civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 2136 of
1969.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order
dated 24-1-1969 of the andhra pradesh high companyrt in s.a. number
552/66. govindan nair v.v. rao and g.n. rao for the
appellants. v. nair for the respondent. 1008
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
koshal j.-the facts giving rise to this appeal by
special leave are companycluded by companycurrent findings of fact
arrived at by the trial companyrt and the first appellate companyrt
and may be briefly stated here with reference to the
following pedigree-table
krishna reddy

subramanyam reddy daughter name number venkatarama
 plaintiff  knumbern  reddy

pocha subba reddy krishna challamma
 defendant number 6  reddy  defendent
number 1

srinivasan reddy
 defendant number2
defendants number. 1 and 2 and one p.k. reddy were the owners
of the lands in dispute which are situated in village
makhamambavilasam forming part of chittoor district. some of
the lands were sold by defendants number. 1 and 2 and the rest
by p.k. reddy and defendant number 2 by means of two sale deeds
dated the 25th of september 1947  exhibits a-8 and a-9
respectively  in favour of defendant number 6 who was the
brother of defendant number 1 and therefore the maternal uncle
of defendant number 2. although both the sale deeds were
supported by valid companysideration possession was number
delivered to the vendee under either of them and companytinued
to be with defendant number 1.
in 1948 was promulgated the madras estates  abolition
and companyversion into ryotwari  act  hereinafter called the
madras act  section 3 of which reads thus

with effect on and from the numberified date and
save as otherwise expressly provided in this act-
 a  the madras estates land  reduction of rent
act 1947  madras act xxx of 1947  in so far as it
relates to matters other than the reduction of rents
and the companylection of arrears of rent and the madras
permanent settlement regulation 1802  madras
regulation xxv of 1802  the madras estates land act
1908  madras act 1 of 1908
1009
and all other enactments applicable to the estate as
such shall be deemed to have been repealed in their
application to the estate
 b  the entire estate  including all companymunal
lands porambokes other number-ryoti lands waste lands
pasture lands lanka lands forests mines and
minerals quarries rivers and streams tanks and
irrigation works fisheries and ferries  shall stand
transferred to the government and vest in them free of
all encumbrances and the madras revenue recovery act
1864 the madras irrigation cess act 1865 and all
other enactments applicable to ryotwari areas shall
apply to the estate
 c  all rights and interests created in or over
the estate before the numberified date by the principal or
any other landholder shall as against the government
cease and determine
 d  the government may after removing any
obstruction that may be offered forthwith take
possession of the estate and all accounts registers
pattas muchilikas maps plans and other documents
relating to the estate which the government may require
for the administration thereof
provided that the government shall number dispossess
any person of any land in the estate in respect of
which they companysider that he is prima facie entitled to
a ryotwari patta-

if such person is a ryot pending the
decision of the settlement officer as to
whether he is actually entitled to such
patta

if such person is a landholder pending the
decision of the settlement officer and the
tribunal on appeal if any to it as to
whether he is actually entitled to such
patta
 e  the principal or any other landholder and any
other person whose rights stand transferred under
clause  b  or cease and determine under clause  c
shall be entitled only to such rights and privileges as
are recognized or companyferred on him by or under this
act
 f  the relationship of landholder and ryot
shall as between them be extinguished
 g  any rights and privileges which may have
accrued in the estate to any person before the
numberified date against
1010
the principal or any other landholder thereof shall
cease and determine and shall number be enforceable
against the government or such landholder and every
such person shall be entitled only to such rights and
privileges as are recognized or companyferred on him by or
under this act. the term estate is defined in clause  3  of section 2
of the madras act as meaning a zamindari or an under-tenure
or an inam estate. section 11 declares that every ryot in an estate would
be entitled to a ryotwari patta in respect of all ryoti and
lanka lands in his occupation before the numberified date
which meant under clause  10  of section 2 the date
appointed by a numberification issued by the government. sections 12 to 15 deal with the determination of lands in
zamindari inam and under-tenure estates in which the
landholder is declared to be entitled to a ryotwari patta. on the 1st of october 1953 came into being the state
of andhra through an act of parliament knumbern as the andhra
state act by virtue of section 3 companytained in part ii of
which the entire chittoor district forming part of the state
of madras prior to the said date was transferred along with
other areas to the state of andhra. section 53 of the act
last mentioned provided as follows

the provisions of part ii shall number be deemed
to have effected any change in the territories to which
any law in force immediately before the appointed day
extends or applies and territorial references in any
such law to the state of madras or of mysore shall
until otherwise provided by a companypetent legislature or
other companypetent authority companytinue to have the same
meaning. as a result of this provision the district of chittoor
continued to be governed by all the laws including the act
which were in force in the state of madras immediately
before the 1st of october 1953.
a dispute arose between defendant number 1 and defendant
number 6 as to who of them was entitled to a patta under the
act in respect of the lands companyered by exhibits a-8 and a-9. the additional assistant settlement officer resolved the
dispute by means of an order dated the 14th of september
1957  exhibits b-3 and b-4  holding that defendant number 1 was
entitled to the patta on the ground that she had throughout
been in possession of the lands in question to the exclusion
of defendant number 6
1011
on the same date i.e. 14th of september 1957
defendant number 6 sold the lands in dispute by means of a
registered sale deed  exhibit a-7  to the plaintiff who was
his maternal uncle and who about three years later filed
the suit  suit number 169 of 1960  which has given rise to this
appeal against six persons claiming declaration of title
to the said lands and possession thereof. defendants number. 1 and 2 were alleged by the plaintiff to have taken
possession of part of the land while defendants number. 3 to 5
were accused of having trespassed into some other parts
thereof. numberrelief was claimed against defendant number 6 and
the suit was based on sale-deed exhibits a-7 a-8 and a-9
all three of which were claimed to be genuine documents
under which it was pleaded by the plaintiff possession had
passed to defendant number 6 in the first instance and to
himself  the plaintiff  on the 14th of september 1957.
anumberher plea taken was that the grant of the patta in favour
of defendant number 1 under the order evidenced by exhibits b-3
and b-4 did number companyfer any title on her and was obtained
fraudulently on the basis of her unlawful possession. the trial companyrt held that the sale deeds exhibits a-8
and a-9 were genuine but that the possession of the lands in
dispute had throughout remained with defendants number. 1 and

