A recounting of the facts without much interpretation
932323
I liked Atkinson's previous WWII books but this one, so far at least, is a recounting of facts and details without interpretation.  I ot more out of Anthony Bevor's books on similar topics.
4753540
The author is a professor in Fresno State's Dept. of Foreign Languages and Literature and writer for the National Review.com. The book is a compilation of his writings regarding the 9/11 crisis for which I assume he was already paid, but for which he has evidently decided to seek further remuneration as the country is recognizing the anniversary of the tragedy (sorry Prof., I didn't buy the book). Most, if not all, of this book is easily available free on-line. As a person who was caught up in some of the tragedy of that day, I can't say that I feel good about anyone who seems to be seeking a profit on this crisis. I didn't see a notice on the book that profits were for charity, such as to the victims.
The author is entitled to his opinions, but his arguments tend to be shallow and lazily written. His manner of presentation leads me to wonder if he is not a professor of reductionism instead of classics. Contrary to his presentation, for example, the U.S. did not enter the First World War due to the sinking of the Lusitania, which occurred nearly two years (and at least two other ocean liner sinkings) before Mr. Wilson asked for a declaration of war. The Lusitania is a better example of the American people remaining level headed. Furthermore, the U.S. was not alone in leaving "both Germany and Japan in smoldering ruin" as he oddly concludes in one of his early chapters. This is an important point since the author thesis is that the U.S. can dismiss international relations and assistance. But, his examples are all based on events that contradict his thesis and there are other examples in his writings.
The author sees as wimpish the contention of some to seek European and Arab support for military action on Europe and the Middle East soil. In fact, that is exactly what the U.S. did before entering Afghanistan. This, to me, is most troubling about the book. The author may want to argue for U.S. unilateralism, but why not truthfully note that his position is without recent and relevant historical precedence. He could admit that his position is unique, but some how worthwhile. Perhaps the author believes that the Spanish-American War (a case of U.S. unilateral action) was an act of American altruism and proper foreign policy. In fact, unilateralism in foreign action has been rejected by Wilson, Roosevelt, Eisenhower, and Nixon to name a few presidents of diverse ideologies.
Throughout the chapters that I read, the author worried not about facts, but only for his opinions to be accepted as the facts. He takes the old rhetorical approach of loudly repeating his opinions as facts, giving no credence to alternative views, and personalizes his criticism of those with whom he disagrees. This is hardly the approach of a university professor.
I don't know Prof. Hanson's background, but he writes like a person who has not served in the military. He seems to have no problem placing others, including inevitably civilians, in the line of fire. I only apologize if I am in error about the author's military experience, but his manner of arguing rings similar to those I have known who speak of the military with little experience. I recommend saving your money, read the author on line if you must, but first swallow a grain of salt.
332265
It's packed with information with some truth and some untruth.  Overall I found it to be a slanted rendition of the history of early contact between indigenous Americans and Europeans.
2002254
This is the fifth of David Griffin's books on the events of 9/11. Despite the overwhelming evidence against the official account, Dr Griffin has been criticised on the grounds that as a theologian rather than a physicist, architect or engineer, he is not qualified to question the government account. Using a similar defence, many people in Congress and the press duck and run for cover when confronted with the issue, claiming inability to comment because of a lack of the necessary technical expertise.

In his latest, incisive polemic, Dr Griffin focuses on the welter of contradictions and inconsistencies of the official story. By adopting this approach, he shows that the only way to cling to the official story is to believe that it is possible for two mutually contradictory statements to both be true.

