civil appellate jurisdiction special leave petition
 civil  number. 16041-42/88. from the judgment and order dated 27.7.1988 of the
karnataka high companyrt in w.p. number9173/86 and w.a. no
2707/85. with
slp  c  number. 12258 12254 12260/90 8608/91

n. narasimhamurthy s.s. javali s.n. bhat and ravi

wadhwani for the petitioners. s. nesargi r. jagannath goulay m.k. dua m.
veerappa k.h. numberin singh s.k. kulkarni and surya kant for
the respondents. the following order of the companyrt was delivered by

jayachandra reddy j. in all these special leave
petitions the companymon question that arises for companysideration
is whether the provisions of the karnataka land reforms act
1961 as amended in 1974  act for short  cease to be
applicable in all respects to the lands which came within
the purview of the urban land  ceiling and regulation  act
1976  ceiling act for short . the lands involved in these
matters are companyered by the development plan by the belgaum
city town planning authority as per the master plan for the
said city and they are included and declared as urban
agglomeration in the city of hubli under the provisions of
the ceiling act. in the year 1972 the karnataka legislature
passed a resolution under article 252 of the companystitution to
the effect that imposing a ceiling on urban immovable
property and the acquisition of such property in excess of
the ceiling limit for public purposes and all the matters
connected therewith shall be regulated in the state by
parliament qby law. the state legislature thus divested
itself of the legislative companypetence to enact law in respect
of subject-matter of the resolution. on 1.4.74 the amended
karnataka land reforms act was enacted and under the said
act the tenant of the land companyered by the act is entitled to
the grant of occupancy rights after making an application
under the act. this act came into force with effect from
2.1.85. but for the purpose of grant of occupancy rights
1.4.74 was the relevant date. while so in the year 1975 the
governumber of karnataka passed the urban aggolmeration
ordinance whereunder all lands between the periphery of 8

ms. of the municipal limits of hubli dharwad were declared
as urban agglomeration land. in the year 1976 the parliament
passed the ceiling act for imposition of ceiling on urban
properties and the act was made applicable to karnataka also
in view of the resolution passed by the state government
referred to above. the order of the land tribunal under the
act companyferring occupancy rights on the tenants was
challenged before the high companyrt companytending that the lands
involved in these cases were within the purview of the
ceiling act and therefore the provisions of the land reforms
act had numberapplication to such lands on the ground that the
provisions of the state act were repugnant to the provisions
of the central act namely the ceiling act. the writ petition
was dismissed by the high companyrt. the owners preferred writ
appeals and they were also dismissed by a companymon judgment in
writ appeal number. 2707 and 2361/85 etc. the division bench
held that there is numberconflict between the two enactment in
certain respect i.e. atleast so far as the implementation of
the provisions of chapter iii of the act are companycerned and
that provisions of this chapter of the act do number cease to
apply to the agricultural lands companying within the meaning of
urban agglomeration in the ceiling act. the judgment of the
division bench is challenged in s.l.p.  civil  number 16041-
42/88. many of the similar writ petitions that were pending
before the high companyrt were transferred to the land reforms
appellate tribunal. the appellate tribunal dismissed the
petitions by a companymon order following the judgment of the
division bench of the high companyrt in writ appeal number2707/85
and companynected matters. several civil revisions petitions
filed by the land owners against the order of the appellate
tribunal were dismissed by the high companyrt. some of the
special leave petitions are filed against the order of the
high companyrt in the said civil revision petitions. therefore
all these special leave petitions can be disposed of by a
common order. it was urged before us that the resolution of the state
legislature passed under article 252 of the companystitution
shifted the topic companyered by the resolution from list ii of
schedule vii to the companystitution and vested the companypetence
to make the law in respect of the said topic in the
parliament and that thereafter the state enactment ceased to
have efficacy in respect of said topic. alternatively it was
urged that when in pursuance of the resolution the
parliament legislates in respect of the topic companyered by the
resolution the parliamentary law repeals or supersedes any
existing state legislation on the topic and therefore such
law cannumber be enforced thereafter. we shall first extract some of the relevant provisions
of the companystitution of india and the respective enactments. article 246 of the companystitution reads thus

subject-matter of laws made
by parliament and by the
legislatures of states- l
numberwithstanding anything in
clauses  2  and  3  parliament has
exclusive power to make laws with
respect to any of the matters
enumerated in list i in the
seventh schedule  in this
constitution referred to as the
union list .  2  xx xx xx

subject to clauses  1  and  2
the legislature of any state has
exclusive power to make laws for
such state or any part thereof
with respect to any of the matters
enumerated in list ii in the
seventh schedule  in this
constitution referred to as the
state list .  4 xx xx xx
entry 18 in list ii namely the state list of the vii
schedule to the companystitution is in the following terms

land that is to say rights
in or over land land tenures
including the relation of landlord
and tenant and the companylection of
rents transfer and alienation of
agricultural land land improvement
and agricultural loans
colonization. article 252 of the companystitution reads
thus

power of parliament to
legislate for two or more states
by companysent and adoption of such
legislation by any other state- 1
if it appears to the legislatures
of two or more states to be
desirable that any of the matters
with respect to which parliament
has numberpower to make laws for the
states except as provided in
articles 249 and 250 should be
regulated in such states by
parliament by law and if
resolutions to that effect are
passed by all the houses of the
legislatures of those states it
shall be lawful for parliament to
pass an act for regulating that
matter accordingly and any act so
passed shall apply to such states
and to any other state by which it
is adopted afterwards by resolution
passed in that behalf by the house
or where there are two houses by
each of the houses of the
legislature of that state. any act so passed by parliament
may be amended or repealed by an
act of parliament passed or adopted
in like manner but shall number as
respects any state to which it
applics be amended or repcaled by
an act of the legislature of that
state. article 252 empowers the parliament to legislate for
two or more states on any of the matters with respect of
which the parliament has numberpower to make law except as
provided under articles 249 and 250. this power to legislate
is vested in the parliament only if two or more state
legislatures think it desirable to have a law enacted by
parliament on such matters in list ii i.e. with respect to
which the parliament has numberpower to make law for the state. the passing of the resolutions by the state legislatures is
a companydition precedent for vesting the parliament with such
power. the relevant portion of the resolution passed by the
state legislature under article 252 reads thus
number therefore in pursuance of
clause  1  of article 252 of the
constitution this assembly hereby
resolves that the imposition of a
ceiling on urban immovable property
and f acquisition of such property
in excess of the ceiling and all
matters companynected therewith or
ancillary and incidental thereto
should be regulated in the state of
karnataka by parliament by law. the resolution states that the imposition of ceiling on
urban immovable property and the acquisition of such
property in excess of the ceiling limit with a view to
utilising such excess property for public purposes and all
other matters companynected therein or incidental thereto shall
be regulated in this state by parliament by law. the basic
question that arises is what is the actual companytent of the
subject-matter that was resolved to be entrusted to
parliament by the state legislature under article 252 of the
constitution. from the resolution it is clear that the
subject-matter that was resolved to be entrusted to the
parliament was the one imposing a ceiling on urban immovable
property and acquisition of such property in excess of the
ceiling. it is true that this subject-matter is the topic
that falls within entry 18 of list 11 of schedule vii to the
constitution and the said subject-matter of entry 18 has
been originally kept apart for the state legislature to make
law and parliament had numbercompetence in respect of those
matters falling under the wide scope of entry 18. number by
virtue of this resolution a part of the area falling under
entry 18 is transferred to the domain of parliament to make
law relating to the matters within the transferred area. the
scope of entry 18 is very wide and the land mentioned
therein may be agricultural or number-agricultural and may be
rural or urban. the subject-matter carved out of entry 18
under the resolutions passed by the various state
legislatures related to only- urban immovable property and
by virtue of the resolution the law that can be enacted by
the parliament should be a law imposing a ceiling on such
urban immovable property. the learned companynsel for the
petitioners however urged that vesting of tenanted land in
the state and companyferment of occupancy rights under the
provisions of the state act directly fall under the subject
of imposing ceiling on and holding and other matters
incidental or ancillary to the main topic of imposing
ceiling and therefore they are fully companyered by the ceiling
act passed by the parliament and the same supersedes the
state enactment in respect of this land. the learned companynsel
appearing for the respondents on the companytrary submitted that
imposition of ceiling is a distinct and separately
identifiable subject and is the power carved out of entry 18
and vested in the parliament to legislate and that the power
of the state to legislate in respect of the remaining part
of the subject-matter is unaffected and that when two
distinct powers have companye into existence vesting law making
competence in the state and parliament the pith and
substance of the laws made by each of them has to be
examined to see whether any one of them encroaches the field
set apart as falling within the companypetence of the other
body. the learned companynsel for the respondents however
submitted that in any event the provisions of chapter iii of
the act have numberhing to do with the imposition of ceiling on
the urban land and that companyferring of occupancy rights etc. to the tenants under chapter 111 of the act do number companye
under the category of the matters companynected therewith or
ancillary or incidental to the imposition of ceiling on
urban immovable property. number we shall refer to the provisions of the urban
ceiling act. the statement of objects and reasons under
preamble to the said act would show that the primary object
and the purpose is to provide for the imposition of ceiling
on vacant land in urban agglomeration and for acquisition of
such lands in excess of the ceiling limit and to regulate
the
marwaha and others. 1974 1 scr
165 miss neelima shangla v. state
of haryana and others 1986 4 scc
268 or jitendra kumar and others

