Chief Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires us to consider once again the standard of review for prison regulations claimed to inhibit the exercise of constitutional rights. Respondents, members of the Islamic faith, were prisoners in New Jersey’s Leesburg State Prison. They challenged policies adopted by prison officials which resulted in their inability to attend Jumu’ah, a weekly Muslim congregational service regularly held in the main prison building and in a separate facility known as “the Farm.” Jumu’ah is commanded by the Koran and must be held every Friday after the sun reaches its zenith and before the Asr, or afternoon prayer. See Koran 62: 9-10; Brief for Imam Jamil Abdullah Al-Amin et al. as Amici Curiae 18-31. There is no question that respondents’ sincerely held religious beliefs compelled attendance at Jumu’ah. We hold that the prison regulations here challenged did not violate respondents’ rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Inmates at Leesburg are placed in one of three custody classifications. Maximum security and “gang minimum” security inmates are housed in the main prison building, and those with the lowest classification — full minimum — live in “the Farm.” Both respondents were classified as gang minimum security prisoners when this suit was filed, and respondent Mateen was later classified as full minimum.
Several changes in prison policy prompted this litigation. In April 1983, the New Jersey Department of Corrections issued Standard 853, which provided that inmates could no longer move directly from maximum security to full minimum status, but were instead required to first spend a period of time in the intermediate gang minimum status. App. 147. This change was designed to redress problems that had arisen when inmates were transferred directly from the restrictive maximum security status to full minimum status, with its markedly higher level of freedom. Because of serious overcrowding in the main building, Standard 853 further mandated that gang minimum inmates ordinarily be assigned jobs outside the main building. Ibid. These inmates work in details of 8 to 15 persons, supervised by one guard. Standard 853 also required that full minimum inmates work outside the main institution, whether on or off prison grounds, or in a satellite building such as the Farm. Ibid.
Corrections officials at Leesburg implemented these policies gradually and, as the District Court noted, with some difficulty. Shabazz v. O’Lone, 595 F. Supp. 928, 929 (NJ 1984). In the initial stages of outside work details for gang minimum prisoners, officials apparently allowed some Muslim inmates to work inside the main building on Fridays so that they could attend Jumu’ah. This alternative was eventually eliminated in March 1984, in light of the directive of Standard 853 that all gang minimum inmates work outside the main building.
Significant problems arose with those inmates assigned to outside work details. Some avoided reporting for their assignments, while others found reasons for returning to the main building during the course of the workday (including their desire to attend religious services). Evidence showed that the return of prisoners during the day resulted in security risks and administrative burdens that prison officials found unacceptable. Because details of inmates were supervised by only one guard, the whole detail was forced to return to the main gate when one prisoner desired to return to the facility. The gate was the site of all incoming foot and vehicle traffic during the day, and prison officials viewed it as a high security risk area. When an inmate returned, vehicle traffic was delayed while the inmate was logged in and searched.
In response to these burdens, Leesburg officials took steps to ensure that those assigned to outside details remained there for the whole day. Thus, arrangements were made to have lunch and required medications brought out to the prisoners, and appointments with doctors and social workers were scheduled for the late afternoon. These changes proved insufficient, however, and prison officials began to study alternatives. After consulting with the director of social services, the director of professional services, and the prison’s imam and chaplain, prison officials in March 1984 issued a policy memorandum which prohibited inmates assigned to outside work details from returning to the prison during the day except in the case of emergency.
The prohibition of returns prevented Muslims assigned to outside work details from attending Jumu’ah. Respondents filed suit under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, alleging that the prison policies unconstitutionally denied them their Free Exercise rights under the First Amendment, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court, applying the standards announced in an earlier decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, concluded that no constitutional violation had occurred. The District Court decided that Standard 853 and the March 1984 prohibition on returns “plausibly advance” the goals of security, order, and rehabilitation. 595 F. Supp., at 934. It rejected alternative arrangements suggested by respondents, finding that “no less restrictive alternative could be adopted without potentially compromising a legitimate institutional objective.” Ibid.
The Court of Appeals, sua sponte hearing the case en banc, decided that its earlier decision relied upon by the District Court was not sufficiently protective of prisoners’ free exercise rights, and went on to state that prison policies could be sustained only if:
“the state . . . show[s] that the challenged regulations were intended to serve, and do serve, the important penological goal of security, and that no reasonable method exists by which [prisoners’] religious rights can be accommodated without creating bona fide security problems. The expert testimony of prison officials should be given due weight, but such testimony is not dispositive of the issue whether no reasonable adjustment is possible. . . . Where it is found that reasonable methods of accommodation can be adopted without sacrificing either the state’s interest in security or the prisoners’ interest in freely exercising their religious rights, the state’s refusal to allow the observance of a central religious practice cannot be justified and violates the prisoner’s first amendment rights.” Shabazz v. O’Lone, 782 F. 2d 416, 420 (CA3 1986) (footnotes omitted).
