An important refutation of Cold War revisionism
353734
A scholar of the Truman administration, Ferrell has compiled six reworked essays that mainly concern the origins of the Cold War. The first three in particular lay waste to the arguments of leftist historians who blame the United States for the Cold War. More specifically, he exposes the inadequacies of their research and the way in which their political agendas pre-determined the outcomes and conclusions of their books. Ferrell points out that the revisionists constructed their arguments before State Department records had become available. He essentially asks, "If the United States was bent on using nuclear weapons to intimidate the Soviets after WWII, why did it do such a slipshod job of producing them?" Ferrell shows how puny the US military became between 1946-50, something which Truman would not have allowed if he had been pursuing confrontation with the USSR.
  The only way Ferrell could have produced a better book would have been to synthesize his essays into more of a single entity that examined the origins of the Cold War.
  His is a fine addition to the growing list of scholarship that is thoroughly refuting and disproving the evidence and the arguments of the Cold War revisionists.
2592709
If all you do is read the standard textbooks and listen to the platitudes that come out the mouths of our ruling class, you will never get the complete picture of "why they hate us." Former Cold Warrior Chalmers Johnson details how the national security apparatus set up during that era and the foreign policies implemented has laid the groundwork for most today's international troubles. "Blowback", a CIA term referring to the unintended consequences of polices that were usually kept secret from the American public, is detailed and explained in depth. Despite the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States has not fully adapted to the post-communist era by rolling back militarism and government secrecy. America continues to maintain a global garrison of bases and relentlessly intervenes in the internal affairs of other countries openly and covertly. In Johnson's words, "The evidence is building up that in the decade following the end of the Cold War, the United States largely abandoned a reliance on diplomacy, economic aid, international law, and multilateral institutions in carrying out its foreign policies and resorted much of the time to bluster, military force, and financial manipulation. The world is not a safer place as a result."

The one disappointment I had with this book was the lack of focus in the Middle East. Nevertheless, it is to be expected since the author is an East Asia expert and most of book focuses on American actions there.
4603944
Major Elliot's informed analysis is just as valid in 2004 as it was in 1949.  The Russian's relentless pursuit of nuclear arsenals and world hegemony is a true threat to world peace, and in particular, Major Elliot makes a strong case for protecting Norway from the high probability of Russian Attack (p. 141).  The Soviet, er, Russian High Command will be anxious to get hold of Norwegian ports for the use of their submarines.  And in the Middle East we must also be vigilant lest Russian columns strike from Transcaucasia in to Abadan and Kuweit.  As Major Eliot writes, a burden of responsibility to protect the benefits of freedom and share its benefits with mankind has been laid on the shoulders of America as has no other country in history.
Actually, that last part probably actually still IS true today.
I miss the Cold War.  The moral relativism that infects the heart of the West and America is a hard thing to deal with, and it may be our own apathy and over-acceptance of other cultures that will ultimately lose the current war of ideas and cultures.
721981
The term 'Neo-Conservative' is now a term of reprobation in most American political discourse. The 'neo-cons' are taken to be responsible for the highly problematic war in Iraq. Legitimate fair critics of the Neo- Cons are unfortunately outshouted by radical left, often Anti- Semitic critics of the neo- Cons who ridicuously accuse Bush, Rumsfeld, and Cheney of being servants of Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, and Douglas Feith.
Murray's book comes not specifically as a defense of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq but rather as an effort to outline the basic Neo- Con position, and to argue that it is the right one for the people of the West to take. He devotes his first chapter to an outline of the thought of the principal theoretician of Neo-Con thought Leo Strauss. The bulk of the book is devoted to outlining Neo- Con thought in international and domestic areas.
Peter Berkowitz in his highly favorable review of this book in the 'Weekly Standard' writes of it as follows:

"In contrast to traditional conservatives, neoconservatives are more comfortable with capitalism, always accepted the moral and political necessity of the welfare state, and consistently sought a prominent role for America in creating a stable and just international order.
In contrast to progressives, neoconservatives are more concerned about the costs of modernity's disruptive ways to the family and traditional morality, strongly doubt the ability of the federal government to improve America through higher taxes and more aggressive social policies, and are skeptical of the integrity and efficacy of the United Nations, while maintaining confidence in the ability of the American armed forces, when diplomacy is exhausted, to advance American interests and ideals."

