Instruct: Identify the main and secondary category of Arxiv papers based on the titles and abstracts
Query: Robust Commitments and Partial Reputation   Agents rarely act in isolation -- their behavioral history, in particular, is
public to others. We seek a non-asymptotic understanding of how a leader agent
should shape this history to its maximal advantage, knowing that follower
agent(s) will be learning and responding to it. We study Stackelberg
leader-follower games with finite observations of the leader commitment, which
commonly models security games and network routing in engineering, and
persuasion mechanisms in economics. First, we formally show that when the game
is not zero-sum and the vanilla Stackelberg commitment is mixed, it is not
robust to observational uncertainty. We propose observation-robust,
polynomial-time-computable commitment constructions for leader strategies that
approximate the Stackelberg payoff, and also show that these commitment rules
approximate the maximum obtainable payoff (which could in general be greater
than the Stackelberg payoff).

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The categories of this paper are: q-bio
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The categories of this paper are: math-ph
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The categories of this paper are: alg-geom
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The categories of this paper are: cond-mat
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The categories of this paper are: adap-org
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The categories of this paper are: gr-qc
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The categories of this paper are: econ
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The categories of this paper are: comp-gas
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The categories of this paper are: ao-sci
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The categories of this paper are: acc-phys
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The categories of this paper are: stat
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The categories of this paper are: cmp-lg
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The categories of this paper are: chao-dyn
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The categories of this paper are: nucl-th
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The categories of this paper are: atom-ph
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The categories of this paper are: hep-lat