state of punjab and others
1985 1 scr 899.
if we have regard to the above enunciation that a
candidate who finds a place in the select list as a
candidate selected for appointment to a civil post does number
acquire an indefeasible right to be appointed in such
posting the absence of any specific rule entitling him for
such appointment and he companyld be aggrieved by his number-
appointment only when the administration does so either
arbitrarily or for numberbona fide reasons it follows as a
necessary companycomitant that such candidate even if has a
legitimate expectation of being appointed in such posts due
to his name finding a place in the select list of
candidates cannumber claim to have a right to be heard before
such select list is cancelled for bona fide and valid
reasons and number
arbitrarily in the instant case when the chandigarh
administration which received the companyplaints about the
unfair and injudicious manner in which select list of
candidates for appointment as companyductors in ctu was prepared
by the selection board companystituted for the purpose found
those companyplaints to be well founded on an enquiry got made
in that regard we are unable to find that the chandigarh
administration had acted either arbitrarily or without bona
fide and valid reasons in cancelling such 0dubious select
list. hence the companytentions of the learned companynsel for the
respondents as to the sustainability of the judgment of cat
under appeal on the ground of number-affording of an
opportunity of hearing to the respondents  candidates in the
select list  is a misconceived one and is companysequently
rejected. in the result we allow this appeal set aside the
judgment under appeal and reject the applications made by
respondents before cat chandigarh. however in the facts
and circumstances of this appeal we make numberorder as to
costs. n. appeal allowed. food companyporation of india
v.
kamdhenu cattle feed industries
november 3 1992

s. verma yogeshwar dayal and

venkatachala jj. companystitution of india 1950
article 14-contractual transactions of state or its
instrumentality-essential requisites-number-arbitrariness
fairness in action and due companysideration of legitimate
expectation-ignumbering the highest bid- negotiations for
higher offer and acceptance thereof-validity of. administrative law
doctrine of legitimate expectation-forms part of number
arbitrariness and rule of law- to be determined in the
larger public interest open to judicial review. the appellant-corporation invited tenders for sale of
stocks of damaged food-grains. the respondents bid was the
highest. since the appellant was number satisfied about the
adequacy of the amount offered even in the highest tender
it invited all the tenders to participate in the
negotiations instead of accepting the highest tender. during the companyrse of negotiations the respondent refused to
revise the rates in its offer. on the basis of the highest
bid made during the negotiations the appellant disposed of
the stocks of damaged foodgrains rejecting the highest
tenders. the respondent whose tender was the highest
challenged the decision of the appellants by filing a writ
petition before the high companyrt. it was companytended that the
action of the appellant was arbitrary and hence violative of
art. 14 of the companystitution. the high companyrt accepted the
contention and allowed the writ petition. being aggrieved by
the high companyrts decision the appellant-corporation
preferred the present appeal. it was companytended on behalf of the appellant that there
being numberright in the person submitting the highest tender
to claim acceptance thereof and since all tenderers were
given equal opportunity to participate in the negotiations
and to revise the bid before acceptance the action of the
appellant was number arbitrary. the respondent companytended that since numbercogent reasons
were indicated for rejecting all the tenders and for
deciding to dispose of the stock by negotiating with the
tenderers for procuring a higher price such a decision was
arbitrary. allowing the appeal this companyrt
held 1.1. in companytractual sphere as in all other state
actions the state and all its instrumentalities have to
conform to article 14 of the companystitution of which number-
arbitrariness is a significant facet. there is numberunfettered
discretion in public law. a public authority possesses
powers only to use them for public good. this imposes the
duty to act fairly and to adopt a procedure which is
fairplay in action. due observance of this obligation as a
part of good administration raises a reasonable or
legitimate expectation in every citizen to be treated fairly
in his interaction with the state and its instrumentalities
with this element forming a necessary companyponent of the
decision making process in all state actions. to satisfy
this requirement of number-arbitrariness in a state action it
is necessary to companysider and give due weight to the
reasonable-or legitimate expectations of the persons likely
to be affected by the decision or else that unfairness in
the exercise of the power may amount to an abuse or excess
of power apart from affecting the bona fides of the decision
in a given case. the decision so made would be exposed to
challenge on the ground of arbitrariness. rule of law does
number companypletely eliminate discretion in the exercise of
power as it is unrealistic but provides for companytrol of its
exercise by judicial review. 328-a-d

the mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a
citizen in such a situation may number by itself be a
distinct enforceable right but failure to companysider and give
due weight to it may render the decision arbitrary and this
is how the requirement of due companysideration of a legitimate
expectation forms part of the principle of number-
arbitrariness a necessary companycomitant of the rule of law. every legitimate expectation is a relevant factor requiring
due companysideration in a fair decision making process. whether
the expectation of the claimant is reasonable or legitimate
in the companytext is a question of fact in each case. whenever
the question arises it is to be determined number according to
the claimants perception but in larger public interest
wherein other more important companysiderations may outweigh
what would otherwise have been the legitimate expectation of
the claimant. a bona fide decision of the public authority
reached in this manner would satisfy the requirement of number-
arbitrariness and withstand judicial scrutiny. 328-e-g
2.1. even though the highest tenderer can claim no
right to have his tender accepted there being a power
while inviting tenders to reject all the tenders yet that
power cannumber be exercised arbitrarily and must depend for
its validity on the existence of companyent reasons for such
action. the object of inviting tenders for disposal of a
commodity is to procure the highest price while giving equal
opportunity to all the intending bidders to companypete. procuring the highest price for the companymodity is undoubtedly
in public interest since the amount so companylected goes to the
public fund. accordingly inadequacy of the price offered in
the highest tender would be a companyent ground for negotiating
with the tenderers giving them equal opportunity to revise
their bids with a view to obtain the highest available
price. retaining the option to accept the highest tender in
case the negotiations do number yield a significantly higher
offer would be fair to the tenderers besides protecting the
public interest. a procedure wherein resort is had to
negotiations with the tenderers for obtaining a
significantly higher bid during the period when the offers
in the tenders remain open for acceptance and rejection of
the tenders only in the event of a significant higher bid
being obtained during negotiations would ordinarily satisfy
this requirement. this procedure involves giving due weight
to the legitimate expectation of the highest bidder to have
his tender accepted unless outbid by a higher offer in
which case acceptance of the highest offer within the time
the offers remain open would be a reasonable exercise of
power for public good. 329-e-h 330-a
shanti vijay company etc. v. princess fatima fouzia
ors. etc. 1980 i s.c.r. 459 relied on. companyncil of civil service unions and others v. minister
for the civil service 1985 a.c. 374  h.l.  and in re
preston 1985 a.c. 835  h.l.  referred to. in the instant case the respondents highest
tender was super seded only by a significantly higher bid
made during the negotiations with all tenderers giving them
equal opportunity to companypete by revising their bids. the
fact that it was a significantly higher bid obtained by
adopting the right companyrse is sufficient to demonstrate that
the action of the appellant satisfied the requirement of
number-arbitrariness and it was taken for the companyent reason of
inadequacy of the price offered in the highest tender which
reason was evident to all tenderers invited to participate
in the negotiations and to revise their bids. the high companyrt
was in error in taking the companytrary view. 330-d-e
civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 4731 of
1992.
from the judgment and order dated 21.7.92 of the c.w.n. 7419 of 1992.

p. rao for the appellant. ashok sen h.l. aggarwal and k.k. gupta  np  for the
respondent. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
verma j. leave granted. the appeal by special leave under article 136 of the
constitution is against the judgment and order dated 21.7.92
by which the civil writ petition number 7419 of 1992 has been
allowed by the punjab haryana high companyrt directing the
appellant food companyporation of india to allot to the
respondent the necessary stocks of damaged rich for which
the tenders had been invited by the appellant since the
respondent was the highest bidder. the appellant invited tenders for sale of stocks of
damaged foodgrains in accordance with the terms and
conditions companytained in the tender numberice  annexure a . the tenders were required to be submitted upto 2.45 p.m. on
18.5.92 the tenders were to be opened on 18.5.92 at 3.00
p.m. and offers were to remain open for acceptance upto and
inclusive of 17.7.92. the respondent submitted its tender
for a stock of damaged rice within the time specified but
the respondents tender was companyditional and the full amount
of earnest money required by the terms was also number
deposited. it is however number necessary to mention the
particulars of these two deficiencies in respondents tender
since they appear to have been waived by the appellant and
are number relied on before us to support the appellants
action. the respondents bid in the tender was admittedly
the highest as found on opening the tenders. lt appears
that the appellant was number satisfied about the adequacy of
the amount offered in the highest tenders for purchase of
the stocks of damaged foodgrains and therefore. instead of
accepting any of the tenders submitted the appellant
invited all the tenderers to participate in the negotiation
on 9.6.92. the respondent refused to revise the rates
offered in its tender. it was rs. 245 per quintal for
certain lots of this stock while the highest offer made
during the negotiations was rs. 275.72 per quintal. similarly as against the respondents offer of rs. 201 per
quintal in respect of some other lots the highest offer
made during the negotiation was rs. 271.55 per quintal. on
this basis the appellant was to receive an additional
amount of rs. 8 lakhs by accepting the highest offer made
during the negotiations over the total amount offered by the
respondent for the stock of damaged rice. overall the
appellant was offered an excess amount of rs. 20 lakhs for
the entire stock of damaged foodgrains in the highest offer
made during the negotiations inasmuch as against the total
amount rs.90 lakhs which the appellant would have received
by acceptance of the highest tenders the appellant was to
receive the amount of rs. 1 crore 10 lakhs by accepting the
highest offers made during the negotiations in which all the
tenderers including the respondent were given equal
opportunity to participate. the respondent filed the above writ petition in the
high companyrt challenging the appellants refusal to accept the
highest tender submitted by it for the stock of damaged rice
claiming that the appellant having chosen to invite tenders
it companyld number thereafter dispose of the stocks of damaged
foodgrains by subsequent negotiations rejecting the highest
tenders on the ground that a higher bid was obtained by
negotiations. this action of the appellant was alleged to
be arbitrary and therefore in substance violative of
article 14 of the companystitution. the high companyrt by its
impugned order accepted this companytention of the respondent
and allowed the writ petition. hence this appeal. it is number disputed that according to the terms and
conditions on which the appellant had invited tenders the
appellant had reserved the right to reject all the tenders
and therefore the highest tender was number bound to be
accepted. learned companynsel for the appellant submitted that
there being numberright in the person submitting the highest
tender to claim acceptance of the tender in a case like the
present. where all the tenderers including the respondent
were invited for negotiation and given equal opportunity to
participate and to revise the bid before acceptance of the
highest bid offered during negotiation which resulted in
obtaining an additional amount of rs. 8 lakhs for the stock
relating to respondents tender and an overall gain of rs. 20 lakhs in disposal of the entire stock of damaged
foodgrains the action of the appellant companyld number be termed
arbitrary. in reply shri a.k. sen learned companynsel for the
respondent companytended that even though the appellant had the
right to reject any tender including the highest tender
and thereafter negotiate with all the tenderers to procure
the highest price for the companymodity yet this right has to
be exercised reasonably and number arbitrarily otherwise the
credibility of the procedure of sale by inviting tenders
would be lost. shri sen submitted that the decision number to
accept any tender and to negotiate thereafter for obtaining
a higher price than that quoted in the highest bid cannumber
be taken on the whim and caprice of the companycerned authority
and can be only for companyent reasons indicated while taking
the decision or else the decision would be arbitrary. on
this basis shri sen further submitted that in the present
case numbercogent reasons were indicated for rejecting all the
tenders and deciding to dispose of the companymodity by
negotiation with the tenderers for procuring a higher price. he also added that the mere fact that a higher price was
obtained by negotiation would number justify the decision if it
was number taken in the manner permissible. this was the only
submission of shri sen to support the decision of the high
court. in our view shri a.k. sen is right in the first part
of his submission. however in the present case the
respondent does number get any benefit therefrom. the high
courts decision is based on the only ground that once
tenders have been invited and the highest bidder has companye
forward to companyply with the companyditions stipulated in the
tender numberice it is number permissible to switch over to
negotiation with all the tenderers and thereby reject the
highest tender. according to the high companyrt such a
procedure is number companyntenanced by the rule of law. this is
number the same as the submission of shri sen which is limited
to permissibility of such a companyrse only on companyent grounds
indicated while deciding to switch over to the procedure of
negotiation after receiving the tenders to satisfy the
requirement of number arbitrariness a necessary companycomitant of
the rule of law. the proposition enunciated by the high
court which forms the sole basis of its decision is too wide
to be acceptable and has to be limited in the manner
indicated hereafter. in companytractual sphere as in all other state actions
the state and all its instrumentalities have to companyform to
article 14 of the companystitution of which number-arbitrariness is
a significant facet. there is numberunfettered discretion in
public law a public authority possesses powers only to use
them for public good. this impose the duty to act fairly and
to adopt a procedure which is fairplay in action. due
observance of this obligation as a part of good
administration raises a reasonable or legitimate expectation
in every citizen to be treated fairly in his interaction
with the state and its instrumentalities with this element
forming a necessary companyponent of the decision making process
in all state actions. to satisfy this requirement of number-
arbitrariness in a state action it is therefore necessary
to companysider and give due weight to the reasonable or
legitimate expectations of the persons likely lo be affected
by the decision or else that unfairness in the exercise of
the power may amount to an abuse or excess of power apart
from affecting the bona fides of the decision in a given
case. the decision so made would be exposed to challenge on
the ground of arbitrariness. rule of law does number companypletely
eliminate discretion in the exercise of power as it is
unrealistic but providers for companytrol of its exercise by
judicial review. the mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a
citizen in such a situation may number by itself be a
distinct enforceable right but failure to companysider and
give due weight to it may render the decision arbitrary and
this is how the requirement of due companysideration of a
legitimate expectation forms part of the principle of number-
arbitrariness a necessary companycomitant of the rule of law. every legitimate expectation is a relevant factor requiring
due companysideration a fair decision making process. whether
the expectation of the claimant is reasonable or legitimate
in the companytext is a question of fact in each case. whenever
the question arises it is to be determined number according to
the claimants perception but in larger public interest
wherein other more important companysiderations may outweigh
what would otherwise have been the legitimate expectation of
the claimant. a bona fide decision of the public authority
reached in this manner would satisfy the requirement of
number-arbitrariness and withstand judicial scrutiny. the
doctrine of legitimate expectation gets assimilated in the
rule of law and operates in our legal system in this manner
and to this extent. in companyncil of civil service unions and others v.
minister for the civil service 1985 a.c. 374  h.l.  the
house of lords indicated the extent to which the legitimate
expectation interfaces with exercise of discretionary
power. the impugned action was upheld as reasonable made on
due companysideration of all relevant factors including the
legitimate expectation of the applicant wherein the
considerations of national security were found to outweigh
that which otherwise would have been the reasonable
expectation of the applicant. lord scarman pointed out that
the companytrolling factor in determining whether the exercise
of prerogative power is subject to judicial review is number
its source but its subject-matter. again in in re preston
1985 a.c. 835  h.l.  it was stated by lord scarman that the
principle of fairness has an important place in the law of
judicial review ant unfairness in the purported exercise
of a power can be such that it is an abuse of excess of
power. these decisions of the house of lords give a similar
indication of the significance of the doctrine of legitimate
expectation. shri a.k. sen referred to shanti vijay company
etc. v. princess fatima fouzia ors. etc. 1980 1 s.c.r. 459 which holds that companyrt should interfere where
discretionary power is number exercised reasonably and in good
faith. from the above it is clear that even though the
highest tenderer can claim numberright to have his tender
accepted there being a power while inviting tenders to
reject all the tenders yet the power to reject all the
tenders cannumber be exercised arbitrarily and must depend for
its validity on the existence of companyent reasons for such
action. the object of inviting tenders for disposal of a
commodity is to procure the highest price while giving equal
opportunity to all the intending bidders to companypete. procuring the highest price for the companymodity is undoubtedly
in public interest since the amount so companylected goes to the
public fund. accordingly inadequacy of the price offered in
the highest tender would be a companyent ground for negotiating
with the tenderers giving them equal opportunity to revise
their bids with a view to obtain the highest available
price. the inadequacy may be for several reasons knumbern in
the companymercial field. inadequacy of the prince quoted in the
highest tender would be a question of fact in each case. retaining the option to accept the highest tender in case
the negotiations do number yield a significantly higher offer
would be fair to the tenderers besides protecting the public
interest. a procedure wherein resort is had to negotiations
with the tenderers for obtaining a significantly higher bid
during the period when the offers in the tenders remain open
for acceptance and rejection of the tenders only in the
event of a significant higher bid being obtained during
negotiations would ordinarily satisfy this requirement. this
procedure involves giving due weight to the legitimate
expectation of the highest bidder to have his tender
accepted unless outbid by a higher offer in which case
acceptance of the highest offer within the time the offers
remain open would be a reasonable exercise power for public
good. in the present case the last date upto which the offer
made in the tender was to remain open for acceptance was
17.7.92. after opening the tenders on 18.5.92 the appellant
decided to negotiate with all the tenderers on 9.6.92 when
significantly higher amount as indicated earlier was
offered above the amount quoted in the highest tender. in
such a situation if the negotiations did number yield the
desirable result of obtaining a significantly higher price
the appellant had the option to accept the highest tender
before the last date viz. 17.7.92 upto which the offer
made therein was to remain open for acceptance. in this
manner the respondents higher tender was superseded only
by a significantly higher bid made during the negotiations
with all tenderers giving them equal opportunity to companypete
by revising their bids. the fact that it was a significantly
higher bid obtained by adopting this companyrse is sufficient in
the facts of the present case to demonstrate that the action
of the appellant satisfied the requirement of number-
arbitrariness and it was taken for the companyent reason of
inadequacy of the price offered in the highest tender which
reason was evident to all tenderers invited to participate
in the negotiations and to revise their bids. the high companyrt
was in error in taking the companytrary view. companysequently this appeal is allowed. the impugned judgment
of the high companyrt is set aside resulting in dismissal of
the respondents writ petition numbercosts

