Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The principal question presented by these cases is the arbitrability, pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U. S. C. §1 et seq., and the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (Convention), [1970] 21 U. S. T. 2517, T. I. A. S. No. 6997, of claims arising under the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. §1 et seq., and encompassed within a valid arbitration clause in an agreement embodying an international commercial transaction.
1 — 1
Petitioner-cross-respondent Mitsubishi Motors Corporation (Mitsubishi) is a Japanese corporation which manufactures automobiles and has its principal place of business in Tokyo, Japan. Mitsubishi is the product of a joint venture between, on the one hand, Chrysler International, S. A. (CISA), a Swiss corporation registered in Geneva and wholly owned by Chrysler Corporation, and, on the other, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Inc., a Japanese corporation. The aim of the joint venture was the distribution through Chrysler dealers outside the continental United States of vehicles manufactured by Mitsubishi and bearing Chrysler and Mitsubishi trademarks. Respondent-cross-petitioner Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. (Soler), is a Puerto Rico corporation with its principal place of business in Pueblo Viejo, Guay-nabo, Puerto Rico.
On October 31, 1979, Soler entered into a Distributor Agreement with CISA which provided for the sale by Soler of Mitsubishi-manufactured vehicles within a designated area, including metropolitan San Juan. App. 18. On the same date, CISA, Soler, and Mitsubishi entered into a Sales Procedure Agreement (Sales Agreement) which, referring to the Distributor Agreement, provided for the direct sale of Mitsubishi products to Soler and governed the terms and conditions of such sales. Id., at 42. Paragraph VI of the Sales Agreement, labeled “Arbitration of Certain Matters,” provides:
“All disputes, controversies or differences which may arise between [Mitsubishi] and [Soler] out of or in relation to Articles I-B through V of this Agreement or for the breach thereof, shall be finally settled by arbitration in Japan in accordance’ with the rules and regulations of the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association.” Id., at 52-53.
Initially, Soler did a brisk business in Mitsubishi-manufactured vehicles. As a result of its strong performance, its minimum sales volume, specified by Mitsubishi and CISA, and agreed to by Soler, for the 1981 model year was substantially increased. Id., at 179. In early 1981, however, the new-car market slackened. Soler ran into serious difficulties in meeting the expected sales volume, and by the spring of 1981 it felt itself compelled to request that Mitsubishi delay or cancel shipment of several orders. 1 Record 181, 183. About the same time, Soler attempted to arrange for the transshipment of a quantity of its vehicles for sale in the continental United States and Latin America. Mitsubishi and CISA, however, refused permission for any such diversion, citing a variety of reasons, and no vehicles were transshipped. Attempts to work out these difficulties failed. Mitsubishi eventually withheld shipment of 966 vehicles, apparently representing orders placed for May, June, and July 1981 production, responsibility for which Soler disclaimed in February 1982. App. 131.
The following month, Mitsubishi brought an action against Soler in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico under the Federal Arbitration Act and the Convention. Mitsubishi sought an order, pursuant to 9 U. S. C. §§4 and 201, to compel arbitration in accord with ¶ VI of the Sales Agreement. App. 15. Shortly after filing the complaint, Mitsubishi filed a request for arbitration before the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association. Id., at 70.
Soler denied the allegations and counterclaimed against both Mitsubishi and CISA. It alleged numerous breaches by Mitsubishi of the Sales Agreement, raised a pair of defamation claims, and asserted causes of action under the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1 et seq.; the federal Automobile Dealers’ Day in Court Act, 70 Stat. 1125, 15 U. S. C. § 1221 et seq.; the Puerto Rico competition statute, P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 10, § 257 et seq. (1976); and the Puerto Rico Dealers’ Contracts Act, P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 10, §278 et seq. (1976 and Supp. 1983). In the counterclaim premised on the Sherman Act, Soler alleged that Mitsubishi and CISA had conspired to divide markets in restraint of trade. To effectuate the plan, according to Soler, Mitsubishi had refused to permit Soler to resell to buyers in North, Central, or South America vehicles it had obligated itself to purchase from Mitsubishi; had refused to ship ordered vehicles or the parts, such as heaters and defoggers, that would be necessary to permit Soler to make its vehicles suitable for resale outside Puerto Rico; and had coercively attempted to replace Soler and its other Puerto Rico distributors with a wholly owned subsidiary which would serve as the exclusive Mitsubishi distributor in Puerto Rico. App. 91-96.
After a hearing, the District Court ordered Mitsubishi and Soler to arbitrate each of the issues raised in the complaint and in all the counterclaims save two and a portion of a third. With regard to the federal antitrust issues, it recognized that the Courts of Appeals, following American Safety Equi pment Corp. v. J. P. Maguire & Co., 391 F. 2d 821 (CA2 1968), uniformly had held that the rights conferred by the antitrust laws were “ ‘of a character inappropriate for enforcement by arbitration.’ ” App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 83-1569, p. B9, quoting Wilko v. Swan, 201 F. 2d 439, 444 (CA2 1953), rev’d, 346 U. S. 427 (1953). The District Court held, however, that the international character of the Mitsubishi-Soler undertaking required enforcement of the agreement to arbitrate even as to the antitrust claims. It relied on Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U. S. 506, 515-520 (1974), in which this Court ordered arbitration, pursuant to a provision embodied in an international agreement, of a claim arising under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 notwithstanding its assumption, arguendo, that Wilko, supra, which held non-arbitrable claims arising under the Securities Act of 1933, also would bar arbitration of a 1934 Act claim arising in a domestic context.
