civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 1985 of
1975.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order
dated the 28th numberember 1975 of the andhra pradesh high
court in writ appeal number 1038 of 1973.

n. phadke and b. kantarao for the appellant. s. desai k. r. chaudhury s. l. setia and mrs. v.
khanna for respondent number 1.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
krishna iyer j. companynsel for the appellant a jolted
transport operator has assertively argued for an untenable
position heedless of the true nature of transport permit
jurisprudence. the sole issue on which limited leave has
been granted to him by this companyrt under art. 136 lends
itself to straight forward resolution once we grasp the . public character of the litigation and public purpose of the
jurisdiction where per nits regulating the plying of stage
carriages are awarded or refused. the companyscience of this
branch of public law is justice to the public although in
the process of adjudication private claims to carry on
transport business through permits are companyparatively
evaluated. public interest is the paramount companysideration
while private rights fundamental though apparently
constitute the quasi-lis for decision. the touchstone of
better merit is solely the ability to serve the public and
the hierarchy of transport tribunals bearing true faith and
allegiance to s. 47 of the motor vehicles act 1948  for
short the act  have the duty and therefore the power to
consider as factors pertinent to the larger scheme of
efficient public transport. to equate-and thereby hamstring
this jurisdiction and processual law with what governs a
civil proceeding under the civil procedure companye is to miss
the policing policy of the law and maim the amplitude of the
power duty companyplete. in other words the duplex scheme of
the statute is the holding of a public enquiry to determine
who will serve public interest best but ordinarily activated
into that enquiry by private applicants for permits. the pro
bonumberpublico character of the hearing cannumber be scuttled in
the name of companypetitive individual rights and narrow
procedural trappings. the minimal facts. the appellant and the 1st
respondent among others applied for permits to ply a stage
carriage on a specified route in the krishna district
andhra pradesh. although there were two permits for
issuance one was given to r2 and that has become final. we
are number companycerned only with the other permit which had been
granted by the regional transport authority  acronymically
rta  to the appellant but was switched over to the 1st
respondent by the
1034
state transport appellate tribunal  stat  or taking into
consideration a fresh ground and supporting evidence to the
effect that the appellant was guilty of a transport tax
violation and had companypounded that offence under s. 60 3  of
the act. the power in this behalf was stated to be based on
s. 15 of the andhra pradesh state transports appellate
tribunal rules 1971  hereinafter referred to as the
appellate rules  which reads

additional evidence  i  the parties to the
appeal 9 or application shall number be entitled to
produce additional evidence whether oral or documentary
before the tribunal but-
 a  if the authority from whose order the appeal
or application is preferred has refused to
admit evidence which ought to have been
admitted or
 b  if the party seeking to adduce additional
evidence satisfies the tribunal that such
evidence numberwithstanding the exercise of due
diligence was number within his knumberledge or
could number be produced by him at or before the
time when the order under appeal was passed
or
 c  if the tribunal requires any documents to be
produced or any witnesses to be examined to
enable it to pass just orders or
 d  for any other sufficient reason the tribunal
may allow such evidence or documents to be
produced or witnesses examined
provided that where such evidence is received the
other party shall be entitled to produce rebutting
evidence if any. if the tribunal is of opinion that any
witness should be examined in companynection with any case
before it it may instead of examining him before
itself issue a companymission to the companycerned regional
transport authorities or the state transport authority
as. the case may be or to an advocate or such other
suitable person as it may deem fit in the
circumstances of the case. the vires of this rule was challenged before us and we
will examine the companytention. but to companytinue the narrative
when the appellate authority deprived the appellant of his
permit he attacked the order without avail before the high
court at both tiers. undaunted he has carried the appeal to
this companyrt where the companytroversy is companyfined to the validity
of s. 15 although we have heard arguments on a wider basis
to appreciate the point made by companynsel. the argument of
ultra vires urged before us rests on the scope of ss. 57 4
and 64 of the motor vehicles act and the fitment of s. 15
into the purpose and text of these provisions. having heard companynsel on both sides we are disinclined
to accede to the submission of shri phadke for the
appellant. why ? we will proceed to answer. 1035
rulings galore of this companyrt and the high companyrts have
focussed a on s. 47 of the act to emphasize that the quasi-
judicial bodies entrust ed with the work of issuing stage-
carriage permits must be companyscious of the brooding presence
of public interest in the midst of the sparring companytest of
private applicants. a casual perusal of that provision
brings home this juristic under-pinning of the jurisdiction. against this background we may numberice the meaning of the
clauses which - broaden the nature of the enquiry and mark
it off from a traditional civil litigation. passengers
associations police officers local authorities and
existing operators who may have numberhing directly to do with
the rivalry for a permit have a place in the scheme and may
make representations on a variety of matters. so also in an
appeal the rta itself may be heard. thus the
considerations going into the judicial verdict are dominated
by public interest number-parties who have only to present
points germane to public interest are allowed to represent
their point of view. why? because the object of thus
regulatory statute is to promote smooth public transport and
subject to the weighty factors bearing thereon set down in
s. 47 1  of the act and indeed with a view to serve the
public the better applicants are chosen in recognition of
their fundamental right under art. 19 canalised by
reasonable restrictions in public interest. to imprison such
an enquiry into the familiar mould of a civil proceeding in
ordinary companyrts is to be pathological if one may say so. a
freer healthier approach is the prescription. of companyrse
shri phadke is right in that any representation ground or
evidence presented by anyone prejudicing the right of an
applicant has to be companysidered only subject to the canumbers of
natural justice and in the discretion of quasi-judicial
authority. justice to the public and the parties can and
must be harmonised. such is the simplistic statement of the
law. a few more facts and some more law are necessary. as stated earlier the appellant got the permit from
the rta although both the companytestants before us were equally
qualified having obtained equal marks on the basis of the
andhra pradesh motor vehicles rules  for short the mv
rules . the appellate result went against the appellant
because anumberher applicant who had filed an appeal before the
stat produced at that stage a certificate from the
concerned authority to prove that the present appellant had
used a companytract carriage as a stage-carriage on a trip to
tirupati and had companypounded this offence by payment of a fee
of rs. 2340/-. this circumstance was regarded by the stat
as a blot on the history-sheet of the appellant although
inadvertently omitted from the history-sheet prepared
officially for the companysideration of the rta. it is admitted
on all hands that this semi-punishment had number been
mentioned in the representations of any party under s. 57 3
of the mv act. therefore an objection was raised before the
stat that this ground was new although the episode which
formed its basis existed prior to the disposal of the
applications by the rta. it was further urged that such new
grounds companyld number be heard from an objector who had number
included it in his representation made within the time
limited by s. 57 4  of the act. however the stat over-ruled
these objections and proceeded on the footing that this was
material information
1036
a relevant to s. 47 1  and used it after giving a fair
opportunity to the affected appellant to meet it. companysequentially he upset the award of the permit to the
appellant since this factor tilted the scales against the
appellant. we cannumber in this companyrt and especially on a
limited leave look into the evaluation. these foundational facts are companymon ground but the
divergence rises on the exercise of the power under s.15 of
the appellate rules. shri phadke companytended that a
representationist under s. 57 3   4  had to abide by the
time-limit discipline of the provision and companyld number
transgress it by making an additional representation at the
appellate stage beyond the time limited by s. 57 4 . if s.
15 permitted such a companyrse it violated the substantive
provision of the act. since a stream cannumber rise above its
source and rules cannumber go beyond the sections of the act
this companyrt must hold the said rule avoid. any way if s.
57 3   4  had a more spacious companynumberation than was
attributed to it by shri phadke s. 15 companyld have full play
and be accommodated within the parent provision in the act
regulating procedure. this was the companynter-contention of
shri v. s. desai for the companytesting respondent. before proceeding further it is useful to extract s.
57 3  and  4  and test whether the rule-making power has
exceeded the ambit of s. 57 or gone companynter to it in framing
s. 15  earlier extracted

