Opinion of the Court by
Mr. Justice White,
announced by The Chief Justice.
The issue in these cases is whether requiring newsmen to appear and testify before state or federal grand juries abridges the freedom of speech and press guaranteed by the First Amendment. We hold that it does not.
I
The writ of certiorari in No. 70-85, Branzburg v. Hayes and Meigs, brings before us two judgments of the Kentucky Court of Appeals, both involving petitioner Branzburg, a staff reporter for the Courier-Journal, a daily newspaper published in Louisville, Kentucky.
On November 15, 1969, the Courier-Journal carried a story under petitioner’s by-line describing in detail his observations of two young residents of Jefferson County synthesizing hashish from marihuana, an activity which, they asserted, earned them about $5,000 in three weeks. The article included a photograph of a pair of hands working above a laboratory table on which was a substance identified by the caption as hashish. The article stated that petitioner had promised not to reveal the identity of the two hashish makers. Petitioner was shortly subpoenaed by the Jefferson County grand jury; he appeared, but refused to identify the individuals he had seen possessing marihuana or the persons he had seen making hashish from marihuana. A state trial court judge ordered petitioner to answer these questions and rejected his contention that the Kentucky reporters’ privilege statute, Ky. Rev. Stat. §421.100 (1962), the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, or §§ 1, 2, and 8 of the Kentucky Constitution authorized his refusal to answer. Petitioner then sought prohibition and mandamus in the Kentucky Court of Appeals on the same grounds, but the Court of Appeals denied the petition. Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S. W. 2d 345 (1970), as modified on denial of rehearing, Jan. 22, 1971. It held that petitioner had abandoned his First Amendment argument in a supplemental memorandum he had filed and tacitly rejected his argument based on the Kentucky Constitution. It also construed Ky. Rev. Stat. § 421.100 as affording a newsman the privilege of refusing to divulge the identity of an informant who supplied him with information, but held that the statute did not permit a reporter to refuse to testify about events he had observed personally, including the identities of those persons he had observed.
The second case involving petitioner Branzburg arose out of his later story published on January 10, 1971, which described in detail the use of drugs in Frankfort, Kentucky. The article reported that in order to provide a comprehensive survey of the “drug scene” in Frankfort, petitioner had “spent two weeks interviewing several dozen drug users in the capital city” and had seen some of them smoking marihuana. A number of conversations with and observations of several unnamed drug users were recounted. Subpoenaed to appear before a Franklin County grand jury “to testify in the matter of violation of statutes concerning use and sale of drugs,” petitioner Branzburg moved to quash the summons; the motion was denied, although an order was issued protecting Branzburg from revealing “confidential associations, sources or information” but requiring that he “answer any questions which concern or pertain to any criminal act, the commission of which was actually observed by [him].” Prior to the time he was slated to appear before the grand jury, petitioner sought mandamus and prohibition from the Kentucky Court of Appeals, arguing that if he were forced to go before the grand jury or to answer questions regarding the identity of informants or disclose information given to him in confidence, his effectiveness as a reporter would be greatly damaged. The Court of Appeals once again denied the requested writs, reaffirming its construction of Ky. Rev. Stat. § 421.100, and rejecting petitioner’s claim of a First Amendment privilege. It distinguished Caldwell v. United States, 434 F. 2d 1081 (CA9 1970), and it also announced its “misgivings” about that decision, asserting that it represented “a drastic departure from the generally recognized rule that the sources of information of a newspaper reporter are not privileged under the First Amendment.” It characterized petitioner’s fear that his ability to obtain news would be destroyed as “so tenuous that it does not, in the opinion of this court, present an issue of abridgement of the freedom of the press within the meaning of that term as used in the Constitution of the United States.”
Petitioner sought a writ of certiorari to review both judgments of the Kentucky Court of Appeals, and we granted the writ. 402 U. S. 942 (1971).
In re Pappas, No. 70-94, originated when petitioner Pappas, a television newsman-photographer working out of the Providence, Rhode Island, office of a New Bedford, Massachusetts, television station, was called to New Bedford on July 30, 1970, to report on civil disorders there which involved fires and other turmoil. He intended to cover a Black Panther news conference at that group’s headquarters in a boarded-up store. Petitioner found the streets around the store barricaded, but he ultimately gained entrance to the area and recorded and photographed a prepared statement read by one of the Black Panther leaders at about 3 p. m. He then asked for and received permission to reenter the area. Returning at about 9 o’ clock, he was allowed to enter and remain inside Panther headquarters. As a condition of entry, Pappas agreed not to disclose anything he saw or heard inside the store except an anticipated police raid, which Pappas, “on his own,” was free to photograph and report as he wished. Pappas stayed inside the headquarters for about three hours, but there was no police raid, and petitioner wrote no story and did not otherwise reveal what had occurred in the store while he was there. Two months later, petitioner was summoned before the Bristol County Grand Jury and appeared, answered questions as to his name, address, employment, and what he had seen and heard outside Panther headquarters, but refused to answer any questions about what had taken place inside headquarters while he was there, claiming that the First Amendment afforded him a privilege to protect confidential informants and their information. A second summons was then served upon him, again directing him to appear before the grand jury and “to give such evidence as he knows relating to any matters which may be inquired of on behalf of the Commonwealth before . . . the Grand Jury.” His motion to quash on First Amendment and other grounds was denied by the trial judge who, noting the absence of a statutory newsman’s privilege in Massachusetts, ruled that petitioner had no constitutional privilege to refuse to divulge to the grand jury what he had seen and heard, including the identity of persons he had observed. The case was reported for decision to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. The record there did not include a transcript of the hearing on the motion to quash, nor did it reveal the specific questions petitioner had refused to answer, the expected nature of his testimony, the nature of the grand jury investigation, or the likelihood of the grand jury’s securing the information it sought from petitioner by other means. The Supreme Judicial Court, however, took “judicial notice that in July, 1970, there were serious civil disorders in New Bedford, which involved street barricades, exclusion of the public from certain streets, fires, and similar turmoil. We were told at the arguments that there was gunfire in certain streets. We assume that the grand jury investigation was an appropriate effort to discover and indict those responsible for criminal acts.” 358 Mass. 604, 607, 266 N. E. 2d 297, 299 (1971). The court then reaffirmed prior Massachusetts holdings that testimonial privileges were “exceptional” and “limited,” stating that “[t]he principle that the public ‘has a right to every man’s evidence’ ” had usually been preferred, in the Commonwealth, to countervailing interests. Ibid. The court rejected the holding of the Ninth Circuit in Caldwell v. United States, supra, and “adhere [d] to the view that there exists no constitutional newsman’s privilege, either qualified or absolute, to refuse to appear and testify before a court or grand jury.” 358 Mass., at 612, 266 N. E. 2d, at 302-303. Any adverse effect upon the free dissemination of news by virtue of petitioner’s being called to testify was deemed to be only “indirect, theoretical, and uncertain.” Id., at 612, 266 N. E. 2d, at 302. The court concluded that “[t]he obligation of newsmen ... is that of every citizen ... to appear when summoned, with relevant written or other material when required, and to answer relevant and reasonable inquiries.” Id., at 612, 266 N. E. 2d, at 303. The court nevertheless noted that grand juries were subject to supervision by the presiding judge, who had the duty “to prevent oppressive, unnecessary, irrelevant, and other improper inquiry and investigation,” ibid., to insure that a witness’ Fifth Amendment rights were not infringed, and to assess the propriety, necessity, and pertinence of the probable testimony to the investigation in progress. The burden was deemed to be on the witness to establish the impropriety of the summons or the questions asked. The denial of the motion to quash was affirmed and we granted a writ of certiorari to petitioner Pappas. 402 U. S. 942 (1971).