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. 723 F. 2d 155 (1983). It first rejected Soler’s argument that Puerto Rico law precluded enforcement of an agreement obligating a local dealer to arbitrate controversies outside Puerto Rico. It also rejected Soler’s suggestion that it could not have intended to arbitrate statutory claims not mentioned in the arbitration agreement. Assessing arbitrability “on an allegation-by-allegation basis,” id., at 159, the court then read the arbitration clause to encompass virtually all the claims arising under .the various statutes, including all those arising under the Sherman Act.
Finally, after endorsing the doctrine of American Safety, precluding arbitration of antitrust claims, the Court of Appeals concluded that neither this Court’s decision in Scherk nor the Convention required abandonment of that doctrine in the face of an international transaction. 723 F. 2d, at 164-168. Accordingly, it reversed the judgment of the District Court insofar as it had ordered submission of “Soler’s antitrust claims” to arbitration. Affirming the remainder of the judgment, the court directed the District Court to consider in the first instance how the parallel judicial and arbitral proceedings should go forward.
We granted certiorari primarily to consider whether an American court should enforce an agreement to resolve antitrust claims by arbitration when that agreement arises from an international transaction. 469 U. S. 916 (1984).
L — J
At the outset, we address the contention raised in Soler’s cross-petition that the arbitration clause at issue may not be read to encompass the statutory counterclaims stated in its answer to the complaint. In making this argument, Soler does not question the Court of Appeals’ application of ¶ VI of the Sales Agreement to the disputes involved here as a matter of standard contract interpretation. Instead, it argues that as a matter of law a court may not construe an arbitration agreement to encompass claims arising out of statutes designed to protect a class to which the party resisting arbitration belongs “unless [that party] has expressly agreed” to arbitrate those claims, see Pet. for Cert, in No. 83-1733, pp. 8, i, by which Soler presumably means that the arbitration clause must specifically mention the statute giving rise to the claims that a party to the clause seeks to arbitrate. See 723 F. 2d, at 159. Soler reasons that, because it falls within the class for whose benefit the federal and local antitrust laws and dealers’ Acts were passed, but the arbitration clause at issue does not mention these statutes or statutes in general, the clause cannot be read to contemplate arbitration of these statutory claims.
We do not agree, for we find no warrant in the Arbitration Act for implying in every contract within its ken a presumption against arbitration of statutory claims. The Act’s centerpiece provision makes a written agreement to arbitrate “in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce . . . valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U. S. C. §2. The “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,” Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U. S. 1, 24 (1983), manifested by this provision and the Act as a whole, is at bottom a policy guaranteeing the enforcement of private contractual arrangements: the Act simply “creates a body of federal substantive law establishing and regulating the duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate.” Id., at 25, n. 32. As this Court recently observed, “[t]he preeminent concern of Congress in passing the Act was to enforce private agreements into which parties had entered,” a concern which “requires that we rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate.” Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U. S. 213, 221 (1985).
Accordingly, the first task of a court asked to compel arbitration of a dispute is to determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute. The court is to make this determination by applying the “federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act.” Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 460 U. S., at 24. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U. S. 395, 400-404 (1967); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U. S. 1, 12 (1984). And that body of law counsels
“that questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration. . . . The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 460 U. S., at 24-25.
See, e. g., Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U. S. 574, 582-583 (1960). Thus, as with any other contract, the parties’ intentions control, but those intentions are generously construed as to issues of arbitrability.
There is no reason to depart from these guidelines where a party bound by an arbitration agreement raises claims founded on statutory rights. Some time ago this Court expressed “hope for [the Act’s] usefulness both in controversies based on statutes or on standards otherwise created,” Wilko v. Swan, 346 U. S. 427, 432 (1953) (footnote omitted); see Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U. S. 117, 135, n. 15 (1973), and we are well past the time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and of the competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited the development of arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution. Just last Term in Southland Corp., supra, where we held that § 2 of the Act declared a national policy applicable equally in state as well as federal courts, we construed an arbitration clause to encompass the disputes at issue without pausing at the source in a state statute of the rights asserted by the parties resisting arbitration. 465 U. S., at 15, and n. 7. Of course, courts should remain attuned to well-supported claims that the agreement to arbitrate resulted from the sort of fraud or overwhelming economic power that would provide grounds “for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U. S. C. §2; see Southland Corp., 465 U. S., at 16, n. 11; The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U. S. 1, 15 (1972). But, absent such compelling considerations, the Act itself provides no basis for disfavoring agreements to arbitrate statutory claims by skewing the otherwise hospitable inquiry into arbitrability.
