Be prepared to rethink your assumptions about China
927556
Can a book be written in a single day?
 Usually, no. But the exception comes when 70 experts on a topicwith on-the-ground experience and observations over 40 yearscome together for a series of panel discussions and in-depth insights. In this book, author William J. Holstein documents and records such an eventa reunion of current and former China Hands in New York, organized by the Overseas Press Club of America in 2014.
 Journalistswith a deeper and more nuanced understanding of Chinaare the first to admit that we got it wrong sometimes. China is a complex country, and the truth is that it emerged as a first-rate economic power without following any known pattern of democratization or human rights. That truth is hard to explain to American readers who want a simple explanation and a clear-cut connection between free elections and well-being. American voters are eager to believe China is a threat to America, a stealer of jobs, a hacker of secrets, a bully of neighbors, an oppressor of its own people.
 But generation after generations of American (and European) journalists covering China have seen that the truth is more nuanced. China does threaten American jobs but also provides the American consumer with affordable consumer goods. Chinese hackers do steal secrets, but the U.S. government is doing the same to Chinas government and military. China does limit Internet access, but that policy had nurtured a rate of hugely successful Internet companies. Chinese people are buying U.S. real estate and companies en massebut they have the freedom to do so.
 For any intelligent reader who wants a broader perspective on China than is available on twitter or TV news, this book is like tapping into the minds of the greatest journalist of the last 40 years. Here you will find a spirited discussion of Chinas treatment of Hong Kong, as well as of American journalists in China, insights into the effects of social media on news coverage, and honest assessments of how Americans sometimes got it wrong.
 Be prepared to rethink your assumptions about China.
2805341
I have learned that perceptions are sometimes more important than facts and in the case of the Chinese viewpoint of the world situation, this holds true.  This book describes in an interesting fashion, the Chinese  perception of the motives, strengths and weaknesses of the world  powers.
The Chinese use an interesting method of determining a nation's  relative power using a quasi-mathematical formula to determine the  Comprehensive National Power (CNP) of any given nation.  They use this also  to project the future CNP of given nations.
This interesting process is  described in detail and the varying uses of this CNP are described.  The  Chinese show the most interest in the United States, Russia, Europe (mainly  Germany, France and the United Kingdom), Japan, India and China.  These  calculations are focused through the lens of Chinese perception.  This is  based on Chinese history including ancient Chinese history, Marxism, Mao  thought and the writings of Deng tso Peng.  This is the most fascinating  portion of the book.
For example, some factions in this debate feel that  Japan is becoming militaristic and will want power in Asia.  Most feel that  Russia will become their friend in the coming struggles.  The optomists  feel that there will be a multipolar power sharing between China, Europe,  Russia, the United States and Japan in a atmosphere of cooperation.
You  may or may not disagree with the Chinese conclusions but the reality is,  they believe that the world operates the way they see it and will react to  world events accordingly.
1781329
Jeremy Haft starts with a very interesting premise, namely that China is not the economic powerhouse that Americans have come to fear. Its economy is not overtaking the US, and there are a number of systemic issues with the way China measures and reports its economy. Plus, the goods and services delivered by both economies are not true equivalents, so any comparison is even more suspect.

I happen to believe, at least partially, Hafts thesis. He does a credible job of making his case, but I did have some issues with how some of his information was presented.

=== The Good Stuff ===

* Haft claims to have spent a considerable amount of time in China, visiting factories and investigating supply chains. I have spent quite a bit of time in China myself on a similar mission, and many of Hafts claims and stories ring true.

* Haft avoids complex economic theory and makes his case in simple, understandable prose. For example, he points out that for a $70 pair of Chinese made sneakers, a good portion of that money is actually spent in the US. Some raw materials may be US sourced, but much of the transportation, warehousing, retail costs, and overhead activities such as advertising are actually purchased in the US.

* Without resorting to jingoisms, the author manages to make the case for why we should fear Chinese products, especially foodstuffs and medicine. He takes a rational look at the Chinese regulatory environment, as well as the production culture that leads to melamine in the milk supply and diseased pig carcasses floating down a Shanghai river.

