Mr. Justice Fortas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether the federal court or an arbitrator is to resolve a claim of “fraud in the inducement/’ under a contract governed by the United States Arbitration Act of 1925, where there is no evidence that the contracting parties intended to withhold that issue from arbitration.
The question arises from the following set of facts. On October 7, 1964, respondent, Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Company, a New Jersey corporation, entered into what was styled a “Consulting Agreement,” with petitioner, Prima Paint Corporation, a Maryland corporation. This agreement followed by less than three weeks the execution of a contract pursuant to which Prima Paint purchased F & C’s paint business. The consulting agreement provided that for a six-year period F & C was to furnish advice and consultation “in connection with the formulae, manufacturing operations, sales and servicing of Prima Trade Sales accounts.” These services were to be performed personally by F & C’s chairman, Jerome K. Jelin, “except in the event of his death or disability.” F & C bound itself for the duration of the contractual period to make no “Trade Sales” of paint or paint products in its existing sales territory or to current customers. To the consulting agreement were appended lists of F & C customers, whose patronage was to be taken over by Prima Paint. In return for these lists, the covenant not to compete, and the services of Mr. Jelin, Prima Paint agreed to pay F & C certain percentages of its receipts from the listed customers and from all others, such payments not to exceed $225,000 over the life of the agreement. The agreement took into account the possibility that Prima Paint might encounter financial difficulties, including bankruptcy, but no corresponding reference was made to possible financial problems which might be encountered by F & C. The agreement stated that it “embodies the entire understanding of the parties on the subject matter.” Finally, the parties agreed to a broad arbitration clause, which read in part:
“Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement, or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in the City of New York, in accordance with the rules then obtaining of the American Arbitration Association . . . .”
The first payment by Prima Paint to F & C under the consulting agreement was due on September 1, 1965. None was made on that date. Seventeen days later, Prima Paint did pay the appropriate amount, but into escrow. It notified attorneys for F & C that in various enumerated respects their client had broken both the consulting agreement and the earlier purchase agreement. Prima Paint’s principal contention, so far as presently relevant, was that F & C had fraudulently represented that it was solvent and able to perform its contractual obligations, whereas it was in fact insolvent and intended to file a petition under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act, 52 Stat. 905, 11 U. S. C. § 701 et seg., shortly after execution of the consulting agreement. Prima Paint noted that such a petition was filed by F & C on October 14, 1964, one week after the contract had been signed. F & C’s response, on October 25, was to serve a “notice of intention to arbitrate.” On November 12, three days before expiration of its time to answer this “notice,” Prima Paint filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, seeking rescission of the consulting agreement on the basis of the alleged fraudulent inducement. The complaint asserted that the federal court had diversity jurisdiction.
Contemporaneously with the filing of its complaint, Prima Paint petitioned the District Court for an order enjoining F & C from proceeding with the arbitration. F & C cross-moved to stay the court action pending arbitration. F & C contended that the issue presented— whether there was fraud in the inducement of the consulting agreement — was a question for the arbitrators and not for the District Court. Cross-affidavits were filed on the merits. On behalf of Prima Paint, the charges in the complaint were reiterated. Affiants for F & C attacked the sufficiency of Prima Paint’s allegations of fraud, denied that misrepresentations had been made during negotiations, and asserted that Prima Paint had relied exclusively upon delivery of the lists, the promise not to compete, and the availability of Mr. Jelin. They contended that Prima Paint had availed itself of these considerations for nearly a year without claiming “fraud,” noting that Prima Paint was in no position to claim ignorance of the bankruptcy proceeding since it had participated therein in February of 1965. They added that F & C was revested with its assets in March of 1965.
The District Court granted F & C’s motion to stay the action pending arbitration, holding that a charge of fraud in the inducement of a contract containing an arbitration clause as broad as this one was a question for the arbitrators and not for the court. For this proposition it relied on Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F. 2d 402 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1959), cert. granted, 362 U. S. 909, dismissed under Rule 60, 364 U. S. 801 (1960). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed Prima Paint’s appeal. It held that the contract in question evidenced a transaction involving interstate commerce; that under the controlling Robert Lawrence Co. decision a claim of fraud in the inducement of the contract generally — as opposed to the arbitration clause itself — is for the arbitrators and not for the courts; and that this rule — one of "national substantive law”— governs even in the face of a contrary state rule. We agree, albeit for somewhat different reasons, and we affirm the decision below.