That is not to say that all controversies implicating statutory rights are suitable for arbitration. There is no reason to distort the process of contract interpretation, however, in order to ferret out the inappropriate. Just as it is the congressional policy manifested in the Federal Arbitration Act that requires courts liberally to construe the scope of arbitration agreements covered by that Act, it is the congressional intention expressed in some other statute on which the courts must rely to.identify any category of claims as to which agreements to arbitrate will be held unenforceable. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U. S., at 434-435; Southland Corp., 465 U. S., at 16, n. 11; Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 470 U. S., at 224-225 (concurring opinion). For that reason, Soler’s concern for statutorily protected classes provides no reason to color the lens through which the arbitration clause is read. By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum. It trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration. We must assume that if Congress intended the substantive protection afforded by a given statute to include protection against waiver of the right to a judicial forum, that intention will be deducible from text or legislative history. See Wilko v. Swan, supra. Having made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should be held to it unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue. Nothing, in the meantime, prevents a party from excluding statutory claims from the scope of an agreement to arbitrate. See Prima Paint Corp., 388 U. S., at 406.
In sum, the Court of Appeals correctly conducted a two-step inquiry, first determining whether the parties’ agreement to arbitrate reached the- statutory issues, and then, upon finding it did, considering whether legal constraints external to the parties’ agreement foreclosed the arbitration of those claims. We endorse its rejection of Soler’s proposed rule of arbitration-clause construction.
HH
We now turn to consider whether Soler’s antitrust claims are nonarbitrable even though it has agreed to arbitrate them. In holding that they are not, the Court of Appeals followed the decision of the Second Circuit in American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J. P. Maguire & Co., 391 F. 2d 821 (1968). Notwithstanding the absence of any explicit support for such an exception in either the Sherman Act or the Federal Arbitration Act, the Second Circuit there reasoned that “the pervasive public interest in enforcement of the antitrust laws, and the nature of the claims that arise in such cases, combine to make . . . antitrust claims . . . inappropriate for arbitration.” Id., at 827-828. We find it unnecessary to assess the legitimacy of the American Safety doctrine as applied to agreements to arbitrate arising from domestic transactions.- As in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U. S. 506 (1974), we conclude that concerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international commercial system for predictability in the resolution of disputes require that we enforce the parties’ agreement, even assuming that a contrary result would be forthcoming in a domestic context.
Even before Scherk, this Court had recognized the utility of forum-selection clauses in international transactions. In The Bremen, supra, an American oil company, seeking to evade a contractual choice of an English forum and, by implication, English law, filed a suit in admiralty in a United States District Court against the German corporation which had contracted to tow its rig to a location in the Adriatic Sea. Notwithstanding the possibility that the English court would enforce provisions in the towage contract exculpating the German party which an American court would refuse to enforce, this Court gave effect to the choice-of-forum clause. It observed:
“The expansion of American business and industry will hardly be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our courts. . . . We cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and international waters exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts.” 407 U. S., at 9.
Recognizing that “agreeing in advance on a forum acceptable to both parties is an indispensable element in international trade, commerce, and contracting,” id., at 13-14, the decision in The Bremen clearly eschewed a provincial solicitude for the jurisdiction of domestic forums.
Identical considerations governed the Court’s decision in Scherk, which categorized “[a]n agreement to arbitrate before a specified tribunal [as], in effect, a specialized kind of forum-selection clause that posits not only the situs of suit but also the procedure to be used in resolving the dispute.” 417 U. S., at 519. In Scherk, the American company Alberto-Culver purchased several interrelated business enterprises, organized under the laws of Germany and Liechtenstein, as well as the rights held by those enterprises in certain trademarks, from a German citizen who at the time of trial resided in Switzerland. Although the contract of sale contained a clause providing for arbitration before the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris of “any controversy or claim [arising] out of this agreement or the breach thereof,” Alberto-Culver subsequently brought suit against Scherk in a Federal District Court in Illinois, alleging that Scherk had violated § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by fraudulently misrepresenting the status of the trademarks as unencumbered. The District Court denied a motion to stay the proceedings before it and enjoined the parties from going forward before the arbitral tribunal in Paris. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, relying on this Court’s holding in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U. S. 427 (1953), that agreements to arbitrate disputes arising under the Securities Act of 1933 are nonarbitrable. This Court reversed, enforcing the arbitration agreement even while assuming for purposes of the decision that the controversy would be nonarbitrable under the holding of Wilko had it arisen out of a domestic transaction. Again, the Court emphasized:
“A contractual provision specifying in advance the forum in which disputes shall be litigated and the law to be applied is ... an almost indispensable precondition to achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to any international business transaction. . . .
“A parochial refusal by the courts of one country to enforce an international arbitration agreement would not only frustrate these purposes, but would invite unseemly and mutually destructive jockeying by the parties to secure tactical litigation advantages. ... [It would] damage the fabric of international commerce and trade, and imperil the willingness and ability of businessmen to enter into international commercial agreements.” 417 U. S., at 516-517.
Accordingly, the Court held Alberto-Culver to its bargain, sending it to the international arbitral tribunal before which it had agreed to seek its remedies.