In considering whether a potential method of accommodation is reasonable, the court added, relevant factors include cost, the effects of overcrowding, understaffing, and inmates’ demonstrated proclivity to unruly conduct. See id., at 420, n. 3. The case was remanded to the District Court for reconsideration under the standards enumerated in the opinion. We granted certiorari to consider the important federal constitutional issues presented by the Court of Appeals’ decision, and to resolve apparent confusion among the Courts of Appeals on the proper standards to be applied in considering prisoners’ free exercise claims. 479 U. S. 881 (1986).
Several general principles guide our consideration of the issues presented here. First, “convicted prisoners do not forfeit all constitutional protections by reason of their conviction and confinement in prison.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 545 (1979). See Turner v. Safley, ante, at 84; Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U. S. 119, 129 (1977). Inmates clearly retain protections afforded by the First Amendment, Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S. 817, 822 (1974), including its directive that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U. S. 319 (1972) (per curiam). Second, “[l]awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system.” Price v. Johnston, 334 U. S. 266, 285 (1948). The limitations on the exercise of constitutional rights arise both from the fact of incarceration and from valid penological objectives — including deterrence of crime, rehabilitation of prisoners, and institutional security. Pell v. Procunier, supra, at 822-823; Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 412 (1974).
In considering the appropriate balance of these factors, we have often said that evaluation of penological objectives is committed to the considered judgment of prison administrators, “who are actually charged with and trained in the running of the particular institution under examination.” Bell v. Wolfish, supra, at 562. See Turner v. Safley, ante, at 86-87. To ensure that courts afford appropriate deference to prison officials, we have determined that prison regulations alleged to infringe constitutional rights are judged under a “reasonableness” test less restrictive than that ordinarily applied to alleged infringements of fundamental constitutional rights. See, e. g., Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., supra, at 128. We recently restated the proper standard: “[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner v. Safiey, ante, at 89. This approach ensures the ability of corrections officials “to anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison administration,” ibid., and avoids unnecessary intrusion of the judiciary into problems particularly ill suited to “resolution by decree.” Procunier v. Martinez, supra, at 405. See also Turner v. Safley, ante, at 89; Bell v. Wolfish, supra, at 548.
We think the Court of Appeals decision in this case was wrong when it established a separate burden on prison officials to prove “that no reasonable method exists by which [prisoners’] religious rights can be accommodated without creating bona fide security problems.” 782 F. 2d, at 420. See also id., at 419 (Prison officials should be required “to produce convincing evidence that they are unable to satisfy their institutional goals in any way that does not infringe inmates’ free exercise rights”). Though the availability of accommodations is relevant to the reasonableness inquiry, we have rejected the notion that “prison officials . . . have to set up and then shoot down every conceivable alternative method of accommodating the claimant’s constitutional complaint.” Turner v. Safley, ante, at 90-91. By placing the burden on prison officials to disprove the availability of alternatives, the approach articulated by the Court of Appeals fails to reflect the respect and deference that the United States Constitution allows for the judgment of prison administrators.
Turning to consideration of the policies challenged in this case, we think the findings of the District Court establish clearly that prison officials have acted in a reasonable manner. Turner v. Safley drew upon our previous decisions to identify several factors relevant to this reasonableness determination. First, a regulation must have a logical connection to legitimate governmental interests invoked to justify it. Ante, at 89-90. The policies at issue here clearly meet that standard. The requirement that full minimum and gang minimum prisoners work outside the main facility was justified by concerns of institutional order and security, for the District Court found that it was “at least in part a response to a critical overcrowding in the state’s prisons, and ... at least in part designed to ease tension and drain on the facilities during that part of the day when the inmates were outside the confines of the main buildings.” 595 F. Supp., at 929. We think it beyond doubt that the standard is related to this legitimate concern.
The subsequent policy prohibiting returns to the institution during the day also passes muster under this standard. Prison officials testified that the returns from outside work details generated congestion and delays at the main gate, a high risk area in any event. Return requests also placed pressure on guards supervising outside details, who previously were required to “evaluate each reason possibly justifying a return to the facilities and either accept or reject that reason.” Id., at 931. Rehabilitative concerns further supported the policy; corrections officials sought a simulation of working conditions and responsibilities in society. Chief Deputy Ucci testified: “One of the things that society demands or expects is that when you have a job, you show up on time, you put in your eight hours, or whatever hours you are supposed to put in, and you don’t get off... . If we can show inmates that they’re supposed to show up for work and work a full day, then when they get out at least we’ve done something.” Tr. 89. These legitimate goals were advanced by the prohibition on returns; it cannot seriously be maintained that “the logical connection between the regulation and the asserted goal is so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational.” Turner v. Safley, ante, at 89-90.
