Instruct: Identify the main and secondary category of Arxiv papers based on the titles and abstracts
Query: Tight Approximation Ratio of Anonymous Pricing   We consider two canonical Bayesian mechanism design settings. In the
single-item setting, we prove tight approximation ratio for anonymous pricing:
compared with Myerson Auction, it extracts at least $\frac{1}{2.62}$-fraction
of revenue; there is a matching lower-bound example.
  In the unit-demand single-buyer setting, we prove tight approximation ratio
between the simplest and optimal deterministic mechanisms: in terms of revenue,
uniform pricing admits a $2.62$-approximation of item pricing; we further
validate the tightness of this ratio.
  These results settle two open problems asked
in~\cite{H13,CD15,AHNPY15,L17,JLTX18}. As an implication, in the single-item
setting: we improve the approximation ratio of the second-price auction with
anonymous reserve to $2.62$, which breaks the state-of-the-art upper bound of
$e \approx 2.72$.

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The categories of this paper are: math
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The categories of this paper are: physics
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The categories of this paper are: acc-phys
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The categories of this paper are: chem-ph
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The categories of this paper are: solv-int
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The categories of this paper are: q-fin
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The categories of this paper are: astro-ph
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The categories of this paper are: math-ph
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The categories of this paper are: hep-ph
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The categories of this paper are: q-bio
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The categories of this paper are: eess
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The categories of this paper are: nucl-ex
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The categories of this paper are: hep-ex
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The categories of this paper are: patt-sol
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The categories of this paper are: bayes-an
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The categories of this paper are: cond-mat