Instruct: Identify the main and secondary category of Arxiv papers based on the titles and abstracts
Query: Optimal Strategies in Sequential Bidding   We are interested in mechanisms that maximize social welfare. In [1] this
problem was studied for multi-unit auctions with unit demand bidders and for
the public project problem, and in each case social welfare undominated
mechanisms in the class of feasible and incentive compatible mechanisms were
identified. One way to improve upon these optimality results is by allowing the
players to move sequentially. With this in mind, we study here sequential
versions of two feasible Groves mechanisms used for single item auctions: the
Vickrey auction and the Bailey-Cavallo mechanism. Because of the absence of
dominant strategies in this sequential setting, we focus on a weaker concept of
an optimal strategy. For each mechanism we introduce natural optimal strategies
and observe that in each mechanism these strategies exhibit different
behaviour. However, we then show that among all optimal strategies, the one we
introduce for each mechanism maximizes the social welfare when each player
follows it. The resulting social welfare can be larger than the one obtained in
the simultaneous setting. Finally, we show that, when interpreting both
mechanisms as simultaneous ones, the vectors of the proposed strategies form a
Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium in the class of optimal strategies.

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The categories of this paper are: math-ph
30
The categories of this paper are: q-alg
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The categories of this paper are: acc-phys
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The categories of this paper are: dg-ga
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The categories of this paper are: nlin
25
The categories of this paper are: patt-sol
28
The categories of this paper are: alg-geom
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The categories of this paper are: comp-gas
10
The categories of this paper are: q-bio
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The categories of this paper are: mtrl-th
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The categories of this paper are: supr-con
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The categories of this paper are: hep-th
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The categories of this paper are: chao-dyn
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The categories of this paper are: nucl-th
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The categories of this paper are: funct-an
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The categories of this paper are: ao-sci