Berkowitz goes on to to say that Murray shows how Neo- Conservatism is a new kind of Conservative thought aimed at and placing greater emphasis on America's leading role in the world.

However difficult the situation may be in Iraq, and it certainly seems like a no- win situation now , even to many who supported the original incursion Murray's thesis is that the Neo-Conservative ideology is the one which will best serve the U.S. and the world in the years ahead.

My reservation would be - With less arrogance, with less certainty, with more caution, with more consideration of what other peoples and other worlds are about - and with greater understanding that one can wholly hope to improve the world and not to dramatically transform it overnight.
3751501
This was a collection of Professor Cohen's "Nation" articles, together with newer reflections a decade later.  After the passage of yet another decade, we find Cohen's take more prophetic than ever:  "But what will be the reaction of our own opinion shapers and policymakers when Russian realities explode the prevailing myths about America's post-Communist friend and partner, as they soon will?  If missionary dogmas persist, the American backlash is easy to foresee - at best, cynicism and indifference to Russia's plight; at worst, a sense of betrayal and a revival of reflexive Cold War attitudes. . . the sequel to the Cold War is likely to be a very cold peace" (p. 103).

The rise of Putin fulfilled this caveat, and in Putin's comeback we see it continue to unfold.  The Russian backlash against Western meddling has been just as severe.  The wonder is that post-cold war trade and diplomacy hasn't collapsed altogether: proof that the superpower conflict was, at bottom, geopolitical rather than ideological.

In one aspect I disagree with Professor Cohen's thesis.  Rather, the collapse of Communist ideology, the Soviet state, and Russia as a power was the result of a quite *successful* crusade.  In rereading Peter Schweizer's "Victory," outlining the intensive sabotage by the Reagan regime in the USSR's last decade, I can't help but believe the missionary "advice" bequeathed to Gorbachev and Yeltsin was premeditated all along, to lead the country into a dead end and make it "safe for the West."  Yeltsin was the best president of Russia America ever had, achieving a capitalist conquest by self-destruction that Reagan failed to accomplish externally; gleefully egged on by advisors who wanted to see the country neutered, its economy subordinate to Western finance, and its state ghettoed in the Eurasian wilderness, never to rise again.

Even in the words of a liberal Democrat, like Clinton advisor Strobe Talbott: "The USSR needed a wrecking ball."  Like most Westerners he assumed this to be a good thing; that the liberated masses would emerge cheering from under the rubble.  To pretend shock and dismay at the bitterness of those trapped - and often crushed - in the ruins is par for the course with Western policy makers.
4130855
This post-Cold War edition of Seyom Brown's classic updates his excellent review of the ways in which war can be avoided, or at least the chance of war breaking out can be minimized.  The strongest chapters start with chapter 3 and run through the end of the book, and they pretty much cover the waterfront of topics relevant to war avoidance.  For this reason they are an excellent way to introduce the subject an adult reader who may have no background in international affairs, or to use in an introductory undergraduate course.

