An impartial view of the South Generals and tactics.
340266
This was the first book I've read about the South point of view of the Civil War, throught Longstreet's action and participation. What I found refreshing was the fact that the South wasn't a unified block: personal feuds, indecisions and bad judgment underminded the war effort as much in the South as in the North.

Conventional litterature wants you to think that Robert E Lee and most particularly Stonewall Jackson were infallible. Lee was a tremendous defensive general, but made numerous bad judgment calls in offensive campaings, and Jackson let Lee down on at least 2 occassions, most notably in the Seven Days War. Seldom do you read about Jackson's poor performances.

As for Longstreet, he had his own weaknesses, but probably was the best tactician the South had. That is the strengh of this book, the picture offered about Longstreet, Lee and Jackson is impartial and both sides of the coin is presented to the reader.

Reading this book made it all clearer to me.
1490902
DH Hill is an important figure in the American Civil War. He commanded a Confederate Division from the Peninsular Campaign through Antietam, was responsibel for the defense of the Virginia and North Carolina coasts, and was with the Army of Tennessee for the Chickamauga Campaign. This biography covers all of that, plus his pre- and post-war careers as regulary army officer, author and educator.

I would have liked more tactical detail, but it's also the only book covering the subject. It's also helpful to see the Virginia fighting from the perspective of a Confederate who didn't think Robert E. Lee walked on water. For the Civil War buff, keep in mind that this book is Hill's perspective only. You'll need a good history of the individual battles, and decent maps.
1054439
Foote provides the kind of detail that makes sense of larger views of the Civil War. To hear about the amount of food needed for an army to march, to hear about the length of time a march takes, to hear about the personalities involved at a decision-making level, make the the more general movement of the war more clear and more coherent.
4766518
It's been thirty years since the Falklands War ended now, probably the last relatively "clean war" involving mostly uniformed combatants in a straight-up fight. With our experience of Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan now make the Falklands seem rather odd. Be that as it may, Sandhurst professor Gregory Fremont-Barnes provides an interesting view of the ground campaign in Osprey's The Falklands 1982: Ground Operations in the South Atlantic. This campaign has been covered extensively in a number of previous books, so there are no new revelations here but the high-quality graphics alone make the book worth owning. The author covers the ground fighting in considerable tactical detail, down to platoon level, and there are maps for each action. I think this factor alone is significant, since most of the previous books on the Falklands had relatively poor maps and it was difficult to make out one hill top position from another. Overall, well-written, a decent amount of analysis and excellent graphic support.

 The initial sections on opposing forces, plans and commanders follow the standard Osprey Campaign format. I thought the section on commanders was a bit too short and given the scale of fighting, should have included at least one officer under the rank of general from each side. The Falklands War was fought and won by junior officers, not generals. The author also strongly highlights the Argentine logistical deficiencies, which bordered on criminal negligence. There were a few ground force issues which were glossed over a bit - such as the unsuccessful British attempt to use U.S.-supplied Stinger MANPADS in the Falklands and the pre-war training some of the British units had in Iceland and Norway which helped their performance in the war. The order of battle provided is decent, but could have gone a bit more into detail (e.g. no battalion commanders listed) given the limited size of the forces involved. The author reserves the bulk of the volume, about 64 pages, for the campaign itself, beginning with the Argentine invasion and ending with the surrender at Stanley. The volume has one tactical map and one battle scene by Graham Turner covering this initial combat.

 The tactical maps covering the British operations upon returning to the Falklands are really the heart of this volume. There are three 3-D maps (Goose Green, Mount Tumbledown and Wireless Ridge), plus three more 2-D maps (Mount Longdon, Mount Harriet and Two Sisters). These maps depict small unit operations down to platoon level and would be very useful for instructing junior infantry officers on tactical operations. The author interweaves first-person accounts into his narrative, although there is limited perspective on battlefield specifics (e.g. exactly how British artillery and close air support was used, tactical C2 and tactical logistics, incl. medical support). I suspect that British quartermasters played a larger role in the final victory than most accounts suggests, but the support troops usually don't appear much in standard accounts, or this one. The author does a fine job analyzing the reasons for the British victory, which has been discussed at length by other authors, as well. He also provides quite a few modern photos of the battlefield today, courtesy of the RAF, although he makes no mention of current British policies or forces on the Falklands (or the fact that some Argentines are still raising the Malvinas issue). Overall, a decent summary of the campaign with excellent maps.
2026157
This volume looks at the 1864 Shenandoah Campaign, a federal military operation which ran concurrently with the Grant's Wilderness Campaign in central Virginia. While Grant attempted to get between Lee and Richmond a succession of Union generals tried to eliminate Confederate control over the strategic Shenandoah valley and possibly use it to cut the vital railroad supplying the Army of Northern Virginia. As the author shows in this volume of the Time-Life Civil War series, some of these generals were inept and experienced Confederate officers were able to beat the Federals and even use the Valley to invade Maryland and threaten Washington D.C. Eventually General Sheridan would be hand-picked by Grant to destroy the Confederates in the Shenandoah.