The key statutory provisions are § § 2, 3, and 4 of the United States Arbitration Act of 1925. Section 2 provides that a written provision for arbitration “in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” Section 3 requires a federal court in which suit has been brought “upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration” to stay the court action pending arbitration once it is satisfied that the issue is arbitrable under the agreement. Section 4 provides a federal remedy for a party “aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration,” and directs the federal court to order arbitration once it is satisfied that an agreement for arbitration has been made and has not been honored.
In Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U. S. 198 (1956), this Court held that the stay provisions of § 3, invoked here by respondent F & C, apply only to the two kinds of contracts specified in §§ 1 and 2 of the Act, namely those in admiralty or evidencing transactions in “commerce.” Our first question, then, is whether the consulting agreement between F & C and Prima Paint is such a contract. We agree with the Court of Appeals that it is. Prima Paint acquired a New Jersey paint business serving at least 175 wholesale clients in a number of States, and secured F & C’s assistance in arranging the transfer of manufacturing and selling operations from New Jersey to Maryland. The consulting agreement was inextricably tied to this interstate ^transfer and to the continuing operations of an interstate manufacturing and wholesaling business. There could not be a clearer case of a contract evidencing a transaction in interstate commerce.
Having determined that the contract in question is within the coverage of the Arbitration Act, we turn to the central issue in this case: whether a claim of fraud in the inducement of the entire contract is to be resolved by the federal court, or whether the matter is to be referred to the arbitrators. The courts of appeals have differed in their approach to this question. The view of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, as expressed in this case and in others, is that — except where the parties otherwise intend — arbitration clauses as a matter of federal law are “separable” from the contracts in which they are embedded, and that where no claim is made that fraud was directed to the arbitration clause itself, a broad arbitration clause will be held to encompass arbitration of the claim that the contract itself was induced by fraud. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, on the other hand, has taken the view that the question of “severability” is one of state law, and that where a State regards such a clause as inseparable a claim of fraud in the inducement must be decided by the court. Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 280 F. 2d 915, 923-924 (C. A. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U. S. 911 (1960).
With respect to cases brought in federal court involving maritime contracts or those evidencing transactions in “commerce,” we think that Congress has provided an explicit answer. That answer is to be found in § 4 of the Act, which provides a remedy to a party seeking to compel compliance with an arbitration agreement. Under §4, with respect to a matter within the jurisdiction of the federal courts save for the existence of an arbitration clause, the federal court is instructed to order arbitration to proceed once it is satisfied that “the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply [with the arbitration agreement] is not in issue.” Accordingly, if the claim is fraud' in the inducement of the arbitration clause itself — an issue which goes to the “making” of the agreement to arbitrate — the federal court may proceed to adjudicate it. But the statutory language does not permit the federal court to consider claims of fraud in the inducement of the contract generally. Section 4 does not expressly relate to situations like the present in which a stay is sought of a federal action in order that arbitration may proceed. But it is inconceivable that Congress intended the rule to differ depending upon which party to the arbitration agreement first invokes the assistance of a federal court. We hold, therefore, that in passing upon a § 3 application for a stay while the parties arbitrate, a federal court may consider only issues relating to the making and performance of the agreement to arbitrate. In so concluding, we not only honor the plain meaning of the statute but also the unmistakably clear congressional purpose that the arbitration procedure, when selected by the parties to a contract, be speedy and not subject to delay and obstruction in the courts.