The Bremen and Scherk establish a strong presumption in favor of enforcement of freely negotiated contractual choice-of-forum provisions. Here, as in Scherk, that presumption is reinforced by the emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution. And at least since this Nation’s accession in 1970 to the Convention, see [1970] 21 U. S. T. 2517, T. I. A. S. 6997, and the implementation of the Convention in the same year by amendment of the Federal Arbitration Act, that federal policy applies with special force in the field of international commerce. Thus, we must weigh the concerns of American Safety against a strong belief in the efficacy of arbitral procedures for the resolution of international commercial disputes and an equal commitment to the enforcement of freely negotiated choice-of-forum clauses.
At the outset, we confess to some skepticism of certain aspects of the American Safety doctrine. As distilled by the First Circuit, 723 F. 2d, at 162, the doctrine comprises four ingredients. First, private parties play a pivotal role in aiding governmental enforcement of the antitrust laws by means of the private action for treble damages. Second, “the strong possibility that contracts which generate antitrust disputes may be contracts of adhesion militates against automatic forum determination by contract.” Third, antitrust issues, prone to complication, require sophisticated legal and economic analysis, and thus are “ill-adapted to strengths of the arbitral process, i. e., expedition, minimal requirements of written rationale, simplicity, resort to basic concepts of common sense and simple equity.” Finally, just as “issues of war and peace are too important to be vested in the generals, . . . decisions as to antitrust regulation of business are too important to be lodged in arbitrators chosen from the business community — particularly those from a foreign community that has had no experience with or exposure to our law and values.” See American Safety, 391 F. 2d, at 826-827.
Initially, we find the second concern unjustified. The mere appearance of an antitrust dispute does not alone warrant invalidation of the selected forum on the undemon-strated assumption that the arbitration clause is tainted. A party resisting arbitration of course may attack directly the validity of the agreement to arbitrate. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U. S. 395 (1967). Moreover, the party may attempt to make a showing that would warrant setting aside the forum-selection clause — that the agreement was “[ajffected by fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargaining power”; that “enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust”; or that proceedings “in the contractual forum will be so gravely difficult and inconvenient that [the resisting party] will for all practical purposes be deprived of his day in court.” The Bremen, 407 U. S., at 12, 15, 18. But absent such a showing — and none was attempted here — there is no basis for assuming the forum inadequate or its selection unfair.
Next, potential complexity should not suffice to ward off arbitration. We might well have some doubt that even the courts following American Safety subscribe fully to the view that antitrust matters are inherently insusceptible to resolution by arbitration, as these same courts have agreed that an undertaking to arbitrate antitrust claims entered into after the dispute arises is acceptable. See, e. g., Coenen v. R. W. Pressprich & Co., 453 F. 2d 1209, 1215 (CA2), cert. denied, 406 U. S. 949 (1972); Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F. 2d 41, 48 (CA5 1974). See also, in the present cases, 723 F. 2d, at 168, n. 12 (leaving question open). And the vertical restraints which most frequently give birth to antitrust claims covered by an arbitration agreement will not often occasion the monstrous proceedings that have given antitrust litigation an image of intractability. In any event, adaptability and access to expertise are hallmarks of arbitration. The anticipated subject matter of the dispute may be taken into account when the arbitrators are appointed, and arbitral rules typically provide for the participation of experts either employed by the parties or appointed by the tribunal. Moreover, it is often a judgment that streamlined proceedings and expeditious results will best serve their needs that causes parties to agree to arbitrate their disputes; it is typically a desire to keep the effort and expense required to resolve a dispute within manageable bounds that prompts them mutually to forgo access to judicial remedies. In sum, the factor of potential complexity alone does not persuade us that an arbitral tribunal could not properly handle an antitrust matter.
For similar reasons, we also reject the proposition that an arbitration panel will pose too great a danger of innate hostility to the constraints on business conduct that antitrust law imposes. International arbitrators frequently are drawn from the legal as well as the business community; where the dispute has an important legal component, the parties and the arbitral body with whose assistance they have agreed to settle their dispute can be expected to select arbitrators accordingly. We decline to indulge the presumption that the parties and arbitral body conducting a proceeding will be unable or unwilling to retain competent, conscientious, and impartial arbitrators.
We are left, then, with the core of the American Safety doctrine — the fundamental importance to American democratic capitalism of the regime of the antitrust laws. See, e. g., United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U. S. 596, 610 (1972); Northern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 356 U. S. 1, 4 (1958). Without doubt, the private cause of action plays a central role in enforcing this regime. See, e. g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U. S. 251, 262 (1972). As the Court of Appeals pointed out:
“ ‘A claim under the antitrust laws is not merely a private matter. The Sherman Act is designed to promote the national interest in a competitive economy; thus, the plaintiff asserting his rights under the Act has been likened to a private attorney-general who protects the public’s interest.’” 723 F. 2d, at 168, quoting American Safety, 391 F. 2d, at 826.
The treble-damages provision wielded by the private litigant is a chief tool in the antitrust enforcement scheme, posing a crucial deterrent to potential violators. See, e. g., Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U. S. 134, 138-139 (1968).
