Justice KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.
The proper construction of federal sentencing statutes and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure can present close questions of statutory and textual interpretation when implementing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Seven Terms ago the Court considered one of these issues in a case involving a prisoner's motion to reduce his sentence, where the prisoner had been sentenced under a plea agreement authorized by a specific Rule of criminal procedure. Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522, 131 S.Ct. 2685, 180 L.Ed.2d 519 (2011). The prisoner maintained that his sentence should be reduced under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) when his Guidelines sentencing range was lowered retroactively. 564 U.S., at 527-528, 131 S.Ct. 2685 (plurality opinion).
No single interpretation or rationale in Freeman commanded a majority of the Court. The courts of appeals then confronted the question of what principle or principles considered in Freeman controlled when an opinion by four Justices and a concurring opinion by a single Justice had allowed a majority of this Court to agree on the judgment in Freeman but not on one interpretation or rule that courts could follow in later cases when similar questions arose under the same statute and Rule.
For guidance courts turned to this Court's opinion in Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 97 S.Ct. 990, 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977). Some courts interpreted Marks as directing them to follow the "narrowest" opinion in Freeman that was necessary for the judgment in that case; and, accordingly, they adopted the reasoning of the opinion concurring in the judgment by Justice SOTOMAYOR. See United States v. Rivera-Martinez, 665 F.3d 344, 348 (C.A.1 2011) ; United States v. Thompson, 682 F.3d 285, 290 (C.A.3 2012) ; United States v. Brown, 653 F.3d 337, 340, n. 1 (C.A.4 2011) ; United States v. Benitez, 822 F.3d 807, 811 (C.A.5 2016) ; United States v. Smith, 658 F.3d 608, 611 (C.A.6 2011) ; United States v. Dixon, 687 F.3d 356, 359 (C.A.7 2012) ; United States v. Browne, 698 F.3d 1042, 1045 (C.A.8 2012) ; United States v. Graham, 704 F.3d 1275, 1277-1278 (C.A.10 2013).
In contrast, the Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia and Ninth Circuits held that no opinion in Freeman provided a controlling rule because the reasoning in the concurrence was not a "logical subset" of the reasoning in the plurality. United States v. Davis, 825 F.3d 1014, 1021-1022 (C.A.9 2016) (en banc); United States v. Epps, 707 F.3d 337, 350 (C.A.D.C.2013). Those courts have adopted the plurality's opinion as the most persuasive interpretation of § 3582(c)(2). Davis, supra, at 1026; Epps, supra, at 351.
To resolve these differences over the proper application of Marks and the proper interpretation of § 3582(c)(2), the Court granted certiorari in the present case. 583 U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 542, 199 L.Ed.2d 422 (2017). The first two questions, relating to Marks, are as follows: (1) "Whether this Court's decision in Marks means that the concurring opinion in a 4-1-4 decision represents the holding of the Court where neither the plurality's reasoning nor the concurrence's reasoning is a logical subset of the other"; and (2) "Whether, under Marks, the lower courts are bound by the four-Justice plurality opinion in Freeman, or, instead, by Justice SOTOMAYOR's separate concurring opinion with which all eight other Justices disagreed." Pet. for Cert. i.
The third question is directed to the underlying statutory issue in this case, the substantive, sentencing issue the Court discussed in the three opinions issued in Freeman . That question is: "Whether, as the four-Justice plurality in Freeman concluded, a defendant who enters into a Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement is generally eligible for a sentence reduction if there is a later, retroactive amendment to the relevant Sentencing Guidelines range." Pet. for Cert. ii.
Taking instruction from the cases decided in the wake of Freeman and the systemic concerns that have arisen in some Circuits, and considering as well the arguments of the parties as to question three, a majority of the Court in the instant case now can resolve the sentencing issue on its merits. So it will be unnecessary to consider questions one and two despite the extensive briefing and careful argument the parties presented to the Court concerning the proper application of Marks . The opinion that follows resolves the sentencing issue in this case; and, as well, it should give the necessary guidance to federal district courts and to the courts of appeals with respect to plea agreements of the kind presented here and in Freeman .
With that explanation, the Court now turns to the circumstances of this case and the sentencing issue it presents.