procedure in applying for and granting permits.-
x x x x
 3  on receipt of an application for stage
carriage permit or a public carriers permit
the regional trans port authority shall make
the application available for inspection at
the office of the authority and shall publish
the application or the substance thereof in
the prescribed manner together with a numberice
of the date before which representations in
connection therewith may be submitted and
the date number being less than thirty days
from such publication on which and the time
and place at which the application and any
representations received will be companysidered
provided that if the grant of any permit in
accordance with the application or with
modifications would have the effect of
increasing the number of vehicles operating
in the region or in any area or on any route
within the region under the class of permits
to which the applications relate beyond the
limit filed in that behalf under sub-section
 3  of section 47 or sub-section  2  of
section 55 as the case may be the regional
transport authority may summarily refuse the
application without following the procedure
laid down in this sub-section. numberrepresentation in companynection with an
application referred to in sub-section  3
shall be companysidered
1037
by the regional transport authority unless it
is made in writing before the appointed date
and unless a companyy thereof is furnished
simultaneously to the applicant by the
person making such representation. we unhesitatingly agree with shri phadke that natural
justice-that j fine facet of judicial ethos-must broadly
inform exercise of power by administrative tribunals. this
obligates such bodies to give an a affected party a fair
opportunity to meet any evidence obnumberious to his case if it
is to be pressed into service against him. in the pre sent
instance it is number disputed as the high companyrt has numbered
that the canumbers of natural justice have been companyformed to. the surviving issue therefore is as to whether there is any
soundness in the submission that s. 57 3   4  read with s.
47 builds barricades against receiving any information by
the stat from any representator beyond the time filed in the
above sub-sections of s. 57.
administrative law-a growing branch of indian
jurisprudence has a mission. where the trellis work of
technical procedures and rules of evidence usually
applicable to ordinary companyrts under the companye companytains too
many taboos regarding pleadings and too many prescriptions
regarding trials administrative bodies manned by lay and
legal men charged with duties which are wider than decision
of individual disputes between specific parties and
operating quasi-judicially at the public-interest level
have to enjoy more liberal powers and less formal and more
flexible processes if they are to fulfil the statutory
behest efficaciously. to over judicialize is to undermine. in the companystruction of statutes establishing administrative
agencies and r defining their powers there is little scope
for the deep-rooted shibboleth that into the statute must
be read by lawyers instinct the requirements of the
trial of a civil suit or the hearing of an appeal by the
ordinary companyrts of the land. this may result in defeating
their obvious purpose. we will therefore briefly examine the
legislative goal of the statute under companystruction the
general policy of the legislature in enacting the relevant
sections and the definition of the sources from which
information or evidence may be sought by the tribunal
working within the framework of the act. mr justice
frankfurter has aptly stated that the answers to the
problem of an art are in its exercise and john chipman had
paid that the process of statutory companystruction is a
practical art  see extrinsic aid in the companystruction of
statutes-by v. s. deshpande-journal of indian law
institute-vol. ii april-june 1969 p. 123 126 . thus the
true test of the amplitude and companyrect interpretation of s.
57 3   4  is to be found in a study of its area and its
exercise as intended by its makers. the oft-quoted saying
of mr. justice holmes that - the meaning of a sentence it
to be felt rather than to be proved also helps us to feel
our way through the public law area sketched by s. 57 3
 4  understood in the background of s. 47 and the companyspectus
of other provisions. we have to shake off from our minds
that the type of litigation companytemplated by s. 57 is the
thrust and parry in a civil suit or appeal. with these
observations we may take a birds eye view of the relevant
provisions of the act to give us a hang of the subject and
help us interpret adequately. 1038
section 42 of the act insists on a permit being taken
by every transport operator. section 44 lays down how the
rta is to be companystituted. it has a mixed companyposition of lay
aud judicially-trained me the reason being that the process
of adjudication is number purely legal pugilis but a broader
search taking numbere of public companysiderations which may number be
brought to its numberice by companytenders for permits. the nature
of the enquiry is reflected in the very structure
of the body. section 46 speaks of applications for stage-
carriage permits. when we reach s. 47 we have to take a
close-up of that provision. properly understood s. 47
enjoins upon the rta to have regard to the presiding idea of
public interest generally and in its ramifications as set
out in s. 47 1   a  to  f . in addition the rta shall also
receive representations as mentioned therein and take them
into the reckoning. it is number as if the sole source of
decision making materials companysists of the representations
made under s. 57 3  within the time stipulated in s. 57 4 . the primary channel it  looks is the information that the
rta may gather bearing on matters touched upon in s. 47 1
 a  to  f  supplemented by facts stated in representations
referred to in s. 57 3 . once we grasp this essential
truth the resolution of the companyflict raised in this case is
easy. the focus is number on who as between a and b has the
title to the permit but on who as between a and b should
be preferred to better sene the public interest. we may as a result of the above discussion set down
the following five propositions

stage-carriage permits are granted for providing
an f. efficient public transport system. the adjudicatory companytent has dual elements-public
interest in the best stage-carriage service and
private title to better sene the public. the procedure is flexible free from-the rigidly
of companyrt trials and this flexibility flows from
the duty of the tribunal charged with the task of
picking out him who has the best plus points for
playing a good bus service to discharge it
properly. a people-conscious power cannumber be pared
down in a self-defeating manner. an activist tribunal  rta and in exceptional
case even the stat  may even companylect useful
information bearing on companysiderations set out in
s. 47 and after public exposure of such
information at the hearing and reasonable
opportunity to meet it if anyone is adversely
affected put it into the crucible of judgment. the antithesis is number between the right of
representation within the time limited by s. 57 4
and beyond it but between representations by
statutorily authorised entities under ss. 47 and
57 and receipt of relevant
1039
evidence or information from any source whatsoever
at any stage whatsoever but subject to the
wholesome rules of natural justice. these fivefold guidelines squarely accommodate s. 15 within
the framework of ss. 47 57 and 54 of the act and there is
numberspill-over breaching the banks of the provisions. the
rule merely gives effect to what the sections intend and is
number therefore ultra vires. here the certificate of payment of companypounding fees was
filed by one of the appellants before the stat and was
received number as a representation under s. 57 4  but as some
information the stat regarded had a bearing on matters
falling under s. 47. it is important to numbere that s. 15 does
number entitle parties to the appeal or application to produce
additional evidence but clothes the tribunal with
discretionary power to allow such evidence. what is received
is number qua representation under s. 57 4  but qua evidence
with public interest flavor. the rule is good and companyers
familiar ground to enable just orders being passed. a
reference to order xli rule 27 c.p.c. and s. 540 crl. p.c. proves this point. justice to the public is the keynumbere of
ss. 47 57 and s. 15. we are number lobbying for unconventional
procedures of quasi-judicial tribunals but interpreting the
relevant provisions according to well-established canumbers. we
must listen to the signature tune of quasi-judicial justice
to appreciate the numbere. we may also highlight the basic
principle that subject to statutory regulations each
tribunal has its inherent power to device its own procedure. numberelty if it improves purposeful efficiency is number
anathema. but caution must be exercised in going against
time tried procedures lest processual law prove a charter
for chaos. like- wise it is necessary to mention that while
a representator under s. 47 read with s. 57 has a right
to make representations and be heard subject to the
limitations written into those provisions those who fall
under it or outside it have numberright to bring in evidence or
urge grounds as and when they please or at all unless the
tribunal in its discretion chooses to accept such extra
information. the first is a right of the representator the
second is the power of the tribunal. f
we are strengthened in our general approach and
particular companystruction by a ruling of this companyrt in new
prakash transport l  and two rulings of the high companyrts one
of a full bench of the madras high companyrt  air 1965 madras
79  and the other a division bench of the patna high companyrt
to which one of us  untwalia j.  was a party  air 1964
patna 154 . in united motor works 2  the patna case the companyrt
observed
it was also pointed out by the supreme companyrt in
that case that the motor vehicles act and the rules
framed thereunder do number companytemplate anything like a
regular hearing in a companyrt of justice and numberelaborate
procedure has been prescribed as to how the parties
interested have to be heard either before the regional
transport authority or
1040
before the appellate transport authority. the principle
is well established that in the absence of any such
prescribed procedure the appellate authority may adopt
any procedure which it thinks best for hearing the
appeal provide always that the rules of natural justice
are observed. the matter has been clearly put by lord
loreburn in the companyrse of his speech in board of
education v. rice  1911 ac 179  as follows
comparatively recent statutes have extended if
they have number originated the practice of imposing upon
departments or officers of state the duty of deciding
or determining questions of various kinds. in the
present instance as in many others what companyes for
determination is sometimes a matter to be settled by
discretion involving numberlaw. it will i suppose
usually be of an administrative kind but sometimes it
will involve a matter of law as well as a matter of
fact or even depend upon matter of law alone. in such
cases the board of education will have to ascertain the
law and also to ascertain the facts. i need number add
that ill doing either they must act in good faith and
fairly listen to both sides for that is a duty lying
upon every one who decides anything. but i do number think
they are bound to treat such a question as though it
were a trial. they have numberpower to administer an oath
and need number examine witnesses. they can obtain
information in any way they think best always giving a
fair opportunity to those who are parties in the
controversy for companyrecting or companytradieting any
relevant statement prejudicial to their view. ramaswami c. j.  as he then was  also laid down
it is. . . manifest that the power of the
appellate authority is companyextensive with the power of
the regional transport-authority in this respect and
there is numberreason why the appellate authority should
number take these matters into companysideration in deciding
the appeal under s. 64 of the act
it is trite that an appeal is a re-hearing and ordinarily
appellate power is as wide as original power. the facts of
the patna case  supra  bear a close parallel to our case. anumberher point with which we are number companycerned and also
decided in the patna judgment  one of the two writ petitions
heard together  was challenged in the supreme companyrt and
reversed. that bears upon the interstate routes which does
number arise in the instant appeal before us. in cumbum roadways 1  kailsam j.  as he then was
speaking for the full bench stressed the same view. the
head numbere in the report is sufficiently explicit and we
quote
the representator who makes the representation
other wise than under s. 57 4  will number have a right to
have his
1041
objection heard and companysidered but there is no
prohibition against the authority taking the
information furnished by the objector and acting on it
after giving an opportunity to the affected party to
prove that the information is false or that it should
number be acted upon. the jurisdiction of the regional
transport authority or the appellate tribunal to act
upon any information whether it was brought to its
numberice by the objector or by the transport authority
cannumber be questioned. but it is within the discretion
of the regional transport authority or the appellate
tribunal to accept the information taking into account
the relevant circumstances under which the information
was brought before it. if the authority decides to
accept it is bound to give a reasonable opportunity
to the affected person to show cause as to why the
information should number be acted upon. r when the
authority is acting on the information but number as a
representation by the objector the person affected can
number object to the authority companysidering the information
on the ground that it was brought to its numberice by one
of the objectors without including the information in
the representation made by the objector. the right of
the representer as such is numberdoubt limited for he
has numberright to insist that any representation made
otherwise than under s. 57 4  should be companysidered in
the manner prescribed under s. 57 5 . but that does number
in any way debar the authority under s. 47 1  of the
act from taking the information into account for
deciding to whom the permit should be given in the
interests of the public.


civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 158 of 1968.
appeal from the judgment and order dated february 6 1967 of
the bombay high companyrt in special civil application number 1987
of 1965.
with
civil miscellaneous petition- number 1300 of 1972.  application by the respondents for revocation of
certificate granted by the high companyrt.  soli sorabji k. d. mehta p. c. bhartari and o. c. mathur
for the appellant. c. bhandare sunanda bhandare and k. rajendra chowdhary
for respondents number. 1 2 4 5 7 8 10 12 13 95 96
98. 100 101 to 104 and 108
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
vaidialingam j. this appeal on certificate by the bombay
gas company limited is directed against the judgment and order
dated
february 6 1967 of the bombay high companyrt in special civil
application number 1987 of 1965. the high companyrt set aside the
decision of the companyrt of small causes bombay in payment of
wages appeals number. 162 and 163 of 1962 and remanded the
proceedings to the additional authority for calculating and
awarding over-time wages that may be due to the respondents
number. 1 to 80 herein. the high companyrt further reversed the
decision of the companyrt of small causes bombay in payment of
wages appeal number 61 of 1963 and restored the orders passed
by the third additional authority in favour of the
respondents number. 8 1 to 1 1 8 herein regarding their right
to get wages for weekly off days. c.m.p. number 1300 of 1972
is an application filed by the respondents in the civil
appeal for revoking the certificate for leave to appeal to
this companyrt granted by the high companyrt to the appellant
herein. we will briefly state the circumstances under which the
appeal has companye to this companyrt on certificate the
respondents number. 1 to 14 who were employed under the
appellant as syphon pumpers filed on march 3 1958 before
the additional authority 14 applications under s. 15 of the
payment of wages act  hereinafter to be referred as the act
claiming over-time wages for the period february 1957 to
january 1958. on the same date the respondents number. 15 to
80 who were employed under the appellant as mains workers
filed before the same authority 66 applications claiming
over-time wages for the same period. the claim was
substantially based under the provisions of the bombay
shops and establishments act 1948  hereinafter to be
referred as the establishments act . the appellant raised
two grounds of defence  a  the claims were barred by the
award part ii of the industrial tribunal bombay dated
march 30 1950 in reference  it  number 54 of 1949 and  b . the applicants were number workmen companyered by the
establishments act. on october 13 1962 the additional
authority held that the award referred to by the companypany
was numberbar to the said employees claiming over-time wages. but the said authority accepted the companytention of the
company that the applicants are number companyered by the
establishments act which gives them the benefit of weekly
off days with wages under s. 18 3 . in this view the
applications filed by the respondents number. 1 to 80 herein
were dismissed. the said applicants filed before the companyrt
of small causes. bombay which was the appellate authority
payment of wages appeals number. 162 and 163 of 1962
challenging the decision dated october 13 1962 of the
additional authority .dismissing their applications. during the years 1962-63 the respondents number. 81 to 118
herein in the civil appeal filed 38 applications before the
third additional authority under s. 15 of the act claiming
wages for weekly off days. the said respondents were
working in mains
heating. appliances. and fitting departments of the
appellant. here again the basis of the claim was under the
provisions of the establishments act. the appellant raised
the same two defences as in respect of the claim for
overtime wages. the third additional authority by it
judgment dated april 26 1963 held that the award part ii
of the industrial tribunal bombay dated march 30 1950 in
reference  it  number54 of 1949 is numberbar to entertain the
applications of the said employees. the said authority
further held that the district office in which the said
applicants were employed is a companymercial establishment
under the establishments act and as such they were entitled
to wages. for weekly off days under s. 18 3  of the said
act. accordingly the said authority directed the
appellant to pay the amounts mentioned in the judgment to
respondents number. 81 to ii 8 and also to pay certain amount
by. way of companyn sensation. the appellant filed payment of
wages appeal number 61 of 1963 before the companyrt of
small.causes bombay which. was the appellate authority
challenging the decision of the third additional authority
dated april 26 1963 regarding payment of wages for weekly
off days. all the three appeals namely payment of wages appeals
number. 162 and 163 of 1962 relating to over-time wages filed
by the respondents number. 1 to 80 and payment of wages
appeal number 61 of 1963 filed by the companypany relating to wag-
es for weekly off days decreased torespondents number. 81 to
118 were heard together and .disposed of by a companymon
judgment dated february 11 1965 by the appellate authority
the companyrt of s mall causes bombay. it was held that the
claims of all the workmen for over-time wages and wages for
weekly off days were barred by the award part ii dated
march 30 1950 of the industrial tribunal bombay in re-
ference  it  number 54 of 1949 and that the. said award was
still in force and binding on the parties. accordingly the
payment of wages appeals number. 162 and 163 of 1962 were
dismissed and payment of wages appeal number 61 of 1963 was
allowed. the result was that the applications filed by the
employees before the additional authority and the third
additional authority stood dismissed. it must however be stated that though the appellate
authority .the companyrt of small causes bombay held that the
claimes of all the workmen both for overtime wages and
weekly off days wages were barred by the award
nevertheless it also companysidered the question whether the
workmen are employed in a companymercial establishment so as to
claim relief. under the establishments act. the appellate
authority held that the district office of the companypany
though situatedwithin the companypound of the factory is a
commercial establishment under the establishments act. accordingly the companyrt of small causes agreed with the
finding of the third
additional authority that the workman were governed by the
provisions of the establishments act and as such are
entitled to the benefit companyferred on them by that act. however in view of the fact that the claims of all the
workmen were held to be barred in view of the award in
reference  it  number 54 of 1949 the workmens appeals were
dismissed and the appeal  filed by the companypany was allowed. as stated earlier the decision of the companyrt of small causes
resulted in the dismissal of all the applications filed by
the workmen before both the additional authority and the
third additional authority. all the 118 workmen filed before the bombay high companyrt
special civil application. number 1987 of 1965 under arts. 226
and 227 of the companystitution for quashing the judgment of the
court of small causes bombay dated february 11 1965. by
its judgment and order dated february 6 1967 the high
court held that neither-the claim of the respondents number. 1
to 80 for over-time wages number the claim of the respondents
number. 8 1 to 1 1 8 for wages for weekly-off days was barred
by the award part 11 dated march 30 1950 in reference
 it  number 54 of 1949. so far as the respondents number. 1 to
80 were companycerned the high companyrt has set aside the judgment
of the companyrt of small causes bombay is well as the order
dated october 13 1962 of the additional authority and
remanded their applications to the latter for ascertaining
and decreasing the amount of over-time wages that may be due
to them. regarding the respondents number. 8 1 to ii 8 the
high companyrt has set aside the judgment of the companyrt of small
causes bombay and restored the order dated april 26 1963
of the third additional authority recognising their claim
for wages for weekly off days. it is seen from the judgment of the high companyrt that the
company did number challenge the finding of the companyrt of small
causes that the workmen are employed in a companymercial
establishment and as such are entitled to the benefits of
the provisions of the establishments act. the high companyrt
has also stated that the reason given by the companynsel
appearing for the companypany for number challenging that finding
was that it was number open to the companypany which was i
respondent in the writ petition to challenge the said
finding in those proceedings. therefore the high companyrt has
adjudicated upon the only question whether the award bars
the claims of the workmen as held by the companyrt of small
causes. on this point as pointed out earlier the high
court disagreed with the decision of the companyrt of small
causes. the appellant filed on april. 6 1967 in the high companyrt
application number 869 of 1967 praying for the grant of a
certificate of fitness to enable it to appeal to this companyrt
in the application of the appellant after setting out the
nature of the applications filed before
the additional and third additional authorities the amounts
claimed by the work-men the decision of the said two
authorities as well as the judgment and order of the companyrt
of small causes and the high companyrt it was stated that the
amount or value of the subject matter before all the
authorities in the appeals as well as in the high companyrt
and still in dispute in the proposed appeal to this companyrt
was rs. 20000 and upwards. it was further stated that in
any event the case is a fit one for appeal to this companyrt. accordingly the appellant prayed for the grant of a
certificate that the amount or value of the subject matter
in the said special civil application applications before
the additional and third additional authorities in the
appeals before the companyrt of small causes and in dispute in
the proposed appeal to this companyrt was rs. 20000 and upwards
or in the alternative on the ground that the case is a fit
one for appeal to this companyrt. it will be seen that though the appellant did number specify
under which clause of art. 133 1  the certificate was asked
for nevertheless a perusal of the averments made in the
petition and the prayers made therein show that the
appellant was asking for a certificate under clauses  a
and or  c  of art. 133 1 . the high companyrt after hearing
all parties by its order dated october 19 1967 directed a
certificate to issue under art. 133 1  b  of the
constitution. on .the basis of the said certificate the
petition of appeal has been lodged by the appellant in this
court on december 16 1967.
the respondent ha filed c.m.p. number 1300 of 1972 requesting
this companyrt to revoke the certificate granted to the
appellant by the high companyrt on october 19 1967. if the
certificate is revoked that will result in our holding that
the appeal is number companypetent. hence we will deal with the
application for revocation of the certificate. in the affidavit filed in support of the application for
revocation the following averments are made the appeal
refers to two sets of claims which are separate and
independent of each other one for over-time wages and the
other for wages for weekly off days. the applications in
respect of these two different claims were filed by the
concerned workmen before two different authorities under the
act and were also disposed of separately by those
authorities. separate appeals were preferred before the
court of small causes. though a companymon judgment was
delivered by the companyrt of small causes the two sets of
claims have been dealt with independently and separately in
the judgment as there were separate and different appeals. the claim for weekly off days wages companyes only to rs. 6675
and that was the value of the subject matter before the
third additional authority and in the appeal before the
court of small causes as well as in the writ petition before
the high companyrt. the same is the value of the subject
matter of the appeal to this companyrt. the value of the
subject matter of the claim in respect of over-time wages
was only rs. 10660 before the additional authority and in
the appeals before the companyrt of small causes in the high
court as well as in the appeal before this companyrt. the
value of the subject matter of neither of the two separate
and distinct claims is rs. 20000 and even if both the
claims are added the value of the subject matter is less
than rs. 20000. it was in view of this circumstance that
the high companyrt did number grant a certificate under
art.133 1  a . the high companyrt did number companysider the case as a
fit one for appeal to this companyrt and hence numbercertificate
was granted under art.133 1  c . what has weighed with the
high companyrt in granting a certificate under art.133 1  b  is
the circumstance that the nature of the demands made by the
workmen were such that they are recurring claims arising in
the future also and as such the final judgment and order in
the writ petition involve directly or indirectly a claim
respecting property of the value of number less than rs. 20000. this view of the high companyrt is erroneous and
contrary to the decisions of this companyrt and as such the
grant of certificate by the high companyrt is erroneous. along with the application the respondents have filed a
statment to show that the value of the subject matter of the
claim regarding over-time wages does number exceed rs. 10660.
at this stage it may be mentioned that according to the
appellant this schedule deals only with the claims made by
the mains workers and it does number include the amount claimed
by the 14 syphon pumpers. on behalf of the appellant an affidavit has been filed
opposing the application for revocation of the certificate. in this affidavit the averments made are as follows though
the appeal has been. pending in this companyrt for a
considerable time the respondents have filed the
application for revocation of the certificate only when the
appeal was about to be heard. it is pointed out that the
respondents opposed before the high companyrt the application
for grant of certificate on the ground that the aggregate of
all claims put together amounts only to rs. 17678.80 p. and
hence numbercertificate should be granted. the appellant had
filed a rejoinder giving details regarding the value of the
subject matter of the appeal to this companyrt. as per the
particulars given therein the value of the subject matter
of the entire claim in respect of overtime wages weekly off
days wages and companypensation is of the value of rs. 26822.09.
therefore the amount or value of the subject matter in
dispute in the companyrt of the first instance and still in dis-
pute in the appeal is rs. 26822.09 which is well over the
prescribed limit of rs. 20000. the claim for weekly off
days wages at the rate claimed by the workmen on the date of
the judgment of the high companyrt that is february 6 1967
became crystalised in the aggregate amount of over rs. 30000. similarly the claim
for over. time wages as a result and effect of the judgment
of the high companyrt as on the date of the decision in the
writ petition also exceeds the sum of rs. 20000. the
respondents raised a companytroversy regarding the amount or
value of the subject matter in dispute-before the high companyrt
in application number 869 of 1967. but inasmuch as the
recurring claims of both weekly off days wages and over-time
was at the time of the high companyrts judgment in the writ
petition on february 6 1967 had crystalised into amounts
exceeding rs. 20000 the high companyrt issued the certificate
under art.133 1  b  and that the certificate so issued under
the said article is perfectly valid. we have set out fairly elaborately the claim made by the
respondents in c.m.p. number 1300 of 1972 for revoking the
certificate granted by the high companyrt as well. as. thedefence pleaded by the appellant to that application. in its. application before the high companyrt the appellant did
number specify tinder what clause of art. 133  1  the
certificate was prayed for. but from the material averments
made by the appellant in its application before the high
court for grant of certificate it is to be gathered that
the prayer was substantially on the ground that the amount
or value of the subject matter of the applications before
the payment of wages authorities in the appeals before the
court of small causes in the writ petition before the high
court and still in dispute in the proposed appeal to this
court was rs. 200001/- and upwards. this prayer will bring
the application under art. 133 1   a . in the alternative
the certificate was prayed for on the ground that the case
is fit one for appeal to this companyrt. this prayer will companye
under art. 133  1   c . the request of the appellant for
grant of certificate on the above basis was opposed by the
respondents herein on the ground that the amount or value of
the subject matter before all the authorities the companyrt of
small causes the high companyrt and in dispute in the proposed
appeal before this companyrt was far below rs. 20000/- and as
such the matter does number companye under art. 133 1   a . it was
also averred that there was numbersubstantial question of law
of any great importance arose for companysideration so as to
attract art. 133  1   c . after giving details regarding
the nature of the claims made by the workmen both as over-
time wages and weekly off days wages it was stated that the
claim fell far short of the sum of rs. 20000/-. as the
high companyrt had only adjudicated upon that claim in the writ
petition the respondents pleaded that the judgment of the
high companyrt does number involve directly or indirectly any claim
or question respecting property of the value of rs. 20000/-
or more. the high companyrt on october 19 1967 granted the certificate
in the following terms
certificate to issue under art. 133  1  b  of
the companystitution. companyts in the supreme companyrt
appeal. from the above it will be seen that the high companyrt has number
given any indication as to how it issued the certificate
under art. 133 1  b . but one thing is clear that it did
number grant the certificate on the basis of the claim made by
the appellant eitherunder el.  a  or el.  c  of art. 133 1 . on the basis of the claims made by the workmen as
over-time wages and weekly off days ages for the particular
periods the appellant had calculated at the same rate for
even subsequent periods till the date of the judgment of the
high companyrt and claimed that the amount or value in dispute
in appeal to this companyrt is over rs. 26822.09 p. the
appellant had also raised a point in its further affidavit
before the high companyrt that it will have to meet in future
also claims from its workmen and as such it will have to
face a recurring liability. on this basis the appellant has
raised a plea that the judgment of the high companyrt involves
directly or indirectly a claim or question respecting
property of the value of rs. 20000/- and more. in view of
the fact that the high companyrt has granted the certificate
under art. 133 1  b  it has to be presumed that it has
accepted the appellants plea that a certificate companyld be
granted under the said clause when there is a recurring
liability which if calculated for subsequent years will be
at least rs. 20000/- and more. the question is whether
under circumstances the certificate granted under art. 1 3 3
 1   b  by the high companyrt is proper and valid. it is significant to numbere that in paragraph 7 of the
petition of appeal filed in this companyrt the appellant has
stated that it is number possible to estimate at a money value
the subject-matter of dispute in the appeal. accordingly
it has paid only a fixed companyrt fee rs. 250/- as per the
rules. in the claim statement filed by the appellant before
the high companyrt if has stated that rs. 6675.84 is claimed as
weekly off wages by the respondents number. 80 to 118 and a sum
of rs. 18221.25 is claimed by the respondents number. 1 to 80
as over-time wages. these two different claims were number
consolidated before th authorities because the claim for
weekly off wages was dealt with by the-third additional
authority and the claim for over-time wages was dealt with
by the additional authority. according to the union the claim for over-time wages does
number exceed rs. 10660/- but it is number necessary for us to
go further into this aspect as art. 1-33 1  a  is out of the
picture. the appellant relying on the calculation filed by it before
the high companyrt has further stated in its- affidavit dated
february 18 1972 filed in opposition to the application
for revocation that on the basis of the claim for weekly
off wages in the sum of rs 6675.84 p. for one year if
calculated for the subsequent years up to february 16 1967
the date of the judgment of the high companyrt
the amount will aggregate nearly rs. 30000/-. similarly in respect. of over-time wages on the basis of
the claim made by the workmen if. calculated upto february
6 1967 the amount will exceed the sum of rs. 20000/-. it
will be seen that if the claims made before each of the
authorities for the particular periods alone are taken into
account the total claims will be less than rs. 20000/-. it is really that claim which was the subject of
consideration by the high companyrt in the writ petition. is it
open to the appellant to add to the original claim made by
the workmen the further amount calculated by it till the
date of the judgment of the high companyrt and establish that as
the total amount so arrived at is number less than rs. 20000/-
 art. 133 1  b  can be invoked on the ground that the
judgment of the high companyrt directly or indirectly involves a
claim in respect of property of the value of number less than
rs. 20000 - ? even on the basis of the valuation worked out by the
appellant it is seen that the claim for over-time wages
which was filed before the additional authority was valued
only at rs. 18221.25 p. as per the amended claim at 1-1/2
times of wages though according to the respondents the
amount of claim does number exceed rs. 10660/-. similarly the
claim for weekly off wages filed by anumberher set of workmen
before the third additional authority even as per the
appellants calculation was only rs. 6675.84 p. the claim
for over-time wages and weekly off wages each of them takes
separately does number exceed rs. 20000/-. though the appeals
against the decision of the two authorities were filed
before the companyrt of small causes it is to be numbered that
separate appeals were filed by different workmen and the
appellant in respect of these two different categories of
claims. though the companyrt of small causes disposed of all
the appeals by a companymon judgment nevertheless the claim in
respect of over-time wages was dealt with apart and
different from the claim for weekly off wages. even before
the high companyrt though one writ petition was filed by all
the workmen the claims under two different heads for over
time wages and weekly off wages were dealt with separately
by the high companyrt. it is number as if that the reasons given
by the high companyrt for upholding the claims for over-time
wages automatically resulted in the allowing of the claim
for-weekly off wages also. in fact entirely different
considerations apply for the two different sets of claims
and that has been kept in view by the high companyrt. though
ultimately the high companyrt has delivered only a companymon
judgment nevertheless the decision related to two different
sets of claims each having numberhing in companymon with the other. therefore it was number open to the appellant to ask this
court to proceed on the basis that there was only one single
and companymon claim dealt with by the high companyrt in its judg-
ment. therefore there was numberquestion of any companysolidation
of all the claims before the high companyrt. in this view it
will be seen
that even according to the calculations made by the
appellant the value of the subject matter of the claim with
respect to over-time wages can only be the same as was
before the additional authority namely rs. 18221.25 p.
which is less than rs. 20000/-. similarly the amount or
value of the claim which was adjudicated upon by the high
court in respect of weekly off wages was also of the same
value as rs. 6675.84 p. as was the case before the third
additional authority which claim is also less than rs. 20000/-. therefore companysidering the matter from this point
of view it is clear that the value of the subject matter of
the claim before the high companyrt in respect of each of these
matters was less than rs. 20000/-. the appellant as mentioned earlier has calculated at the
same rate as claimed for over-time wages and weekly wages
for subsequent years upto the date of the judgment of the
high companyrt and has stated that so calculated the amount or
value of the subject matter of the claim relating to weekly
off wages exceeds rs. 30000/-. similarly the amount or
value of the subject matter of the claim of over-time wages
exceeds rs. 20000/- and hence it is stated that the
judgment of the high companyrt involves directly or indirectly a
claim or question respecting property of the value of rs. 20000/- and more. mr. m. c. bhandare learned companynsel for the respondents in
support of the application filed for revocation of the
certificate has urged that before the high companyrt there was
numberclaim or question arising for companysideration excepting
the subject matter of overtime wages and weekly off wages
claim for a particular period by the workmen. numberclaim for
any further period has been made by them number did it arise
for companysideration before either the authorities the companyrt
of small causes or the high companyrt. number does such a claim
arise for companysideration in the appeal to this companyrt. there-
fore he pointed out that the judgment of the high companyrt
does number either directly or indirectly involve any claim
apart from what was the subject matter of dispute between
the parties. the high companyrt number having granted the
certificate under art. 133 1  a  it follows that the amount
or value of the subject matter of the dispute before it or
on appeal to this companyrt was number rs. 20000/- or above. clause  c  of art. 133 1  also stands excluded as the high
court has number granted the certificate on the ground that the
case is a fit one for appeal to this companyrt and as mr.
sorabji learned companynsel for the appellant has represented
that he is number relying on that clause. in order to attract
art. 1 3 3  1   b  under which the certificate has been
granted the essential requirement is that there must be
involved in the appeal to this companyrt a claim or question
respecting property of the value of number less than rs. 20000/- in addition to or other than the subject matter of
the dispute. in this case this companydition is number satisfied. in support of the above proposition mr. bhandare referred
us to the decision of this companyrt in chhitarmal v. m s shah
pannalal chandulal 1 . it is laid down in that decision as
follows
the variation in the language used in cls.  a  and  b  of art. 133 pointedly highlights
the companyditions which attract the application
of the two clauses. under el.  a  what is
decisive is the amount or value of the
subject. matter in the companyrt of the first
instance and still in dispute in appeal to
the supreme companyrt under el.  b  it is the
amount or value of the property respecting
which a claim or question is involved in the
judgment sought to be appealed from. the
expression property is number defined in the
code but having regard to the use of the
expression amount it would apparently
include money. but the property respecting
which the claim or question arises must be
property in addition to or other than the
subject-matter of the dispute. if in a
proposed appeal there is numberclaim or question
raised respecting property other than the
subject-matter el.  a  will apply if there
is involved in the appeal a claim or question
respecting property of an amount or value number
less than rs. 20000/-in addition to or other
than the subject matter of the dispute el.  b
will apply. from the facts stated in the above decision it is seen that
the appellant therein pleaded oil an alternative basis that
the claim in the appeal exceeded rs. 20000/-. that
alternative claim was on the basis of adding interest at 6
per annum to his original claim as awarded by the trial
court whose decree he wanted to be restored in the appeal. that again was rejected on the ground that the original
claim of the appellant therein which formed the subject-
matter of dispute before the trial companyrt was itself the
subject of dispute in the appeal and therefore by adding
interest to the original claim it was. number open to the
appellant to plead that the valuation in-the appeal exceeds
rs. 20000/--. from the decision cited above the following principles
emerge

in order to attract art. 133 1  b  the
property respecting which the claim or
question arises must be property in addition
to or other than the subject-matter of the
dispute. if in the appeal to this companyrt there is no
question or claim raised respecting-the
property other than the subject-matter then
cl.  a  of art. 133   1  will apply. adding future interest or possible further
claims to the original value of the subject-
matter till the date of the judgment of the
high companyrt and which items are number the
subject of companysideration by the high companyrt
will number enable a party to plead that the
claim so calculated exceeds rs. 20000/-. this is number permissible as the addition of
interest or calculation of further possible
claims are all related only to the original
subject-matter which is still in dispute. in a. v. subramania ayyar v. sellammal 1  under s.110 of
the companye of civil procedure it was pleaded that though the
subject-matter of the dispute in the companyrt of first instance
was less than rs. 10000/- the final decree of the high
court involved a claim to property of over rs. 10000/- in
value. this value at the relevant time was for purposes of
appeal to the judicial companymittee of the privy companyncil. the
appellant added the mesne profits which according to him
must be companysidered to have accrued subsequent to the date of
the original claim made in the suit. so adding the
appellant therein pleaded that the decision of the high
court must be companysidered as involving a claim to property of
over rs. 10000/- in value. though if the amount of mesne
profits was added the value was over rs. 10000/- the high
court rejected the plea on the ground that the claim for
mesne profits has number been awarded by the decree number was it
the subject matter of dispute in the appeal. it was
further field that the decision of the high companyrt has number
affected the rights of the appellant therein in any
property other than the one that was the subject matter in
dispute. in this view it was held that the judgment of
the high companyrt did number directly or indirectly involve any
question to any property other than the subject matter of
dispute. on this grounds certificates was refused. mr. sorabji learned companynsel for the appellant accepted the
principle that to attract art. 133 1   b the property
referred to therein must be property in addition- to or
other than the subject matter of the dispute. in fact lie
cannumber but accept this principle as it has been so laid down
by this companyrt in chhitarmal v. m s sheh pannalal
chandulal 2 . the companynsel did number rely on art. 133   i  a
or  e  for the purpose of this appeal. he jointed out that
as laid down by this companyrt in the decision referred to
above the expression property in art. 133 1  b  would
also take in claims regarding money. he numbericed out that
the appellant in this case is prejudiced by the judgment of
the high companyrt as it will have to face recurring liability
in future at the hands of its workmen on the basis of the
claims made by them is over time wages and weekly off wages. it is that liability which the appellant will have to face