Thé importance of the private damages remedy, however, does not compel the conclusion that it may not be sought outside an American court. Notwithstanding its important incidental policing function, the treble-damages cause of action conferred on private parties by §4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U. S. C. § 15, and pursued by Soler here by way of its third counterclaim, seeks primarily to enable an injured competitor to gain compensation for that injury.
“Section 4 ... is in essence a remedial provision. It provides treble damages to ‘[a]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws . . . .’ Of course, treble damages also play an important role in penalizing wrongdoers and deterring wrongdoing, as we also have frequently observed. ... It nevertheless is true that the treble-damages provision, which makes awards available only to injured parties, and measures the awards by a multiple of the injury actually proved, is designed primarily as a remedy.” Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U. S. 477, 485-486 (1977).
After examining the respective legislative histories, the Court in Brunswick recognized that when first enacted in 1890 as §7 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 210, the treble-damages provision “was conceived of primarily as a remedy for ‘[t]he people of the United States as individuals,’” 429 U. S., at 486, n. 10, quoting 21 Cong. Rec. 1767-1768 (1890) (remarks of Sen. George); when reenacted in 1914 as § 4 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, it was still “conceived primarily as ‘opening] the door of justice to every man, whenever he may be injured by those who violate the antitrust laws, and giv[ing] the injured party ample damages for the wrong suffered.’” 429 U. S., at 486, n. 10, quoting 51 Cong. Rec. 9073 (1914) (remarks of Rep. Webb). And, of course, the antitrust cause of action remains at all times under the control of the individual litigant: no citizen is under an obligation to bring an antitrust suit, see Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U. S. 720, 746 (1977), and the private antitrust plaintiff needs no executive or judicial approval before settling one. It follows that, at least where the international cast of a transaction would otherwise add an element of uncertainty to dispute resolution, the prospective litigant may provide in advance for a mutually agreeable procedure whereby he would seek his antitrust recovery as well as settle other controversies.
There is no reason to assume at the outset of the dispute that international arbitration will not provide an adequate mechanism. To be sure, the international arbitral tribunal owes no prior allegiance to the legal norms of particular states; hence, it has no direct obligation to vindicate their statutory dictates. The tribunal, however, is bound to effectuate the intentions of the parties. Where the parties have agreed that the arbitral body is to decide a defined set of claims which includes, as in these cases, those arising from the application of American antitrust law, the tribunal therefore should be bound to decide that dispute in accord with the national law giving rise to the claim. Cf. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U. S., at 433-434. And so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function.
Having permitted the arbitration to go forward, the national courts of the United States will have the opportunity at the award-enforcement stage to ensure that the legitimate interest in the enforcement of the antitrust laws has been addressed. The Convention reserves to each signatory country the right to refuse enforcement of an award where the “recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country.” Art. V(2)(b), 21 U. S. T., at 2520; see Scherk, 417 U. S., at 519, n. 14. While the efficacy of the arbitral process requires that substantive review at the award-enforcement stage remain minimal, it would not reqfiire intrusive inquiry to ascertain that the tribunal took cognizance of the antitrust claims and actually decided them.
As international trade has expanded in recent decades, so too has the use of international arbitration to resolve disputes arising in the course of that trade. The controversies that international arbitral institutions are called upon to resolve have increased in diversity as well as in complexity. Yet the potential of these tribunals for efficient disposition of legal disagreements arising from commercial relations has not yet been tested. If they are to take a central place in the international legal order, national courts will need to “shake off the old judicial hostility to arbitration,” Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F. 2d 978, 985 (CA2 1942), and also their customary and understandable unwillingness to cede jurisdiction of a claim arising under domestic law to a foreign or transnational tribunal. To this extent, at least, it will be necessary for national courts to subordinate domestic notions of arbitrability to the international policy favoring commercial arbitration. See Scherk, supra.
Accordingly, we “require this representative of the American business community to honor its bargain,” Alberto-Culver Co. v. Scherk, 484 F. 2d 611, 620 (CA7 1973) (Stevens, J., dissenting), by holding this agreement to arbitrate “enforceable] ... in accord with the explicit provisions of the Arbitration Act.” Scherk, 417 U. S., at 520.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Powell took no part in the decision of these cases.
The reasons advanced included concerns that such diversion would interfere with the Japanese trade policy of voluntarily limiting imports to the United States, App. 143,177-178; that the Soler-ordered vehicles would be unsuitable for use in certain proposed destinations because of their manufacture, with use in Puerto Rico in mind, without heaters and defoggers, id., at 182; that the vehicles would be unsuitable for use in Latin America because of the unavailability there of the unleaded, high-octane fuel they required, id., at 177,181-182; that adequate warranty service could not be ensured, id., at 176, 182; and that diversion to the mainland would violate contractual obligations between CISA and Mitsubishi, id., at 144, 183.
The complaint alleged that Soler had failed to pay for 966 ordered vehicles; that it had failed to pay contractual “distress unit penalties,” intended to reimburse Mitsubishi for storage costs and interest charges incurred because of Soler’s failure to take shipment of ordered vehicles; that Soler’s failure to fulfill warranty obligations threatened Mitsubishi’s reputation and goodwill; that Soler had failed to obtain required financing; and that the Distributor and Sales Agreements had expired by their terms or, alternatively, that Soler had surrendered its rights under the Sales Agreement.Id., at 11-14.
