Instruct: Identify the main and secondary category of Arxiv papers based on the titles and abstracts
Query: Revenue Maximization via Hiding Item Attributes   We study probabilistic single-item second-price auctions where the item is
characterized by a set of attributes. The auctioneer knows the actual
instantiation of all the attributes, but he may choose to reveal only a subset
of these attributes to the bidders. Our model is an abstraction of the
following Ad auction scenario. The website (auctioneer) knows the demographic
information of its impressions, and this information is in terms of a list of
attributes (e.g., age, gender, country of location). The website may hide
certain attributes from its advertisers (bidders) in order to create thicker
market, which may lead to higher revenue. We study how to hide attributes in an
optimal way. We show that it is NP-hard to solve for the optimal attribute
hiding scheme. We then derive a polynomial-time solvable upper bound on the
optimal revenue. Finally, we propose two heuristic-based attribute hiding
schemes. Experiments show that revenue achieved by these schemes is close to
the upper bound.

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The categories of this paper are: gr-qc
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The categories of this paper are: astro-ph
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The categories of this paper are: mtrl-th
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The categories of this paper are: chao-dyn
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The categories of this paper are: dg-ga
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The categories of this paper are: chem-ph
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The categories of this paper are: alg-geom
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The categories of this paper are: plasm-ph
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The categories of this paper are: bayes-an
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The categories of this paper are: hep-ex
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The categories of this paper are: supr-con
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The categories of this paper are: math
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The categories of this paper are: nlin
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The categories of this paper are: math-ph
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The categories of this paper are: patt-sol
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The categories of this paper are: q-fin