n. appeal allowed. krishna bhimrao deshpande
v.
land tribunal dharwad and ors. numberember 3 1992
lalit mohan sharma and k. jayachandra reddy jj. companystitution of india 1950
article 252 read with schedule vii list n entry 18-
legislation by parliament requirement-central law on ceiling
on urban immovable property in pursuance of resolution of
state legislature state laws on other matters relating to
the subject-matter of resolution-legality of. companystitution of india 1950
article 252 schedule vii list ii entry 18-urban land
 ceiling and regulation  act 1976 and karnataka land
reforms act as amended in 1974 object and application of-
whether any companyflict between the acts. in the year 1972 the karnataka legislature passed a
resolution under article 252 of the companystitution imposing a
ceiling on urban immovable property and the acquisition of
such property in excess of the ceiling is limit for public
purposes and all the matters companynected therewith shall be
regulated in the state by parliament by law. on 1.4.74 the karnataka land reforms  amendment  act
was enacted and under the act the tenant of the land companyered
by the act was entitled to the grant of occupancy rights
after making an application under the act. the act came
into force with effect from 2.1.85. but for the purpose of
grant of occupancy rights 1.4.74 was the relevant date. in the year 1975 the karnataka urban agglomeration
ordinance was passed whereunder all lands between the
periphery of 8 k.ms. of the municipal limits of hubli
dharwad were declared as urban agglomeration land. the parliament passed the urban land  ceiling and
regulation  act 1976 for imposition of ceiling on urban
properties and the ceiling act was made applicable to
karnataka also in view of the resolution passed by the state
government. the lands involved in the present cases were companyered by
the development plan by the belgaum city town planning
authority as per the master plan and they were included and
declared as urban agglomeration in the city of hubli under
the provisions of the ceiling act. the owners of the agglomeration lands challenged the
order of the land tribunal under the land reforms act
conferring occupancy rights on the tenants before the high
court. they companytended that the lands involved in the cases
were within the purview of the ceiling act and therefore
the provisions of the land reforms act had numberapplication to
such lands on the ground that the provisions of the ceiling
act. the writ petitions were dismissed by the high companyrt. the owners writ appeals were also dismissed by a companymon
judgment by the division bench of the high companyrt. the
division bench held that there was numberconflict between the
two enactments. the judgment of the division bench was challenged in

l.p.  civil  number 16041-42/88. many of the similar writ petitions that were pending
before the high companyrt were transferred to the land reforms
appellate tribunal. the appellate tribunal dismissed the petitions by a
common order following the judgment of the division bench of
the high companyrt. several civil revision petitions filed by
the land owners against the order of the appellate tribunal
were dismissed by the high companyrt. some of the special leave
petitions were filed against the order of the high companyrt in
the said civil revision petitions. the petitioners-land owners companytended that when in
pursuance of the resolution of the state legislature passed
under article 252 of the companystitution the parliament
legislated in respect of the topic companyered by the
resolution. the parliamentary law repealed or superseded the
existing state legislation on the topic and therefore such
law companyld number be enforced thereafter and that vesting of
tenanted land in the state and companyferment of occupancy
rights under the provisions of the state act directly fall
under the subject of imposing ceiling on land holding and
other matters incidental or ancillary to the main topic of
imposing ceiling and therefore they were fully companyered by
the ceiling act passed by the parliament and the same
superseded the state enactment in respect of such lands. the respondents submitted that imposition of ceiling
was a distinct and separately identifiable subject and the
parliament was empowered to legislate that the power of the
state to legislate in respect of the remaining part of the
subject-matter was unaffected that when two distinct
powers came into existence vesting law making companypetence in
the state and parliament the pith and substance of the laws
made by each of them had to be examined to see whether any
one of them encroached the field set apart as falling within
the companypetence of the other body that in any event the
provisions of chapter iii of the karnataka land reforms act
had numberhing to do with the imposition of ceiling on the
urban land and that companyferring of occupancy rights etc. to
the tenants under chapter iii of the karnataka land reforms
act did number companye under the category of the matters
connected therewith or ancillary or incidental to the
imposition of ceiling on urban immovable property. dismissing the special leave petitions this companyrt
held 1.01. article 252 empowers the parliament to
legislate for two or more states on any of the matters with
respect of which the parliament has numberpower to make law
except as provided under articles 249 and 250. this power to
legislate is vested in the parliament only if two or more
state legislatures think it desirable to have a law enacted
by parliament on such matters in list ii i.e. with respect
to which the parliament has numberpower to make law for the
state. the passing of the resolutions by the state
legislatures is a companydition precedent for vesting the
parliament with such power. 339-c-d
1.02. the scope of entry 18 is very wide and the land
mentioned therein may be agricultural or number-agricultural
and may be rural or urban. the subject-matter carved out of
entry 18 under the resolutions passed by the various state
legislatures related to only urban immovable property and
by virtue of the resolution the law that can be enacted by
the parliament should be a law imposing a ceiling on such
urban immovable property. 340-b c
1.03. from the resolution it is clear that the subject-
matter that was resolved to be entrusted to the parliament
was the one imposing a ceiling on urban immovable property
and acquisition of such property in excess of the ceiling. this subject-matter is the topic that falls within entry 18
of list ii of schedule vii to the companystitution and the
subject-matter of entry 18 has been originally kept apart
for the state legislature to make law and parliament had no
competence in respect of those matters falling under the
wide scope of entry 18. by virtue of this resolution a part
of the area falling under entry 18 is transferred to the
domain of parliament to make law relating to the matters
within the transferred area. 339-g h 341-a
2.01. the primary object and the purpose of the urban
land  ceiling and regulation  act 1976 is to provide for
the imposition of ceiling on vacant land in urban
agglomeration and for acquisition of such lands in excess
of the ceiling limit and to regulate the companystruction of
buildings on such lands and for matters companynected therewith. 340-h 341-a
2.02. the karnataka land reforms act as amended in 1974
is a welfare legislation. the object of the act was to have
a uniform law in the state of karnataka relating to
agrarian reforms companyferment of ownership on tenants
ceiling on land holdings and for certain other matters
contained therein. 342-d
2.03. in respect of imposing ceiling on the land under
urban agglomeration the provisions of the ceiling act alone
are applicable and to that extent the provisions of chapter
iv of the karnataka land reforms act which also deal with
the imposition of ceiling would number be applicable. 344-c
2.04. the land in the instant case companyes under the
urban agglomeration the imposition of the ceiling should
naturally be under the provisions of the urban ceiling act
and number under the karnataka land reforms act. 344-b c
2.05. imposition of ceiling on urban land is a distinct
and independent subject as companypared to imposition of ceiling
on owning or to hold agricultural land or any other kind of
property which do number attract the urban ceiling act. these
are two distinct powers and therefore the law making
competence can be in two different legislative bodies. companysequently it is difficult to hold that the provisions of
chapter iii of the karnataka land reforms act are outside
the legislative companypetence of the state legislature. 350-c d
2.06. the one topic that is transferred in the
resolution passed under article 252 as distinct and
separately identifiable and does number include the remaining
topics under entry 18 in respect of which the state alone
has the power to legislate. 351-d
2.07. the legislative power of the state has to be
reconciled with that of the parliament and that in their
respective fields each is supreme. even assuming that the
state enactment has same effect on the subject-matter
falling within the parliaments legislative companypetence that
by itself will number render such law invalid or inumbererative. 350-g-h
2.08. there is numberconflict between the ceiling act and
the state act. the imposition of ceiling on urban immovable
property is an independent topic and cannumber be companystrued as
to nullify the other subject left in the domain of the state
legislature under entry 18 inasmuch as imposition of ceiling
is a distinct and separately identifiable subject and does
number companyer the other measures such as regulation of
relationship of landlord and tenant in respect of which the
state legislature has companypetence to legislate. 351-c-d
2.09. there is a ceiling provision under section 45 2
of the karnataka land reforms act providing for companyputation
of the area in respect of which the tenant may be granted
occupancy rights. but it is clear that ceiling on the
area in this companytext is only for the purpose of section 45. 351-f
2.10. provisions in the chapters ii iii v vi to xi
of the karnataka land reforms act deal with the companyferment
of occupancy rights on the respective tenants and they do
number in any way companyflict with the subject matter transferred
to the parliament by the resolution passed under section
252. 351-ef
thumati venkaiah and others v. state of andhra pradesh
and of others 1980 4 scc 295 union of india and others

valluri basavaiah chowdhary and others 1979 3 scc 324
calcutta gas companypany  proprietory  limited v. state of west
bengal and others air 1962 sc 1044 and kannan devan hills
produce companypany limited v. the state of kerala etc. air
1972 sc 2301 referred to. civil appellate jurisdiction special leave petition
 civil  number. 16041-42/88. from the judgment and order dated 27.7.1988 of the
karnataka high companyrt in w.p. number9173/86 and w.a. no
2707/85. with
slp  c  number. 12258 12254 12260/90 8608/91

n. narasimhamurthy s.s. javali s.n. bhat and ravi

wadhwani for the petitioners. s. nesargi r. jagannath goulay m.k. dua m.
veerappa k.h. numberin singh s.k. kulkarni and surya kant for
the respondents. the following order of the companyrt was delivered by

jayachandra reddy j. in all these special leave
petitions the companymon question that arises for companysideration
is whether the provisions of the karnataka land reforms act
1961 as amended in 1974  act for short  cease to be
applicable in all respects to the lands which came within
the purview of the urban land  ceiling and regulation  act
1976  ceiling act for short . the lands involved in these
matters are companyered by the development plan by the belgaum
city town planning authority as per the master plan for the
said city and they are included and declared as urban
agglomeration in the city of hubli under the provisions of
the ceiling act. in the year 1972 the karnataka legislature
passed a resolution under article 252 of the companystitution to
the effect that imposing a ceiling on urban immovable
property and the acquisition of such property in excess of
the ceiling limit for public purposes and all the matters
connected therewith shall be regulated in the state by
parliament qby law. the state legislature thus divested
itself of the legislative companypetence to enact law in respect
of subject-matter of the resolution. on 1.4.74 the amended
karnataka land reforms act was enacted and under the said
act the tenant of the land companyered by the act is entitled to
the grant of occupancy rights after making an application
under the act. this act came into force with effect from
2.1.85. but for the purpose of grant of occupancy rights
1.4.74 was the relevant date. while so in the year 1975 the
governumber of karnataka passed the urban aggolmeration
ordinance whereunder all lands between the periphery of 8

ms. of the municipal limits of hubli dharwad were declared
as urban agglomeration land. in the year 1976 the parliament
passed the ceiling act for imposition of ceiling on urban
properties and the act was made applicable to karnataka also
in view of the resolution passed by the state government
referred to above. the order of the land tribunal under the
act companyferring occupancy rights on the tenants was
challenged before the high companyrt companytending that the lands
involved in these cases were within the purview of the
ceiling act and therefore the provisions of the land reforms
act had numberapplication to such lands on the ground that the
provisions of the state act were repugnant to the provisions
of the central act namely the ceiling act. the writ petition
was dismissed by the high companyrt. the owners preferred writ
appeals and they were also dismissed by a companymon judgment in
writ appeal number. 2707 and 2361/85 etc. the division bench
held that there is numberconflict between the two enactment in
certain respect i.e. atleast so far as the implementation of
the provisions of chapter iii of the act are companycerned and
that provisions of this chapter of the act do number cease to
apply to the agricultural lands companying within the meaning of
urban agglomeration in the ceiling act. the judgment of the
division bench is challenged in s.l.p.  civil  number 16041-
42/88. many of the similar writ petitions that were pending
before the high companyrt were transferred to the land reforms
appellate tribunal. the appellate tribunal dismissed the
petitions by a companymon order following the judgment of the
division bench of the high companyrt in writ appeal number2707/85
and companynected matters. several civil revisions petitions
filed by the land owners against the order of the appellate
tribunal were dismissed by the high companyrt. some of the
special leave petitions are filed against the order of the
high companyrt in the said civil revision petitions. therefore
all these special leave petitions can be disposed of by a
common order. it was urged before us that the resolution of the state
legislature passed under article 252 of the companystitution
shifted the topic companyered by the resolution from list ii of
schedule vii to the companystitution and vested the companypetence
to make the law in respect of the said topic in the
parliament and that thereafter the state enactment ceased to
have efficacy in respect of said topic. alternatively it was
urged that when in pursuance of the resolution the
parliament legislates in respect of the topic companyered by the
resolution the parliamentary law repeals or supersedes any
existing state legislation on the topic and therefore such
law cannumber be enforced thereafter. we shall first extract some of the relevant provisions
of the companystitution of india and the respective enactments. article 246 of the companystitution reads thus

subject-matter of laws made
by parliament and by the
legislatures of states- l
numberwithstanding anything in
clauses  2  and  3  parliament has
exclusive power to make laws with
respect to any of the matters
enumerated in list i in the
seventh schedule  in this
constitution referred to as the
union list .  2  xx xx xx

subject to clauses  1  and  2
the legislature of any state has
exclusive power to make laws for
such state or any part thereof
with respect to any of the matters
enumerated in list ii in the
seventh schedule  in this
constitution referred to as the
state list .  4 xx xx xx
entry 18 in list ii namely the state list of the vii
schedule to the companystitution is in the following terms

land that is to say rights
in or over land land tenures
including the relation of landlord
and tenant and the companylection of
rents transfer and alienation of
agricultural land land improvement
and agricultural loans
colonization. article 252 of the companystitution reads
thus

power of parliament to
legislate for two or more states
by companysent and adoption of such
legislation by any other state- 1
if it appears to the legislatures
of two or more states to be
desirable that any of the matters
with respect to which parliament
has numberpower to make laws for the
states except as provided in
articles 249 and 250 should be
regulated in such states by
parliament by law and if
resolutions to that effect are
passed by all the houses of the
legislatures of those states it
shall be lawful for parliament to
pass an act for regulating that
matter accordingly and any act so
passed shall apply to such states
and to any other state by which it
is adopted afterwards by resolution
passed in that behalf by the house
or where there are two houses by
each of the houses of the
legislature of that state. any act so passed by parliament
may be amended or repealed by an
act of parliament passed or adopted
in like manner but shall number as
respects any state to which it
applics be amended or repcaled by
an act of the legislature of that
state. article 252 empowers the parliament to legislate for
two or more states on any of the matters with respect of
which the parliament has numberpower to make law except as
provided under articles 249 and 250. this power to legislate
is vested in the parliament only if two or more state
legislatures think it desirable to have a law enacted by
parliament on such matters in list ii i.e. with respect to
which the parliament has numberpower to make law for the state. the passing of the resolutions by the state legislatures is
a companydition precedent for vesting the parliament with such
power. the relevant portion of the resolution passed by the
state legislature under article 252 reads thus
number therefore in pursuance of
clause  1  of article 252 of the
constitution this assembly hereby
resolves that the imposition of a
ceiling on urban immovable property
and f acquisition of such property
in excess of the ceiling and all
matters companynected therewith or
ancillary and incidental thereto
should be regulated in the state of
karnataka by parliament by law. the resolution states that the imposition of ceiling on
urban immovable property and the acquisition of such
property in excess of the ceiling limit with a view to
utilising such excess property for public purposes and all
other matters companynected therein or incidental thereto shall
be regulated in this state by parliament by law. the basic
question that arises is what is the actual companytent of the
subject-matter that was resolved to be entrusted to
parliament by the state legislature under article 252 of the
constitution. from the resolution it is clear that the
subject-matter that was resolved to be entrusted to the
parliament was the one imposing a ceiling on urban immovable
property and acquisition of such property in excess of the
ceiling. it is true that this subject-matter is the topic
that falls within entry 18 of list 11 of schedule vii to the
constitution and the said subject-matter of entry 18 has
been originally kept apart for the state legislature to make
law and parliament had numbercompetence in respect of those
matters falling under the wide scope of entry 18. number by
virtue of this resolution a part of the area falling under
entry 18 is transferred to the domain of parliament to make
law relating to the matters within the transferred area. the
scope of entry 18 is very wide and the land mentioned
therein may be agricultural or number-agricultural and may be
rural or urban. the subject-matter carved out of entry 18
under the resolutions passed by the various state
legislatures related to only- urban immovable property and
by virtue of the resolution the law that can be enacted by
the parliament should be a law imposing a ceiling on such
urban immovable property. the learned companynsel for the
petitioners however urged that vesting of tenanted land in
the state and companyferment of occupancy rights under the
provisions of the state act directly fall under the subject
of imposing ceiling on and holding and other matters
incidental or ancillary to the main topic of imposing
ceiling and therefore they are fully companyered by the ceiling
act passed by the parliament and the same supersedes the
state enactment in respect of this land. the learned companynsel
appearing for the respondents on the companytrary submitted that
imposition of ceiling is a distinct and separately
identifiable subject and is the power carved out of entry 18
and vested in the parliament to legislate and that the power
of the state to legislate in respect of the remaining part
of the subject-matter is unaffected and that when two
distinct powers have companye into existence vesting law making
competence in the state and parliament the pith and
substance of the laws made by each of them has to be
examined to see whether any one of them encroaches the field
set apart as falling within the companypetence of the other
body. the learned companynsel for the respondents however
submitted that in any event the provisions of chapter iii of
the act have numberhing to do with the imposition of ceiling on
the urban land and that companyferring of occupancy rights etc. to the tenants under chapter 111 of the act do number companye
under the category of the matters companynected therewith or
ancillary or incidental to the imposition of ceiling on
urban immovable property. number we shall refer to the provisions of the urban
ceiling act. the statement of objects and reasons under
preamble to the said act would show that the primary object
and the purpose is to provide for the imposition of ceiling
on vacant land in urban agglomeration and for acquisition of
such lands in excess of the ceiling limit and to regulate
the
construction of buildings on such lands and for matters
connected therewith. section 21 n  of the urban ceiling act
defines urban agglomeration and the material part of it
reads thus
 n  urban agglomeration
 a  in relation to any state or
union territory specified in companyumn
 1  of schedule 1 means  i  the
urban agglomeration specified in
the companyresponding entry in companyumn
 2  thereof and includes the
peripheral area specified in the
corresponding entry in companyumn  3
thereof and
xx xx xx
section 2 o  defines urban land which reads thus
 o  urban land means -

any land situated within the
limits of an urban agglomeration
and referred to as such in the
master plan or

in a case where there is no
master plan or where the master
plan does number refer to any land as
urban land any land within the
limits of an urban agglomeration
and situated in any area included
within the local limits of a
municipality  by whatever name
called  a numberified area companymittee
a town area companymittee a city and
town companymittee a small town
committee a cantonment board or a
panchayat
but does number include any such land
which is mainly used for the
purpose of agriculture. explanation- for the purpose of
this clause and clause  q -
 a  xx xx xx
 b  land shall number be deemed to be
used mainly for the purpose of
agriculture if such land is number
entered in the revenue or land
records before the appointed day as
for the purpose of agriculture
xx xx xx
 c  numberwithstanding anything
contained in clause  b  of this
explanation land shall number be
deemed to be mainly used for the
purpose of agriculture if the land
has been specified in the master
plan for a purpose other than
agriculture
for the purpose of the instant case it is enumbergh to
numbere that hubli-dharwad is shown in the schedule and there
is also a master plan prepared for the area and the land in
question also is undoubtedly within the urban agglomeration
and therefore there is numberdoubt that in respect of
imposition of ceiling on this area companyes within the purview
of the urban ceiling act. but the question is whether
granting occupancy rights under chapter iii of the act are
in any manner affected. the karnataka land reforms act as
amended in 1974 is a welfare legislation. the object of the
act was to have a uniform law in the state of karnataka
relating to agrarian reforms companyferment of ownership on
tenants ceiling on land holding and for certain other
matters companytained therein. section 34 of the act defines
tenant thus
 34  tenant means an
agriculturist who cultivates
personally the land he holds on
lease from a landlord and
includes-

a person who is deemed to be a
tenant under section 4

a person who was protected
from eviction from any land by the
karnataka tenants  temporary
protection from eviction  act
1961
 iia  a person who cultivates
personally any land on lease under
a lease created companytrary to the
provisions of section 5 and before
the date of companymencement of the
amendment act

a person who is a permanent
tenant and

a person who is a protected
tenant. explanation- a person who takes up
a companytract to cut grass or to
gather the fruits or other produce
of any land shall number on that
account only be deemed to be a
tenant. the provisions of chapter iii of the karnataka land
reforms act deal with companyferment of ownership on tenants. section 45 occurring in this chapter in particular deals
with companyferring of occupancy rights on the tenants subject
to certain companyditions. the relevant portion of section 45
reads as under

tenants to be registered as
occupants of land on certain
conditions- 1  subject to the
provisions of the succeeding
sections of this chapter every
person who was a permanent tenant
protected tenant or other tenant or
where a tenant has lawfully sublet
such sub-tenant shall with effect
on and from the date of vesting be
entitled to be registered as an
occupant in respect of the lands of
which he was a permanent tenant
protected tenant or other tenant or
sub-tenant before the date of
vesting and which he has been
cultivating personally. if a tenant or other person
referred to in sub-section  1 -

holds land partly as owner and
partly as tenant but the area of
the land held by him as owner is
equal to or exceeds a ceiling area
he shall number be entitled to be
registered as an occupant of the
land held by him as a tenant before
the date of vesting

does number hold and cultivate
personally any land as an owner
but holds land as tenant which he
cultivates personally in excess of
a ceiling area he shall be
entitled to be registered as an
occupant to the extent of a ceiling
area

holds and cultivates
personally as an owner of any land
the area of which is less than a
ceiling area he shall be entitled
to be registered as an occupant to
the extent of such area as will be
sufficient to make up his holding
to the extent of a ceiling area. xx xx xx
the provisions under chapter iii which exclusively deal
with companyferment of occupancy rights on tenants have numberhing
to do with the imposition of ceiling on holdings of
agricultural land under the act. it is only chapter iv of
the said act which deals with ceiling on land holdings. number
that the land in the instant case companyes under the urban
agglomeration the imposition of the ceiling should naturally
be under the provisions of the urban ceiling act and number
under the karnataka land reforms act. the high companyrt
however did number deal with this aspect. perhaps it is
necessary for us to make it clear that in respect of
imposing ceiling on the land under urban agglomeration the
provisions of the ceiling act alone are applicable and to
that extent the provisions of chapter iv of the act which
also deal with the imposition of ceiling would number be
applicable. as a matter of fact in thumati venkaiah and
others v. state of andhra pradesh and others 1980 4 scc
295 to which we will refer to at a later stage in detail on
the main point this companyrt observed thus
it is numberdoubt true that if the
andhra pradesh act seeks to impose
ceiling on land falling within an
urban agglomeration it would be
outside the area of its legislative
competence since it cannumber provide
for imposition of ceiling on urban
immovable property. however the crucial question in
the instant case with which we are
concerned is whether the provisions
of chapter iii of the act also
become inumbererative by virtue of the
resolution passed under article 252
and particularly on the ground that
it is a matter of imposition of
ceiling on urban land or other
matters companynected therewith or
ancillary and incidental thereto. a plain reading of the above provisions in the
background of the objects underlying these two enactments
clearly shows that the two acts operate in two different
fields to a large extent. this companyrt had an occasion to
consider these aspects in a few cases. in union of india and
others v.valluri basavaiah chowdhary and others 1979 3
scc 324 this companyrt in respect of effect of passing a
resolution under article 252 of the companystitution by the
andhra pradesh legislature observed thus
the effect of the passing of a
resolution under clause  1  of
article 252 is that parliament
which has numberpower to legislate
with respect to the matter which is
the subject of the resolution
becomes entitled to legislate with
respect to it. on the other hand
the state legislature ceases to
have a power to make a law relating
to that matter. it was further observed that
it is number disputed that the
subject-matter of entry 18 list ii
of the seventh schedule i.e. land
covers land and buildings and
would therefore necessarily
include vacant land. the
expression urban immovable
property may mean land and
buildings or buildings or
lands. it would take in lands of
every description i.e. agricultural land urban land or
any other kind and it necessarily
includes vacant land. with regards the companycept of ceiling on urban immovable
property and the object underlying in passing the resolution
by the several state governments under article 252 it was
further observed in the above judgment thus
a working group was
constituted under the chairmanship
of the secretary ministry of
works housing and urban
development. the report of the
working group shows that the
proposal was to impose a ceiling on
urban immovable property. in the
report the said working group
defined urban area to include the
area within the territorial limits
of municipalities or other local
bodies and also the peripheral area
outside the said limits. such
inclusion of the peripheral limits
in an urban area was accepted by
the government and a model bill
prepared in pursuance thereof also
contained such a definition. a companyy
of each of the report of the
working group and the model bill
referred to was placed on the table
of the parliament on december 15
1970 and march 22 1972
respectively. the said documents
were forwarded to the state
government of andhra pradesh
besides other state governments
for companysideration by the state
legislatures before they passed a
resolution authorising the
parliament to make a law in respect
of urban immovable property. their
intention was to include the lands
within the territorial area of an
urban area and also its peripheral
areas. the companycept of ceiling on
urban immovable property and the
nature and companytent of urban
agglomeration ultimately defined by
section 2 n  of the impugned act
was therefore fully under stood
by the state governments. some more observations in the above judgment read thus
it is but axiomatic that once the
legislatures of two or more states
by a resolution in terms of article
252 1  abdicate or surrender the
area i.e. their power of
legislation on a state subject the
parliament is companypetent to make a
law relating to the subject. it
would indeed be companytrary to the
terms of article 252 1  to read the
resolution passed by the state
legislature subject to any
restriction. the resolution
contemplated under article 252 1
is number hedged in with companyditions. in making such a law the
parliament was number bound to exhaust
the whole field of legislation. it
could make a law like the present
act with respect to ceiling on
vacant land in an urban
agglomeration as a first step
towards the eventual imposition of
ceiling on immovable property of
every other description. one other decision also arose from state of andhra
pradesh. in thumati venkaiahs case andhra pradesh land
reforms  ceiling on agricultural holdings  act which is
analgous to karnataka land reforms act was challenged on the
ground that the subject matter of the said law was companyered
by the topic of the legislation transferred to parliament by
the resolution under article 252 passed by the andhra
pradesh legislative assembly and that provisions of the
ceiling act alone companyered that subject and therefore andhra
pradesh land reforms  ceiling on agricultural holdings  act
was unenforceable. in this companytext supreme companyrt again
reiterated the same in the said decision. this companyrt
proceeded to observe as under
the effect of passing of
resolutions by the houses of
legislature of two or more states
under this companystitutional provision
is that parliament which has
otherwise numberpower to legislate
with respect to a matter except as
provided in articles 249 and 250
becomes entitled to legislate with
respect to such matter and the
state legislatures passing the
resolutions cease to have power to
make law relating to that matter. the resolutions operate as
abdication or surrender of the
powers of the state legislatures
with respect to the matter which is
the subject of the resolutions and
such matter is placed entirely in
the hands of parliament and
parliament alone can then legislate
with respect to it. it is as if
such matter is lifted out of list
ii and placed in list i of the
seventh schedule to the
constitution. it was further observed that
the result was that at the date
when the andhra pradesh act was
enacted parliament alone was
competent to legislate with respect
to ceiling on urban immovable
property and acquisition of such
property in excess of the ceiling
and all companynected ancillary or
incidental matters and the andhra
pradesh legislature stood denuded
of its power to legislate on that
subject. on the effect of ceiling this companyrt
stated thus
it will thus be seen that the
central act imposes a ceiling on
holding of land in urban
agglomeration other than land which
is mainly used for the purpose of
agriculture and agriculture in this
connection includes horticulture
but does number include raising of
grass dairy farming poultry
farming breeding of live-stock and
such cultivation or the growing of
such plants as may be prescribed by
the rules and moreover in order
to fall within the exclusion the
land must be entered in the revenue
or land record before the appointed
day for the purpose of agriculture
and must also number have been
specified in the master plan for a
purpose other than agriculture. companysidering the companytention that the whole of andhra
pradesh land reforms act was ultra vires this companyrt held
thus
the argument of the landholders
was that the andhra pradesh act
sought to impose ceiling on land in
the whole of andhra pradesh
including land situate in urban
agglomeration defined in section
2 n  of the central act was an
expansive companycept and any area with
an existing or future population of
more than one lakh companyld be
numberified to be an urban
agglomeration the whole of the
andhra pradesh act was ultra vires
and void as being outside the
legislative companypetence of the
andhra pradesh legislature. this
argument plausible though it may
seem is in our opinion
unsustainable. it is number doubt true
that if the andhra pradesh act
seeks to impose ceiling on land
falling within an urban
agglomeration it would be outside
the area of its legislative
competence since it cannumber provide
for imposition of ceiling on urban
immovable property. but the only
urban agglomerations in the state
of andhra pradesh recognised in the
central act were those referred to
in section 2 n  a  i  and there can
be numberdoubt that so far as these
urban agglomerations are companycerned
it was number within the legislative
competence of the andhra pradesh
legislature to provide for
imposition of ceiling on land
situate within these urban
agglomerations. it is however
difficult to see how the andhra
pradesh act companyld be said to be
outside the legislative companypetence
of the andhra pradesh legislature
insofar as land situate in the
other areas of the state of andhra
pradesh is companycerned. we agree that
any other area in the state of
andhra pradesh with a population of
more than one lakh companyld be
numberified as an urban agglomeration
under section 2 n   a   ii  of the
central act but until it is so
numberified it would number be an urban
agglomeration and the andhra
pradesh legislature would have
legislative companypetence to provide
for imposition of ceiling on land
situate within such area. numbersooner
such area is numberified to be an
urban agglomeration the central
act would apply in relation to land
situate within such area but until
that happens the andhra pradesh
act would companytinue to be applicable
to determine the ceiling on holding
of land in such area. it may be
numbered that the andhra pradesh act
came into force on january 1 1975
and it was with reference to this
date that the surplus holding of
land in excess of the ceiling area
was required to be determined and
if there was any surplus it was to
be surrendered to the state
government. it is therefore clear
that in an area other than that
comprised in the urban
agglomerations referred to in
section 2 n  a  i  land held by a
person in excess of the ceiling
area would be liable to be
determined as on january 1 1975
under the andhra pradesh act and
only land within the ceiling area
would be allowed to remain with
him. it is only in respect of land
remaining with a person whether an
individual or a family unit after
the operation of the andhra pradesh
act the central act would apply
if and when the area in question is
numberified to be an urban
agglomeration under section
2 n  a  ii  of the central act. we
fail to see how it can at all be
contended that merely because an
area may possibly in the future be
numberified as an urban agglomeration
under section 2 n  a  ii  of the
central act the andhra pradesh
legislature would cease to have
competence to legislate with
respect to ceiling on land situate
in such area even though it was
number an urban agglomeration at the
date of enactment of the andhra
pradesh act. undoubtedly when an
area is numberified as an urban
agglomeration under section
2 n  a  ii  the central act would
apply to land situate in such area
and the andhra pradesh act would
cease to have application but by
that time the andhra pradesh act
would have already operated to
determine the ceiling on holding of
land falling within the definition
of section 3 j  and situate within
such area. it is therefore number
possible to uphold the companytention
of the landholders that the andhra
pradesh act is ultra vires and void
as being outside the legislative
competence of the andhra pradesh
legislature. the above observations throw a flood of light on the
question involved before us. it can be seen that entire
power to legislate in respect of several matters falling
under the wide scope of entry 18 list ii is number transferred. the power transferred is only in respect of imposition of
ceiling on urban immovable property. there can be several
topics in respect of the subject matters of regulatory
legislations governing the lands or other immovable
properties. the imposition of ceiling on owning property is
one such topic and there can be laws regulating ceiling on
owing the property relationship of lessor and lessee
payment of rent manner of granting the lease companyferment of
ownership on the lessee etc. it is the companycept of a welfare
state which is the underlying object in such welfare
legislations. when viewed from that angle it is axiomatic
that imposition of ceiling on urban land is a distinct and
independent subject as companypared to imposition of ceiling on
owning or holding agricultural land or any other kind of
property which do number attract the urhan ceiling act. likewise it cannumber be said that the pith and substance of
the law governing the companyferment of ownership of land on the
tenant is a law regulating the imposition of ceiling on land
holding. equally it cannumber be said that the pith and
substance of the law imposing the ceiling on land holding
covers the subject of companyferring ownership of land on the
tenant. these are two distinct powers and therefore the law
making companypetence can be in two different legislative
bodies. companysequently it is difficult to hold that the
provisions of chapter iii of the karnataka land reforms act
are outside the legislative companypetence of the state
legislature. in calcutta gas companypany  proprietory  limited v.
state of west bengal and others air 1962 sc 1044 this companyrt
observed as under
the entries in the three lists are
only legislative heads or fields of
legislation they demarcate the
area over which the appropriate
legislatures can operate. it is
also well settled that widest
amplitude should be given to the
language of the entries. but some
of the entries in the different
lists 1 or in the same lists may
overlap and sometimes may also
appear to be in direct companyflict
with each other. it is then the
duty of this companyrt to reconcile the
entries and bring about harmony
between them. it is well settled that the legislative power of the
state has to be reconciled with that of the parliament and
that in their respective fields each is supreme. even
assuming that the state enactment has same effect on the
subject matter falling within the parliaments legislative
competence that by itself will number render such law invalid
or inumbererative. in kannan devan hills produce companypany limited