Our decision in Turner also found it relevant that “alternative means of exercising the right. . . remain open to prison inmates.” Ante, at 90. There are, of course, no alternative means of attending Jumu’ah; respondents’ religious beliefs insist that it occur at a particular time. But the very stringent requirements as to the time at which Jumu’ah may be held may make it extraordinarily difficult for prison officials to assure that every Muslim prisoner is able to attend that service. While we in no way minimize the central importance of Jumu’ah to respondents, we are unwilling to hold that prison officials are required by the Constitution to sacrifice legitimate penological objectives to that end. In Turner, we did not look to see whether prisoners had other means of communicating with fellow inmates, but instead examined whether the inmates were deprived of “all means of expression.” Ante, at 92. Here, similarly, we think it appropriate to see whether under these regulations respondents retain the ability to participate in other Muslim religious ceremonies. The record establishes that respondents are not deprived of all forms of religious exercise, but instead freely observe a number of their religious obligations. The right to congregate for prayer or discussion is “virtually unlimited except during working hours,” Tr. 182 (testimony of O’Lone), and the state-provided imam has free access to the prison. Muslim prisoners are given different meals whenever pork is served in the prison cafeteria. Special arrangements are also made during the month -long observance of Ramadan, a period of fasting and prayer. During Ramadan, Muslim prisoners are awakened at 4 a.m. for an early breakfast, and receive dinner at 8:30 each evening. We think this ability on the part of respondents to participate in other religious observances of their faith supports the conclusion that the restrictions at issue here were reasonable.
Finally, the case for the validity of these regulations is strengthened by examination of the impact that accommodation of respondents’ asserted right would have on other inmates, on prison personnel, and on allocation of prison resources generally. See Turner v. Safley, ante, at 90. Respondents suggest several accommodations of their practices, including placing all Muslim inmates in one or two inside work details or providing weekend labor for Muslim inmates. See Brief for Respondents 52-53. As noted by the District Court, however, each of respondents’ suggested accommodations would, in the judgment of prison officials, have adverse effects on the institution. Inside work details for gang minimum inmates would be inconsistent with the legitimate concerns underlying Standard 853, and the District Court found that the extra supervision necessary to establish weekend details for Muslim prisoners “would be a drain on scarce human resources” at the prison. 595 F. Supp., at 932. Prison officials determined that the alternatives would also threaten prison security by allowing “affinity groups” in the prison to flourish. Administrator O’Lone testified that “we have found out and think almost every prison administrator knows that any time you put a group of individuals together with one particular affinity interest . . . you wind up with ... a leadership role and an organizational structure that will almost invariably challenge the institutional authority.” Tr. 179-180. Finally, the officials determined that special arrangements for one group would create problems as “other inmates [see] that a certain segment is escaping a rigorous work detail” and perceive favoritism. Id., at 178-179. These concerns of prison administrators provide adequate support for the conclusion that accommodations of respondents’ request to attend Jumu’ah would have undesirable results in the institution. These difficulties also make.clear that there are no “obvious, easy alternatives to the policy adopted by petitioners.” Turner v. Safley, ante, at 93.
We take this opportunity to reaffirm our refusal, even where claims are made under the First Amendment, to “substitute our judgment on . . . difficult and sensitive matters of institutional administration,” Block v. Rutherford, 468 U. S. 576, 588 (1984), for the determinations of those charged with the formidable task of running a prison. Here the District Court decided that the regulations alleged to infringe constitutional rights were reasonably related to legitimate peno-logical objectives. We agree with the District Court, and it necessarily follows that the regulations in question do not offend the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore
Reversed.
Respondent Shabazz died on January 15, 1986.
Our decision in Turner v. Safiey rejected respondents’ principal argument in this case — that more rigorous scrutiny is appropriate unless a court can conclude that the activity for which prisoners seek protection is “presumptively dangerous.” See Brief for Respondents 30. See also Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 754 F. 2d 1015, 1033 (CA2 1985). As we noted in Turner, ante, at 89, “[t]he determination that an activity is ‘presumptively dangerous’ appears simply to be a conclusion about the reasonableness of the prison restriction in light of the articulated security concerns. It therefore provides a tenuous basis for creating a hierarchy of standards of review.”
Nor are we convinced that heightened scrutiny is appropriate whenever regulations effectively prohibit, rather than simply limit, a particular exercise of constitutional rights. See Brief for Respondents 30. As Turner makes clear, the presence or absence of alternative accommodations of prisoners’ rights is properly considered a factor in the reasonableness analysis rather than a basis for heightened scrutiny. See Turner, ante, at 88, 90-91.
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