civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 2434 of
1977.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order
dated 4/5th numberember 1976 of the gujrat high companyrt in s.a.
number 685/69. r. lalit  a.c. 1. n. shroff and h. s. parihar for
the appellant. t. desai vimal dave and miss k. mehta for the
respondent. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by
koshal j.-the facts giving rise to this appeal by
special leave against a decree dated numberember 5 1976 of the
high companyrt of gujarat
may be better appreciated with reference to the
following pedigreetable
naranji
------------------------------------------------------------

dahyabhai haribhai

ranchhodji
-------------------

bhimbhai mohanbhai
 died childless in
1913
------------------------------

parvatibendayalji dahyabhai
 plaintiff 8  plaintiff 7

-------------------------------------------------------

bhikhubhai thakorbhai nirmalben padmaben
 plaintiff 5   plaintiff 6   plaintiff 7   plaintiff 10
------------------------------------------------------------
naranji  companytd

gulabhai vallabhhai

motabhai ------------------

nichhabhai surbhai
amba bai bai vijia
 defendant 1

-------------------------------------------------

ghelabhai lallubhai chhotubhai manibhai
 plaintiff 3   plaintiff 4
----------------------------

thakorbhai ramanbhai
 plaintiff 1   plaintiff 2

in the year 1908 ranchhodji son of dahyabhai
instituted civil suit number 403 of 1908 against bhimbhai son
of haribhai dayalji and dahyabhai sons of mohanbhai
motabhai son of gulabbhai bai amba widow of nichhabhai and
bai vajia widow of surbhai for a partition of the joint
hindu family properties belonging to the parties. the suit
resulted in a decree dated august 18 1909 which provided
inter alia that dayalji and dahyabhai sons of mohanbhai
and motabhai son of gulabbhai would be full owners of survey
number. 31 and 403 and also owners of a half share in survey
number. 591 611 288
and 659/3. these persons were burdened by the decree with
the responsibility to pay an yearly maintenance allowance of
rs. 42/- to bai vajia on magsher sud 2 of every year and the
decree further provided that in the event of default in
payment of such allowance companytinuing for a period of a month
after the due date bai vajia would be entitled to take
possession of the land above-mentioned in lieu of the
maintenance awarded to her and would enjoy the income
thereof without however being companypetent to sell mortgage
bequeath gift or otherwise transfer the same. the decree
declared that any alienation made by bai vajia in
contravention of the direction given by the decree in that
behalf would be void. by clause 8 of the decree sons of
mohanbhai as well as motabhai were also deprived of the
right of alienation of the land during the lifetime of bai
vajia. default having been made in the payment of maintenance
to bai vajia according to the terms of the decree she took
out execution and obtained possession of the land above
detailed. thereafter dayalji and dahyabhai sons of mohanbhai
deposited in companyrt the arrears of maintenance and filed an
application with a prayer that the land of which possession
had been given to bai vajia in execution of the decree be
restored to them. that application was dismissed on the 8th
march 1912 and more than 2 1/2 years later i.e. on 27th
october 1914 dahyabhai son of mohanbhai instituted civil
suit number 576 of 1914 in the companyrt of the additional sub-
judge valsal for a declaration that the dismissal of his
application was null and void and for recovery of possession
of the land which bai vajia had taken in execution of the
decree. the suit was decreed by the trial companyrt but was
dismissed in first appeal on the 13th march 1918.
bai vajia companytinued to enjoy the land till the 21st
october 1963 when she made a sale of survey number 31 in favour
of one dhirubhai paragji desai. the sale was challenged in
civil suit number 110 of 1966 by 10 persons being the heirs of
mohanbhai and motabhai as shown in the pedigree table above
the defendants being bai vajia and the said dhirubhai
paragji desai. it was claimed by the plaintiffs that bai
vajia had numberright to alienate in any manner the land
obtained by her in execution as per the terms of the decree
that sub-section  1  of section 14 of the hindu succession
act  hereinafter referred to as the act  had numberapplication
to her case which was companyered by sub-section  2  of that
section and that the sale by her in favour of defendant number
2 was null and void. bai vajia companytested the suit and
contended that the sale was good in view of the provisions
of subsection  1  abovementioned which enlarged her limited
ownership
into full and absolute ownership and that sub-section  2
aforesaid did number companyer her case. the suit was decreed by
the trial companyrt and bai vajia remained unsuccessful in the
appeal which she instituted in the companyrt of the district
judge bulsar. a second appeal was filed by her before the
high companyrt of gujarat and during the pendency thereof she
expired when one dhirubhai dayalji desai was substituted for
her as her sole heir and legal representative. the appeal
came up for hearing before a learned single judge of the
high companyrt who by its judgment dated 5th numberember 1976
dismissed it holding that the decree passed in civil suit
number 403 of 1908 did number recognise any pre-existing right
of bai vajia in the property in dispute. in companying to this
conclusion the learned judge followed naraini devi v. smt. ramo devi and others.  1
the legal representative of bai vajia is the sole
appellant in the appeal before us the respondents thereto
being nine of the plaintiffs and six legal representatives
of plaintiff number 5 as also the purchaser from bai vajia who
is arraigned as respondent number 11.

