Instruct: Identify the main and secondary category of Arxiv papers based on the titles and abstracts
Query: Balanced Ranking Mechanisms   In the private values single object auction model, we construct a
satisfactory mechanism - a symmetric, dominant strategy incentive compatible,
and budget-balanced mechanism. Our mechanism allocates the object to the
highest valued agent with more than 99% probability provided there are at least
14 agents. It is also ex-post individually rational. We show that our mechanism
is optimal in a restricted class of satisfactory ranking mechanisms. Since
achieving efficiency through a dominant strategy incentive compatible and
budget-balanced mechanism is impossible in this model, our results illustrate
the limits of this impossibility.

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The categories of this paper are: physics
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The categories of this paper are: acc-phys
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The categories of this paper are: eess
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The categories of this paper are: hep-ex
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The categories of this paper are: patt-sol
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The categories of this paper are: econ
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The categories of this paper are: cond-mat
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The categories of this paper are: ao-sci
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The categories of this paper are: solv-int
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The categories of this paper are: hep-lat
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The categories of this paper are: chao-dyn
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The categories of this paper are: math
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The categories of this paper are: nucl-ex
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The categories of this paper are: plasm-ph
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The categories of this paper are: math-ph
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The categories of this paper are: mtrl-th