Instruct: Identify the main and secondary category of Arxiv papers based on the titles and abstracts
Query: Optimal Deterministic Mechanisms for an Additive Buyer   We study revenue maximization by deterministic mechanisms for the simplest
case for which Myerson's characterization does not hold: a single seller
selling two items, with independently distributed values, to a single additive
buyer. We prove that optimal mechanisms are submodular and hence monotone.
Furthermore, we show that in the IID case, optimal mechanisms are symmetric.
Our characterizations are surprisingly non-trivial, and we show that they fail
to extend in several natural ways, e.g. for correlated distributions or more
than two items. In particular, this shows that the optimality of symmetric
mechanisms does not follow from the symmetry of the IID distribution.

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The categories of this paper are: supr-con
0
The categories of this paper are: hep-ph
32
The categories of this paper are: atom-ph
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The categories of this paper are: dg-ga
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The categories of this paper are: eess
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The categories of this paper are: solv-int
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The categories of this paper are: plasm-ph
2
The categories of this paper are: math
10
The categories of this paper are: q-bio
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The categories of this paper are: funct-an
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The categories of this paper are: nucl-th
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The categories of this paper are: hep-lat
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The categories of this paper are: stat
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The categories of this paper are: alg-geom
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The categories of this paper are: bayes-an
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The categories of this paper are: nlin