Instruct: Identify the main and secondary category of Arxiv papers based on the titles and abstracts
Query: Group-level selection avoids the tragedy of the commons   The public goods game is a famous example illustrating the tragedy of the
commons. In this game cooperating individuals contribute to a pool, which in
turn is distributed to all members of the group, including defectors who reap
the same rewards as cooperators without having made a contribution before. The
question is now, how to incentivize group members to all cooperate as it
maximizes the common good. While costly punishment presents one such method,
the cost of punishment still reduces the common good. Here we show how
group-level selection can be such an incentive, and specifically how even
fractions of group-level selection can overcome the benefits defectors receive.
Further, we show how punishment and group-level selection interact. This work
suggests that a redistribution similar to a basic income that is coupled to the
economic success of the entire group could overcome the tragedy of the commons.

36
The categories of this paper are: cmp-lg
9
The categories of this paper are: nlin
21
The categories of this paper are: adap-org
27
The categories of this paper are: comp-gas
19
The categories of this paper are: eess
15
The categories of this paper are: nucl-ex
6
The categories of this paper are: astro-ph
26
The categories of this paper are: bayes-an
11
The categories of this paper are: hep-lat
8
The categories of this paper are: hep-ex
34
The categories of this paper are: chem-ph
18
The categories of this paper are: econ
12
The categories of this paper are: nucl-th
16
The categories of this paper are: stat
31
The categories of this paper are: ao-sci
17
The categories of this paper are: q-fin