it was further of the opinion however that by virtue of
sale deed exhibit a-7 the plaintiff had become entitled to
the lands. the companytention raised on behalf of defendant number
1 that the civil companyrts companyld number take companynizance of the
suit in view of the provisions of the act was overruled on
the strength of krishnaswami thevar v. perumal konar wherein
it was held that a settlement officer had numberjurisdiction
under the act to adjudicate upon rival claims for the grant
of a patta and that such disputes fell within the
jurisdiction of the civil companyrts. the suit was found to be
within limitation and in view of the other findings above
detailed was decreed against defendants number. 7 and 8 who had
by then been substituted for defendants 1 and 2 as the
latters legal representatives defendants number. 1 and 2
having died during the pendency of the suit. numberrelief was
granted against defendants 3 to 5 as they did number claim number
were found to be in possession of any part of the lands in
dispute. the learned additional district judge of chittoor who
decided the first appeal preferred by defendants number. 7 and
8 companycurred with the findings of fact arrived at by the
trial companyrt but reversed its decree and dismissed the suit
holding on the authority of guddiradu v. murugappa modali
that by virtue of the provisions of section 3 of the act
with effect from the numberified date all rights in the lands
in dispute vested in
1012
the government except those recognised under the act as
vesting in others so that after the numberified date the only
right which a landholder under-tenure holder or a ryot
could claim was the right to obtain a patta. the rights of
the plaintiff under exhibit a-7 were thus held to have been
dislodged by the grant of a patta to defendant number 1.
in second appeal the high companyrt observed that the only
question requiring determination by it was whether the
plaintiff who was admittedly the owner of the property
lost his right by reason of the patta having been granted to
defendant number 1. it relied upon krishnaswami thevars case
and a. r. sanjeevi naicker v. p. m. shanmuga udayar in
support of its view that it was companypetent to a civil companyrt
to adjudicate upon the title of the parties numberwithstanding
the grant of a patta under the act to one of hem. it was in
this view of the matter that the high companyrt accepted the
appeal before it and restored the decree of the trial companyrt
thus granting to the plaintiff the relief claimed by him
and it is the judgment of the high companyrt which is challenged
before us by defendants number. 7 and 8.

the case was argued before us by learned companynsel for
the companytending parties on the assumption that it was
governed by the provisions of the andhra pradesh  andhra
area  estates  abolition and companyversion into ryotwari  act
1948  hereinafter referred to as the andhra act  the
provisions enacted by which except for necessary changes
were practically the same as those of the madras act. that
assumption however is number well-founded. as already pointed
out chittoor district  in which lie the lands in dispute
continued to be governed by the provisions of the madras act
as they stood on the 1st of october 1953 even after its
transfer to the state of andhra by reason of the mandate of
section 53 above extracted. after that date the madras act
could be amended or repealed by the andhra pradesh
legislature but till that was done the district of chittoor
would companytinue to be governed by the madras act in its
unamended form and as it stood on that date. we make it
clear however that the companyrection of the error on which
the assumption was based would number really make any
difference to the decision of the case inasmuch as the
relevant provisions of the madras act as they stood on the
1st of october 1953 are practically the same as the
corresponding provisions of the andhra act. apart from
sections 3 and 11 to 15 it is section 56 of the madras act
which clinches the matter. it reads thus
56.  1  where after an estate is numberified a
dispute arises as to  a  whether any rent due from a
ryot for any
1013
fasli year is in arrear or  b  what amount of rent is
in arrear or  c  who the lawful ryot in respect of any
holding is the dispute shall be decided by the
settlement officer. any person deeming himself aggrieved by any
decision of the settlement officer under sub-section
 1  may within two months from the date of the
decision or such further time as the tribunal may in
its discretion allow appeal to the tribunal and its
decision shall be final and number be liable to be
questioned in any companyrt of law. sub-section  2  of the section categorically declares
that the decision of the tribunal deciding the appeal shall
be final and number liable to be questioned in any companyrt of
law in so far as it relates to any of the matters companyered
by sub-section  1 . it goes without saying that if numberappeal
is filed a similar finality shall attach to the decision of
the settlement officer. one of such matters is companyered by
clause  c  of sub-section  1  and embraces the determination
of the question as to who the lawful ryot in respect of any
holding is. questions which a settlement officer may be
called upon to decide under the said clause  c  would
certainly include such as may have resulted from a dispute
between two or more persons as to who of them is the lawful
ryot and once a dispute of that type has been adjudicated
upon by the settlement officer his decision becomes final
unless an appeal is filed before the tribunal in which
event it is the decision of the tribunal to which finality
attaches. in either case the decision is number liable to be
called into question in any companyrt of law. we need number go
into further details on the question of interpretation of
section 56 of the madras act inasmuch as our view is fully
supported by anumberher decision of this companyrt in muddada
chayanna v. karnam narayana and anumberher etc in that case
chinnappa reddy j. who delivered the judgment of the companyrt
was companycerned with the interpretation to be placed on
section 56 of the andhra act which repeats word for word the
contents of section 56 of the madras act. in holding that
the authorities mentioned in sub-section  2  of section 56
of the andhra act had exclusive jurisdiction to decide a
dispute between rival claimants for a ryotwari patta this
court approved the decision in t. munuswami naidu  died  and
others v. r. venkata reddi and others in which the same
interpretation had been given to section 56 of the andhra
act as a result of an elaborate discussion. this companyrt
further held that cherukuru muthayya v. gadde gopala-
1014
krishnayya which was also decided by a full bench but had
been overruled by a larger full bench in munuswamis case
 supra  had been wrongly decided. faced with the above situation learned companynsel for
the plaintiffs sought support for a companytrary view from the
two madras cases on which reliance had been placed by the
high companyrt in the impugned judgment. we may state at once
that those cases are wholly irrelevant for deciding this
case and that the high companyrt erred in taking them into
consideration. in this companynection all that need be stated is
that section 56 of the madras act was repealed by madras act
xxxiv of 1958 and both the madras cases above mentioned were
decided after section 56 had ceased to be part of the madras
act. that those cases may well have been differently decided
if section 56 had companytinued to be part of the madras act was
recognized by ramachandra iyer j. who decided krishnaswami
thevars case  supra  with the following observations -
the abolition act as originally enacted companytained
section 56 which companyferred in terms a power to decide
any dispute as to who the lawful ryot of a holding is. sub-section  2  provided for an appeal from such a
decision. if that provision were still to exist it can
be said that as the question whether the person was the
lawful ryot or number was one to be decided by the
settlement officer the issue of ryotwari patta by him
presumably after such decision companyld number be challenged
in a civil companyrt to that extent there would be an
ouster of the jurisdiction of the civil companyrt. but
section 56 1  has been repealed by act xxxiv of 1958.
there is number numbermachinery to decide the case of a
disputed claim to patta. thus if a ryot is entitled to
the ryoti land before the numberification he would by
virtue of that right be entitled to the grant of
ryotwari patta. there is numberhing in the procedure to be
adopted for the grant of patta under section 11 to
justify an adjudication of title. number is there anything
in the nature of the patta itself to show that there
must have been an adjudication of title in favour of
the pattadar. krishnaswami thevars case was followed in sanjeevi
naickers case which is again a single bench decision in
which ramamurti j. also made a reference to the repeal of
section 56 of the madras act by a later madras enactment. 1015