Well-illustrated, with great photos, artwork, maps and pictures of artifacts. Includes sidebars on the Volunteer Reserve Corps, the forts of Washington, artwork of the Battle of Cedar Creek, VMI, Sheridan's army, and the destruction of Chambersburg.
3923208
The author sets out to correct the misconceptions about Grant, and largely succeeds.  By means of careful review of historic documents, Vessey demonstrates that Grant was a light drinker throughout the Civil War (and perhaps throughout his life).  He also demonstrates that Grant, far from being a butcher who disregarded the well-being of his own troops, was continuously and unremittingly caring about reducing both the hardships and the casualties of his men.

Grant has suffered by comparison with the mythic general and noble gentleman, Robert E. Lee.  Vessey fails to address this comparison in a general way, and thereby misses an opportunity to raise Grants stature.  For example, the author fails to note that it was Lee, not Grant, who lost the higher percentage of his troops as battle casualties.  However, Vessey does demonstrate quite convincingly that in the Richmond campaign that ended the war, Grant out-generaled and out-strategized Lee, continuously flanking Lee to force him to retreat to the massive fortifications around Richmond and Petersburg.  Lee was then fixed in place (to use Grants own term), and prevented from sending elements of his army to provide material assistance to Johnston, Bragg, Hood and other rebel generals, who were being dismantled in detail by Sherman, Sheridan, Thomas and other Federal generals.  After Grant became the supreme leader of all the Union forces, he demonstrated his strategic mastery, not only in the Richmond campaign, but with his direction of all the Union generals in other theaters of the war.  Grants strategic leadership included his direction of Sherman, whose Atlanta campaign and campaign northward toward Richmond were both part of Grants grand design.  (Vessey demonstrates that even the march to the sea by Sherman, from Atlanta to Savannah, was Grants idea originally, though it was Sherman who ultimately chose that plan over other options that Grant suggested to him.)

While Vessey does demonstrate Grants strategic genius, he passed on the opportunity to make the point that Grant always succeeded in his strategic forays into enemy territory, while Lee was unsuccessful in his; he was held to a draw by the weak General McClellan at the Battle of Antietam and was soundly defeated by the solid but unspectacular General Meade at Gettysburg.

One important comparison that Vessey notes in passing but then fails to elaborate upon in detail is that figures regarding the numbers of combatants available to Grant by comparison to his Confederate rivals are misleading because Union forces counted cooks, teamsters and other non-combat troops in their numbers while the Confederates did not.  One infers that this was because most of the support personnel of the Confederates were slaves.  So the edge in numbers of troops accorded to Grant in all the histories is consistently overstated.  (This apparently applied to all of the battles of the Civil War.)  Vessey fails to provide any analysis showing the scale of the overstatement, however.

In summary, Grant, the Forgotten Hero is a fine and useful work, one that will be of interest to readers who gravitate to Civil War history, or to military history in general.  If someone had done a decent job of copy-editing this book, my rating would be five stars.  As it is, I would go for four-and-a-half stars if I could.
2477009
The title of this book says why it is probably worth reading. The author in no way  ignores the glaring deficiencies in South Vietnam's government and higher command. Nevertheless, he points out that there were also patriots and heroes in ARVN. In the process he sheds light on some historic battles that have been poorly reported for too long. The only reason I didn't give this book a higher rating is that I'm not sure the author spent quite the time writing it that it deserves. This is not the best book ever written but it is one of the few on this subject.
872237
Thomas Army provides a good argument for how technology won the Civil War. But his more convincing argument isn't that the industrial might of the North defeated the South. Rather, the industrious members of the a free society (engineers, mechanics, and so forth) defeated a petty aristocracy that had disdain for those who worked with their hands.