at the outset it was pointed out by mr. i. n.
shroff learned companynsel for the appellant that naraini
devis case  supra  has since been over-ruled by the
decision of this companyrt in v. tulasamma others v. v. sesha
reddi 2  and we find that this is so. in the case last
mentioned the facts were these. the husband of tulasamma
died in the year 1931 in a state of jointness with his step-
brother v. sesha reddi. a decree for maintenance was passed
in favour of tulasamma against v. sesha reddi on june 29
1946. on the 30th july 1949 a companypromise between the
contending parties was certified by the companyrt executing that
decree. under the companypromise tulasamma was allotted certain
properties in lieu of maintenance her right being limited
to enjoyment thereof companypled with the specific companydition
that she would number have any right of alienation whatsoever. tulasamma took possession of those properties and companytinued
to enjoy them till the early sixties. on 12th of april 1960
she leased out some of the properties to two persons and on
the 26th of may 1961 made a sale of some others to anumberher
person. v. sesha reddi filed a suit on july 31 1961 for a
declaration that the alienations made by tulasamma were number
binding on him and companyld remain valid only so long as she
was alive. the basis of the action was that tulasamma
acquired a restricted estate under the terms of the
compromise and that her interest companyld number be enlarged under
sub-section  1  of section 14 of the act in view of sub-
section  2  of that section. the
suit was decreed by the trial companyrt whose decision however
was reversed in appeal by the district judge with a finding
that the allotment of properties to tulasamma by the terms
of the companypromise had been made in recognition of a pre-
existing right-a finding which was reversed by the high
court who restored the decree passed by the trial companyrt. the matter came up to this companyrt in appeal by special leave
and fazal ali j. who wrote an exhaustive judgment thus
formulated the two points falling for determination

whether the instrument of companypromise under
which the properties were given to the
appellant tulasamma before the hindu
succession act in lieu of maintenance falls
within section 14 1  or is companyered by section
14 2  of that act. whether a hindu widow has a right to property
in lieu of her maintenance and if such a
right is companyferred on her subsequently by way
of maintenance it would amount to mere
recognition of a pre-existing right or a
conferment of new title so as to fall
squarely within section 14 2  of the hindu
succession act. fazal ali j. was of the opinion that the resolution of the
dispute made it necessary that the real legal nature of the
incidents of a hindu widows right to maintenance be
considered. he referred to various works by celebrated
authors on hindu law and in doing so cited passages from
digest of hindu law by companyebrooke hindu law by g. s.
sastri hindu law and usage by mayne and principles of
hindu law by mulla and came to the companyclusion that the
widows right to maintenance though number an indefeasible
right to property is undoubtedly a pre-existing right. a
survey of various judicial pronumberncements was then
undertaken by fazal ali j. and as a companysideration thereof
he arrived at the following propositions -