United States v. Caldwell, No. 70-57, arose from subpoenas issued by a federal grand jury in the Northern District of California to respondent Earl Caldwell, a reporter for the New York Times assigned to cover the Black Panther Party and other black militant groups. A subpoena duces tecum was served on respondent on February 2, 1970, ordering him to appear before the grand jury to testify and to bring with him notes and tape recordings of interviews given him for publication by officers and spokesmen of the Black Panther Party concerning the aims, purposes, and activities of that organization. Respondent objected to the scope of this subpoena, and an agreement between his counsel and the Government attorneys resulted in a continuance. A second subpoena, served on March 16, omitted the documentary requirement and simply ordered Caldwell “to appear ... to testify before the Grand Jury.” Respondent and his employer, the New York Times, moved to quash on the ground that the unlimited breadth of the subpoenas and the fact that Caldwell would have to appear in secret before the grand jury would destroy his working relationship with the Black Panther Party and “suppress vital First Amendment freedoms ... by driving a wedge of distrust and silence between the news media and the militants.” App. 7. Respondent argued that “so drastic an incursion upon First Amendment freedoms” should not be permitted “in the absence of a compelling governmental interest — not shown here — in requiring Mr. Caldwell's appearance before the grand jury.” Ibid. The motion was supported by amicus curiae memoranda from other publishing concerns and by affidavits from newsmen asserting the unfavorable impact on news sources of requiring reporters to appear before grand juries. The Government filed three memoranda in opposition to the motion to quash, each supported by affidavits. These documents stated that the grand jury was investigating, among other things, possible violations of a number of criminal statutes, including 18 U. S. C. § 871 (threats against the President), 18 U. S. C. § 1751 (assassination, attempts to assassinate, conspiracy to assassinate the President), 18 U. S. C. § 231 (civil disorders), 18 U. S. C. § 2101 (interstate travel to incite a riot), and 18 U. S. C. § 1341 (mail frauds and swindles). It was recited that on November 15, 1969, an officer of the Black Panther Party made a publicly televised speech in which he had declared that “[w]e will kill Richard Nixon” and that this threat had been repeated in three subsequent issues of the Party newspaper. App. 66, 77. Also referred to were various writings by Caldwell about the Black Panther Party, including an article published in the New York Times on December 14, 1969, stating that “[i]n their role as the vanguard in a revolutionary struggle the Panthers have picked up guns,” and quoting the Chief of Staff of the Party as declaring: “We advocate the very direct overthrow of the Government by way of force and violence. By picking up guns and moving against it because we recognize it as being oppressive and in recognizing that we know that the only solution to it is armed struggle [sic].” App. 62. The Government also stated that the Chief of Staff of the Party had been indicted by the grand jury on December 3, 1969, for uttering threats against the life of the President in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 871 and that various efforts had been made to secure evidence of crimes under investigation through the immunization of persons allegedly associated with the Black Panther Party.
On April 6, the District Court denied the motion to quash, Application of Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358 (ND Cal. 1970), on the ground that “every person within the jurisdiction of the government” is bound to testify upon being properly summoned. Id., at 360 (emphasis in original) . Nevertheless, the court accepted respondent’s First Amendment arguments to the extent of issuing a protective order, providing that although respondent had to divulge whatever information had been given to him for publication, he “shall not be required to reveal confidential associations, sources or information received, developed or maintained by him as a professional journalist in the course of his efforts to gather news for dissemination to the public through the press or other news media.” The court held that the First Amendment afforded respondent a privilege to refuse disclosure of such confidential information until there had been “a showing by the Government of a compelling and overriding national interest in requiring Mr. Caldwell’s testimony which cannot be served by any alternative means.” Id., at 362.
Subsequently, the term of the grand jury expired, a new grand jury was convened, and a new subpoena ad testificandum was issued and served on May 22, 1970. A new motion to quash by respondent and memorandum in opposition by the Government were filed, and, by stipulation of the parties, the motion was submitted on the prior record. The court denied the motion to quash, repeating the protective provisions in its prior order but this time directing Caldwell to appear before the grand jury pursuant to the May 22 subpoena. Respondent refused to appear before the grand jury, and the court issued an order to show cause why he should not be held in contempt. Upon his further refusal to go before the grand jury, respondent was ordered committed for contempt until such time as he complied with the court’s order or until the expiration of the term of the grand jury.
Respondent Caldwell appealed the contempt order, and the Court of Appeals reversed. Caldwell v. United States, 434 F. 2d 1081 (CA9 1970). Viewing the issue before it as whether Caldwell was required to appear before the grand jury at all, rather than the scope of permissible interrogation, the court first determined that the First Amendment provided a qualified testimonial privilege to newsmen; in its view, requiring a reporter like Caldwell to testify would deter his informants from communicating with him in the future and would cause him to censor his writings in an effort to avoid being subpoenaed. Absent compelling reasons for requiring his testimony, he was held privileged to withhold it. The court also held, for similar First Amendment reasons, that, absent some special showing of necessity by the Government, attendance by Caldwell at a secret meeting of the grand jury was something he was privileged to refuse because of the potential impact of such an appearance on the flow of news to the public. We granted the United States’ petition for certiorari. 402 U. S. 942 (1971).
II
Petitioners Branzburg and Pappas and respondent Caldwell press First Amendment claims that may be simply put: that to gather news it is often necessary to agree either not to identify the source of information published or to publish only part of the facts revealed, or both; that if the reporter is nevertheless forced to reveal these confidences to a grand jury, the source so identified and other confidential sources of other reporters will be measurably deterred from furnishing publishable information, all to the detriment of the free flow of information protected by the First Amendment. Although the newsmen in these cases do not claim an absolute privilege against official interrogation in all circumstances, they assert that the reporter should not be forced either to appear or to testify before a grand jury or at trial until and unless sufficient grounds are shown for believing that the reporter possesses information relevant to a crime the grand jury is investigating, that the information the reporter has is unavailable from other sources, and that the need for the information is sufficiently compelling to override the claimed invasion of First Amendment interests occasioned by the disclosure. Principally relied upon are prior cases emphasizing the importance of the First Amendment guarantees to individual development and to our system of representative government, decisions requiring that official action with adverse impact on First Amendment rights be justified by a public interest that is “compelling” or “paramount,” and those precedents establishing the principle that justifiable governmental goals may not be achieved by unduly broad means having an unnecessary impact on protected rights of speech, press, or association. The heart of the claim is that the burden on news gathering resulting from compelling reporters to disclose confidential information outweighs any public interest in obtaining the information.
We do not question the significance of free speech, press, or assembly to the country’s welfare. Nor is it suggested that news gathering does not qualify for First Amendment protection; without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated. But these cases involve no intrusions upon speech or assembly, no prior restraint or restriction on what the press may publish, and no express or implied command that the press publish what it prefers to withhold. No exaction or tax for the privilege of publishing, and no penalty, civil or criminal, related to the content of published material is at issue here. The use of confidential sources by the press is not forbidden or restricted; reporters remain free to seek news from any source by means within the law. No attempt is made to require the press to publish its sources of information or indiscriminately to disclose them on request.
The sole issue before us is the obligation of reporters to respond to grand jury subpoenas as other citizens do and to answer questions relevant to an investigation into the commission of crime. Citizens generally are not constitutionally immune from grand jury subpoenas; and neither the First Amendment nor any other constitutional provision protects the average citizen from disclosing to a grand jury information that he has received in confidence. The claim is, however, that reporters are exempt from these obligations because if forced to respond to subpoenas and identify their sources or disclose other confidences, their informants will refuse or be reluctant to furnish newsworthy information in the future. This asserted burden on news gathering is said to make compelled testimony from newsmen constitutionally suspect and to require a privileged position for them.
It is clear that the First Amendment does not invalidate every incidental burdening of the press that may result from the enforcement of civil or criminal statutes of general applicability. Under prior cases, otherwise valid laws serving substantial public interests may be enforced against the press as against others, despite the possible burden that may be imposed. The Court has emphasized that “[t]he publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from the application of general laws. He has no special privilege to invade the rights and liberties of others.” Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U. S. 103, 132-133 (1937). It was there held that the Associated Press, a news-gathering and disseminating organization, was not exempt from the requirements of the National Labor Relations Act. The holding was reaffirmed in Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186, 192-193 (1946), where the Court rejected the claim that applying the Fair Labor Standards Act to a newspaper publishing business would abridge the freedom of press guaranteed by the First Amendment. See also Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U. S. 178 (1946). Associated Press v. United States, 326 U. S. 1 (1945), similarly overruled assertions that the First Amendment precluded application of the Sherman Act to a news-gathering and disseminating organization. Cf. Indiana Farmer’s Guide Publishing Co. v. Prairie Farmer Publishing Co., 293 U. S. 268, 276 (1934); Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U. S. 131, 139 (1969); Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U. S. 143, 155-156 (1951). Likewise, a newspaper may be subjected to nondiscriminatory forms of general taxation. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 250 (1936); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105, 112 (1943).
The prevailing view is that the press is not free to publish with impunity everything and anything it desires to publish. Although it may deter or regulate what is said or published, the press may not circulate knowing or reckless falsehoods damaging to private reputation without subjecting itself to liability for damages, including punitive damages, or even criminal prosecution. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 279-280 (1964); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64, 74 (1964); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S. 130, 147 (1967) (opinion of Harlan, J.,); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U. S. 265, 277 (1971). A newspaper or a journalist may also be punished for contempt of court, in appropriate circumstances. Craig v. Harney, 331 U. S. 367, 377-378 (1947).
