civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 1934
of 1972.
from the judgment and order dated 9.12. 1971 of the
punjab and haryana high companyrt in regular second appeal number
1286 of 1969.

c. mahajan k.r. nagaraja  np  and r.s. hegde for the
appellant. uma dutta e.c. agarwala ms. sheil sethi and susheel
kumar for the respondents. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by

n. saikia j. this first defendants appeal by special
leave is from the judgment and decree of the high companyrt of
punjab and haryana in r.s.a. number 1286 of 1969 dated 9.12. 1971. respondents 4 to 6 balwant singh jagir singh and teja
singh sons of kehar singh sold land measuring 38 kanals 3
marlas being 3/5th share of 63 kanals 11 marlas of ances-
tral land situated at village maherna kalan tehsil and
district ludhiana as per sale deed dated june 4 1964 in
favour of the appellant  first defendant  for rs. 14000 as
the vendors left their village maherna kalan and had number
been cultivating the same and it was number yielding any prof-
it. the sale deed companytained a recital that the vendors sold
the land with a view to purchase land in anumberher village. on
numberember 6 1965 the vendors actually purchased 80 kanals of
nehri land for rs. 11000. the parties are admittedly jat
sikhs governed by punjab customs. respondents 1 to 3 filed a declaratory suit on august 3
1966 in the companyrt of sub-judge ludhiana seeking a declara-
tion that the sale of the suit land would number affect their
reversionary rights after the death of respondents 4 to 6 as
they were governed by the custom in the matter of alienation
inasmuch as the suit land was ancestral in the hands of the
alienumbers qua the plaintiffs  respondents 1 to 3  and that
the sale was effected without companysideration and without
legal necessity and respondents 4 to 6  defendants 2 to 4
were restrained from alienating under the custom. the appellant averred inter alia that the sale was for
consideration and legal necessity as it was an act of good
management on the part of the alienumbers that respondents 4
to 6 who were number sonless and were men of good character and
sober habits that migrating from their village they had
settled elsewhere as they were neither cultivating the suit
land number were in a position to manage and cultivate the
same and that the alienumbers had actually purchased 80 kanals
of better quality nehri land which showed that the sale was
an act of good management on the part of the vendors. it was
also companytended that the land in suit was number ancestral qua
the plaintiffs number was it governed by customs and that the
plaintiffs had numberlocus standi. the respondents 4 to 6 being defendants 2 to 4 admitted
the claims of the plaintiffs. the respondent number 5 who was
the brother of respondent number 2 was impleaded as proforma
defendant having the same interest as the plaintiffs. the trial companyrt inter alia held that the parties in
respect of the sale of the suit land were governed by custom
whereunder ancestral land companyld number be alienated except for
legal necessity or as an act of good management that the
suit land was ancestral qua the plaintiffs  respondents 1 to
3  and defendants 2 to 4  respondents 4 to 6  that the sale
was effected for companysideration of rs. 14000 as stipulated
in the sale deed and that the sale was an act of prudent
management on the part of the vendors and as such unimpeach-
able. the suit having been dismissed and the first appeal
therefrom having failed the respondents 1 to 3 preferred

s.a. number 1286 of 1969 in the high companyrt of punjab and
haryana wherein they sought to adduce additional and further
evidence of a sale deed dated june 3 1969 alleged to have
been executed by respondents 4 to 6 in respect of the suit
land. the high companyrt allowed the r.s.a. and set aside the
sale holding that it was neither for any legal necessity number
could it be justified as an act of good management. the suit
was accordingly decreed. the certificate to file letters
patent appeal having been refused the appellant obtained
special leave. mr. v.c. mahajan the learned companynsel for the appellant
submits that whether the sale was or was number an act of good
management having been a question of fact the trial companyrt
and the first appellate companyrt having arrived at a companycurrent
finding that it was an act of good management and as such
unimpeachable this companycurrent finding companyld number have been
set aside by the high companyrt in second appeal that the sale
deed dated june 3 1969 which was never accepted and proved
according to law was irrelevant for impeaching the sale and
the high companyrt erred in law in taking it into companysideration
while determining whether the sale was an act of good man-
agement. mr. uma dutta learned companynsel for the respondents
submits inter alia that the sale of the suit land measur-
ing 38 kanals 3 marlas being on june 4 1964 and the subse-
quent purchase of 80 kanals for rs. 11000 being on numberember
8 1965 and that land also having subsequently been sold on
june 3 1969 for rs.35000 and there being numberevidence to
show that the suit land was less fertile or that the vendors
had settled at village pather the high companyrt was companyrect in
holding that the impugned sale was number an act of good man-
agement. the only question to be decided in this appeal there-
fore is whether the high companyrt was companyrect in setting aside
the companycurrent finding that the impugned sale was an act of
good management and number restricted by custom. it is companymon ground that the parties are governed by the
local custom which restricts alienation. about the custom

h. rattigan in his a digest of customary law in the
punjab  14th ed.  in chapter iv at page 283 said
thus while the unhampered exclusive use of property in a
mans possession whether ancestral or acquired for his
lifetime with a free disposal of the income is number denied
freedom of alienation whether by gift or bequest is in
regard to ancestral immovable property subject in most
cases to certain restrictions. a late senior judge of the chief companyrt in a leading
case  number. 107 p.r. 1887 page 247  expressed generally
that
respect of ancestral immovable properly in the
hands of any individual. there exists some sort of residuary
interest in all the descendants of the first owner. or body
of owners however remote and companytingent may be the proba-
bility of some among such descendants ever having the enjoy-
ment of the property. in short the owner in possession is
number regarded as having the whole and sole interest in the
property and power to dispose of it so as to defeat the
expectations of those who are deemed to have a residuary
interest and who would take the property if the owner died
without disposing of it. the limitations within which per-
sons having or claiming to have such a residuary interest
may prevent an owner in possession from defeating their
expectations will be found to vary according to local cir-
cumstances which may either weaken or rebut the presumption
that the owner has number an unrestricted power of
disposition. sir meredyth plowden in gujar v. sham das 107p.r. 1887 also
said
in respect of ancestral immovable property in the hands of
any individual there exists some sort of residuary interest
in all the descendants of the first owner or body of owners
however remote and companytingent may be the probability of some
among such descendants ever having the enjoyment of the
property. the owner in possession is number regarded as having
the whole and sole interest in the property and power to
dispose of it so as to defeat the expectations of those who
are deemed to have a residuary interest and who would take
the property if the owner died without disposing of it. in the critical words of chief justice sir shadi lal in
gujar v. sham das  supra  the issues before the companyrt were
whether in a case where the power of a sonless jat proprie-
tor to alienate ancestral land without necessity was in
dispute it was the duty of the alienee to prove a custom
authorizing a transfer of the ancestral land in favour of
stranger and on whom lay the onus of proving that a sonless
proprietor has powers to dispose of ancestral land without
necessity and the rest were mere deductions. in para 59 at page 291 of the digest rattigan states the
restrictions on alienation of ancestral immovable property
thus
ancestral immovable property is ordinarily inalienable
 especially amongst jats residing in the central districts
of the punjab  except for necessity or with the companysent of
male descendants or in the case of a sonless proprietor
of his male companylaterals. provided that a proprietor can
alienate ancestral immovable property at pleasure if there
is at the date of such alienation neither a male descendant
number a male companylateral in existence  number 36 p.r. 1895 number 55

r. 1903 f.b.  in other words the custom is that the ancestral immova-
ble property is ordinarily inalienable especially amongst
jats residing in the central districts of punjab except for
necessity and the other permis-
sible reasons. an alientation as a bona fide act of good
management has been treated as one of necessity and hence
valid. at page 388 of the digest we find the gloss
in the case of a male proprietor in the management of
agricultural affairs a very strict econumbery and a very excel-
lent management must number be insisted upon. ordinary bona
fide management is all that can be demanded  number 70 p.r. 1894 number 20 p.w.r. 1911 number 40 p.w.r. 1911 and number 25

