Instruct: Identify the main and secondary category of Arxiv papers based on the titles and abstracts
Query: Group Strategyproof Pareto-Stable Marriage with Indifferences via the
  Generalized Assignment Game   We study the variant of the stable marriage problem in which the preferences
of the agents are allowed to include indifferences. We present a mechanism for
producing Pareto-stable matchings in stable marriage markets with indifferences
that is group strategyproof for one side of the market. Our key technique
involves modeling the stable marriage market as a generalized assignment game.
We also show that our mechanism can be implemented efficiently. These results
can be extended to the college admissions problem with indifferences.

34
The categories of this paper are: chem-ph
2
The categories of this paper are: math
36
The categories of this paper are: cmp-lg
13
The categories of this paper are: quant-ph
11
The categories of this paper are: hep-lat
24
The categories of this paper are: dg-ga
3
The categories of this paper are: physics
10
The categories of this paper are: q-bio
32
The categories of this paper are: atom-ph
21
The categories of this paper are: adap-org
19
The categories of this paper are: eess
37
The categories of this paper are: supr-con
6
The categories of this paper are: astro-ph
29
The categories of this paper are: funct-an
22
The categories of this paper are: chao-dyn
30
The categories of this paper are: q-alg