I
A
Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, the United States Sentencing Commission establishes Sentencing Guidelines based on the seriousness of a defendant's offense and his criminal history. Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 820, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 177 L.Ed.2d 271 (2010). In combination, these two factors yield a range of potential sentences for a district court to choose from in sentencing a particular defendant. "The Sentencing Guidelines provide the framework for the tens of thousands of federal sentencing proceedings that occur each year." Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U.S. ----, ----, 136 S.Ct. 1338, 1342, 194 L.Ed.2d 444 (2016).
After this Court's decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), the Guidelines are advisory only. But a district court still "must consult those Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing." Id., at 264, 125 S.Ct. 738 ; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4). Courts must also consider various other sentencing factors listed in § 3553(a), including "the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct." § 3553(a)(6).
The Act requires the Commission to review and revise the Guidelines from time to time. 28 U.S.C. § 994(o ). When the Commission amends the Guidelines in a way that reduces the Guidelines range for "a particular offense or category of offenses,"
the Commission must "specify in what circumstances and by what amount the sentences of prisoners serving terms of imprisonment for the offense may be reduced." § 994(u). In this way the Act requires the Commission to decide whether amendments to the Guidelines should have retroactive effect.
If an amendment applies retroactively, the Act authorizes district courts to reduce the sentences of prisoners who were sentenced based on a Guidelines range that would have been lower had the amendment been in place when they were sentenced. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Specifically, § 3582(c)(2) provides:
"[I]n the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(o ), ... the court may reduce the term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission."
B
The controlling issue here is whether a defendant may seek relief under § 3582(c)(2) if he entered a plea agreement specifying a particular sentence under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C). This kind of plea agreement is sometimes referred to as a "Type-C agreement."
In a Type-C agreement the Government and a defendant "agree that a specific sentence or sentencing range is the appropriate disposition of the case, or that a particular provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, or policy statement, or sentencing factor does or does not apply," and "such a recommendation or request binds the court once the court accepts the plea agreement." Rule 11(c)(1)(C). When the Government and a defendant enter a Type-C agreement, the district court has three choices: It "may accept the agreement, reject it, or defer a decision until the court has reviewed the presentence report." Rule 11(c)(3)(A). If the court rejects the agreement, the defendant may withdraw his guilty plea. Rule 11(c)(5)(B).
In deciding whether to accept an agreement that includes a specific sentence, the district court must consider the Sentencing Guidelines. The court may not accept the agreement unless the court is satisfied that "(1) the agreed sentence is within the applicable guideline range; or (2)(A) the agreed sentence is outside the applicable guideline range for justifiable reasons; and (B) those reasons are set forth with specificity." United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual § 6B1.2(c) (Nov. 2016) (USSG). "[T]he decision whether to accept the agreement will often be deferred until the sentencing hearing," which means that "the decision whether to accept the plea agreement will often be made at the same time that the defendant is sentenced." United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 678, 117 S.Ct. 1630, 137 L.Ed.2d 935 (1997).
C
1
In 2013 petitioner Erik Hughes was indicted on drug and gun charges for his participation in a conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. About four months later, the Government and Hughes negotiated a Type-C plea agreement. Hughes agreed to plead guilty to two of the four charges (conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and being a felon in possession of a gun); and in exchange the Government agreed to dismiss the other two charges and to refrain from filing an information giving formal notification to the District Court of his prior drug felonies. If the Government had filed the information, Hughes would have been subject to a mandatory sentence of life in prison. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A), 851(a). The agreement stipulated that Hughes would receive a sentence of 180 months, but it did not refer to any particular Guidelines range.
Hughes entered his guilty plea in December 2013. The District Court accepted the plea at that time, but it deferred consideration of the plea agreement (and hence the stipulated 180-month sentence) until sentencing.
Three months later, at the sentencing hearing, the District Court accepted the agreement and sentenced Hughes to 180 months in prison. The court stated that it had "considered the plea agreement [and] the sentencing guidelines, particularly the provisions of [ § 3553(a) ]," and that it would "accept and approve the binding plea agreement." App. to Pet. for Cert. 32a-33a. The court calculated Hughes' Guidelines range as 188 to 235 months in prison and heard statements from Hughes' daughter, mother, and Hughes himself. Id., at 37a-43a. When it imposed the agreed 180-month sentence the court reiterated that it was "a reasonable sentence in this case compatible with the advisory United States Sentencing Guidelines but in accordance with the mandatory matters the Court is required to consider in ultimately determining a sentence." Id., at 44a, 47a.