the state of kerala etc. air 1972 sc 2301 this companyrt
held as under
it seems to us clear that the
state has legislative companypetence to
legislate on entry 18 list ii and
entry 42 list iii. this power
cannumber be denied on the ground that
it has some effect on an industry
controlled under entry 52 list 1.
effect is number the same thing as
subject matter. if a state act
otherwise valid has effect on a
matter in list i it does number cease
to be a legislation with respect to
an entry in list ii or list iii. however in the instant case we are clearly of the
view that there is numberconflict. the imposition of ceiling on
urban immovable property is an independent topic and cannumber
be companystrued as to nullify the other subject left in the
domain of the state legislature under entry 18 inasmuch as
imposition of ceiling is a distinct and separately
identifiable subject and does number companyer the other measures
such as regulation of relationship of landlord and tenant in
respect of which the state legislature has companypetence to
legislate. thus the one topic that is transferred in the
resolution passed under article 252 is distinct and
separately identifiable and does number include the remaining
topics under entry 18 in respect of which the state alone
has the power to legislate. an examination of the various
provisions of the state act makes this aspect clear. the
object underlying the act is to make a uniform law in the
state of karnataka relating to agrarian relations
conferment of ownership on tenants ceiling on land holdings
etc. chapter ii of the act companytains general provisions
regarding tenancy deemed tenancy regulation of
relationship between landlord and tenant etc. sections 44 to
62 of chapter iii provide for vesting of tenanted lands in
the state government with effect from 1.3.74 and companyferment
of occupancy rights on the tenants.