=== The Not-So-Good Stuff ===

* I found some of Hafts arguments a little weak. As a trivial example, he spends a few pages destroying Chinese economic statistics as unreliable and falsified. Fair enough, I believe him. But then a few chapters later, he uses Chinese figures to make his point.

* I also had problems with some of this production analysis. Again, as an example, he points out that much of the content of a Chinese-made iPhone is actually American such as SDRAM, application processors and audio codecs. While these components may have the name of a European or American company on their label, I would be willing to bet money that these components never saw Europe or Asia. I do agree with him, though, that US import/export numbers do not always capture 100% of US made content.

* Haft can get a bit shrill which tends to weaken his persuasiveness. He must mention the Swine River scandal 25 times, and it gets repetitive. Other points are repeated multiple times, again weakening rather than strengthening his arguments.

* Finally, I found some of the more technical aspects of his arguments lacking. He seems to imply that most logistics dollars spent on Chinese products accrue to Americans, but I cant remember the last time I saw an American container ship with an American crew. Also there were currency charts that got a bit sloppy with such details as whether constant or period yuan were used.

=== Summary ===

I enjoyed the book, and Haft makes a case that should be standard reading for all the nations China bashers. Certainly, China poses economic competition to the US, but Haft injects some rationality into the discussion. I would like to his arguments and prose tightened up a bit, and some of the sarcastic rhetoric removed so that the book presents tighter and more coherent arguments.

One thought that did occur to me was that I could see this exact book being written in late 19th century Great Britain about that economic upstart across the ocean, the United States. Food for thought.

In spite of the things I didn't like, I would recommend the book for anyone wanting a better understanding of how the US and Chinese economies really compare.

=== Disclaimer ===

I was able to read an advance copy through the courtesy of the publisher and NetGalley.
873765
Dwight H. Perkins delivered this essay as part of The Henry Wendt Lecture Series on May 9, 2006.  All of us are concerned about China, its rapid growth, and what that will mean for the world (and, really, the problems it could mean for us).

Perkins surveys the China's post Mao history (since 1978, so a bit after) and the wrenching changes the country has undergone.  He also takes a look at various approaches to China's future growth.  Most people do have some concern that China's per capita income can be a quarter of ours and their economy will surpass ours in overall size.  Of course, they still have a long way to go.

The section on the sources of political tension within China is fascinating.  The changes and urbanization of China are straining the capacities of the cities and even building them fast enough.  It also has a big implication on the 200 or 300 million migrant workers that keep their agriculture working.  On top of that, the population is aging rapidly because of the one child policy.  One cannot believably view China's future as clear sailing to global economic domination.  Just remember the concern so many had about Japan in the 1980s.  Yes, there are many differences between Japan then and China now, but it is still a relevant cautionary tale.

However, the economic expansion within China is going to necessarily have a big impact on the rest of the globe.  We will not only compete for basic resources, but the markets for advanced goods and services will also be affected by such a mammoth nation and its output.  However, as it grows, its internal demand will also skyrocket.  Many of the resources now used by China for exports will be demanded by its own people, so things will change again.  Also, the tremendous pollution it now accepts as part of economic growth will almost certainly be rejected as people become better off.  Also, the effects of this pollution on other nations will likely be the subject of intense political negotiations.

A very interesting lecture and a lot for us to think about.  It is less than fifty pages long and something anyone interested in China and its place in the world will want to read.
4572967
A great many words are employed to say information on Chinese economic reporting is mostly derived by government edicts, editing; ergo,politically-prompted juggling. When reports come out, so says this amazingly-lauded number-fabricating and crunching explanation of the way growth, spending, commodity prices and predictions of growth in the world's most populous country, investors and financial media mavens don't jump. They wait to see how the Chinese government will react.

The numbers derived seem practically (how will investors react?) and politically (what do we want them to think?). I am no numbers' person, but reading about their collecting and developing numbers I just think "This just can't be right".