It has generally been held that the First Amendment does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to information not available to the public generally. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 16-17 (1965); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U. S. 713, 728-730 (1971), (Stewart, J., concurring); Tribune Review Publishing Co. v. Thomas, 254 F. 2d 883, 885 (CA3 1958) ; In the Matter of United Press Assns. v. Valente, 308 N. Y. 71, 77, 123 N. E. 2d 777, 778 (1954). In Zemel v. Rusk, supra, for example, the Court sustained the Government’s refusal to validate passports to Cuba even though that restriction “render[ed] less than wholly free the flow of information concerning that country.” Id., at 16. The ban on travel was held constitutional, for “[t]he right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information.” Id., at 17.
Despite the fact that news gathering may be hampered, the press is regularly excluded from grand jury proceedings, our own conferences, the meetings of other official bodies gathered in executive session, and the meetings of private organizations. Newsmen have no constitutional right of access to the scenes of crime or disaster when the general public is excluded, and they may be prohibited from attending or publishing information about trials if such restrictions are necessary to assure a defendant a fair trial before an impartial tribunal. In Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333 (1966), for example, the Court reversed a state court conviction where the trial court failed to adopt “stricter rules governing the use of the courtroom by newsmen, as Sheppard’s counsel requested,” neglected to insulate witnesses from the press, and made no “effort to control the release of leads, information, and gossip to the press by police officers, witnesses, and the counsel for both sides.” Id., at 358, 359. “[T]he trial court might well have proscribed extrajudicial statements by any lawyer, party, witness, or court official which divulged prejudicial matters.” Id., at 361. See also Estes v. Texas, 381 U. S. 532, 539-540 (1965); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U. S. 723, 726 (1963).
It is thus not surprising that the great weight of authority is that newsmen are not exempt from the normal duty of appearing before a grand jury and answering questions relevant to a criminal investigation. At common law, courts consistently refused to recognize the existence of any privilege authorizing a newsman to refuse to reveal confidential information to a grand jury. See, e. g., Ex parte Lawrence, 116 Cal. 298, 48 P. 124 (1897); Plunkett v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72, 70 S. E. 781 (1911); Clein v. State, 52 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 1950); In re Grunow, 84 N. J. L. 235, 85 A. 1011 (1913); People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff, 269 N. Y. 291, 199 N. E. 415 (1936); Joslyn v. People, 67 Colo. 297, 184 P. 375 (1919); Adams v. Associated Press, 46 F. R. D. 439 (SD Tex. 1969); Brewster v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 20 F. R. D. 416 (Mass. 1957). See generally Annot., 7 A. L. R. 3d 591 (1966). In 1958, a news gatherer asserted for the first time that the First Amendment exempted confidential information from public disclosure pursuant to a subpoena issued in a civil suit, Garland v. Torre, 259 F. 2d 545 (CA2), cert. denied, 358 U. S. 910 (1958), but the claim was denied, and this argument has been almost uniformly rejected since then, although there are occasional dicta that, in circumstances not presented here, a newsman might be excused. In re Goodfader, 45 Haw. 317, 367 P. 2d 472 (1961); In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A. 2d 181 (1963); State v. Buchanan, 250 Ore. 244, 436 P. 2d 729, cert. denied, 392 U. S. 905 (1968); Murphy v. Colorado (No. 19604, Sup. Ct. Colo.), cert. denied, 365 U. S. 843 (1961) (unreported, discussed in In re Goodfader, supra, at 366, 367 P. 2d, at 498 (Mizuha, J., dissenting)). These courts have applied the presumption against the existence of an asserted testimonial privilege, United States v. Bryan, 339 U. S. 323, 331 (1950), and have concluded that the First Amendment interest asserted by the newsman was outweighed by the general obligation of a citizen to appear before a grand jury or at trial, pursuant to a subpoena, and give what information he possesses. The opinions of the state courts in Branzburg and Pappas are typical of the prevailing view, although a few recent cases, such as Caldwell, have recognized and given effect to some form of constitutional newsman’s privilege. See State v. Knops, 49 Wis. 2d 647, 183 N. W. 2d 93 (1971) (dictum); Alioto v. Cowles Communications, Inc., C. A. No. 52150 (ND Cal. 1969); In re Grand Jury Witnesses, 322 F. Supp. 573 (ND Cal. 1970); People v. Dohrn, Crim. No. 69-3808 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct. 1970).
The prevailing constitutional view of the newsman’s privilege is very much rooted in the ancient role of the grand jury that has the dual function of determining if there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and of protecting citizens against unfounded criminal prosecutions. Grand jury proceedings are constitutionally mandated for the institution of federal criminal prosecutions for capital or other serious crimes, and “its constitutional prerogatives are rooted in long centuries of Anglo-American history.” Hannah v. Larche, 363 U. S. 420, 489-490 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result). The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.” The adoption of the grand jury “in our Constitution as the sole method for preferring charges in serious criminal cases shows the high place it held as an instrument of justice.” Costello v. United States, 350 U. S. 359, 362 (1956). Although state systems of criminal procedure differ greatly among themselves, the grand jury is similarly guaranteed by many state constitutions and plays an important role in fair and effective law enforcement in the overwhelming majority of the States. Because its task is to inquire into the existence of possible criminal conduct and to return only well-founded indictments, its investigative powers are necessarily broad. “It is a grand inquest, a body with powers of investigation and inquisition, the scope of whose inquiries is not to be limited narrowly by questions of propriety or forecasts of the probable result of the investigation, or by doubts whether any particular individual will be found properly subject to an accusation of crime.” Blair v. United States, 250 U. S. 273, 282 (1919). Hence, the grand jury’s authority to subpoena witnesses is not only historic, id., at 279-281, but essential to its task. Although the powers of the grand jury are not unlimited and are subject to the supervision of a judge, the longstanding principle that “the public . . . has a right to every man’s evidence,” except for those persons protected by a constitutional, common-law, or statutory privilege, United States v. Bryan, 339 U. S., at 331; Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421, 438 (1932) ; 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence §2192 (McNaughton rev. 1961), is particularly applicable to grand jury proceedings.
A number of States have provided newsmen a statutory privilege of varying breadth, but the majority have not done so, and none has been provided by federal statute. Until now the only testimonial privilege for unofficial witnesses that is rooted in the Federal Constitution is the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. We are asked to create another by interpreting the First Amendment to grant newsmen a testimonial privilege that other citizens do not enjoy. This we decline to do. Fair and effective law enforcement aimed at providing security for the person and property of the individual is a fundamental function of government, and the grand jury plays an important, constitutionally mandated role in this process. On the records now before us, we perceive no basis for holding that the public interest in law enforcement and in ensuring effective grand jury proceedings is insufficient to override the consequential, but uncertain, burden on news gathering that is said to result from insisting that reporters, like other citizens, respond to relevant questions put to them in the course of a valid grand jury-investigation or criminal trial.
This conclusion itself involves no restraint on what newspapers may publish or on the type or quality of information reporters may seek to acquire, nor does it threaten the vast bulk of confidential relationships between reporters and their sources. Grand juries address themselves to the issues of whether crimes have been committed and who committed them. Only where news sources themselves are implicated) in crime or possess information relevant to the grand jury’s task need they or the reporter be concerned about grand jury subpoenas. Nothing before us indicates that a large number or percentage of all confidential news sources falls into either category and would in any way be deterred by our holding that the Constitution does not, as it never has, exempt the newsman from performing the citizen’s normal duty of appearing and furnishing information relevant to the grand jury’s task.
The preference for anonymity of those confidential informants involved in actual criminal conduct is presumably a product of their desire to escape criminal prosecution, and this preference, while understandable, is hardly deserving of constitutional protection. It would be frivolous to assert — and no one does in these cases — that the First Amendment, in the interest of securing news or otherwise, confers a license on either the reporter or his news sources to violate valid criminal laws. Although stealing documents or private wiretapping could provide newsworthy information, neither reporter nor source is immune from conviction for such conduct, whatever the impact on the flow of news. Neither is immune, on First Amendment grounds, from testifying against the other, before the grand jury or at a criminal trial. The Amendment does not reach so far as to override the interest of the public in ensuring that neither reporter nor source is invading the rights of other citizens through reprehensible conduct forbidden to all other persons. To assert the contrary-proposition
“is to answer it, since it involves in its very statement the contention that the freedom of the press is the freedom to do wrong with impunity and implies the right to frustrate and defeat the discharge of those governmental duties upon the performance of which the freedom of all, including that of the press, depends. ... It suffices to say that, however complete is the right of the press to state public things and discuss them, that right, as every other right enjoyed in human society, is subject to the restraints which separate right from wrong-doing.” Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U. S. 402, 419-420 (1918).