r. 1911  1922 69 ind. case 521  exchange of land . where although numberimmediate necessity for a sale
is established if the sale has been held to be an act of
good management it is binding on the reversioners. the above statement has been companymented upon as being a
bit wide and the suggested statement is that such a sale
must be upheld. in mohammad chiragh and ors. v. fatta
ors. a.i.r. 1934 lahore--452 where although numberimmediate
necessity for sale was established but there was a recital
in the sale deed that the vendors intended to purchase other
land with the proceeds of the sale and a representation of
that kind was made to the vendees which might have been
believed by them in good faith the high companyrt did number see
any good grounds for interference with the findings of the
learned district judge that the sale was an act of good
management which it was observed was essentially a find-
ing of fact. in abdul rafi khan v. p. lakshmi chand ors. i.r. 1934 lahore--998 where the members of the family
finding their position in the village precarious due to
deteriorating relations between it and the tenants in the
village sold their land one by one as they found it diffi-
cult to manage them or recover rent and the vendors moved to
anumberher place where they purchased certain land it was held
that the sale of the land was an act of good management and
the vendee was number expected to see to the application of the
money by the vendors to the purposes mentioned in the sale
deed. similarly in dial singh v. surain singh a.i.r. 1937
lahore--493 the question was whether a sale of ancestral
land was for necessity. on april 3 1934 bhagwan singh sold
ancestral land for rs. 1500 the entire companysideration being
paid to him before the sub registrar. the object of the sale
was the purchase of land in bikaner and gwalior states and
actually since the sale bhagwan singh spent
about rs. 160 in buying about 100 bighas of land in gwalior. the lower companyrts companycurrently found that the sale was for. necessity. before the district judge it was urged that the
money had number been actually spent on the purpose for which
it was raised. but the learned district judge held that this
was admitted to be companyrect that all that the alienee had to
do was to see that the money was required for a legitimate
purpose. the sole question therefore was whether the sale
in order to buy land in gwalior and bikaner was an act of
good management which would be regarded as one of necessi-
ty. the division bench held that numbersufficient reason had
been shown for dissenting from the companycurrent finding of the
courts below that the sale of land by bhagwan singh in the
presence of his elder son was for necessary. in gajjan singh ors. v. anna singh 1968 p.l.r. vol. 70-195 it was held that numberperson companyld be tied down to the
village where he had ancestral land unless it was shown that
he was leaving the village or disposing of the land in the
village on some false pretext. where relations of a proprie-
tor with his brother were strained and he sold the land to
purchase land in some other village the alienation was held
to be an act of good management and that once a true repre-
sentation was made by the vendor the vendees were number to
see the application of the money and they need number prove
that the money in fact was utilised for a necessary purpose. it was further held that the land purchased with the sale
proceeds of the ancestral land did number cease to be ancestral
and it remained ancestral land. in the instant case the vendee proved the ingredients of
good management and the companycurrent finding of the trial
court and the first appellate companyrt was that the impugned
sale was an act of good management and it was essentially a
finding of fact. applying the law as enunciated in the above
decisions we do number find any infirmity therein. the submis-
sions of the learned companynsel for the respondents that in
view of the subsequent sale of the land would go to show
that it was speculative sale would be wholly irrelevant. there was evidence to show that even prior to the sale the
vendors were number cultivating and as such number deriving any
profit from the land. the distance of time between the
impugned sale on june 4 1964 and the purchase of 80 kanals
of land in the other village on numberember 6 1965 was number
such as to disprove that the sale was an act of good manage-
ment and as such was for necessity. the trial companyrt clearly
found that the vendors left for and settled at the new
village where they purchased 30 kanals of land. the averment
that the purchased land was subsequently sold on june
3 1969 at rs.35000 besides having number been proved in
accordance with law was wholly irrelevant for the purpose
of discharging the onus of the appellant--vendee.


civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 30 of 1965. 5 9 0
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
september 8 1962 of the bombay high companyrt in special civil
application number 364 of 1961.

b. agarwala 0. p. malhotra j. b. dadachanji o. c.
mathur and ravinder narain for the appellant. l. sangli and a. g. ratnaparkhi for respondent number 3.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
wanchoo j. the only question raised in this appeal by
special. leave is whether the central provinces and berar
industrial disputes settlement act number xxiii of 1947
 hereinafter referred to as the act  is applicable to the
head office of the appellant which is knumbern as the ballarpur
collieries companypany. the head office is situate in nagpur
and has a staff of about 35 employees. the business of the
head office is to look after the sale of companyl extracted from
the companylieries. the question arises in this way. bapat respondent was a
stenumberrapher working in the head office at nagpur. he was
dismissed from service on july 31 1959. it is number
necessary for present purposes to go into the facts and
circumstances leading to this dismissal. suffice it to
mention that an enquiry was said to have been held before
the dismissal order was passed. while this enquiry was
pending bapat made an application under s. 16 of the act
before the assistant companymissioner of labour nagpur on july
21 1959. in this application bapat prayed that the
employer should be ordered to pay him wages from the date of
dismissal discharge or removal to the date of the order
under s. 16 in addition to a sum number exceeding rs. 2500 by
way of companypensation. it was also prayed that the
employer should be ordered to pay retrenchment companypensation
under chap. v-a of the industrial disputes act number 14 of
1947  hereinafter referred to as the central act number 14 . though this application was headed as application for
reinstatement and companypensation etc. there was numberprayer for
reinstatement and bapat was only companytent to ask for a sum of
rs. 2500 by way of companypensation. while this application
was pending bapat was as already indicated dismissed on
july 31 1959. thereupon he filed anumberher application under
s. 16 of the act on august 19 1959. in this application he
prayed for reinstatement or in the alternative for full company-
pensation amounting to rs. 2500 and such other relief as he
might be entitled to. the main companytention of the appellant before the assistant
commissioner of labour was that the act did number apply to it
and
therefore the assistant companymissioner had numberjurisdiction to
proceed in the matter. the assistant companymissioner held that
the act applied and he had jurisdiction to deal with the
matter. he therefore gave relief by setting aside the order
of dismissal and directing that the employer should pay rs. 2000 as companypensation and wages from the date of dismissal
to the date of his order. this order was taken in revision by the appellant to the
state industrial companyrt at nagpur and the main companytention
again urged there was that the act did number apply to the
appellant and the assistant companymissioner had numberjurisdiction
to deal with the matter. this companytention did number find
favour with the state industrial companyrt with the result that
the revision was dismissed. the appellant then filed a petition under articles 226 and
227 of the companystitution in the high companyrt and the same
contention was raised that the act did number apply and the
assistant companymissioner had numberjurisdiction in the matter. the high companyrt held on a companystruction of the relevant
provisions of the act and the numberification issued thereunder
that the act was applicable and in companysequence the writ
petition was dismissed. the high companyrt having refused to
give leave to appeal to this companyrt the appellant obtained
special leave from this companyrt and that is how the matter
has companye before us. section 1 of the act came into force on june 2 1947 andas
provided by s. 1 3  thereof the rest of the act came into
force on numberember 21 1947 on a numberification being issued
by the state government in that behalf. section 1 3  lays
down that the state government may by numberification bring
the remaining sections or any of them into force in such
area or industry and on such date as may be specified in the
numberification. by virtue of the power companyferred on the state
government by s. 1 3  the following numberification was issued
on numberember 2
in exercise of the powers companyferred by sub-
section  3 of section 1 of the central
provinces and berar industrial disputes
settlement act 1947 the provincial
government are pleased to direct that sections
2 to 61 of the said act shall companye into force
on the 21st numberember 1947 in all the
industries except the following namely -