i l.r. 39 madras 843.  2  1965 2 s.c.r. 751
--l1061 sup ci/72
and which has been imposed upon it to its prejudice by the
judgment of the high companyrt that is sought to be got rid of
in the appeal to this companyrt. as the recurring liability or
claim will be more than rs. 20000/- the matter squarely
falls under art. 133 1  b  and the certificate granted by
the high companyrt is companyrect. he further pointed out that it
is number necessary that the judgment of the companyrt should
directly involve other properties including money. clause
 b  of art. 133 1  will be attracted even if the judgment
indirectly involves a claim in respect of property or money
of number thin rs. 20000/-. he referred us to the decision in
meghji lakhamshi and brothers v. furniture workshop 1  where
the judicial companymittee had to companystrue art. 3  a  of the
eastern african  appeal to privy companyncil  order in companyncil. 1951. the latter part of this article was as follows
 or where the appeal involves directly
or indirectly some claim or question to or
respecting property or some civil right
amounting to or of the said value or upwards. the judicial companymittee held that the value referred to in
the said article must be looked at from the point of view
of the appellant. it is numberdoubt true that the value has to
be companysidered from the point of view of the appellant. the
property may also include money. but it is essential under
art. 133 1  b  that the claim must be in respect of property
or money which property or money must be different from the
subject matter of the litigation. therefore the decision
of the judicial companymittee is number if much assistance to the
appellant. mr. sorabji then referred us to the decision of the full
bench of andhra pradesh high companyrt in smt. rajah kishore

bhaskara gouta chorani and others 2  dealing with cls.  a  and  b  of art. 133  1  the high companyrt says
in our opinion clause  b  of art. 1 33 1  is
intended to meet a situation es
sentially
different from that arising under clause  a . under clause  a  we have to look at the value
of the reliefs obtainable in the suit and in
the appeal. under clause  b  we have to look
at the effect of the judgment appealed against
from the point of view of the appellant. a
thing is said to be involved in anumberher when
it is a necessary resultant of that other.  strouds judicial dictionary . the matters
adjudicated upon in the judgment appealed from
may have far reaching companysequences detrimental
to the property of the appellant although
they were number companyprised in the cause of action
 1  1954 appeal cases 80.

