Instruct: Identify the main and secondary category of Arxiv papers based on the titles and abstracts
Query: A Simple Mechanism for a Budget-Constrained Buyer   We study a classic Bayesian mechanism design setting of monopoly problem for
an additive buyer in the presence of budgets. In this setting a monopolist
seller with $m$ heterogeneous items faces a single buyer and seeks to maximize
her revenue. The buyer has a budget and additive valuations drawn independently
for each item from (non-identical) distributions. We show that when the buyer's
budget is publicly known, the better of selling each item separately and
selling the grand bundle extracts a constant fraction of the optimal revenue.
When the budget is private, we consider a standard Bayesian setting where
buyer's budget $b$ is drawn from a known distribution $B$. We show that if $b$
is independent of the valuations and distribution $B$ satisfies monotone hazard
rate condition, then selling items separately or in a grand bundle is still
approximately optimal. We give a complementary example showing that no constant
approximation simple mechanism is possible if budget $b$ can be interdependent
with valuations.

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The categories of this paper are: stat
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The categories of this paper are: comp-gas
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The categories of this paper are: atom-ph
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The categories of this paper are: patt-sol
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The categories of this paper are: hep-lat
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The categories of this paper are: plasm-ph
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The categories of this paper are: chem-ph
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The categories of this paper are: supr-con
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The categories of this paper are: math
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The categories of this paper are: q-bio
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The categories of this paper are: nucl-ex
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The categories of this paper are: nlin
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The categories of this paper are: math-ph
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The categories of this paper are: dg-ga
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The categories of this paper are: q-alg
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The categories of this paper are: nucl-th