Section 4 provides in pertinent part:
“A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district court which, save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction under title 28, in a civil action or in admiralty of the subject matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the parties, for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement. . . . The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement.”
Section 201 provides: “The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of June 10, 1958, shall be enforced in United States courts in accordance with this chapter.” Article II of the Convention, in turn, provides:
“1. Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration.
“3. The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in respect of which the parties have made an agreement within the meaning of this article, shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.” 21 U. S. T., at 2519. Title 9 U. S. C. §203 confers jurisdiction on the district courts of the United States over an action falling under the Convention.
Mitsubishi also sought an order against threatened litigation. App. 15-16.
The alleged breaches included wrongful refusal to ship ordered vehicles and necessary parts, failure to make payment for warranty work and authorized rebates, and bad faith in establishing minimum-sales volumes. Id., at 97-101.
The fourth counterclaim alleged that Mitsubishi had made statements that defamed Soler’s good name and business reputation to a company with which Soler was then negotiating the sale of its plant and distributorship. Id., at 96. The sixth counterclaim alleged that Mitsubishi had made a willfully false and malicious statement in an affidavit submitted in support of as application for a temporary restraining order, and that Mitsubishi had wrongfully advised Soler’s customers and the public in its market area that they should no longer do business with Soler. Id., at 98-99.
The District Court found that the arbitration clause did not cover the fourth and sixth counterclaims, which sought damages for defamation, see n. 6, supra, or the allegations in the seventh counterclaim concerning discriminatory treatment and the establishment of minimum-sales volumes. App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 83-1569, pp. B10-B11. Accordingly, it retained jurisdiction over those portions of the litigation. In addition, because no arbitration agreement between Soler and CISA existed, the court retained jurisdiction, insofar as they sought relief from CISA, over the first, second, third, and ninth counterclaims, which raised claims under the Puerto Rico Dealers’ Contracts Act, the federal Automobile Dealers’ Day in Court Act, the Sherman Act, and the Puerto Rico competition statute, respectively. Id., at B12. These aspects of the District Court’s ruling were not appealed and are not before this Court.
Soler relied on P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 10, §278b-2 (Supp. 1983), which purports to render null and void “[a]ny stipulation that obligates a dealer to adjust, arbitrate or litigate any controversy that comes up regarding his dealer’s contract outside of Puerto Rico, or under foreign law or rule of law.” See Walborg Corp. v. Superior Court, 104 P. R. R. 258 (1975). The Court of Appeals held this provision pre-empted by 9 U. S. C. § 2, which declares arbitration agreements valid and enforceable “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 723 F. 2d, at 158. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U. S. 1 (1984). See also Ledee v. Ceramiche Ragno, 684 F. 2d 184 (CA1 1982). Soler does not challenge this holding in its cross-petition here.
As the Court of Appeals saw it, “[t]he question ... is not whether the arbitration clause mentions antitrust or any other particular cause of action, but whether the factual allegations underlying Soler’s counterclaims — and Mitsubishi’s bona fide defenses to those counterclaims — are within the scope of the arbitration clause, whatever the legal labels attached to those allegations.” 723 F. 2d, at 159. Because Soler’s counterclaim under the Puerto Rico Dealers’ Contracts Act focused on Mitsubishi’s alleged failure to comply with the provisions of the Sales Agreement governing delivery of automobiles, and those provisions were found in that portion of Article I of the Agreement subject to arbitration, the Court of Appeals placed this first counterclaim within the arbitration clause. Id., at 159-160.
The court read the Sherman Act counterclaim to raise issues of wrongful termination of Soler’s distributorship, wrongful failure to ship ordered parts and vehicles, and -wrongful refusal to permit transshipment of stock to the United States and Latin America. Because the existence of just cause for termination turned on Mitsubishi’s allegations that Soler had breached the Sales Agreement by, for example, failing to pay for ordered vehicles, the wrongful termination claim implicated at least three provisions within the arbitration clause: Article I-D(l), which rendered a dealer’s orders “firm”; Article I-E, which provided for “distress unit penalties” where the dealer prevented timely shipment; and Article I-F, specifying payment obligations and procedures. The court therefore held the arbitration clause to cover this dispute. Because the nonshipment claim implicated Soler’s obligation under Article I-F to proffer acceptable credit, the court found this dispute covered as well. And because the transshipment claim prompted Mitsubishi defenses concerning the suitability of vehicles manufactured to Soler’s specifications for use in different locales and Soler’s inability to provide warranty service to transshipped products, it implicated Soler’s obligation under Article IV, another covered provision, to make use of Mitsubishi’s trademarks in a manner that would not dilute Mitsubishi’s reputation and goodwill or damage its name and reputation. The court therefore found the arbitration agreement also to include this dispute, noting that such trademark concerns “are relevant to the legality of territorially based restricted distribution arrangements of the sort at issue here.” 723 F. 2d, at 160-161, citing Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U. S. 36 (1977).