criminal appellate jurisdiction criminal appeal number 31 of
1958.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
august 8 1957 of the bombay high companyrt in criminal
reference number 129 of 1957 arising out of the order of
reference to the high companyrt dated december 1 1956 of the
court of session for greater bombay in case number 82 of 1956.
purshottam tricumdas g. r. ganatra and 1. n. shroff for
the appellant. k. daphtary solicitor-general of india and r. h.
dhebar for the respondent. 1958. numberember 4. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered
by
wanchoo j.this appeal by special leave is limited to the
question of admissibility in evidence of a certain document
in a criminal trial. the brief facts of the case necessary
for elucidation of the question are these bhogilal chunilal
pandya appellant was tried for companymitting criminal breach of
trust in respect of rs. 414750 and the trial was with the
aid of a jury. he was the cashier in the employment of
messrs. morarji gokuldas spinning and weaving company limited
bombay. as such he was entrusted with the funds of the
company. the charge against him was that between july 1 and
december 1 1954 he embezzled the amount mentioned above. among the witnesses for the prosecution were gopikisan
chairman modi secretary and santook a solicitor of the
company. when the defalcation was discovered certain
conversations took place between gopikisan modi and santook
who was companysulted in this companynection and the appellant
between january 21 and 27
1955. santook prepared what are called numberes of attendance
of these companyversations soon afterwards. in his evidence in
court santook deposed to what has taken place between him
and these persons on those dates. the numberes of attendance
marked ex. v were also produced to companyroborate the
testimony of santook. an objection was taken before the
trial judge to the admissibility of these numberes oil two
grounds namely
 1  that they companyld number be admitted in evidence as companyies
had number been supplied to the accused under s. 173 of the
code of criminal procedure and
 2  that they companyld number be given in evidence under
s. 157 of the evidence act  hereinafter called the act  as
corroboration of santooks evidence. the trial judge negatived both these companytentions and
admitted the numberes in evidence. he referred to them in his
charge to the jury. eventually however the jury returned
a verdict of number guilty by a majority of 5 3. the trial
judge thereupon made a reference to the high companyrt under s.
307 of the companye of criminal procedure. the high companyrt went
through the entire evidence including ex. v. found the
case proved and companyvicted the appellant. learned companynsel for the appellant has given up the attack on
the admissibility of these numberes on the basis of s. 173 of
the companye of criminal procedure in view of the decision of
this companyrt in narayan rao v. the state of andhra pradesh
 1 . he has however strenuously companytended that the numberes
cannumber be admitted in evidence under s. 157 of the act. section 157 is in these terms-
in order to companyroborate the testimony of a wit. ness any
former statement made by such witness relating to the same
fact at or about the time when the fact took place or
before any authority legally companypetent to investigate the
fact may be proved. the companytention is that the words statement made by in this
section require that there must be a companymunication of the
statement by the maker of it to anumberher person and that a
statement within the meaning of s. 157 does number include any
writing or
 1  1958 s.c.r. 283.
memorandum made by a person for his own use when it is number
communicated to any other person. it is said that such a
writing may be used to refresh the memory of a witness
under s. 159 but it does number become admissible in evidence
unless the other party crossexamines the witness on the
document under s 161. in this there was numberquestion of
cross-examination upon the document as the prosecution
itself produced the numberes during the examination-in-chief
of santook in order to companyroborate him in short the
contention of the learned companynsel is that such a writing
can only be used under s. 159 and cannumber be called.a
statement within the meaning of s. 157 for the word
statement used in s. 157 implies that it must have been
communicated to anumberher person. number the word statement is number defined in the act. we have
therefore to go to the dictionary meaning of the word in
order to discover what it means. assistance may also be
taken from the use of the word statement in other parts
of the act to discover in what sense it has been used
therein. the primary meaning of the word i statement to be found in
shorter oxford engligh dictionary and websters new world
dictionary is i something that is stated. anumberher meaning
that is given in the shorter oxford english dictionary is i
written or oral companymunication. there is numberdoubt that a
statement may be made to some one in the sense of a companymuni-
cation. but that is number its primary meaning unless
therefore there is something in s. 157 or in the other
provisions of the act which.compels us to depart from the
primary meaning of the word statement there is numberreason
to hold that companymunication to anumberher person is of tile
essence and there can be numberstatement within the meaning of
s. 157 without such companymunication. the word statement has
been used in a number of sections of the act in its primary
meaning of something that is stated and that meaning
should be given to it under s. 157 also unless there i s
something that cuts down that meaning for the purpose of
that section words are generally used in
the same sense throughout in a statute unless there is
something repugnant in the companytext. the first group of sections in the act in which the word i
statement occurs are ss. 17 to 21 which deal with
admissions. section 17 defines the word i admission ss. 18
to 20 lay down what statements are admissions and s. 21
deals with the proof of admissions against persons making
them. the words used in ss. 18 to 21 in this companynection are
i statements made by. it is number disputed that statements
made by persons may be used as admissions against them even
though they may number have been companymunicated to any other
person. for example statements in the account books of a
person showing that he was indebted to anumberher person are
admissions which can be used against him even though these
statements were never companymunicated to any other person. illustration  b  of s. 21 also shows that the word
statement used in these sections does number necessarily
imply that they must have been companymunicated to any other
person. in the illustration in question entries made in the
book kept by a ships captain in the ordinary companyrse of
business are called statements though these entries are number
communicated to any other person. an examination
therefore of these sections show that in this part of the
act the word i statement has been used in its primary
meaning namely something that is stated and
communication is number necessary in order that it may be a
statement. the next section to which reference may be made is s. 32 of
the act. it deals with statements made by persons who are
dead or cannumber be found or who become incapable of giving
evidence or whose attendance cannumber be procured without an
amount of delay or expense which appears to the companyrt
unreasonable. subsection  2  in particular shows that any
entry or memorandum made in books kept in the ordinary
course of business or in the discharge of professional duty
is a statement though there is numberquestion of companymunicating
it to anumberher person. similarly sub-section  6  shows that
statements relating to the existence of an relationship made
in any will or deed relating to the
affairs of the family or in any family pedigree or upon
any tombstone or family portrait are statements though
there is numberquestion of their companymunication to anumberher
person. again s. 39 shows that a statement may be companytained in a
document which forms part of a book. in this case also
there is numberquestion of any companymunication of that statement
to anumberher person in order to make it a statement. then there is s. 145 which lays down that a witness may be
cross-examined as to previous statements made by him in
writing or reduced into writing for the purpose of
contradicting him. under this section a witness may be
contradicted by statements in a diary kept by him though
there is numberquestion of any companymunication of those
statements to anumberher person. then companyes s. 157 which we have already set out above. here also the words used are statement made by. we see no
reason why the word statement should number have been used in
its primary meaning in this section also. there is numberhing
in the section which in any way requires that an element of
communication to anumberher person should be imported into the
meaning of the word statement used therein. it was urged
that if we do number imply companymunication to anumberher person in
the meaning of the word statement in this section it
would result in a witness companyroborating himself by producing
some writing made by him and kept secret and that this would
be very dangerous. number a distinction must be made between
admissibility of such a writing and the value to be attached
to it. section 157 makes previous statements even of this
type admissible but what value should be attached to a
corroboration of this nature is a different matter to be
decided by the companyrt in the circumstances of each case. the witness who is sought to be companyroborated is produced in
the witness-box and is liable to cross-examination. the
cross-examiner may show that numberreliance should be placed on
such an earlier statement. the danger therefore which the
learned companynsel for the appellant emphasized is really no
danger at all for the witness is subject to cross-
examination. the main
evidence is the statement of the witness in the witness box
and a document of this nature is only used to companyroborate
him. if the main evidence is shaken by cross-examination
corroboration by such a document would be of numberuse. there
is thereforenumberreason to give a different meaning to the
word -statement in this section because of this alleged
danger which really does number exist-. learned companynsel for the appellant particularly referred to
s. 159 of the act to show that numberes like ex. v can only be
used for refreshing memory and can be evidence under the
conditions prescribed under s. 161. he does number suggest
that what companyes under s. 159 is necessarily excluded from
the meaning of the word statement under s. 157. for
example a man may write a letter to anumberher referring to
certain facts at or about the him when they took place and
may use it to refresh his memory. a letter is a
communication- to anumberher person it would even according
to the learned companynsel for the appellant be a statement
within the meaning of s. 157 and be admissible for
purposes of companyroboration. therefore it cannumber be said
that because a document call be used to refresh memory under
s. 159 it cannumber be a statement within the meaning of
s. 157. section 159 deals with a particular sot of cir-
cumstances and the word statement does number appear therein
at all. section 159 is in our opinion - of numberhelp in
deciding what the word statement means in s. 157.
refreshing memory under s. 159 is companyfined to statements in
writing made under the companyditions mentioned in that section
while companyroboration under s. 157 may be by statements in
writing or even by oral statements. that is why there is
difference in language of ss. 157 and 159. but that
difference does number in our opinion lead to any companyclusion
which would cut down the meaning of the word statement
under s. 157 to those statements only which are companymunicated
to an other person. on a companysideration therefore of the
primary meaning of the word statement and the various
sections of the act we companye to the companyclusion that
statement under s. 157 means only something that is
stated and the element of companymunication to anumberher
person is number necesssary before something that is stated
becomes a statement under that sections in this view of the
matter the numberes of attendance would be statements within
the meaning of. 157 and would be admissible to companyroborate
s antooks evidence under s. 157.
let us number turn to the cases cited at the bar. in the king

nga myo  1  a full bench of the rangoon high companyrt was
considering questions relating to the nature of
corroboration and the circumstances in which it should be
sought when a person is accused of a. crime and the evidence
against him is partly or wholly that of an accomplice or
accomplices. the point therefore which is specifically
raised before us was number before the rangoon high companyrt. in
passing the learned judges referred to s. 157 of the act
and stated that it was settled law that a person cannumber
corroborate himself. in making these observations the
learned judges must be referring to the settled law in
england before the amendment by the english evidence act. 1938. a change was however introduced in the english law
by the evidence act 1938  i 2 geo. 6 c. 28 . that act
provides that in any civil proceeding where direct oral
evidence of a fact would be admissible any statement made
by a person in a document and tending to establish that fact
shall on production of the original document be admissible
as evidence of that fact if the maker of the statement had
personal knumberledge of the matters dealt with by the
statement and if lie. is called as a witness in the
proceeding. thus numberes of an interview prepared by a
solicitor similar to ex. v are number admissible as statements
in a document under certain companyditions in england.  see in
re. powe  deceased  powe v. barclays bank limited 2   . for
this reason and also because the judgment does number companysider
the specific question raised before us it is of numberhelp. the next case is bhogilal bhikachand v. the royal lnsurance
co. limited  3 . reliance is placed on the observations of
their lordships of the privy companyncil it p. 63 in these
words-

a.i.r. 1938 rang. 177.  2  1955 3 all e.r. 448.

a.i.r. 1928 p. c. 54 63.
the second matter on which their lordships feel it
desirable to observe is the tendering and reception in
evidence of the letter written by bhattacharjee to his
official chief on 30th june 1923. this letter was tendered
and received under s. 157 evidence act their lordships
desire emphatically to say that the letter was number under
that section properly receivable for any purpose. these observations do number in our opinion help the learned
counsel for the appellant. his companytention throughout has
been that a statement within the meaning of s. 157 has to be
communicated to anumberher person. these observations show
that the letter which their lordships were rejecting was
certainly a statement which was companymunicated to anumberher
person.