Thus, we cannot seriously entertain the notion that the First Amendment protects a newsman’s agreement to conceal the criminal conduct of his source, or evidence thereof, on the theory that it is better to write about crime than to do something about it. Insofar as any reporter in these cases undertook not to reveal or testify about the crime he witnessed, his claim of privilege under the First Amendment presents no substantial question. The crimes of news sources are no less reprehensible and threatening to the public interest when witnessed by a reporter than when they are not.
There remain those situations where a source is not engaged in criminal conduct but has information suggesting illegal conduct by others. Newsmen frequently receive information from such sources pursuant to a tacit or express agreement to withhold the source’s name and suppress any information that the source wishes not published. Such informants presumably desire anonymity in order to avoid being entangled as a witness in a criminal trial or grand jury investigation. They may fear that disclosure will threaten their job security or personal safety or that it will simply result in dishonor or embarrassment.
The argument that the flow of news will be diminished by compelling reporters to aid the grand jury in a criminal investigation is not irrational, nor are the records before us silent on the matter. But we remain unclear how often and to what extent informers are actually deterred from furnishing information when newsmen are forced to testify before a grand jury. The available data indicate that some newsmen rely a great deal on confidential sources and that some informants are particularly sensitive to the threat of exposure and may be silenced if it is held by this Court that, ordinarily, newsmen must testify pursuant to subpoenas, but the evidence fails to demonstrate that there would be a significant constriction of the flow of news to the public if this Court reaffirms the prior common-law and constitutional rule regarding the testimonial obligations of newsmen. Estimates of the inhibiting effect of such subpoenas on the willingness of informants to make disclosures to newsmen are widely divergent and to a great extent speculative. It would be difficult to canvass the views of the informants themselves; surveys of reporters on this topic are chiefly opinions of predicted informant behavior and must be viewed in the light of the professional self-interest of the interviewees. Reliance by the press on confidential informants does not mean that all such sources will in fact dry up because of the later possible appearance of the newsman before a grand jury. The reporter may never be called and if he objects to testifying, the prosecution may not insist. Also, the relationship of many informants to the press is a symbiotic one which is unlikely to be greatly inhibited by the threat of subpoena: quite often, such informants are members of a minority political or cultural group that relies heavily on the media to propagate its views, publicize its aims, and magnify its exposure to the public. Moreover, grand juries characteristically conduct secret proceedings, and law enforcement officers are themselves experienced in dealing with informers, and have their own methods for protecting them without interference with the effective administration of justice. There is little before us indicating that informants whose interest in avoiding exposure is that it may threaten job security, personal safety, or peace of mind, would in fact be in a worse position, or would think they would be, if they risked placing their trust in public officials as well as reporters. We doubt if the informer who prefers anonymity but is sincerely interested in furnishing evidence of crime will always or very often be deterred by the prospect of dealing with those public authorities characteristically charged with the duty to protect the public interest as well as his.
Accepting the fact, however, that an undetermined number of informants not themselves implicated in crime will nevertheless, for whatever reason, refuse to talk to newsmen if they fear identification by a reporter in an official investigation, we cannot accept the argument that the public interest in possible future news about crime from undisclosed, unverified sources must take precedence over the public interest in pursuing and prosecuting those crimes reported to the press by informants and in thus deterring the commission of such crimes in the future.
We note first that the privilege claimed is that of the reporter, not the informant, and that if the authorities independently identify the informant, neither his own reluctance to testify nor the objection of the newsman would shield him from grand jury inquiry, whatever the impact on the flow of news or on his future usefulness as a secret source of information. More important, it is obvious that agreements to conceal information relevant to commission of crime have very little to recommend them from the standpoint of public policy. Historically, the common law recognized a duty to raise the “hue and cry” and report felonies to the authorities. Misprision of a felony — that is, the concealment of a felony “which a man knows, but never assented to . . . [so as to become] either principal or accessory,” 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *121, was often said to be a common-law crime. The first Congress passed a statute, 1 Stat. 113, § 6, as amended, 35 Stat. 1114, § 146, 62 Stat. 684, which is still in effect, defining a federal crime of misprision:
“Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable by a court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make known the same to some judge or other person in civil or military authority under the United States, shall be [guilty of misprision].” 18 U. S. C. § 4.
It is apparent from this statute, as well as from our history and that of England, that concealment of crime and agreements to do so are not looked upon with favor. Such conduct deserves no encomium, and we decline now to afford it First Amendment protection by denigrating the duty of a citizen, whether reporter or informer, to respond to grand jury subpoena and answer relevant questions put to him.
Of course, the press has the right to abide by its agreement not to publish all the information it has, but the right to withhold news is not equivalent to a First Amendment exemption from the ordinary duty of all other citizens to furnish relevant information to a grand jury performing an important public function. Private restraints on the flow of information are not so favored by the First Amendment that they override all other public interests. As Mr. Justice Black declared in another context, “[fjreedom of the press from governmental interference under the First Amendment does not sanction repression of that freedom by private interests.” Associated Press v. United States, 326 U. S., at 20.
Neither are we now convinced that a virtually impenetrable constitutional shield, beyond legislative or judicial control, should be forged to protect a private system of informers operated by the press to report on criminal conduct, a system that would be unaccountable to the public, would pose a threat to the citizen’s justifiable expectations of privacy, and would equally protect well-intentioned informants and those who for pay or otherwise betray their trust to their employer or associates. The public through its elected and appointed law enforcement officers regularly utilizes informers, and in proper circumstances may assert a privilege against disclosing the identity of these informers. But
“[t]he purpose of the privilege is the furtherance and protection of the public interest in effective law enforcement. The privilege recognizes the obligation of citizens to communicate their knowledge of the commission of crimes to law-enforcement officials and, by preserving their anonymity, encourages them to perform that obligation.” Roviaro v. United States, 353 U. S. 53, 59 (1957).
Such informers enjoy no constitutional protection. Their testimony is available to the public when desired by grand juries or at criminal trials; their identity cannot be concealed from the defendant when it is critical to his case. Id., at 60-61, 62; McCray v. Illinois, 386 U. S. 300, 310 (1967); Smith v. Illinois, 390 U. S. 129, 131 (1968); Alford v. United States, 282 U. S. 687, 693 (1931). Clearly, this system is not impervious to control by the judiciary and the decision whether to unmask an informer or to continue to profit by his anonymity is in public, not private, hands. We think that it should remain there and that public authorities should retain the options of either insisting on the informer’s testimony relevant to the prosecution of crime or of seeking the benefit of further information that his exposure might prevent.
We are admonished that refusal to provide a First Amendment reporter’s privilege will undermine the freedom of the press to collect and disseminate news. But this is not the lesson history teaches us. As noted previously, the common law recognized no such privilege, and the constitutional argument was not even asserted until 1958. From the beginning of our country the press has operated without constitutional protection for press informants, and the press has flourished. The existing constitutional rules have not been a serious obstacle to either the development or retention of confidential news sources by the press.
It is said that currently press subpoenas have multiplied, that mutual distrust and tension between press and officialdom have increased, that reporting styles have changed, and that there is now more need for confidential sources, particularly where the press seeks news about minority cultural and political groups or dissident organizations suspicious of the law and public officials. These developments, even if true, are treacherous grounds for a far-reaching interpretation of the First Amendment fastening a nationwide rule on courts, grand juries, and prosecuting officials everywhere. The obligation to testify in response to grand jury subpoenas will not threaten these sources not involved with criminal conduct and without information relevant to grand jury investigations, and we cannot hold that the Constitution places the sources in these two categories either above the law or beyond its reach.