One example of many, many boggling examples of Chinese developing financial figures, the People's Bank of China "...selects 50 representative cities from around the country. In each city, 8 banks are selected as the focus and 50 depositors are chosen from each bank...  The survey asks participant views on the current situation and future outlook for consumer prices, wages, house prices and choice between spending and saving."

Then values are assigned to positive, neutral and negative responses. The selection criteria are not explained. Government pollsters asking somebody something is repeated in a variety of financial venues. And too, in other fact gathering, questions are asked of business managers, farmers and producers of all kinds. In provincial areas, according go this book, there's a lot of lying done to make the Government think the individuals are doing a heck of a job. Numbers are inflated, projections optimistically cited. Seems to me the whole process is chaotic. Ironically it's said that when producers hype their output, they're taxed on it. And go out of business thanks to the inflated numbers.

Is China growing? Unemployment shrinking? Inflation poised? Will China shift from an industrial economy to a service economy? It seems we won't know until 'way after any shift plays out. And neither will the Chinese number-crunchers. For blind-flying speculators and investors, tossing a coin seems the right strategy.

The example cited seems subjective. Maybe because analysis isn't explained and subject to change,depending on expediencies. I called my  former money manager and current friend to ask for his take on this situation. I told him I'd send him this $50 book to read and comment on; he didn't reply. He always replies to my queries. As he does business in China I think his silence spoke loudly.

A great many articulate words are said to simply say "The problem of a sample set that is incapable of telling the truth to anyone in an official badge remains, and that adds to the difficulties the NBS (National Bureau of Statistics) faces.
1052642
Unlike most of the many books being published these days about China, this one tries to take Chinese culture seriously. That is, economic and political concerns do not dominate the discussion but emerge as the visible consequences of cultural choices operated by the Chinese leadership. The basic and inescapable assertion is that these leaders could not stay in power unless they found support broadly based in the Chinese population. Mere police power, despite its high development in China, could not succeed without the broad credibility of the leadership's national and nationalist narratives.
  Callahan's work is to unpack the major factors that have been at work over the last several decades, notably the theme of National Humiliation that has been cultivated in history textbooks and media presentations.
The author reminds us that this theme, though it came visibly to the fore after the Tiananmen events of 1989, was not at all new. Reformers late in the Qing Dynasty played up this view, as did the Republic of China during its years of dominance.
  The author's main point is that Westerners, if they seek to be realistic, must recognize that the present leadership continues to show remarkable astuteness in engaging popular support, despite diverse kinds of unhappiness and opposition. Only by taking the Chinese seriously on their own terms can we as outsiders hope to cope with China.
  The title attracts attention, but is not quite right. If it is taken as implying that the Chinese tend to view the world both pessimistically and optimistically, it disregards Callaghan's basis theme: that we need to break  up our Western  mindsets that tend  to categorize China as one thing or another. China instead operates through methods of oxymoron and paradox, structures of feeling rather than abstract categories - and, in particular, those structures of feeling in which one emotion (national humiliation) can feed into its apparent opposite (national pride). In other words, these rhetorical figures remind us that China does not fit comfortably into Western categories. What Callaghan shows is that we need to admit much more complexity into our views of China, even if they is not comfortable for many in the West. Arguing for a new Chinese perspective, based chapter by chapter on actual Chinese artifacts, Callaghan seeks to reorient our own vision of China - to see not what but who is the China with which we must now engage.
3022567
A fascinating insight into the different strategic view-points and orientations of China and the West, and a serious warning as to the dangers of continuing to misunderstand and misinterpret their intentions both short-term and long-term.  An excellent read, and I highly recommend it.
320985
John Poole's latest book identifies a number of very interesting and useful insights worthy of further exploration. Here are just a few.

First, Poole states China is exploiting the US focus on the war on terrorism to conduct low-level activities in Africa. The goal being to to expand China's economic and political influence. Poole notes this falls in line with China's vision of waging "Unrestricted Warfare" against the United States.