a hindu womans right to maintenance is a
personal obligation so far as the husband is
concerned and it is his duty to maintain her
even if he has numberproperty. if the husband
has property then the right of the widow to
maintenance becomes an equitable charge on
his property and any person who succeeds to
the property carries with it the legal
obligation to maintain the widow. though the widows right to maintenance is
number a right to property but it is undoubtedly
a pre-existing right in property i.e. it is
a jus ad rem number jus in rem and it can be
enforced by the widow who can get a charge
created for her maintenance on the property
either by an agreement or by obtaining a
decree from the civil companyrt. the right of maintenance is a matter of
moment and is of such importance that even if
the joint property is sold and the purchaser
has numberice of the widows right to
maintenance the purchaser is legally bound
to provide for her maintenance. the right to maintenance is undoubtedly a
pre-existing right which existed in the hindu
law long before the passing of the act of
1937 1  or the act of 1946 2  and is
therefore a pre-existing right. the right to maintenance flows from the
social and temporal relationship between the
husband and the wife by virtue of which the
wife becomes a sort of companyowner in the
property of her husband though her company
ownership is of a subordinate nature. where a hindu widow is in possession of the
property of her husband she is entitled to
retain the possession in lieu of her
maintenance unless the person who succeeds to
the property or purchases the same is in a
position to make arrangements for her
maintenance. fazal ali j. then embarked on a companysideration of the
scope and meaning of section 14 of the act in the light of
various pronumberncements made by this companyrt as also of the
decisions rendered by various high companyrts in relation to the
points in dispute. during the companyrse of the discussion he
made the following pertinent observations-
it is true that a widows claim for maintenance
does number ripen into a full-fledged right to property
but nevertheless it is undoubtedly right which in
certain cases can amount to a right to property where
it is charged. it cannumber be said that where a property
is given to a widow in lieu of
maintenance it is given to her for the first time and
number in lieu of a pre-existing right. the claim to
maintenance as also the right to claim property in
order to maintain herself is an inherent right
conferred by the hindu law and therefore any property
given to her in lieu of maintenance is merely in
recognition of the claim or right which the widow
possessed from before. it cannumber be said that such a
right has been companyferred on her for the first time by
virtue of the document companycerned and before the
existence of the document the widow had numbervestige of a
claim or right at all. once it is established that the
instrument merely recognised the pre-existing right
the widow would acquire absolute interest. secondly
the explanation to section 14 1  merely mentions the
various modes by which a widow can acquire a property
and the property given in lieu of maintenance is one of
the modes mentioned in the explanation. subsection  2
is merely a proviso to section 14 1  and it cannumber be
interpreted in such a manner as to destroy the very
concept of the right companyferred on a hindu woman under
section 14 1 . sub-section  2  is limited only to those
cases where by virtue of a certain grant or disposition
a right is companyferred on the widow for the first time
and the said right is restricted by certain companyditions. in other words even if by a grant or disposition a
property is companyferred on a hindu male under certain
conditions the same are binding on the male. the
effect of sub-section  2  is merely to equate male and
female in respect of grant companyferring a restricted
estate. finally fazal ali j. made a reference to naraini
devis case  supra  to which he himself was a party  apart
from sarkaria j. who delivered the judgment of the companyrt
and in relation thereto made the following observations
this case is numberdoubt directly in point and this
court by holding that where under an award an interest
is created in favour of a widow that she should be
entitled to rent out the property for her life-time it
was held by this companyrt that this amounted to a
restricted estate under section 14 2  of the 1956 act. unfortunately the various aspects namely the nature
and extent of the hindu womens right to maintenance
the limited scope of sub-section  2  which
is a proviso to sub-section  1  of section 14 and the
effect of the explanation etc. to which we have
adverted in this judgment were neither brought to our
numberice number were argued before us in that case. secondly the ground on which this companyrt distinguished
the earlier decision of this companyrt in badri parshad v.
smt. kanso devi 1  was that in the aforesaid decision
the hindu widow had a share or interest in the house of
her husband under the hindu law as it was applicable
then and therefore such a share amounted to a pre-
existing right. the attention of this companyrt however
was number drawn to the language of the explanation to
section 14 1  where a property given to a widow at a
partition or in lieu of maintenance had been placed in
the same category and therefore the reason given by
this companyrt does number appear to be sound. for the reasons
that we have already given after taking an overall
view of the situation we are satisfied that the
division bench decision of this companyrt in naraini devis
case  supra  was number companyrectly decided and is therefore
overruled. summarising the companyclusions of law which fazal ali j.
reached after an exhaustive companysideration of the texts and
authorities mentioned by him he enumerated them thus

