Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question of the constitutionality on its face of a New York criminal obscenity statute which prohibits the sale to minors under 17 years of age of material defined to be obscene on the basis of its appeal to them whether or not it would be obscene to adults.
Appellant and his wife operate “Sam’s Stationery and Luncheonette” in Bellmore, Long Island. They have a lunch counter, and, among other things, also sell magazines including some so-called “girlie” magazines. Appellant was prosecuted under two informations, each in two counts, which charged that he personally sold a 16-year-old boy two “girlie” magazines on each of two dates in October 1965, in violation of § 484-h of the New York Penal Law. He was tried before a judge without a jury in Nassau County District Court and was found guilty on both counts. The judge found (1) that the magazines contained pictures which depicted female “nudity” in a manner defined in subsection 1 (b), that is “the showing of . . . female . . . buttocks with less than a full opaque covering, or the showing of the female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of any portion thereof below the top of the nipple . . . ,” and (2) that the pictures were “harmful to minors” in that they had, within the meaning of subsection 1 (f) “that quality of . . . representation ... of nudity . . . [which] . . . (i) predominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful or morbid interest of minors, and (ii) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors, and (iii) is utterly without redeeming social importance for minors.” He held that both sales to the 16-year-old boy therefore constituted the violation under § 484 — h of “knowingly to sell ... to a minor” under 17 of “(a) any picture . . . which depicts nudity . . . and which is harmful to minors,” and “(b) any . . . magazine . . . which contains . . . [such pictures] . . . and which, taken as a whole, is harmful to minors.” The conviction was affirmed without opinion by the Appellate Term, Second Department, of the Supreme Court. Appellant was denied leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals and then appealed to this Court. We noted probable jurisdiction. 388 U. S. 904. We affirm.
I.
The “girlie” picture magazines involved in the sales here are not obscene for adults, Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767. But § 484r-h does not bar the appellant from stocking the magazines and selling them to persons 17 years of age or older, and therefore the conviction is not invalid under our decision in Butler v. Michigan, 352 U. S. 380.
Obscenity is not within the area of protected speech or press. Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 485. The three-pronged test of subsection 1 (f) for judging the obscenity of material sold to minors under 17 is a variable from the formulation for determining obscenity under Roth stated in the plurality opinion in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U. S. 413, 418. Appellant’s primary attack upon § 484-h is leveled at the power of the State to adapt this Memoirs formulation to define the material’s obscenity on the basis of its appeal to minors, and thus exclude material so defined from the area of protected expression. He makes no argument that the magazines are not “harmful to minors” within the definition in subsection 1 (f). Thus “[n]o issue is presented . . . concerning the obscenity of the material involved.” Roth, supra, at 481, n. 8.
The New York Court of Appeals “upheld the Legislature’s power to employ variable concepts of obscenity” in a case in which the same challenge to state power to enact such a law was also addressed to § 484r-h. Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, 18 N. Y. 2d 71, 218 N. E. 2d 668, appeal dismissed for want of a properly presented federal question, sub nom. Bookcase, Inc. v. Leary, 385 U. S. 12. In sustaining state power to enact the law, the Court of Appeals said, Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, at 75, 218 N. E. 2d, at 671:
“[M]aterial which is protected for distribution to adults is not necessarily constitutionally protected from restriction upon its dissemination to children. In other words, the concept of obscenity or of unprotected matter may vary according to the group to whom the questionable material is directed or from whom it is quarantined. Because of the State’s exigent interest in preventing distribution to children of objectionable material, it can exercise its power to protect the health, safety, welfare and morals of its community by barring the distribution to children of books recognized to be suitable for adults.”
Appellant’s attack is not that New York was without power to draw the line at age 17. Rather, his contention is the broad proposition that the scope of the constitutional freedom of expression secured to a citizen to read or see material concerned with sex cannot be made to depend upon whether the citizen is an adult or a minor. He accordingly insists that the denial to minors under 17 of access to material condemned by § 484-h, insofar as that material is not obscene for persons 17 years of age or older, constitutes an unconstitutional deprivation of protected liberty.