I think Poole is onto something here, and we may be seeing evidence of this today as China appears to be expanding in other parts of the world as well, such as the creation of islands in the Pacific to extend China's territorial seas. The piece, "Unrestricted Warfare" can be found online and compared with Poole's assessments.

Second, Poole also states China's presence in Africa existed for a longer time than many of us realize. Poole notes of China's presence in Africa going back to the 1970s, alongside the former Soviet Union. Now the Soviet Union is out of the way, and the US remains focused on fighting Islamist extremists, China is well-positioned to expand its logistics networks and influence mechanisms in natural resource-rich Africa.

Third, Poole provides researchers a number of interesting start-points to begin analysis to confirm/deny relationships between specific persons, political bodies, businesses and other entities that seem to be witting/unwitting agents of China.

While I have differences in opinion regarding some other points in the book, this work is definitely worth exploring as Poole forces readers/researchers to challenge their own research and assumptions. The author tells us what we need to know, not what we want to know.
2539329
I would recommend any decision maker (in addition to the academic community and China scholars) read this book. You can not walk around the book if you want to understand current China. I personally found it extremely perceptive and very helpful. And the book has genuinely created an immense interest in teh dunamics of Chinese affairs, something that was not existent in me beforehand.
Many thanks to the author for this brilliant work!
3697746
- This is an excellent book because it covers views that you generally don't get covered well in English - those of Chinese observers and commentators. In particular it avoids the naturally US centric agenda driven views you normally get from Chinese thinktanks.
- The main takeaway here is that there is a profound difference in expectations between technocrats who see the inevitability of an economic slowdown due to an aging population, passing the Lewis turning point and wasteful investment and the foreign policy establishment which is hawkish and completely ignores these issues in their pursuit of China's rise.
- This conflict - between high foreign policy expectations and expansionism and a technocrat / economist elite seeing the inevitability of slower growth and growth in influence from here is the main tension point of Chinese policy today.
234592
David Shambaugh challenges with much dexterity the conventional wisdom that China already has all the tools to be a global great power.  China comes out as a confused and conflicted rising power.  Although the country has become prosperous, it feels at the same time that its national security is at risk and that the world has not shown the international respect that it craves.

Mr. Shambaugh explores the diplomatic, economic, cultural, and military footprints of China around the world to prove to his readers that China is only a partial power in each of these four dimensions.

1) Diplomatically, China comes out as risk-averse and narrowly self-absorbed.  The country is primarily concerned with domestic economic development and the image and longevity of the ruling Communist Party.  China has shown both little interest in global governance and discomfort with the liberal international order set by the West after WWII.
2) Economically, China increasingly has a decisive influence on global trade and the imports of energy and raw materials through its mercantilism.  However, Chinese outbound investments and multinationals have not yet had much impact on the rest of the world.  Similarly, China's aid programs reflect both a lack of size commensurate with its status of world's second-largest economy and a frequent non-compliance with international donor standards.
3) Culturally, China is not generating emulation because of the sui generis nature of its culture and the lack of a transferrable economic experience.  Nonetheless, the country has a clear impact on tourism and art purchasing around the world.
4) Militarily, China does not come even close to the U.S. in conventional global power-projection capacities.  However, China qualifies as a global power in the areas of missile forces, space-based capabilities, and cyber forces.  Furthermore, China has not been good at cultivating allies as the U.S. has done due to its erratic, inconsistent foreign policies over time.

Therefore, Mr. Shambaugh invites his audience to rethink the rise of China.  He agrees with Joseph Nye that the greatest danger is that China overestimates itself and the U.S. overestimates China, especially in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2007-2008.

Finally, Mr. Shambaugh succinctly explains to his readers that the realist, liberal, and constructivist mainstream international relations schools seek to condition and shape China's rise.  He calls for fine-tuning the efficacy, logic, and strategy of integrating China into the institutions, rules, laws, and norms of the international community.  Therefore, Mr. Shambaugh emphasizes training schemes for Chinese professionals more carefully focused on the key areas of civil society, media, rule of law, government transparency, human rights, and global governance.