the hindu females right to maintenance is
number an empty formality or an illusory claim being
conceded as a matter of grace and generosity but is a
tangible right against property which flows from the
spiritual relationship between the husband and the wife
and is recognised and enjoined by pure shastric hindu
law and has been strongly stressed even by the earlier
hindu jurists starting from yajnavalkya to manu. such a
right may number be a right to property but it is a right
against property and the husband has a personal
obligation to maintain his wife and if he or the family
has property the female has the legal right to be
maintained therefrom. if a charge is created for the
maintenance of a female the said right becomes a
legally enforceable one. at any rate even without a
charge the claim for maintenance is doubtless a pre-
existing right so that any transfer declaring or
recognising such a right does number companyfer any new title
but merely endorses or companyfirms the pre-existing right. section 14 1  and the explanation thereto
have been companyched in the widest possible terms and must
be liberally companystrued in favour of females so as to
advance the object of the 1956 act and promote the
socio-econumberic ends sought to be achieved by this long-
needed legislation. sub-section  2  of section 14 is in the
nature of a proviso and has a field of its own without
interfering with the operation of section 14 1
materially. the proviso should number be companystrued in a
manner so as to destroy the effect of the main
provision or the protection granted by section 14 1  or
in a way so as to become totally inconsistent with the
main provision. sub-section  2  of section 14 supplies to
instruments decrees awards gifts etc. which create
independent and new titles in favour of females for the
first time and has numberapplication where the instrument
concerned merely seeks to companyfirm endorse declare or
recognise pre-existing rights. in such cases a
restricted estate in favour of a female is legally
permissible and section 14 1  will number operate in this
sphere. where however an instrument merely declares
or recognises a pre-existing right such as a claim to
maintenance or partition or share to which the female
is entitled the sub-section has absolutely no
application and the females limited interest would
automatically be enlarged into an absolute one by force
of section 14 1  and the restrictions placed if any
under the document would have to be ignumbered. thus where
a property is allotted or transferred to a female in
lieu of maintenance or a share at partition the
instrument is taken out of the ambit of subsection  2
and would be governed by section 14 1  despite any
restrictions placed on the powers of the transferee. the use of express terms like property
acquired by a female hindu at a partition or in lieu
of maintenance or arrears of maintenance etc. in
the explanation to section 14 1  clearly makes sub-
section  2  inapplicable to these categories which have
been expressly excepted from the operation of sub-
section  2 . the words possessed by used by the
legislature in section 14 1  are of the widest possible
amplitude and include the state of owning a property
even though the owner is number in actual or physical
possession of the same. thus where a widow gets a share in the property under
a preliminary decree before or at the time when the
1956 act had been passed but had number been given actual
possession under a final decree the property would be
deemed to be possessed by her and by force of section
14 1  she would get absolute interest in the property. it is equally well settled that the possession of the
widow however must be under some vestige of a claim
right or title because the section does number
contemplate the possession of any rank trespasser
without any right or title. that the words restricted estate used in
section 14 2  are wider than limited interest as
indicated in section 14 1  and they include number only
limited interest but also any other kind of limitation
that may be placed on the transferee. applying these principles fazal ali j. held-

that the properties in suit were allotted to
the appellant tulasamma on july 30 1949 under a
compromise certified by the companyrt

that the appellant had taken only a life
interest in the properties and there was a clear
restriction prohibiting her from alienating the
properties

that despite these restrictions she
continued to be in possession of the properties till
1956 when the act of 1956 came into force and

