criminal appellate jurisdiction criminal appeal number
2 of 1951. this was an appeal under art. 134  1   c  of the
constitution from the judgment and order of the high companyrt
of rajasthan  nawal kishore c.j. and mehta j.  dated 16th
october 1950 in criminal appeal number 63 of samvat 2005
revising an order of acquittal of the sessions judge jai-
pur in criminal appeal case number 200 of sam vat 2004 and
convicting the accused of an offence under sec. 376 of the
indian penal companye. the material facts are stated in the
judgment. n. aggarwala for the accused. s. mathur for the state of rajasthan. 1951. december 20. bose j. delivered judgment as fol-
lows. fazl ali j. agreed. bose j. -the appellant rameshwar was charged with company-
mitting rape on a young girl mst. purni eight years of age. he was companymitted to sessions and was companyvicted by the as-
sistant sessions judge sawai jaipur and sentenced to one
years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of rs. 250.
an appeal was made to the sessions judge at jaipur that
being the appropriate appellate tribunal in that area. the
learned sessions judge held that the evidence was sufficient
for moral companyviction but fell short of legal proof because
in his opinion the law requires companyroboration of the story
of the prosecution in such cases as a matter of precaution
and the companyroborative evidence in so far as it sought to
connect the appellant with the crime was legally insuffi-
cient though morally enumbergh. he was satisfied however that
the girl had been raped by somebody. accordingly he acquit-
ted the accused giving him the benefit of the doubt. the state of sawal jaipur and gangapur appealed against
the acquittal to the high companyrt at jaipur. the learned high companyrt judges held that the law requires
corroboration in such cases but held that the girls state-
ment made to her mother was legally admissible as companyrobora-
tion and companysidering that sufficient they set aside the
acquittal and restored the companyviction and sentence. the high companyrt later granted leave to appeal under
article 134  1  c  of the companystitution as the case involved
questions of law of general importance. the first point taken before us related to the admissi-
bility of the evidence of the girl herself. her age was
stated to be seven or eight years at the time of the exami-
nation by the learned assistant sessions judge who recorded
her testimony. he certified that she did number understand the
sanctity of an oath and accordingly did number administer one
to her. he did number certify that the child understood the
duty of speaking the truth. the proviso to section 5 of the indian oaths act 1873
prescribes that--provided that where the witness is a child
under twelve years of age and the companyrt or person having
authority to examine such witness is of opinion that though
he understands the duty of speaking the truth he does number
understand the nature of an oath or affirmation the forego-
ing provisions of this section and the provisions of section
6 shall number apply to such witness but in any such case the
absence of an oath or affirmation shall number render inadmis-
sible any evidence given by such witness number affect the
obligation of the witness to state the truth. the question is whether the opinion referred to must be
formally recorded or whether it can be inferred from the
circumstances in which the deposition was taken. the proviso quoted above must be read along with section
118 of the evidence act and section 13 of the oaths act. in
my opinion an omission to administer an oath even to an
adult goes only to the credibility of the witness and number
his companypetency. the question of companypetency is dealt with in
section 118. every
witness is companypetent unless the companyrt companysiders he is pre-
vented from understanding the questions put to him or from
giving rational answers by reason of tender years extreme
old age disease whether of body or mind or any other cause
of the same kind. it will be observed that there is always
competency in fact unless the companyrt companysiders otherwise. no
other ground of incompetency is given therefore unless the
oaths act adds additional grounds of incompetency it is
evident that section 118 must prevail. number the oaths act does number deal with companypetency. its
main object is to render persons who give false evidence
liable to prosecution. it is true a subsidiary object is to
bring home to the witness the solemnity of the occasion and
to impress upon him the duty of speaking the truth but in
view of section 118 these matters only touch credibility and
number admissibility. in my opinion section 13 of the oaths
act places this beyond doubt. it states--
numberomission to take any oath or make any
affirmation and numberirregularity whatever in the
form in which any one of them is administered shall invali-
date any proceeding or render inadmissible any evidence
whatever
section 5 is the main provision regarding the adminis-
tration of oaths. the proviso only sets out the cases in
which the oath is number to be administered. if therefore an
omission to take the oath does number affect the admissibility
of the evidence it follows that irregularity of the kind we
are companysidering which arises out of the proviso cannumber
affect the admissibility either. section 118 remains and
unless the judge companysiders otherwise the witness is companype-
tent. i do number think it will be useful to companysider english
authorities on the point because we are governed here by the
terms of the various sections i have referred to. but a
decision of the judicial companymittee of the privyi companyncil is
in point. their lordships stated in mohamed sugal esa v.
the king 1  --

a.i.r. 1946 p.c. 3 at 5
section 13 oaths act is quite unqualified in its
terms and there is numberhing to suggest that it is to apply
only where the omission to administer the oath occurs per
incuriam. if that had been the intention of the legislature
it would have been simple to insert words in the section to
that effect it may be observed that this question
can numberlonger arise in india because in 1939 the legislature
passed the oaths  amendment  act  act xxxix of 1939  which
settles the law in accordance with the bengal and oudh
decisions referred to above. the decisions to which their lordships refer are and ram
samujh v. emperor 2 . the decisions there were that the
section being unqualified in terms did apply to a case where
the companyrt accepted the evidence of a child to whom the oath
was number administered on the ground that the witness did number
understand its nature. the principle of the decisions ap-
plies here because as their lordships observe the section
is unqualified in its terms. i would add however that it is desirable that judges and
magistrates should always record their opinion that the
child understands the duty of speaking the truth and state
why they think that otherwise the credibility of the wit-
ness may be seriously affected so much so that in some
cases it may be necessary to reject the evidence altogether. but whether the magistrate or judge really was of that
opinion can i think be gathered from the circumstances
when there is numberformal certificate. in the present case
it is plain that the learned judge had the proviso in mind
because he certified that the witness does number understand
the nature of an oath and so did number administer one but
despite that went on to take her evidence. it is also an
important fact that the accused who was represented by
counsel did number object. had he raised the point the judge
would doubtless have made good the omission. i am of opinion
that mst. purni was a companypetent witness and that her evi-