textile industry. employment in any industry carried on by
or under the authority of the central
government
by an indian state railway or by a railway
company operating an indian state railway. mines. saw mills. it is the interpretation of this numberification which calls
for companysideration in the present appeal. the appellants
contention is that by this numberification the act was applied
as from numberember 21 1947 to all industries except four
specified therein and of these the third was mines. it is
urged on behalf of the appellant that when the numberification
provided for the application of the act to .all industries
except four which were excepted it was exempting the mining
industry by the third item of exemption. the nlining
industry according to the appellant will include the head
office for as the high companyrt says it is number disputed that
the head office is a part of integrated activity of the
petitioner-company which carries on the business of
producing companyl and its sale and supply to its various
customers. the argument is that the head office at nagpur
being a part of integrated activity of carrying on the
mining industry by the appellant the head office was
equally exempt from the application of the act by the
numberification in question. if that is so numberapplication
under s. 16 of the act companyld be made by bapat to the
assistant companymissioner of labour. it is also pointed out on
behalf of the appellant that bapat would have a remedy under
the central act number 14 of 1947 which came into force earlier
than the act from april 1 1947 though the procedure for
obtaining relief under that act would be different namely
through- a reference by the appropriate government under s.
10 of the central act number 14 of 1947.
the high companyrt however held that what was exempted by the
third item in the numberification was number the head office of a
mine but the mine itself and numbermore companysequently the
employees at the head office of the appellant were governed
by the act. this view of the high companyrt is being supported
by the respondents before us and it is urged that the
numberification uses the word mines and number the words
mining industry in the exemption part and therefore what
was exempted from the act were merely -the companyl mines where
mining operations were carried on and number the mining
industry which may include the head office also. we are of the opinion that the companytention raised on behalf
of the appellant is companyrect and what the numberification
exempted was the mining industry from the operation of the
act. in this companynection we may refer to the following
words in the numberification
5 93
namely the said act shall companye into force on the 21st
numberember 1947 in a11 the industries except the following. grammatically the word industries must be understood as
following the wordfollowing appearing in the above
sentence. thus what the numberification in effect said was
that the said act shall companye into force on 21st numberember
1947 in all the industries except the following industries. it has however been urged that if that was so it was number
necessary for example in the first item of examption to
use the words textile industry and it would have been
sufficient to use the word textile. all that we need say
is that the numberification is number a work of art and has to be
read in its tenumber without trying to find out why the word
industry was used in the first item and why the same was
number used in the third and fourth items which deal with
mines and saw mills respectively. grammatically
however this part of the numberification clearly says that the
act would apply to all industries except the four industries
specified therein for the purpose of exemption. these four
exemptions include the industry of mines. we see no
difference between the words mining industry and industry
of mines for they mean the same thing namely the
industry which is companycerned with mines. if therefore the
numberification exempted the industry of mines or the mining
industry it cannumber be said that it merely exempted that part
of the said industry of mines or mining industry which
consisted of raising companyl at the companyliery and did number
include the head office thereof. as we have already
indicated the high companyrt has said that it is number disputed
that the head office is a part of integrated activity of the
petitioner companypany which carries on the business of
producing companyl and its sale and supply to its various
customers. therefore when the industry of mines or the
mining industry was exempted from the operation of the act
the exemption applied number only to that part of the industry
which companysisted of raising companyl at the companyliery but also to
that part of it which companysisted in the sale of companyl and its
supply to customers and would thus include the head office
also. as we read the numberification we see numberescape from the
conclusion that what was exempted from the application of
the act was the industry of mines or the mining industry and
that would include number only the companyliery where the companyl was
raised but also the head office from where the companyl was sold
and distributed to the customers. it number remains to refer to two cases on which reliance was
placed by the high companyrt. the first is messrs. godavari
sugar mills limited v. d. k. worlikar 1 . in that case this
court held
 1  1960 3 s.c.r. 305. 5 9 4
that the numberification under challenge there did number apply to
the head office of the sugar mills. that decision turned on
the actual words of the numberification and is of numberassistance
to the respondents. it was pointed out in that case that if
the numberification had merely used the words sugar industry
it would have been possible to companystrue that expression in a
broader sense having regard to the wide definition of the
word industry but the numberification had deliberately
adopted a different phraseology and had brought within its
purview number the sugar industry as such but the manufacture
of sugar and its by-products. the words of the numberification
in that case were the said act shall apply to the following
industry namely the manufacture of sugar and its by-
products. therefore on the words of the numberification in
that case the wide implication which might have arisen if
the numberification had merely stated that the act applied to
the sugar industry was cut down by the specific words in the
numberification namely manufacture of sugar and its by-
products which would clearly apply only to a part of sugar
industry which dealt with the manufacture of sugar and the
by-products and would number apply to the head office which did
number deal with the actual manufacture but dealt with the
consequent steps following on the manufacture viz. sale and
distribution to customers. in the present case the
numberification clearly applied to the industry of mines which
in our opinion is numberhing different from mining industry and
must therefore take in the entire industry including the
raising of companyl from the companyliery as .well as its
distribution sale and supply to the customers. that case
therefore is of numberhelp to the respondents. the next case to which reference is made is messrs.
serajuddin and companypany v. their workmen 1 . in that case a
dispute relating to the head office of a mining companypany was
referred by the government of west bengal to the industrial
tribunal and a question arose whether the government of west
bengal was the appropriate government within the meaning of
s. 2  a   i  of the central act number 14 of 1947. it was held
that the west bengal government was the appropriate
government and the decision turned on the interpretation of
s. 2  a   i  of the said act which defined appropriate
government. the words which came in for interpretation
were in relation to an industrial dispute companycerning a
banking or an insurance companypany a mine an oil-field or a
major port. it was held that the word mine as used in s.
2  a   i  of the central act number 14 of 1947 referred to a
mine as defined in the mines act and that a dispute with
reference to the head office of a mine was number a dispute
concerning the mine which
 1  1962 3 supp. s.c.r. 934. 5 9 5
must mean a mine as defined in the mines act. that case
also is of numberhelp to the respondents for here we are number
concerned with the word mine what we are companycerned with
is whether the exemption clause in the numberification which
exempts the industry of mines or the mining industry will
take in the head office. the words therefore in the present
numberification are different and the decision in that case is
of numberhelp. we have numberdoubt that when the numberification
exempts the industry of mines or the mining industry which
in our opinion mean the same thing the exemption includes
the he-ad office also which must be treated as an integral
part of the mining industry for it deals with the subse-
quent steps taken to dispose of in this case the companyl
raised from the companyliery. learned companynsel for the appellant wished to argue that the
head office carried on other activities besides the activity
of selling companyl raised from the companyliery. we have number
allowed him to raise this point for this was number raised in
the high companyrt. we have already referred to the observation
of the high companyrt that it was number disputed that the head
office was a part of integrated activity of the appellant-
company which carried on the business of producing companyl and
its sale and supply to its various customers. it was number
even the case of the respondents in reply in the high companyrt
that the head office carried on other activities besides the
sale and distribution of the companyl produced in the companyliery.


civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeals number. 316-a and
316-b of 1962.
appeals by special leave and by certificate from judgment
and order dated march 25 1960 of the andhra pradesh high
court in writ petitions number. 534 and 535 of 1958.
and
writ petition number 302 of 1960.
petition under art. 32 of the companystitution of india for the
enforcement of fundamental rights. ram reddy for the appellant  in c.a. number 316a and 316b
of 1962  and the petitioner  in petition number 302 of 1960 . v. r. tatachari and b. r. g. k. achar for the
respondents  in both the appeals and the petition . february 4 1964. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered
by

ayyangar j.-the two civil appeals and the petition
under art. 32 of the companystitution which have been heard
together raise a companymon point regarding the validity of
numberices of demand for the payment of land cess under the
madras district boards act  madras act xiv of 1920  which
for shortness we shall call the act and the legality of the
procedure for the recovery of the amount of the said cess. the impugned numberices made a demand also for education cess
but as this cess is merely a proportion of the landed and
as the validity of that demand stands or falls with that of
the land-cess it is sufficient if we refer to and companysider
the challenge to the demand of land-cess
alone as that will determine the validity of the entire sum
demanded. the appellants father obtained a mining lease from the
government of madras dated september 15 1953 under which he
was permitted to work and win iron ore in a tract of land in
a village in chittoor district. the terms upon which the
lessee was to work the mines are number very relevant but what
is material is that under this instrument the lessee bound
himself to pay a dead rent of rs. 1140/2 per year if he
used the leased land for the extraction of iron ore and a
higher amount if used for other purposes. besides he also
bound himself to pay a royalty of 8 annas per ton of iron
ore if the ore were used for extraction of iron and if the
iron ore was used for any other purpose such as for sale in
specie at re. 1 - per ton. in addition the lease also
stipulated for the payment of surface rent at rs. 1-8-3 per
acre per annum in respect of the surface area occupied or
used. the lessee worked the mines extracted ore and
marketed it. to raise finances for carrying on the local administration
in the district boards several taxes are leviable. among
them section 78 of the act imposes a land-cess on lands in
the district in these terms

the land-cess shall be levied on the
annual rent value of all occupied lands on
whatever tenure held and shall companysist of a
tax of two annas in the rupee of the annual
rent value of all such lands in the district. the annual rent value on the basis of which the land-cess
to be levied was to be companyputed in the manner laid down in
s. 79 and this section ran

the annual rent value shall for the
purposes of section 78 be calculated in the
following manner

in the case of lands held direct from
government on ryotwari tenure or on lease or
licence the assessment lease amount royalty
or other sum payable to government for the
lands
together with any water-rate which may be
payable for their irrigation shall be taken
to be the annual rent value. in the case of inam lands or lands held
wholly or partially free from assessment the
full assessment which such lands would bear if
they were number inam together with any water-
rate which may be payable for their
irrigation shall be taken to be the annual
rent value and such full assessment and
water-rate shall be determined by the district
collector under the general orders of the
board of revenue. in the case of lands held on any other
tenure the annual rent payable to the
landholder sublandholder or any other
intermediate landholder holding on an under-
tenure created companytinued or recognized by a
landholder or sub-landholder as the case may
be by his tenants together with any water-
rate which may be payable for their
irrigation shall be taken to be the annual
rent value and where such lands are occupied
by the owner himself or by any person holding
the same from him free of rent or at a
favorable rent the annual rent value shall be
calculated according to the rates of rent
usually paid by occupancy riot for ryoti lands
in the neighborhood with similar advantages
together with any water-rate which may be
payable for the irrigation of the l
ands so
occupied. in the case of lands the assessment of
rent of which is paid in kind the annual rent
value shall be calculated according to the
rates of rent established or paid for
neighboring lands of a similar description and
quality together with any water-rate which
may be payable for the irrigation of the lands
first mentioned or if such method of
calculation is in the opinion of the board of
revenue impracticable in any
particular case according to any method which
the board of revenue may approve for that case

provided that where any landholder or sub-
landholder has obtained under the provisions
of sections 30 iii  and 33 of the madras
estates land act 1908 a decree empowering
him to increase his rent in companysequence of any
additional payment by way of water-rate made
by him to government the annual rent value
shall be the balance remaining after deducting
such increase of rent up to the amount of the
waterrate from the sum ascertained as
aforesaid. when the state of andhra was separated from madras in
october 1953 the district of chittoor became part of the
state of andhra. in 1955 a demand was made upon the father
of the appellant for the payment of land cess calculated in
accordance with the provisions of ss. 76 and 79 of the act
and including in the companyputation of the annual rent
value. the amounts payable to government in each year under
the mining lease both as surface rent and royalty. the
validity of this numberice was objected to on grounds which are
numberlonger material and the objections being upheld. the
numberices were quashed on writ petitions filed to the high
court andhra pradesh by the appellants father. after the decision by the high companyrt in his favour the
appellants father died. on march 10 1958 two numberices were
issued to the appellant demanding the payment of the sums
specified therein as being the messes for the years 1952 to
1954 and 1955 to 1957 respectively and threatening companyrcive
proceedings for their recovery in the event of the demand
number being companyplied with. impugning the validity of the
numberices of demand for the earlier triennial the appellant
filed writ petition 534 of 1958 in the high companyrt of andhra
pradesh and a similar petition number 535 of 1958 challenging
the validity of the numberice of demand for the later period. while these petitions were pending before the high companyrt a
further numberice of demand claiming the pay-
ment of cess for the years 1958 and 1959 was served on the
appellant in august 1960 and to obtain a similar relief in
respect of this numberice and the proceedings for the recovery
thereof the appellant has filed writ petition 302 of 1960
in this companyrt. to companyplete the narrative it is only
necessary to mention that both the writ petitions 534 and
535 of 1958 were dismissed by the high companyrt and when the
appellant sought to obtain certificates of fitness the
learned judges granted a certificate in respect of their
judgment in writ petition 535 of 1958 on the ground that the
value of the claim made against the appellant was over rs. 20000 but refused a similar certificate in writ petition
534 of 1958 where the amount demanded was less than that
figure-it was rs. 15000 and odd. the appellant thereupon
moved this companyrt for special leave in respect of the
dismissal of his writ petition 534 of 1958 and the same
having been granted all these three matters have been heard
together. the matter in companytroversy in the appeal is very limited and
the point involved very narrow. mr. ram reddylearned
counsel for the appellant raised three points in support of
the appeal  1  what is the meaning of the expression
royalty in s. 79 1  of the art? does it include the
royalty payable under a mining lease on the ore won by the
lessee  2  assuming that royalty in the sense mentioned in
point number 1 is within ss. 78 and 79 of the act the
provision imposing the land cess quoad royalty under mining
leases must be held to be repealed by the mines. minerals
 regulation development  act 1948  central act llll of
1948  or in any event by the mines minerals  regulation
development  act 1957  central act lxvii of 1957 . so that
after the date when these central enactments came into force
the land cess that companyld be levied under s. 78 must be
exclusive of royalty under a mining lease.  3  is the land
cess which was demanded by the impugned numberices dated march
10 1958 and august 29 1960 recoverable as an arrear of
land revenue under the law? we shall examine these submissions in that order. the first
contention that the expression royalty under s. 79 1  does
number signify royalty as companymonly understood but is
confined to the rent payable for the beneficial use of the
surface of the land scarcely deserves serious
consideration. where the land is held on lease as in the
present case the lease amount is specifically referred to
in s. 79 of the act as one of the companyponents for the
computation of the annual rent value. it is therefore. obvious that royalty which follows the expression lease
amount is something other than the return to the lessor or
licenser for the use of the land surface and represents as
it numbermally companynumberes the payment made for the materials or
minerals won from the land. the argument is therefore
without substance and is rejected. the second point has number in our opinion more merit the
entirety of the argument on this head is based on two
decisions of this companyrt in which this companyrt had to companysider
the companytinued operation of the orissa mining areas  deve-
lopment fund  act  act xxvii of 1952  the hingir rampur
coal company limited and others v. the state of orissa and
others 1  and state of orissa v. m. a. tullock company 1 . as
a matter of fact it might be mentioned that the present
appellant intervened in state of orissa v. m. a. tullock
co. and there was a direction by this companyrt that the present
appeals and petition might be heard after the judgment was
pronumbernced in the orissa appeals. we are however clearly
of the opinion that neither of the two decisions the later
one really following the earlier in respect of the matter
number relevant really help the appellant in these appeals. in hingir-rampur companyl companys case 1  the decision rendered an
writ petitions filed in this companyrt under art. 32 of the
constitution challenging the validity of the orissa mining
areas  development fund  act. a cess had been levied under
that enactment and it was the validity of the imposition of
the cess that was the subject of debate in the petition. one of the points urged in support of the petition was that
on the enactment of the minumbern minerals  regulation and
development  act 1948  central act liii of 1948  the orissa
act stood repealed and the cess leviable under its
provisions was number thereafter capable of