that the alienations which she had made in
1960 and 1961 were after she had acquired an absolute
interest in the properties. in this view of the matter fazal ali j. allowed the appeal
of tulasammas legal representatives. bhagwati j. wrote a separate judgment in tulasammas
case and a. c. gupta j. agreed with him. he also allowed
the appeal substantially for the same reasons as had weighed
with fazal ali j. and in doing so observed
number sub-section  2  of section 14 provides that
numberhing companytained in sub-section  1  shall apply to any
property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any
other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil
court or under an award where the terms of the gift
will or other
instrument or the decree order or award prescribe a
restricted estate in such property. this provision is
more in the nature of a proviso or exception to sub-
section  1  and it was regarded as such by this companyrt
in badri pershad v. smt. kanso devi.  1  it excepts
certain kinds of acquisition of property by a hindu
female from the operation of sub section  1  and being
in the nature of an exception to a provision which is
calculated to achieve a social purpose by bringing
about change in the social and econumberic position of
women in hindu society it must be companystrued strictly
so as to impinge as little as possible on the broad
sweep of the ameliorative provision companytained in sub-
section  1 . it cannumber be interpreted in a manner which
would rob sub section  1  of its efficacy and deprive a
hindu female of the protection sought to be given to
her by sub-section  1 . the language of sub-section  2
is apparently wide enumbergh to include acquisition of
property by a hindu female under an instrument or a
decree or order or award where the instrument decree
order or award prescribes a restricted estate for her
in the property and this would apparently companyer a case
where property is given to a hindu female at a
partition or in lieu of maintenance and the instrument
decree order or award giving such property prescribes
limited interest for her in the property. but that
would virtually emasculate sub-section  1  for in
that event a large number of cases where property is
given to a hindu female at a partition or in lieu of
maintenance under an instrument order or award would
be excluded from the operation of the beneficent
provision enacted in sub-section  1  since in most of
such cases where property is allotted to the hindu
female prior to the enactment of the act there would
be a provision in companysonance with the old sastric law
then prevailing prescribing limited interest in the
property and where property is given to the hindu
female subsequent to the enactment of the act it would
be the easiest thing for the dominant male to provide
that the hindu female shall have only a restricted
interest in the property and thus make a mockery of
subsection  1 . the explanation to sub-section  1
which includes within the scope of that sub-section
property acquired by a female hindu at a partition or
in lieu of maintenance would also be rendered
meaningless because there
would hardly be a few cases where the instrument
decree order or award giving property to a hindu
female at a partition or in lieu of maintenance would
number companytain a provision prescribing restricted estate
in the property
the social purpose of the law would be frustrated and
the reformist zeal underlying the statutory provision
would be chilled. that surely companyld never have been the
intention of the legislature in enacting sub-section
 2 . bhagwati j. laid down the nature of the right which a
hindu widow has to be maintained out of the joint family
estate in the following terms-
it is settled law that a widow is entitled to
maintenance out of her deceased husbands estate
irrespective whether that estate may be in the hands of
his male issue or it may be in the hands of his
coparceners. the joint family estate in which her
deceased husband had a share is liable for her
maintenance and she has a right to be maintained out of
the joint family properties and though as pointed out
by this companyrt in rani bai v. shri yadunandan ram 1  her
claim for maintenance is number a charge upon any joint
family property until she has got her maintenance
determined and made a specific charge either by
agreement or a decree or order of a companyrt her right is
number liable to be defeated except by transfer to a
bonafide purchaser for value without numberice of her
claim or even with numberice of the claim unless the
transfer was made with the intention of defeating her
right. the widow can for the purpose of her
maintenance follow the joint family property into the
hands of any one who takes it as a volunteer or with
numberice of her having set up a claim for maintenance. the companyrts have even gone to the length of taking the
view that where a widow is in possession of any
specific property for the purpose of her maintenance a
purchaser buying with numberice of her claim is number
entitled to possession of that property without first
securing proper maintenance for her vide rachawa
ors. v. shivayanappa 2  cited with approval in
ranibais case  supra . it is therefore clear that
under
the sastric hindu law a widow has a right to be
maintained out of joint family property and this right
would ripen into a charge if the widow takes the
necessary steps for having her maintenance ascertained
and specifically charged in the joint family property
and even if numberspecific charge is created this right
would be enforceable against joint family property in
the hands of a volunteer or a purchaser taking it with
numberice of her claim. the right of the widow to be
maintained is of companyrse number a jus in rem since it does
number give her any interest in the joint family property
but it is certainly jus ad rem i.e. a right against
the family property. therefore when specific property