Griffin has thus placed members of Congress and the press in an extremely awkward position. If they accept that mutually contradictory statements are consistent with the official story, they demonstrate that they are intellectually unfit for duty. On the other hand, if they continue to ignore the contradictions they show that they are morally unfit, by underlining their complicity in the coverup of the greatest mass murder in United States history.
2942306
The lack of fact--checking is evident.  Many other reviewers have pointed out inaccuracies.  One howler is the claim that the mass suicide of Jewish patriots at Masada occurred in AD 472.
3151651
This book seems to basically accomplish what it sets out to, but not without some yawns and doubts in the author's objectivety from the reader. The book is filled with detail and information, but the reader is left to figure out the distinction between the major characters and facts and the more minor.
Perhaps a bigger concern is that the author seems very biased at certain points. She is rather negative towards Christianity (at least the later versions) and oddly positive towards Islam.
But, if the reader can filter out all the opinion, and get through the dense areas, there is a lot to be learned here.
2418569
This thoroughly researched
book is a biography of the
President's ancestors but is
thin on analysis of him, which
us what I was expecting
Some facts were superfluous
and seemed to be included
merely to demonstrate the depth
of the author's research. It is
informative but not enjoyable.
2172755
This book is written for the mass consuption of the choir. It is not a bad book for this reason, but its narrative is ripe with claims that are presented as mere observations, and the vast historical sweep of the book sacrifices depth. It thus resembles the thoughtful, heart-felt ruminations of an opinionated (though beloved) relative, rather than a thick work of scholarship.
2219918
The author obviously made the decision  to give to a detailed factual account, an almost daily blow by blow chronicle, opposed to a more interpretive analysis and he has succeeded as far as one can succeed with this one dimensional story telling. Within that scope, however, he tends to neglect the Soviet losses, the 27 million or more who perished while not missing a chance to describe almost every atrocity taken against the Jews, Brits, Americans and even the Germans and Japanese when their cities were scorched and demolished. Overall, though, an amazing amount of research and information presented that boggles the mind and makes us wonder how something like this could ever have happened.
1545455
I found that the biographical data on the selection of intellectuals of the Sicherheitsdienst was of interest in that it offered a human side or face to these leading men of SD's actions in the east during world war two.  Their personal backgrounds, educations, career paths, and the evolution of their beliefs and values as National Socialists should be of interest to anyone doing serious research while avoiding the standard demonization so common in this area of history.

Ingrao freely acknowledges that the men studied were highly intelligent, sometimes brilliant, as well as highly educated and even gifted.  He bemoans this kind of human material placing itself into the hands of the Nazis and their aims, then tries to explain how they could be involved in it all.

I suppose there is some value in the author's attempting to 'explain' how and why these men did what they did or were accused of, but there are pitfalls.  Firstly, Ingrao uncritically accepts just about every accusation made or statistic presented by the Soviet authorities - themselves masters of deception and politicization of history as well as no mean practitioners of mass genocide themselves.  Secondly, the analysis of beliefs and backgrounds as causative factors doesn't really work so well in isolation, i.e. it is done here with the SD men but not with, say, those of the victor powers, all of whom committed their own individual or mass-scale atrocities.  What I am saying is that one can't really ignore or approve of one set of genocides while pathologizing and condemning another.  Why is one perfectly explainable while another remains semi-mysterious?

A very interesting thing relating to the Einsatzgruppen and something which the author touches upon but does not explore, is the issue of the veracity of their own reports to higher commands.  My readings in other sources indicate that not everything reported was accurate or even possible in some instances, and yet the reports are blithely accepted as factual.  Additionally, the author does not deal with the critical problem of a major shift in estimation of the numbers of victims of the Einsatzgruppen which customarily have been estimated by historians as being in the scores or hundreds of thousands, but more recently have shifted into around five million - but without clear explication of how such small units could accomplish this, give the vast expanses of territory to cover, the paucity of motorized transport, the heavy burden of anti-partisan duties, personnel shortages, et cetera.

At any rate I did find the book quite interesting, and I hope that the author will move forward with serious research into the above questions and issues, to clear up a lot of confusion and misunderstanding.
618502
Perhaps the very nature of the subject results in a history that is sketchy.  It has many fascinating chapters that fill in the gaps of other WWII histories, and person who is well read in WWII histories will find this an important title for the collection.  But reading this without a good WWII background may be misleading.

  The author makes numerous statements that are not backed up with facts.  For example, in a reference to a daring theft of Vichy French naval ciphers, the author claims that without these ciphers the North Africa landings in 1942 [Torch] wouldn't have been possible.  Really?

  Another example is the Dieppe landings.  We're lead to believe that there were a number of spin-off missions from the "failed" Dieppe invasion in 1942, including the rescue of 19 French secret agents locked up in the landing area, and investigating German radar capabilities.  But the author never convinces me that these were worth the cost of over 5,000 men lost in the battle.

  I think Stevenson gives the reader the impression that secret ops were responsible for preventing the Nazis from building atomic weapons.  From other books I have read on the subject, Hitler had little interest in devoting the resources required for this project.  The German scientists had pursued the wrong path early in the war and never got back on the correct path.  If BSC had done nothing in this field, the Germans would still not have built an atomic bomb before the war ended.  Of course the Allies didn't know this and I don't fault them for making the effort to disrupt German atomic research, but it was really just overkill.

