Instruct: Identify the main and secondary category of Arxiv papers based on the titles and abstracts
Query: A Local-Dominance Theory of Voting Equilibria   It is well known that no reasonable voting rule is strategyproof. Moreover,
the common Plurality rule is particularly prone to strategic behavior of the
voters and empirical studies show that people often vote strategically in
practice. Multiple game-theoretic models have been proposed to better
understand and predict such behavior and the outcomes it induces. However,
these models often make unrealistic assumptions regarding voters' behavior and
the information on which they base their vote.
  We suggest a new model for strategic voting that takes into account voters'
bounded rationality, as well as their limited access to reliable information.
We introduce a simple behavioral heuristic based on \emph{local dominance},
where each voter considers a set of possible world states without assigning
probabilities to them. This set is constructed based on prospective candidates'
scores (e.g., available from an inaccurate poll). In a \emph{voting
equilibrium}, all voters vote for candidates not dominated within the set of
possible states.
  We prove that these voting equilibria exist in the Plurality rule for a broad
class of local dominance relations (that is, different ways to decide which
states are possible). Furthermore, we show that in an iterative setting where
voters may repeatedly change their vote, local dominance-based dynamics quickly
converge to an equilibrium if voters start from the truthful state. Weaker
convergence guarantees in more general settings are also provided.
  Using extensive simulations of strategic voting on generated and real
preference profiles, we show that convergence is fast and robust, that emerging
equilibria are consistent across various starting conditions, and that they
replicate widely known patterns of human voting behavior such as Duverger's
law. Further, strategic voting generally improves the quality of the winner
compared to truthful voting.

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The categories of this paper are: hep-th
29
The categories of this paper are: funct-an
17
The categories of this paper are: q-fin
21
The categories of this paper are: adap-org
9
The categories of this paper are: nlin
36
The categories of this paper are: cmp-lg
6
The categories of this paper are: astro-ph
4
The categories of this paper are: cond-mat
32
The categories of this paper are: atom-ph
19
The categories of this paper are: eess
2
The categories of this paper are: math
18
The categories of this paper are: econ
37
The categories of this paper are: supr-con
11
The categories of this paper are: hep-lat
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The categories of this paper are: hep-ex
10
The categories of this paper are: q-bio