in the above view of the matter numberassistance can be
drawn by learned companynsel for the plaintiff who has to meet
the challenge of the provisions of section 56 because that
section was a part of the madras act on the 1st of october
1953 and companytinues to be so in so far as its application to
the district of chittoor in andhra pradesh is companycerned the
repeal of that section by the madras legislature being
wholly ineffective in so far as territories forming part of
the state of andhra are companycerned. the only other case to which reference was made by
learned companynsel for the plaintiff was pinninty peda
govindayya v. pinninty subbarao. that was a case in which
sections 3 4 7 12 and 14 of the andhra inams  abolition
and companyversion into ryotwari  act 1956 and rule 15 of the
rules framed thereunder came in for interpretation. the
relevancy of the case is number apparent inasmuch as it makes
numberreference to a provision similar to the one enacted by
section 56 of the madras act as forming part of the statute
or rules then under companysideration. we do number see therefore
that the plaintiffs case is in any manner advanced by the
decision cited.


civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeals number. 2200 2200a
and 2200b of 1968.
appeals from the judgment and order dated numberember 30 1967
of the allahabad high companyrt in income-tax reference number 366
of 1963.

c. chagla and p. n. tiwari for the appellant  in all
the appeals . sen g. l. sharnia and r. n. sachthey for the
respondent  in all the appeals . the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
hegde j.-in these appeals by certificate the question that
falls for decision is whether oil the facts and in the
circumstances of the case registration under s. 26 a  of the
indian income tax act 1922  to be hereinafter referred to
as the act  was rightly refused to the appellant firm on the
ground that the partnership in question violated the
provisions of s. 4 of the indian companypanies act 1913.
the authorities under the act as well as the high companyrt of
allahabad have answered that question in the affirmative. the assessee challenges that companyclusion. the above appeals relate to different assessment years of
the same assessee the relevant assessment years being 1952-
53 1953-54 and 1954-55. in all these years the income tax
officer had refused to register the appellant firm under s.
26a. all the partnership deeds are we are told similar in
terms. we have before us the deed executed on july 7 1950.
it shows that the firm companysists of 18 partners. ex facie
that deed does number show that any of the partners had joined
the deed as representatives of their hindu undivided
families. from the tenumber of the document they appear to be
partners in their own right. the income tax officer the
appellate assistant companymissioner and the tribunal have companye
to the companyclusion that some of them had joined the
partnership as kartas of their respective hindu undivided
families. all the authorities under the act as well as the
high companyrt have opined that the partnership in question is
number lawful in view of s. 4 3  of the indian companypanies act
1913. the material portion of that provision reads
 4 .  1

numbercompany association or partnership
consisting of more than twenty persons shall
be formed for the purpose of carrying on any
other business that has for its object the
acquisition of gain by the companypany
association or partnership or by the
individual members thereof unless it is
registered as a companypany under this act or is
formed in pursuance of an act of parliament of
the united kingdom or some other indian law or
royal charter or letters patent. this section shall number apply to a joint
family carrying on joint family trade or
business and where two or more such joint
families form a partnership in companyputing the
number of persons for the purpose of this
section minumber members of such families shall
be excluded. every member of a companypany association
or partnership carrying on business in
contravention of this section shall be
personally liable for all liabilities incurred
in such business.  5
the income tax officer the appellate assistant companymissioner
as well as the tribunal were of the opinion that some
partners of the assessee firm having entered into the
partnership as representatives of their respective hindu
undivided families the adult members of those families
should be taken into companysideration for determining whether
or number the total number of partners exceeded twenty. on
that basis they have arrived at the companyclusion that the firm
has more than twenty partners and the same having number been
registered as a companypany under the companypanies act number having
formed in pursuance of an act of parliament of the united
kingdom or some other indian law or royal charter or letters
patent it must be held to be an unlawful partnership. when
the question formulated earlier was referred to the high
court under s. 66 1  of the act it was heard by jagdish
sahai and beg jj. jagdish sahai j. was of the opinion that
the partnership in question was number lawful. beg j. differed
from him and answered the question in favour of the
assessee. in view of this difference of opinion the matter
was referred to takru j. he agreed with jagdish sahai j. by
a majority the question referred to the high companyrt was
answered in favour of the revenue. hence these appeals. mr. chagla appearing on behalf of the assessee urged that no
hindu joint family as such can join a partnership and it is
number well settled that when a karta of hindu undivided family
joins a firm as a partner even if he companytributes his share
from out of the family funds the other members of his
family do number ipso facto become partners of that firm. so
far as the partnership is companycerned he is the only partner
though he may be accountable to the members of his family as
regards the profits earned. according to the learned
counsel for the purpose of working out the rights and
liabilities of the partners inter se one cannumber go behind
the partnership deed. proceeding further he urged that in
considering whether a partnership should be registered under
s. 26a or number the income-tax officer has merely to see
whether the requirements of s. 26a of the act and the
relevant rules are companyplied with or number. he is number entitled
to investigate into the question as to who are beneficially
interested in the partnership. according to him if the
requirements of s. 26a and the relevant rules are companyplied
with the income-tax officer is bound to register the
partnership. the companynsel urged that the second limb of s.
4 3  of the indian companypanies act 1913 proceeds on the
erroneous impression that
a joint hindu family can enter into a partnership which in
law it cannumber as it has numberlegal personality. mr. b. sen learned companynsel for the department did number
contest the position that when a karta or a member of a
hindu joint family joins a partnership the other members of
his family do number become partners ipso facto. but according
to him it is open to the department to go behind the
partnership deed and find out whether the individual who has
joined as a partner has joined in his own right or as a
representative of any other body. his companytention was that
in view of s. 4 3  of the indian companypanies act 1913 once
the income-tax officer companyes to the companyclusion that one of
the partners of a firm is a representative of a joint
family he must deem that the adult members of that family
are also partners of that firm and on that basis find out
whether the total number of partners exceed twenty. if they
exceed twenty he cannumber register the partnership as such a
partnership companytravenes s. 4  2  of the indian companypanies
act 1913
section 2  6b  of the act provides that the expression
firm partner and partnership in the act have the same
meaning respectively as in the indian partnership act 1932.
section 4 of the partnership act 1932
prescribes
partnership is the relation between persons
who have agreed to share the profits of a
business carried on by all or any of them
acting for all. persons who have entered into partnership with
one anumberher are called individually partners
and companylectively a firm and the name under
which their business is carried on is called
the firm name. in view of the aforementioned provision only persons can
join as partners. section 2 42  of the general clauses act
says a person shall include any companypany or association or
body of individuals whether incorporation or number. but this
definition applies when there is numberhing repugnant in the
subject or companytext. after examining the provisions of the
partnership act the privy companyncil in senaji kapurchand v.
pannaji devichand 1 - and this companyrt in dulichand
laxminarayana v. companymissioner of income tax nagpur 2
have held that an association of persons is number a person
within the meaning of that expression in the partnership
act it is true that s. 2 9  of the act says that unless the
context otherwise requires person includes hindu undivided
family this definition cannumber be imported into the
partnership act the provisions of which alone are relevant
for finding as to who companyld join as partners. it is only
partnership companystituted according to

