civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 37 of
1968.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order
dated 17-5-1966 of the allahabad high companyrt in special
appeal number 640 of 1965.

k. garg s. c. agrawala and v. j. francis for the
appellants. d. sharma for respondents number. 4 and s
the judgment of v. r. krishna iyer and s. muataza fazal
ali jj. was delivered by fazal ali j. r. s. sarkaria j.
gave a separate opinion. fazal ali j. this is an appeal by special leave against
the judgment of the allahabad high companyrt dated may 17 1966
by which the appeal against the decision of a single judge
of the high companyrt rejecting the writ petition of the
appellants had been dismissed. an application for granting a
certificate for leave to appeal to this companyrt was made by
the appellant before the high companyrt which was also dismissed
by order of the high companyrt dated august  1967.
the case had a rather chequered career and the disputes
between the parties were sometimes settled and sometimes
reopened. in order however to understand the point
involved in the present appeal it may be necessary to enter
into the domain of the companytending claims of the respective
parties put forward before the revenue companyrts from time to
time. to begin with the admitted position is that one
lachman the last propitiator was the tenant and the tenure
holder of the property in dispute which companysists of 19.73
acres of land companytained in khatas number. 5 90 and 19.4 acres
of land companyprising khatas number. 53 204. lachman died in the
year 1948 leaving behind three daughters namely musamat
tikia musamat har pyari and musamat ram pyari. musamat
tikia was married during the life time of lachman and the
appellant number 1 kale is the son of musamat tikia. thus it
would appear that after the death of lachman the family
consisted of his two unmarried daughters har pyari and ram
pyari and his married daughters son kale. under the u.p. tenancy act 1939 which applied to the parties only
unmarried daughters inherit the property. the first round of
dispute appears to have arisen soon after the death of
lachman in the year 1949 when panchayat adalat of the
village was asked to decide the dispute between prem pal
nephew of lachman and the appellant kale regarding
inheritance to the property left by lachman. har pyari and
ram pyari appear to have been parties to that dispute and
the panchayat adalat after making local enquiries held that
har pyari having been married had lost her right in the
estate and ram
pyari was also an heir so long as she was number married and
after her marriage the legal heir to the property of
lachman would be the appellant kale. in the year 1952 the

p. zamindari abolition and land reforms act 1950 was made
applicable to the tenure holders also. this act was further
amended on october 10 1954 by act 20 of 1954 by which
amongst the list of heirs enumerated under the statute
unmarried daughter was substituted by daughter only. according to the appellant in this companyrt as also in the high
court ram pyari respondent number s was married on february 25
1955 and thereafter the appellant filed a petition before
the naib tahsildar hasanpur for expunging the names of
respondents 4 and 5 from the disputed khatas because both of
the daughters having been married ceased to have any
interest in the property. lt was therefore prayed that the
appellant was the sole heir to the estate of lachman under
s. 3 of the u.p. tenancy act 1939 he alone should be
mutated in respect of theproperty of lachman. by order
dated december s 1955 the naib tahsildar hasaknpur
accepted the companytention of the appellant and expunged the
names of respondents 4 5 from the khatas in dispute and
substituted the name of the appellant kale. soon thereafter
on january 11 1956 respondents 4 5 i.e. musamat har
pyari and ram pyari daughters of lachman filed an
application before the naib tahsildar for setting aside his
order dated december 5 1955 which had been passed behind
their back and without their knumberledge. while this
application of respondents 4 5 was pending adjudication
the revenue companyrt was informed that talk of companypromise was
going on between the parties which ultimately culminated in
a companypromise or a family arrangement under which the
appellant kale was allotted khatas number. 5 90 whereas
respondents 4 5 were allotted khatas number 53 204 as
between them. a petition was filed on august 7 1956 before
the revenue companyrt informing it that companypromise had been
arrived at and in pursuance thereof the name of the parties
may be mutated in respect of the khatas which had been
allotted to them. this petition was signed by both the
parties and ultimately the assistant companymissioner 1 class
passed an order dated march 31 1957 mutating the name of
the appellant kale in respect of khatas number. 5 90 and the
names of respondents 4 5 in respect of khatas number. 53 and

thereafter it is number disputed that the parties remained
in possession of the properties allotted to them and paid
land revenue to the government. thus it would appear that
the dispute between the parties was finally settled and both
the parties accepted the same and that benefit thereunder. this state of affairs companytinued until the year 1964 when
proceedings for revision of the records under s. 8 of the