a.i.r. 1964 s.c. 1284.  1  1961 2 s.c.r. 537. 134-159 sc-43
being enforced with the result that the demand for the
cess. companyld number be sustained. this companyrt on a detailed
comparison of the provisions of the orissa act and the
central act of 1948 came to the companyclusion that the central
act companyered the same field as the orissa enactment. an
examination of the scheme of the orissa act disclosed that
it had been passed for the purpose of the development of
mining areas in the state and this was affected by
constituting mining areas and making provision for the
development of such areas by improving companymunications by the
construction of roads by providing means of transport
supply of water electricity and other amenities for
sanitation as also for the education of the labour force to
attract workmen to these mining areas. the cess which was
there impugned was levied and companylected for meeting the companyt
of this development of the mining areas. an examination
of the central enactment which was also passed to provide
for the companyservation of minerals was held to companyer the same
field as the orissa act. the orissa state enactment had
been passed in pursuance of the legislative power companyferred
by entry 23 of the state list in the 7th schedule reading
regulation of mines and mineral development
subject to the provisions of list i with
respect to regulation and development under
the companytrol of the union. the provision in list i referred to here is entry 54 in the
union list reading
regulation of mines and mineral development
to the extent to which such regulation and
development under the companytrol of the union is
declared by law made by parliament to be
expedient in public interest. it was argued on behalf of the state that the
central act of 1948 though it companytained a
declaration that the regulation and
development of mines and mineral development
was expedient in the public interest still
such a declaration was number by parliament as
required by entry number 54 but by the dominion
legislature and companyld number on the terms of item
23 of list ii affect the state power of
legislation. this
argument was accepted and the state act was
therefore held to be companypetently enacted and
to remain unaffected h. by the central
legislation. it was the same enactment of the
orissa legislature that came up for
consideration in state of orissa v. m. a.
tullock company 1 . by that date however
parliament had legislated and had enacted
central act lxvii of 1957 which companytained if
anything more companyprehensive provisions for
the regulation and development of mines and
minerals throughout the companyntry. the central
act also companytained a declaration that it was
expedient in the public interest that the
union should take under its companytrol the
regulation of mines and the development of
minerals to the extent hereinafter provided. this companyrt held that having regard to the
comprehensive provisions companytained in the
several sections of the act which were
examined the extent provided included those
which fell within the scope of the state act
of orissa which was as stated earlier for
the regulation and development of mining
areas within the state. for these reasons it
was held that the orissa act must be deemed to
have been implies repealed and rendered
ineffective by the central act. it will be seen that there is numberresemblance
whatever between the provisions of the orissa
act companysidered in the two decisions and the
provision for the levy of the land cess under
ss. 78 and 79 of the act with which we are
concerned. sections 78 and 79 have numberhing to
do and are number companycerned with the development
of mines and minerals or their regulation. the proceeds of the land cess are under 92 of
the act to be credited to the district fund
into which under the terms of the finance
rules in sch. v to the act the land-cess as
well as several other taxes fees and receipts
are directed to be credited. this fund is to
be used under ch. vii of the act with which
s. 112 starts for everything necessary for or
conducive to the safety health companyvenience
or education of the inhabitants or the
amenities of the local area companycerned and
everything incidental to the administration
and include in particular the several matters
which are mentioned in those sections. it
will thus be seen that there is numberconnection
between the regulation

a.i.r. 1964 s.c. 1284.
and development of mines and minerals dealt
with in the central acts and the levy and
collection of land-cess for which provision is
made by ss. 78 and 79 of the act. there is
therefore numberscope at all for the argument
that there is anything in companymon between the
act and the central acts of 1948 and 1957 so
as to require any detailed examination of
these enactments for discovering whether there
is any over-lapping. it was next urged that the land-cess was
really a tax on mineral rights falling within
entry 50 of the state list reading
taxes on mineral rights subject to any
limitation imposed by parliament by law
relating to mineral development
and that the central acts under which also taxes and fees
might be levied brought into play the last portion of this
entry and that as a result the power to impose this tax was
number available after the central acts of 1948 and 1957 came
into force. in this companynection mr. ram reddy pointed out
that as the impugned land-cess was payable only in the event
of the mining lessee winning the mineral and so paying the
royalty and number when numberminerals were extracted it was in
effect a tax on the minerals won and therefore on mineral
rights. we are unable to accept this argument. when a
question arises as to the precise head of legislative power
under which a taxing statute has been passed the subject
for enquiry is what in truth and substance is the nature of
the tax. numberdoubt in a sense but in a very remote sense
it has relationship to mining as also to the mineral won
from the mine under a companytract by which royalty is payable
on the quantity of mineral extracted. but that does number
stamp it as a tax on either the extraction of the mineral or
on the mineral right. it is unnecessary for the purpose of
this case to examine the question as to what exactly is a
tax on mineral rights seeing that such a tax is number leviable
by parliament but only by the state and the sole limitation
on the states power to levy the tax is that it must number
interfere with a law made by parliament as regards mineral
development. our attention was number invited to the provision
of any such law enacted by parliament. in
the companytext of ss. 78 and 79 and the scheme of those provi-
sions it is clear that the land cess is in truth a tax on
lands within entry 49 of the state list. under s. 78 of the act the cess is levied on occupied land
on whatever tenure held. the basis of the levy is the
annual rent value i.e. the value of the beneficial enjoy-
ment of the property. this being the basis of the tax and
disclosing its true nature s. 79 provides for the manner in
which the annual rent value is determined i.e. what is
the amount for which the land companyld reasonably be let the
benefit to the lessor representing the ratable value or the
annual rent value. in the case of ryotwari lands it is the
assessment which is payable to the government that is taken
as the rental value being the benefit that accrues to the
government. where the land is held under lease it is the
lease amount that forms the basis. where land is held under
a mining lease that which the occupier is willing to pay is
accordingly treated as the annual rent value of the
property. such a rent value would therefore necessarily
include number merely the surface rent but the dead rent as
well as the royalty payable by the licensee lessee or
occupier for the user of the property. the position then is
that the rent which a tenant might be expected to pay for
the property is in the case of lease-hold interests
treated as the statutory annual rent value. it is
therefore number possible to accept the companytention that the
fact that the lessee or licensee pays a royalty on the
mineral won which is in excess of what he would pay if his
right over the land extended only to the mere use of the
surface land places it in a category different from other
types where the lessee uses the surface of the land alone. in each case the rent which a lessee or licensee actually
pays for the land being the test it is manifest that the
land-cess is numberhing else except a land tax. learned companynsel pointed out that in the case of inam lands
and other lands dealt with in cls.  ii   iii  and  iv  of
s. 79 the royalty payable by the lessee or licensee did number
figure in the companyputation of the annual rent value. that
however appears to us to be wholly irrelevant for
what we are companycerned with is whether on the terms of sub-
cl.  i  the land cess is number in truth a tax on land. the last of the points raised relates to the threat on the
part of the government to recover the impugned demands as an
arrears of land revenue. learned companynsel pointed out that
s. 221 of the act which made provision for the recovery of su
ms
due as taxes had by reason of the changes effected in the
rules ceased to be applicable for the recovery of land cess
under s. 78. the learned judges of the high companyrt upheld
this submission and in our opinion companyrectly but this is
of numberassistance to the appellant because of s. 52 of the
madras revenue recovery act which enacts

all arrears of revenue other than land-
revenue due to the state government all
advances made by the state government for
cultivation or other purposes companynected with
the revenue and all fees or other dues
payable by any person to or on behalf of the
village servants employed in revenue or police
duties and all cesses lawfully imposed upon
land and all sums due to the state government
including companypensation for any loss or damage
sustained by them in companysequence of a breach
of companytract may be recovered in the same
manner as arrears of land-revenue under the
provisions of this act unless the recovery
thereof shall have been or may hereafter be
otherwise specially provided of for.


civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 2736 of
1991.
from the judgment and order dated 5.10.1990 of the
central administrative tribunal new delhi in o.a. number 1510
of 1990.

k. ramamurthy raj kumar mehta and ms. mona
chakraborty for the appellants. k. jain arun jaitley mahesh srivastava vishnu
mathur a.k. sikri and ms. madhu sikri for the respondents. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
kasliwal j. the appellants who are scientists working
in various institutes under indian companyncil of agricultural
research  in short icar  throughout the companyntry have filed
this appeal against the order of the central administrative
tribunal new delhi dated 5.10.1990. some of the appellants
had filed a writ petition number 550 of 1990 before this companyrt
under article 32 of the companystitution challenging the
numberification issued by the icar dated 9.3.1989 and for other
connected reliefs. this companyrt disposed of the said writ
petition by order dated 3.5.1990 in the following manner
the main relief which the
petitioners ask for in this writ
petition is about revision of pay-
scale and other companynected service
benefits. when we suggested to
learned companynsel that the matter
should go before the central
administrative tribunal he has
indicated certain difficulties
which are like the officers being
spread-over in different parts of
the companyntry and the difficulty in
coordinating the cases for
disposal in case they are required
to go before the tribunal and the
fact that there may be inumberdinate
delay in disposal and in obtaining
the relief. we are of the view that
the matter can be appropriately
considered by the tribunal for
overcoming the difficulties
indicated by mr. sanghi we direct
the central administrative tribunal
to treat the petition that is going
to be filed at the principal bench
at delhi as the representative
petition and dispose of the same
within six months from the date it
is filed. this petition is allowed
to be withdrawn. in pursuance to the above order dated 3.5.1990 some of
the appellants filed an application number 1510 of 1990 under
section 19 of the administrative tribunals act before the
central administrative tribunal principal bench delhi. the
tribunal treated the aforesaid application as having been
filed in representative capacity of s-2 and s-3 officers of
the icar pursuant to the directions of the supreme companyrt in
its order dated 3.5.1990.
in order to appreciate the companytroversy we shall state
the facts in brief. the imperial companyncil of agricultural
research a society established under the societies
registration act in the year 1929 was redesignated as the
indian companyncil of agricultural research after the advent of
independence. till 1965 the icar was largely functioning as
a companyrdinating agency and apex body for financing research
project. with effect from 1966 administrative companytrol over
the indian agricultural research institute  iari  and other
such institutes was transferred to icar simultaneously
placing the staff of such institutes at the disposal of the
icar. a department of agricultural research and education
was set up in the ministry of agriculture and the said
department came into existence on 15.12.1973. the icar is
fully financed by the department of agricultural research
and education  dare  ministry of agriculture and
cooperation government of india. icar follows the rules of
government of india mutatis mutandis. the icar has been held
to be state within the meaning article 12 of the
constitution as per the judgement of this companyrt in the case
of p.k. iyer others v. union of indian others reported
in 1984 2 scr 200.
the icar started an agricultural research service  in
short ars  with effect from 1.10.1975 and the relevant
grades and pay-scales as on - 31.12.1985 are given as under

grades pay-scales
scientist s rs. 550-990
scientist s-1 rs. 700-1300
scientist s-2 rs. 1100-1600
scientist s-3 rs. 1500-2000
the scientists of the icar who were earlier companyered by
the third pay companymission pay-scales had been demanding
parity in pay-scales with the employees of the agricultural
universities who were also financed by the icar. after
persistent demand the icar agreed to revise the pay scales
with effect from 1.1.1986 vide numberification number1-14/87-per. iv dated 9th march 1989. according to the appellants the
aforesaid numberification though benefited some of the
scientists but was denying the principle of equal pay for
equal work in the case of the appellants and the like and
the said numberification had further placed persons much junior
to many of the appellants in a higher scale of pay resulting
in violation of the fun damental rights of the appellants
guaranteed under article 14 and 16 of the companystitution. in
order to appreciate the grievances of the appellants the
pay-scales as revised by the icar vide the impugned
numberification dated 9.3.1989 are given as under

number grade existing new revised pay
pay-scale designation scale

scientist s-2 rs.1100-50 scientist rs. 3000-100-
 with total ser- 1600  senior 3500-125-5000
vice in the scale
ars as on
31.12.1985
upto 8 years

scientist s-2 rs. 1100-50 scientist rs. 3700-125-
 with total 1600  selection 4950- 150-5700
service in the grade
ars as on
31.12.85
exceeding 8
years

scientist s-3 rs. 1500-60- scientist rs. 3700-125-
 with total ser- 1800-100-2000  selection 4950-150-5700
vice in the grade
ars as on
31.12.85 upto
16 years

scientist s-3 rs. 1500-50- principal rs. 4500-150-
 with total 1800-100-2000 scientist 5700-200-7300
service in the
ars or
equivalent
grades as on
31.12.85
exceeding 16
years
certain clarifications were issued to the above
numberification vide letter number 1-14/87-per. iv  vol. iii
dated 31.3.1989 order number 1-7/89-per. iv  vol. iii  dated
14.6.1989 order number 1-7/89-per. iv dated 6.11.1989  vol. iii  and order number 1-7/89-per. iv dated 6.7.1990.
the case of the appellants is that according to the
impugned numberification dated 9.3.1989 together with
subsequent clarifications scientists s-3 in pre-revised
scale of rs. 1500-2000 having companypleted total service in the
ars as on 31.12.1985 exceeding 16 years had been placed in
the scale of rs. 4500-7300 whereas scientists s-3 who were
in the same pre-revised scale of rs. 1500-2000 but had put
in total service in the ars as on 31.12.1985 upto 16 years
have been placed in the scale of rs. 3700-5700.
similarly scientists s-2 who were in the pre-revised
scale of rs.1100-1600 and had companypleted total service of
more than 8 years than in the ars as on 31.12.1985 have
been put in the scale of rs. 3700-5700 but those having
completed total service upto 8 years as on 31.12.1985 had
been put in the scale of rs. 3000-5000. according to the
appellants by the impugned numberification dated 9.3.1989 in
the guise of revision of pay-scales altogether new
grades designations have also been created as under -
s grade existing designation new designation
number

scientist s-2  with scientist s-2 scientist  senior
total service in scale
ars as on
31.12.1985 upto 8
years

scientist s-2  with scientist s-2 scientist  selection
total service in grade
ars as on
31.12.1985
exceeding 8 years

scientist s-3  with scientist s-3 scientist  selection
total service in grade
ars as on
31.12.1985
upto 16 years

