Instruct: Identify the main and secondary category of Arxiv papers based on the titles and abstracts
Query: Limits of Personalization: Prophet Inequalities for Revenue-Ordered
  Assortments   Consider a clairvoyant firm that knows the products' valuations of each
arriving consumer and offers them only the most profitable product they are
willing to buy. How much more can such a firm make relative to a firm that
offers all consumers the assortment that maximizes expected revenues? We show
that for general discrete choice models, the ratio can be exponential in the
number of products, but at most equal to the number of products for random
utility models. We show that the ratio is at most 2 for the $\alpha$-shaken
multinomial logit ($\alpha$-MNL) which includes the MNL and the general
attraction model (GAM) as special cases. We also provide sufficient conditions
for the ratio of at most 2 to hold for the latent class MNL, and in fact show
that in the limit as the coefficient of variation of the utilities goes to
infinity the bound is at most 1.5. For all of these cases the revenue-ordered
heuristic yields the stated guarantees relevant to the clairvoyant firm.

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The categories of this paper are: stat
32
The categories of this paper are: atom-ph
36
The categories of this paper are: cmp-lg
33
The categories of this paper are: plasm-ph
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The categories of this paper are: nucl-ex
25
The categories of this paper are: patt-sol
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The categories of this paper are: q-bio
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The categories of this paper are: nlin
8
The categories of this paper are: hep-ex
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The categories of this paper are: q-fin
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The categories of this paper are: dg-ga
35
The categories of this paper are: mtrl-th
1
The categories of this paper are: cs
6
The categories of this paper are: astro-ph
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The categories of this paper are: nucl-th
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The categories of this paper are: hep-lat