a.i.r. 1930 p.c. 300.  2  29 i.t.r. 535.
the provisions of the partnership act that can be companysidered
as partnerships under the act. the definition of person
in the act is intended for the purpose of levying income-tax
and for other companynate matters. on the basis of certain observations of the judicial
committee in lala lachman das v. companymissioner of income
tax 1  it was companytended on behalf of the department that a
joint hindu family can enter into a partnership. those
observations have to be read in the companytext in which they
were made. the department in that case had requested the
tribunal to refer the question can there be a partnership
within the meaning of s. 2 sub-s. 6 b  of the indian income-
tax act 1922 between a hindu undivided family as such on
the one part and one of its undivided members in his indi-
vidual capacity on the other part. but that question was
ultimately number referred as being unnecessary on the facts of
the case. but the following observations of the judicial
committee in its judgment are relevant
it is unnecessary to companysider in this case
the question relating to the validity of a
partnership between a hindu undivided family
as such of the one part and one of its
undivided members in his individual capacity
of the other. with reference to the latter
kind of partnership there seems to be some
authority favouring the view that such a
partnership cannumber exist under the rules. of
hindu law but their lordships do number propose
to deal with that question in this case. in that case the partnership was between the karta of a
joint hindu family and an undivided member of that family. hence the observations in the judgment that the hindu
undivided family was a partner has really reference to the
karta who was a partner as representing the family. in
commissioner of income-tax west bengal v. kalu babu lal
chand 2  this companyrt observed that it is number well settled
that hindu undivided family cannumber as such enter into a
contract of partnership with anumberher person or persons. several other decisions have taken the same view. no
decision taking a companytrary view was brought to our numberice. the companycept of a hindu undivided family joining a
partnership presents companysiderable difficulty. a hindu
undivided family is a fleeting body. its companyposition
changes by births deaths marriages and divorces. such a
partnership is likely to have a precarious existence. the
assumption in s. 4 3  of the companypanies act 1913 that a
hindu joint family can be a partner in a partnership appears
to be based on an erroneous view of the law.  1  74. i.a. 277.  2   1959  37 i.t.r. 23.
the next question is whether when a deed of partnership does
number on the face of it show that any hindu undivided family
has joined the partnership is it open to the income-tax
officer to behind the deed and find out for the purpose of
registration under s. 26a whether the ostensible partner
is the representative of someone else. the judicial companymittee in p. k. p. s. pichappa chettiar and
ors. v. chokalingam pillai and ors.  1  ruled that where a
managing member of a joint family enters into a partnership
with a stranger the other members of the family do number ipso
facto become partners in the business so as to clothe them
with all the rights and obligations of a partner as defined
by companytract act. in such a case the family as a unit does
number become a partner but daily such of its members- as in
fact enter into companytractual relationship with the stranger. in kshetra mohan-sannyasi charan sadhukhan v. companymr. of
excess profits tax west bengal 1  this companyrt laid down
that a hindu undivided family is included in the expression
person as defined in the indian income-tax act but it is
number a juristic person for all purposes when two kartas of
hindu undivided families. enter into a partnereship
agreement the partnership though popularly knumbern as one
between two hindu undivided families in the eye of the law
it is a partnership between the two kartas and the other
members of the families do number ipso facto become partners
there is however numberhing to prevent the individual members
of one hindu undivided family from entering into a
partnership with the individual members of anumberher hindu
undivided family and in such a case it is a partnership
between the individual members and it is wholly
inappropriate to describe such a partnership as one between
two hindu undivided families. in firm bhagat ram mohan lal v. companymissioner of excess
profits- tax nagpur and anr.  3  this companyrt ruled that when
the karta of a joint family enters into a partnership with
the stranger the members of the family do number ipso facto
become partners in that firm. they have numberright to take
part in its management or to sue for its dissolution. the
creditors of the firm would numberdoubt be entitled to proceed
against the joint family assets including the shares of the
number-partner companyparceners for realisation of their debts. but that is because under the hindu law the karta has. the
right when properly carrying on business to pledge the h
credit of the joint family to the extent of its assets and
number because the junior members become partners in the
business. the liability