The argument for such a constitutional privilege rests heavily on those cases holding that the infringement of protected First Amendment rights must be no broader than necessary to achieve a permissible governmental purpose, see cases cited at n. 19, supra. We do not deal, however, with a governmental institution that has abused its proper function, as a legislative committee does when it “expose [s] for the sake of exposure.” Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178, 200 (1957). Nothing in the record indicates that these grand juries were “prob[ing] at will and without relation to existing need.” DeGregory v. Attorney General of New Hampshire, 383 U. S. 825, 829 (1966). Nor did the grand juries attempt to invade protected First Amendment rights by forcing wholesale disclosure of names and organizational affiliations for a purpose that was not germane to the determination of whether crime has been committed, cf. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449 (1958); NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 (1963); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516 (1960), and the characteristic secrecy of grand jury proceedings is a further protection against the undue invasion of such rights. See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 6 (e). The investigative power of the grand jury is necessarily broad if its public responsibility is to be adequately discharged. Costello v. United States, 350 U. S., at 364.
The requirements of those cases, see n. 18, supra, which hold that a State’s interest must be “compelling” or “paramount” to justify even an indirect burden on First Amendment rights, are also met here. As we have indicated, the investigation of crime by the grand jury implements a fundamental governmental role of securing the safety of the person and property of the citizen, and it appears to us that calling reporters to give testimony in the manner and for the reasons that other citizens are called “bears a reasonable relationship to the achievement of the governmental purpose asserted as its justification.” Bates v. Little Rock, supra, at 525. If the test is. that the government “convincingly show a substantial relation between the information sought and a subject of overriding and compelling state interest,” Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U. S. 539, 546 (1963), it is quite apparent (1) that the State has the necessary interest in extirpating the traffic in illegal drugs, in forestalling assassination attempts on the President, and in preventing the community from being disrupted by violent disorders endangering both persons and property; and (2) that, based on the stories Branzburg and Caldwell wrote and Pappas’ admitted conduct, the grand jury called these reporters as they would others — because it was likely that they could supply information to help the government determine whether illegal conduct had occurred and, if it had, whether there was sufficient evidence to return an indictment.
Similar considerations dispose of the reporters’ claims that preliminary to requiring their grand jury appearance, the State must show that a crime has been committed and that they possess relevant information not available from other sources, for only the grand jury itself can make this determination. The role of the grand jury as an important instrument of effective law enforcement necessarily includes an investigatory function with respect to determining whether a crime has been committed and who committed it. To this end it must call witnesses, in the manner best suited to perform its task. “When the grand jury is performing its investigatory function into a general problem area . . . society’s interest is best served by a thorough and extensive investigation.” Wood v. Georgia, 370 U. S. 375, 392 (1962). A grand jury investigation “is not fully carried out until every available clue has been run down and all witnesses examined in every proper way to find if a crime has been committed.” United States v. Stone, 429 F. 2d 138, 140 (CA2 1970). Such an investigation may be triggered by tips, rumors, evidence proffered by the prosecutor, or the personal knowledge of the grand jurors. Costello v. United States, 350 U. S., at 362. It is only after the grand jury has examined the evidence that a determination of whether the proceeding will result in an indictment can be made.
“It is impossible to conceive that in such cases the examination of witnesses must be stopped until a basis is laid by an indictment formally preferred, when the very object of the examination is to ascertain who shall be indicted.” Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 65 (1906).
See also Hendricks v. United States, 223 U. S. 178 (1912) ; Blair v. United States, 250 U. S., at 282-283. We see no reason to hold that these reporters, any more than other citizens, should be excused from furnishing information that may help the grand jury in arriving at its initial determinations.
The privilege claimed here is conditional, not absolute; given the suggested preliminary showings and compelling need, the reporter would be required to testify. Presumably, such a rule would reduce the instances in which reporters could be required to appear, but predicting in advance when and in what circumstances they could be compelled to do so would be difficult. Such a rule would also have implications for the issuance of compulsory process to reporters at civil and criminal trials and at legislative hearings. If newsmen’s confidential sources are as sensitive as they are claimed to be, the prospect of being unmasked whenever a judge determines the situation justifies it is hardly a satisfactory solution to the problem. For them, it would appear that only an absolute privilege would suffice.
We are unwilling to embark the judiciary on a long and difficult journey to such an uncertain destination. The administration of a constitutional newsman’s privilege would present practical and conceptual difficulties of a high order. Sooner or later, it would be necessary to define those categories of newsmen who qualified for the privilege, a questionable procedure in light of the traditional doctrine that liberty of the press is the right of the lonely pamphleteer who uses carbon paper or a mimeograph just as much as of the large metropolitan publisher who utilizes the latest photocomposition methods. Cf. In re Grand Jury Witnesses, 322 F. Supp. 573, 574 (ND Cal. 1970). Freedom of the press is a “fundamental personal right” which “is not confined to newspapers and periodicals. It necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets. . . . The press in its historic connotation comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion.” Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 450, 452 (1938). See also Mills v. Alabama, 384 U. S. 214, 219 (1966); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105, 111 (1943). The informative function asserted by representatives of the organized press in the present cases is also performed by lecturers, political pollsters, novelists, academic researchers, and dramatists. Almost any author may quite accurately assert that he is contributing to the flow of information to the public, that he relies on confidential sources of information, and that these sources will be silenced if he is forced to make disclosures before a grand jury.
In each instance where a reporter is subpoenaed to testify, the courts would also be embroiled in preliminary factual and legal determinations with respect to whether the proper predicate had been laid for the reporter’s appearance: Is there probable cause to believe a crime has been committed? Is it likely that the reporter has useful information gained in confidence? Could the grand jury obtain the information elsewhere? Is the official interest sufficient to outweigh the claimed privilege?
Thus, in the end, by considering whether enforcement of a particular law served a “compelling” governmental interest, the courts would be inextricably involved in distinguishing between the value of enforcing different criminal laws. By requiring testimony from a reporter in investigations involving some crimes but not in others, they would be making a value judgment that a legislature had declined to make, since in each case the criminal law involved would represent a considered legislative judgment, not constitutionally suspect, of what conduct is liable to criminal prosecution. The task of judges, like other officials outside the legislative branch, is not to make the law but to uphold it in accordance with their oaths.
At the federal level, Congress has freedom to determine whether a statutory newsman’s privilege is necessary and desirable and to fashion standards and rules as narrow or broad as deemed necessary to deal with the evil discerned and, equally important, to refashion those rules as experience from time to time may dictate. There is also merit in leaving state legislatures free, within First Amendment limits, to fashion their own standards in light of the conditions and problems with respect to the relations between law enforcement officials and press in their own areas. It goes without saying, of course, that we are powerless to bar state courts from responding in their own way and construing their own constitutions so as to recognize a newsman’s privilege, either qualified or absolute.
In addition, there is much force in the pragmatic view that the press has at its disposal powerful mechanisms of communication and is far from helpless to protect itself from harassment or substantial harm. Furthermore, if what the newsmen urged in these cases is true — that law enforcement cannot hope to gain and may suffer from subpoenaing newsmen before grand juries— prosecutors will be loath to risk so much for so little. Thus, at the federal level the Attorney General has already fashioned a set of rules for federal officials in connection with subpoenaing members of the press to testify before grand juries or at criminal trials. These rules are a major step in the direction the reporters herein desire to move. They may prove wholly sufficient to resolve the bulk of disagreements and controversies between press and federal officials.
Finally, as we have earlier indicated, news gathering is not without its First Amendment protections, and grand jury investigations if instituted or conducted other than in good faith, would pose wholly different issues for resolution under the First Amendment. Official harassment of the press undertaken not for purposes of law enforcement but to disrupt a reporter’s relationship with his news sources would have no justification. Grand juries are subject to judicial control and subpoenas to motions to quash. We do not expect courts will forget that grand juries must operate within the limits of the First Amendment as well as the Fifth.
Ill
We turn, therefore, to the disposition of the cases before us. From what we have said, it necessarily follows that the decision in United States v. Caldwell, No. 70-57, must be reversed. If there is no First Amendment privilege to refuse to answer the relevant and material questions asked during a good-faith grand jury investigation, then it is a fortiori true that there is no privilege to refuse to appear before such a grand jury until the Government demonstrates some “compelling need” for a newsman’s testimony. Other issues were urged upon us, but since they were not passed upon by the Court of Appeals, we decline to address them in the first instance.
The decisions in No. 70-85, Branzburg v. Hayes and Branzburg v. Meigs, must be affirmed. Here, petitioner refused to answer questions that directly related to criminal conduct that he had observed and written about. The Kentucky Court of Appeals noted that marihuana is defined as a narcotic drug by statute, Ky. Rev. Stat. § 218.010 (14) (1962), and that unlicensed possession or compounding of it is a felony punishable by both fine and imprisonment. Ky. Rev. Stat. §218.210 (1962). It held that petitioner “saw the commission of the statutory felonies of unlawful possession of marijuana and the unlawful conversion of it into hashish,” in Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S. W. 2d, at 346. Petitioner may be presumed to have observed similar violations of the state narcotics laws during the research he did for the story that forms the basis of the subpoena in Branzburg v. Meigs. In both cases, if what petitioner wrote was true, he had direct information to provide the grand jury-concerning the commission of serious crimes.
