Mr. Justice Minton
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Anderson, Clayton & Co., a Delaware corporation, was organized in 1929. Its capital structure consisted of preferred stock and 100,000 shares of common stock, the capital value of which was fixed at one dollar per share. By April 21, 1930, all of the common stock had been issued, in varying amounts, to the corporation’s managing officials, in consideration of their worth and responsibility to the company, which is engaged in the highly technical and skilled business of cotton merchandising.
In 1931 a written agreement was entered into between the corporation and the common stockholders, the purpose of which was to restrict the ownership of the common stock to the management group and to adjust the respective interests in the common stock among that group as responsibility changed. Accordingly, the agreement provided that the stock could not be disposed of except by written consent of the owners of 75% of the common stock. Upon the death of any party to the agreement, the corporation agreed to purchase the common stock of the deceased at its book value as of July 31 preceding the stockholder’s death.
One M. D. Anderson, one of the chief officers of the company, was originally issued 31,000 shares. During the development of the corporation, Mr. Anderson had transferred shares of his stock, pursuant to the agreement, to junior officials as they assumed more duties and responsibilities, until at the time of his death in 1939 he owned 18,574 shares. These shares the corporation purchased at their book value of $50.79 per share. This stock was not retired, but was retained as treasury stock. While in the treasury, it could not be voted nor were dividends paid on it.
The company in 1944 sold 6,500 of these shares to junior officials at the then book value of $112.68 per share. The difference between the price paid Anderson’s estate and that received from the sale of the shares to the junior officials was $402,285, on which the United States imposed a long-term capital-gains tax of $100,571.25. Respondent paid the tax and sued in the Court of Claims to recover the amount. The respondent took the position that no long-term capital gain resulted because it was not dealing in its stock “as it might in the shares of another corporation,” as contemplated in Treasury Regulations 111, § 29.22 (a)-15. The Court of Claims agreed with respondent and entered judgment for recovery of the tax paid, with interest. 129 Ct. Cl. 295, 122 F. Supp. 837. We granted certiorari, 348 U. S. 936, because of the claim of conflict with decisions of the Courts of Appeals.
The sole question therefore is whether, in the circumstances of this case, Treasury Regulations 111, § 29.22 (a)-15 makes the sale of this treasury stock of the corporation a taxable transaction under § 22 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939.
Article 66 of Treasury Regulations 74, promulgated under the Revenue Act of 1928, provided that a corporation which purchases its own stock, holds it as treasury stock, and later sells it “realizes no gain or loss” from such transactions. This Court upheld that regulation as a proper one interpretive of the general terms of § 22 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code. Helvering v. Reynolds Co., 306 U. S. 110, 114. The present regulation was promulgated in 1934. Its effect was to remove the categorical exclusion of taxable gains or losses arising out of the purchase and sale by a corporation of its own stock accorded such transactions by Article 66 of Treasury Regulations 74. The amended regulation specifically excludes from tax consequences a corporation’s sale of its stock upon original issue whether sold for more or less than par or stated value. On the other hand, the regulation specifically provides that tax consequences flow from the receipt by the corporation of its own stock as consideration for sales of its property or in satisfaction of indebtedness to it. With regard to all other dealings by a corporation in its own stock, whether or not tax consequences result depends generally upon the “real nature of the transaction, which is to be ascertained from all its facts and circumstances.” The regulation provides further that “if a corporation deals in its own shares as it might in the shares of another corporation,” such dealings are considered, for tax purposes, as though the corporation were in fact dealing in the other corporation’s stock. Thus, whether the transaction here in question is taxable depends, in the final analysis, on whether respondent corporation dealt with its shares of treasury stock “as it might” have dealt with another corporation’s stock.
The Court of Claims ruled, after a thorough examination of all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction, that the corporation was not dealing in its shares as it might in the shares of another corporation. This conclusion is abundantly supported by the subsidiary findings, which are all supported by the evidence in this case.