In summary, Mr. Shambaugh convincingly demonstrates that China is only a partial power diplomatically, economically, culturally, and militarily whose integration into the international community is a work in progress.
2426403
For decades the U.S. and China relied on a 'marriage of convenience' that guaranteed China a huge market for exports, while American consumers received a cornucopia of inexpensive products and a buyer of its debt. Roach basically contends that it's time for the two nations to switch identities - more savings and less consumption in the U.S., less savings and more consumptionin China.

The new China is here, yet we're fixated on the old China. China is now moving to a more balanced consumer-led growth model via services-led job growth (China's services sector overtook the combined shares of manufacturing and construction as the economy's largest segment in 2013), urbanization-driven income leveraging, and a stronger social-safety net. Services generate about 30% more jobs/output unit than do manufacturing and construction, allowing China to meet its labor absorption and social stability goals with economic growth of only 7-8%.

China now has the smallest services sector of any major economy, and Roach sees it possibly increasing by about $12 trillion by 2015, providing an opportunity for the U.S. Roach suggests pursuing that opportunity rather than continued Chinese currency bashing - reality is we had deficits with 102 nations in 2012 which Roach contends is the result of a U.S. savings gap. Besides, the renminbi has risen 35% since 7/2005 and its current account surplus is less than 3% of GDP. Roach would also like to see cyberattack issues raised to high-priority status.

As for rebalancing - China needs to save less and consume more, and the U.S. the opposite. Phasing out the one-child policy and reforming the residential permit system (hukou) are early steps; another is earmarking 30% of China's SOE profits for funding its safety net programs. While both nations have a surplus labor problem, China has a strategy and the commitment of its new leadership, the U.S. has neither - still stuck in our commitment to the Invisible Hand, an increasingly questionable direction. Regardless, Roach also points out that China's shift will drawn down its surplus saving and further reduce its current-account surplus - thus, who will fund chronic U.S. savings shortfalls, how will Americans hold down inflation in the future?

Another conflict - the imbalance between our projections of vast military power and the erosion of our domestic economic base, vs. China's rising nationalism. A major power realignment, first economic, eventually military as well, may follow. Skills on both sides will determine whether this transition is stable and peaceful; however, a special need is for the U.S. to defuse hostility towards China - often incorrectly blaming China for its enormous trade deficit when China was just the final link in a long supply chain with much of financed by American firms, assembling parts made elsewhere. We also need to stop predicting China's collapse - economically and politically.
1324294
The book is thought-provoking and well-articulated. However, I wasn't convinced on Russia, and authors fail to explain rise of China.
2708093
that's what you'll be if you don't read this book. but seriously...
 this is a well-written collection of essays with thought-provoking observations of American culture & politics from an outsider. Wendy Liu relies on familiar Chinese proverbs to help provide insight and understanding to an unfamiliar country and people.
4861351
I agree with other reviewers that the title undersells the vast scope of this very interesting and detailed book about the era of US-Chinese cooperation.

It's hard to believe reading this that just five years later, the US would be involved in total war against the Chinese communists who we were fairly close with in 1945 - but the book describes a communist shadow government that certainly portrayed an ideal it didn't seem they ever intended to live up to.

I knew the big picture of the Chinese-Japanese war - but I was only vaguely aware of how meaningful it was that the Chinese resisted so strongly. A million+ Japanese soldiers were bogged down in trying to subjugate China, which could have been used to maintain a much stronger stranglehold on the Pacific. If we add those resources to how Japan had successfully eliminated the US and British presence, and suddenly Australia would have been in play in 1942. But, thanks in part, I think to Chinese resistance, that didn't happen.

It is interesting how our military leadership despised Chinese nationalist leader Chaing Kai-Sheck, complaining how despotic his government was - when many of his worst excesses would be far surpassed by the communists to come. But it's really not that surprising; since the communists under Mao didn't really have to govern any part of the country, they seemed a more reasonable choice than the "devil we knew" in Chaing. And, there were certainly many members of the media of the time willing to carry water for the glamorous communist cause - and the Soviet Union were allies, after all.

