Instruct: Identify the main and secondary category of Arxiv papers based on the titles and abstracts
Query: Approximately Envy-Free Spectrum Allocation with Complementarities   With spectrum auctions as our prime motivation, in this paper we analyze
combinatorial auctions where agents' valuations exhibit complementarities.
Assuming that the agents only value bundles of size at most $k$ and also
assuming that we can assess prices, we present a mechanism that is efficient,
approximately envy-free, asymptotically strategy-proof and that has
polynomial-time complexity. Modifying an iterative rounding procedure from
assignment problems, we use the primal and dual optimal solutions to the linear
programming relaxation of the auction problem to construct a lottery for the
allocations and to assess the prices to bundles. The allocations in the lottery
over-allocate goods by at most $k-1$ units, and the dual prices are shown to be
(approximately) envy-free irrespective of the allocation chosen. We conclude
with a detailed numerical investigation of a specific spectrum allocation
problem.

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The categories of this paper are: nlin
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The categories of this paper are: patt-sol
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The categories of this paper are: astro-ph
30
The categories of this paper are: q-alg
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The categories of this paper are: cond-mat
0
The categories of this paper are: hep-ph
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The categories of this paper are: hep-ex
17
The categories of this paper are: q-fin
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The categories of this paper are: math
33
The categories of this paper are: plasm-ph
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The categories of this paper are: nucl-ex
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The categories of this paper are: acc-phys
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The categories of this paper are: adap-org
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The categories of this paper are: math-ph
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The categories of this paper are: chem-ph
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The categories of this paper are: eess