, hampering adoption of cloud services for many sensitive or
critical applications. As a result, CSPs and CPU manufacturers are rushing to
find solutions for secure outsourced computation in the Cloud. While enclaves,
like Intel SGX, are strongly limited in terms of throughput and size, AMD's
Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) offers hardware support for transparently
protecting code and data of entire VMs, thus removing the performance, memory
and software adaption barriers of enclaves. Through attestation of boot code
integrity and means for securely transferring secrets into an encrypted VM,
CSPs are effectively removed from the list of trusted entities. There have been
several attacks on the security of SEV, by abusing I/O channels to encrypt and
decrypt data, or by moving encrypted code blocks at runtime. Yet, none of these
attacks have targeted the attestation protocol, the core of the secure
computing environment created by SEV. We show that the current attestation
mechanism of Zen 1 and Zen 2 architectures has a significant flaw, allowing us
to manipulate the loaded code without affecting the attestation outcome. An
attacker may abuse this weakness to inject arbitrary code at startup -- and
thus take control over the entire VM execution, without any indication to the
VM's owner. Our attack primitives allow the attacker to do extensive
modifications to the bootloader and the operating system, like injecting spy
code or extracting secret data. We present a full end-to-end attack, from the
initial exploit to leaking the key of the encrypted disk image during boot,
giving the attacker unthrottled access to all of the VM's persistent data.

19
The categories of this paper are: eess
4
The categories of this paper are: cond-mat
27
The categories of this paper are: comp-gas
7
The categories of this paper are: hep-th
20
The categories of this paper are: acc-phys
13
The categories of this paper are: quant-ph
34
The categories of this paper are: chem-ph
0
The categories of this paper are: hep-ph
21
The categories of this paper are: adap-org
17
The categories of this paper are: q-fin
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The categories of this paper are: bayes-an
18
The categories of this paper are: econ
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The categories of this paper are: supr-con
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The categories of this paper are: ao-sci
5
The categories of this paper are: gr-qc
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The categories of this paper are: math-ph