  I found the first half of the book much more intersting, especially where the author reveals the treachery of the appeasers and Nazi sympathizers like Joe Kennedy and Charles Lindbergh.  I take issue with the previous reviewer (Rob "Coolerking") in his comparison of today's 'War against Terror" with WWII.  The Bush administration has created a negative environment in the American intelligence community where the operatives are only listened to if they provide information that supports the Administrations goals or beliefs.  Anything contrary is ignored.  In the case of the Valerie Plame case, when she gave contrary evidence to the case Bush was making for attacking Iraq, she was exposed.  This abuse of intelligence is not what intrepid had in mind.  In fact, he speaks about this very issue in his forward when he writes, "So there is the conundrum: How can we wield the weapons of secrecy wihout doing damage to ourselves?  How can we preserve the secrecy without endangering constitutional law and the individual guarantees of freedom?"

  I recommend this book for WWII buffs, but having a broad background on the subject is a perequisite.
2286859
I always thought reading a book about Gold Rush-era California would be interesting, but Susan Lee Johnson has been able to make it seem not very compelling.
This is a "People's History" sort of book, a tale of the minor characters in history, in particular the miners and their society.  In such a book, there are oppressors (often white males) and oppressed (usually women and non-whites).  Johnson supports this thesis with numerous tales of robbery and murder, which may all be true, but also reflect a political agenda that she is trying to promote.  This removes any real objectivity from her book.
The main problem with this book, however, is it is not very well-organized.  Johnson has filled the book with some good (and some not-so-good) anecdotes, but there is not all that much joining these stories together.  The result is a sometimes informative but usually rambling work.  In the end, I felt like I hadn't learned very much about this era other than a few tales that needed a better context.
3648850
Zinn disappoints with a biased and narrow accounting of the United States' history.  Despite the one-sided slant on key events (and much information not presented), this book is worth reading if only for the volume of factual stories and events gleamed over by conventional texts.
4269775
You can tell that this book was a collaboration between authors.  While it provides historical facts on the events that occurred, it doesn't give any insight on the events other than the obvious.
1946098
I read the book and unlike many of the impassioned reviewers below, was not at all that convinced by Rhoda Berenson's defense of her daughter.  For one thing, the book is mostly a broad indictment of the Peruvian criminal justice system (which clearly isn't very just) and the Berenson's (unsuccessful) efforts to bring their daughter home. Although told in chronological format, the book is a highly selective account that avoids hard, controversial questions, or at best, answers them superficially..  The reader learns more about Rhoda than about Lori, who is sketched as a sort of a modern-day humanitarian saint on a mission of peace and goodwill. Others might call her foolhardy.
This book does not challenge that assertion, but it does argue persuasively that Lori has suffered enough and should be released.
4444976
This is an interesting and informative book, though there is very little here that is really new.

Editor David Isby has collected and reprinted fourteen German officer interrogation reports compiled after the war for the United States Army. Hundreds of these reports reside in the U.S. National Archives in College Park, Maryland as well as at the U.S. Army Military History Center in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Some 318 were published in a 24-volume set that is today very difficult to find. Isby provides little depth into the reports themselves in his very short introduction, though he does provide a biography of each contributor and two appendices dealing with the German Seventh Army on 24 July 1944.

These reports, written from the German perspective, describe the Wehrmacht situation on 25 July 1944, the eve of the American breakout from Normandy during Operation Cobra and then proceed, chronologically through the German counterattack at Avranches, the Battle of Falaise and the 2nd Panzer Division attack on Alencon. The reports are extremely informative and interesting.

The problem is that the German officers who wrote these reports had their own agenda and, after the war, succeeded in embedding a series of myths in the military culture of the Allies that have endured to this day. The first is that the Germans would have won the war or would have won the fighting at Normandy during Cobra had it not been for the interference of Hitler. Linked to this myth is another that the Wehrmacht, even until the last days of the war, was far superior to any of the Allied armies at the tactical and operational levels of war. Another was that the Wehrmacht emerged from the war "clean" or free from any complicity in the mass genocide and other war crimes commmitted by Hitler's armed forces. This myth places all the blame for such crimes on the shoulders of the SS.

The conclusions and major themes in all these reports were orchestrated by the senior German military officers in Allied capativity. They reviewed and approved each report and it is now known that they refused to allow major criticisms of the Wehrmacht or its military leadership.

Unfortunately, Isby provides the reader with neither a measure of balance to these reports nor even insight on when or how they were written.

Contemporary historians, however, have debunked all these myths, with German historians themselves in the lead on this effort.

Thus, though this is an interesting book, the reader must take what he reads with a grain of salt.
3897487
The author'a writing style and the topic keeps the readers interest going. However, the author needs to do a better fact check, showing a tendency to either roll over events & incidents with a superficial knowledge or exaggerate incidents and outcomes.
Overall, a nice read but not an authoritative book. I will not use this book as a reference.