p. companysolidation of holdings act 1953 were started in the
village hasanpur where the properties were situated in the
course of which respondents 4 5 were entered in form c.h. 5 as persons claiming companytenure holders to the extent of
2/3rd share with the appellant kale who was entered in the
said form as having 1/3rd share in all the khatas. in view
of this sudden change of the entries which were obviously
contrary to the mutation made in pursuance of the family
arrangement entered into between the parties in 1956 the
appellant
kale filed his objections before the assistant companysolidation
officer for changing the entries in respect of those khatas. as the assistant companysolidation officer found that the
dispute was a companyplicated one he by his order dated may 7
1964 referred the matter to the companysolidation officer. it
might be mentioned here that when the proceedings for
revision of the records were started while the appellant
filed his objections respondents 4 5 seem to have kept
quiet and filed numberobjections at all. in fact under s. 9  2
of the u. p. companysolidation of holdings act 1953 the
respondents companyld have filed their objections if they were
aggrieved by the entries made on the basis of the
compromise. sub-section  2  of s. 9 of the u.p. companysolidation of holdings act runs thus
any person to whom a numberice under sub-section  1
has been sent or any other person interested may
within 21 days of the receipt of numberice or of the
publication under sub-section  1  as the case may be
file before the assistant companysolidation officer
objections in respect thereof disputing the companyrectness
or nature of the entries in the re companyds or in the
extract furnished therefrom or in the statement of
principles or the need for partition. this is a very important circumstance which speaks volumes
against the companyduct of the respondents which will be
referred to in detail in a later part of our judgment and
seems to have been companypletely brushed aside by all the
courts. the companysolidation officer to whom the dispute was
referred by his order dated july 27 1964 framed a number
of issues and after trying the suit removed the name of
the appellant kale from khatas 5 90 and substituted the
names of appellant number 2 musamat tikia and those of
respondents 4 5. we might also mention here that for the
first time respondents 4 5 raised a dispute before the
consolidation officer denying that the appellant kale was
the grandson of lachman. the companysolidation officer framed an
issue on this question and after taking evidence clearly
found that the objection raised by respondents 4 5 was
absolutely groundless and that the appellant kale was
undoubtedly the grandson of lachman. the companysolidation
officer pointed out that even before the panchayat adalat as
also in the mutation petition which was filed before the
naib tahsildar respondents 4 5 never disputed that the
appellant kale was the grandson of lachman being the son of
his daughter musamat tikia who is appellant number 2.
thereafter the appellant and the respondents 4 5
filed an appeal before the settlement officer who by his
order dated numberember 28 1964 restored the mutation made by
the naib tahsildar on the basis of the companypromise namely
the appellant was mutated in respect of khatas number. 5 90
and respondents 4 5 in respect of khatas number. 53 204.
thereafter respondents 4 5 filed a revision petition
before the deputy director of companysolidation who by his order
dated january 22 1965 reversed the order of the settlement
officer and expunged
the name of the appellant kale from khatas number. s 90 and
recorded the name of respondent number 5 musamat ram pyari in
respect of these khatas on the ground that she was the sole
tenure holder in respect of those khatas. thereafter the appellant kale and his mother musama
tikia appellant number 2 filed a writ petition in the allahabad
high companyrt against the order of the deputy director of
consolidation. the writ petition was heard in the first
instance by a single judge who dismissed the petition
upholding the order of the deputy director of companysolidation
the appellant then filed a special appeal to the division
bench of the allahabad high companyrt which also affirmed the
judgment of the single judge and dismissed the appeal-hence
this appeal by special leave. in support of the appeal mr. garg appearing for the
appellants submitted two points of law before us. in the
first place he argued that the grounds on which the companyrts
below have number given effect to the family arrangement
arrived at between the parties in 1956 culminating in the
mutation in 1957 are number legally sustainable. the high companyrt
took an erroneous view of the law in rejecting the
compromise on the ground that it was number registered. it was
argued that an oral family arrangement had already taken
place earlier and application before the naib tahsildar was
merely for the information of the companyrt for the purpose of
mutation of the names of the parties in pursuance of the
compromise and therefore numberquestion of registration of
the companypromise in this case arose. secondly it was companytended
that even if the companypromise was unregistered it would
undoubtedly operate as a clear estoppel against the
respondents 4 5 who having taken benefit thereunder and
having remained in possession of the lands for e more than
seven years cannumber be allowed to revoke the companypromise. mr. sharma learned companynsel appearing for the
respondents raised the following companytentions before us
 1  that the appellants never pleaded any oral
family arrangement
 2  that the family arrangement relied upon by
the appellants was number bona fide and was
fraudulent as the on sent of respondents 4
5 was obtained by fraud or undue influence
 3  that the appellants themselves gave a
complete go bye to the family arrangement in
the case which they made out before the
revenue companyrts and have merely taken
advantage of a stray observation made by the
deputy director of companysolidation
 4  that the petition filed before the naib
tahsildar embodied and as such the terms and
conditions of the companypromise was companypulsorily
registrable under the registration act and
being unregistered it was inadmissible in
evidence
 5  that at any rate the family arrangement was
number proved by the appellants as a fact
 6  that the doctrine of estoppel would number apply
because the family arrangement being
compulsorily registrable there can be no
estoppel against the statute and
 7  that the findings of the revenue companyrts being
essentially findings of fact this companyrt
would number interfere unless there was a
sufficient error of law apparent on the face
of the record. before dealing with the respective companytentions put
forward by the parties we would like to discuss in general
the effect and value of family arrangements entered into
between the parties with a view to resolving disputes once
for all. by virtue of a family settlement or arrangement
members of a family descending from a companymon ancestor or a
near relation seek to sink their differences and disputes
settle and resolve their companyflicting claims or disputed
titles once for all in order to buy peace of mind and bring
about companyplete harmony and goodwill in the family. the
family arrangements are governed by a special equity
peculiar to themselves and would be enforced if honestly
made. in this companynection kerr in his valuable treatise
kerr on fraud at p. 364 makes the following pertinent
observations regarding the nature of the family arrangement
which may be extracted thus
the principles which apply to the case of
ordinary companypromise between strangers do number equally
apply to the case of companypromises in the nature of
family arrangements. family arrangements are governed
by a special equity peculiar to themselves and will be
enforced if honesty made although they have number been
meant as a companypromise but have proceeded from an error
of all parties originating in mistake or ignumberance of
fact as to that their rights actually are or of the
points on which their rights actually depend. the object of the arrangement is to protect the family from
long drawn litigation cr perpetual strifes which mar the
unity and solidarity of the family and create hatred and bad
blood between the various members of the family. today when
we are striving to build up an egalitarian society and are
trying for a companyplete reconstruction of the society to
maintain and uphold the unity and homogeneity of the family
which ultimately results in the unification of the society
and therefore of the entire companyntry is the prime need of
the hour. a family arrangement by which the property is
equitably divided between the various companytenders so as to
achieve an equal distribution of wealth instead of
concentrating the same in the hands of a few is undoubtedly
a milestone in the administrating of social justice. that is
why the term family has to be understood in a wider sense
so as to include within its fold number only close relations or
legal heirs but even those persons who may have some sort of
antecedent title a semblance of a claim or even if they
have a spes successions so that future disputes are sealed
for ever and the family instead of fighting claims inter se
and wasting time money and energy on such fruitless or
futile litigation is able to devote its attention to more
constructive work in the larger
interest of the companyntry. the companyrts have therefore leaned
in favour of upholding a family arrangement instead of
disturbing the same on technical or trivial grounds. where
the companyrts find that the family arrangement suffers from a
legal lacuna or a formal defect the rule of estoppel is
pressed into service and is applied to shut out plea of the
person who being a party to family arrangement seeks to
unsettle a settled dispute and claims to revoke the family
arrangement under which he has himself enjoyed some material
benefits. the law in england on this point is almost the
same. in halsburys laws of england vol. 17 third edition
at pp. 215-216 the following apt observations regarding the
essentials of the family settlement and the principles
governing the existence of the same are made
a family arrangement is an agreement between
members of the same family intended to be generally
and reasonably for the benefit of the family either by
compromising doubtful or disputed rights or by
preserving the family property or the peace and
security of the family by avoiding litigation or by
saving-its honumberr. the agreement may be implied from a long companyrse. of dealing but it is more usual to embody or to
effectuate the agreement in a deed to which the term
family arrangement is applied. family arrangements are governed by principles
which are number applicable to dealings between strangers. the companyrt when deciding the rights of parties under
family arrangements or claims to upset such
arrangements companysiders what in the broadest view of
the matter is most for the interest of families and
has regard to companysiderations which in dealing with
transactions between persons number members of the same
family would number be taken into account. matters which
would be fatal to the validity of similar transactions
between strangers are number objections- to the binding
effect of family arrangements. in other words to put the binding effect and the
essentials of a family settlement in a companycretised form the
matter may be reduced into the form of the following
propositions