There remains the question whether such a rule is constitutionally permissible. The point is made that, whatever the nature of the contract involved here, this case is in federal court solely by reason of diversity of citizenship, and that since the decision in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938), federal courts are bound in diversity cases to follow state rules of decision in matters which are “substantive” rather than “procedural,” or where the matter is “outcome determinative.” Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99 (1945). The question in this case, however, is not whether Congress may fashion federal substantive rules to govern questions arising in simple diversity cases. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., supra, at 202, and concurring opinion, at 208. Rather, the question is whether Congress may prescribe how federal courts are to conduct themselves with respect to subject matter over which Congress plainly has power to legislate. The answer to that can only be in the affirmative. And it is clear beyond dispute that the federal arbitration statute is based upon and confined to the incontestable federal foundations of “control over interstate commerce and over admiralty.” H. R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1924); S. Rep. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1924).
In the present case no claim has been advanced by Prima Paint that F & C fraudulently induced it to enter into the agreement to arbitrate “[a]ny controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement, or the breach thereof.” This contractual language is easily broad enough to encompass Prima Paint’s claim that both execution and acceleration of the consulting agreement itself were procured by fraud. Indeed, no claim is made that Prima Paint ever intended that “legal” issues relating to the contract be excluded from arbitration, or that it was not entirely free so to contract. Federal courts are bound to apply rules enacted by Congress with respect to matters — here, a contract involving commerce — over which it has legislative power. The question which Prima Paint requested the District Court to adjudicate preliminarily to allowing arbitration to proceed is one not intended by Congress to delay the granting of a § 3 stay. Accordingly, the decision below dismissing Prima Paint’s appeal is
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Harlan: In joining the Court’s opinion I desire to note that I would also affirm the judgment below on the basis of Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F. 2d 402 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1959), cert, granted, 362 U. S. 909, dismissed under Rule 60, 364 U. S. 801 (1960).
9 U. S. C. §§ 1-14.
Although the letter to F & C’s attorneys had alleged breaches of both consulting and purchasing agreements, and the fraudulent inducement of both, the complaint did not refer to the earlier purchase agreement, alleging only that Prima Paint had been “fraudulently induced to accelerate the execution and closing date of the [consulting] agreement herein, from October 21, 1964 to October 7,1964. . . .”
Whether a party seeking rescission of a contract on the ground of fraudulent inducement may in New York obtain judicial resolution of his claim is not entirely clear. Compare Exercycle Corp. v. Maratta, 9 N. Y. 2d 329, 334, 174 N. E. 2d 463, 465 (1961), and Amerotron Corp. v. Maxwell Shapiro Woolen Co., 3 App. Div. 2d 899, 162 N. Y. S. 2d 214 (1957), aff’d, 4 N. Y. 2d 722, 148 N. E. 2d 319 (1958), with Fabrex Corp. v. Winard Sales Co., 23 Misc. 2d 26, 200 N. Y. S. 2d 278 (1960). In light of our disposition of this case, we need not decide the status of the issue under New York law.
The meaning of “maritime transaction” and “commerce” is set forth in § 1 of the Act.
See, infra, at 403-404.
This conclusion is amply supported by an affidavit submitted to the District Court by Prima Paint’s own president, which read in part:
“The agreement entered into between the parties on October 7, 1964, contemplated and intended an orderly transfer of the assets of the defendant to the plaintiff, and further contemplated and intended that the defendant would consult, advise, assist and help the plaintiff so as to insure a smooth transition of manufacturing operations to Maryland from New Jersey, together with the .sales and servicing of customer accounts and the retention of the said customers.”
The affidavit’s references to a “transfer of the assets” cannot fairly be read to mean only “expertise and know-how . . . and a covenant not to compete,” as argued by counsel for petitioner.
It is suggested in dissent that, despite the absence of any language in the statute so indicating, we should construe it to apply only to “contracts between merchants for the interstate shipment of goods.” Not only have we neither the desire nor the warrant so to amend the statute, but we find persuasive and authoritative evidence of a contrary legislative intent. See, e. g., the House Report on this legislation which proclaims that “[t]he control over interstate commerce [one of the bases for the legislation] reaches not only the actual physical interstate shipment of goods but also contracts relating to interstate commerce.” H. R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1924). We note, too, that were the dissent’s curious narrowing of the statute correct, there would have been no necessity for Congress to have amended the statute to exclude certain kinds of employment contracts. See § 1. In any event, the anomaly urged upon us in dissent is manifested by the present case. It would be remarkable to say that a contract for the purchase of a single can of paint may evidence a transaction in interstate commerce, but that an agreement relating to the facilitation of the purchase of an entire interstate paint business and its re-establishment and operation in another State is not.