The Court of Appeals read the federal Automobile Dealers’ Day in Court Act claim to raise issues as to Mitsubishi’s good faith in establishing minimum-sales volumes and Mitsubishi’s alleged attempt to coerce Soler into accepting replacement by a Mitsubishi subsidiary. It agreed with the District Court’s conclusion, in which Mitsubishi acquiesced, that the arbitration clause did not reach the first issue; it found the second, arising from Soler’s payment problems, to restate claims already found to be covered. 723 F. 2d, at 161.
Finally, the Court of Appeals found the antitrust claims under Puerto Rico law entirely to reiterate claims elsewhere stated; accordingly, it held them arbitrable to the same extent as their counterparts. Ibid.
Soler suggests that the court thereby declared antitrust claims arising under Puerto Rico law nonarbitrable as well. We read the Court of Appeals’ opinion to have held only the federal antitrust claims nonarbitrable. See id., at 157 (“principal issue on this appeal is whether arbitration of federal antitrust claims may be compelled under the Federal Arbitration Act”); id., at 161 (“major question in this appeal is whether the antitrust issues raised by Soler’s third counterclaim [grounded on Sherman Act] are subject to arbitration”). In any event, any contention that the local antitrust claims are nonarbitrable would be foreclosed by this Court’s decision in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U. S., at 10, where we held that the Federal Arbitration Act “withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.”
In this Court, Soler suggests for the first time that Congress intended that claims under the federal Automobile Dealers’ Day in Court Act be nonarbitrable. Brief for Respondent and Cross-Petitioner 21, n. 12. Because Soler did not raise this question in the Court of Appeals or present it in its cross-petition, we do not address it here.
Following entry of the District Court’s judgment, both it and the Court of Appeals denied motions by Soler for a stay pending appeal. The parties accordingly commenced preparation for the arbitration in Japan. Upon remand from the Court of Appeals, however, Soler withdrew the antitrust claims from the arbitration tribunal and sought a stay of arbitration pending the completion of the judicial proceedings on the ground that the antitrust claims permeated the claims that remained before that tribunal. The District Court denied the motion, instead staying its own proceedings pending the arbitration in Japan. The arbitration recommenced, but apparently came to a halt once again in September 1984 upon the filing by Soler of a petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U. S. C. § 1101 et seq.
We therefore have no reason to review the Court of Appeals’ construction of the scope of the arbitration clause in the light of the allegations of Soler’s counterclaims. See n. 9, supra; Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U. S., at 15, n. 7.
Soler does suggest that, because the title of the clause referred only to “certain matters,” App. 52, and the clause itself specifically referred only to “Articles I-B through V,” ibid., it should be read narrowly to exclude the statutory claims. Soler ignores the inclusion within those “certain matters” of “[a]ll disputes, controversies or differences which may arise between [Mitsubishi] and [Soler] out of or in relation to [the specified provisions] or for the breach thereof.” Contrary to Soler’s suggestion, the exclusion of some areas of possible dispute from the scope of an arbitration clause does not serve to restrict the reach of an otherwise broad clause in the areas in which it was intended to operate. Thus, insofar as the allegations underlying the statutory claims touch matters covered by the enumerated articles, the Court of Appeals properly resolved any doubts in favor of arbitrability. See 723 F. 2d, at 159.
The Court previously has explained that the Act was designed to overcome an anachronistic judicial hostility to agreements to arbitrate, which American courts had borrowed from English common law. See Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U. S. 213, 219-221, and n. 6 (1985); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U. S. 506, 510, and n. 4 (1974).
The claims whose arbitrability was at issue in Southland Corp. arose under the disclosure requirements of the California Franchise Investment Law, Cal. Corp. Code Ann. § 31000 et seq. (West 1977). While the dissent in Southland Corp. disputed the applicability of the Act to proceedings in the state courts, it did not object to the Court’s reading of the arbitration clause under examination.
Act of July 31,1970, Pub. L. 91-368, 84 Stat. 692, codified at 9 U. S. C. §§201-208.
See, e. g., Japan Commercial Arbitration Association Rule 26, reprinted in App. 218-219; L. Craig, W. Park, & J. Paulsson, International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration §§25.03, 26.04 (1984); Art. 27, Arbitration Rules of United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) (1976), reprinted in 2 Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 167 (1977).
See Craig, Park, & Paulsson, supra, § 12.03, p. 28; Sanders, Commentary on UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules § 15.1, in 2 Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, supra, at 203.
We are advised by Mitsubishi and amicus International Chamber of Commerce, without contradiction by Soler, that the arbitration panel selected to hear the parties’ claims here is composed of three Japanese lawyers, one a former law school dean, another a former judge, and the third a practicing attorney with American legal training who has written on Japanese antitrust law. Brief for Petitioner in No. 83-1569, p. 26; Brief for International Chamber of Commerce as Amicus Curiae 16, n. 28.