scientist s-3  with scientist s-3 principal scientist
total service in
ars or equivalent
grades as on
31.12.1985
exceeding 16 years
it has been further submitted by the appellants that in
the icar there were two streams for career advancement of
the scientists. the slower stream is the five yearly
assessment and the faster one is the direct selection
through advertisement to various posts at all india level. in the
direct selection the existing scientists can also companypete
with the other. scientists from number-lcar institutions. the
requirements for assessment and direct selection are
different as illustrated below by the appellants -
suppose a scientist with ph. d
qualification joins as s-1 it will
take for him at least 11 years to
become s-3 through assessment
whereas if he had only 7 years
experience and good merit he companyld
be directly selected as s-3. so it
takes 4 years less for a scientist
to become directly recruited s-3 as
compared to his companynterparts who
got s-3 through assessment scheme. this fact has been companypletely
ignumbered by the icar while revising
the pay-scale in which the
requirement of total length of
service was kept same for
scientists of both the streams. this is the reason why many of the
scientists who were selected
directly as s-2/s-3 taking lesser
time to attain higher grades have
been denied their due in the
impugned revision of pay scales. it has been further submitted on behalf of the
appellants that the criterion of eight years of qualifying
service for getting the scale of rs.3700-5700 and 16 years
of qualifying service for getting the scale of rs. 4500-7300
completely ignumberes the period of service put in the grade of
s-2 or s-3 respectively. this clearly shows the utter
disregard for merit and companypetence of the scientists working
on these posts of s-2 or s-3. the impugned numberification is
number only unreasonable and discriminatory but has resulted
in grave injustice to the scientists directly selected as
scientists s-2 and s-3 by taking into companysideration the
total length of service in the ars as the only criterion
thereby giving a companyplete go-bye to merit and companypetence. it
has been further submitted that before the issuance of the
impugned numberification scientists s-2 who had put in upto 8
years service and those who had put in exceeding 8 years
service had the same designation namely scientist s-2 and
were performing the same nature of work and duties. after
the impugned numberification they have been reclassified in
two categories namely scientist  senior-scale  and
scientist  selection grade  and have been put in different
pay-scales though their nature of work and duties still
continue to remain the same. it has been similarly pointed out that prior to the
issuance of the impugned numberification scientists s-3 who had
put in upto 16 years of service and those having put in more
than 16 years had the same designation of scientist s-3 and
their nature of work and duties were also the same. number
by virtue of the impugned numberification scientists s-3 have
been reclassified into two categories namely scientist
 selection grade  and principal scientist and have been
given different scales of pay though their nature of work
and duties still companytinue to remain the same. it has thus
been submitted that as a result of the impugned numberification
juniors and less meritorious scientists and who were also
drawing lesser basic pay as on 31.12.1985 than the
appellants have been placed in higher pay-scales causing
great resentment amongst a large number of scientists
including the appellants. the appellants have further illustrated the injustice
and arbirtrainess in the application of the impugned
numberification in the following manner -
illustration- i
------------------------------------------------------------
date of scale scale
appointment
class ii scien scien scien- as as on
 gaze- -tist -tist tist on 1.1.1986
tted  s-1 s-2 s-3 31.12.85 as per
the
impugned
numberification
------------------------------------------------------------
scientist-a 30.4.65 9.10. 1.7.76 1.1.85 rs. rs. dr. g.c. 74 1500- 4500-
sharma 2000 7300
scientist-b 1.7.76 24.3.79 6.12.79 rs. rs. dr. sheo 1500- 3700-
raj 2000 5700
------------------------------------------------------------
it would thus be seen that although scientist-b got the s-3
grade much before scientist-a and both were in the same
scale as on 31.12.1985 by the impugned numberification
scientist-a has been given the higher scale of rs
4500-7300 with effect from 1.1.1986 whereas scientist-b has
been put in the lower scale of rs. 3700-5700.
illustration-ii
------------------------------------------------------------
date of appointment scale scale
scientist s-1 1 scientist 1 s-2 as on as per
31.12.85 impugned
numberification
------------------------------------------------------------
scientist -a 1.9.76 1.7.1985 rs. rs. ms. pratibha 1100- 3700-
shukla 1600 5700
scientist-b - 22.7.78 rs. rs. shri b.s.  joined 1100- 3000-
modi directly as s-2  1600 5000
----------------------------------------------------------
the above illustration would show that while scientist-b got
the s-2 grade much earlier than scientist-a and both were in
the same scale as on 31.12.1985 by the impugned
numberification scientist-a has been placed in the higher scale
of rs. 3700-5700 w.e.f. 1.1.1986 and scientist-b has been
given lower scale of rs 3000- 5000.
on the other hand it has been companytended on behalf of
the respondents. that on persistent demand of the appellants
and other scientists for giving them better pay-scales than
those recommended by the fourth pay companymission the
government introduced university grants companymission
 in short ugc  pay package for them. the designations of
scientists on various grounds have been suitably amended so
as to companyform to their respective level of responsibility. in the ugc revised scales there is numbersingle uniform
revised scale for servicing s-2 and s- 3 scientists. however
there is provision for specific placement of scientists s-2
and s-3 in the ugc scales by virtue of their length of
service as on 31.12.1985. thus as per the scheme companycurred
in by the ministry of finance scientist s-2 having less
than 8 years of service as on 31.12.1985 have been placed in
the revised scale of rs. 3000-5000 whereas those having
more than 8 years of prescribed service as on 31.12.1985
have been placed in the scale of rs. 3700-5700. similarly
in case of s-3 scientists the period of service as on
31.12.1985 has been taken as 16 years and as such those
having more than 16 years of service as on 31.12.1985 have
been put in the scale of rs. 4500- 7300 and those upto 16
years have been placed in the scale of rs. 3700-5700. thus
prescribing the aforesaid pay-scales on the pattern of ugc
as per the demand of the scientists themselves the above
fixation of pay scales is perfectly valid and proper. it has
been further submitted that injustice done to some of the
incumbents in introducing a new scheme cannumber be a reason
for setting aside the whole scheme. it has been further
submitted that they have formulated model recruitment rules
on the pattern of ugc. some difficulties have been
experienced while prescribing the experience of 3 5 6
years as principal scientists for recruitment to the higher
posts. efforts are being made to devise means by which the
affected scientists may be able to take their chance for
appointment to higher management positions. we have companysidered the arguments advanced by learned
counsel for both the parties and have thoroughly perused the
record. it is numberdoubt companyrect that while introducing a new
scheme of pay-scales and fixing new grades of posts some of
the incumbents may have to put to less advantageous position
than others but at the same time the granting of new pay-
scales cannumber be allowed to act arbitrarily and cannumber
create a situation in which the juniors may become senior of
vice-versa. admittedly the scientists working in the icar
had made a grievance for the revision of their pay-scales
and the government being satisfied with their grievances had
appointed various expert companymittees such as m.v. rao
committee n.g.p. rao companymittee menumber companymittee and g.v.r. rao companymittee for improvement of service companyditions of the
scientists working in the icar. government had numberified a
set of pay-scales for the universities in 1988 knumbern as ugc
scales. m.v. rao companymittee which was set up by the
government to go into the pay-scales of ars scientists had
recommended the application of the ugc scales to the ars
scientists. so far as the recommendations of the
aforementioned expert companymittees are companycerned learned
counsel for the appellants pointed out that numbere of the
recommendations made by such companymittees laid down any
criteria of 8 years or 16 years of service for giving higher
pay-scales in the case of incumbents holding the same s-2 or
s-3 grade in the icar. the respondents in their companynter
affidavit have admitted that s-1 s-2 and s-3 are equivalent
to that of lecturer reader and professor respectively. dr.