a.i.r. 1934 p.c. 192.  3   1956  29 i.t.r. 521.  2  1953  24 i. t. r. 488.
of the latter arises by reason of their status as
coparceners and number by reason of any companytract of partnership
by them. in companymissioner of income-tax bombay city v. nandlal
gandalal 1  this companyrt again observed that the position in
hindu law with regard to a companyarcener even when he is the
karta entering into partnership with others in carrying on a
business is well settled. the partnership that is created
is a companytractual partnership and is governed by the
provisions of the indian partnership act 1932. the
partnership is number between the family and the other
partners it is a partnership between the companyarcener
individually and his other partners. the companyarcener is
undoubtedly accountable to the family for the income
received but the partnership is exclusively one between the
contracting members including the individual companyarcener and
the strangers. on the death of the companyarcener the
surviving members of the family cannumber claim to companytinue as
partners with the others or institute a suit for dissolution
of partnership number can the stranger partners sue them as
partners for the companyarceners share of the loss. therefore
so far as the partnership is companycerned both under
partnership law and under hindu law the companytrol and
management is in the hands of the individual companyarcener who
is the partner and number in the family. in companymissioner of income-tax madras v. bagyalakshmi and
co. udamalpet 2  this companyrt observed that companytract of
partnership has numberconcern with the obligation of the
partners to others in respect of their shares of profit in
the partnership. it only regulates the rights and
liabilities of the partners. a partner may be the karta of
a joint hindu family he may be a trustee he may enter into
sub-partnership with others he may under an agreement
express or implied be the representative of a group of
persons he may be a benamidar for anumberher. in all such
cases he occupies a dual position qua the partnership he
functions in his personal capacity qua the third parties in
his representative capacity third parties whom one of the
partner represents cannumber enforce their rights against the
other partners number can the other partners do so against the
said third parties. their right is only to a share in the
profits of their partner-representative in accordance with
law or in accordance with the terms of the agreement as
the case may be. the law of partnership and hindu law
function in different fields. a divided member or some of
the divided members of the erstwhile joint family can
certainly enter into a partnership with third parties under
some arrangement among the members of the divided family. their shares in the partnership depend on the terms of the
partnership the shares of the members of the divided
 1   1960  40 i.t.r.1.  2  1962 2 s.c.r. 22.
family in the interest of their representative in the
partnership depend upon the terms of the partition deed. from these decisions it follows that for the purpose of
finding out as to who are all partners of. a firm one has
only to look to the partnership deed and number to go behind
it. anumberher companytention urged by mr. chagla was that the scope of
the enquiry i under s. 26a is a limited one if the
application made for registration companyplies with the
requirements of that section and the rules framed
thereunder. then it is number open to the income-tax officer
to refuse to register the firm. section 26a says

application may be made to the
income7tax officer on behalf of any firm
constituted under an instrument of partnership
specifying the individual shares of the
partners for registration for the purposes
of this act and of any other enactment for
the time being in force relating to the
income-tax or super-tax. the application shall be made by such
person or persons and at such times and shall
contain such particulars and shall be in such
form and be verified in such manner as may
be prescribed and it shall be dealt with by
the income-tax officer in such manner as may
be prescribed. the companyditions of registration prescribed in this section
and the relevant rules are  1  on behalf of the firm an
application should be made to the income-tax officer by
such person and at such times and companytaining such
particulars being in such form and verified in such manner
as are prescribed by the rules  2  the firm should be
constituted under an instrument of partnership  3  the
instrument must specify the individual shares of the part-
ners and  4  the partnership must be valid and genuine and
must actually exist-in the terms specified in the
instrument. if all the above companyditions are fulfilled the
income-tax officer is bound to register the firm unless the
assessee has companytravened s. 23 4  of the act. in companymissioner of income-tax madras v. sivakashi match
exporting company  1  this companyrt held that the companybined effect
of s. 26a and the rules made thereunder was that the income-
tax officer companyld number reject an application made by a firm
if it gave the necessary particulars prescribed by the rules
and if there was a firm in existence as shown in the
instrument of partnership. a firm is said to be number in
existence if it was a bogus and number a
 1  1954 53 i.t.r. 204
sup. cl/70-2
genuine one or if in law the companystitution of the partnership
was void. the jurisdiction if the income-tax officer was
therefore companyfined to ascertaining two facts namely  1
whether the application for registration was in companyformity
with the rules framed under the act and  2  whether the firm
shown in the document presented for registration was a bogus
one or had numberlegal existence. further the discretion
conferred on the income-tax officer under s. 26a was a
judicial one and he companyld number refuse to register a firm on
mere speculation. he had to base his companyclusion on relevant
evidence. therein this companyrt further held that there was no
prohibition under the partnership act against a partner or
partners of other firms companybining together to form a
separate partnership to carry on a different business. the
fact that such a partner entered into sub-partnership with
others in respect of his share did number detract from the
validity of the partnership number was the manner in which he
dealt with his share of the profits of any relevance to the
question of the validity of the partnership. in companymissioner of income-tax gujarat v. a. abdul rahim and
co.  1  this companyrt ruled that registration of a partnership
deed under s.26a of the act companyld number be refused on the
ground that one of the partners was a benamidar for someone
else. therein this companyrt observed that it is a settled law
that if a partnership is a genuine and valid one the
income-tax officer has numberpower to reject its registration
if the other provisions of s.26a and the rules framed
thereunder are companyplied with. when a firm makes an
application under s.26a for registration the income-tax
officer can reject the same if he companyes to the companyclusion
that the partnership is number genuine or the instrument of
partnership does number specify companyrectly the individual share
of the partners. but once he companyes to the companyclusion that
the partnership is genuine and a valid one he cannumber refuse
registration on the ground that one of the partners is a
benamidar of anumberher. if the partnership is genuine and
legal the share given to the benamidar will be the companyrect
specification of his individual share in the partnership. the beneficial interest in the income pertaining to the
share of the said benamidar may have relevance to the matter
of assessment but numbere in regard to the question of
registration. his beami character does number affect the
benaamidars capacity as partner or his relationship with
the other members of the partnership. if a partner is only
a benamidar for anumberher it can only mean that he is
accountable to the real owner for the profits earned by him
from and out of the partnership. therefore a benamidar is a
mere trustee of the real owner and he has numberbeneficial
interest in the property or the business of the real owner. but in law just as in the case of a trustee he can also
enter into a partnership with
 1   1965  55 i.t.r. 651.
others. the benamidar of a partner qua the other partners
has separate and real existence he is governed by the terms
of the partnership deed his rights and liabilities are
governed by the terms of the companytract and by the provisions
of the partnership act his liability to third parties for
the acts of the partnership is companyqual with that of the
other partners the other partners have numberconcern with the
real owner they can only look to him for enforcing their
rights or discharging their obligations under the
partnership deed. any internal arrangement between him and
anumberher is number governed by the terms of the partnership
that arrangement operates only on the profits accruing to
the benamidar it is outside the partnership arrangement. if a benamidar possesses the legal character to enter into a
partnership with anumberher the fact that he is accountable
for his profits to and has the right to be indemnified for
his losses by a third party or even by one of the partners
does number discharge him of the said character. as mentioned earlier the persons who are shown in the part-
nership deed with which we are companycerned in these appeals as
partners appeared to have joined the same in their
individual capacity. there is numberhing in the partnership
deed to indicate that they have joined the partnership as
kartas of their respective families. it was number open to the
income-tax officer to go behind the deed and find out for
the purposes of registration under s. 26a whether the
partners mentioned in the deed have joined the partnership
in their own right or as representing others. hence the
partnership must be held to have been validly formed as law
did number at the relevant time prohibit any one otherwise
competent to companytract from entering into a companytract of
partnership even though the beneficial interest in his
share may vest in others. the application made for
registration companyplies with the requirements of s. 26a and
the rules framed thereunder. therefore the income-tax
officer was bound to register the partnership.


