Instruct: Identify the main and secondary category of Arxiv papers based on the titles and abstracts
Query: Strategyproof Pareto-Stable Mechanisms for Two-Sided Matching with
  Indifferences   We study variants of the stable marriage and college admissions models in
which the agents are allowed to express weak preferences over the set of agents
on the other side of the market and the option of remaining unmatched. For the
problems that we address, previous authors have presented polynomial-time
algorithms for computing a "Pareto-stable" matching. In the case of college
admissions, these algorithms require the preferences of the colleges over
groups of students to satisfy a technical condition related to responsiveness.
We design new polynomial-time Pareto-stable algorithms for stable marriage and
college admissions that correspond to strategyproof mechanisms. For stable
marriage, it is known that no Pareto-stable mechanism is strategyproof for all
of the agents; our algorithm provides a mechanism that is strategyproof for the
agents on one side of the market. For college admissions, it is known that no
Pareto-stable mechanism can be strategyproof for the colleges; our algorithm
provides a mechanism that is strategyproof for the students.

25
The categories of this paper are: patt-sol
8
The categories of this paper are: hep-ex
2
The categories of this paper are: math
21
The categories of this paper are: adap-org
14
The categories of this paper are: math-ph
31
The categories of this paper are: ao-sci
27
The categories of this paper are: comp-gas
18
The categories of this paper are: econ
10
The categories of this paper are: q-bio
5
The categories of this paper are: gr-qc
30
The categories of this paper are: q-alg
19
The categories of this paper are: eess
3
The categories of this paper are: physics
24
The categories of this paper are: dg-ga
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The categories of this paper are: q-fin
12
The categories of this paper are: nucl-th