We have no occasion in this case to consider the impact of the guarantees of freedom of expression upon the totality of the relationship of the minor and the State, cf. In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 13. It is enough for the purposes of this case that we inquire whether it was constitutionally impermissible for New York, insofar as § 484-h does so, to accord minors under 17 a more restricted right than that assured to adults to judge and determine for themselves what sex material they may read or see. We conclude that we cannot say that the statute invades the area of freedom of expression constitutionally secured to minors.
Appellant argues that there is an invasion of protected rights under § 484-h constitutionally indistinguishable from the invasions under the Nebraska statute forbidding children to study German, which was struck down in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390; the Oregon statute interfering with children’s attendance at private and parochial schools, which was struck down in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510; and the statute compelling children against their religious scruples to give the flag salute, which was struck down in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624. We reject that argument. We do not regard New York’s regulation in defining obscenity on the basis of its appeal to minors under 17 as involving an invasion of such minors’ constitutionally protected freedoms. Rather § 484-h simply adjusts the definition of obscenity “to social realities by permitting the appeal of this type of material to be assessed in terms of the sexual interests . . .” of such minors. Mishkin v. New York, 383 U. S. 602, 609; Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, supra, at 75, 218 N. E. 2d, at 671. That the State has power to make that adjustment seems clear, for we have recognized that even where there is an invasion of protected freedoms “the power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults . . . .” Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 170. In Prince we sustained the conviction of the guardian of a nine-year-old girl, both members of the sect of Jehovah’s Witnesses, for violating the Massachusetts Child Labor Law by permitting the girl to sell the sect’s religious tracts on the streets of Boston.
The well-being of its children is of course a subject within the State’s constitutional power to regulate, and, in our view, two interests justify the limitations in § 484-h upon the availability of sex material to minors under 17, at least if it was rational for the legislature to find that the minors’ exposure to such material might be harmful. First of all, constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents’ claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our society. “It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.” Prince v. Massachusetts, supra, at 166. The legislature could properly conclude that parents and others, teachers for example, who have this primary responsibility for children’s well-being are entitled to the support of laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility. Indeed, subsection 1 (f) (ii) of § 484-h expressly recognizes the parental role in assessing sex-related material harmful to minors according “to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors.” Moreover, the prohibition against sales to minors does not bar parents who so desire from purchasing the magazines for their children.
The State also has an independent interest in the well-being of its youth. The New York Court of Appeals squarely bottomed its decision on that interest in Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, supra, at 75, 218 N. E. 2d, at 671. Judge Fuld, now Chief Judge Fuld, also emphasized its significance in the earlier case of People v. Kahan, 15 N. Y. 2d 311, 206 N. E. 2d 333, which had struck down the first version of § 484-h on grounds of vagueness. In his concurring opinion, id., at 312, 206 N. E. 2d, at 334, he said:
“While the supervision of children’s reading may best be left to their parents, the knowledge that parental control or guidance cannot always be provided and society’s transcendent interest in protecting the welfare of children justify reasonable regulation of the sale of material to them. It is, therefore, altogether fitting and proper for a state to include in a statute designed to regulate the sale of pornography to children special standards, broader than those embodied in legislation aimed at controlling dissemination of such material to adults.”
In Prince v. Massachusetts, supra, at 165, this Court, too, recognized that the State has an interest “to protect the welfare of children” and to see that they are “safeguarded from abuses” which might prevent their “growth into free and independent well-developed men and citizens.” The only question remaining, therefore, is whether the New York Legislature might rationally conclude, as it has, that exposure to the materials proscribed by § 484-h constitutes such an “abuse.”
Section 484-e of the law states a legislative finding that the material condemned by § 484-h is “a basic factor in impairing the ethical and moral development of our youth and a clear and present danger to the people of the state.” It is very doubtful that this finding expresses an accepted scientific fact. But obscenity is not protected expression and may be suppressed without a showing of the circumstances which lie behind the phrase “clear and present danger” in its application to protected speech. Roth v. United States, supra, at 486-487. To sustain state power to exclude material defined as obscenity by § 484-h requires only that we be able to say that it was not irrational for the legislature to find that exposure to material condemned by the statute is harmful to minors. In Meyer v. Nebraska, supra, at 400, we were able to say that children’s knowledge of the German language “cannot reasonably be regarded as harmful.” That cannot be said by us of minors’ reading and seeing sex material. To be sure, there is no lack of “studies” which purport to demonstrate that obscenity is or is not “a basic factor in impairing the ethical and moral development of . . . youth and a clear and present danger to the people of the state.” But the growing consensus of commentators is that “while these studies all agree that a causal link has not been demonstrated, they are equally agreed that a causal link has not been disproved either.” We do not demand of legislatures “scientifically certain criteria of legislation.” Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 110. We therefore cannot say that § 484-h, in defining the obscenity of material on the basis of its appeal to minors undér 17, has no rational relation to the objective of safeguarding such minors from harm.