There's always hindsight - if Japan's full-scale invasion is 1938, maybe the nationalists have defeated the communists by then. If the US government isn't quite so enamored with Mao, maybe his forces don't get the same foothold. On the other hand, given the poverty, devastation and destroyed society that China faced both before and after World War II, I think they were always going down the path of a dramatic societal shift.

At first glance, this might seem "niche history," but that's just our Westernized biases showing through - this theater of the war was every bit as significant - maybe moreso - than D-Day, or the entire European front. I can't say it's "forgotten history" because I'm not sure how much we remembered in the first place.

Very well done history, and an interesting and dynamic at these personalities of the time - men like Mao and Chaing didn't just change the world, they DIRECTED the world, and it's sort of a shame we don't give them their proper due - not in a good/bad way, but as towering figures of their time.
929946
In The Writing on the Wall: China and the West in the 21st Century (which I recommend to anybody who cares about global peace and prosperity), author Will Hutton says, "[China] requires our understanding and engagement - not our enmity and suspicion, which could culminate in self-defeatingly creating the very crisis we fear."

If you want to know such enmity and suspicion to the extreme, read The Coming Wars of China, which is simply a categorisation of the bad stories about China you can find over the internet. (Author's note: "Much of the research conducted for this book was done over the internet.") To give you an example, on page 137-138 the author uses the information on the Banqiao Dam found at Wikipedia - the Banqiao Dam was built in the early 1950s and crested and collapsed when Typhoon Nina hit in 1975 - to prove that it is not a good idea to build the Three Gorges Dam.

In fact, you know you are in for some catastrophic scenarios when you read the author's prediction in the form of a "News Release, October 25, 2012" on the first page of the Introduction:

- "Global stock exchanges were devastated this week by the worst collapse in history as a wave of panic selling followed...a Chinese government announcement that it would no longer finance the mounting budget and trade deficits of a 'profligate United States'."

- "It's been a tough year for Sino-US relations. In January, the US ambassador to the United Nations stormed out in protest over...[China's] veto to shield terrorist regimes such as Iran from diplomatic sanctions in exchange for oil. In March, China's president abruptly cancelled a state visit after the US Treasury Department branded China a 'currency manipulator.' During an unusually hot August that raised collateral fears of global warming, the US Pacific Fleet engaged in a tense, week-long standoff over Taiwan with China's [navy]."

- "Meanwhile, domestic unrest in China continues to escalate... A recent report released by the US Central Intelligence Agency has warned that should such domestic unrest reach a boiling point in China, the result may be 'sharper military conflicts with the United States, Taiwan, and possibly even Japan as Chinese leaders seek to unify the now increasingly fractured nation against a 'common enemy.'"

Of course, if you like betting, you can always buy the book now and check the validity of the author's prediction in the year 2012.

I would not, however, recommend that you do this. Instead, I recommend that you buy Will Hutton's The Writing on the Wall, which is one of the first truly enlightening books on China because of the author's unbiased attitude and approach.
1545101
Read the book while you travel through China, and your eyes will be opened.  Fishman covers two sides of the China story.  First is the upside of their strength.  Labor that is nearly free allows China to undercut capital-heavy US in supplier cheaper goods for Wal-mart and the rest of the world.  China then buys the equipment of their bankrupt competitors on the secondary market, and their productivity increases.  A country of small businessmen are on the move.

Fishman also covers the negative.  Decentralized government makes it difficult for the central powers to enforce intellectual property rights.  Rampant copying.  Pollution coming from the insistance on pushing cars.  Indeed growth is coming with a price.

The book comes out remarkably balanced.  Yes there is a great growth story in China.  Yes, they are eating many of our companies alive.  But we are benifiting too, and China has to struggle with some downside of it's grand plans.

That said, the book does take a "Pay attention, this is the 2nd coming of Japan, but more so!" type of hype.  The reality is that China is important, but the world isn't going to end.  People are paying attention.  Less hype and more insight would've been helpful.  (But then again, I may not have found the book without the hype)