2
Less than two months after the District Court sentenced Hughes, the Sentencing Commission adopted amendment 782 to the Guidelines. USSG App. C, Amdt. 782 (Supp. Nov. 2012-Nov. 2016). The amendment reduced the base offense level by two levels for most drug offenses. The Commission later made amendment 782 retroactive for defendants who, like Hughes, already had been sentenced under the higher offense levels. Amdt. 788. Under the revised Guidelines, Hughes' sentencing range is 151 to 188 months-about three to four years lower than the range in effect when he was sentenced.
Hughes filed a motion for a reduced sentence under § 3582(c)(2). The District Court denied the motion, concluding that Hughes is ineligible for relief; and the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 849 F.3d 1008, 1016 (2017) ; App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a. Both courts concluded that the Freeman concurrence stated the holding of this Court under Marks, and that under the concurrence's interpretation Hughes was ineligible for a reduced sentence because his plea agreement did not expressly rely on a Guidelines range. 849 F.3d, at 1015 ; App. to Pet. for Cert. 25a. This Court granted certiorari. 583 U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 542, 199 L.Ed.2d 422.
II
A principal purpose of the Sentencing Guidelines is to promote "uniformity in sentencing imposed by different federal courts for similar criminal conduct." Molina-Martinez, 578 U.S., at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 1342 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted; emphasis deleted). Yet in the aftermath of Freeman, a defendant's eligibility for a reduced sentence under § 3582(c)(2) turns on the Circuit in which the case arises. Further, even within Circuits that follow the Freeman concurrence, unwarranted disparities have resulted depending on the fortuity of whether a defendant's Type-C agreement includes a specific-enough reference to a Guidelines range. See Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae 13-20. In some cases defendants have been held ineligible for relief even where the sentencing hearing makes it crystal clear that the Government and the defendant agreed to a Guidelines sentence and the district court imposed one. See, e.g., United States v. McNeese, 819 F.3d 922, 929 (C.A.6 2016).
In addition this Court's precedents since Freeman have further confirmed that the Guidelines remain the foundation of federal sentencing decisions. In Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 133 S.Ct. 2072, 186 L.Ed.2d 84 (2013), for example, the Court held that the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits retroactive application of amended Guidelines that increase a defendant's sentencing range. Id., at 544, 133 S.Ct. 2072. The Court reasoned that, Booker notwithstanding, the Guidelines remain "the lodestone of sentencing." 569 U.S., at 544, 133 S.Ct. 2072. And in Molina-Martinez, the Court held that in the ordinary case a defendant suffers prejudice from a Guidelines error because of "the systemic function of the selected Guidelines range." 578 U.S., at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 1346.
"The post-Booker federal sentencing scheme aims to achieve uniformity by ensuring that sentencing decisions are anchored by the Guidelines." Peugh, supra, at 541, 133 S.Ct. 2072. In this context clarity and consistency are essential. To resolve the uncertainty that resulted from this Court's divided decision in Freeman, the Court now holds that a sentence imposed pursuant to a Type-C agreement is "based on" the defendant's Guidelines range so long as that range was part of the framework the district court relied on in imposing the sentence or accepting the agreement.
A
As already mentioned, § 3582(c)(2) authorizes a district court to reduce a defendant's sentence if the defendant "has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission." A district court imposes a sentence that is "based on" a Guidelines range if the range was a basis for the court's exercise of discretion in imposing a sentence. To "base" means "[t]o make, form, or serve as a foundation for," or "[t]o use (something) as the thing from which something else is developed." Black's Law Dictionary 180 (10th ed. 2014). Likewise, a "base" is "[t]he starting point or foundational part of something," or "[a] point, part, line, or quantity from which a reckoning or conclusion proceeds." Ibid. ; see also ibid. (similarly defining "basis").