The only question presented at the present time in In re Pappas, No. 70-94, is whether petitioner Pappas must appear before the grand jury to testify pursuant to subpoena. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court characterized the record in this case as “meager,” and it is not clear what petitioner will be asked by the grand jury. It is not even clear that he will be asked to divulge information received in confidence. We affirm the decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and hold that petitioner must appear before the grand jury to answer the questions put to him, subject, of course, to the supervision of the presiding judge as to “the propriety, purposes, and scope of the grand jury inquiry and the pertinence of the probable testimony.” 358 Mass., at 614, 266 N. E. 2d, at 303-304.
So ordered.
The article contained the following paragraph: “T don’t know why I’m letting you do this story,’ [one informant] said quietly. ‘To make the nares (narcotics detectives) mad, I guess. That’s the main reason.’ However, Larry and his partner asked for and received a promise that their names would be changed.” App. 3-4.
The Foreman of the grand jury reported that petitioner Branz-burg had refused to answer the following two questions: “^‡1. On November 12, or 13, 1969, who was the person or persons you observed in possession of Marijuana, about which you wrote an article in the Courier-Journal on November 15, 1969? #2. On November 12, or 13, 1969, who was the person or persons you observed compounding Marijuana, producing same to a compound known as Hashish?” App. 6.
Judge J. Miles Pound. The respondent in this case, Hon. John P. Hayes, is the successor of Judge Pound.
Ky. Rev. Stat. §421.100 provides:
“No person shall be compelled to disclose in any legal proceeding or trial before any court, or before any grand or petit jury, or before the presiding officer of any tribunal, or his agent or agents, or before the General Assembly, or any committee thereof, or before any city or county legislative body, or any committee thereof, or elsewhere, the source of any information procured or obtained by him, and published in a newspaper or by a radio or television broadcasting station by which he is engaged or employed, or with which he is connected.”
Petitioner’s Motion to Quash argued:
“If Mr. Branzburg were required to disclose these confidences to the Grand Jury, or any other person, he would thereby destroy the relationship of trust which he presently enjoys with those in the drug culture. They would refuse to speak to him; they would become even more reluctant than they are now to speak to any newsman; and the news media would thereby be vitally hampered in their ability to cover the views and activities of those involved in the drug culture.
“The inevitable effect of the subpoena issued to Mr. Branz-burg, if it not be quashed by this Court, will be to suppress vital First Amendment freedoms of Mr. Branzburg, of the Courier-Journal, of the news media, and of those involved in the drug culture by driving a wedge of distrust and silence between the news media and the drug culture. This Court should not sanction a use of its process entailing so drastic an incursion upon First Amendment freedoms in the absence of compelling Commonwealth interest in requiring Mr. Branzburg’s appearance before the Grand Jury. It is insufficient merely to protect Mr. Branzburg’s right to silence after he appears before the Grand Jury. This Court should totally excuse Mr. Branzburg from responding to the subpoena and even entering the Grand Jury room. Once Mr. Branzburg is required to go behind the closed doors of the Grand Jury room, his effectiveness as a reporter in these areas is totally destroyed. The secrecy that surrounds Grand Jury testimony necessarily introduces uncertainties in the minds of those who fear a betrayal of their confidences.” App. 43-44.
After the Kentucky Court of Appeals’ decision in Branzburg v. Meigs was announced, petitioner filed a rehearing motion in Branzburg v. Pound suggesting that the court had not passed upon his First Amendment argument and calling to the court’s attention the recent Ninth Circuit decision in Caldwell v. United States, 434 F. 2d 1081 (1970). On Jan. 22, 1971, the court denied petitioner’s motion and filed an amended opinion in the case, adding a footnote, 461 S. W. 2d 345, 346 n. 1, to indicate that petitioner had abandoned his First Amendment argument and elected to rely wholly on Ky. Rev. Stat. § 421.100 when he filed a Supplemental Memorandum before oral argument. In his Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus, petitioner had clearly relied on the First Amendment, and he had filed his Supplemental Memorandum in response to the State’s Memorandum in Opposition to the granting of the writs. As its title indicates, this Memorandum was complementary to petitioner’s earlier Petition, and it dealt primarily with the State’s construction of the phrase “source of any information” in Ky. Rev. Stat. § 421.100. The passage that the Kentucky Court of Appeals cited to indicate abandonment of petitioner’s First Amendment claim is as follows:
“Thus, the controversy continues as to whether a newsman’s source of information should be privileged. However, that question is not before the Court in this case. The Legislature of Kentucky has settled the issue, having decided that a newsman’s source of information is to be privileged. Because of this there is no point in citing Professor Wigmore and other authorities who speak against the grant of such a privilege. The question has been many times debated, and the Legislature has spoken. The only question before the Court is the construction of the term ‘source of information’ as it was intended by the Legislature.”
Though the passage itself is somewhat unclear, the surrounding discussion indicates that petitioner was asserting here that the question of whether a common-law privilege should be recognized was irrelevant since the legislature had already enacted a statute. In his earlier discussion, petitioner had analyzed certain cases in which the First Amendment argument was made but indicated that it was not necessary to reach this question if the statutory phrase “source of any information” were interpreted expansively. We do not interpret this discussion as indicating that petitioner was abandoning his First Amendment claim if the Kentucky Court of Appeals did not agree with his statutory interpretation argument, and we hold that the constitutional question in Branzburg v. Pound was properly preserved for review.
Petitioner’s news films of this event were made available to the Bristol County District Attorney. App. 4.
The case was reported by the superior court directly to the Supreme Judicial Court for an interlocutory ruling under Mass. Gen. Laws, c. 278, § 30A and Mass. Gen. Laws, c. 231, § 111 (1959). The Supreme Judicial Court’s decision appears at 358 Mass. 604, 266 N. E. 2d 297 (1971).
“We do not have before us the text of any specific questions which Pappas has refused to answer before the grand jury, or any petition to hold him for contempt for his refusal. We have only general statements concerning (a) the inquiries of the grand jury, and (b) the materiality of the testimony sought from Pappas. The record does not show the expected nature of his testimony or what likelihood there is of being able to obtain that testimony from persons other than news gatherers.” 358 Mass., at 606-607, 266 N. E. 2d, at 299 (footnote omitted).
The court expressly declined to consider, however, appearances of newsmen before legislative or administrative bodies. Id., at 612 n. 10, 266 N. E. 2d, at 303 n. 10.
The court noted that “a presiding judge may consider in his discretion” the argument that the use of newsmen as witnesses is likely to result in unnecessary or burdensome use of their work product, id., at 614 n. 13, 266 N. E. 2d, at 304 n. 13, and cautioned that: “We do not suggest that a general investigation of mere political or group association of persons, without substantial relation to criminal events, may not be viewed by a judge in a somewhat different manner from an investigation of particular criminal events concerning which a newsman may have knowledge.” Id., at 614 n. 14, 266 N. E. 2d, at 304 n. 14.
The subpoena ordered production of “[n]otes and tape recordings of interviews covering the period from January 1, 1969, to date, reflecting statements made for publication by offlcers and spokesmen for the Black Panther Party concerning the aims and purposes of said organization and the activities of said organization, its officers, staff, personnel, and members, including specifically but not limited to interviews given by Da,vid Hilliard and Raymond 'Masai’ Hewitt.” App. 20.
The New York Times was granted standing to intervene as a party on the motion to quash the subpoenas. Application of Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358, 359 (ND Cal, 1970). It did not file an appeal from the District Court’s contempt citation, and it did not seek certiorari here. It has filed an amicus curiae brief, however.
Respondent appealed from the District Court’s April 6 denial of his motion to quash on April 17, 1970, and the Government moved to dismiss that appeal on the ground that the order was interlocutory. On May 12, 1970, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal without opinion.
The Government did not file a cross-appeal and did not challenge the validity of the District Court protective order in the Court of Appeals.
The petition presented a single question: “Whether a newspaper reporter who has published articles about an organization can, under the First Amendment, properly refuse to appear before a grand jury investigating possible crimes by members of that organization who have been quoted in the published articles.”