II.
Appellant challenges subsections (f) and (g) of § 484-h as in any event void for vagueness. The attack on subsection (f) is that the definition of obscenity “harmful to minors” is so vague that an honest distributor of publications cannot know when he might be held to have violated § 484-h. But the New York Court of Appeals construed this definition to be “virtually identical to the Supreme Court’s most recent statement of the elements of obscenity. [Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U. S. 413, 418],” Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, supra, at 76, 218 N. E. 2d, at 672. The definition therefore gives “men in acting adequate notice of what is prohibited” and does not offend the requirements of due process. Roth v. United States, supra, at 492; see also Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507, 520.
As is required by Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147, § 484—h prohibits only those sales made “knowingly.” The challenge to the scienter requirement of subsection (g) centers on the definition of “knowingly” insofar as it includes “reason to know” or “a belief or ground for belief which warrants further inspection or inquiry of both: (i) the character and content of any material described herein which is reasonably susceptible of examination by the defendant, and (ii) the age of the minor, provided however, that an honest mistake shall constitute an excuse from liability hereunder if the defendant made a reasonable bona fide attempt to ascertain the true age of such minor.”
As to (i), § 484 — h was passed after the New York Court of Appeals decided People v. Finkelstein, 9 N. Y. 2d 342, 174 N. E. 2d 470, which read the requirement of scienter into New York’s general obscenity statute, § 1141 of the Penal Law. The constitutional requirement of scienter, in the sense of knowledge of the contents of material, rests on the necessity “to avoid the hazard of self-censorship of constitutionally protected material and to compensate for the ambiguities inherent in the definition of obscenity,” Mishkin v. New York, supra, at 511. The Court of Appeals in Finkelstein interpreted § 1141 to require “the vital element of sci-enter” and defined that requirement in these terms: “A reading of the statute [§ 1141] as a whole clearly indicates that only those who are in some manner aware of the character of the material they attempt to distribute should be punished. It is not innocent but calculated purveyance of filth which is exorcised . . . .” 9 N. Y. 2d, at 344-345, 174 N. E. 2d, at 471. (Emphasis supplied.) In Mishkin v. New York, supra, at 510-511, we held that a challenge to the validity of § 1141 founded on Smith v. California, supra, was foreclosed in fight of this construction. When § 484 — h was before the New York Legislature its attention was directed to People v. Finkelstein, as defining the nature of scienter required to sustain the statute. 1965 N. Y. S. Leg. Ann. 54 — 56. We may therefore infer that the reference in provision (i) to knowledge of “the character and content of any material described herein” incorporates the gloss given the term “character” in People v. Finkelstein. In that circumstance Mishkin requires rejection of appellant’s challenge to provision (i) and makes it unnecessary for us to define further today “what sort of mental element is requisite to a constitutionally permissible prosecution,” Smith v. California, supra, at 154.
Appellant also attacks provision (ii) as impermissibly vague. This attack however is leveled only at the proviso according the defendant a defense of “honest mistake” as to the age of the minor. Appellant argues that “the statute does not tell the bookseller what effort he must make before he can be excused.” The argument is wholly without merit. The proviso states expressly that the defendant must be acquitted on the ground of “honest mistake” if the defendant proves that he made “a reasonable bona fide attempt to ascertain the true age of such minor.” Cf. 1967 Penal Law § 235.22 (2), n. 1, supra.
Affirmed.
[For concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan see post, p. 704.]
APPENDIX A TO OPINION OF THE COURT.
New York Penal Law § 484r-h as enacted by L. 1965, c. 327, provides:
§ 484r-h. Exposing minors to harmful materials
1. Definitions. As used in this section:
(a) “Minor” means any person under the age of seventeen years.
