Instruct: Identify the main and secondary category of Arxiv papers based on the titles and abstracts
Query: The Pareto Frontier for Random Mechanisms   We study the trade-offs between strategyproofness and other desiderata, such
as efficiency or fairness, that often arise in the design of random ordinal
mechanisms. We use approximate strategyproofness to define manipulability, a
measure to quantify the incentive properties of non-strategyproof mechanisms,
and we introduce the deficit, a measure to quantify the performance of
mechanisms with respect to another desideratum. When this desideratum is
incompatible with strategyproofness, mechanisms that trade off manipulability
and deficit optimally form the Pareto frontier. Our main contribution is a
structural characterization of this Pareto frontier, and we present algorithms
that exploit this structure to compute it. To illustrate its shape, we apply
our results for two different desiderata, namely Plurality and Veto scoring, in
settings with 3 alternatives and up to 18 agents.

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The categories of this paper are: stat
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The categories of this paper are: astro-ph
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The categories of this paper are: math-ph
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The categories of this paper are: hep-th
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The categories of this paper are: mtrl-th
5
The categories of this paper are: gr-qc
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The categories of this paper are: adap-org
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The categories of this paper are: dg-ga
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The categories of this paper are: acc-phys
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The categories of this paper are: hep-ph
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The categories of this paper are: q-alg
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The categories of this paper are: hep-ex
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The categories of this paper are: atom-ph
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The categories of this paper are: cond-mat
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The categories of this paper are: funct-an
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The categories of this paper are: math