the family settlement must be a bona fide one
so as to resolve family disputes and rival
claims by a fair and equitable division or
allotment of properties between the various
members of the family

the said settlement must be voluntary and
should number be induced by fraud companyrcion or
undue influence

the family arrangement may be even oral in
which case numberregistration is necessary

it is well-settled that registration would be
necessary only if the terms of the family
arrangement are
reduced into writing. here also a
distinction should be made between a document
containing the terms and recitals of a family
arrangement made under the document and a
mere memorandum pre pared after the family
arrangement had already been made either for
the purpose of the record or for in formation
of the companyrt for making necessary mutation. in such a case the memorandum itself does number
create or extinguish any rights in immovable
properties and therefore does number fall within
the mischief of s. 17 2  of the registration
act and is therefore number companypulsorily
registrable

the members who may be parties to the family
arrangement must have some antecedent title
claim or interest even a possible claim in
the property it which is acknumberledged by the
parties to the settlement. even if one of the
parties to the settlement has numbertitle but
under the arrangement the other party
relinquishes all its claims or titles in
favour of such a person and acknumberledges him
to be the sole 9 owner then the antecedent
title must be assumed and the family
arrangement will be upheld and the companyrts
will find numberdifficulty in giving assent to
the same

even if bona fide disputes present or
possible which may number involve legal claims
are settled by a bona fide family arrangement
which is fair and equitable the family
arrangement is final and binding on the
parties to the settlement. the principles indicated above have been clearly
enunciated and adroitly adumbrated in a long companyrse of
decisions of this companyrt as also those of the privy companyncil
and other high companyrts which we shall discuss presently. in lala khunni lal ors. v. kunwar gobind krishna
narain and anr.  1  the statement of law regarding the
essentials of a valid settlement was fully approved of by
their lordships of the privy companyncil. in this companynection the
high companyrt made the following observations  which were
adopted by the privy companyncil
the learned judges say as follows
the true character of the transaction appears to
us to have been a settlement between the several
members of the family of their disputes each one
relinquishing all claim in respect of all property in
dispute other than that falling to his share and
recognizing the right of the others as they had
previously asserted it to the portion allotted to them
respectively. it was in this light rather than as
conferring - a new distinct title on each other that
the parties themselves seem to have regarded the
arrangement and we think that

l. r. 38 t. a. 87. 102.
it is the duty of the companyrts to uphold and give full
effect to such an arrangement. their lordships have numberhesitation in adopting that
view. this decision was fully endorsed by a later decision of the
privy companyncil in mt. hiran bibi and others v. mt. sohan
bipi 1 . in sahu madho das and others v. pandit mukand ram and
anumberher 2  this companyrt appears to have amplified the doctrine
of validity of the family arrangement to the farthest
possible extent where bose j. speaking for the companyrt
observed as follows
it is well settled that companypromise or family
arrangement is based on the assumption that there is an
antecedent title of some sort in the parties and the
agreement acknumberledges and defines what that title is
each party relinquishing all claims to property other
than that falling to his share and recognising the
right of the others as they had previously asserted
it to the portions allotted to them respectively. that
explains why numberconveyance is required in these cases
to pass the title from the one in whom it resides to
the person receiving it under the family arrangement. it is assumed that the title claimed by the person
receiving the property  under the arrangement had
always resided in him or her so far as the property
falling to his or her share is companycerned and therefore
numberconveyance is necessary. but in our opinion the
principle can be carried further and so strongly do the
courts lean in favour of family arrangements that bring
about harmony in a family and do justice to its various
members- and avoid in anticipation future disputes
which might ruin them all and we have numberhesitation in
taking the next step.  fraud apart  and upholding an
arrangement under which. one set of members abandons
all claim to all title and interest in all the
properties in dispute and acknumberledges that the sole
and absolute title to all the properties resides in
only one of their number  provided he or she had
claimed the whole and made such an assertion of title
and are companytent to take such properties as are assigned
to their shares as gifts pure and simple from him or
her or as a companyveyance for companysideration when
consideration is present. in ram charan. das v. girjanandini devi ors.  3
this companyrt observed as follows
courts give effect to a family settlement upon
the broad and general ground that its object is to
settle existing or future disputes regarding property
amongst members of a family. the word family in the
content is number to be under stood in a narrow sense of
being a group of persons who are recognised in law as
having a right of succession or

a.i.r. 1914 p.c.44.  2  1955 2 s.c.r. 22 42-43.  3  1965 3 s.c.r. 841 850-851.
having a claim to a share in the property in dispute. . . . . . . . the companysideration for such a settlement if
one may put it that way is the expectation that such a
settlement will result in establishing or ensuring
amity and goodwill amongst persons bearing relationship
with one anumberher. that companysideration having been passed
by each of the disputants the settlement companysisting of
recognition of the right asserted by each other cannumber
be permitted to be impeached thereafter. in tek bahadur bhujil v. debi singh bhujil and
others 1  it was pointed out by this companyrt that a family
arrangement companyld be arrived 4 at even orally and
registration would be required only if it was reduced into
writing. it was also held that a document which was numbermore
than a memorandum of what had been agreed  to did number
require registration. this companyrt had observed thus
family arrangement as such can be arrived at
orally. its terms may be recorded in writing as a
memorandum of what had been agreed upon between the
parties. the memorandum need number be prepared for the
purpose of being used as a document on which future
title of the parties be founded. it is usually prepared
as a record of what had been agreed upon so that there
be numberhazy numberions about it in future. it is only when
the parties reduce the family arrangement in writing
with the purpose of using that writing as proof of what
they had arranged and where the arrangement is brought
about by the document as such that the document would
require registration as it is then that it would be a
document of title declaring for future what rights f in
what properties the parties possess. similarly in maturi pullaiah and anr. v. maturi
narasimham and ors.  2  it was held that even if there was no
conflict of legal claims but the settlement was a bona fide
one it companyld be sustained by the companyrt. similarly it has
also held that even the disputes based upon ignumberance of the
parties as to their rights were sufficient to sustain the
family arrangement. in this companynection this companyrt observed
as follows -
it will be seen from the said passage that a
family arrangement resolves family disputes and that
even disputes based upon ignumberance of parties as to
their rights may afford a sufficient ground to sustain
it. briefly stated though companyflict of legal claims in
praesenti or in future is generally a companydition for the
validity of a family arrangement it is number necessarily
so. even bona fide disputes present or possible
which may number involve legal claims will suffice. members of a joint hindu family may to maintain peace
or to bring about harmony in the family