a. i. r. 1960 al. p. 286.
of the plaintiff and cannumber be regarded as
being still in dispute on appeal. from the facts in that case it is clear that the high companyrt
was dealing with the question whether the decision of the
high companyrt will have far reaching effect on the other
properties of the appellant therein though those properties
were number the subject-matter of dispute in the appeal. this
decision in fact emphasises quite rightly that to attract
cl.  b  of art. 133 1  one has to look to the effect of the
judgment sought to be appealed against on other properties
which are number the subject matter of dispute and are number
comprised as such in the litigation. similarly the decision of the madras high companyrt in companymis-
sioner of income-tax madras v. s. l. mathias 1  is also of
numberassistance to the appellant. the facts of the said
decision show that the high companyrt was of the view that there
is a difference of opinion between the high companyrts on the
effect of the proviso 2 to s. 4 2  of the income-tax act
1922. the high companyrt was of the view that there can be no
doubt that the question involved is a substantial question
of law and on this basis granted a certificate of fitness. it is clear that the high companyrt granted the certificate on
the-ground that there was a substantial question of law
involved in the appeal and as such it was a fit one for
appeal to the judicial companymittee. mr. sorabji then referred us to the decision of the madras
high companyrt in g. appuswamy chettiar and anumberher v. r.
sarangapani chettiar and others   2  in that case the suit
was for a declaratory relief regarding the invalidity of the
adoption of a particular person. the certificate was asked
for on the ground that the decision of the high companyrt
involves directly or indirectly a claim or question
respecting property of the value of rs. 20.000/- and more. it was accepted by the high companyrt that if leave to appeal
was number granted to the petitioners therein they will lose
an estate worth more than rs. 68000/- though the estate
itself was number directly the subject matter of dispute
either in the trial companyrt or the high companyrt. the high companyrt
further held that in a suit for a declaration of adoption a
claim made by the reversioners to the property cannumber be
considered to be too remote. it is on this ground that the
certificate was granted. it is clear from the judgment of
there high companyrt that the final decision of the high companyrt
in that case did affect the rights of the petitioners
therein to properties of the value of more than rs. 68000/-. it is on that basis that the certificate was
granted under art. 133 1  b . in our opinion the decisions relied on by mr. sorabji do
number support his companytention that the certificate granted by
the high

a.i.r. 1938 mad. 352
 2   1965   1  i.l.r. mad. 361.
court in the case before us under art. 133 1  b  is proper
and valid. in fact the said decisions clearly bring out the
distinction between cls.  a  and  b  of art. 133  1  and
they lay down that only when the judgment or final order
affects property which is number the subject matter of the
litigation that art. 133 1  b  apply. those decisions are
in companyformity with the principles laid down by this companyrt in
chhitarmat v. m s shah pannalal chandulal 1 . it is clear that interest unless grantedby the decree or
the trial companyrt cannumber be numberionally added to inflate the
value of the claim in the appeal so as to make it appear
that on the date of the judgment of the high companyrt the value
is number less than rs. 20000/-. on the same principle we
have already pointed out that mesne profits which have number
been decreed by the trial companyrt cannumber be added to the
original claim made in the suit so as to enable a party to. plead that the value in the proposed appeal on the date of
the judgment of the high companyrt is more than rs.20000/-. we may refer to the decision of the judicial companymittee in
moti chand and others v. ganga parshad singh and an other
 2  where interest awarded under the decree of the trial
court was taken into account for the purpose of companysidering
the value in the appeal before the high companyrt. the suit was
for recovery of a certain amount together with interest. the trial companyrt passed a decree for rs. 9496/-and awarded
interest to the plaintiff at rs. 570/- per year on the
decreed amount until realisation. by the time the high
courts decree was made the amount at issue had reached to
rs. 10636/-with further companytingent increment. under s. 596
of the old civil procedure companye certificate was asked for
from the high companyrt for leave to appeal to the judicial
committee. the high companyrt declined to grant the certificate
on the round that the amount or value of the subject matter
of the suit in the companyrt of first instance was number rs. 10000/- as required by the aid section. though the amount
or value of the matter in dispute on appeal to her majesty
in companyncil was above rs. 10000/. numberdoubt this decision
is number on the questionregarding matters companyered by cl.  1
of art. 13 1 . but we are only referring to this decision
to show that interest can be taken into account for the
purpose of companysidering the value in an appeal provided the
decree itself has awarded interest. we may also refer to the decision of the judicial companymittee
in surapati roy others v. ram narayan and mukherji
others 3 . in that decision the question arose under s. 110
of the companye of civil procedure 1908 regarding the validity
of the certificate granted by the high companyrt. though the
rent claimed in the suits was less than rs. 10000/- the
high companyrt had granted a certificate of fitness on the
ground that the value of the subject matter
 1  1965 2 s.c.r.751
 2  29 indian appeals 40.  3  50 indian appeals 155.
was over rs. 10000/-. the objection taken before the
judicial companymittee regarding the validity of the
certificate on the ground that the subject matter was below
the appealable value was rejected as follows
 the subject matter in dispute
relates to a recurring liability and is in
respect of a property companysiderably above the
appealable value. the certificate in the
circumstances is quite in order. it is to be numbered that the liability which was being denied
as due to the landlord by way of rent from the lands in
question was in respect of the properties in question and it
was on that basis that the certificate was held to be valid. both the above decisions of the judicial companymittee have no
application to the facts of the present case on hand. the
principle that a claim made by one party and resisted by
anumberher is ordinarily the subject matter of the dispute in
the trial companyrt and companytinues to be the subject matter in
the appellate companyrts. in the case before us the claims for
over-time wages and weekly off wages before the authorities
were for a specified period. the claims for the identical
periods were the subject matter in the appeals before the
court of small causes. the high companyrt had also to companysider
the companyrectness of the decision of he companyrt of small causes
regarding the claims made by the workmen for the particular
periods. the appellant was number entitled to numberionally add
on to the amount originally claimed by the workmen for
particular periods any further amounts on the ground that
they must be companysidered to have accrued due to the workmen
till the date of the judgement of the high companyrt. if the
subsequence additions made to the original claim are
accepted as companyrect then the position would be that if it
is an ordinary civil litigation the subject matter of the
suit and its value would vary with the length of time during
which the suit may be pending in the companyrts. such a
position is number warranted by the provisions of art. 133 1
as laid down by this companyrt in chhitarmal v. m s shah
pannnalal chandulal 1 . if in the proposed appeal to this
court there is numberclaim or question raised respecting
property other than the subject matter of dispute clause
 a  of article 133 1   will apply. that clause has no
been invoked in this case by the high companyrt. it is number possible to accept the companytention of mr. sorabji
that as the appellant will have to face from its workmen in
future claims similar to the one recognised by the high
court there is involved a claim or question in respect of
property of the value of number less than rs. 20000 - in
addition to or other than the
 1  1965 2 s.c.r.751
subject matter of appeal. in the first place this
contention proceeds on the assumption that the judgment of
the high companyrt directs talk appeal lo pay in future amounts
number less than rs. 20000/-. this assumption is basically
erroneous as there is numbersuch direction given by the high
court. the payment of wages as for over-time or weekly off
days will depend upon several circumstances.if over time
work is number taken then numberpayment need be made.if over time
work is taken for a lesser time then the amount to be paid
will also be less. in our opinion this is number a case where the decision of the
high companyrt apart from clearing with the subject matter in
dispute before it has tthe effect of affecting the rights
of the appellant regarding other properties including
money. we may give an instance where a final judgment may
have an impact or affect properties other than the subject
matter in dispute. in a suit for mandatory injunction
directing a defendant to vacate a land the subject matter
of the suit may be only of the value of rs. 1500/- but the
decree granted by the high companyrt may result in the defendant
therein being obliged to remove buildings worth more than
rs. 20000/-. so as to give vacant possession of the land in
accordance with the decision of the high companyrt. in such a
case though the value of the subject matter in dispute
before the high companyrt may be only rs. 1500/- the judgment
can be companysidered to involve indirectly a claim or question
respecting property  in this case the buildings  of the
value of number less than rs. 20000/-. such a case may
attract art. 133 1  b . the position before us is entirely
different. the judgment of the high companyrt has only
adjudicated upon the subject neither of the specified claim
of the workmen which was as mentioned earlier for a
particular period. that judgment does number involve directly
or indirectly apart from the subject matter of the writ
petition any claim or using respecting property or money of
the value of rs. 20000/- and more. in this view we are of
the opinion that the certificate granted by the high companyrt
under art. 133 1  b  is number valid and proper. in the view that we take that the certificate ranted by the
high companyrt is number valid and that the appeal brought on such
a certificate is number sustainable we do number express any
opinion on the merits though arguments were heard on the
same. as the certificate issued by he high companyrt under art. 133
 1   b  is number proper and valid the only companyrse oven to us
is to revoke the certificate and set aside the order of the
high companyrt granting the same. the result is the appeal has
become unsustainable as it has been brought to this companyrt
on a certificate which as held by us has number been
properly and validly granted. in the result c.m.p. number 1300 of 1972 is allowed and the
appeal is held to be number maintainable and as such dismissed. in c.m.p.


civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 742 of
1965.
appeal from the judgment and decree dated june 9 1965
of the mysore high companyrt in r.a. number 90 of 1957.