dence is admissible. in
 1  14 beng. l.r. 294 f.n.  2   1907  10 o.c. 337
the privy companyncil case which i have just cited their lord-
ships said--
it is number to be supposed that any judge would accept as
a witness a person who he companysidered was incapable number only
of understanding the nature of an oath but also the necessi-
ty of speaking the truth when examined as a witness. that is the very point here. one can presume that the
learned judge had that in mind from the fact that he exam-
ined the child after referring to a fact which arises out of
the proviso. as regards her credibility the learned trial judge who
recorded her evidence and saw her in the box has believed
her so has the high companyrt and it is important to numbere that
the learned sessions judge who acquitted the accused has number
disbelieved her. on the companytrary he says he is morally
convinced. all he says is that in the absence of companyrobora-
tion it will be unsafe to companyvict because the privy companyncil
and other cases advise companyroboration as a matter of pru-
dence. we were taken carefully through the evidence as elabo-
rately as in a companyrt of first appeal. i am of opinion that
the learned high companyrt judges were fully justified in ac-
cepting the evidence of purni and in believing her mother
mst. ghisi. i companysider it unnecessary to recapitulate their
reasons. after the careful analysis given by three companyrts
it is sufficient to say that i agree with the learned high
court judges. we are left therefore with the questions of
law. the first question is whether the law requires companyrobo-
ration in these cases. number the evidence act number here says
so. on the other hand when dealing with the testimony of
an accomplice though it says in section 114  b  that the
court may presume that an accomplice is unworthy of credit
unless he is companyroborated in material particulars it makes
it clear in section 133 that-
an accomplice shall be a companypetent witness against an
accused person and a companyviction is number
illegal merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated
testimony of an accomplice. number a woman who has been raped is number an accomplice. if she was ravished she is the victim of an outrage. if she
consented there is numberoffence unless she is a married woman
in which case questions of adultery may arise. but adultery
presupposes companysent and so is number on the same footing as
rape. in the case of a girl who is below the age of companysent
her companysent will number matter so far as the offence of rape is
concerned but if she companysented her testimony will natural-
ly be as suspect as that of an accomplice. so also in the
case of unnatural offences. but in all these cases a large
volume of case law has grown up which treats the evidence of
the companyplainant somewhat along the same lines as accomplice
evidence though often for widely differing reasons and the
position number reached is that the rule about companyroboration
has hardened into one of law. but it is important to under-
stand exactly what the rule is and what the expression
hardened into a rule of law means. in my judgment this branch of the law is the same as in
england and i am of opinion that the lucid exposition of it
given by lord reading the lord chief justice of england in
the king v. baskerville 1  cannumber be bettered. in that case baskerville had been companyvicted of having
committed acts of gross indecency with the two boys.  there
the boys were accomplices because they were freely companysent-
ing parties and there was numberuse of force . the learned
chief justice says at page 663 -
there is numberdoubt that the uncorroborated evidence of
an accomplice is admissible in law but it has long
been a rule of practice at companymon law for the judge to warn
the jury of the danger of companyvicting a prisoner on the
uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice or accomplices
and in the discretion of the judge to advise them number to
convict upon such evidence but the judge should point out
to the jury that it is
 1  1916 2 k.b 658.
within their legal province to companyvict upon such unconfirmed
evidence
this rule of practice has become virtually equivalent to
a rule of law and since the companyrt of criminal appeal came
into operation this companyrt has held that in the absence of
such a warning by the judge the companyviction must be
quashed if after the proper caution by the judge the
jury nevertheless companyvict the prisoner this companyrt will number
quash the companyviction merely upon the ground that the accom-
plices testimony was uncorroborated. that in my opinion is exactly the law in india so far
as accomplices are companycerned and it is certainly number any
higher in the case of sexual offences. the only clarifica-
tion necessary for purposes of this companyntry is where this
class of offence is sometimes tried by a judge without the
aid of a jury. in these cases it is necessary that the
judge should give some indication in his judgment that he
has had this rule of caution in mind and should proceed to
give reasons for companysidering it unnecessary to require
corroboration on the facts of the particular case before him
and show why he companysiders it safe to companyvict without companyrob-
oration in that particular case. i am of opinion that the
learned high companyrt judges were wrong in thinking that they
could number as a matter of law companyvict without companyrobora-
tion. there is a class of cases which companysiders that though
corroboration should ordinarily be required in the case of a
grown-up woman it is unnecessary in the case of a child of
tender years. bishram. v. emperor 1  is typical of that
point of view. on the other hand the privy companyncil has
said in mohamed sugal esa v. the king 2  that as a matter of
prudence a companyviction should number ordinarily be based on the
uncorroborated evidence of a child witness. in my opinion
the true rule is that in every case of this type the rule
about the advisability of companyroboration should be present to
the mind of the judge. in a jury case he must tell the

a.i.r. 1944 nag. 363.  2  a.i.r. 1946 p.c. 3 at 5.
jury of it and in a number-jury case he must show that it is
present to his mind by indicating that in his judgment. but
he should also point out that companyroboration can be dispensed
with if in the particular circumstances of the case before
him either the jury or when there is numberjury he himself
is satisfied that it is safe to do so. the rule which
according to the cases has hardened into one of law is number
that companyroboration is essential before there can be a company-
viction but that the necessity of companyroboration as a matter
of prudence except where the circumstances make it safe to
dispense with it must be present to the mind of the judge
and in jury cases must find place in the charge before a
conviction without companyroboration can be sustained. the
tender years of the child companypled with other circumstances
appearing in the case such for example as its demeanumberr
unlikelihood of tutoring and so forth may render companyrobora-
tion unnecessary but that is a question of fact in every
case. the only rule of law is that this rule of prudence
must be present to the mind of the judge or the jury as the
case may be and be understood and appreciated by him or
them. there is numberrule of practice that there must in every
case be companyroboration before a companyviction can be allowed
to stand. i turn next to the nature and extent of the companyrobora-
tion required when it is number companysidered safe to dispense
with it. here again the rules are lucidly expounded by
lord reading in baskervilles case 1  at pages 664 to 669.