I have omitted the first two chapters from this endorsement because in them Brown strays into biological and psychological theories of the causes of war that are at best exploratory, and certainly both contested and inherently contestable.  In these chapters he is trying to prove too much on far too slender a foundation, and I found them unreliable.  But he moves to firmer ground in the succeeding chapters, and provides a sound historical account of measures to prevent war and how well they worked, and why.
101006
Identifying roots of  the Cold War as far back as WWI, this excellent "Hourly History" recounts the decades long stand off between the United States and  Soviet Russia  It was  however, the conclusion of WWII that left the two rival governments as the world's only super  powers. Besides dominating the news this rivalry permeated peoples' consciousness whether they were aware  of it or not For me as a young teenage paper deliverer I wondered about the never ending first page headlines related to Senator Joseph McCarthy.  A so called "red scare" was on and communist sympathizers and even spies were searched out and exposed.  Though II did not know it at the time the official policy of the United States was determined opposition and containment of communism. What comes to mind was the prevalence of words , terms, and events such as: Berlin airlift, U-2 planes, Bay of Pigs, arms race,loyalty oaths, Sputnik, Check Point Charlie, MAD meaning mutually assured destruction, Korea,, Cuban Missile Crisis, Vietnam. It was  not until 1983 when I had opportunity to be part  of a European tour with emphasis on East Germany that it seemed that there was an easing of tensions between the rivals.  I began a correspondence  with an East German. man,.  I was his eyes on the West side of the Iron Curtain he was my eyes on the East side of that divide.  Oddly enough after a six year correspondence in 1989 the Berlin Wall came down and the Soviet Union dissolved.  I never hear from him again. These two events marked the end of the Cold War.  Perhaps the policy objective of containment had been reached.  Reading this book made me aware of how thoroughly and completely its events and tensions permeated decades of my life.
3101823
Huntington's contention is that the Cold War was bipolar; it was a conflict between capitalist, free market economies led by U S vs. socialist, state-planned economies led by Soviets.  Beneath this economic ideology was the military reality of two superpowers involved throughout the world in diplomatic and covert 'destabilizing' tactics. After the USSR collapsed, this ideological conflict left a 'void' and a more influential, unipolar U S / capitalist superpower. Huntington's analyses are based upon expert knowledge. (He was a Director of Strategic Planning during the Carter Admin.)

To fill this decline of Soviet influence in the Near Abroad & throughout the developing world, Huntington argues that a future world order would be based upon civilization as the determining factor rather than economic structure. He outlines roughly 6 dominant civilizations: The West (U S, Europe, Australa), Japanese, Orthodox (led by Russia), Islamic, Sinic or Chinese, Hindu (led by India). Buddhist, African, and Latin are also cultures which may prove to be civilizational in the sense that Huntington uses this term. 'Clashes of civilization' will take place at the faultlines (which are the borders between these 6 dominant civilizations). These will become the likely points of violent conflict in the future 'remaking of world order'.

In his conclusions Huntington draws particular attention to Islam, noting that 'Islam has bloody borders'.
He is also concerned about the increasing influence of multiculturalism in U S academics. He also predicts the 'decline of the West' which seems counter-intuitive, given that its main rival has collapsed into the CIS.
Huntington bases this upon the dominance of the U S & USSR post-WWII.
  This book produced a paradigm shift in how Westerners understand the world after 1990. It is a must-read. It has been prophetic in terms of the threat of Islamic extremism and terrorism / GWOT. Its critics have contended that Huntington created a self-fulfilling prophesy but I have traveled widely and I believe that his assessments were depressingly realistic (especially post 9/11).

Some comments & criticism:

1)Unlike the Neo-cons, Huntington is neither arrogant, nor endorsing an American Empire, nor pre-emptive wars. These Neo-conservatives are hardline pro-Israeli ideologues, often playing to their Judeo-Christian religious audiences / constituents. I'd describe Huntington as a secularist in foreign policy and a  moderate / conservative realist -- mostly concerned about U S national interest in foreign affairs.