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S. 130, 145 (1967) (opinion of Harlan, J.); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 270 (1964); Talley v. California, 362 U. S. 60, 64-65 (1960); Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 263 (1941); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 250 (1936); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 722 (1931).
NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 439 (1963); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 530 (1945); DeGregory v. Attorney General of New Hampshire, 383 U. S. 825, 829 (1966); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516, 524 (1960); Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 161 (1939); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449, 464 (1958).
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51, 56 (1965); NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U. S. 288, 307 (1964); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U. S. 141, 147 (1943); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U. S. 11, 18 (1966).
There has been a great deal of writing in recent years on the existence of a newsman’s constitutional right of nondisclosure of confidential information. See, e. g., Beaver, The Newsman’s Code, The Claim of Privilege and Everyman’s Right to Evidence, 47 Ore. L. Rev. 243 (1968); Guest & Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64 Nw. U. L. Rev. 18 (1969); Note, Reporters and Their Sources: The Constitutional Right to a Confidential Relationship, 80 Yale L. J. 317 (1970); Comment, The Newsman’s Privilege: Government Investigations, Criminal Prosecutions and Private Litigation, 58 Calif. L. Rev. 1198 (1970); Note, The Right of the Press to Gather Information, 71 Col. L. Rev. 838 (1971); Nelson, The Newsmen’s Privilege Against Disclosure of Confidential Sources and Information, 24 Yand. L. Rev. 667 (1971).
“In general, then, the mere fact that a communication was made in express confidence, or in the implied confidence of a confidential relation, does not create a privilege.
“. . . No pledge of privacy nor oath of secrecy can avail against demand for the truth in a court of justice.” 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence §2286 (McNaughton rev. 1961). This was not always the rule at common law, however. In 17th century England, the obligations of honor among gentlemen were occasionally recognized as privileging from compulsory disclosure information obtained in exchange for a promise of confidence. See Bulstrod v. Letchmere, 2 Freem. 6, 22 Eng. Rep. 1019 (1676); Lord Grey’s Trial, 9 How. St. Tr. 127 (1682).
“There are few restrictions on action which could not be clothed by ingenious argument in the garb of decreased data flow. For example, the prohibition of unauthorized entry into the White House diminishes the citizen’s opportunities to gather information he might find relevant to his opinion of the way the country is being run, but that does not make entry into the White House a First Amendment right.” 381 U. S., at 16-17.
“Historically, [the grand jury] has been regarded as a primary security to the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive persecution; it serves the invaluable function in our society of standing between the accuser and the accused ... to determine whether a charge is founded upon reason or was dictated by an intimidating power or by malice and personal ill will.” Wood v. Georgia, 370 U. S. 375, 390 (1962) (footnote omitted).
It has been held that “infamous” punishments include confinement at hard labor, United States v. Moreland, 258 U. S. 433 (1922); incarceration in a penitentiary, Mackin v. United States, 117 U. S. 348 (1886); and imprisonment for more than a year, Barkman v. Sanford, 162 F. 2d 592 (CA5), cert. denied, 332 U. S. 816 (1947). Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 7 (a) has codified these holdings: “An offense which may be punished by death shall be prosecuted by indictment. An offense which may be punished by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year or at hard labor shall be prosecuted by indictment or, if indictment is waived, it may be prosecuted by information. Any other offense may be prosecuted by indictment or by information.”
Although indictment by grand jury is not part of the due process of law guaranteed to state criminal defendants by the Fourteenth Amendment, Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516 (1884), a recent study reveals that 32 States require that certain kinds of criminal prosecutions be initiated by indictment. Spain, The Grand Jury, Past and Present: A Survey, 2 Am. Crim. L. Q. 119, 126-142 (1964). In the 18 States in which the prosecutor may proceed by information, the grand jury is retained as an alternative means of invoking the criminal process and as an investigative tool. Ibid.
Jeremy Bentham vividly illustrated this maxim:
“Are men of the first rank and consideration — are men high in office-men whose time is not less valuable to the public than to themselves — are such men to be forced to quit their business, their functions, and what is more than all, their pleasure, at the beck of every idle or malicious adversary, to dance attendance upon every petty cause? Yes, as far as it is necessary, they and everybody. . . . Were the Prince of Wales, the Archbishop of Canterbury, and the Lord High Chancellor, to be passing by in the same coach, while a chimney-sweeper and a barrow-woman were in dispute about a halfpennyworth of apples, and the chimney-sweeper or the barrow-woman were to think proper to call upon them for their evidence, could they refuse it? No, most certainly.” 4 The Works of Jeremy Bentham 320-321 (J. Bowring ed. 1843).
In United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 34 (No. 14,692d) (CC Va. 1807), Chief Justice Marshall, sitting on Circuit, opined that in proper circumstances a subpoena could be issued to the President of the United States.
Thus far, 17 States have provided some type of statutory protection to a newsman’s confidential sources:
Ala. Code, Tit. 7, § 370 (1960); Alaska Stat. § 09.25.150 (Supp. 1971); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-2237 (Supp. 1971-1972); Ark. Stat. Ann. §43-917 (1964); Cal. Evid. Code § 1070 (Supp. 1972); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 2-1733 (1968); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 421.100 (1962); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§45:1451-45:1454 (Supp. 1972); Md. Ann. Code, Art. 35, §2 (1971); Mich. Comp. Laws § 767.5a (Supp. 1956), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.945 (1) (1954); Mont. Rev. Codes Aim. §93-601-2 (1964); Nev. Rev. Stat. §49.275 (1971); N. J. Rev. Stat. §§ 2A:84A-21, 2A:84A-29 (Supp. 1972-1973); N. M. Stat. Ann. §20-1-12.1 (1970); N. Y. Civ. Rights Law § 79-h (Supp. 1971-1972); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2739.12 (1954); Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 28, § 330 (Supp. 1972-1973).
Such legislation has been introduced, however. See, e. g., S. 1311, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S. 3552, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); H. R. 16328, H. R. 16704, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); S. 1851, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); H. R. 8519, H. R. 7787, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); S. 965, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); H. R. 355, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). For a general analysis of proposed congressional legislation, see Staff of Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., The Newsman’s Privilege (Comm. Print 1966).
The creation of new testimonial privileges has been met with disfavor by commentators since such privileges obstruct the search for truth. Wigmore condemns such privileges as “so many deroga-tions from a positive general rule [that everyone is obligated to testify when properly summoned]” and as “obstacle[s] to the administration of justice.” 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2192 (McNaughton rev. 1961). His criticism that “all privileges of exemption from this duty are exceptional, and are therefore to be discountenanced,” id., at §2192, p. 73 (emphasis in original) has been frequently echoed. Morgan, Foreword, Model Code of Evidence 22-30 (1942) ; 2 Z. Chafee, Government and Mass Communications 496-497 (1947); Report of ABA Committee on Improvements in the Law of Evidence, 63 A. B. A. Reports 595 (1938); C. McCormick, Evidence 159 (2d ed. 1972); Chafee, Privileged Communications: Is Justice Served or Obstructed by Closing the Doctor’s Mouth on the Witness Stand?, 52 Yale L. J. 607 (1943); Ladd, Privileges, 1969 Law & the Social Order 555, 556; 58 Am. Jur., Witnesses §546 (1948); 97 C. J. S., Witnesses § 259 (1957); McMann v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 87 F. 2d 377, 378 (CA2 1937) (L. Hand, J.). Neither the ALI’s Model Code of Evidence (1942), the Uniform Rules of Evidence of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (1953), nor the Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates (rev. ed. 1971) has included a newsman’s privilege.
The holding in this case involved a construction of the Contempt of Court Act of 1831, 4 Stat. 487, which permitted summary trial of contempts “so near [to the court] as to obstruct the administration of justice.” The Court held that the Act required only that the conduct have a “direct tendency to prevent and obstruct the discharge of judicial duty.” 247 U. S., at 419. This view was overruled and the Act given a much narrower reading in Nye v. United States, 313 U. S. 33, 47-52 (1941). See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 194, 205-206 (1968).
Respondent Caldwell attached a number of affidavits from prominent newsmen to his initial motion to quash, which detail the experiences of such journalists after they have been subpoenaed. Appendix to No. 70-57, pp. 22-61.