In the typical sentencing case there will be no question that the defendant's Guidelines range was a basis for his sentence. The Sentencing Reform Act requires a district court to calculate and consider a defendant's Guidelines range in every case. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Indeed, the Guidelines are "the starting point for every sentencing calculation in the federal system." Peugh, supra, at 542, 133 S.Ct. 2072 ; see also Molina-Martinez, 578 U.S., at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 1345 ("The Court has made clear that the Guidelines are to be the sentencing court's starting point and initial benchmark" (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)). "Even if the sentencing judge sees a reason to vary from the Guidelines, if the judge uses the sentencing range as the beginning point to explain the decision to deviate from it, then the Guidelines are in a real sense the basis for the sentence." Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis deleted). In general, § 3582(c)(2) allows district courts to reconsider a prisoner's sentence based on a new starting point-that is, a lower Guidelines range-and determine whether a reduction in the prisoner's sentence is appropriate.
A sentence imposed pursuant to a Type-C agreement is no exception to the general rule that a defendant's Guidelines range is both the starting point and a basis for his ultimate sentence. Although in a Type-C agreement the Government and the defendant may agree to a specific sentence, that bargain is contingent on the district court accepting the agreement and its stipulated sentence. Freeman, 564 U.S., at 529-530, 131 S.Ct. 2685. The Sentencing Guidelines prohibit district courts from accepting Type-C agreements without first evaluating the recommended sentence in light of the defendant's Guidelines range. USSG § 6B1.2(c). So in the usual case the court's acceptance of a Type-C agreement and the sentence to be imposed pursuant to that agreement are "based on" the defendant's Guidelines range.
To be sure, the Guidelines are advisory only, and so not every sentence will be consistent with the relevant Guidelines range. See Koons v. United States,post, --- U.S., at ----, 138 S.Ct., at 1789 (defendants' Guidelines ranges "clearly did not" form a basis of the ultimate sentences). For example, in Koons the Court today holds that five defendants' sentences were not "based on" subsequently lowered Guidelines ranges because in that case the Guidelines and the record make clear that the sentencing judge "discarded" their sentencing ranges "in favor of mandatory minimums and substantial-assistance factors." Post, at 1782 - 1783; see also Molina-Martinez, supra, at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 1346 ("The record in a case may show, for example, that the district court thought the sentence it chose was appropriate irrespective of the Guidelines range").
If the Guidelines range was not "a relevant part of the analytic framework the judge used to determine the sentence or to approve the agreement," Freeman, supra, at 530, 131 S.Ct. 2685, then the defendant's sentence was not based on that sentencing range, and relief under § 3582(c)(2) is unavailable. And that is so regardless of whether a defendant pleaded guilty pursuant to a Type-C agreement or whether the agreement itself referred to a Guidelines range. The statutory language points to the reasons for the sentence that the district court imposed, not the reasons for the parties' plea agreement. Still, cases like Koons are a narrow exception to the general rule that, in most cases, a defendant's sentence will be "based on" his Guidelines range. In federal sentencing the Guidelines are a district court's starting point, so when the Commission lowers a defendant's Guidelines range the defendant will be eligible for relief under § 3582(c)(2) absent clear demonstration, based on the record as a whole, that the court would have imposed the same sentence regardless of the Guidelines. See Koons,post, --- U.S., at ----, 138 S.Ct., at 1788-1790.
This interpretation furthers § 3582(c)(2)'s purpose, as well as the broader purposes of the Sentencing Reform Act. "The Act aims to create a comprehensive sentencing scheme in which those who commit crimes of similar severity under similar conditions receive similar sentences." Freeman, 564 U.S., at 533, 131 S.Ct. 2685. " Section 3582(c)(2) contributes to that goal by ensuring that district courts may adjust sentences imposed pursuant to a range that the Commission concludes [is] too severe, out of step with the seriousness of the crime and the sentencing ranges of analogous offenses, and inconsistent with the Act's purposes."
Ibid. And there is no reason a defendant's eligibility for relief should turn on the form of his plea agreement.