2)His prediction of decline of the West was not linked causally to anything specific. I would have liked for him to relate it to the rise of multinational corporations, ostensibly based in U S, which operate globally but depend upon the U S govt. intervention, U S military, U S tax-payer bail-out when their 'globalizing' tactics to maximize profits fail. Huntington & his Olin sponsor aren't going to be so honest in a published book for a wide audience.
96982
On Thermonuclear War is a work from 1960 that runs counter to the conventional wisdom of his day, and which still exists to this day. He attacks the so-called "cataclysmic" view of nuclear war. Kahn provides numbers to show that a total nuclear war is survivable, and that our society could eventually recuperate. Make no mistake, at no point does he advocate nuclear war, he merely makes us face the fact that it could happen, and that we had better be prepared to deal with it. After all, the Soviets did. Although this book would seem to be dated in this Post-Cold War era, remember that we and the Russians still possess hefty nuclear arsenals, and the world is a much less stable place than during the Cold War. This book can be hard to read, given the plethora of technical information, but it is worth it.
4086806
Chen Jian's works on China's rise to international power are groundbreaking books exploiting Chinese (and Soviet too) source materials and interviews.  This book follows along the same pattern established in his 1994 book, "China's Road to the Korean War," which argues that Mao's ideological commitment to the social and political revolution forecasted, even guaranteed, a shooting conflict with the United States.  In Mao's China and the Cold War, Chen goes further in his analysis, demonstrating that it was Mao's worldview and determination to make China the central figure in the international Communist movement that was the driving force behind China's many foreign entanglements: Korea, First and Second Indo-China Wars, Taiwan Strait Crisis, the sundering of the brotherly alliance between Beijing and Hanoi, and the nearly fatal rift between Mao and Moscow.  Chen deftly describes Mao's concern for "continuous revolution," and the fear that reactionary movements abroad would influence the Chinese population at home.  Of equal concern to Mao was the effort to harness the people's enthusiasm for ultimately disasterous endeavors, such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution.  Chen shows that Mao accomplished these "mobilizations" and maintained his grip on power by demonizing first the United States, then the Soviet Union.  This form of politics served Mao well, allowing him to keep his supporters in check (even if he ended up purging them in the end) and his opponents disoriented.  It even allowed him the freedom to make the compromise most surprising of all -- normalization of relations with the United States in the early '70s.  Chen points out that even with this act, Mao was pursuing his goal of radicalizing his own movement, particulary vis-a-vis the Soviets.  Ironic, then, that in permanently casting away from the Soviet-led bloc (to which Mao had more than once pledged allegiance), Mao nearly guaranteed the former's disintegration and went a long way to undermining international Communism's appeal world-wide.

A bibliographical essay addressing each chapter enhances the usefulness of this book for students and those getting acquainted with the Far East during the Cold War.
3626396
Ellen Schrecker is a committed Communist and revisionist historian.  No amount of evidence from Soviet archives open since 1991 will dissuade her from her position that it is the free nations and peoples of the world that caused the cold war, rather than the aggressive and murdering nations that she loves so and whose passing she laments.

Ellen Shrecker is part of the politburo of the American historians that are trying to rewrite history.  It won't work.  The facts are out and she is swimming against a flood of paper that give the lie to her beliefs.  If you REALLY want to understand where things stand, read David Horwitz, Ron Radosh, John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr.
913615
David North sets fact from fiction in his review of claims made in recent biographies featuring Lenin's co-revolutionist and outspoken critic of the Stalinist beaureaucracy. North carefully examines the quality of Trotsky scholarship and calls into serious question the integrity of those complicit in the falsification of history. He finds that many of the claims about Trotsky's life have origins in Soviet fabrications, or are simply made up and unsupported by the authors. North clears the record on Trotsky and restores him to his proper place in history.

This book provides the reader with a decent starting point for studying the life of a brilliant and influential man. I recommend it for anyone seeking to better understand the life of Leon Trotsky or the roots of the international Trostskyist movement.
4249808
In his now-classic essay, Professor Theodore von Laue offers a highly original interpretation of the history of the Soviet Union and Communism. The Communist overthrow of the Tsar in 1917 has traditionally been seen as an angry reaction to incompetance of the old regime. But according to von Laue, it was more than that. The new leaders desperately needed to catch up with the West. For by now the industrial revolution had transformed Western Europe while Russia lagged far behind. Determined to catch up, the Communists forced industrialization and modernization on their peoples. But herein lay the crux of the problem: "How to infuse the creativity of Western urban-industrial civilization, evolved under highly favorable geographic and historical circumstances, into habits and institutions shaped by relentless adversity." (p. 3). The method the Soviets, and Stalin in particular, used to deal with this was coercion, a un-Western way to try and emulate the West. And it failed miserably. For according to von Laue, "Where political and economic unity has been traditionally imposed by force, it cannot be readily replaced, in face of profound geographical and historical obstacles, by voluntary cooperation." Thus despite the repression, the gulags, the forced resettlements, and forced labor, the Soviet peoples never developed the creativity, initiative or cooperation to modernize. The multi-ethnic facade finally crumbled under Gorbachev's liberalization policies.