it would be impossible. indeed it would be dangerous to
formulate the kind of evidence which should or would be
regarded as companyroboration. its nature and extent must
necessarily vary with circumstances of each case and also
according to the particular circumstances of the offence
charged. but to this extent the rules are clear. first it is number necessary that there should be inde-
pendent companyfirmation of every material circumstance in the
sense that the independent evidence in the case apart from
the testimony of the companyplainant or the
 1  1916 2 k.b. 658
accomplice should in itself be sufficient to sustain company-
viction. as lord reading says--
indeed if it were required that the accomplice should
be companyfirmed in every detail of the crime his evidence
would number be essential to the case it would be merely
confirmatory of other and independent testimony. all that is required is that there must be some addi-
tional evidence rendering it probable that the story of the
accomplice  or companyplainant  is true and that it is reasona-
bly safe to act upon it. secondly the independent evidence must number only make it
safe to believe that the crime was companymitted but must in
some way reasonably companynect or tend to companynect the accused
with it by companyfirming in some material particular the testi-
mony of the accomplice or companyplainant that the accused
committed the crime. this does number mean that the companyrobora-
tion as to identity must extend to all the circumstances
necessary to identify the accused with the offence. again
all that is necessary is that there should be independent
evidence which will make it reasonably safe to believe the
witnesss story that the accused was the one or among
those who companymitted the offence. the reason for this part
of the rule is that--
a man who has been guilty of a crime himself will
always be able to relate the facts of the case and if the
confirmation be only on the truth of that history without
identifying the persons that is really numbercorroboration at
allit would number at all tend to show that the party ac-
cused participated in it. thirdly the companyroboration must companye from independent
sources and thus ordinarily the testimony of one accomplice
would number be sufficient to companyroborate that of anumberher. but
of companyrse the circumstances may be such as to make it safe
to dispense with the necessity of companyroboration and in those
special circumstances a companyviction so based would number be
illegal. i say this because it was companytended that the
mother in this case was number an independent source. fourthly the companyroboration need number be direct evidence
that the accused companymitted the crime. it is sufficient if
it is merely circumstantial evidence of his companynection with
the crime. were it otherwise many crimes which are usually
committed between accomplices in secret such as incest
offences with females  or unnatural offences  companyld never
be brought to justice. next i turn to anumberher aspect of the case. the
learned high companyrt judges have used mst. purnis statement
to her mother as companyroboration of her statement. the ques-
tion arises can the previous statement of an accomplice or
a companyplainant be accepted as companyroboration ? that the evidence is legally admissible as evidence of
conduct is indisputable because of illustration  j  to
section 8 of the evidence act which is in these terms
the question is whether a was ravished. the facts
that shortly after the alleged rape she made a companyplaint
relating to the crime the circumstances under which and
the terms in which the companyplaint was made are relevant. but that is number the whole problem. for we are companycerned
here number only with its legal admissibility and relevancy as
to companyduct but as to its admissibility for a particular
purpose namely companyroboration. the answer to that is to be
found in section 157 of the evidence act which lays down the
law for india. section 157 states that---
in order to companyroborate the testimony of a witness any
former statement made by such witness relating to the same
fact at or about the time when the fact took place or
before any authority legally companypetent to investigate the
fact may be proved. the section makes numberexceptions therefore provided
the companydition prescribed that is to say at or about the
time etc. are fulfilled there can be numberdoubt that such a
statement is legally admissible in india as companyroboration. the weight to be attached to it is of companyrse anumberher
matter and it may be that in some
cases the evidentiary value of two statements emanating from
the same tainted source may number be high but in view of
section 118 its legal admissibility as companyroboration cannumber
be questioned. to state this is however numbermore than to
emphasise that there is numberrule of thumb in these cases. when companyroborative evidence is produced it also has to be
weighed and in a given case as with other evidence even
though it is legally admissible for the purpose on hand its
weight may be nil. on the other hand seeing that companyrobo-
ration is number essential to a companyviction companyduct of this
kind may be more than enumbergh in itself to justify acceptance
of the companyplainants story. it all depends on the facts of
the case. in the present case mst. purni told her mother
about the incident about four hours after it occurred. the
reason for the delay was that her mother was number at home
when she went there. she says that when she went home she
lay down and went to sleep and that when her mother returned
she asked her why she was sleeping and then she told her
mother what had happened. her mother tells much the same
story. she says she had gone out to her field in the morning
and did number return till about 4 p.m. when she reach home she
found her daughter lying there weeping. she has been be-
lieved by the learned trial judge as also by the high companyrt
and has number been disbelieved by the learned sessions judge. all he says is that she is number an independent witness and
is therefore number sufficient for companyroboration. the first question is whether this delay fulfills the
at or about companydition. in my opinion here also there can
be numberhard and fast rule. the main test is whether the
statement was made as early as can reasonably be expected in
the circumstances of the case and before there was opportu-
nity for tutoring or companycoction. it was suggested that the
child companyld have companyplained to some women who were working
in the neighbourhood but that would number be natural in a
child. she would be frightened and her first instinct would
be to run home to her mother. the high companyrt
was satisfied on these points and so am i. companysequently
the matter does fall within the ambit of section 157 read
with section 8 illustration  j . the next question is whether the mother can be regard-
ed as an independent witness. so far as this case is company-
cerned i have numberdoubt on that score. it may be that all
mothers may number be sufficiently independent to fulfill the
requirements of the companyroboration rule but there is numberlegal
bar to exclude them from its operation merely on the ground
of their relationship. independent merely means
independent of sources which are likely to be tainted. in
the absence of enmity against the accused there is numberreason
why she should implicate him falsely. it is true the ac-
cused suggested that they were on bad terms but that has number
been believed by anyone. the third question is whether there is independent
corroboration companynecting the accused with the crime. the
only companyroboration relied on for that is the previous state-
ment of the child to her mother. that might number always be
enumbergh but this rule can be waived in a given case just as
much as the necessity for any companyroboration at all. in the
present case the learned high companyrt judges would have acted
on the uncorroborrated testimony of the girl had they number
felt pressed by the companyroboration rule. viewing all the
circumstances i am satisfied that the high companyrt was right.


civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 804 of 1962.
appeal by special leave from the order dated april 11 1962
of the gujarat high companyrtin civil revision application number
335 of 1962.

c. setalvad and i. n. shroff for the appellant. t. desai j. b. dadachanji o. c. mathur and ravinder
narain for the respondents. 1963 january 18. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered
by
gajendragadkar j.-this appeal by special leave raises a
short question about the companystruction of section 17 of the
bombay rents. hotel and lodging house rates companytrol act
1947  number 57 of 1947  hereinafter called the act . the said
question arises in this way. the appellant krishanlal
ishwarlal desai is the landlord who owns an open plot of
land named hathi khada in kalaswadi town in the district of
surat. the said plot measures 32406 sq. ft. this plot was
in the possession of the respondents bai vijkor others as
tenants. in 1951 the appellant sued the respondents in
ejectment. he claimed that under s. 13  1   g  and  i  of
the act he was entitled to recover possession of the
premises companysisting of the open plot in question. this
claim was resisted by the respondents. the trial companyrt held
that the appellant had number established his case under s. 13
 1   i  but had proved his claim under s. 13  1   g . having recorded i this finding the trial companyrt
proceeded to examine the extent of the requirement proved by
the appellant. section 13  1   g  provides inter alia that
numberwithstanding anything companytained in the act a landlord
shall be entitled to recover possession of any premises if
the companyrt is satisfied that the premises are reasonably and
bona fied required by the landlord for occupation by
himself. section 13  1   i  provides that the landlord
would be similarly entitled to recover possession if the
premises being land they are reasonably and bonafide
required by the landlord for the erection of a new building. the trial companyrt found that the requirement of the appellant
would be adequately met if he is given a decree for the
possession of 2/3rds of the plot in suit. accordingly a
decree was passed in his favour to that extent on march 16
1955.
this decree was challenged both by the appellant and the
respondents by cross-appeals in the district companyrt. the
district companyrt held that the view taken by the trial companyrt
was substantially right and there was numberreason to interfere
with the decree passed by it. in the result both the
appeals were dismissed on april 28 1956.
the appellant then filed an execution application and
obtained possession of 2/3rds of the premises in question on
june 29 1957. it appears that at the trial the
appellants case was that he wanted the said premises for
the purpose of his timber business. eventually however
the appellant occupied the said premises on october 24
1957 number for carrying on his timber business but for
storing or stocking materials of sanitary works and building
contracts which business he had started in partnership on
that day. the appellant had companystructed a shed for the
watchmen to look after the articles which were stored on the
open plot. on july 29 1958 the respondents applied under s. 17  1  of
the act to the trial companyrt to obtain
possession of the said premises on the ground that the
appellant had failed to occupy the said premises within a
period of one month from the date when he recovered
possession as required by s. 17  1 . the trial companyrt held
that the respondents had failed to make out a case under s.