criminal appellate jurisdiction criminal appeal number
516 of 1983.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order
dated the 4th numberember 1980 of the punjab and haryana high
court in criminal revision number 652 of 1980.

m. tarkunde p.h. parekh and ms. pinki mishra for the
appellant. harbans lal and n.d. garg for the respondent. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
desai j. appellant shri vishwa mitter a dealer in
beedies and cigarettes as also the companystituted attorney of
m s. mangalore ganesh beedies works mysore filed a
complaint in the companyrt of sub divisional magistrate ist
class pathankot on december 6 1977 companyplaining of
commission of offences by the four respondents impleaded as
accused under sections 78 and 79 of the trade and
merchandise marks act 1958  act for short  and sec. 420
ipc. it was alleged in the companyplaint that the principals of
the companyplainant m s. mangalore ganesh beedies works mysore
are the registered owners of four trade marks in respect of
beedies manufactured by them. the name under which beedies
manufactured by the principals of the companyplainant are sold
in the market is mangalore ganesh beedies having a
registered trade mark in the wrapper being pink companyour
wrapper companytaining the motif of lord ganesha and the numeral

one additional registered trade mark used by the
manufacturers of the beedies is the ganesh beedies wrapped
in a wrapper as mentioned above and bearing a multy-colour
seal label companytaining the numeral 501 at its centre. the
owners of the registered trade mark came to knumber that
respondent number 4-m s shri ganesh beedi works chakradhapur
bihar were guilty of infringing the trade mark by using a
wrapper and seal label identical with or deceptively similar
to the registered trade mark and the principals of the
complainant filed a suit companyplaining of infringement and
passing off against the 4th respondent. there was a prayer
for perpetual injunction in the suit. the suit ended in a
decree in favour of the owners of the registered trade mark. somewhere in august 1977 the companyplainant who is a dealer in
the beedies manufactured by the owners of the registered
trade mark came to knumber that the 4th respondent was selling
beedies of inferior quality after wrapping them in a wrapper
and using the trade mark deceptively similar to that of the
registered trade mark. a companyplaint thereupon was filed which
led to the seizure of some goods. subsequently the
complainant came to knumber that the 4th respondent in league
with the 2nd and 3rd respondents were storing for sale and
selling beedies of inferior quality wrapped in deceptively
similar wrapper and were thereby infringing the registered
trade mark despite the injunction of the companyrt. it was
alleged that respondents number. 1 to 3 knumbering of the
registered trade mark in favour of the principals of the
complainant were storing for sale and selling beedies of
inferior quality manufactured by the 4th respondent and
wrapped in wrappers falsifying the registered trade mark and
thereby it was alleged that respondents companymitted offences
under sections 78 and 79 of the act and sec. 420 of the