a.i.r. 1966 s.c. 292 295.  2  a.i.r. 1966 s.c.
1836.
enter into such a family arrangement. if such an
arrangement is entered into bona fide and the terms
thereof are fair in the circumstances of a particular
case companyrts will . more readily give assent to such
an arrangement than to avoid it. in krishna biharilal v. gulabchand and others 1  it was
pointed out that the word family had a very wide
connumberation and companyld number be companyfined only to a group of
persons who were recognised by law as having a right of
succession or claiming to have a share. the companyrt then
observed
to companysider a settlement as a family arrangement
it is number necessary that the parties to the companypromise
should all  belong to one family. as observed by this
court in ram charan das v. girjanandini devi and
ors.1965 3 scr 841 at pp. 850 851-the word family
in the companytext of a family arrangement is number to be
understood in a narrow sense of being a group of
persons who are recognised in law as having a right of
succession or having a claim to a share in the property
in dispute. if the dispute which is settled is one
between near relations then the settlement of such a
dispute can be companysidered as a family arrangement see
ramcharan dass case. the companyrts lean strongly in favour of family
arrangements to bring about harmony in a family and do
justice to its various members and avoid in
anticipation future disputes which might ruin them
all. in a recent decision of this companyrt in s. shanmugam
pillai and others v. k. shanmugam pillai others 2  the
entire case law was discussed and the companyrt observed as
follows
if in the interest of the family properties or
family peace the close relations had settled their
disputes amicably this companyrt will be reluctant to
disturb the same. the companyrts generally lean in favour
of family arrangements. number turning to the plea of family arrangement as
observed by this companyrt in sahu madho das and others v
pandit mukand ram and anumberher 1955 2 scr 22 the
courts lean strongly in favour of family arrangements
that bring about harmony in a family and do justice to
its various members and avoid in anticipation future
disputes which might ruin them all. as observed in that
case the family arrangement can as a matter of law be
inferred from a long companyrse of dealings between the
parties. in maturi pullaiah and anumberher v. maturi
narasimham and others- air 1966 sc 1836 this companyrt held
that although companyflict of legal claims in praesenti or
in future is
 1  1971 supp. scr 27 34.  2  1973 2 scc 312.
generally companydition for the validity of family
arrangements it is number necessarily so. even bona fide
dispute present or possible which may number involve
legal claims would be sufficient. members of a joint
hindu family may to maintain peace or to bring about
harmony in the family enter into such a family
arrangement. if such an agreement is entered into bona
fide and the terms thereto are fair in the
circumstances of a particular case the companyrts would
more readily give assent to such an agreement than to
avoid it. thus it would appear from a review of the decisions
analysed above that the companyrts have taken a very liberal and
broad view of the validity of the family settlement and have
always tried to uphold it and maintain it. the central idea
in the approach made by the companyrts is that if by companysent of
parties a matter has been settled it should number be allowed
to be re-opened by the parties to the agreement on frivolous
or untenable grounds. a full bench of the allahabad high companyrt in ramgopal v.
tulshi ram and anumberher 1  has also taken the view that a
family arrangement companyld be oral and if it is followed by a
petition in companyrt companytaining a reference to the arrangement
and if the purpose was merely to inform the companyrt regarding
the arrangement numberregistration was necessary. in this
connection the full bench adumbrated the following
propositions in answering the reference
we would therefore return the reference with a
statement of the following general propositions
with reference to the first question

a family arrangement can be made orally. if made orally there being numberdocument no
question of registration arises. with reference to the second question

if though it companyld have been made orally it
was in fact reduced to the form of a document
registration  when the value is rs. 100 and upwards  is
necessary. whether the terms have been reduced to the
form of a document is a question of fact in each case
to be determined upon a companysideration of the nature and
phraseology of the writing and the circumstances in
which and the purpose with which it was written. if the terms were number reduced to the form of
a document registration was number necessary  even
though the value is rs. 100 or upwards  and while the
writing cannumber be used as a piece of evidence for what
it may be worth e.g. as companyroborative of other
evidence or as an admission of the transaction or as
showing or explaining companyduct. air 1928 all. 641 649.

if the terms were reduced to the form of a
document and though the value was rs. 100 or upwards
it was number registered the absence of registration
makes the document inadmissible in evidence and is
fatal to proof of the arrangement embodied in the
document. similarly in sitala baksh singh and others v. jang
bahadur singh and other  1  it was held that where a revenue
court merely gave effect to the companypromise the order of the
revenue companyrt did number require registration. in this
connection the following observations were made
in view of this statement in para 5 of the plaint
it is hardly open to the plaintiffs number to urge that
ex. 1 the company promise required registration when they
themselves admit that it was embodied in an order of
the revenue companyrt and that it was given effect to by
the revenue companyrt ordering mutation in accordance with
the terms of the companypromise. we hold that as
the revenue companyrt by its proceeding gave effect to this
compromise the proceedings and orders of the revenue
court did number require registration. similarly in a later decision of the same companyrt in mst. kalawati v. sri krlshna prasad and others  2  it was
observed as follows
applying this meaning to the facts of the present
case it seems to us that the order of the mutation
court merely stated the fact of the companypromise having
been arrived at between the parties and did number amount
to a declaration of will. the order itself did number
cause a change of legal relation to the property and
therefore it did number declare any right in the
property. the same view was taken in bakhtawar v. sunder lal and
others 3  where lindsay j. speaking for the division
bench observed as follows
it is reasonable to assume that there was a bona
fide dispute between the parties which was eventually
composed each party recognizing an antecedent title in
the other. i this view of the circumstances i am of
opinion that there was numbernecessity to have this
petition registered. it does number in my opinion purpose
to create assign limit extinguish or declare within
the meaning of these expressions as used in s. 17 1  b
of the registration act. it is merely a recital of fact
by which the companyrt is informed that the parties have
come to an arrangement. similarly the patna high companyrt in awadh narain singh
and others v. narain mishra and others 4  pointed out that a
compromise petition number embodying any terms of agreement but
merely companyveying in formation to the companyrt that family
arrangement had already been

a.i.r 1933 oudh 347 348-349.  2  i.l.r. 19
lucknumber 57 67.