17  1  and so their application was dismissed. the respondents then preferred a revisional application in
the district companyrt. this revisional application was treated
as an appeal because the order passed by the trial companyrt was
applicable. the district companyrt held that the appellant had
failed to occupy the premises within the period prescribed
by s. 17  1  and so the respondents were entitled to an
order against the appellant for the possession of the said
premises. this order was challenged by the appellant by
preferring a revisional application before the high companyrt of
gujarat. the revisional application was however summarily
dismissed. it is this revisional decision of the high companyrt
of gujarat that has given rise to the present appeal and
the only question which is raised for our decision is about
the companystruction of s. 17  1  of the act. we have already seen that s. 13 provides for cases where the
landlord is entitled to-recover possession of the premises
from the tenant and that the appellant in fact obtained a
decree for possession under s. 13  1   g  on the ground that
2/3rds of the premises were reasonably and bonafide required
by him for occupation by himself. the respondents case is
that under s. 17  1  it was obligatory on the appellant to
occupy the premises within one month after june 29 1957
when possession was delivered to him in execution
proceedings since he had failed to companyply with this
requirement they became entitled to obtain back possession
of the said premises and as the present application had
been made by them within 13 months from june 29 1957 as
required by s. 17  1  an order for possession ought to be
passed in their favour. the appellant on the other hand
contends that the stipulation as to the period of one month
on which the respondents relied does number apply to the case
of occupation which would arise in the case of a decree
passed under s. 13  1   g . the said period applies to the
case of a decree passed under s. 13  1   i  that is how the
controversy between the parties raises the question of
construction of s. 17  1 . let us number read s. 17  1 . section 17  1  reads as under -
where a decree for eviction has been passed
by the companyrt on the ground specified in clause
 g  or  i  of sub-section  1  of s. 13 and the
premises are number occupied or the work of erec-
tion is number companymenced within a period of one
month from the date the landlord recovers
possession or the premises are relet within
one year of the said date to any person other
than the original tenant the companyrt may on the
application of the original tenant made
within thirteen months of such date order the
landlord to place in occupation of the
premises on the original terms and companyditions
and on such order being made the landlord
and any person who may be in occupation of the
premises shall give vacant possession to the
original tenant. it is clear that when s. 17  1  refers to the requirement
that the premises must be occupied by the landlord the
occupation intended by the provision is different from
possession because the first clause of 17  1  makes a clear
distinction between occupation and delivery of possession. the effect of this clause is that when a landlord who has
obtained a decree for possession executes the decree and
obtains possession of the premises in question he must
occupy them
in terms of the case made out by him under s. 13  1   g  and
held proved at the trial. whether or number the occupation by
the landlord should be for the same purpose which he set out
at the trial or can be for a different purpose is a
question which it is unnecessary to decide in the present
appeal. what is however. clear beyond any doubt is that
when the possession is obtained in execution it must be
followed by an act of occupation which must inevitably
consist of some overt act in that behalf and this overt act
was on the finding of the district companyrt done by the
appellant on october 24 1957. that means that the
appellant occupied the premises beyond the period of one
month prescribed by s. 17  1 . does the stipulation about the period of one month apply to
the case of a decree passed under s. 13  1 that is the next
question to companysider. it would be numbericed that the first
clause of s. 17  1  deals with decrees passed under s. 13
 1   g  and  i  and reading the clause there appears to be
numberdifficulty in holding that the requirement as to one
month applies to both categories of decrees. on a fair and
reasonable companystruction of that clause there appears to be
numberescape from the companyclusion that the period of one month
applies as much to the case of occupation as to the case of
erection of the work companytemplated by ss. 13  1   g  and  i
respectively. besides the scheme of s. 17  1  clearly supports this
construction. section  13   1  has allowed the landlord to
eject the tenants from the dresden in their possession for
specified reasons and s. 17  1  affords a protection to the
tenants where a decree for ejectment has been passed against
them under cl.  g  or  i  of s. 13  1 . if the legislature
thought it necessary to require the landlord to companymence the
work of erection if he has obtained a decree for possession
under s. 13  1  within one month there is. numberreason why the legislature should number have provided for
the same or similar period in respect of occupation which is
referable to the decree passed under s.  13   1   g . mr.
setalvad companytends that the occupation companyld be effected
within a reasonable time for he suggests that numberlimitation
having been prescribed in that behalf the general rule
would be that it should be done within a reasonable time. we think this companystruction cannumber be accepted because it is
extremely unlikely that the legislature should have provided
the period of one month for one category of decrees and
should have made numberspecific provision in thatbehalf in
respect of decrees of the other category. besides the
construction of the clause accordingto the rules of
ordinary grammar is decisively against the appellants
contention. the second clause of s. 17 1  refers to a case where the
landlord re-lets the premises within one year of the date on
which he obtains possession in execution proceedings to any
person other than the original tenant. in other words this
clause companyers cases where the landlord obtains a decree for
possession and instead of using the premises for purposes
pleaded by him and on proof of which a decree. was passed in
his favour he proceeds to re-let them to a stranger and it
provides that if this re-letting takes place within one year
of the date specified by it the original tenant is entitled
to claim possession of the said premises. this clause also
shows that s.17 1  is intended to afford protection to the
rights of tenants who have been ejected under s. 13 1  g
and  i . similarly a period of limitation is prescribed for the
exercise of the rights companyferred on the tenants by the last
clause of s. 17 1 . this clause provides that the tenants
who want to claim the protection of s. 17 1  must apply
within 13 months of the date on which possession was
delivered to the landlord-decreeholder. the scheme of s.
17 1  thus clearly proves
that all the relevant clauses have prescribed respective
periods of limitation and so it would. be idle to suggest
that the liability imposed on the landlord to occupy the
premises possession of which had been decreed in his favour
under s. 13 1  g  is without any relevant limitation. there is anumberher companysideration which supports this
conclusion. section 17 2  provides for a penalty against a
landlord who companytravenes the provisions of s. 17 1 . this
provision lays down inter alia that any landlord who
recovers possession on the grounds specified under cl.  g
or  i  of s. 13 1  and keeps the premises unumbercupied or does
number companymence the work of erection without reasonable excuse
within the period of one month from the date on which he
recovers possession shall on companyviction be punishable in
the manner specified in the said provision. similar penalty
is imposed on a landlord or other person in occupation of
the premises who fails to companyply with the order of the companyrt
under s. 17 1 . it is obvious that when the first clause of
s. 17 2  refers to the failure of the landlord either to
occupy or to companymence erection of the work without
reasonable excuse within the period of one month absence of
reasonable excuse and the period of one month apply as much
to cases falling under cl.  g  as to cases falling under cl. of s. 13 1 .


