Instruct: Identify the main and secondary category of Arxiv papers based on the titles and abstracts
Query: Reactive Strategies: The Establishment of Cooperation   Cooperation is usually represented as a Prisoner's Dilemma game. Although
individual self-interest may not favour cooperation, cooperation can evolve if,
for example, players interact multiple times adjusting their behaviour
accordingly to opponent's previous action. To analyze population dynamics,
replicator equation has been widely used under several versions. Although it is
usually stated that a strategy called Generous-tit-for-tat is the winner within
the reactive strategies set, here we show that this result depends on
replicator's version and on the number of available strategies, stemming from
the fact that a dynamics system is also defined by the number of available
strategies and not only by the model version. Using computer simulations and
analytical arguments, we show that Generous-tit-for-tat victory is found only
if the number of strategies available is not too large, with defection winning
otherwise.

9
The categories of this paper are: nlin
12
The categories of this paper are: nucl-th
4
The categories of this paper are: cond-mat
11
The categories of this paper are: hep-lat
26
The categories of this paper are: bayes-an
37
The categories of this paper are: supr-con
7
The categories of this paper are: hep-th
6
The categories of this paper are: astro-ph
35
The categories of this paper are: mtrl-th
29
The categories of this paper are: funct-an
28
The categories of this paper are: alg-geom
27
The categories of this paper are: comp-gas
18
The categories of this paper are: econ
17
The categories of this paper are: q-fin
36
The categories of this paper are: cmp-lg
15
The categories of this paper are: nucl-ex