Instruct: Identify the main and secondary category of Arxiv papers based on the titles and abstracts
Query: Learning Fair Equilibria in Sponsored Search Auctions   In this work we investigate the strategic learning implications of the
deployment of sponsored search auction mechanisms that obey to fairness
criteria. We introduce a new class of mechanisms composing a traditional
Generalized Second Price auction (GSP) with different fair division schemes to
achieve some desired level of fairness between two groups of Bayesian strategic
advertisers. We propose two mechanisms, $\beta$-Fair GSP and GSP-EFX, that
compose GSP with, respectively, an envy-free up to one item (EF1), and an
envy-free up to any item (EFX) fair division scheme. The payments of GSP are
adjusted in order to compensate the advertisers that suffer a loss of
efficiency due the fair division stage. We prove that, for both mechanisms, if
bidders play so as to minimize their external regret they are guaranteed to
reach an equilibrium with good social welfare. We also prove that the
mechanisms are budget balanced, so that the payments charged by the traditional
GSP mechanism are a good proxy of the total compensation offered to the
advertisers. Finally, we evaluate the quality of the allocations of the two
mechanisms through experiments on real-world data.

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The categories of this paper are: cond-mat
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The categories of this paper are: astro-ph
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The categories of this paper are: chem-ph
10
The categories of this paper are: q-bio
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The categories of this paper are: hep-th
28
The categories of this paper are: alg-geom
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The categories of this paper are: nlin
37
The categories of this paper are: supr-con
29
The categories of this paper are: funct-an
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The categories of this paper are: stat
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The categories of this paper are: solv-int
32
The categories of this paper are: atom-ph
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The categories of this paper are: hep-ph
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The categories of this paper are: math-ph
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The categories of this paper are: nucl-ex
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The categories of this paper are: gr-qc