 Not only is von Laue's view of the Soviet project as more of an attempt to catch up with the West than class struggle novel, but his assertion that culture, rather than material factors, drives development is also provocative. Von Laue later expanded on the themes in this book and applied them on a global scale in "The World Revolution of Westernization," where he examines the industrial and democratic revolutions that began in Britain and France, and traces their impact on the rest of the world, arguing that most cultures were unable to assimilate these concepts into their existing norms, thus disrupting these societies. The only societies that sucessfully adopted Westernization were the United States (itself an offshoot of Britain) and Japan, a highly imitative culture. But these ideas originated in "Why Lenin? Why Stalin? Why Gorbachev?" As for the future of Russia, von Laue remains dubious, arguing that it is impossible to transfer "cultural achievements, especially human attitudes, values, and institutions, from one country to other, unprepared countries." (p. 179) Perhaps that is why Russia still lags far behind.
1733129
This is an important work of original scholarship.  It draws on the author's own archival research as well as the most recent work by Russian and Western scholars working on the Cold War.  It should be of interest to historians because of the new insights it brings to familiar episodes and the uncovering of less familiar ones.  Scholars and students of International Relations will welcome the work as the first application of "societal constructivism" as a theoretical framework for understanding the origins and course of the Cold War.  There are many excellent insights and real gems of historical discovery and explication here:  the treatment of the Doctor's Plot, the reaction in the Writers' Union to the Thaw and the continuing changes in temperature; the analysis of Beria - so far from a closet liberal, yet responsive to the societal sentiments that surfaced with the death of Stalin.  The discussion of all of these issues will engage historians of the Soviet Union and the Cold War while political scientists will appreciate the author's attention to research design and theoretical innovation.
4539176
It was a good attempt at explaining the collapse of Soviet Union. The need for continuing class struggle during the so finalist construction was ignored by CPSU after Stalin was not properly dealt with. The international conference of the Communist parties popularly known as 81 parties conference had rightly warned against the growing revisionist or right deviation in the international Commnust and Working class movement. However, the movement succumbed to Khruschev revisionism. The book has thrown enough light on Bukharin and his influence on Khruschevites. Organisational problems rather than ideological problems were exposed more.
3202741
Annette Gordon-Reed has created a revisionist text with some refutable details.  Primarily her focus on the dual family, and TJ's relationship with Sally Hemings.  This has been challenged as there is no irrefutable evidence that he was the father.

DNA tests revealed only that the Hemings decedents had the Jefferson DNA, which could have meant TJ's brother Randolph or one of his sons could have had on ongoing relationship with Sally.  Unfortunately, we will never know for certain but again revisionism must be separated from historical accuracy.  William Hyland Jr.'s book " In Defense of Thomas Jefferson" presents a persuasive argument in this regard.

The book otherwise presents some interesting insights into TJ's life.  Credit should also be given to Prof. Peter Onuf for his contribution.
930399
The author, Richard Butler, headed the UN Special Commission for Disarming Iraq.  He was formerly a career member of the Australian diplomatic corp. and is a strong advocate of nuclear disarmament.  In this book, the author gives his point of view.  The international community of countries is facing a critical choice concerning the spread of nuclear weapons. The world is divided into countries that possess nuclear weapons, the "Have" countries, and those countries that do not possess such weapons are the Have-Nots".  In the U.S., every country that attempts to join the ranks of the "Have" countries are berated with military threats and international sanctions because they have broken the terms of the (Non-Proliferation Treaty) NPT.  The author's view is that the "Have" countries have themselves to blame for the root of the problem.  The other half of the NPT holds that the countries possessing Nuclear Weapons must strive toward disarmament. The "Have -Not " countries that are playing catch-up in this arms race consider the NPT a broken treaty as they view each successive generation of improved nuclear weapons being deployed by the "Have" countries. Richard Butler's idea is that everything the nuclear powers use to prevent the remainder of the countries from joining its privileged circle is doomed to failure.  The idea for the U.S. to set up a missile defense system will just be another privileged circle that will make the "playing" field even more tilted.  Another exclusive club that will also become more populated as the technology trickles down.  The book provides an excellent history of the Nuclear Weapons Age politics and treaties and their interplay upon different countries of the world community. .

Some very current and good information is provided on the status of Iraq.  The author explains the problems and his views very well.  Well worth the read.  His solutions seem to be a situation of "more of the same thing"  I gave it three stars just because the solutions seems so weak. The information and the history provided is the five star section of the book.