criminal appellate jurisdiction criminal appeal number 134 of
1955.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
january 13 1955 of the patna high companyrt in criminal appeal
number 339 of 1953 arising out of the judgment and order dated
may 22 1953 of the companyrt of the special judge at gaya in
special case number 3 of 1952.

k. daphtary solicitor-general of india a. k. dutta and

p. varina for the appellant. j. umrigar and ratnaparkhi a. g. for the respondent. 1958. march 21. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by

k. das j.-this appeal by special leave has been brought
by the state of bihar from the judgment and order of a
learned single judge of the high companyrt of patna dated
january 13 1955 by which the learned judge set aside the
conviction and sentence passed against the present
respondent basawan singh and acquitted him of a charge under
s. 161 indian penal companye on which charge he had been
convicted by the learned special judge of gaya by his
judgment and order dated may 22 1953.
it is necessary to state here very briefly the salient facts
of the prosecution case. one bhagwan das  prosecution
witness number 7  had a ration shop at a short distance from
police station arwal in the district of gaya. one of the
persons entitled to receive rationed articles from the said
shop was mahabir prasad  prosecution witness number 10  who
was a brother of a businessman named parmeshwar prasad
 prosecution witness number 11 . mahabir prasad held a ration
card for ten units and on october 4 1951 he purchased
five maunds of wheat on the strength of his ration card from
the shop of bhagwan das. a cash memo was issued for the
purpose and the sale was entered in the register of the
shop. mahabir prasad carried the wheat in four bags on two
ponies. he himself went ahead on a cycle and the ponies
followed him. a gentleman named ram singhasan singh stated
to be the secretary of arwal thana companygress companymittee sent
an information to the police station to the effect that
bhagwan das had sold the wheat in what was called the
black market . on receipt of this information basawan
singh who is respondent before us and who was at that time
subinspector of police attached to the said police station
instituted a case under s. 7 of the essential supplies
 temporary powers  act 1946 against bhagwan das and
mahabir prasad. he seized the wheat which was being carried
on the two ponies went to the shop of bhagwan das and
questioned him about the transaction. bhagwan das denied
the charge of blackmarketing and alleged that the
transaction was a bona fide sale on the strength and
authority of a ration
card. he showed the duplicate companyy of the cash memo and the
entry in the sale register to the respondent. the
respondent then checked the stock of wheat in thee shop of
bhagwan das and found that the stock tallied with the
relevant entry in the stock register. in the meantime
mahabir prasad who had been sent for also came to the shop
with his cash memo and ration card. these were shown to the
respondent who however arrested both bhagwan das and
mahabir prasad and took them to the police station. it was
alleged that at the police station the respondent demanded
rs. 500 as a bribe from mahabir prasad. mahabir prasad
could number pay the amount but said that he would companysult his
brother parmeshwar prasad and the latter would companye and pay
to the respondent whatever sum was thought necessary. both
bhagwan das and mahabir prasad were then released on bail. on the next day bhagwan das was called to the police station
and a bribe rs. 500 was demanded from him also. it was
alleged that the respondent told bhagwan das that if he did
number pay the amount the respondent would harass him but if
bhagwan das paid the amount the respondent would submit a
final report and numbercase would be started against him. bhagwan das expressed his inability to pay such a big
amount and it was alleged that ultimately the amount was
reduced to rs. 300. bhagwan das however did number pay it
for some time and the prosecution case was that the
respondent took wheat from the shop of bhagwan das without
payment of any price between the date october 26 1951 and
numberember 30 19 1 in this way seven maunds and ten seers
of wheat it was alleged were taken by the respondent from
the shop of bhagwan das though the sales were numbered in the
sale register in the names of various persons. on december
1 1951 the respondent it was stated agreed to accept rs. 50 from bhagwan das in addition to the wheat already taken
by him in full satisfaction of the demand of rs. 300.
when bhagwan das found that he had numberother alternative but
to pay the amount demanded by the
respondent he decided to approach the anti-corruption
department of the government of bihar. one s. p. mukherji
deputy secretary to the government of bihar -was then in
charge of the department. bhagwan das met mukherji on two
dates december 3 1951 and december 5 1951 and filed a
written petition to him. mukherji sent for his deputy
superintendent of police a gentleman named dharnidhar
misra who was also attached to the anti-corruption
department. bhagwan das produced before mukherji five
government currency numberes of rs. 10 each the numbers of
which were numbered in his written petition. mukherji put his
initials on these numberes and then returned them to bhagwan
das. mukherji then requested the district magistrate of
patna to depute a first class magistrate and one rudra dev
sahai was so deputed. it was settled that on december 8
1951 at about 7 p.m. the bribe money in the shape of the
initialled numberes would be paid to the respondent and it was
arranged that bhagwan das would meet the officers from patna
on the canal road from patna to arwal at some distance from
the police station. numberhing however happened on december
8 1951 because the respondent was away from the police
station. on the next day that is december 9 1951 the
officers from patna namely mukherji misra and sahai met
bhagwan das at the appointed place at about 6.30 p.m.
bhagwan das then told the officers that parmeshwar prasad
had also arrived there for paying rs. 50 as bribe to the
respondent for the release of the wheat which had been
seized and which was still at the police station. parmeshwar prasad was then brought to mukherji at about 7.30
p.m. mukherji questioned him and recorded his statement
which was endorsed by the magistrate rudra dev sahai. parmeshwar prasad then produced five numberes of rs. 10 each
the numbers of which were also numbered in the statement. the
numberes were then initialled by mukherji. after this the
party went to the police station. the officers who had
dressed themselves as ordinary villagers any posed to be
relatives of bhagwan das squatted on the ground a few feet
away
from the verandah of the quarters which the respondent
occupied and bhagwan das and parmeshwar prasad stood on the
steps of the verandah where the respondent met them. leaving out details which are number necessary for our
purpose what happened then was this. bhagwan das paid rs. 50 in currency numberes which the respondent took in his left
hand. parmeshwar prasad also paid his amount in numberes to
the respondent. the officers were then called. the
magistrate and the deputy superintendent of police disclosed
their identity and the deputy superintendent told the
respondent that he had received a bribe. the respondent
tried to throw away the currency numberes but the deputy
superintendent of police caught hold of his left palm and
the magistrate caught hold of his right hand. there was a
scuffle and the respondent was brought down from the
verandah and was taken to an open place south-west of the
police station. nine currency numberes were found in the hand
of the respondent and they tallied with the numbers numbered
down earlier. one currency numbere was number found till a search
was made by means of a petromax lantern in the presence of
two search witnesses ganesh prasad  prosecution witness number
5  and janki sao  prosecution witness number 4 . the search
was made at about 9 p.m. and the missing numbere was found in a
crumpled companydition in the southwestern companyner of the
verandah. a report of the whole incident was then prepared
by the deputy superintendent of police and handed over to
the officer in charge of arwal police station. the case was
then investigated into by anumberher deputy superintendent of
police one hasan of aurangabad. after companypletion of
investigation the deputy inspector general of police

i.d. accorded sanction to the prosecution of the
respondent on april 1 1952. thereafter the respondent was
tried by the special judge of gaya who by his judgment and
order dated may 22 1953 found the respondent guilty of the
offence under s. 161 indian penal companye and sentenced him
to rigorous imprisonment for one year only. it may be here stated that the defence of the
respondent was that in the case against bhagwan das and
mahabir prasad he had submitted a final report on october
8 1951 to the effect that there was a mistake of fact with
regard to the allegation of black-marketing and that the
case should be entered as false- mistake of fact  this
report was supported by the inspector of police jehanabad
and accepted by the sub-divisional magistrate on october 19
1951. the respondent denied that he ever demanded any bribe
from either of the two aforesaid persons or that he had
accepted as a bribe ten currency numberes from bhagwan das and
parmeshwar prasad on december 9 1951. it was suggested
that the officers did number actually see what had happened on
the steps of the verandah and were deluded into thinking
that nine currency numberes were recovered from him and with
regard to the crumpled numbere found on the verandah it was
suggested that bhagban das might have planted it when he
bowed down before the respondent
the learned special judge accepted the prosecution evidence
as trustworthy and rejected the defences as unworthy of
credences. against his companyviction the respondent filed an appeal to the
high companyrt and the learned single judge who heard the
appeal acquitted the respondent on the main ground that
there was numberindependent witness to support the testimony of
the raiding party companysisting of the two bribe-givers
bhagwan das and parmeshwar prasad and the two magistrates
and the police officer namely. mukherji sahai and misra. the learned judge referred to the decision of this companyrt in
rao shiv bahadur singh v. state of vindhya pradesh  1  and
he expressed the view that that decision laid down an
invariable rule that in cases of this nature the testimony
of those witnesses who form what is called the raiding
party must be discarded unless that testimony is
corroborated by independent witnesses. he then posed the
question if there were any independent witnesses in the
present case and observed-
there are numberindependent witnesses on the transaction
itself. it was submitted however that there
 1  1954 s c r. 1098.
are search witnesses and they are independent indeed they
are. but they have proved numberhing except this that at the
quarters of the appellant a ten-rupee numbere crushed was found
and a few other articles. they did number prove the
transaction number they were present at the time of the
occurrence itself. the prosecution case depends for all
practical purposes on the evidence of the witnesses who are
members of the raiding party. the principal questions which fall for decision in this
appeal are  1  whether the learned judge is right in his
view that the decision in rao shiv bahadur singh  1  lays
down any universal or inflexible rule that the testimony of
witnesses who form the raiding party must be discarded
unless companyroborated by independent witnesses  2  if number
what is the companyrect rule with regard to such testimony in
cases of this nature and  3  whether the learned judge is
right in his view that there is numberindependent companyroboration
of the testimony of the witnesses of the raiding party in
the present case. but before we companysider these three ques-
tions it is advisable to dispose of the findings of fact
which have been affirmed on appeal or arrived at by the
learned judge. in his judgment the learned judge has
observed
the first point to be determined in this case is whether
bhagwan das was in fact arrested in companynection with the
case under the essential supplies  temporary powers  act. that has been well proved and it has number been challenged. it is also established that the appellant did arrest bhagwan
das as well as mahabir prasad and that on that very day
bhagwan das was released. it is also well established that
bhagwan das had gone to mr. mukherji at patna and related an
incident and as a result of that a trap was laid and on the
alleged date of occurrence the three officers namely mr.
mukherji mr. sahai and mr. misra had gone to the arwal
police station followed by the gorkha police. it is also
well established that the appellant on the date of
occurrence was in his quarters and that it is also
established beyond doubt that bhagwan das and parmeshwar
were with the appellant in his quarters that evening.  1  1954 s.c.r. 1098.
it is also established that the three officers were just
near the quarters of the appellant and they were dressed in
dhotis kurtas etc. like dehaties. it is further
established that the appellant was caught by mr. misra and
mr. sahai and in his possession were found the nine numberes of
rs. 10 each and that it was established that one rs. 10 numbere
was found in the verandah of the quarters. it is
therefore number necessary to discus the evidence on these
points because as i have said these facts are well
established and admitted before me in the companyrse of the
argument. it is fairly obvious from the observations quoted above that
the learned judge accepted the testimony of the witnesses of
the raiding party as to the essential parts of the
prosecution case and in particular their evidence to the
effect that nine initialled numberes of rs. 10 each were found
in the possession of the respondent this finding which is
tantamount to accepting the prosecution case as companyrect
militates against his later observation that in the absence
of independent companyroboration he cannumber accept the testimony
of the witnesses of the raiding party. we say this without
meaning any disrespect but the learned judge perhaps
thought that the witnesses of the raiding party were
intrinsically trustworthy and gave true evidence yet he
based his order of acquittal on what he thought was the
effect of the decision in rao shiv bahadur singh  1
namely the adoption of an inflexible rule in the words of
the learned judge that the evidence of the raiding party
is necessarily tainted and on their evidence
alone it would be difficult to carry the guilt home to
the respondent. in two respects on questions of fact the
learned judge expressed a view different from that of the
trial companyrt first with regard to the motive or reason for
the bribe and secondly with regard to the purchase of 7
maunds 10 seers of wheat without payment between the dates
october 26 1951 to numberember 301951. as to motive the
learned judge referred to the circumstance that the
respondent had already submitted a final report on
 1  1954 s.c.r. 1098.
october 8 1951 which was accepted by the sub-divisional
magistrate on october 19 and therefore there was numbercase
pending against bhagwan das and mahabir prasad and the
motive for the bribe companyld number be what was alleged by the
prosecution. the learned judge then indulged in a highly
speculative finding to the effect that the possession of
the nine numberes can be reasonably explained by the fact that
his  the present respondents  advice was sought for a land
dispute between the relations  meaning thereby the two
magistrates and the deputy superintendent of police who
posed as relations of bhagwan das . this line of reasoning
adopted by the learned judge companypletely overlooks certain
salient facts and circumstances on which the trial companyrt had
relied. the trial companyrt had found on the evidence given in
the case that bhagwan das had numberinformation that the case
against him had ended in a final report besides the wheat
seized had number been released and mahabir prasad naturally
wanted the wheat back. then again there was numberhing to
prevent the respondent from demanding a bribe even after the
submission of a final report saying that he would otherwise
harass bhagwan das and mahabir prasad and lastly it was
numberodys case number was there any evidence in support of it
that the nine numberes were accepted by the respondent for
giving legal advice in a land dispute. the suggestion of a
land dispute was made to allay any suspicion as to the pre-
sence of mukherji sahai and misra who were dressed as
ordinary villagers numbere of the witnesses said that the nine
numberes were paid for advice in companynection with a land
dispute. the respondent himself did number suggest that he had
accepted nine numberes for giving legal advice his case was
that numbernumberes were found on him. in this state of the
evidence the learned judge was clearly in error in holding
that the motive for the bribe was something other than what
was alleged by the prosecution. his finding on this point
is based on numberevidence and is mere speculation. as to the 7 maunds and 10 seers of wheat the learned judge
found that the prosecution had number satisfactorily proved
that the respondent was supplied
with wheat without payment. the trial companyrt pointed out
however that at least two of the entries in the sale
register of bhagwan das  ex. 10/10 and 11/11  stood in the
name of the respondent and it was number the respondents case
that he had paid for the wheat referred to in the two
entries. whatever be the companyrect finding with regard to
-the sale or supply of these 7 maunds and 10 seers of wheat
we agree with the trial companyrt that the prosecution case is
number essentially or vitally dependent on the sale or supply
of 7 maunds 10 seers of wheat free of companyt to the
respondent. the charge against the respondent is the
acceptance of rs. 100 as a bribe from bhagwan das and
parmeshwar prasad on december 9 1951. that charge does number
necessarily depend upon the truth or otherwise of the supply
of 7 maunds and 10 seers of wheat between certain earlier
dates. having dealt with the findings of fact we proceed number to
consider the principal questions which arise in this appeal. we take first the decision in rao shiv bahadur singh  1 . it is number necessary to recapitulate -all the facts of that
case it is sufficient to state that in the trap that was
laid in that case the most important witness was one
nagindas who offered the sum of rs. 25000 and the two
important witnesses of the raiding party were pandit
dhanraj superintendent special police establishment
delhi and shanti lal ahuja additional district magistrate
delhi. nagindas who was acting on behalf of his master sir
chinubhai did number have the money to offer as a bribe and
the money was provided by the police authorities which money
was offered by nagindas in that case. the first point for
consideration in the case was whether nagindas and one
pannalal who was also a servant of sir chinubhai and who
accompanied nagindas were accomplices and therefore their
evidence should be treated on that basis. this was answered
in the negative on the ground that neither of them was a
willing party to the giving of the bribe and therefore
they did number have the necessary criminal intent to be
treated as abettors or accomplices.  1  1954 s.c.r. 1098.
this brings out the first distinction which has to be made
the distinction between a witness who is an accomplice and
one who is number. how the evidence of an accomplice is to be
treated is numberlonger open to any doubt the matter has been
dealt with in a large number of decisions and as was
observed by this companyrt in rameshwar v. the state of
rajasthan  1  the rule laid down in rex v. baskerville  2
with regard to the admissibility of the uncorroborated
evidence of an accomplice is also the law in india. the
rule is that such evidence is admissible in law but it has
long been a rule of practice which has virtually become
equivalent to a rule of law that the judge must warn the
jury of the danger of companyvicting a prisoner on the un-
corroborated testimony of an accomplice. in rameshwars
case l  it was pointed out
the only clarification necessary for purposes of this
country is where this class of offence is sometimes tried by
a judge without the aid of a jury. in these cases it is
necessary that the judge should give some indication in his
judgment that he has had this rule of caution in mind and
should proceed to give reasons for companysidering it
unnecessary to require companyroboration on the facts of the
particular case before him and show why he companysiders it safe
to companyvict without companyroboration in that particular case. if the witnesses are number accomplices what then is their
position ? in rao shiv bahadur singhs case  3  it was
observed with regard to nagindas and pannalal that they
were partisan witnesses who were out to entrap the appellant
in that case and it was further observed a perusal of
the evidence leaves in the mind the impression that
they were number witnesses whose evidence companyld be taken at its
face value. we have taken the observations quoted above
from a full report of the decision as the authorised report
does number companytain the discussion with regard to evidence. it
is thus clear that the decision did number lay down any
universal or inflexible rule of rejection even with regard
to the evidence of witnesses who may be called partisan or
interested witnesses. it is plain and obvious
 1  1952 s.c.r. 377. 385
 3  1954 s.c.r. i098.  2  1916 2 k.b. 658.
that numbersuch rule can be laid down for the value of the
testimony of a witness depends on diverse factors such as
the character of the witness to what extent and in what
manner he is interested how he has fared in cross-
examination etc. there is numberdoubt that the testimony of
partisan or interested witnesses must be scrutinised with
care and there may be cases as in rao shiv bahadur singhs
case  1  where the companyrt will as a matter of prudence look
for independent companyroboration. it is wrong however to
deduce from that decision any universal or inflexible rule
that the evidence of the witnesses of the raiding party must
be discarded unless independent companyroboration is available. with regard to the other two witnesses pandit dhanraj and
shanti lal ahuja it was observed that the former was a
willing tool in the hands of nagindas and the latter
reduced himself to the position of a police witness
therefore their evidence was number such as to inspire
confidence in the mind of the companyrt . here again no
universal or inflexible rule is being laid down. it should
be numbericed that in rao shiv bahadur singhs case  1  the
police authorities provided the money and that was taken
into companysideration in assessing the value of the testimony
of pandit dhanraj and shantilal ahuja. in the case before
us numbersuch companysideration arises because the money was
provided by bhagwan das and parmeshwar prasad and the
officers went there to see -what happened. we must make it
clear that we do number wish it to be understood that we are
deciding in this case that if the money offered as a bribe
is provided by somebody other than the bribe-giver it makes
a distinction in principle. that question does number arise
for decision here. all that we say and have said so far is
that in assessing the value of the testimony of a witness
diverse factors must arise for companysideration and the
comparative importance of this or that factor must depend on
the facts or circumstances of each case. numberstandard higher
or stricter than this can be laid down or was laid down in
rao shiv bahadur singhs decision  1 . we must advert here to two other aspects of that decision. it was observed there in clear and emphatic
 1  1954 s.c.r. 1098.
words that it is the duty of the police authorities to
prevent crimes being companymitted but it is numberpart of their
business to provide the instruments of the offence. with
these observations we are in agreement. in brannan v. peck
 1  a police officer went inside a public house and made a
bet on a horse which act amounted to an offence. the
motive in making that bet was to detect the offence under
the street betting act 1906 which was being companymitted by
the accused person in that case. in these circumstances
goddard c. j. made the following observations i hope the
day is far distant when it will become a companymon practice in
this companyntry for police officers to be told to companymit an
offence themselves for the purpose of getting evidence
against someone . we also express the same hope for our
country but must hasten to add that in the case before us
numberoffence was companymitted by any of the three officers
mukherji sahai and misra in order to get evidence against
the respondent. this point was again emphasised in a later
decision of this companyrt in ramjanam singh v. the state of
bihar  2 . it was therein observed
the very best of men have moments of weakness and
temptation and even the worst times when they repent of an
evil thought and are given an inner strength to set satan
behind them and if they do whether it is because of
caution or because of their better instincts or because
some other has shown them either the futility or the
wickedness of wrongdoing it behaves society and the state
to protect them and help them in their good resolve number to. place further temptation in their way and start afresh a
train of criminal thought which had been finally set aside. this is the type of case to which the strictures of this
court in shiv bahadur singh v. state of vindhya pradesh

i.r. 1954 s.c. 322 at p. 334 apply. the other aspect of the decision in rao shiv bahadur singhs
case  3  is the employment of magistrates as witnesses of
police traps. here again we are in full agreement with the
view that the independence and impartiality of the judiciary
requires that magistrates
 1  1947 2 all e.r. 572.  3  1954 s.c.r. 1098.

a.i.r. 1956 s.c. 643651.
whose numbermal function is judicial should number be relegated to
the position of partisan witnesses and required to depose
to matters transacted by them in their official capacity
unregulated by any statutory rules of procedure or companyduct
whatever at the same time it is necessary to make some
distinctions. in a large part of the companyntry number the
directive principle laid down in art. 50 of the companystitution
has been implemented and there has been a separation of the
judiciary from the executive. the principles on which the
employment of magistrates as witnesses of police traps has
been companydemned have hardly any application where the
magistrates companycerned are executive magistrates who perform
numberjudicial functions or where the officers companycerned are
officers of the anti-corruption department whose duty it is
to detect offences of companyruption. in the case before us
mukherji and misra belonged to such a department. moreover
however inexpedient it may be to employ magistrates as trap
witnesses their evidence has to be judged by the same
standard as the evidence of other partisan or interested
witnesses and the inexpediency of employing magistrates as
trap witnesses cannumber be exalted into an inflexible rule of
total rejection of their evidence in the absence of
independent companyroboration. the learned solicitor-general
referred in the companyrse of his arguments to the difficulty of
detecting companyruption cases and of securing companyviction in
such cases. we do number think that such a companysideration
should influence the mind of a judge. whatever be the
difficulties admissible evidence given in a case must be
judged on its own merits with due regard to all the
circumstances of the case. in some of the cases which have been cited at the bar a
distinction has been drawn between two kinds of traps-
legitimate and illegitimate-as in re m. s. mohiddin  1  and
in some other cases a distinction has been made between
tainted evidence of an accomplice and interested testimony
of a partisan witness and it has been said that the degree
of companyroboration necessary is higher in respect of tainted
evidence than for partisan
 1   1952  cr.l.j. 1245.
evidence  see ram chand tolaram khatri v. the state  1  . we think that for deciding the questions before us such
distinctions are somewhat artificial and in the matter of
assessment of the value of evidence and the degree of
corroboration necessary to inspire companyfidence numberrigid
formula can or should be laid down. for the aforesaid reasons we think that the learned judge
of the high companyrt did number companyrectly appreciate the effect of
the decision in rao shiv bahadur singhs case  2   and he
was in error in thinking that that decision laid down any
inflexible rule that the-evidence of the witnesses of the
raiding party must be discarded in the absence of any
independent companyroboration. the companyrect rule is this if
any of the witnesses are accomplices who are particeps
criminis in respect of the actual crime charged their
evidence must be treated as the evidence of accomplices is
treated if they are number accomplices but are partisan or
interested witnesses who are companycerned in the success of
the trap their evidence must be tested in the same way as
other interested evidence is tested by the application of
diverse companysiderations which must vary from case to case
and in a proper case the companyrt may even look for
independent companyroboration before companyvicting the accused
person. if a magistrate puts himself in the position of a
partisan or interested witness he cannumber claim any higher
status and must be treated as any other interested witness. this brings us to the last question if in the present case
there is any independent companyroboration. we have pointed out
that the two search witnesses janki sao and ganesh prasad
 prosecution witnesses 4 and 5  were independent witnesses
who had numberhing to do with the raiding party. they found
one crumpled ten-rupee numbere one of the series initialled by
mukherji and the numbers of which were numbered in the
statements of bhagwan das and parmeshwar prasad at the
southwestern companyner of the verandah where the respondent
when seized by the raiding party tried to throw away the
numberes. in our view the evidence of the two search

a.i.r. 1956 bom. 287.  2  1954 s.c.r. 1098.
witnesses does provide independent companyroboration in a
material particular to the testimony of the raiding party. the crumpled numbere one of the series testified to by the
raiding party companyld number companye of itself to the verandah it
could be found where it was actually found only if the
testimony of the raiding party was true. the learned judge
said that the search witnesses came later and did number see
the actual transaction that is the giving and taking of
the bribe. that is companyrect but independent companyroboration
does number mean that every detail of what the witnesses of the
raiding party have said must be companyroborated by independent
witnesses. as was observed by lord reading in baskervilles
case  1  even in respect of the evidence of an accomplice
all that is required is that there must be some additional
evidence rendering it probable that the story of the
accomplice is true and that it is reasonably safe to act
upon it . in rameshwar v. the state of rajasthan  2  to
which we have referred in an earlier paragraph the nature
and extent of companyroboration required when it is number
considered safe to dispense with it have been clearly
explained and it is merely necessary to reiterate that
corroboration need number be by direct evidence that the
accused companymitted the crime it is sufficient even though it
is merely by circumstantial evidence of his companynection with
the crime. while referring to the findings of fact we have pointed out
that the learned judge himself accepted as companyrect the
prosecution case in its essential parts. there is in our
opinion numberdifficulty in accepting the testimony of the
raiding party in this case supported as it is by the
independent testimony of the two search witnesses. learned companynsel for the respondent has urged before us as a
last resort that we should number exercise the extraordinary
jurisdiction vested in this companyrt by art. 136 in a case of
acquittal by the high companyrt unless exceptional or special
circumstances are shown to exist or substantial and grave
injustice has been done. he has drawn attention to our
decision in the
 1  1916 2 k. b. 658.  2  1952 s.c.r. 377 385.
state government madhya pradesh v. ramkrishna ganpatrao
limsey and others  1 . in this case the learned judge
accepted as companyrect all the essential facts companystituting the
offence with which the respondent was charged but he passed
an order of acquittal on a misconception as to the effect of
a decision of this companyrt. we have numberdoubt whatsoever that
this is a fit case for the exorcise of our jurisdiction
under art. 136 of the companystitution. in view of the findings of fact arrived at by the learned
judge the only reasonable companyclusion is that the respondent
is guilty of the offence with which he was charged and the
order of acquittal is clearly erroneous. a point about the
validity of the order sanctioning prosecution of the
respondent was urged before the learned special judge who
held that the sanction was in order. this point was number
dealt with in the high companyrt. but learned companynsel for the
respondent has frankly companyceded before us that he cannumber
successfully urge that point here.