Two cases decided after Freeman now reinforce this proposition. See Molina-Martinez, 578 U.S., at ---- - ----, 136 S.Ct., at 1346-1347 ; Peugh, 569 U.S., at 541-544, 133 S.Ct. 2072. These cases confirm that the Guidelines remain a basis for almost all federal sentences. In Peugh, the Court recognized that "[e]ven after Booker rendered the Sentencing Guidelines advisory, district courts have in the vast majority of cases imposed either within-Guidelines sentences or sentences that depart downward from the Guidelines on the Government's motion." Id., at 543, 133 S.Ct. 2072. And in Molina-Martinez, the Court explained that "[t]he Commission's statistics demonstrate the real and pervasive effect the Guidelines have on sentencing." 578 U.S., at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 1346. In short, experience has shown that, although the interpretation proffered by Justice SOTOMAYOR's concurring opinion in Freeman could be one permissible reading of § 3582(c)(2), the system Congress put in place is best implemented, as a systemic, structural matter, by the interpretation confirmed in the instant case.
B
In response, the Government largely recycles arguments that a majority of this Court rejected in Freeman . For example, the Government contends that allowing defendants who enter Type-C agreements to seek reduced sentences under § 3582(c)(2) would deprive the Government of one of the benefits of its bargain-namely, the defendant's agreement to a particular sentence. But that has nothing to do with whether a defendant's sentence was based on the Sentencing Guidelines under § 3582(c)(2). Freeman, 564 U.S., at 531, 131 S.Ct. 2685 ; see also id., at 540, 131 S.Ct. 2685 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.). And in any event, "[w]hat is at stake in this case is a defendant's eligibility for relief, not the extent of that relief." Id., at 532, 131 S.Ct. 2685 (plurality opinion). Even if a defendant is eligible for relief, before a district court grants a reduction it must consider "the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable" and the Commission's "applicable policy statements." § 3582(c)(2). The district court can consider the benefits the defendant gained by entering a Type-C agreement when it decides whether a reduction is appropriate (or when it determines the extent of any reduction), "for the statute permits but does not require the court to reduce a sentence." Freeman, supra, at 532, 131 S.Ct. 2685.
The Government also contends that allowing courts to reduce the sentences of defendants like Hughes would be inconsistent with the Commission's policy statement in USSG § 1B1.10, which provides that when a district court modifies a sentence under § 3582(c)(2) it "shall substitute only the [retroactive] amendments listed in subsection (d) for the corresponding guidelines provisions that were applied when the defendant was sentenced and shall leave all other guideline application decisions unaffected." USSG § 1B1.10(b)(1). According to the Government, no "guidelines provisions" are "applied" when a defendant enters a Type-C agreement because at the moment of sentencing-that is, after the court has already accepted the agreement- Rule 11 prohibits the court from imposing any sentence other than the one the parties bargained for.
This argument fails for at least two reasons. First, the Government's interpretation of § 1B1.10 depends on an artificial distinction between a court's decision to accept a Type-C agreement and its decision to impose the agreed-upon sentence. As explained above, a district court must consider the defendant's "applicable Guidelines range" when it decides whether to accept or reject the agreement, USSG § 6B1.2(c) -often, as here, at the sentencing hearing, after the court has reviewed the presentence report. And as the Government itself points out, once the district court accepts the agreement, the agreed-upon sentence is the only sentence the court may impose. Thus, there is no meaningful difference between a court's decision to accept a Type-C agreement that includes a particular sentence and the court's decision (sometimes, as here, just minutes later) to impose that sentence.
Second, the Commission's policy statement "seeks to isolate whatever marginal effect the since-rejected Guideline had on the defendant's sentence." Freeman, 564 U.S., at 530, 131 S.Ct. 2685. Accordingly, relief under § 3582(c)(2) should be available to permit the district court to reconsider a prior sentence to the extent the prisoner's Guidelines range was a relevant part of the framework the judge used to accept the agreement or determine the sentence. Ibid. If the district court concludes that it would have imposed the same sentence even if the defendant had been subject to the lower range, then the court retains discretion to deny relief.
C
In this case the District Court accepted Hughes' Type-C agreement after concluding that a 180-month sentence was consistent with the Sentencing Guidelines. App. to Pet. for Cert. 33a. The court then calculated Hughes' sentencing range and imposed a sentence that the court deemed "compatible" with the Guidelines. Id., at 36a, 47a. Thus, the sentencing range was a basis for the sentence that the District Court imposed. That range has "subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission," so Hughes is eligible for relief under § 3582(c)(2). The Court expresses no view as to whether the District Court should exercise its discretion to reduce Hughes' sentence after considering the § 3553(a) factors and the Commission's relevant policy statements. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).
* * *
For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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