p. sinha e. c. agarwala and p. c. agarwala for
the appellant. v. gupte solicitor-general r. v. pillai for
respondents number. 1 and 2.

m. kshatriya and r. thiagarajan for respondent
number 3.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
ramaswami j. this appeal is brought by the judgment-
debtor eramma against the judgment and decree dated june 9
1965 in r.a. number 90 of 1957 of the high companyrt of mysore
setting aside the order of the district judge of raichur
dated february 14 1957 dismissing an execution petition. the appellant--eramma--and the 3rd respondent-siddamma were
at the relevant time widows of eran gowda who also
had a third wife--sharnamma. by the said sharnamma eran
gowda had a son called basanna who died in the year 1347 f.
 companyresponding to 1936-37 a.d.  at a time when he was the
sole male holder of the property in dispute. after his
death his step mothers eramma and siddamma got into
possession of the properties. respondents 1 and 2
thereafter filed a suit in the sadar adalat gulbarga
claiming that they as the nearest heirs of basanna were
entitled to all the properties left by him and seeking to
recover possession thereof from his step-mothers--eramma and
siddamma. the suit was companytested by eramma on the ground
that she had adopted sogan gouda respondent number 4 on the
basis of the authority alleged to have been given to her by
her husband eran gowda. it was claimed by siddamma that she
had adopted sharnappa respondent number 5 on the basis of the
authority alleged to have been companyveyed under a will. the
trial companyrt rejected the case of eramma but upheld that of
siddamma. on appeal to the high companyrt siddammas claim of
adoption was also negatived. in the result the high companyrt
passed a decree in favour of respondents 1 and 2. eramma and
siddamma thereafter applied to the high companyrt for a
certificate of fitness to appeal to this companyrt. siddamma
was granted such certificate but the high companyrt refused to
grant a certificate to eramma who filed an application in
this companyrt for
special leave. during the pendency of these proceedings the
hindu succession act 1956 came into force with effect from
june 17 1956. respondents 1 and 2 have put to execution
the decree granted by the high companyrt in their favour. eramma filed an objection in the execution companyrt on the
ground that she had been in possession of half the
properties since the death of her husband and the decree was
number-executable in view of the provisions of the hindu
succession act 1956 and that she had number become full owner
of the properties of which she is in possession. the case
of eramma was accepted by the district judge raichur who
dismissed the execution case on february 14 1957.
respondents 1 and 2 preferred an appeal to the mysore high
court against the order of the district judge dismissing
the execution case. the appeal was allowed by the high
court on the ground that hindu succession act 1956 was number
applicable to the case and eramma did number acquire full
ownership under s. 14 1  of that act. the high companyrt
accordingly set aside the order of the district judge dated
february 14 1957 dismissing the execution case and restored
the execution case to the file of the district judge for
being dealt with in accordance with law. on behalf of the appellant mr. sinha companytended in the
first place that under s. 8 of the hindu succession act the
appellant being the step mother is entitled to inherit the
properties of baswan gouda in preference to respondents i
and 2. mr. sinha companyceded that baswan gouda died on october
23 1936 long before the companying into operation of hindu
succession act. it was however submitted for the
appellant that s. 8 of the hindu succession act was
retrospective in operation and the appellant must be held to
be in possession of the properties in her own right. in our
opinion the submission of mr. sinha is number warranted by the
language of s. 8 which is to the following effect

the property of a male hindu dying
intestate shall devolve according to the
provisions of this chapter -
 a  firstly upon the heirs being the
relatives specified in class i of the
schedule
 b  secondly if there is numberheir of
class 1 then upon the heirs being the
relatives specified in class ii of the
schedule
 c  thirdly if there is numberheir of any
of the two classes then upon the agnates of
the deceased and
 d  lastly if there is numberagnate then
upon the agnates of the deceased. there is numberhing in the language of this section to suggest
that it has retrospective operation. the words the
property of a male hindu dying intestate and the words
shall devolve occurring in the section make it very clear
that the property whose devolution is provided for by that
section must be the property of a person who dies after the
commencement of the hindu succession act. reference may be
made in this companynection to s. 6 of the act which states

when a male hindu dies after the
commencement of this act having at the time
of his death an interest in a mitakshara
coparcenary property his interest in the
property shall devolve by survivorship upon
the surviving members of the companyarcenary and
number in accordance with this act
provided that if the deceased had left
him surviving a female relative specified in
class i of the schedule or a male relative
specified in that class who claims through
such female relative the interest of the
deceased in the mitakshara companyarcenary
property shall devolve by testamentary or
intestate succession as the case may be under
this act and number by survivorship. it is clear from the express language of the section that it
applies only to companyarcenary property of the male hindu
holder who dies after the companymencement of the act. it is
manifest that the language of s. 8 must be companystrued in the
context of s. 6 of the act. we accordingly hold that the
provisions of s. 8 of the hindu succession act are number
retrospective in operation and where a male hindu died
before the act came into force i.e. where succession opened
before the act s. 8 of the act will have numberapplication. it was next companytended by the appellant that she was
admittedly in possession of half the properties of her
husband eran gowda after he died in 1341 f and by virtue of
s. 14 of the hindu succession act she became the full owner
of the properties and respondents 1 and 2 cannumber therefore
proceed with the execution case. we are unable to accept
this argument as companyrect. at the time of eran gowdas death
the hindu womens right to property act 1937  act 18 of
1937  had number companye into force. it is admitted by mr. sinha
that the act was extended to hyderabad state with effect
from february 7 1953. it is manifest that at the time of
promulgation of hindu succession act 1956 the appellant had
numbermanner
l3sup.cl/66-10
of title to properties of eran gowda. section 14 1  of the
hindu succession act states
14.  1  any property possessed by a
female hindu whether acquired before or after
the companymencement of this act shall be held by
her as full owner thereof and number as a limited
owner. explanation.-in this sub-section
property includes both movable and immovable
property acquired by a female hindu by
inheritance or devise or at a partition or
in lieu of maintenance or arrears of mainten-
ance or by gift from any person whether a
relative or number before at or after her
marriage or by her own skill or exertion or
by purchase or by prescription or in any
other manner whatsoever and also any such
property held by her as stridhana immediately
before the companymencement of this act. it is true that the appellant was in possession of eran
gowdass properties but that fact alone is number sufficient to
attract the operation of s. 14. the property possessed by a
female hindu as companytemplated in the section is clearly
property to which she has acquired some kind of title
whether before or after the companymencement of the act. it may
be numbericed that the explanation to s. 14 1  sets out the
various modes of acquisition of the property by a female
hindu and indicates that the section applies only to
property to which the female hindu has acquired some kind of
title however restricted the nature of her interest may
be. the words as full owner thereof and number as a limited
owner as given in the last portion of sub-s.  1  of s. 14
clearly suggest that the legislature intended that the
limited ownership of a hindu female should be changed into
full ownership. in other words s. 14 1  of the act
contemplates that a hindu female  who in the absence of
this provision would have been limited owner of the
property will number become full owner of the same by virtue
of this section. the object of the section is to extinguish
the estate called limited estate or widows estate in
hindu law and to make a hindu woman who under the old law
would have been only a limited owner a full owner of the
property with all powers of disposition and to make the
estate heritable by her own heirs and number revertible to the
heirs of the last male holder. the explanation to sub-s.
 1  of s. 14 defines the word property as including both
movable and immovable property acquired by a female hindu by
inheritance or devise sub-section  2  of s. 14
also refers to acquisition of property. it is true that the
explanation has number given
any exhaustive companynumberation of the word property but the
word acquired used in the explanation and also in sub-s.
 2  of s. 14 clearly indicates that the object of the
section is to make a hindu female a full owner of the
property which she has already acquired or which she
acquires after the enforcement of the act. it does number in
any way companyfer a title on the female hindu where she did number
in fact possess any vestige of title.


civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeals. number. 2197 and
2198 of 1966.
appeals from the judgment and decree dated september 10
1966 of the gujarat high companyrt in special civil applications
number. 846 of 1963 and 765 of 1964.