(b) “Nudity” means the showing of the human male or female genitals, pubic area or buttocks with less than a full opaque covering, or the showing of the female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of any portion thereof below the top of the nipple, or the depiction of covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state.
(c) “Sexual conduct” means acts of masturbation, homosexuality, sexual intercourse, or physical contact with a person’s clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks or, if such person be a female, breast.
(d) “Sexual excitement” means the condition of human male or female genitals when in a state of sexual stimulation ór arousal.
(e) “Sado-masochistic abuse” means flagellation or torture by or upon a person clad in undergarments, a mask or bizarre costume, or the condition of being fettered, bound or otherwise physically restrained on the part of one so clothed.
(f) “Harmful to minors” means that quality of any description or representation, in whatever form, of nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or sadomasochistic abuse, when it:
(i) predominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful or morbid interest of minors, and
(ii) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors, and
(iii) is utterly without redeeming social importance for minors.
(g) “Knowingly” means having general knowledge of, or reason to know, or a belief or ground for belief which warrants further inspection or inquiry of both:
(i) the character and content of any material described herein which is reasonably susceptible of examination by the defendant, and
(ii) the age of the minor, provided however, that an honest mistake shall constitute an excuse from liability hereunder if the defendant made a reasonable bona fide attempt to ascertain the true age of such minor.
2. It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to sell or loan for monetary consideration to a minor:
(a) any picture, photograph, drawing, sculpture, motion picture film, or similar visual representation or image of a person or portion of the human body which depicts nudity, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse and which is harmful to minors, or
(b) any book, pamphlet, magazine, printed matter however reproduced, or sound recording which contains any matter enumerated in paragraph (a) of subdivision two hereof, or explicit and detailed verbal descriptions or narrative accounts of sexual excitement, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse and which, taken as a whole, is harmful to minors.
3. It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to exhibit for a monetary consideration to a minor or knowingly to sell to a minor an admission ticket or pass or knowingly to admit a minor for a monetary consideration to premises whereon there is exhibited, a motion picture, show or other presentation which, in whole or in part, depicts nudity, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse and which is harmful to minors.
4. A violation of any provision hereof shall constitute a misdemeanor.
APPENDIX B TO OPINION OF THE COURT.
State obscenity statutes having some provision referring to distribution to minors are:
Cal. Pen. Code §§311-312 (Supp. 1966); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§40-9-16 to 40-9-27 (1963); Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. §§ 53-243 to 53-245 (Supp. 1965); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, §§435, 711-713 (1953); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§847.011-847.06 (1965 and Supp. 1968); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 26-6301 to 26-6309a (Supp. 1967); Hawaii Rev. Laws §267-8 (1955); Idaho Code Ann. §§ 18-1506 to 18-1510 (Supp. 1967); Ill. Ann. Stat., c. 38, §§11-20 to 11-21 (Supp. 1967); Iowa Code Ann. §§ 725.4 — 725.12 (1950); Ky. Rev. Stat. §§436.100-436.130, 436.540-436.580 (1963 and Supp. 1966); La. Rev. Stat. §§ 14:91.11, 14:92, 14:106 (Supp. 1967); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17, §§2901-2905 (1964); Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, §§417-425 (1957 and Supp. 1967); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., c. 272, §§28-33 (1959 and Supp. 1968); Mich. Stat. Ann. §§28.575-28.579 (1954 and Supp. 1968); Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 563.270-563.310 (1953 and Supp. 1967); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §§ 94-3601 to 94-3606 (1947 and Supp. 1967); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§28-926.09 to 28-926.10 (1965 Cum. Supp.); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§201.250, 207.180 (1965); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 571-A:1 to 571-A:5 (Supp. 1967); N. J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:115-1.1 to 2A: 115-4 (Supp. 1967); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 14^-189 (Supp. 1967); N. D. Cent. Code §§ 12-21-07 to 12-21-09 (1960); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§2903.10-2903.11, 2905.34^2905.39 (1954 and Supp. 1966); Okla. Stat. Ann., Tit. 21, §§ 1021-1024, 1032-1039 (1958 and Supp. 1967); Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 18, §§ 3831-3833, 4524 (1963 and Supp. 1967); R. I. Gen. Laws Ann. §§11-31-1 to 11-31-10 (1956 and Supp. 1967); S. C. Code Ann. §§ 16-414.1 to 16-421 (1962 and Supp. 1967) ; Tex. Pen. Code, Arts. 526, 527b (1952 and Supp. 1967); Utah Code Ann. §§76-39-5, 76-39-17 (Supp. 1967); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 13, §§2801-2805 (1959); Ya. Code Ann. §§ 18.1-227 to 18.1-236.3 (1960 and Supp. 1966); W. Ya. Code Ann. § 61-8-11 (1966); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-103, 7-148 (1957).
