Instruct: Identify the main and secondary category of Arxiv papers based on the titles and abstracts
Query: Revenue Monotonicity Under Misspecified Bidders   We investigate revenue guarantees for auction mechanisms in a model where a
distribution is specified for each bidder, but only some of the distributions
are correct. The subset of bidders whose distribution is correctly specified
(henceforth, the "green bidders") is unknown to the auctioneer. The question we
address is whether the auctioneer can run a mechanism that is guaranteed to
obtain at least as much revenue, in expectation, as would be obtained by
running an optimal mechanism on the green bidders only. For single-parameter
feasibility environments, we find that the answer depends on the feasibility
constraint. For matroid environments, running the optimal mechanism using all
the specified distributions (including the incorrect ones) guarantees at least
as much revenue in expectation as running the optimal mechanism on the green
bidders. For any feasibility constraint that is not a matroid, there exists a
way of setting the specified distributions and the true distributions such that
the opposite conclusion holds.

17
The categories of this paper are: q-fin
25
The categories of this paper are: patt-sol
26
The categories of this paper are: bayes-an
11
The categories of this paper are: hep-lat
5
The categories of this paper are: gr-qc
10
The categories of this paper are: q-bio
0
The categories of this paper are: hep-ph
28
The categories of this paper are: alg-geom
6
The categories of this paper are: astro-ph
29
The categories of this paper are: funct-an
36
The categories of this paper are: cmp-lg
14
The categories of this paper are: math-ph
24
The categories of this paper are: dg-ga
7
The categories of this paper are: hep-th
27
The categories of this paper are: comp-gas
32
The categories of this paper are: atom-ph