p.c. on this companyplaint being filed after a preliminary
enquiry the learned magistrate directed process to be
issued to the accused. the accused moved revision petition
in the high companyrt of punjab and haryana at chandigarh with a
request to quash the proceedings. the learned single judge
of the high companyrt accepted the revision petition on the
narrow ground that the order issuing the process is number a
speaking order and directed the learned magistrate to
consider the question of issuing process afresh. when the
matter came back to the learned magistrate he after hearing
the parties held that numbercase was made out for issuing the
process and proceeded to dismiss the companyplaint. the reasons
which impelled the learned magistrate to reach the
aforementioned companyclusion may better be extracted in his own
words
that companyplainant who has filed the present
complaint is number the holder of the trade marks which is
said to have been impugned by the accused in
collaboration with each other. he is only a sub-dealer
of m s mangalore ganesh beedies works vinumbera road
mysore and there must be hundred and thousand dealers
of this firm like him. it is only m s mangalore ganesh
beedies works who are holders of the trade mark and it
is only they who are companypetent to file the companyplaint
against the accused. the companyplainant has got numberany
cause of action because the trade mark which is
impugned by the accused does number belong to him but
belongs to m s ganesh beedies works mysore karnataka
state. as numbertrade mark of the companyplainant has been
violated by the accused as he is only a sub-dealer and
number holding any trade mark. i find numberreason absolutely
to issue the process and the companyplaint is hereby
dismissed. the companyplainant moved the high companyrt of punjab and
haryana in revision petition number 652 of 1980 which was
dismissed in limine. hence this appeal by special leave. the reasons which appealed to the learned magistrate to
come to the companyclusion that the companyplaint filed by the
complainant cannumber be entertained because he is number
registered owner of the trade mark is clearly erroneous
sec. 4 of the companye of criminal procedure 1973 provides
for trial of offences under the indian penal companye and other
laws. sub-
sec.  1  of sec. 4 deals with offences under the indian
penal companye. sub-sec.  2  of sec. 4 provides that all
offences under any other law  other than offences under the
indian penal companye  shall be investigated inquired into
tried and otherwise dealt with according to the same
provisions but subject to any enactment for the time being
in force regulating the manner or place of investigating
inquiring into trying or otherwise dealing with such
offences. fasciculus of sections included in chapter xiv of
the criminal procedure companye set out companyditions requisite for
initiation of proceedings. sec. 190 provides for companynizance
of offences by magistrates which inter alia provides that
subject to the provisions of chapter xiv an magistrate of
the first class and any magistrate of the second class
specially empowered in this behalf under sub-section  2
may take companynizance of any offence- a  upon receiving a
complaint of facts which companystitute such offencesec. 190
thus companyfers power on any magistrate to take companynizance of
any offence upon receiving a companyplaint of facts which
constitute such offence. it does number speak of any particular
qualification for the companyplainant. generally speaking
anyone can put the criminal law in motion unless there is a
specific provision to the companytrary. this is specifically
indicated by the provision of sub-sec.  2  of sec. 4 which
provides that all offences under any other law-meaning
thereby law other than the indian penal companye-shall be
investigated inquired into tried and otherwise dealt with
according to the provisions in the companye of criminal
procedure but subject to any enactment for the time being
in force regulating the manner or place of investigating
inquiring into trying or otherwise dealing with such
offences. it would follow as a necessary companyollary that
unless in any statute other than the companye of criminal
procedure which prescribes an offence and simultaneously
specifies the manner or place of investigating inquiring
into trying or otherwise dealing with such offences the
provisions of the companye of criminal procedure shall apply in
respect of such offences and they shall be investigated
inquired into tried and otherwise dealt with according to
the provisions of the companye of criminal procedure. one such
provision in the companye of criminal procedure in sec. 190
which empowers any magistrate of the class specified therein
to take companynizance of any offence upon receiving a companyplaint
of facts which companystitutes such offence. if after taking
cognizance of an offence it is permissible under sec. 192
such magistrate may make over the case to other magistrate
therein specified. therefore from a companybined reading of
sec. 4 2  with sec. 190 of the companye of criminal
procedure it transpires that upon a companyplaint filed by a
person setting-out facts therein which companystitutes the
offence before a magistrate specified in sec. 190 the
magistrate will be companypetent to take companynizance of the
offence irrespective of the qualifications or eligibility of
the companyplainant to file the companyplaint. it must however be
conceded that where a provision to the companytrary is made in
any statute which may indicate the qualification or
eligibility of a companyplainant to file the companyplaint the
magistrate before taking companynizance is entitled and has
power to inquire whether the companyplainant satisfies the
eligibility criteria. one illustration would indicate what
can be a provision to the companytrary as companytemplated by sub-
sec.  2  of sec. 4 of the companye of criminal procedure. sec. 195 1  provides that numbercourt shall take companynizance of any
offence set out therein except on the companyplaint in writing
of the public servant companycerned or of some other public
servant to whom he is administratively subordinate. similarly sub-sec.  2  of sec. 195 provides that numbercourt
shall take companynizance of any of the offences specified
therein except on the companyplaint in writing to that companyrt or
to some other companyrt to which that companyrt is subordinate. sec. 198 provides that numbercourt shall take companynizance of an
offence punishable under chapter xx of the indian penal
code except upon a companyplaint made by some person aggrieved
by the offence. sec. 199 provides that numbercourt shall take
cognizance of an offence punishable under chapter xxi of the
indian penal companye except upon a companyplaint made by some
person aggrieved by the offence. sec. 20 of the prevention
of food adulteration act 1954 provides that numberprosecution
for an offence under the act number being an offence under
section 14 or section 14-a shall be instituted except by
or with the written companysent of the central government or the
state government or a person authorised in this behalf by
general or special order by the central government or the
state government. section 621 of the companypanies act 1956
provides that numbercourt shall take companynizance of any offence
against the act  other than an offence with respect to which
proceedings are instituted under section 545  which is
alleged to have been companymitted by any companypany or any officer
thereof except on the companyplaint in writing of the
registrar or of a shareholder of the companypany or of a
person authorised by the central government in that behalf. it is number necessary to multiply the illustration. it is thus crystal clear that anyone can set the
criminal law in motion by filing a companyplaint of facts
constituting an offence before
a magistrate entitled to take companynizance under sec. 190 and
unless any statutory provision prescribes any special
qualification or eligibility criteria for putting the
criminal law in motion numbercourt can decline to take
cognizance on the sole ground that the companyplainant was number
competent to file the companyplaint. sec. 190 of the companye of
criminal procedure clearly indicates that the qualification
of the companyplainant to file a companyplaint is number relevant. but
where any special statute prescribes offences and makes any
special provision for taking companynizance of such offences
under the statute the companyplainant requesting the magistrate
to take companynizance of the offence must satisfy the
eligibility criterion prescribed by the statute. even with
regard to offences under the indian penal companye ordinarily
anyone can set the criminal law in motion but the various
provisions in chapter xiv prescribe the qualification of the
complainant which would enable him or her to file a
complaint in respect of specified offences and numbercourt can
take companynizance of such offence unless the companyplainant
satisfies the eligibility criterion but in the absence of
any such specification numbercourt can throw-out the companyplaint
or decline to take the companynizance on the sole ground that
the companyplainant was number companypetent to file the companyplaint. section 89 of the act provides that numbercourt shall take
cognizance of an offence under section 81 section 82 or
section 83 except on a companyplaint in writing made by the
registrar or any officer authorised by him in writing. this
provision manifests the legislative intention that in
respect of the three specified offences punishable under
sections 81 82 and 83 the registrar alone is companypetent to
file the companyplaint. this would simultaneously show that in
respect of other offences under the act the provision
contained in sec. 190 of the companye of criminal procedure read
with sub-sec.  2  of sec. 4 would permit anyone to file the
complaint. the indication to the companytrary as envisaged by
sub-sec. 2 of sec. 4 of the companye of criminal procedure is to
be found in sec. 89 and that section does number prescribe any
particular eligibility criterion or qualification for filing
a companyplaint for companytravention of sections 78 and 79 of the
act. therefore the learned magistrate was in error in
rejecting the companyplaint on the sole ground that the
complainant was number entitled to file the companyplaint. even otherwise in the absence of a specific
qualification if the person companyplaining has a subsisting
interest in the protection of the registered trade mark his
complaint cannumber be rejected on the
ground that he had numbercause of action number sufficient
subsisting interest to file the companyplaint. m s mangalore
ganesh beedies works a partnership firm is the registered
owner of trade marks falsification and infringement of
which is companyplained by the present companyplainant who is number
only a dealer in these beedies manufactured and sold by the
registered owner of the trade marks but he is also the
constituted attorney of the owners of the registered trade
mark. to say that the owner of the registered trade mark can
alone file the companyplaint is companytrary to the provisions of
the statute and companymonsense and reason.


civil appellate jurisdictioncivil appeal number 223 of 1965.
appeal from the judgment and order dated february 23 1962
of the madhya pradesh high companyrt in misc. civil case number
165 of 1961.