Appellant makes no attack upon § 484-h as applied. We therefore have no occasion to consider, the sufficiency of the evidence, or such issues as burden of proof, whether expert evidence is either required or permissible, or any other questions which might be pertinent to the application of the statute. Appellant does argue that because the trial judge included a finding that two of the magazines “contained verbal descriptions and narrative accounts of sexual excitement and sexual conduct,” an offense not charged in the informations, the conviction must be set aside under Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U. S. 196. But this case was tried and the appellant was found guilty only on the charges of selling magazines containing pictures depicting female nudity. It is therefore not a case where defendant was tried and convicted of a violation of one offense when he was charged with a distinctly and substantially different offense.
The full text of § 484^-h is attached as Appendix A. It was enacted in L. 1965, c. 327, to replace an earlier version held invalid by the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Kahan, 15 N. Y. 2d 311, 206 N. E. 2d 333, and People v. Bookcase, Inc., 14 N. Y. 2d 409, 201 N. E. 2d 14. Section 484-h in turn was replaced by L. 1967, c. 791, now §§ 235.20-235.22 of the Penal Law. The major changes under the 1967 law added a provision that the one charged with a violation “is presumed to [sell] with knowledge of the character and content of the material sold and the provision that “it is an affirmative defense that: (a) The defendant had reasonable cause to believe that the minor involved was seventeen years old or more; and (b) Such minor exhibited to the defendant a draft card, driver’s license, birth certificate or other official or apparently official document purporting to establish that such minor was seventeen years old or more.” Neither addition is involved in this case. We intimate no view whatever upon the constitutional validity of the presumption. See in general Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147; Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513; 41 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 791 (1966); 30 Albany L. Rev. 133 (1966).
The 1967 law also repealed outright § 484-i which had been enacted one week after § 484r-h. L. 1965, c. 327. It forbade sales to minors under the age of 18. The New York Court of Appeals sustained its validity against a challenge that it was void for vagueness. People v. Tannenbaum, 18 N. Y. 2d 268, 220 N. E. 2d 783. For an analysis of § 48A-i and a comparison with § 484-h see 33 Brooklyn L. Rev. 329 (1967).
The case is not moot. The appellant might have been sentenced to one year’s imprisonment, or a $500 fine or both. N. Y. Penal Law § 1937. The trial judge however exercised authority under N. Y. Penal Law §2188 and on May 17, 1966, suspended sentence on all counts. Under § 470-a of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure, the judge could thereafter recall appellant and impose sentence only within one year, or before May 17, 1967. The judge did not do so. Although St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U. S. 41, held that a criminal case had become moot when the petitioner finished serving his sentence before direct review in this Court, St. Pierre also recognized that the case would not have been moot had “petitioner shown that under either state or federal law further penalties or disabilities can be imposed on him as result of the judgment which has now been satisfied.” Id., at 43. The State of New York concedes in its brief in this Court addressed to mootness “that certain disabilities do flow from the conviction.” The brief states that among these is “the possibility of ineligibility for licensing under state and municipal license laws regulating various lawful occupations . . . .” Since the argument, the parties advised the Court that, although this is the first time appellant has been convicted of any crime, this conviction might result in the revocation of the license required by municipal law as a prerequisite to engaging in the luncheonette business he carries on in Bellmore, New York. Belhnore is an “unincorporated village” within the Town of Hempstead, Long Island, 1967 N. Y. S. Leg. Man. 1154. The town has a licensing ordinance which provides that the “Commissioner of Buildings . . . may suspend or revoke any license issued, in his discretion, for . . . (e) conviction of any crime.” LL 21, Town of Hempstead, eff. December 1, 1966, §8.1 (e). In these circumstances the case is not moot since the conviction may entail collateral consequences sufficient to bring the case within the St. Pierre exception. See Fiswick v. United States, 329 U. S. 211, 220-222. We were not able to reach that conclusion in Tannenbaum v. New York, 388 U. S. 439, or Jacobs v. New York, 388 U. S. 431, in which the appeals were dismissed as moot. In Tannenbaum there was no contention that the convictions under the now repealed §484-i entailed any collateral consequences. In Jacobs the appeal was dismissed on motion of the State which alleged, inter alia, that New York law did not impose “any further penalty upon conviction of the misdemeanor here in issue.” Appellant did not there show, or contend, that his license might be revoked for “conviction of any crime”; he asserted only that the conviction might be the basis of a suspension under a provision of the Administrative Code of the City of New York requiring the Department of Licenses to assure that motion picture theatres are not conducted in a manner offensive to “public morals.”