As a practicing satellite communications systems engineer, I had to go back to my collage days to remember what gabions, revetments, and lunettes are. I loved the maps and the illustrations.

Both the North and the South had railroads. You can read for yourself how, in the South, the individual railroad companies in the South would not contribute to the war effort without being paid (not that the Northern railroads weren't paid) and that their precious States Rights kept them from having a unified command.

A good book to read after reading this book is Stephen Ambrose's, "Nothing Like It in the World: The Men Who Built the Transcontinental Railroad".

One complaint - the font is very small. Good luck with that.
2096430
This book manages to present the battle of Shiloh in an even-handed way,'from the viewpoints of both sides, Generals and privates. It doesn't get too bogged down in names and places and concentrates on the important points. Even if you're familiar with what took place at Shiloh, this book will likely teach you more, in a very readable format.
2018242
William C. Davis, famous and rather prolific Civil War historians, faces the myths that constitute the Lost Cause doctrine and destroys a lot of them.

The book is a collection of articles published previously on several reviews: they analize the relationships between Jefferson Davis and his generals, the forgotten fronts of war (South Carolina, Trans-Mississippi), and -last but not least- the southern attempts to find explanations to the defeat.

The second half of the book is the better. The chapters devoted to the "forgotten fronts" are pheraphs too short and generic.

However a very intriguing book.
2553782
It is refreshing to see things from the Southern point of view.  Because the Yankees won, they got to write all the text-books.  Reading this book will probably give you a somewhat different view of the war.  You will see how much the South suffered, despite its great effort and spirit.  The book is full of interesting details that one will not find in the normal military history books.  It has much about the life of Southerners (the civilians) during the war.  Great for civil war buffs who want a more balanced view of the war.
3022045
A nice little book for the price on a nearly-forgotten battle.  Great maps.  Interesting photos.  Well explained background information on generals' plans and thinking.  Has little information about specific soldiers, however (e.g., no mention of Lt. Col. E. J. Pike who earned a Medal of Honor at St Mihiel).

Overall an effective presentation.
444478
Wert writes a better book here than he did with his biography of Gen. Longstreet.  A fine, well researched story of what has been relegated to the status of sideshow to the campaigns of General Grant in 1864.  Wert balances detail (unit citations down to regimental level) with discussions of strategies and the big picture pressures under which both commanders operated.  My greatest criticism is that the maps are simplistic and would have been more useful if they had been drawn to the same level of detail (regimental with better terrain markings) as the author uses in the text.  Overall, a good read for civil war buffs.
1799038
I am Bryce A. Suderow, author of "The Petersburg Campaign" a two volume history of the Siege of Petersburg that won the Douglas Southall Freeman Award in 2014 for best Civil War book of the year.

Since my expertise is the Siege of Petersburg, I'll address myself to Rose's section on that campaign.

I'm impressed by the thorough job Rose did in researching the correspondence volumes in the Official Records.  By citing Grant's correspondence he demonstrates how again and again Grant threw together badly planned campaigns that were bound to fail.  To my mind this proves that Grant was not a good battlefield general.

I'm also impressed by Rose's clarity and his restraint.  Instead of sneering at Grant, he simply delivers the facts and lets them speak for thsmselves.
2769618
In most histories of the Korean War, the Korean army tends to be overlooked except with respect to their combat abilities, or lack thereof.  However, this is a harsh assessment, and it should be noted that the Korean army put more troops in the field than the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada combined.  So while it could be considered that as a whole, the Korean army did not perform particularly well in combat, they did bear their fair share of the fighting, and this is reflected in their losses.  However, there were units of the ROK army that were militarily capable, and these obviously tended to be units led by the competent officers of the ROK army.  Paik was one such individual, who is regarded by Max Hastings in his book "The Korean War" as being the "ablest South Korean commander".  "From Pusan to Panmunjom" is the story of Paik's war, which stretched from the beginning of the war as a field commander to its conclusion, just over three years later, at which time Paik was Army Chief of Staff, and a four star general.