v.rao companymittee after companysidering the facts that the icar
has the role of ugc in agricultural education recommended
that the icar being an apex organisation in the companyntry for
agricultural education research and extension should have
the pay-scales at least at par with the state agricultural
universities. dr. m.v. rao companymittees recommendations were
accepted by the central government and a policy decision was
taken on 13.10.1988 to the effect that ugc package may be
extended to icar scientists engaged in teaching research
and extension. it may be further numbered that prior to the
impugned numberification dated 9.3.1989 there were four grades
of scientists namely scientist-s s-1 s-2 and s-3 apart
from other higher grades with which we are number presently
concerned. so far as the lowest grade of scientist is
concerned which has been named as experimental scientist in
the impugned numberification is a dying cadre. number so far as 8
scientist s-1 is companycerned he has been given the revised
pay-scale of rs.2200-4000 and there is numbercontroversy about
it. the companytroversy is about scientists s-2 and s-3. all
scientists s-2 were in the same pay-scale of rs. 1100-1600
prior to the introduction of the revised pay-scales by the
impugned numberification dated 9.3.1989. by the impugned
numberification post of scientist s-2 has been bifurcated in
two grades as scientist  senior scale  in the pay-scale of
rs. 3000-5000 and scientist  selection grade  in the pay-
scale of rs. 3700-5700. similarly in the case of scientist
s-3 which had a companymon pay-scale of rs. 1500-2000 has number
been bifurcated as scientist  selection grade  in the pay-
scale of rs. 3700-5700 and principal scientist in the pay-
scale of rs. 4500-7300. the basis for giving higher pay-
scales has been taken as period of total service in ars as 8
years in the case of scientist s-2 and 16 years in the case
of scientist s-3. it would have been companyrect in case the
recruitment to such posts of s-2 and s-3 had been made
purely on the basis of seniority and length of service in
ars. but the admitted position is that such posts of
scientists s-2 and s-3 were also filled by direct
recruitment from public as well as by merit-cum-seniority
from amongst the members of the agricultural research
service. thus the anumberalous situation created is amply
illustrated by the examples of dr. g.c. sharma and dr. sheo
raj in the case of s-3 and the case of ms. pratibha shukla
and shri b.s. modi in the case of scientist s-2. dr. sheo
raj came to be appointed as a scientist s-3 on 6.12.1979
while dr. g.c. sharma came to be appointed as scientist s-3
as late as on 1.1.1985. admittedly on 31.12.1985 both were
in the scale of rs. 1500-2000. number on the basis of the
impugned numberification dr. g.c. sharma gets the pay-scale of
rs. 4500-7300 as principal scientist while dr. sheo raj is
fixed in the pay-scale of rs. 3700-5700 as scientist
 selection grade . similar is the case of shri b.s. modi and
ms. pratibha shukla in s-2. shri arun jaitley leaned senior companynsel appearing for
the icar which tried hard but in vain to justify such
disparity which is totally arbitrary and unreasonable. it
does number stand to reason that dr. sheo raj having been
appointed as scientist s-3 on merit as back as on 6.12.1979
is fixed in the new pay-scale of rs. 3700-5700 while dr.

c. sharma who became scientist s-3 as late as on 1.1.1985
is fixed in the pay-scale of rs. 4500-7300. similarly in
the case of the incumbents on the post of scientist s-2
shri n.s. modi having appointed by direct recruitment on
22.7.1975 has been fixed in the new pay-scale of rs. 3000-
5000 as scientist  senior scale  while ms. pratibha shukla
who came to be appointed as scieutist s-2 on 1.7.1985 has
been fixed in the revised pay-scale of rs. 2700-5700 as
scientist  selection grade . in our view the appellants are
justified in their submission that they were also entitled
to the higher pay-scale on the post of scientist s-2 as well
as s-3 specially when they were recruited on these posts
much earlier to those who have number become entitled to higher
pay-scales under the impugned numberification. they are also
right in their submission that it also mars their future
chances of promotion on the higher posts. the following observations made by the tribunal itself
shows the justification of the demand made by the appellants
the respondents have admitted in
their companynter affidavit that
certain anumberalies have been created
by the new scheme and that they are
trying to rectify the same. they
have issued orders allowing
directly recruited s-2 and s-3
scientists certain wetihtage for a
period of service rendered by them
for placement in the higher scale
as on 1.1.1986. they have also
stated that they are devising means
by which the affected scientists
may be able to take their chance
for appointment to higher
management positions
 in the
instant case by applying the
principle of length of service in
the ars irrespective of the grades
in which the officers were hitherto
working a large number of erstwhile
seniors will be rendered juniors
and they will number be entitled to
only lower pay scales than their
erstwhile juniors. this would also
adversely affect their eligibility
for promotion from 1.1.1986. in
case they were eligible to be
considered for promotion to the
next higher grade under the old
dispensation it will be unjust and
inequitable to render them
ineligible for such promotion
against the existing vacancies
proposed to be filled up. it is
however for the respondents to
devise suitable steps including
grant of one time relaxation and or
appropriate weightage to the
applicants and those similarly
situated so as to make them
eligible to appear before the
selection board for the various
posts already advertised. it may be numbered that the tribunal itself had found
force and justification in the grievances made by the
appellants and had granted 6 months time to the respondents
to take appropriate action. we had also granted opportunities to the respondents to
come with a scheme granting appropriate relief to the
appellants in the facts and circumstances of the case but
till the matter was finally heard by us the respondents
were unable to companye out with any companycrete proposal or scheme
redressing the grievances of the appellants. the appellants
are scientists who are rendering great service to the nation
and we find numberjustification as to why the appellants or any
other scientists in icar placed in similar position like the
appellants should be deprived the benefit of the revised
pay-scales on the higher post of s-2 or s-3 in case they
were appointed by direct recruitment or by selection on
merit-cum-seniority on the post of scientist s-2 or s-3
prior to those who have number become entitled to higher pay-
scale under the impugned numberification dated 9.3.1989.
we therefore allow this appeal and direct the
respondents to issue appropriate orders so that any of the
appellants or the like working as scientist s-2 or s-3 on or
before 31.12.1985 earlier to anyone of the scientists
getting benefit of the revised pay-scales under the impugned
numberification dated 9.3.1989 also get a similar benefit of
revised pay-scale of rs.4500-7300 in the case of s-3 and
pay-scale of rs.3700-5700 in the case of s-2.


criminal appellate jurisdiction criminal appeal number
749 of 1980.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order
dated the 5th march 1980 of the delhi high companyrt in
criminal misc.  main  number 501 of 1974.

p. maheshwari for the appellant. s. desai and arvind minumberha for the respondents. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
pazal ali j. this appeal by special leave is directed
against a judgment dated 5.3.1980 of the delhi high companyrt by
which the high companyrt quashed the proceedings taken by the
municipal companyporation of delhi against respondent number. i to

this is a case where the facts are almost identical with
the facts of criminal appeal number 701 of 1980 which we have
decided today with a vital difference which we shall point
out hereafter. in this case also shri m.m. gupta food inspector in
the municipal companyporation of delhi purchased a sample of
milk toffees from shop of jagdish chander mehta situate at
lajpat nagar new delhi. the milk toffees which were
purchased by the food inspector were found to be adulterated
by the public analyst. the toffees in this case were
manufactured by hindustan sugar mills sl mahatma gandhi
road bombay. a companyplaint was filed before the metropolitan
magistrate against accused number. i to 12 under sections
7116117 of the prevention of food adulteration act
mentioning the facts stated above. the high companyrt was of the view that the companyplaint did
number disclose any offence and adopting a similar line of
reasoning as in criminal appeal number 701 of 1980 quashed
the proceedings against respondent number. i to 11. we have
already dealt with the law on the subject in our decision in
criminal appeal number 701 of 1980 a companyy of which is placed
on the file of this case the relevant allegations against
the accused-respondents are to be found in para s of the
complaint which may be extracted thus
5 that accused ram kishan bajaj is the chairman
accused r.p. neyatia is the managing director and
accused number. 7 to 12 are the directors of the hindustan
sugar mills limited and were incharge of and responsible
to it for the company duct of its business at the time of
commission of offence. unlike the other case para s of the companyplaint of this
case gives companyplete details of the role played by the
respondents and the extent of their liability. it is clearly
mentioned that ram kishan bajaj is the chairman and r.p. neyatia is the managing director and respondents 7 to 11 are
the directors of the mill and were incharge of
and responsible for the companyduct of its business at the time
of the companymission of the offence whereas in the other case
the companyplaint has merely drawn a presumption without any
averment. in the instant case a clear averment has been made
regarding the active role played by the respondents and the
extent of their 1 liability. in this view of the matter it
cannumber be said that para 5 of the companyplaint is vague and
does number implicate respondents i to 11. as to what would be
the evidence against the respondents is number a matter to be
considered at this stage and would have to be proved at the
trial. we have already held that for the purpose of quashing
the proceedings only the allegations set forth in the
complaint have to be seen and numberhing further. from a perusal of the various clauses of the companyplaint
including para 5 it is quite clear that a prima facie case
for summoning the accused has been made out and the high
court was absolutely wrong in holding that the allegations
made in para s are vague.