One of the magazines was an issue of the magazine “Sir.” We held in Gent v. Arkansas, decided with Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767, 769, that an Arkansas statute which did not reflect a specific and limited state concern for juveniles was unconstitutional insofar as it was applied to suppress distribution of another issue of that magazine. Other cases which turned on findings of nonobscenity of this type of magazine include: Central Magazine Sales, Ltd. v. United States, 389 U. S. 50; Conner v. City of Hammond, 389 U. S. 48; Potomac News Co. v. United States, 389 U. S. 47; Mazes v. Ohio, 388 U. S. 453; A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 388 U. S. 452; Books, Inc. v. United States, 388 U. S. 449; Aday v. United States, 388 U. S. 447; Avansino v. New York, 388 U. S. 446; Sheperd v. New York, 388 U. S. 444; Friedman v. New York, 388 U. S. 441; Keney v. New York, 388 U. S. 440; see also Rosenbloom v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 450; Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U. S. 372.
People v. Tannenbaum, 18 N. Y. 2d 268, 270, 220 N. E. 2d 783, 785, dismissed as moot, 388 U. S. 439. The concept of variable obscenity is developed in Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 5 (1960). At 85 the authors state:
“Variable obscenity . . . furnishes a useful analytical tool for dealing with the problem of denying adolescents access to material aimed at a primary audience of sexually mature adults. For variable obscenity focuses attention upon the make-up of primary and peripheral audiences in varying circumstances, and provides a reasonably satisfactory means for delineating the obscene in each circumstance.”
Suggestions that legislatures might give attention to laws dealing specifically with safeguarding children against pornographic material have been made by many judges and commentators. See, e. g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U. S. 184, 195 (opinion of Justices BreNNAN and Goldberg); id., at 201 (dissenting opinion of The Chief Justice) ; Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U. S. 463, 498, n. 1 (dissenting opinion of Me. Justice Stewart); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 366 F. 2d 590, 593; In re Louisiana News Co., 187 F. Supp. 241, 247; United States v. Levine, 83 F. 2d 156; United States v. Dennett, 39 F. 2d 564; R. Kuh, Foolish Figleaves? 258-260 (1967); Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 Yale L. J. 877, 939 (1963); Gerber, A Suggested Solution to the Riddle of Obscenity, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 834, 848 (1964); Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 Col. L. Rev. 391, 413, n. 68 (1963); Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 7; Magrath, The Obscenity Cases: Grapes of Roth, 1966 Sup. Ct. Rev/7, 75.
The obscenity laws of 35 other States include provisions referring to minors. The laws are listed in Appendix B to this opinion. None is a precise counterpart of New York’s § 484-h and we imply no view whatever on questions of their constitutionality.
Many commentators, including many committed to the proposition that “[n]o general restriction on expression in terms of ‘obscenity’ can ... be reconciled with the first amendment,” recognize that “the power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults,” and accordingly acknowledge a supervening state interest in the regulation of literature sold to children, Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 Yale L. J. 877, 938, 939 (1963):
“Different factors come into play, also, where the interest at stake is the effect of erotic expression upon children. The world of children is not strictly part of the adult realm of free expression. The factor of immaturity, and perhaps other considerations, impose different rules. Without attempting here to formulate the principles relevant to freedom of expression for children, it suffices to say that regulations of communication addressed to them need not conform to the requirements of the first amendment in the same way as those applicable to adults.”