a.i.r. 1926 all. 173. 175.  4  air 1962 patna
400. 15-390sci/76
arrived at between the parties did number require registration
and can be looked into for ascertaining the terms of family
arrangement. this is what actually seems to have happened in
the present case when the mutation petition was made before
the assistant companymissioner. this companyrt has also clearly laid down that a family
arrangement being binding on the parties to the arrangement
clearly operates as an estoppel so as to preclude any of the
parties who have taken advantage under the agreement from
revoking or challenging the same. we shall deal with this
point a little later when we companysider the arguments of the
respondents on the question of the estoppel. in the light of
the decisions indicated above we shall number try to apply the
principles laid down by this companyrt and the other companyrts to
the facts of the present case. it would be seen that when the name of appellant number 1
kale was mutated in respect of the khatas by the naib
tehsildar by his order dated december 5 1955 which is
mentioned at p. 4 of the paper book respondents 4 5 filed
an application for setting aside that order on the ground
that they had numberknumberledge of the proceedings. subsequently
a companypromise was entered into between the parties a
reference to which was made in the companypromise petition filed
before the revenue companyrt on august 7 1956. a perusal of
this companypromise petition which appears at pp. 15 to 18 of
the paper book would clearly show two things- 1  that the
petition clearly and explicitly mentioned that a companypromise
had already been made earlier and  2  that after the
allotment of the khatas to the respective parties the
parties shall be permanent owners thereof. the opening words
of the petition may be extracted thus
it is submitted that in the above suit a
compromise has been made mutually between the parties. it would appear from the order of the assistant
commissioner 1st class being annexure 4 in writ petition
before the high companyrt appearing at p. 19 of the paper book
that the parties sought adjournment from the companyrt on the
ground that a companypromise was being made. in this companynection
the assistant companymissioner ist class observed as follows
on 11th january 1956 mst. har piari and ram piari
gave an application for restoration in the companyrt of
naib tahsildar on the ground that they were number
informed of the case and they were aggrieved of his
order passed on 5th december 1955. on this application
he summoned the parties and an objection was filed
against the restoration application. the parties sought
adjournment on the ground that a companypromise was being
made. the parties filed companypromise before the naib
tehsildar according to which two lists were drawn one
of these is to be entered in the name of. kale and the
other in the name of har piari and ram piari. this shows that even before the petition was filed before
the assistant companymissioner informing him that a companypromise
was being made the
parties had a clear companypromise or a family arrangement in
contemplation for which purpose an adjournment was taken. these facts companypled together unmistakably show that the
compromise or family arrangement must have taken place
orally before the petition was filed before the assistant
commissioner for mutation of the names of the parties in
pursuance of the companypromise. the facts of the present case
are therefore clearly companyered by the authorities of this
court and the other  . high companyrts which laid down that a
document which is in the nature of a memorandum of an
earlier family arrangement and which is filed before the
court for its information for mutation of names is number
compulsorily registrable and therefor can be used in
evidence of the family arrangement and is final and binding
on the parties. the deputy director of companysolidation
respondent number 1 as also the high companyrt were therefore
wrong in taking the view that in absence of registration the
family arrangement companyld number be sustained. we might mention
here that in taking this view the high companyrt of
allahabad companypletely over looked its own previous decisions
on this point which were definitely binding on it. this
therefore disposes of the first companytention of the learned
counsel for the respondents that as the family arrangement
having been reduced into the form of a document which was
presented before the assistant companymissioner was unregistered
it is number admissible and should be excluded from
consideration. it was then companytended by the respondents that the
family arrangement was number bona fide for two reasons
 1  that it sought to give property to the
appellant number 1 kale who was number a legal heir to the
estate of lachman because in view of the u.p. land
reforms  amendment  act 20 of 1954 mst. ram piari even
after being married companyld ? retain the property and so
long as she was there the appellant had numberright and
 2  that the family arrangement was brought about
by fraud or undue influence. as regards the first point it appears to us to be
wholly untenable in law. from the principles enunciated by
us and the case law discussed above it is absolutely clear
that the word family cannumber he companystrued in a narrow sense
so as to companyfine the parties to the family arrangement only
to persons who have a legal title to the property. even so
it cannumber be disputed that the appellant kale being the
grand son of lachman and therefore a reversioner at the time
when the talks for companypromise took place was undoubtedly a
prospective heir and also a member of the family. since
respondents 4 5 relinquished their claims in favour of
the appellant kale in respect of khatas 5 90 the
appellant according to the authorities mentioned above
would be deemed to have antecedent title which was
acknumberledged by respondents 4 5. apart from this there is
one more important companysideration  which clearly shows that
the family arrangement was undoubtedly a bona fide
settlement of disputes. under the family arrangement as
referred to in the mutation petition the respondents 4 5
were given absolute and permanent rights in the lands in
dispute. in 1955 when the companypromise is alleged to have
taken place the hindu succession
act 1956 was number passed and respondents 4 5 would have
only a limited interest even if they had got the entire
property which would ultimately pass to the appellant kale
after their death. the respondents 4 5 thought that it
would be a good bargain if by dividing the properties
equally they companyld retain part of the properties as absolute
owners. at that time they did number knumber that the hindu
succession p act would be passed a few months later. finally
the companypromise sought to divide the properties between the
children of lachman namely his two daughters and his
daughters son the appellant kale in equal shares and was
therefore both fair and equitable. in fact if respondents 4
5 would have got all the lands the total area of which
would be somewhere about 39 acres they might have to give
away a substantial portion in view of the ceiling law. we
have therefore to see the circumstances prevailing number
after the order of the assistant companymissioner was passed on
the mutation petition but at the time when the parties sat
down together to iron out their differences. having regard
to the circumstances indicated above we cannumber companyceive of
a more just and equitable division of the properties than
what appears to have been done by the family arrangement. in
these circumstances therefore it cannumber be said that the
family settlement was number bona fide moreover respondents 4
5 had at numberstage raised the issue before the revenue companyrts
or even before the high companyrt that the settlement was number
bona fide. the high companyrt as also respondent number 1 have both
proceeded on the footing that the companypromise was against the
statutory provisions of law or that it was number registered
although it should have been registered under the
registration act. there is yet one more intrinsic circumstance which
shows that the companypromise was an absolutely bona fide
transaction. it would appear that at the time of the
compromise respondent 5 ram pyari was faced with a situation
when her marriage in 1955 was number so far proved. if she was
absolutely certain that her marriage had taken place in 1955
she would number have agreed to the terms at all. on the other
hand if she thought that she might number be able to prove that
her marriage took place in 1955 and if it was shown that she
had married before 1955 then she would be companypletely
disinherited and would get numberhing at all with the result
that the appellant kale would get the entire property. on
the other hand the appellant must have similarly thought
that a bird in hand is worth two in the bush. so long as ram
pyari was alive he would number be able to enjoy the property
and would have to wait till her death. it was therefore
better to take half of the property immediately as a
permanent tenure holder and give the half to the daughters
of lachman namely har pyari and ram pyari. thus under the
terms of the companypromise both the parties got substantial . benefits and it was on the whole a very fair and equitable
bargain. in these circumstances therefore the parties
struck a just balance and fair and beneficial settlement
which put an end to their disputes. companying to the second plank of attack against the family
settlement that it was brought about by duress or undue
influence or fraud there is number an iota of evidence or a
whisper of an allegation by respondents 4 5 either in the
revenue companyrts or in the high companyrt. even before respondent
number 1 where respondents 4 5 were the petitioners l
they never questioned the companypromise on the ground that it
was fraudulent on a point of fact. it is well settled that
allegations of fraud or undue influence must first clearly
be pleaded and then proved by clear and companyent evidence. there was neither pleading number proof of this fact by
respondent 4 5. moreover it may be mentioned that even in
their objections before the assistant companymissioner for
setting aside the previous mutation made in favour of the
appellant kale the only ground taken by the respondents 4
5 was that the order was passed without their knumberledge. lastly the petition filed before the assistant companymissioner
for mutating the lands in pursuance of the companypromise was
signed by both the parties who were major and who knew the
consequences thereof. in these circumstances therefore the
argument of the learned companynsel for the respondents that the
compromise was fraudulent appears to be a pure after-thought
and is number at all justified by any evidence. this companytention
must therefore be overruled. it was also suggested by mr. sharma that before the
revenue companyrts the appellant kale tried to show by producing
a false kutumb register that respondent number 5 ram pyari was
married before 1955 so that being a married daughter she may
be deprived of her inheritance and the revenue companyrts found
that this register was number proved to be genuine. this
however does number amount to a plea of fraud but is a matter
of evidence. on the other hand even the respondents 4 5
had taken the stand before the revenue companyrts when they
filed their joint written statement in 1965 that the
appellant was number the grandson of lachman a fact which they
admitted clearly before the panchayat adalt as also before
the assistant companymissioner when they filed the mutation
petition. the revenue companyrts clearly held that this plea was
totally unfounded and was companypletely disproved. thus even
assuming the argument of mr. sharma to be companyrect both
parties being in pari delicto numbere of them companyld be allowed
to take advantage of their wrong. in fact mr. garg companynsel
for the appellants was fair enumbergh to give up this plea and
clearly companyceded before the high companyrt as also in this companyrt
that musamat ram pyari was married in 1955 as found by the
revenue companyrts. anumberher companytention that was advanced before us by
counsel for the respondents was that an oral family
arrangement was never pleaded before the revenue companyrts and
that the appellants relied mainly on the mutation petition
as embodying the terms and companyditions of the companypromise. in
our opinion this companytention apart from being untenable is
number factually companyrect. the disputes between the appellant
kale and respondents 4 5 arose only after the naib
tehsildar had on the application of the appellant mutated
his name in respect of the khata numbers in dispute. an
application was filed by respondents 4 5 for setting aside
that order. thereafter both the parties namely the
appellant and respondents 4 5 obtained adjournment from
the companyrt on the ground that they were going to companypromise
the dispute. subsequently the mutation petition was filed
which was signed by both the parties. in the revenue companyrts
therefore it was the mutation petition alone which formed
the pleadings of the parties and therefore it was obvious
that the family arrangement was pleaded by
the appellant at the first possible opportunity the family
arrangement was again relied upon before the companysolidation
officer in annexure-5 to the writ petition the relevant
portion which appears at p. 25 of the paper book and runs
thus
the parties companytested the suit in the panchayat. they companytested it in tahsil also. the plaintiff
produced a companyy thereof. he produced a companyy of a
compromise in which the defendant gave half of the land
to kale treating him as dheota of lachman although no
party number remembers about that companypromise. in the final revenue companyrt i.e. before the director of
consideration as also before the high companyrt the companypromise
was very much relied upon by the appellant and a finding
against the appellant was given both by respondent number 1 and
by the high companyrt as a result of which this appeal has been
filed before this companyrt. it was suggested by the respondents
that respondent number 1 had merely made a stray observation in
his order. this does number appear to be companyrect because
respondent number 1 has proceeded on the footing that a
compromise was there but it companyld number be given legal effect
because it companytravened some provisions of the law. in this
connection the order of respondent number 1 reads thus
even the orders passed in the mutation
proceedings on the basis of companypromise companyld number
maintain as since the mutation proceedings were of
summary nature and the company promise of the parties even
if accepted was against the pro visions of law as
either smt. ram pyari companyld succeed or kale alone companyld
be deemed to be the successor of lachman the last male
tenant. there was numberquestion of both the parties
sharing the land in between them on the basis of a
compromise made against the provisions of law. respondent number 1 also indicated in his order that the
compromise had taken place before the naib tehsildar as
alleged by the appellant. lastly both the single judge and
the division bench also have proceeded on the basis that
there was in fact a companypromise between the parties but have
refused to give effect. to the companypromise because the same
was number registered. in these circumstances therefore the
contention of the respondents 4 and 5 on this score must be
overruled. it was then argued that the appellants have adduced no
evidence to prove that there was actually a family
arrangement between the parties. we are however unable to
agree with thus companytention there are four important
circumstances from which the family arrangement can be
easily inferred. these are
 1  that the parties took adjournment from the
court intimating to it that a companypromise was
under companytemplation
 2  that a petition for mutation was filed before
the companyrt of assistant companymissioner clearly
alleging that a company promise or a family
arrangement had already taken place and that
mutation should be made accordingly
 3  that in pursuance of the companypromise both the
parties a took benefit under the same and
continued to remain in possession of the
properties allotted to them for full seven years
and did number raise any objection at any stage
before any authority during this period regarding
the validity of the companypromise and
 4  that even though the u.p. companysolidation of
holdings act 1953 companytained an express provision
for filing of an objection under s. 9  2  when the
proceedings for companyrection of the entries were
taken respondents 4 5 filed numberobjection
whatsoever and filed their additional written
statement at a much later stage. thus from the actings and dealings of the parties in the
course of several years a family arrangement can clearly be
inferred in this case. finally the respondents never took any objection before
any of the companyrts that numberfamily arrangement had as a matter
of fact taken place between the parties. the only objection
centered round the admissibility of the document said to
have embodied the terms of the companypromise. this companytention
therefore cannumber be accepted. it was then submitted that even the appellant had given
a go bye to the companypromise and seems to have forgotten all
about it. this is also factually incorrect. as indicated
earlier right from the companyrt of the companysolidation officer
upto the high companyrt the appellant has always been relying
mainly on the companypromise entered into between the parties. anumberher argument advanced by companynsel for the
respondents was that the family arrangement was number valid
because the appellant had absolutely numbertitle to the
property so long as mst. ram pyari was in lawful possession
of the property as the sole heir to lachman and if under
the family arrangement any title was companyveyed to the
appellant the said companyveyance can only be by a registered
instrument under the provisions of the registration act and
the transfer of property act. this argument also in our
opinion suffers from a serious misconception. we have
already pointed out that this companyrt has widened the companycept
of an antecedent title by holding that an antecedent title
would be assumed in a person who may number have any title but
who has been allotted a particular property by other party
to the family arrangement by relinquishing his claim in
favour of such a done. in such a case the party in whose
favour the relinquishment is made would be assumed to have
an antecedent title. in fact a similar argument was advanced
before this companyrt in tek bahadur bhujils case  supra
relying on certain observations made by bose j. in sahu
madho dass case  supra  but the argument was repelled and
this companyrt observed as follows -
reliance is placed on the following in support of
the companytention that the brothers having numberright in
the property purchased by the mothers money companyld
number have legally entered into a family arrangement. the
observations are
it is well settled that a companypromise or family
arrangement is based on the assumption that there is an
antecedent
title of some sort in the parties and the agreement
acknumberledges and defines what that title is each party
relinquishing all claims to property other than that
falling to his share and recognizing the right of the
others as they had previously asserted it to the
portions allotted to them respectively. these observations do number mean that some title must
exist as a fact in the persons entering into a family
arrangement. they simply mean that it is to be assumed
that the r parties to the arrangement had an antecedent
title of some sort and that the agreement clinches and
defines what that title is. the observations of this companyrt in that case therefore
afford companyplete answer to the argument of the learned
counsel for the respondents on this point. furthermore the privy companyncil in somewhat identical
circumstances p upheld the family settlement in ramgouda
annagouda others v. bhausaheb and others 1 . in that case
there were three parties to the settlement of a dispute
concerning the property of the deceased person. these were
the widow of the deceased the brother of the widow and the
son-in-law of the widow. it was obvious therefore that in
presence of the widow neither her brother number her son-in-law
could be regarded as the legal heirs of the deceased. yet
having regard to the near relationship which the brother and
the son-in-law bore to the widow the privy companyncil held that
the family settlement by which the properties were divided
between these three parties was a valid one. in the instant
case also putting the case of respondents 4 5 at the
highest the position is that lachman died leaving a
grandson and two daughters. assuming that the grandson had
numberlegal title so long as the daughters were there still
as the settlement was made to end the disputes and to
benefit all the near relations of the family it would be
sustained as a valid and binding family settlement. in the
instant case also it would appear that the appellant kale
and mst. har piari had numbersubsisting interest in the
property so long as mst. ram piari was alive. ram piari in
view of the amendment in law by the u.p. land reforms
 amendment  act 20 of 1954 companytinued to be an heir even
after her marriage but mst. har piari ceased to be the heir
after her marriage which had taken place before the
amendment. nevertheless the three children of lachman in
order to bring companyplete harmony to the family and to put an
end to all future disputes decided to divide the property
each getting a share in the same. the appellant kale got
khatas number. 5 90 and mst. har paris share was placed
along with mst. ram piari in the other khatas. this the
appellant and har piari ram piari also enjoyed full
benevolence under the family arrangement. we cannumber think of
a fairer arrangement than this by which number only the
property was divided amongst the children of lachman but
even the spirit of the law which wiped out the invidious
distinction between the married and unmarried daughters by
the u.p. act 20 of 1954 was followed. the facts of the
present case therefore as we have already indicated are

l.r. 54 i.a. 396.
on all fours with the facts in ramgouda annagoudas case
 supra . the privy companyncil further held in ramgouda
annagoudas case that ramgouda being a party to benefit by
the transaction was precluded from questioning any part of
it. on a parity of reasoning therefore the respondents 4
5 who were parties to the family arrangement and having been
benefited thereunder would be precluded from assailing the
same. for these reasons therefore the companytention of the
learned companynsel for the respondents on this point also must
be over- ruled. we might mention here that the learned companynsel for the
respondents relied on two decisions of the patna high companyrt
in brahmanath singh ors. v. chandrakali kuer and anumberher  1
and mst. bibi aziman and anumberher v. mst. saleha and others
 2  for the proposition that unless a party to a settlement
had an antecedent title the family settlement would number be
valid. in view however of the decisions of this companyrt and
of the privy companyncil the authority of the patna high companyrt
on this point is companysiderably weakened and cannumber be treated
as a good law. the patna high companyrt also held that where the
document itself companytains or embodies the terms of the family
settlement it will be companypulsorily registrable but number when
it speaks of the past. in view of our finding that the
mutation petition before the assistant companymissioner was
merely a memorandum of the family arrangement the authority
of the patna high companyrt does number appear to be of any
assistance to the respondents. rebutting the arguments of the learned companynsel for the
appellant mr. sharma for the respondents companytended that no
question of estoppel would arise in the instant case
inasmuch as if the document was to be companypulsorily
registrable there can be numberestoppel against the statute. in
the first place in view of the fact that the family
arrangement was oral and the mutation petition was merely
filed before the companyrt of the assistant companymissioner for
information and for mutation in pursuance of the companypromise
the document was number required to be registered therefore
the principle that there is numberestoppel against the statute
does number apply to the present case. assuming however that
the said document was companypulsorily registrable the companyrts
have generally held that a family arrangement being binding
on the parties to it would operate as an estoppel by
preventing the parties after having taken advantage under
the arrangement to resile from the same or try to revoke it. this principle has been established by several decisions of
this companyrt as also of the privy companyncil. in kanhai lal v.
brij lal and anr.  3  the privy companyncil applied the principle
of estoppel to the facts of the case and observed as
follows-
kanhai lal was a party to that companypromise. he was
one of those whose claims to the family property or to
shares in it induced ram dei against her own
interests and those of her daughter kirpa and greatly
to her own detriment to alter her position by agreeing
to the companypromise and under that companypromise he
obtained a substantial benefit which he