General Paik Sun-yup was commander of the 1st ROK Division at the time of the North Korean invasion of the South, which commenced in June 1950, and it is these early days of the war which form the initial portion of the book.  Paik remained in command during the counteroffensive, and led the 1st ROK division into Pyongyang.  This was significant for Paik, who had been forced to flee the city in late 1945 when communists threatened.  Paik then proceeded onto the Yalu.  Of course, the course of the war was quickly reversed upon entry of the Chinese into the theatre of war, and following the retreat of the allied forces, the war settled into a stalemate.  Paik, being involved as a field commander throughout the entire war, is ideally placed to comment and provide his views and experiences on all the major actions and phases of the Korean War.  Paik provides a mixture of command and field level experiences - ranging from interrogating Chinese POWs to having a telephone conversation with a frightened North Korean soldier defending Pyongyang as the 1st ROK Division approached from one direction while the US 1st CAV approached from another.  There are also interesting accounts of the interaction with American forces.  The great value in this book is the Korean perspective of the Korean/US relationship. It seems that, contrary to the generally accepted view, there was a great deal of respect between the American units that supported the 1st ROK Division (which admittedly was one of the most, if not the most, capable Korean unit).  Nonetheless, there were difficulties in the Korean/US relationship, and Paik does tend to tiptoe through these carefully.

Unlike some memoirs, there are a few (large scale) maps interspersed throughout the text that assist the reader in understanding the movement of various units.  There is also a selection of black & white photographs.  Generals Ridgway and van Fleet (Ridgway's successor as commander of the US 8th Army), both of whom worked with Paik, contributed a foreword. At times, the language tends to be relatively formal - but every now and then Paik breaks into a more casual turn of phrase.

"From Pusan to Panmunjom" is recommended for all those interested in the Korean War - this book offers a Korean perspective on the events of the war, a perspective which is in contrast to the multitude of US-centric books on the Korean War that are available.
4822363
Anyone who has a decent understanding of the war knows about the Vicksburg Campaign. However, not as many know about a simultaneous Siege happening to the south in Louisiana at Port Hudson. General Nathaniel Banks and his Army of the Gulf (XIX Corps) besieged 6,000-odd men under Confederate Major General Franklin Gardner from May 23-July 9, 1863. After these 48 days, the Confederates surrendered, not because they were defeated, but because Vicksburg had fallen and they now had no hope of a rescue. Cunningham's book is a good introduction to this topic except for one important detail: maps. There are only two maps. One shows the larger area of operations along the Mississippi River from Cairo, IL to New Orleans. The other shows the siege lines in such a zoomed out map that I had trouble reading everything. This makes for a difficult time while following along. I pulled out my Official Records Atlas several times during my reading. The Order of Battle is slightly above average, with no strengths but with regimental commanders listed. Cunningham has adequate notes and a solid bibliography. The book was originally published in 1963, so that might explain the lack of maps. I enjoyed Cunningham's delivery. It was smooth and kept me interested throughout. However, he tended to make some grandiose claims from time to time regarding the ability of the Confederates to break the Siege. If you read it, you'll know what I'm talking about. This is a solid introduction to the Campaign, but it is by no means definitive. I would recommend the two-volume The Guns of Port Hudson by David C. Edmonds for that label. The books are not cheap and they're difficult to find, but judging by the second volume (which I own), they are worth it.

174 pp., 2 maps
4325895
You can best judge a person by the company he keeps; and in Clyde Wilson's  case he has been keeping very good company indeed.
In this book, the  editor of the papers of John Calhoun tells the story of one of the  defenders of Calhoun's principles, James Johnston Pettigrew.  The portrait  is of a man who is engaging and noble.
When you visit Gettysburg, stand  at the North Carolina monument and gaze across the field at the copse of  trees; you will be standing at the spot where Pettigrew and his men began  their march to glory.  As Wilson's portrait of Pettigrew makes clear, and  as any serious and honest student of the struggle for Southern independence  should know, these were men who fought for a variety of reasons.  In  Pettigrew's case, it was to preserve a substantial measure of the world  that America had inherited from Europe against a foe bent on destroying  that world in the name of an abstract principle.
These were not, in  short and contrary to the simplistic explanations of the conflict that  dominate public discourse today, men who marched into the cannon's mouth  with dreams of masters whipping slaves in their hearts.  On the contrary,  they were men who believed fervently that they were resisting the tyranny  of a government that was fighting to keep them where they would rather not  be; and in this, they, not Lincoln and his generals, were the real heirs of  the American Revolution.
It is through reading the work of scholars  like Professor Wilson that we can honestly approximate the reasons for this  last (on the Confederate side) just as well as necessary war in America's  story.  For unlike this rather partisan review, the book is soberly written  and the story unfolds in the measured tones of a man who has absorbed the  lessons of his heroes.