We agree with the Court of Claims. Here the purchase and sale were made pursuant to a contract entered into without any shown purpose of advantageous investment. Instead the purpose of the agreement was found to be to maintain the distribution of the stock among responsible and active members of the organization in a manner designed to reflect their worth to the corporation. Indicative of this singleness of purpose is the fact that some of the stock purchased from Mr. Anderson’s estate was sold to the corporation’s other executives at a price below that for which it was acquired. No consideration was given to the opportune time for purchase or sale. The purchase of Mr. Anderson’s stock by the corporation was dictated by the terms of the contract upon the fortuitous circumstance of his death. Moreover, when purchased, the stock was lodged in the treasury. It could not be taken into account in any payment of dividends, nor voted in shareholder meetings, nor counted for the purpose of establishing a quorum. These unrecognized rights are all incident to the ownership of common stock of other corporations. It is thus clear that respondent was not dealing in its shares as it might in the shares of others.
The Government urges that the crucial inquiry as to whether the transaction is taxable under the regulation depends for its answer upon whether the reacquired shares are resold or retired and new shares issued; since the shares were not retired, the resale at a price greater than cost results in a taxable gain under § 22 (a) of the Code and the applicable regulation. The Government receives comfort for its position in the language of Commissioner v. Batten, Barton, Durstine & Osborn, Inc., 171 F. 2d 474, 476, and Commissioner v. Landers Corp., 210 F. 2d 188, 191. But we do not think formalities should be raised to such an important position. Moreover, the applicable regulation provides that tax consequences depend upon “the real nature of the transaction, which is to be ascertained from all its facts and circumstances,” and not upon the sole circumstance that the stock is not retired. When viewed in its entirety, the instant transaction, limited to a wholly intracorporate purpose with no element of speculation or gain envisioned from dealing in its shares, does not constitute dealing by the corporation in its own shares as it might deal in the shares of another corporation within the meaning of the regulation.
The judgment is
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Burton dissent.
“Sec. 29.22 (a)-15. Acquisition or Disposition by a Corporation of its Own Capital Stock, (a) Whether the acquisition or disposition by a corporation of shares of its own capital stock gives rise to taxable gain or deductible loss depends upon the real nature of the transaction, which is to be ascertained from all its facts and circumstances. The receipt by a corporation of the subscription price of shares of its capital stock upon their original issuance gives rise to neither taxable gain nor deductible loss, whether the subscription or issue price be in excess of, or less than, the par or stated value of such stock.
“(b) But if a corporation deals in its own shares as it might in the shares of another corporation, the resulting gain or loss is to be computed in the same manner as though the corporation were dealing in the shares of another. So also if the corporation receives its own stocks as consideration upon the sale of property by it, or in satisfaction of indebtedness to it, the gain or loss resulting is to be computed in the same manner as though the payment had been made in any other property. Any gain derived from such transactions is subject to tax, and any loss sustained is allowable as a deduction where permitted by the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.”
Commissioner v. Landers Corp., 210 F. 2d 188; Commissioner v. H. W. Porter cfc Co., 187 F. 2d 939; Commissioner v. Rollins Burdick Hunter Co., 174 F. 2d 698; Commissioner v. Batten, Barton, Durstine & Osborn, Inc., 171 F. 2d 474.
“Sec. 22. Gross Income.
“(a) General Definition. 'Gross income’ includes gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for personal service (including personal service as an officer or employee of a State, or any political subdivision thereof, or any agency or instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing), of whatever kind and in whatever form paid, or from professions, vocations, trades, businesses, commerce, or sales, or dealings in property, whether real or personal, growing out of the ownership or use of or interest in such property; also from interest, rent, dividends, securities, or the transaction of any business carried on for gain or profit, or gains or profits and income derived from any source whatever. . . .” For tax years after 1953, transactions such as the one here involved carry no tax consequences by virtue of congressional enactment of § 1032 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which provides: “No gain or loss shall be recognized to a corporation on the receipt of money or other property in exchange for stock (including treasury stock) of such corporation.”
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence.