civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 146 of 1956.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
december 3 1954 of the madras high companyrt in referred case
number 69 of 1954.

s. k. aiyanger for the appellant. 1094

ganapathy iyer and t. m. sen for respondents number. 1
and 2. 1957. may 6. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
sinha j.-this appeal by special leave and the summons under
rule 30 of order iv of the supreme companyrt rules 1950 have
been heard together and will be disposed of by this
judgment. the appellant was an advocate of the madras high companyrt of
more than 25 years standing and was enrolled as an
advocate of the then federal companyrt in the year 1939. as
will presently appear he has had a chequered career at the
bar. a full bench of the madras high companyrt presided over
by the chief justice of that companyrt by its judgment and
order dated december 3 1954 has directed that the
appellants name be removed from the roll of advocates of
the madras high companyrt for grave professional misconduct. this companyrt having been apprised of the result of the
proceedings against the appellant in the high companyrt issued
numberice to him to show cause why he should number be suspended
from practice in view of the findings recorded by the high
court. it appears that the appellant was engaged by one k. t.
appannah ordinarily residing in bangalore city who will
hereinafter be referred to as the companyplainant to companyplete a
transaction of sale between the companyplainant and the owner of
a house property in the city of madras whom we shall call
in the companyrse of this judgment as the vendor after
scrutinizing the title deeds in respect of the property
which was the subject-matter of the transaction of sale. before the appellant was engaged by the companyplainant the
bargain had been struck and the sale price of the property
had been fixed at rs. 15000 out of which rs. 1300 had been
paid to the vendor by way of earnest money. a retired
government servant named sundararajayya who was a relation
of the companyplainant and used to live near about the
appellants residence had also helped the companyplainant in
acquiring the property and in that companynection used to give
instructions to the appellant
1095
on behalf of the companyplainant. on may 11 1951 the
complainant sent by way of a demand draft the sum of rs. 1400 to the appellant to meet the companyts of stamp for the
sale deed and registration and a fee of rs. 150 to the
appellant for his work in companynection with the transaction. in the companyrse of the enquiry into the title to the property
it was discovered that there was a mortgage on the property
of rs. 5500 on the basis of a registered mortgage-deed
which had been filed in companyrt in companynection with a
litigation in respect of that very property pending on the
original side of the madras high companyrt. by negotiation it
was settled that rs. 5500 out of the sale price shall be
reserved for the discharge of the mortgage debt and that
the remaining amount of the companysideration will be paid to
the vendor on companypletion of the sale transaction and
delivery of vacant possession of the property. the
appellant wrote to the companyplainant that the latter should
send him a demand draft for rs. 5600 in his name for
payment to the mortgagee aforesaid when the mortgage bond
properly discharged would be handed over to the appellant
acting for the companyplainant. in due companyrse on or about june
26 1951 a demand draft in the name of the appellant for
rs. 5600 was sent by the companyplainant for the express
purpose of discharging the mortgage debt aforesaid. on
august 21 1951 a cheque for rs. 1200 on september 26
1951 a cheque for rs. 500 and on october 19 1951 a
demand draft for rs. 5500 all in the name of the
appellant were sent by the companyplainant in order to put him
in funds for companypleting the transaction of sale and for
payment of the companysideration money to the vendor. on july
9 1951 the sale-deed was executed by some of the
executants and on september 6 1951 it was executed by the
remaining executant and registered. hence it would appear
that between may 11 1951 and october 24 1951 the
complainant had paid to the appellant the sum of rs. 15200 which was sufficient to pay the outstanding amount
of the companysideration for sale namely rs. 13700 including
the mortgage amount aforesaid of rs. 5500 besides the
costs of stamp and registration and the appellants fees. but it appears
1096
that the vendors portion of the companysideration money was
paid by the appellant on numberember 23 1951 after some
avoidable delay due to him and vacant delivery of
possession given to the appellant as stipulated between the
parties. it appears further that the companyplainant was in
need of raising money on the security of the newly-acquired
property and therefore was anxious to receive all the
documents of title including the mortgage bond duly
discharged. but the appellant for reasons of his own went
on postponing the payment of the mortgage money on some
pretext or the other. on being pressed for the mortgage-
deed duly discharged being handed over to the companyplainant
and as a result of a protracted companyrespondence the appel-
lant sent to the companyplainant on june 26 1952 a number of
documents including cancelled mortgage documents. it
should be added here that the mortgage transaction of rs. 5500 had been entered into by the owner of the property in
order to discharge previous mortgages on the same property. all these documents had to be withdrawn from the high companyrt
where they had been in the custody of the companyrt as already
indicated. unfortunately sundararajayya died on june 28
1952. as a result of further companyrespondence the
complainant came to realise to his companyt that the mortgage
debt of rs. 5500 had number been paid to the mortgagee as
arranged between the appellant and the companyplainant who had
put him in funds with the express purpose of obtaining a
clear title to the property which he had agreed to purchase. thus the companyplainant was reduced to the necessity of filing
a regular petition of companyplaint in the high companyrt on
numberember 14 1952. in that-petition of companyplaint the
complainant made companyious quotations from the letters
addressed by the appellant to him and made reference to the
fact that the mortgagee had already instituted a suit in
court for recovery of the mortgage money and had impleaded
the companyplainant as party defendant to the suit. the
gravamen of the charge against the appellant was that he
had number discharged the outstanding mortgage on the property
purchased for which he had been supplied with ample funds
by the companyplainant
1097
and that he had number disclosed how and in what manner the
complainants money meant for the purpose had been
utilized by the appellant. in answer to the numberice issued to him on february 16 1953
the appellant submitted along statement by way of an
explanation which runs into about 43 pages in print which
is more in the nature of an argument in justification of his
conduct than a statement of facts. the high companyrt referred the companyplaint for inquiry and
report to the bar companyncil. three members of the companyncil
constituted the tribunal which held a very elaborate
inquiry. after recording both oral and documentary
evidence the bar companyncil made its report on may 5 1954
holding that
both the charges have been fully established and
that the respondent has number only number used the moneys of the
complainant for the purpose for which the money was sent
but that the respondent has number accounted at all for the sum
of rupees 5000 which was admittedly cashed by him and
brought into his bank account though number in his professional
account. in companyrse of its report the tribunal found that the
appellant had received all the amounts sent by the
complainant as set out above. it also pointed out that an
unfortunate feature of the case was that the mortgage bond
in question which was one of the cancelled mortgage
documents had number been produced before it. the number-
production of the crucial document was explained to the
tribunal by companynsel for the companyplainant. it was stated that
the mortgagedeed in question along with other documents
had been left by the companyplainant with his companynsel and that
the whole bundle of papers including those documents had
disappeared from his office. one can only surmise as to
who may have been responsible for secreting those documents
or for whose benefit they had been stolen away as alleged
by companynsel for the companyplainant. anumberher ugly aspect of the
proceedings was that a number of letters admittedly written
by the appellant to the companyplainant in companynection with the
transaction of sale had been found by the high companyrt to
have been
1098
tampered with or bodily substituted. the tribunal observed
with particular reference to exhibit c-12 which was alleged
to have been substituted for the original that the learned
counsel for the companyplainant had number persisted in the charge
that it had been substituted and that he did number press the
charge that there had been certain alterations in some other
letters which formed part of the voluminumbers companyrespondence
that passed between the appellant and the companyplainant. it
may be observed here that numberspecific charge had been
drawn up against the appellant in respect of those letters. hence when the tribunal stated that the charge had been
withdrawn it only meant to say that the learned companynsel for
the companyplainant did number persist in his allegations about
those alterations or the wholesale substitution of exhibit
c-12 about which we will have to say something more in the
course of this judgment. the tribunal examined in some detail the particular
defence of the appellant with reference to the specific
charges made against him in respect of the sum of rs. 5600
admittedly sent by the companyplainant for the specific purpose
of discharging the mortgage encumbrance on the purchased
property. it appears to have been the appellants case that
the demand draft for rs. 5500 dated october 24 1951 had
been sent to him through sundararajayya and that the
appellant after getting the amount of the draft credited to
his personal account kept only rs. 500 for payment to the
vendor and made over to sundararajayya the remaining 5000
rupees in cash. it was number his case that the companyplainant
had instructed him to pay to sundararajayya the 5000
rupees alleged by him to have been paid to sundararajayya. it was number even his case that he had taken any receipt for
the said sum from sundararajayya though he alleged that he
had given a receipt to sundararajayya for the much smaller
sum of rs. 500 which he admitted to have kept in his hands
on account of the companyplainant for payment to the vendee. after reviewing the entire evidence and particularly the
correspondence that passed between the appellant and the
complainant the
1099
tribunal came to the companyclusion that the appellant
dishonestly and fraudulently represented to the companyplainant
that the mortgage had been cancelled and he picked out 3 out
of the 36 documents received by him from the vendor
including the mortgage document  herein involved and sent
the same to the companyplainant describing them as cancelled
documents. the only inference that one can draw is that
the respondent having utilized the monies intended for the
discharge of the mortgage for his own purpose put on the
mortgage document the marks of cancellation and sent the
same to the companyplainant at the pressure of the companyplainants
demand for the discharged mortgage document. the tribunal
also examined all the relevant evidence bearing on the
payment back of rs. 5000 to sundararajayya out of the
demand draft for rs. 5500 admittedly sent by the
complainant and credited to the personal account of the
appellant. as already indicated sundararajayya had died
before the companymencement of the inquiry and therefore his
evidence companyld number be available to the tribunal. but in
spite of the companyplete absence of the mortgage bond in
question from the record and of the possible explanation of
sundararajayya the tribunal had numberdifficulty in companying to
the companyclusion that the appellant is clearly guilty number
only of professional misconduct but also a clear breach of
trust. this report of the tribunal was closely examined by a full
bench of the madras high companyrt. the learned chief justice
who presided over the bench after carefully companysidering all
that companyld have been said on behalf of the appellant and
the relevant evidence both oral and documentary companyfirmed
the findings of the tribunal. it went a little further and
held that exhibit c-12 was number genuine and that the letters-
exhibits c- 10 and c- 11 companytained interpolations at the
instance of the appellant who was the respondent before the
court. in this companynection the high companyrt made the
following observations
the learned advocate-general attacked the genuineness of
this letter. whether there was anumberher genuine letter of
the same date or number it is number
1100
necessary to decide. numberdoubt this letter is in the
handwriting of the respondent. after deep companysideration of
all the circumstances we are clearly of opinion that this
letter must have been introduced into the bundle is of
documents with the companyplainants advocate at or about the
same time when the respondent made the interpolations in
the letters dated 6-9-1951 and 6-10-1951  exhibits c-10 and
c-11 . in the result the high companyrt directed that the appellants
name be removed from the roll of advocates of that companyrt. against this order the appellant prayed for and obtained
special leave to appeal to this companyrt. it is companyvenient at
this stage to deal with the arguments advanced by the
learned companynsel for the appellant. it has been suggested
that the inquiry by the bar companyncil tribunal was rambling
and roving. this objection is number altogether unfounded. it appears from the order sheet maintained by the tribunal
that charges were framed on july 22 1953 and the inquiry
continued from date to date until the report was made on may
5 1954. the tribunal handled the case on as many as 45
dates and the printed record of the inquiry runs into 296
pages in print. this must have entailed a good deal of
expenditure of time and money to the parties and one may
particularly sympathize with the companyplainant who had to go
through all this after having been deprived of at least rs. 5000 if number more as found by the high companyrt and the
tribunal. but if it is necessary to apportion blame much
of it may be laid at the door of the appellant himself who
appears to have spent a lot of ingenuity over trying to
explain his dealings with his unfortunate client. in answer
to the charge framed by the bar companyncil tribunal the
appellant submitted a long written answer on september 27
1953. but before that he had already submitted a written
explanation on february 16 1953 running into 43 pages in
print as already indicated. there is numberdoubt that the
appellant left numberstone unturned to cloud the issues and to
throw a veil over his mis-deeds as found by the tribunal
and the madras high companyrt. it is cleat therefore that it
is
1101
number the appellant who should have made any grievance out of
the so-called rambling and roving inquiry. it was next pointed out that the inquiry by the tribunal
into the alleged misconduct of the appellant was in the
nature of a quasi-criminal proceeding and  as necessary
corollaries to this proposition it was companytended
 1  that the charge should have been more precise that
 2  it should have been proved beyond all reasonable doubt. we have examined these companytentions with reference to the
record as prepared by the tribunal and in our opinion it
has number been made out that the charge was so defective as to
mislead the appellant or to cause any substantial prejudice
to him or that there is any room for reasonable doubt as to
the truth of the charges framed against the appellant. the
charges framed against the appellant were in these terms
that you mr. c  in acting for the petitioner as his
advocate in the matter of scrutinising the title deeds of
number 104-a lloyds road gopalapuram madras and putting
through the sale of the said premises in petitioners
favour received from the petitioner rs. 5600 for the
purpose of discharging a mortgage encumbrance on the
property and that you have number applied the monies so
entrusted to you then and there for the purposes of
entrustment. that you mr. c have further number disclosed to the
petitioner how and in what manner you have utilised the said
monies and that you have number accounted for the same when
demanded. that you have for these reasons companymitted acts of
professional misconduct liable to be dealt with under the
bar companyncils act. with reference to the charge in the first paragraph it was
contended that the charge as it appears has been
completely answered by the appellant. the argument runs as
follows the reference to the sum of rs. 5600 apparently
is to the demand draft for the said amount dated january 26
1951. this amount the appellant claimed had been paid
over to the vendee
1102
himself on numberember 23 1951 when vacant possession of the
premises purchased was delivered to the appellant. this companyld have been a companyplete answer to the charge if it
had been found as a fact that out of the demand draft dated
october 24 1951 of rs. 5500 the appellant had paid back
to sundararajayya the sum of rs. 5000 as alleged by him. but as found by the companyrt below companyfirming the companyclusions
of the bar companyncil tribunal the appellant had failed to
establish by reliable evidence that the sum of rs. 5000
had as a matter of fact been paid back to sundararajayya
aforesaid. hence on the findings it is clear that the
appellant had in his hands more than ample funds to pay the
entire companysideration money including the mortgage
encumbrance of rs. 5500 after deducting rs. 1300 which
had already been paid to the vendor by way of earnest money
before the appellant came on the scene. but it is sought to
be pointed out on behalf of the appellant that the charge
against him was number that he had number accounted for or had
embezzled any portion of the sum of re. 5500 sent to him
last on october 24 1951. this argument assumes that the
mortgage-debt outstanding against the purchased property had
to be discharged in specie out of any particular item out
of several instalments in which the companyplainant bad
entrusted the total sum of rs. 15200 to the appellant in
connection with the transaction in question. the appellant
had to account for the due application of the said amount of
rs. 15200 being the total sum placed in his hands by his
client for the purpose of seeing through the transaction. the appellant himself does number claim that he rendered
account of the total sum thus entrusted to him by his
client. the appellant cannumber be said to have duly accounted
for all this sum unless it were held that he had paid rs. 5000 in cash to sundararajayya. on his own showing if it
is held as it has been found by the high companyrt in
agreement with the tribunal that the sum of rs. 5000 had
number been paid to sundararajayya the appellant has number
accounted for the entire amount entrusted to him by his
client. this then is a clear
1103
case shorn of all verbiage introduced by the appellant
himself to cloud the issues that the appellant was
entrusted by his client with the sum of rs. 15200 out of
which he had to discharge the mortgage-debt of rs. 5500
as settled with the mortgagee by the appellant himself
acting on behalf of the companyplainant. the appellant has
never pretended that he has paid this sum to the mortgagee. this is made absolutely clear by the appellants statement
in paragraph 58 of his written explanation to the
following effect
there is numberquestion of my having discharged the
mortgage. i did number discharge the mortgage. i never paid
any money to the mortgagee or to anyone on his behalf. i
never told or wrote and i companyld number have told or written to
any at any time that i had paid the mortgage claim. the
allegation or suggestion to that effect is untrue. as
already stated i was number placed with the requisite funds on
and after 21-11-1951.
there is thus numberescape from the companyclusion that the
appellant had number applied the sum of rs. 5500 in
discharging the mortgage debt aforesaid out of the sum of
rs. 15200 placed in his hands by the companyplainant for the
specific purpose of acquiring a clear title to the property. it would have been better if the bar companyncil tribunal had
called upon the appellant to account for the entire amount
of rs. 15200 which he admitted he had received from his
client instead of mentioning only the one item of rs. 5600. that would have been a straight case to state
against the appellant. but there is numberreason to hold that
the appellant was in any way prejudiced in his defence by
the omission in the charge to mention the entire sum of
money entrusted to him. it was repeatedly mentioned before
us that the appellant might have been a fool in his dealings
with the money placed at his disposal by his client-the
complainant. there are clear indications in the record that
the appellant far from being a fool is a knave and that
he knew fully what charge he had to meet. there is no
ambiguity in the charge and there is numberdoubt that the high
court was fully justified in wholeheartedly companyfirming the
conclusions of the
1104
tribunal. it is equally clear to us that there is numberroom
for any doubt whatsoever that the appellant had
misappropriated his clients money and that the high companyrt
was fully justified in striking off his name from the roll
of advocates of that companyrt. it remains to companysider the further points sought to be made
on behalf of the appellant that the high companyrt was number
justified in recording its findings in respect of exhibits
c-10 c-11 and c-12 quoted above specially when the
learned companynsel for the companyplainant had number pressed those
allegations of interpolation and forgery before the
tribunal. this companytention is well founded. we have
therefore left companypletely out of account those allegations
of material alterations in exhibits c-10 and c-11 and the
alleged wholesale substitution of the original of exhibit c-

in companysidering the question whether the charges framed
against the appellant have been substantiated we have
proceeded on the assumption that these letters as they
appear at present are genuine. they companytain the statements
of the appellant himself and companystitute an attempt to
explain away his acts of omission and companymission in relation
to the transaction of sale for which he had been engaged by
the companyplainant. those statements are wholly out of tune
with the rest of the record and particularly inconsistent
with the rest of the companyrespondence which had admittedly
passed between the appellant and the companyplainant. we have
number dealt in detail with the voluminumbers companyrespondence
between the parties because this being an appeal by special
leave we have number found it necessary to examine very
closely the findings of fact recorded by the high companyrt in
concurrence with the tribunal. the case against the
appellant as made out by the companyplainant is fully
supported by a large body of reliable oral and documentary
evidence which is companysistent only with the guilt of the
appellant and wholly inconsistent with his innumberence
numberwithstanding the fact that he made a belated but vain
attempt to white-wash his misconduct. turning to the summons issued by this companyrt to the
appellant the first question that arises is the
1105
procedure according to which this summons is to be disposed
of should this companyrt initiate independent proceedings in the
sense of making fresh inquiry after recording evidence pro
and company and then companye to its companyclusions or should this
court proceed upon the inquiry already made by the high
court through the bar companyncil tribunal and record its
orders after giving the advocate companycerned an opportunity of
being heard against similar orders being passed by this
court in view of the companysideration that an advocate of this
court may be entitled to practice in any of the subordinate
courts in india even though he may number be borne on the roll
of advocates of any particular high companyrt ? in this
connection we have precedents of the time of the federal
court and of this companyrt which are analogous to the case in
hand. in those cases the federal companyrt and subsequently this
court acted upon the report of the high companyrt companytaining its
orders in respect of an advocate on its rolls and passed
orders after giving an opportunity to the advocate companycerned
to show cause why disciplinary action should number be taken
against him in view of the findings of the high companyrt. in
those cases it was number companysidered necessary to have a fresh
inquiry made and the companyrt being satisfied that the orders
of the high companyrt were well-founded in fact and law passed
similar orders. curiously enumbergh the first precedent of
the federal companyrt in the matter of an advocate  1  relates
to the case of the appellant himself at an earlier stage of
his career as an advocate. the companyrt companysisting of sir
maurice gwyer chief justice sir s. varadachariar and sir
torick ameer ali jj. dealt with his case. the appellant had
been charged in respect of events which had happened in
1934-35 and was companyvicted in 1941 at the madras sessions
of only one out of 5 companynts of an attempt to cheat. he
served a sentence of 18 months rigorous imprisonment. then the matter was dealt with by the high companyrt on a
report made by the tribunal of the madras bar companyncil to
the effect that the

case number xvi of 1942 decided on march 23 1943. 1106
appellants companyviction involved moral turpitude and in
1942 the madras high companyrt ordered him to be struck off the
roll of advocates of that companyrt. in the companyrse of their
short order the federal companyrt made the following
observations
having regard to the decision of the high companyrt of madras
in a matter which may be regarded as analogous  in re an
advocate 1. l. r. 46 mad. p. 903  we have number dealt with
that before us as if an order made against the respondent
must follow automatically from the result of the proceedings
in madras and we have heard the respondent at length in
support of the written memorandum submitted. as a result of such hearing however we are number satisfied
that circumstances exist so exceptional or extraordinary as
to make it either possible or proper for us to disregard the
verdict or the subsequent order of the high companyrt against
the respondent
in these circumstances we have to hold that grounds have number
been adduced sufficient to prevent an order removing the
respondent from the rolls of this companyrt following upon the
order made by the high companyrt of madras and such an order
must number be made. -
the appellant ceased to be on the roll of advocates of the
madras high companyrt and of the federal companyrt as a result of
the federal companyrt order passed as quoted above some time
in 1943. in 1948 the appellant moved the federal companyrt for
reinstatement as an advocate of that companyrt in view of the
fact that he had been re-instated by the madras high companyrt
by its order dated march 22 1948. that companyrt had passed
its orders on affidavits and certificates of good character
during the period the advocate stood struck off the roll of
advocates. a judge of the federal companyrt during the long
vacation passed orders reinstating the appellant as an
advocate of that companyrt following the orders passed by the
madras high companyrt. that is how the appellant was re-
introduced to the profession and within about two years of
his reinstatement the companyplainant fell a victim to the
appellants dishonest and fraudulent companyduct as found
above. 1107
in anumberher case in re d. a. shanmugasundaraswami 1  an
advocate companying again from the madras high companyrt a similar
proceeding followed. one d. a. shanmughasundaraswami an
advocate of the madras high companyrt had been dealt with by
that companyrt for c professional misconduct on several companynts. after the necessary inquiry and report by the tribunal of
the bar companyncil the high companyrt directed his name to be
struck off the roll of advocates of that companyrt. as that
advocate was also borne on the roll of advocates of the
federal companyrt summons under order iv rule 29 of the rules
of that companyrt was issued and the federal companyrt companysisting
of kania chief justice fazl ali patanjali sastri mahajan
and b. k. mukherjee jj. by their order dated january 24
ordered that his name should be similarly removed from the
roll of advocates of the federal companyrt. their lordships
relying upon the precedent referred to in the last
paragraph passed their order in these terms
having regard to a precedent of this companyrt we did lot
consider that on the footing of the order made by the madras
high companyrt an order of removal of his name from the rolls of
this companyrt should automatically follow. he accordingly
argued his case before us in detail. after hearing the respondent at great length we see no
reason to differ from the companyclusion of the madras high
court. we are number satisfied that circumstances exist which
make either possible or proper for us to disregard the