The Court of Appeals was concerned that international arbitrators would lack “experience with or exposure to our law and values.” 723 F. 2d, at 162. The obstacles confronted by the arbitration panel in this case, however, should be no greater than those confronted by any judicial or arbitral tribunal required to determine foreign law. See, e. g., Fed. Rule Civ. Proe. 44.1. Moreover, while our attachment to the antitrust laws may be stronger than most, many other countries, including Japan, have similar bodies of competition law. See, e. g., 1 Law of Transnational Business Transactions, ch. 9 (Banks, Antitrust Aspects of International Business Operations), §9.03[7] (V. Nanda ed. 1984); H. Iyori & A. Uesugi, The Antimonopoly Laws of Japan (1983).
In addition to the clause providing for arbitration before the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association, the Sales Agreement includes a choice-of-law clause which reads: “This Agreement is made in, and will be governed by and construed in all respects according to the laws of the Swiss Confederation as if entirely performed therein.” App. 56. The United States raises the possibility that the arbitral panel will read this provision not simply to govern interpretation of the contract terms, but wholly to displace American law even where it otherwise would apply. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 20. The International Chamber of Commerce opines that it is “[e]oneeivabl[e], although we believe it unlikely, [that] the arbitrators could consider Soler’s affirmative claim of anti-competitive conduct by CISA and Mitsubishi to fall within the purview of this choice-of-law provision, with the result that it would be decided under Swiss law rather than the U. S. Sherman Act.” Brief for International Chamber of Commerce as Amicus Curiae 25. At oral argument, however, counsel for Mitsubishi conceded that American law applied to the antitrust claims and represented that the claims had been submitted to the arbitration panel in Japan on that basis. Tr. of Oral. Arg. 18. The record confirms that before the decision of the Court of Appeals the arbitral panel had taken these claims under submission. See District Court Order of May 25, 1984, pp. 2-3.
We therefore have no occasion to speculate on this matter at this stage in the proceedings, when Mitsubishi seeks to enforce the agreement to arbitrate, not to enforce an award. Nor need we consider now the effect of an arbitral tribunal’s failure to take cognizance of the statutory cause of action on the claimant’s capacity to reinitiate suit in federal court. We merely note that in the event the choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies for antitrust violations, we would have little hesitation in condemning the agreement as against public policy. See, e. g., Redel’s Inc. v. General Electric Co., 498 F. 2d 95, 98-99 (CA5 1974); Gaines v. Carrollton Tobacco Board of Trade, Inc., 386 F. 2d 757, 759 (CA6 1967); Fox Midwest Theatres v. Means, 221 F. 2d 173, 180 (CA8 1955). Cf. Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp., 349 U. S. 322, 329 (1955). See generally 15 S. Williston, Contracts § 1750A (3d ed. 1972).
See n. 19, supra. We note, for example, that the rules of the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association provide for the taking of a “summary record” of each hearing, Rule 28.1; for the stenographic recording of the proceedings where the tribunal so orders or a party requests one, Rule 28.2; and for a statement of reasons for the award unless the parties agree otherwise, Rule 36.1(4). See App. 219 and 221.
Needless to say, we intimate no views on the merits of Soler’s antitrust claims.
We do not quarrel with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that Art. 11(1) of the Convention, which requires the recognition of agreements to arbitrate that involve “subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration,” contemplates exceptions to arbitrability grounded in domestic law. See 723 F. 2d, at 164-166; G. Gaja, International Commercial Arbitration: New York Convention I. B.2 (1984); A. van den Berg, The New York Convention of 1958: Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation 152-154 (1981); Contini, International Commercial Arbitration: The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 8 Am. J. Comp. L. 283, 296 (1959). But see Van den Berg, swpra, at 154, and n. 98 (collecting contrary authorities); Gaja, supra, at I. D., n. 43 (same). And it appears that before acceding to the Convention the Senate was advised by a State Department memorandum that the Convention provided for such exceptions. See S. Exec. Doc. E, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 19 (1968).
In acceding to the Convention the Senate restricted its applicability to commercial matters, in accord with Art. 1(3). See 21 U. S. T., at 2519, 2560. Yet in implementing the Convention by amendment to the Federal Arbitration Act, Congress did not specify any matters it intended to exclude from its scope. See Act of July 31, 1970, Pub. L. 91-368, 84 Stat. 692, codified at 9 U. S. C. §§201-208. In Scherk, this Court recited Art. 11(1), including the language relied upon by the Court of Appeals, but paid heed to the Convention delegates’ “frequent[ly voiced] concern that courts of signatory countries in which an agreement to arbitrate is sought to be enforced should not be permitted to decline enforcement of such agreements on the basis of parochial views of their desirability or in a manner that would diminish the mutually binding nature of the agreements.” 417 U. S., at 520, n. 15, citing G. Haight, Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: Summary Analysis of Record of United Nations Conference, May/June 1958, pp. 24-28 (1958). There, moreover, the Court dealt, arguendo, with an exception to arbitrability grounded in express congressional language; here, in contrast, we face a judicially implied exception. The utility of the Convention in promoting the process of international commercial arbitration depends upon the willingness of national courts to let go of matters they normally would think of as their own. Doubtless, Congress may specify categories of claims it wishes to reserve for decision by our own courts without contravening this Nation’s obligations under the Convention. But we decline to subvert the spirit of the United States’ accession to the Convention by recognizing subject-matter exceptions where Congress has not expressly directed the courts to do so.
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