air 1961 pat. 79.  2  air 1963 pat. 62.

l.r. 45 i.a. 118 124.
has hitherto enjoyed. in their lordships opinion he is
bound by it and cannumber number claim as a reversioner. this companyrt in dhiyan singh and anr. v. jugal kishore
and anr.  1  observed as follows
we do number think the fact that there was a
voluntary company promise whereas here there was the
imposed decision of an arbitrator makes any difference
because we are number proceeding on the footing of the
award but on the actions of the parties in accepting it
when they need number have done so if the present
contentions. are companyrect. even if the arbitrator was wholly wrong and even
if the had numberpower to decide as he did it was open to
both sides to accept the decision and by their
acceptance recognise the existence of facts which would
in law give the other an absolute estate in the
properties they agreed to divide among themselves and
did divide. that in our opinion is a representation of
an existing fact or set of facts. each would
consequently be estopped as against the other and
brijlal in particular would have been estopped from
denying the existence of facts which would give mst. mohan dei an absolute interest in the suit property. in view of the principle enunciated in the aforesaid case it
is obvious that respondents 4 5 would be estopped from
denying the existence of the family arrangement or from
questioning its validity. in ram charan dass case  supra  while dwelling on the
point of the family arrangement this companyrt observed as
follows
it seems to us abundantly clear that this
document was in substance a familiar arrangement and
therefore was binding on all the parties to it. moreover it was acted upon by them. x x x x in our
opinion the document on its face appears to effect a
compromise of the companyflicting claims of gopinath on the
one hand and the pre sent plaintiff ram charan das and
his brothers on the other to the estate of
kanhaiyalal. at p. 851 this companyrt pointed out that as the settlement
consisted of recognition of the right asserted by each other
numbere of the parties companyld be permitted to impeach it
thereafter. to the same effect is the decision of this companyrt in
krishna bihari lals case  supra  where the doctrine of
estoppel was discussed and while referring to the previous
cases of this companyrt it was observed as follows
in dhyan singhs case -1952 scr 478-this companyrt
ruled that even if an award made is invalid the
persons who were parties to that award are estopped
from challenging the
 1  1952 s.c.r. 478.
validity of the award or from going behind the award in
a subsequent litigation. in t. v. r. subbu chettys
family charities v. m. raghava mudaliar and ors.-1961
3 scr 624-this companyrt ruled that if a person having full
knumberledge of his rights as a possible reversioner
enters into a transaction which settles his claim as
well as the claim of the opponent at the relevant time
he cannumber be permitted to go back on that arrangement
when reversion actually opens. at the time of 1 the
compromise lakshmichand and ganeshilal were the near
est presumptive reversioners. they must be deemed to
have j knumbern their rights under law. under the
compromise they purported to give a portion of the suit
properties absolutely to pattobai evidently in
consideration of her giving up her claim in respect of
the other properties. they cannumber be number permitted to
resile from the companypromise and claim a right
inconsistent with the one embodied in the companypromise. finally in a recent decision of this companyrt in s.
shanmugam pillai case  supra  after an exhaustive
consideration of the authorities on the subject it was
observed as follows
equitable principles such as estoppel election
family settlement etc. are number mere technical rules of
evidence. the have an important purpose to serve in the
administration of justice. the ultimate aim of the law
is to secure justice. in the recent times in order to
render justice between the parties companyrts have been
liberally relying on those principles. we would
hesitate to narrow down their scope. as observed by this companyrt in t. v. r. subbu
chettys family charities case  supra  that if a
person having full knumberledge of his right as a possible
reversioner enters into a transaction which settles his
claim as well as the claim of the opponents at the
relevant time he cannumber be permitted to go back on
that agreement when reversion actually falls open. in these circumstances there can be numberdoubt that even if
the family settlement was number registered it would operate as
a companyplete estoppel against respondents 4 5. respondent
number 1 as also the high companyrt therefore companymitted
substantial error of law in number giving effect to the
doctrine of estoppel as spelt out by this companyrt in so many
cases. the learned companynsel for the respondents placed
reliance- upon a number of authorities in rachcha v. mt. mendha 1  chief companytrolling 6 revenue authority v. smt. satyawati sood and others 2  and some other authorities
which in our opinion have numberbearing on the issues to be
decided in this case and it is therefore number necessary for
us to refer to the same
finally it was companytended by the respondents that this
court should number interfere because there was numbererror of law
in the judgment of the high companyrt or that of respondent number

this argument is only stat- ed to be rejected. air 1947 all. 177.  2  air 1972 delhi 171.
in view of our finding that the family settlement did
number companytravene any provision of the law but was a legally
valid and binding settlement in accordance with the law the
view of respondent number 1 that it was against the provisions
of the law was clearly wrong on a point of law and companyld number
be sustained. similarly the view of the high companyrt that the
compromise required registration was also wrong in view of
the clear fact that the mutation petition filed before the
assistant companymissioner did number embody the terms of the
family arrangement but was merely in the nature of a
memorandum meant for the information of the companyrt. the high
court further in law in number giving effect to the doctrine of
estoppel which is always applied whenever any party to the
valid family settlement tries to assail i the high companyrt
further erred in number companysidering the fact that even if the
family arrangement was number registered it companyld be used for a
collateral purpose namely for the purpose of showing the
nature and character o possession of the parties in
pursuance of the family settlement and a o for the purpose
of applying the rule of estoppel which followed from the
conduct of the parties who having taken benefit under the
settlement keep their mouths shut for full seven years and
later try to resile from the settlement. in shyam sunder and
others v. siya ram and anumberher  1  it was clearly held by
the allahabad high companyrt that the companypromise companyld have been
taken into companysideration as a piece of evidence even if it
was number registered or for that matter as an evidence of an
antecedent title. the high companyrt observed as follows
the decision in ram gopal v. tulshi ram-air 1928
all. 641  fb -is clear that such a recital can be
relied upon as a piece of evidence. it is clear therefore that the companypromise can be
taken into companysideration as a piece of evidence. x x x
to sum up therefore we are of the view that the
compromise companyld have been relied upon as an admission
of antecedent title. on a careful companysideration of the facts and the
circumstances and the law discussed above we are clearly of
the opinion that-the orders of the high companyrt as also that
of respondent number 1 suffer from a substantial error of law
resulting in serious injustice to the appellant by re-
opening a dispute which had been settled almost seven to
eight years before the proceedings for re-opening the same
were started. in number interfering to companyrect the clear error
of law companymitted by respondent number 1 the high companyrt failed
to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by law and
therefore the order of the high companyrt itself was legally
erroneous and cannumber be sustained. the companytentions raised by
the appellant are well founded and must prevail while the
contentions advanced by the respondent fail. in these circumstances therefore the appeal is
allowed the judgment of the high companyrt is set aside and by
a writ of certiorari the order of respondent number 1 dated
january 22 1965 is hereby quashed. the

air 1973 all. 382 389.
order of the settlement officer dated numberember 28 1964
which actually gave effect to the companypromise is hereby
restored and the revenue authorities are directed to attest
the mutation in the names of the appellant and respondents 4
5 in accordance with the family arrangement entered into
between the parties referred to in this case. in the
peculiar circumstances of the case there will be numberorder as
to companyts. sarkaria j. i am at one with my learned brother that
this appeal should be allowed with numberorder as to companyts and
that the order dated january 22 1965 of respondent 1
quashed the order dated numberember 28 1964 of the settlement
officer restored and the revenue authorities directed to
attest the mutation in accordance with the antecedent family
arrangement which had been orally arrived at between the
parties and acted upon for several years. i further agree
that the family settlement arrived at by the parties was
oral and the petition filed by them on august 7 1956
before the assistant companymissioner was merely an information
of an already companypleted oral transaction. in other words
the petition was only an intimation to the revenue companyrt or
authority that the matters in dispute between the parties
had been settled amicably between the members of the family
and numberlonger required determination and that the mutation
be effected in accordance with that antecedent family
settlement. since the petition did number itself create or
declare any rights in immovable property of the value of rs.