Instruct: Identify the main and secondary category of Arxiv papers based on the titles and abstracts
Query: Best-response dynamics, playing sequences, and convergence to
  equilibrium in random games   We analyze the performance of the best-response dynamic across all
normal-form games using a random games approach. The playing sequence -- the
order in which players update their actions -- is essentially irrelevant in
determining whether the dynamic converges to a Nash equilibrium in certain
classes of games (e.g. in potential games) but, when evaluated across all
possible games, convergence to equilibrium depends on the playing sequence in
an extreme way. Our main asymptotic result shows that the best-response dynamic
converges to a pure Nash equilibrium in a vanishingly small fraction of all
(large) games when players take turns according to a fixed cyclic order. By
contrast, when the playing sequence is random, the dynamic converges to a pure
Nash equilibrium if one exists in almost all (large) games.

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The categories of this paper are: math-ph
3
The categories of this paper are: physics
15
The categories of this paper are: nucl-ex
31
The categories of this paper are: ao-sci
24
The categories of this paper are: dg-ga
19
The categories of this paper are: eess
0
The categories of this paper are: hep-ph
21
The categories of this paper are: adap-org
26
The categories of this paper are: bayes-an
32
The categories of this paper are: atom-ph
20
The categories of this paper are: acc-phys
28
The categories of this paper are: alg-geom
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The categories of this paper are: mtrl-th
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The categories of this paper are: q-fin
5
The categories of this paper are: gr-qc
6
The categories of this paper are: astro-ph