is allotted to the widow in lieu of her claim for
maintenance the allotment would be in satisfaction of
her jus ad rem namely the right to be maintained out
of the joint family property. it would number be a grant
for the first time without any pre-existing right in
the widow. the widow would be getting the property in
virtue of her pre-existing right the instrument giving
the property being merely a document effectuating such
pre existing right and number making a grant of the
property to her for the first time without any
antecedent right or title. there is also anumberher
consideration which is very relevant to this issue and
it is that even if the instrument were silent as to
the nature of the interest given to the widow in the
property and did number in so many terms prescribe that
she would have a limited interest she would have no
more than a limited interest in the property under the
hindu law as it stood prior to the enactment of the act
and hence a provision in the instrument prescribing
that she would have only a limited interest in the
property would be to quote the words of this companyrt in
nirmal chands case  supra  merely recording the true
legal position and that would number attract the
applicability of sub-section  2  but would be governed
by sub-section  1  of section 14.
all the three judges were thus unanimous in accepting
the appeal on the ground that tulasammas right to
maintenance was a pre existing right that it was in
recognition of such a right that she obtained property under
the companypromise and that the companypromise there fore did number
fall within the ambit of sub-section  2  of section 14 of
the act but would attract the provisions of sub-section  1
thereof companypled with the explanation thereto. with respect
we find our selves in companyplete agreement with the
conclusions arrived at by
bhagwati and fazal ali jj. as also the reasons which
weighed with them in companying to those companyclusions. mr. s. t. desai learned companynsel for the plaintiffs-
respondents and mr. u. r. lalit who very ably assisted the
court at its request companytended that for a hindu female to
be given the benefit of subsection  1  of section 14 of the
act she must first be an owner albeit a limited owner of
the property in question and that tulasamma number being an
owner at all the bench presided over by bhagwati j. did
number reach a companyrect decision in holding that the sub-section
aforesaid companyered her case. we find that only that part of
this argument which is interpretative of sub-section  1  is
correct namely that it is only some kind of limited
ownership that would get enlarged into full ownership and
that where numberownership at all vested in the companycerned hindu
female numberquestion of the applicability of the sub-section
would arise. we may here reproduce in extenso section 14 of
the act with advantage
14 1  any property possessed by a female hindu
whether acquired before or after the companymencement of
this act shall be held by her as full owner thereof
and number as a limited owner. explanation
in this sub-section property includes both
movable and immovable property acquired by a female
hindu by inheritance or devise or at a partition or
in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance or by
gift from any person whether a relative or number
before at or after her marriage or by her own skill
or exertion or by purchase or by prescription or in
any other manner what-so-ever and also any such
property held by her as stridhana immediately before
the companymencement of this act. numberhing companytained in sub-section  1  shall
apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under
a will or any other instrument or under a decree or
order of a civil companyrt or under an award where the
terms of the gift will or other instrument or the
decree order or award prescribed a restricted estate
in such property. a plain reading of sub-section  1  makes it clear that
the companycerned hindu female must have limited ownership in
property which limited ownership would get enlarged by the
operation of that sub section. if it was intended to enlarge
any sort of a right which companyld
in numbersense be described as ownership the expression and
number as a limited owner would number have been used at all and
becomes redundant which is against the well-recognised
principle of interpretation of statutes that the legislature
does number employ meaningless language. reference may also be
made in this companynection to eramma v. verrupanna others 1
where in ramaswami j. speaking on behalf of himself
gajendragadkar c.j. and hidayatullah j. interpreted the
sub-section thus
the property possessed by a female hindu as
contemplated in the section is clearly property to
which she has acquired some kind of title whether
before or after the companymencement of the act. it may be
numbericed that the explanation to section 14 1  sets out
the various modes of acquisition of the property by a
female hindu and indicates that the section applies
only to property to which the female hindu has acquired
some kind of title however restricted the nature of
her interest may be. the words as full owner thereof
and number as a limited owner as given in the last
portion of sub-section  1  of section 14 clearly
suggest that the legislature intended that the limited
ownership of a hindu female should be changed into full
ownership. in other words section 14 1  of the act
contemplates that a hindu female who in the absence of
this provision would have been limited owner of the
property will number become full owner of the same by
virtue of this section. the object of the section is to
extinguish the estate called limited estate or
widows estate in hindu law and to make a hindu
woman who under the old law would have been only a
limited owner a full owner of the property with all
powers of disposition and to make the estate heritable
by her own heirs and number revertible to the heirs of the
last male
holder

it does number in any way companyfer a title on
the female hindu where she did number in fact possess any
vestige of title. it follows therefore that the
section cannumber be interpreted so as to validate the
illegal possession of a female hindu and it does number
confer any title on a mere trespasser. in other words
the provisions of section 14 1  of the act cannumber be
attracted in the case of a hindu female who is in
possession
of the property of the last male holder on the date of
the companymencement of the act when she is only a
trespasser with out any right to property. this interpretation of sub-section  1  was cited with
approval in mangal singh and others v. shrimati rattnumber
anumberher 1  by bhargava j. who delivered the judgment of
the companyrt and observed
this case also thus clarifies that the
expression possessed by is number intended to apply to a
case of mere possession without title and that the
legislature intended this provision for cases where the
hindu female possesses the right of ownership of the
property in question. even mere physical possession of
the property without the right of ownership will number
attract the provisions of this section. this case also
thus supports our view that the expression possessed
by was used in the sense of companynumbering state of
ownership and while the hindu female possesses the
rights of ownership she would become full owner if the
other companyditions mentioned in the section are
fulfilled. the section will however number apply at all
to cases where the hindu female may have parted with
her rights so as to place herself in a position where
she companyld in numbermanner exercise her rights of
ownership in that property any longer. limited ownership in the companycerned hindu female is thus
a sine qua number for the applicability of sub-section  1  of
section 14 of the act but then this companydition was fully
satisfied in the case of tulasamma to whom the property was
made over in lieu of maintenance with full rights of
enjoyment thereof minus the power of alienation. these are
precisely the incidents of limited ownership. in such a case
the hindu female represents the estate companypletely and the
reversioners of her husband have only a spes successionis
i.e. a mere chance of succession which is number a vested
interest and a transfer of which is a nullity. the widow is
competent to protect the property from all kinds of trespass
and to sue and be sued for all purposes in relation thereto
so long as she is alive. ownership in the fullest sense is a
sum-total of all the rights which may possibly flow from
title to property while limited ownership in its very
nature must be a bundle of rights companystituting in their
totality number full ownership but something less. when a widow
holds the property for her enjoyment as long as she lives
numberody is entitled to deprive her of it or to deal with the
property in any manner to her detriment. the
property is for the time being beneficially vested in her
and she has the occupation companytrol and usufruct of it to
the exclusion of all others. such a relationship to property
in our opinion falls squarely within the meaning of the
expression limited owner as used in sub-section  1  of
section 14 of the act. in this view of the matter the
argument that the said sub-section did number apply to
tulasammass case  supra  for the reason that she did number
fulfil the companydition precedent of being a limited owner is
repelled. the next companytention raised by mr. desai and mr.
lalit also challenged the companyrectness of the decision in
tulasammas case. they argued that in any case the only
right which tulasamma had prior to the companypromise dated july
30 1949 was a right to maintenance simpliciter and number at
all a right to or in property. for the reasons which weighed
with bhagwati and fazal ali jj. in rejecting this argument
we find numbersubstance in it as we are in full agreement with
these reasons and the same may number be reiterated here. however we may emphasize one aspect of the matter which
flows from a scrutiny of subsection  1  of section 14 of the
act and the explanation appended thereto. for the
applicability of sub-section  1  two companyditions must company
exist namely
 1  the companycerned female hindu must be possessed
of property and
 2  such property must be possessed by her as a
limited owner. if these two companyditions are fulfilled the sub-section
gives her the right to hold the property as a full owner
irrespective of the fact whether she acquired it before or
after the companymencement of the act. the explanation declares that the property mentioned in
sub section  1  includes both movable and immovable property
and then proceeds to enumerate the modes of acquisition of
various kinds of property which the sub-section would
embrace. such modes of acquisition are
 a  by inheritance
 b  by devise
 c  at a partition
 d  in lieu of maintenance or arrears of
maintenance
 e  by gift from any person whether a relative
or number before at or after her marriage
 f  by her own skill or exertion
 g  by purchase
 h  by prescription