In addition to Robert Lawrence Co., supra, see In re Kinoshita & Co., 287 F. 2d 951 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1961). With respect to claims other than fraud in the inducement, the court has followed a similar process of analysis. See, e. g., Metro Industrial Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F. 2d 382 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1961) (dispute over performance); El Hoss Engineer. & Transport Co. v. American Ind. Oil Co., 289 F. 2d 346 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1961) (where, however, the court found an intent not to submit the issue in question to arbitration).
The Court of Appeals has been careful to honor evidence that the parties intended to withhold such issues from the arbitrators and to reserve them for judicial resolution. See El Hoss Engineer. & Transport Co. v. American Ind. Oil Co., supra. We note that categories of contracts otherwise within the Arbitration Act but in which one of the parties characteristically has little bargaining power are expressly excluded from the reach of the Act. See § 1.
These cases and others are discussed in a recent Note, Commercial Arbitration in Federal Courts, 20 Vand. L. Rev. 607, 622-625 (1967).
Section 4 reads in part: “The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement. ... If the making of the arbitration agreement or the failure, neglect, or refusal to perform the same be in issue, the court shall proceed summarily to the trial thereof.”
This position is consistent both with the decision in Moseley v. Electronic Facilities, 374 U. S. 167, 171, 172 (1963), and with the statutory scheme. As the “saving clause” in § 2 indicates, the purpose of Congress in 1925 was to make arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not more so. To immunize an arbitration agreement from judicial challenge on the ground of fraud in the inducement would be to elevate it over other forms of contract. — a situation inconsistent with the “saving clause.”
It is true that the Arbitration Act was passed 13 years before this Court’s decision in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, supra, brought to an end the regime of Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (1842), and that at the time of enactment Congress had reason to believe that it still had power to create federal rules to govern questions of “general law” arising in simple diversity cases — at least, absent any state statute to the contrary. If Congress relied at all on this “oft-challenged” power, see Erie R. Co., 304 U. S., at 69, it was only supplementary to the admiralty and commerce powers, which formed the principal bases of the legislation. Indeed, Congressman Graham, the bill’s sponsor in the House, told his colleagues that it “only affects contracts relating to interstate subjects and contracts in admiralty.” 65 Cong. Rec. 1931 (1924). The Senate Report on this legislation similarly indicated that the bill “[relates] to maritime transactions and to contracts in interstate and foreign commerce.” S. Rep. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1924).
Non-congressional sponsors of the legislation agreed. As Mr. Charles L. Bernheimer, chairman of the Arbitration Committee of the New York Chamber of Commerce, told the Senate subcommittee, the proposed legislation “follows the lines of the New York arbitration law, applying it to the fields wherein there is Federal jurisdiction. These fields are in admiralty and in foreign and interstate commerce.” Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214, before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 67th Cong., 4th Sess., 2 (1923). In the joint House and Senate hearings, Mr. Bernheimer answered “Yes; entirely,” to the statement of the chairman, Senator Sterling, that “What you have in mind is that this proposed legislation relates to contracts arising in interstate commerce.” Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and H. R. 646 before the Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1924). Mr. Julius Henry Cohen, draftsman for the American Bar Association of the proposed bill, said the sponsor’s goals were: “[F]irst ... to get a State statute, and then to get a Federal law to cover interstate and foreign commerce and admiralty, and, third, to get a treaty with foreign countries.” Joint Hearings, supra, at 16 (emphasis added). See also Joint Hearings, supra, at 27-28 (statement of Mr. Alexander Rose). Mr. Cohen did submit a brief to the Subcommittee urging a jurisdictional base broader than the commerce and admiralty powers, Joint Hearings, supra, at 37-38, but there is no indication in the statute or in the legislative history that this invitation to go beyond those powers was accepted, and his own testimony took a much narrower tack.
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