See also Gerber, supra, at 848; Kalven, supra, at 7; Magrath, supra, at 75. Prince v. Massachusetts is urged to be constitutional authority for such regulation. See, e. g., Kuh, supra, at 258-260; Comment, Exclusion of Children from Violent Movies, 67 Col. L. Rev. 1149, 1169-1160 (1967); Note, Constitutional Problems in Obscenity Legislation Protecting Children, 54 Geo. L. J. 1379 (1966).
One commentator who argues that obscenity legislation might be constitutionally defective as an imposition of a single standard of public morality would give effect to the parental role and accept laws relating only to minors. Henkin,, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 Col. L. Rev. 391, 413, n. 68 (1963):
“One must consider also how much difference it makes if laws are designed to protect only the morals of a child. While many of the constitutional arguments against morals legislation apply equally to legislation protecting the morals of children, one can well distinguish laws which do not impose a morality on children, but which support the right of parents to deal with the morals of their children as they see fit.”
See also Elias, Sex Publications and Moral Corruption: The Supreme Court Dilemma, 9 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 302, 320-321 (1967).
Compare Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U. S., at 424 (opinion of Douglas, J.) with id., at 441 (opinion of Clark, J.). See Kuh, supra, cc. 18-19; Gaylin, Book Review, 77 Yale L. J. 579, 591-595 (1968); Magrath, supra, at 52.
Our conclusion in Roth, at 486 — 187, that the clear and present danger test was irrelevant to the determination of obscenity made it unnecessary in that case to consider the debate among the authorities whether exposure to pornography caused antisocial consequences. See also Mishkin v. New York, supra; Ginzburg v. United States, supra; Memoirs v. Massachusetts, supra.
Magrath, supra, at 52. See, e. g., id., at 49-56; Dibble, Obscenity: A State Quarantine to Protect Children, 39 So. Cal. L. Rev. 345 (1966); Wall, Obscenity and Youth: The Problem and a Possible Solution, Crim. L. Bull., Vol. 1, No. 8, pp. 28, 30 (1965); Note, 55 Cal. L. Rev. 926, 934 (1967); Comment, 34 Ford. L. Rev. 692, 694 (1966). See also J. Paul & M. Schwartz, Federal Censorship: Obscenity in the Mail, 191-192; Blakey, Book Review, 41 Notre Dame Law. 1055, 1060, n. 46 (1966); Green, Obscenity, Censorship, and Juvenile Delinquency, 14 U. Toronto L. Rev. 229, 249 (1962); Lockhart & McClure, Literature, The Law of Obscenity, and the Constitution, 38 Minn. L. Rev. 295, 373-385 (1954); Note, 52 Ky. L. J. 429, 447 (1964). But despite the vigor of the ongoing controversy whether obscene material will perceptibly create a danger of antisocial conduct, or will probably induce its recipients to such conduct, a medical practitioner recently suggested that the possibility of harmful effects to youth cannot be dismissed as frivolous. Dr. Gaylin of the Columbia University Psychoanalytic Clinic, reporting on the views of some psychiatrists in 77 Yale L. J., at 592-593, said:
“It is in the period of growth [of youth] when these patterns of behavior are laid down, when environmental stimuli of all sorts must be integrated into a workable sense of self, when sensuality is being defined and fears elaborated, when pleasure confronts security and impulse encounters control — it is in this period, undramatically and with time, that legalized pornography may conceivably be damaging.”
Dr. Gaylin emphasizes that a child might not be as well prepared as an adult to make an intelligent choice as to the material he chooses to read:
“[Pjsychiatrists . . . made a distinction between the reading of pornography, as unlikely to be per se harmful, and the permitting of the reading of pornography, which was conceived as potentially destructive. The child is protected in his reading of pornography by the knowledge that it is pornographic, i. e., disapproved. It is outside of parental standards and not a part of his identification processes. To openly permit implies parental approval and even suggests seductive encouragement. If this is so of parental approval, it is equally so of societal approval — another potent influence on the developing ego.” Id., at 594.
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