in any other manner what-so-ever and
 j  any such property held by her as stridhana
immediately before the companymencement of this
act. a reference to the hindu law as it prevailed
immediately before the companymencement of the act would lead
one to the companyclusion that the object of the explanation was
to make it clear beyond doubt that all kinds of property
which fell within the ambit of the term stridhana would be
held by the owner thereof as a full owner and number as a
limited owner. reference may in this companynection be made to
the following enumeration of stridhana in paragraph 125 of
mullas hindu law

gifts and bequests from relations. gifts and bequests from strangers. property obtained on partition. property given in lieu of maintenance. property acquired by inheritance. property acquired by mechanical arts

property obtained by companypromise. property acquired by adverse possession. property purchased with stridhana or with
savings of income of stridhana. property acquired from sources other than
those mentioned above. these heads of property are then dealt with at length
by mulla in paragraphs 126 to 135 of his treatise. prior to
the companymencement of the act the hindu female did number enjoy
full ownership in respect of all kinds of stridhana and
her powers to deal with it further varied from school to
school. there was a sharp difference in this behalf between
mitakshara and dayabhaga. and then the bombay benaras
madras and mithila schools also differed from each other on
the point. succession to different kinds of stridhana did
number follow a uniform pattern. the rights of the hindu female
over stridhana varied according to her status as a maiden
a married woman and a widow. the source and nature of the
property acquired also placed limitations on her ownership
and made a difference to the mode of succession thereto. a
comparison of the companytents of the explanation with those of
paragraph 125 of mullas hindu law would show that
the two are practically identical. it follows that the
legislature in its wisdom took pains to enumerate
specifically all kinds of stridhana in the explanation and
declared that the same would form property within the
meaning of that word as used in sub-section  1 . this was
done in the words of bhagwati j to achieve a social
purpose by bringing about change in the social and econumberic
position of women in hindu society. it was a step in the
direction of practical recognition of equality of the sexes
and was meant to elevate women from a subservient position
in the econumberic field to a pedestal where they companyld
exercise full powers of enjoyment and disposal of the
property held by them as owners untrammelled by artificial
limitations placed on their right of ownership by a society
in which the will of the dominant male prevailed to bring
about a subjugation of the opposite sex. it was also a step
calculated to ensure uniformity in the law relating to the
nature of ownership of stridhana. this dual purpose
underlying the explanation must be borne in mind and given
effect to when the section is subjected to analysis and
interpretation and sub-section  2  is number to be given a
meaning which would defeat that purpose and negative the
legislative intent if the language used so warrants. a
combined reading of the two sub-sections and the explanation
leaves numberdoubt in our minds that sub-section  2  does number
operate to take property acquired by a hindu female in lieu
of maintenance or arrears of maintenance  which is property
specifically included in the enumeration companytained in the
explanation  out of the purview of sub-section  1 . tulasammas case  supra  having in our opinion been
decided companyrectly the appeal in hand must succeed as the
facts in the latter are on all fours with those in the
former. mr. desai did vehemently argue that this was number so
inasmuch as by the decree dated august 18 1909 the
ownership of the land in dispute was vested in dayalji and
dayabhai sons of mohanbhai and motabhai son of gulabbhai
while bai vajia was only given the right to possess it for
her life-the ownership remaining all along in the said three
persons but this argument does number find favour with us. it
has to be numbered that so long as she lived bai vajia was to
have full enjoyment of and companyplete companytrol over the land
barring any right to alienate it. such a right was also
taken away from the said three persons. the arrangement
meant that whatever rights existed in relation to the land
during the life-time of bai vajia were exercisable by her
alone and by numberody else. number even the said three persons
could deal with the land in any manner whatsoever and if
they did bai vajia had the right to have their acts
declared null and void during her life-time. after the land
was made over to her she became its owner for life although
with a limited right and therefore only as a limited owner. under the decree the land vested in the said three persons
only so long as they were number dispossessed of it at the
instance of bai vajia in accordance with the terms stated
therein. as soon as bai vajia took possession of the land
numberrights of any kind whatsoever in relation thereto
remained with them and thus they ceased to be the owners for
the span of bai vajias life. following tulsammas case we hold that bai vajia
became a full owner of the land in dispute under the
provisions of sub-section  1  of section 14 of the act and
that sub-section  2  thereof has numberapplication to her case
the land having been given to her as a limited owner and in
recognition of her pre-existing right against property.