Instruct: Identify the main and secondary category of Arxiv papers based on the titles and abstracts
Query: Expressiveness and Robustness of First-Price Position Auctions   Since economic mechanisms are often applied to very different instances of
the same problem, it is desirable to identify mechanisms that work well in a
wide range of circumstances. We pursue this goal for a position auction setting
and specifically seek mechanisms that guarantee good outcomes under both
complete and incomplete information. A variant of the generalized first-price
mechanism with multi-dimensional bids turns out to be the only standard
mechanism able to achieve this goal, even when types are one-dimensional. The
fact that expressiveness beyond the type space is both necessary and sufficient
for this kind of robustness provides an interesting counterpoint to previous
work on position auctions that has highlighted the benefits of simplicity. From
a technical perspective our results are interesting because they establish
equilibrium existence for a multi-dimensional bid space, where standard
techniques break down. The structure of the equilibrium bids moreover provides
an intuitive explanation for why first-price payments may be able to support
equilibria in a wider range of circumstances than second-price payments.

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The categories of this paper are: mtrl-th
16
The categories of this paper are: stat
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The categories of this paper are: chao-dyn
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The categories of this paper are: comp-gas
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The categories of this paper are: cmp-lg
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The categories of this paper are: adap-org
3
The categories of this paper are: physics
0
The categories of this paper are: hep-ph
6
The categories of this paper are: astro-ph
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The categories of this paper are: econ
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The categories of this paper are: alg-geom
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The categories of this paper are: math-ph
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The categories of this paper are: hep-lat
2
The categories of this paper are: math
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The categories of this paper are: solv-int
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The categories of this paper are: bayes-an