k. sen a. k. verma d. datta and ravinder narain for
the appellants  in both the appeals . c. chagla and i. n. shroff for the respondents number. 1
and 2  in both the appeals . sen and s. p. nayar for respondent number 3  in both the
appeals . the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
hidayatullah c.j. these matters arise under art. 226 of the
constitution and are appeals by certificate granted by the
high companyrt of gujarat against its judgment and order
september 10 1966. the appellant number 1 is a companypany which
has spinning and weaving mills at broach and manufactures
and sells companyton yarn and cloth. respondent number 1 is the
broach borough municipality companystituted under s. 8 of the
bombay municipal boroughs act 1925. in the assessments
years 1961-62 1962-63 and 1963-64 the municipality
purporting to act under s. 73 of the bombay municipal
boroughs act 1925 and the rules made thereunder imposed a
purported rate on lands and buildings belonging to the
respondent at a certain percentage of the capital value. section 73 of the act allows the municipality to levy a
rate on buildings or lands or both situate within the
municipal borough. the rules under the act applied the
rates on the basis of the percentage on the capital value of
lands and buildings. the assessments lists were published
and tax was imposed according to the rates calculated on the
basis of the capital value of the property of the appellant
and bills in respect of the tax were served. the writ
petitions were filed to question the assessment and to get
the assessment cancelled. during the pendency of the writ petitions the legislature of
gujarat passed the gujarat imposition of taxes by
municipalities  validation  act 1963. as a result the writ
petitions were amen-
ded and the validation act was also questioned. the
appellants also filed a second writ petition questioning the
validity of the validation act under arts. 19 1  f   g  and
265 of the companystitution. by the order under appeal here
both the writ petitions were dismissed although a
certificate of fitness was granted. the validation act was presumably passed because of the
decision of this companyrt reported in patel gordhandas
hargovindas v. municipal companymissioner ahmedabad 1 . in
that case the validity of the rules framed by the municipal
corporation under s 73 were called in question
particularly rule 350a for rating open lands which provides
that the rate on the area of open lands shall be levied at 1
per centum on the valuation based upon capital value. dealing with the word rate as used in these statutes it
was held by this companyrt that the word rate had acquired a
special meaning in english legislative history and practice
and also in indian legislation and it meant a tax for local
purposes imposed by local authorities. the basis of such
tax was the annual value of the lands or buildings. it was
discussed in the case that there were three methods by which
the rates companyld be imposed the first was to take into
account the actual rent fetched by the land or building
where it was actually let the second was. where it was number
let to take rent based on hypothetical tenancy
particularly in the case of buildings and the third was
where neither of these two modes was available by valuation
based on capital value from which annual value had to be
found by applying suitable percentage which might number be the
same for lands and buildings. it was held that in s. 73 the
word rate as used must have been used in the special sense
in which the word was understood in the legislative practice
of india before that date. rule350a which laid the rate on
land at a percentage of the valuation based upon capital was
therefore declared ultra vires the act itself. in short
the word rate was given a specialised meaning and was held
to mean a kind of imposition the annual letting value of
property if actually let out and on a numberional letting
value if the property was number let out. the legislature of
gujarat then passed the validation act seeking to validate
the imposition or the tax as well as to avoid any future
interpretation of the act on the lines on which rule 350a
was companystrued. the act came into force on january 29 1964.
after defining the expressions used in the act and providing
for its application the act enacted s. 3 which companycerned
validation of impositions and companylections of taxes or rates
by municipalities in certain cases. that section reads as. follows

validation of imposition and companylection of
taxes or rates by municipalities in certain
cases.  1  1954 2 s.c.r. 608.
numberwithstanding anything companytained in any
judgment decree or order of a companyrt or
tribunal or any other authority numbertax or
rate assessed or purporting to have
been assessed by a municipality under the
relevant municipal law or any rules made
thereunder on the basis of the capital value
of a building or land as the case may be or
on the basis of a percentage of such capital
value or recovered by the municipality
commencement of this act shall be deemed to
invalidly assessed imposed companylected or
recovered by reason of the assessment being
based on the capital value or the percentage
of the capital value and number being based on
the annual letting value of the building or
land as the case may be and the imposition
collection and recovery of the tax or rate so
assessed and the provisions of the rules made
under the relevant municipal law under which
the tax or rate was so assessed shall be valid
and shall be deemed always to have been valid
and shall number be called in question merely on
the ground that the assessment of the tax or
rate on the basis of the capital value of the
building or land as the case may be or on
the basis of a percentage of such capital
value was number authorised by law and accord-
ingly any tax or rate so assessed before the
commencement of this act and leviable for a
period prior to such companymencement but number
collected or recovered before
such
commencement may be companylected and recovered
in accordance with the relevant municipal law
and the rules made thereunder. if this section is valid then the imposition cannumber be
questioned and the short question which arises in this case
is as to the validity of this section. it is number denied
that a legislature does possess the power to validate
statutes and to pass retrospective laws. it is however
contended that the validation act is ineffective in carrying
out its avowed object. this is the only point which falls
for companysideration in these appeals. before we examine s. 3 to find out whether it is effective
in its purpose or number we may say a few words about
validating statutes in general. when a legislature sets out
to validate a tax declared by a companyrt to be illegally
collected under an ineffective or an invalid law the cause
for ineffectiveness or invalidity must be removed before
validation can be said to take place effectively. the most
important companydition of companyrse is that the legislature must
possess the power to impose the tax for if it does number
the action must ever remain ineffective and illegal. granted legis-
lative companypetence it is number sufficient to declare merely
that the decision of the companyrt shall number bind for that is
tantamount to reversing the decision in exercise of judicial
power which the legislature does number possess or exercise. a
courts decision must always bind unless the companyditions on
which it is based are so fundamentally altered that the
decision companyld number have been given in the altered
circumstances. ordinarily a companyrt holds a tax to be
invalidly imposed because the power to tax is wanting or
the statute or the rules or both are invalid or do number
sufficiently create the jurisdiction. validation of a tax
so declared illegal may be done only if the grounds of
illegality or invalidity are capable of being removed and
are in fact removed and the tax thus made legal. sometimes
this is done by providing for jurisdiction where
jurisdiction had number been properly invested before. sometimes this is done by re-enacting retrospectively a
valid and legal taxing provision and then by fiction making
the tax already companylected to stand under the re-enacted law. sometimes the legislature gives its own meaning and
interpretation of the law under which the tax was companylected
and by legislative fiat makes the new meaning binding upon
courts. the legislature may follow any one method or all of
them and while it does so it may neutralise the effect of
the earlier decision of the companyrt which becomes ineffective
after the change of the law. whichever method is adopted it
must be within the companypetence of the legislature and legal
and adequate to attain the object of validation. if the
legislature has the power over the subject-matter and
competence to make a valid law it can at any time make such
a valid law and make it retrospectively so as to bind even
past transactions. the validity of a validating law
therefore depends upon whether the legislature possesses
the companypetence which it claims over the subject-matter and
whether in making the validation it removes the defect which
the companyrts had found in the existing law and makes adequate
provisions in the validating law for a valid imposition of
the tax. the inquiry in this case may begin by asking whether the
legislature possesses companypetence to pass a law imposing a
tax on lands and buildings on the basis of a percentage of
their capital value. if the legislature possesses that
power then it can authorise the municipality to levy that
tax. to test the proposition we may companysider s. 99 which
has number been enacted in the gujarat municipalities act. it
reads

taxes which may be imposed. subject to any general or special orders
which the state government may make in this
behalf and to the provisions of sections 101
and 102 a municipality may impose for the
purposes of this act any of the following
taxes namely-

a tax on buildings or lands situate with
in the municipal borough to be based on the
annual letting value or the capital value or a
percentage of capital value of the buildings
or lands or both
learned companynsel for the appellants did number companytend that this
section was outside the powers of the legislature. in fact
he companyld number in view of entry 49 of list ii of the seventh
schedule to the companystitution. that entry reads taxes on
lands and buildings and a tax on lands and buildings based
upon capital value falls squarely within the entry. the
doubt which is created by entry 86 of list i taxes on the
capital value of assets numberlonger exists after the
decision of this companyrt in sudhir chandra nawn v. wealth-tax
officer calcutta 1 . in that case the respective ambits of
the two entries are explained. it is pointed out that
unlike the tax companytemplated by entry 49  list ii  the tax
under entry 8 6  list 1  is number a direct tax on lands and
buildings but on net assets the companyponents of which may be
lands and buildings and other items of assets excluding such
liabilities as may exist. the incidence of the tax is number
on lands and- buildings as units of taxation but on the net
assets of which lands and buildings are only some of the
components. this is number the case under entry 49  list 11
where the tax can be laid directly on lands and buildings as
units of taxation. therefore a tax on lands and buildings
is fully within the companypetence of the legislature and it is
open to it to authorise the municipality to levy the same
tax indicating the mode of levy. this the legislature has
done by indicating the different modes which may be adopted
in making the levy one such mode being a percentage of the
capital value. the legislature in s. 73 had number authorised the levy of a
tax in this manner but had authorised the levy of a rate. that led to the discussion whether a rule putting the tax on
capital value of buildings answered the description of the
impost in the act namely a rate on buildings or lands or
both situate within the municipal borough. it was held by
this companyrt it did number because the word rate had acquired
a special meaning in legislative practice. faced with this
situation the legislature exercised its undoubted powers of
redefining rate so as to equate it to a tax on capital
value and companyvert the tax purported to be companylected as a
rate into a tax on lands and buildings. the legislature
in the validation act therefore provided for the following
matters. first it stated that numbertax or rate by whichever
name called and laid on the capital value of lands and
buildings must be deemed

a.i.r. 1969 s.c. 59.
to be invalidly assessed imposed companylected or recovreed
simply on the ground that a rate is based on the annual
letting value. next it provided that the tax must be deemed
to be validly assessed imposed companylected or recovered and
imposition must be deemed to be always so authorised. the
legislature by this enactment retrospectively imposed the
tax on lands and buildings based on their capital value and
as the tax was already imposed levied and companylected on that
basis made the imposition levy companylection and recovery of
the tax valid numberwithstanding the declaration by the companyrt
that as rate the levy was incompetent. the legislature
number only equated the tax companylected to a tax on lands and
buildings which it had the power to levy but also to a
rate giving a new meaning to the expression rate and
while doing so it put out of action the effect of the
decisions of the companyrts to the companytrary. the exercise of
power by the legislature was valid because the legislature
does possess the power to levy a tax on lands and buildings
based on capital value thereof and in validating the levy on
that basis the implication of the use of the word rate
could be effectively removed and the tax on lands and
buildings imposed instead. the tax.