verdict or the subsequent order of the madras high companyrt
against the respondent. under the circumstances we hold
that numbersufficient grounds have been adduced to prevent an
order removing the respondent from the rolls of this companyrt
following upon the order made by the madras high companyrt and
such an order is therefore made. this companyrt dealt with the case of an advocate of the bombay
high companyrt who was also enrolled as a senior advocate of
this companyrt. that case is in the matter of mr. g a
senior advocate of the supreme companyrt 2  . after

misc. case number x of 1948 decided on january 24 1949.  2   1955 1 s.c.r. 490. 1108
the advocate had been suspended from practice by the bombay
high companyrt for six months and that order was brought to the
numberice of this companyrt this companyrt dealt with the matter under
order iv rule 30 and passed orders similar to that passed
by the bombay high companyrt. anumberher case from the bombay high companyrt dealt with by this
court is in the matter of -d an advocate of the supreme
court 1 . when the matter was dealt with by this companyrt
under order iv rule 30 of the rules the advocate after
having been suspended from practice for a period of one
year by the bombay high companyrt prayed that a fresh inquiry
might be held into the matter. this companyrt rejected that
prayer of the advocate and proceeded upon the record as
made by the high companyrt through the bar companyncil. this companyrt
agreed with the view taken by the bombay high companyrt about
his misconduct in companynection with a criminal trial and
suspended the advocate from practice for a period company
terminus with the period of suspension fixed by the high
court. on a review of the aforesaid precedents it may be taken
that the following principles have been laid down by the
federal companyrt and by this companyrt when dealing with a summons
under rule 30 of order iv of supreme companyrt rules or its
equivalent rule of the federal companyrt-

any order by a high companyrt by way of disciplinary
action against an advocate borne on the roll of advocates
both of a high companyrt and of this companyrt is number automatically
followed by a similar order by this companyrt
 2  this companyrt need number start a fresh inquiry by way of
recording evidence over again against the advocate
concerned for professional misconduct
 3  it is enumbergh that this companyrt should generally examine
the record prepared by the bar companyncil of a high companyrt
under the directions of that companyrt on the basis of which
the high companyrt has passed its orders and take into account
the findings of the high companyrt
 1  1955 2 s.c.r. 1006. 1109
 4  of companyrse this companyrt has to grant a reasonable
opportunity to the advocate companycerned of being heard
against the action proposed to be taken against him under
its disciplinary jurisdiction
 5  it is open to this companyrt in an appropriate case to
permit the advocate to adduce such additional evidences it
thinks fit
 6  this companyrt after hearing the advocate or his legal
adviser and if necessary the attorney-general or such
other advocate as may be appointed to place the view-point
of the legal profession generally or of the companyplainant or
the aggrieved party if he desires to be heard in the matter
may pass such order as it may deem fit and proper in its
judicial discretion. it may be numbered that in the instant case at the final
hearing we did number find it necessary to adjourn the hearing
to issue numberice to the attorney-general number was any request
made in that behalf. in view of these precedents as also in view of the fact
that ordinarily it is necessary that a person in order to
be entitled to be enrolled as an advocate of the supreme
court should be borne on the roll of advocates of a high
court proceedings in this companyrt under rule 30 of order iv
of the rules should numbermally be treated as a natural sequel
to the proceedings in the high companyrt under the bar companyncils
act. if one is number a fit and proper person to companytinue on
the roll of advocates of a high companyrt a fortiori he cannumber
be permitted to companytinue on the roll of advocates of this
court. it is a great privilege to be borne on the roll of
advocates of the supreme companyrt and only such persons as
show a high degree of integrity of character should be so
enrolled. any person who has been found by the high companyrt
to have fallen from that high standard of integrity of
character required of an advocate of a companyrt must suffer
the companysequences of his name being removed from the roll of
advocates of this companyrt.