Instruct: Identify the main and secondary category of Arxiv papers based on the titles and abstracts
Query: Democratic Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods   We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to groups of
agents. Agents in the same group share the same set of goods even though they
may have different preferences. Previous work has focused on unanimous
fairness, in which all agents in each group must agree that their group's share
is fair. Under this strict requirement, fair allocations exist only for small
groups. We introduce the concept of democratic fairness, which aims to satisfy
a certain fraction of the agents in each group. This concept is better suited
to large groups such as cities or countries. We present protocols for
democratic fair allocation among two or more arbitrarily large groups of agents
with monotonic, additive, or binary valuations. For two groups with arbitrary
monotonic valuations, we give an efficient protocol that guarantees
envy-freeness up to one good for at least $1/2$ of the agents in each group,
and prove that the $1/2$ fraction is optimal. We also present other protocols
that make weaker fairness guarantees to more agents in each group, or to more
groups. Our protocols combine techniques from different fields, including
combinatorial game theory, cake cutting, and voting.

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The categories of this paper are: patt-sol
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The categories of this paper are: econ
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The categories of this paper are: nlin
12
The categories of this paper are: nucl-th
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The categories of this paper are: atom-ph
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The categories of this paper are: ao-sci
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The categories of this paper are: funct-an
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The categories of this paper are: hep-ex
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The categories of this paper are: dg-ga
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The categories of this paper are: math-ph
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The categories of this paper are: hep-th
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The categories of this paper are: comp-gas
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The categories of this paper are: plasm-ph
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The categories of this paper are: nucl-ex
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The categories of this paper are: hep-lat
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The categories of this paper are: mtrl-th