Instruct: Identify the main and secondary category of Arxiv papers based on the titles and abstracts
Query: Bayesian Algorithmic Mechanism Design   The principal problem in algorithmic mechanism design is in merging the
incentive constraints imposed by selfish behavior with the algorithmic
constraints imposed by computational intractability. This field is motivated by
the observation that the preeminent approach for designing incentive compatible
mechanisms, namely that of Vickrey, Clarke, and Groves; and the central
approach for circumventing computational obstacles, that of approximation
algorithms, are fundamentally incompatible: natural applications of the VCG
approach to an approximation algorithm fails to yield an incentive compatible
mechanism. We consider relaxing the desideratum of (ex post) incentive
compatibility (IC) to Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC), where
truthtelling is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium (the standard notion of incentive
compatibility in economics). For welfare maximization in single-parameter agent
settings, we give a general black-box reduction that turns any approximation
algorithm into a Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism with essentially the
same approximation factor.

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The categories of this paper are: hep-ph
29
The categories of this paper are: funct-an
18
The categories of this paper are: econ
5
The categories of this paper are: gr-qc
24
The categories of this paper are: dg-ga
35
The categories of this paper are: mtrl-th
26
The categories of this paper are: bayes-an
6
The categories of this paper are: astro-ph
17
The categories of this paper are: q-fin
11
The categories of this paper are: hep-lat
8
The categories of this paper are: hep-ex
19
The categories of this paper are: eess
3
The categories of this paper are: physics
15
The categories of this paper are: nucl-ex
32
The categories of this paper are: atom-ph
34
The categories of this paper are: chem-ph