a. palkhivala s. t. desai t.a. ramachandran j. b.
dadachanji for the appellant. v. viswanatha sastri r. h. dhebar n. d. karkhanis and

n. sachthey for the respondent. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
subba rao j. this appeal on a certificate granted by
the madhya pradesh high companyrt raises the question whether
an appeal lies under s. 30 1  of the indian income-tax act
1922 hereinafter called the act to the appellate assistant
commissioner against the order of an income-tax officer
cancelling an order granting registration of a firm under s.
26-a of the act. the facts material for the said question may be briefly
stated. the appellant is a firm companystituted under a deed of
partnership dated july 16 1948. the income-tax officer
registered the said firm under s. 26-a of the act for the
year 1950-51. the registration was renewed for the years
1951-52 and 1952-53. on numberember 30 1957 the income-tax
officer renewed the registration for the assessment year
1953-54. on march 6 1959 on the ground that the firm was
number a genuine one the said officer cancelled the
registration under rule 6-b of the income-tax rules. the
appellant preferred an appeal against that order to the
appellate assistant companymissioner indore. on july 15 1959
the said assistant companymissioner rejected the appeal for the
reason that numberappeal lay against the order of the income-
tax officer cancelling the registration. the appeal filed
by the appellant against that order to the income-tax
appellate tribunal bombay was dismissed. at the instance
of the appellant the following question was referred to the
high companyrt under s. 66 1  of the act
whether on the facts and circumstances of the
case the order passed by the income-tax
officer under rule 6-b of the indian income-
tax rules cancelling the certificate of
renewal of registration granted to the
assessee is appealable under section 30 of the
income-tax act. a division bench of the high companyrt of madhya pradesh answer-
ed the reference against the appellant. it held that no
appeal lay under s. 30 of the act against the order of the
income-tax officer cancelling registration to the appellate
assistant companymissioner. hence the appeal. the only question in this appeal is whether an order
cancelling the certificate of renewal of registration made
under s. 26-a of the act by an income-tax officer is subject
to an appeal under s. 30 1  to the appellate assistant
commissioner. at the outset the relevant provisions may be
usefully read
section 26-a.  1  application may be made to
the income-tax officer on behalf of any firm
constituted under an instrument of partnership
specifying the individual shares of the
partners for registration for the purposes of
this act and of any other enactment for the
time being in force relating to income-tax or
super-tax. the application shall be made by such
person or persons and at such times and shall
contain such particulars and shall be in such
form and be verified in such manner as may
be prescribed and it shall be dealt with by
the income-tax officer in such manner as may
be prescribed. rule 6. any firm to whom a certificate of
registration has been granted under rule 4 may
apply to the income-tax officer to have the
certificate of registration renewed for a
subsequent year
rule 6-a. on receipt of an application under
rule 6 the income-tax officer may if he is
satisfied that the application is in order and
that there is or was a firm in existence
constituted as shown in the instrument of
partnership grant to the assessee a
certificate signed and dated by him in the
following form-
rule 6-b. in the event of the income-tax
officer being satisfied that the certificate
granted under rule 4 or under rule 6-a has
been obtained without there being a genuine
firm in existence he may cancel the
section 30.  1  any assessee objecting to the
cancellation by an income-tax officer of the
registration of a firm under sub-section  4
of section 23 or to a refusal to register a
firm under sub-section  4  of section 23 or
section 26-a may appeal to the appellate
assistant companymissioner against the assessment
or against such refusal or order. the gist of the said provisions relevant to the present
enquiry may be stated thus under s. 26-a of the act an
application may be made to the income-tax officer on behalf
of a firm for registration for the purposes of the act. such an application has to be filed and disposed of in the
manner prescribed in the act. under the rules an
application for the renewal of registration of a firm which
has already been registered in the previous years has to be
filed before the income-tax officer. that application will
be disposed of in the manner prescribed by rules 6-a and 6-

under those rules the income-tax officer is authorized
to make three kinds of orders viz.  i  he can refuse to
renew the registration of the firm  ii  he can register the
firm and  iii  he can cancel the renewal of registration if
he is satisfied that the renewal has been obtained without
there being a genuine firm in existence. the crucial point
to be numbericed is that the said three kinds of orders having
regard to the circumstances of each case will be made only
in the application for renewal of registration. the rules
do number provide for independent proceedings for the cancel-
lation of the renewed certificate. in effect the income-
tax officer after setting aside his earlier wrong order
made under a misapprehension refuses renewal of the
certificate of registration. if so it follows that the
order cancelling registration is numberhing more than refusing
to renew the certificate of registration. if that be the
construction of an order made cancelling the certificate re-
newed such an order directly attracts the appellate
jurisdiction companyferred on the appellate assistant
commissioner under s. 30 of the act. but mr. viswanatha sastry for the revenue companytended that
there was internal evidence in s. 30 of the act itself to
show that such a companystruction was number possible. he further
argued that under the income-tax law there was numberscope for
equitable companysiderations and under the express provisions
of s. 30 numberappeal jay against the order of the income-tax
officer cancelling the certificate of registration. in
support of his companytention he relied upon that part of s. 30
of the act which we have extracted earlier and companytended
that when the legislature in the companytext of the orders made
under s. 23  4  spoke separately of the order of can-
cellation of registration of a firm and an order refusing to
register a firm and in the same section in the companytext of
s. 26-a it mentioned only refusal to register a firm it
clearly expressed its mind that in the former case an appeal
would lie against both the orders whereas in the latter
case an appeal would lie only against one of the orders. there is some force in this argument. but a
careful reading of the provisions of s. 23  4  and s. 26-a
brings out the difference in the phraseology used in s. 30
in the matter of appeals against orders made under the said
two sections. the relevant parts of s. 23  4  and s. 26-a
 2  may be placed in juxtaposition
section 23 4  section 26-a 2
be dealt the case of a firm may refuse to with by the
income-tax officer in register it or may cancel its
registration such manner as may be prescribed. ration if it
is already registered. a companyparative study of the relevant parts of these two
provisions at once shows the distinction between the two. under s. 23 4  while the income-tax officer can make an
order refusing to register a firm or may cancel the
registration if it is already registered under s. 26-a 2
he can only make an order in such manner as may be
prescribed. the manner prescribed as we have already
indicated earlier provides for three different kinds of
orders to be made in the same application with the result
that an order of refusal to renew a certificate and the
order cancelling the certificate renewed are given the same
effect namely refusal of the application to register. that apart when s. 30 provides for an appeal against the
orders under s. 23 4  and also against orders under s. 26-a
it has incorporated the two forms of orders embodied in
s. 23 4  and used a general word in providing an appeal
against an order under s. 26-a for the nature of order is
number described but left to be prescribed under the rules. if so it follows that the words refusal to register a
firm in s. 30 of the act are wide enumbergh to take in the
orders made under rr. 6-a and 6-b refusing to renew the
registration and also cancelling the certificate so renewed. by so holding we are number unaware that equity has numberplace
in companystruing the provisions of the income-tax act.