Cf., e. g., the results of a study conducted by Guest & Stanzler, which appears as an appendix to their article, supra, n. 20. A number of editors of daily newspapers of varying circulation were asked the question, “Excluding one- or two-sentence gossip items, on the average how many stories based on information received in confidence are published in your paper each year? Very rough estimate.” Answers varied significantly, e. g., “Virtually innumerable,” Tucson Daily Citizen (41,969 daily circ.), “Too many to remember,” Los Angeles Herald-Examiner (718,221 daily circ.), “Occasionally,” Denver Post (252,084 daily circ.), “Rarely,” Cleveland Plain Dealer (370,499 daily circ.), “Very rare, some politics,” Oregon Journal (146,403 daily circ.). This study did not purport to measure the extent of deterrence of informants caused by subpoenas to the press.
In his Press Subpoenas: An Empirical and Legal Analysis, Study Report of the Reporters’ Committee on Freedom of the Press 6-12, Prof. Vince Blasi discusses these methodological problems. Prof. Blasi’s survey found that slightly more than half of the 975 reporters questioned said that they relied on regular confidential sources for at least 10% of their stories. Id., at 21. Of this group of reporters, only 8% were able to say with some certainty that their professional functioning had been adversely affected by the threat of subpoena; another 11% were not certain whether or not they had been adversely affected. Id., at 53.
See Statute of Westminster First, 3 Edw. 1, e. 9, p. 43 (1275) ; Statute of Westminster Second, 13 Edw. 1, c. 6, pp. 114 — 115 (1285) ; Sheriffs Act of 1887, 50 & 51 Viet., c. 55, §8(1); 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *293-295; 2 W. Holdsworth, History of English Law 80-81, 101-102 (3d ed. 1927); 4 id., at 521-522.
See, e. g., Scrope’s Case, referred to in 3 Coke’s Institute 36; Rex v. Cowper, 5 Mod. 206, 87 Eng. Rep. 611 (1696); Proceedings under a Special Commission for the County of York, 31 How. St. Tr. 965, 969 (1813); Sykes v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1961] 3 W. L. R. 371. But see Glazebrook, Misprision of Felony — Shadow or Phantom?, 8 Am. J. Legal Hist. 189 (1964). See also Act 5 & 6 Edw. 6, c. 11 (1552).
This statute has been construed, however, to require both knowledge of a crime and some affirmative act of concealment or participation. Bratton v. United States, 73 F. 2d 795 (CA10 1934); United States v. Farrar, 38 F. 2d 515, 516 (Mass.), aff’d on other grounds, 281 U. S. 624 (1930); United States v. Norman, 391 F. 2d 212 (CA6), cert. denied, 390 U. S. 1014 (1968); Lancey v. United States, 356 F. 2d 407 (CA9), cert. denied, 385 U. S. 922 (1966). Cf. Mar-bury v. Brooks, 7 Wheat. 556, 575 (1822) (Marshall, C. J.).
Though the constitutional argument for a newsman’s privilege has been put forward very recently, newsmen have contended for a number of years that such a privilege was desirable. See, e. g., Sie-bert & Ryniker, Press Winning Fight to Guard Sources, Editor & Publisher, Sept. 1, 1934, pp. 9, 36-37; G. Bird & F. Merwin, The Press and Society 592 (1971). The first newsman’s privilege statute was enacted by Maryland in 1896, and currently is codified as Md. Ann. Code, Art. 35, §2 (1971).
A list of recent subpoenas to the news media is contained in the appendix to the brief of amicus New York Times in No. 70-57.
“Under the case-by-case method of developing rules, it will be difficult for potential informants and reporters to predict whether testimony will be compelled since the decision will turn on the judge’s ad hoc assessment in different fact settings of 'importance’ or 'relevance’ in relation to the free press interest. A 'general’ deterrent effect is likely to result. This type of effect stems from the vagueness of the tests and from the uncertainty attending their application. For example, if a reporter’s information goes to the 'heart of the matter’ in Situation X, another reporter and informant who subsequently are in Situation Y will not know if ‘heart of the matter rule X’ will be extended to them, and deterrence will thereby result. Leaving substantial discretion with judges to delineate those ‘situations’ in which rules of ‘relevance’ or ‘importance’ apply would therefore seem to undermine significantly the effectiveness of a reporter-informer privilege.” Note, Reporters and Their Sources: The Constitutional Right to a Confidential Relationship, 80 Yale L. J. 317, 341 (1970).
In re Grand Jury Witnesses, 322 F. Supp. 573 (ND Cal. 1970), illustrates the impact of this ad hoc approach. Here, the grand jury was, as in Caldwell, investigating the Black Panther Party, and was “inquiring into matters which involve possible violations of Congressional acts passed to protect the person of the President (18 U. S. C. § 1751), to free him from threats (18 U. S. C. §871), to protect our armed forces from unlawful interference (18 U. S. C. §2387), conspiracy to commit the foregoing offenses (18 U. S. C. §371), and related statutes prohibiting acts directed against the security of the government.” Id., at 577. The two witnesses, reporters for a Black Panther Party newspaper, were subpoenaed and given Fifth Amendment immunity against criminal prosecution, and they claimed a First Amendment journalist’s privilege. The District Court entered a protective order, allowing them to refuse to divulge confidential information until the Government demonstrated “a compelling and overriding national interest in requiring the testimony of [the witnesses] which cannot be served by any alternative means.” Id., at 574. The Government claimed that it had information that the witnesses had associated with persons who had conspired to perform some of the criminal acts that the grand jury was investigating. The court held the Government had met its burden and ordered the witnesses to testify:
“The whole point of the investigation is to identify persons known to the [witnesses] who may have engaged in activities violative of the above indicated statutes, and also to ascertain the details of their alleged unlawful activities. All questions directed to such objectives of the investigation are unquestionably relevant, and any other evaluation thereof by the Court without knowledge of the facts before the Grand Jury would clearly constitute 'undue interference of the Court.’” Id., at 577.
Another illustration is provided by State v. Knops, 49 Wis. 2d 647, 183 N. W. 2d 93 (1971), in which a grand jury was investigating the August 24, 1970, bombing of Sterling Hall on the University of Wisconsin Madison campus. On August 26, 1970, an “underground” newspaper, the Madison Kaleidoscope, printed a front-page story entitled “The Bombers Tell Why and What Next — Exclusive to Kaleidoscope.” An editor of the Kaleidoscope was subpoenaed, appeared, asserted his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, was given immunity, and then pleaded that he had a First Amendment privilege against disclosing his confidential informants. The Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected his claim and upheld his contempt sentence: “[Appellant] faces five very narrow and specific questions, all of which are founded on information which he himself has already volunteered. The purpose of these questions is very clear. The need for answers to them is ‘overriding,’ to say the least. The need for these answers is nothing short of the public’s need (and right) to protect itself from physical attack by apprehending the perpetrators of such attacks.” 49 Wis. 2d, at 658, 183 N. W. 2d., at 98-99.
Such a privilege might be claimed by groups that set up newspapers in order to engage in criminal activity and to therefore be insulated from grand jury inquiry, regardless of Fifth Amendment grants of immunity. It might appear that such “sham” newspapers would be easily distinguishable, yet the First Amendment ordinarily prohibits courts from inquiring into the content of expression, except in cases of obscenity or libel, and protects speech and publications regardless of their motivation, orthodoxy, truthfulness, timeliness, or taste. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S., at 269-270; Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U. S. 684, 689 (1959); Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507, 510 (1948); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S., at 537. By affording a privilege to some organs of communication but not to others, courts would inevitably be discriminating on the basis of content.
The Guidelines for Subpoenas to the News Media were first announced in a speech by the Attorney General on August 10, 1970, and then were expressed in Department of Justice Memo. No. 692 (Sept. 2, 1970), which was sent to all United States Attorneys by the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division. The Guidelines state, that: “The Department of Justice recognizes that compulsory process in some circumstances may have a limiting effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights. In determining whether to request issuance of a subpoena to the press, the approach in every case must be to weigh that limiting effect against the public interest to be served in the fair administration of justice” and that: “The Department of Justice does not consider the press ‘an investigative arm of the government.’ Therefore, all reasonable attempts should be made to obtain information from non-press sources before there is any consideration of subpoenaing the press.” The Guidelines provide for negotiations with the press and require the express authorization of the Attorney General for such subpoenas. The principles to be applied in authorizing such subpoenas are stated to be whether there is “sufficient reason to believe that the information sought [from the journalist] is essential to a successful investigation,” and ■whether the Government has unsuccessfully attempted to obtain the information from alternative non-press sources. The Guidelines provide, however, that in “emergencies and other unusual situations,” subpoenas may be issued which do not exactly conform to the Guidelines.
Cf. Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37, 49, 53-54 (1971).
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