Instruct: Identify the main and secondary category of Arxiv papers based on the titles and abstracts
Query: Condorcet's Principle and the Preference Reversal Paradox   We prove that every Condorcet-consistent voting rule can be manipulated by a
voter who completely reverses their preference ranking, assuming that there are
at least 4 alternatives. This corrects an error and improves a result of
[Sanver, M. R. and Zwicker, W. S. (2009). One-way monotonicity as a form of
strategy-proofness. Int J Game Theory 38(4), 553-574.] For the case of
precisely 4 alternatives, we exactly characterise the number of voters for
which this impossibility result can be proven. We also show analogues of our
result for irresolute voting rules. We then leverage our result to state a
strong form of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem.

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The categories of this paper are: supr-con
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The categories of this paper are: acc-phys
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The categories of this paper are: stat
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The categories of this paper are: dg-ga
3
The categories of this paper are: physics
8
The categories of this paper are: hep-ex
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The categories of this paper are: q-fin
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The categories of this paper are: ao-sci
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The categories of this paper are: hep-lat
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The categories of this paper are: nucl-ex
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The categories of this paper are: alg-geom
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The categories of this paper are: adap-org
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The categories of this paper are: q-alg
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The categories of this paper are: hep-ph
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The categories of this paper are: chem-ph
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The categories of this paper are: q-bio