Instruct: Identify the main and secondary category of Arxiv papers based on the titles and abstracts
Query: Evolution of cooperation in costly institutes   We show that in a situation where individuals have a choice between a costly
institute and a free institute to perform a collective action task, the
existence of a participation cost promotes cooperation in the costly institute.
Despite paying for a participation cost, costly cooperators, who join the
costly institute and cooperate, can out-perform defectors, who predominantly
join a free institute. This, not only promotes cooperation in the costly
institute but also facilitates the evolution of cooperation in the free
institute. A costly institute out-performs a free institute when the
profitability of the collective action is low. On the other hand, a free
institute performs better when the collective action's profitability is high.
Furthermore, we show that in a structured population, when individuals have a
choice between different institutes, a mutualistic relation between cooperators
with different institute preferences emerges and helps the evolution of
cooperation.

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The categories of this paper are: hep-ph
37
The categories of this paper are: supr-con
19
The categories of this paper are: eess
28
The categories of this paper are: alg-geom
1
The categories of this paper are: cs
23
The categories of this paper are: solv-int
4
The categories of this paper are: cond-mat
17
The categories of this paper are: q-fin
15
The categories of this paper are: nucl-ex
13
The categories of this paper are: quant-ph
27
The categories of this paper are: comp-gas
20
The categories of this paper are: acc-phys
6
The categories of this paper are: astro-ph
21
The categories of this paper are: adap-org
29
The categories of this paper are: funct-an
31
The categories of this paper are: ao-sci