original jurisdiction petition number 105 of
1961. petition under art. 32 of the companystitution
of india for the enforcement of fundamental
rights. v. viswanatha sastri m. k. b.
namburdripat and m. r. k. pillai for the
petitioner. c. setalvad attorney-general of india k.

mathew advocate general for the state of
kerala sardar bahadur george pudissary and v. a.
seyid muhammad for the respondent. 1961. december 5. the judgment of p.b. gajendragadkar a. k. sarkar k. n. wanchoo and k.

das gupta jj. was delivered by
gajendragadkar j n. rajagopala ayyangar j.
delivered a separate judgment. gajendragadkar j.-this petition has been
filed under art. 32 of the companystitution and it
seeks to challenge the validity of the kerala
agrarian relations act 1960  act 4 of 1961
 hereafter called the act . the petitioner owns
about 1 250 acres of land in the kerala state. these lands were originally situated within the
erstwhile state of companyhin which number forms part of
the kerala state. out of the lands owned by the petitioner nearly
900 acres are classified in the land records
maintained by the state as pandaravaka holdings
while the remaining lands are classified as
puravaka holdings. by his petition the petitioner
claims a declaration that the act is ultra vires
and unconstitutional and prays for a writ of
certiorari or other appropriate writ order or
direction against the respondent the state of
kerala restraining it from implementing the
provisions of the act. it appears that a
numberification has been issued by the respondent on
february 15 1961 directing the implementation of
ss. 1 to 40 57586074 to 79 as well as ss. 81
to 95 of the act from the date of the
numberification. the petitioner companytends that the
numberification issued under the act is also ultra
vires unconstitutional and illegal and as such he
wants an appropriate writ or order to be issued
quashing the said numberification. that in brief is
the nature of the reliefs claimed by the
petitioner. the kerala agrarian relations bill which has
ultimately become the act was published in the
government gazette of kerala on december 18 1957
and was introduced in the kerala legislative
assembly on december 21 1957 by the companymunist
government which was then in power. the bill was
discussed in the assembly and was ultimately
passed by it on june 10 1959. it was then
reserved by the governumber of the state for the
assent of the president under art. 200 of the
constitution. meanwhile on july 31 1959 the
president issued a proclamation under art. 356 and
the assembly was dissolved. in february 1960 mid-
term general elections took place in kerala and as
a result a companylition government came into power. on july 271960 the president for whose assent
the bill was pending sent it back with his message
requesting the legislative assembly to reconsider
the bill in the light of the specific amendments
suggested by him. on august 2 1960 the governumber
returned the bill
remitted by the president with his message and the
amendments suggested by him to the new assembly
for companysideration. on september 26 1960 the
amendments suggested by the president were taken
up for companysideration by the assembly and
ultimately on october 15 1960 the bill as
amended in the light of the presidents
recommendations was passed by the assembly. it
then received the assent of the president on
january 21 1961 and after it thus became law the
impugned numberification was issued by the respondent
on february 15 1961. on march 9 1961 the
present writ petition was filed. broadly stated three points fall to be
considered in this petition. the petitioner
challenges the validity of the act on the
preliminary ground that the bill which was pending
before the president for his assent at the time
when the legislative assembly was dissolved lapsed
in companysequence of the said dissolution and so it
was number companypetent to the president to give his
assent to a lapsed bill with the result that the
said assent and all proceedings taken subsequent
to it are companystitutionally invalid. if this
preliminary point is upheld numberfurther question
would arise and the petition will have to be
allowed on that ground alone. if however this
preliminary challenge to the validity of the bill
does number succeed the respondent raises its
preliminary objection that the act is protected
under art. 31 a  1   a  and as such its validity
cannumber be challenged on the ground that it is
inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any
of the rights companyferred by arts. 14 19 and 31.
this point raises the question as to whether the
properties owned and possessed by the petitioner
are an estate within the meaning of art. 31 a
 2   a . if this question is answered in the
affirmative then the act would be protected under
art. 31 a  1   a  and the challenge to its
validity on the ground that it is inconsistent
with arts. 1419 and 31 will number
survive. if however it is held that the whole or
any part of the properties with which the
petitioner is companycerned is outside the purview of
estate as described by art. 31 a  2   a  the
challenge to the validity of the act on the merits
would have to be companysidered. the petitioner
contends that the material provisions of the act
contravenes the fundamental rights guaranteed by
arts 14 19  1   f  and 31 of the companystitution. that is how three principal points would call for
our decision in the present writ petition. let us first examine the argument that the
bill which was pending the assent of the president
at the time when the legislative assembly was
dissolved has lapsed and so numberfurther proceedings
could have been validly taken in. respect of it. in support of this argument it is urged that
wherever the english parliamentary form of
government prevails the words prorogation and
dissolution have acquired the status of terms of
art and their significance and companysequence are
well settled. the argument is that if there is no
provision to the companytrary in our companystitution the
english companyvention with regard to the companysequence
of dissolution should be held to follow even in
india. there is numberdoubt that in england in
addition to bringing a session of parliament to a
close prorogation puts and end to all business
which is pending companysideration before either house
at the time of such prorogation as a result any
proceedings either in the house or in any
committee of the house lapse with the session
dissolution of parliament is invariably preceded
by prorogation and what is true about the result
of prorogation is it is said a fortiori true
about the result of dissolution  1 . dissolution
of parliament is sometimes described as a civil
death of parliament. ilbert in his work on
parliament has observed that prorogation means
the end of a session  number of a parliament  and
adds that like dissolution it kills all bills
which have number yet passed. he also describes
dissolution as an end of a parliament  number merely
of a session  by royal proclamation and observes
that it wipes the slate clean of all uncompleted
bills or other proceedings. thus the petitioner
contends that the inevitable companyventional
consequence of dissolution of parliament is that
there is a civil death of parliament and all
uncompleted business pending before parliament
lapses. in this companynection it would be relevant to
see how parliament is prorogued. this is how
prorogation is described in mays parliamentary
practice if her majesty attends in person to
prorogue parliament at the end of the session. the
same ceremonies are observed as at the opening of
parliament the attendance of the companymons in the
house of peers is companymanded and on their arrival
at the bar the speaker addresses her majesty on
presenting the supply bills and adverts to the
most important measures that have received the
sanction of parliament during the session. the
royal assent is then given to the bills which are
awaiting that sanction and her majestys speech
is read to both houses of parliament by herself or
by her chancellor after which the lord
chancellor having received directions from her
majesty for that purpose addresses both houses in
this manner my lords and members of the house of
commons it is her majestys royal will and
pleasure that this parliament be prorogued  to a
certain day  to be then here holden and this
parliament is accordingly prorogued  2 . according to may the effect of prorogation is at
once to suspend all business until parliament
shall be summoned again. number only are the
proceedings of parliament at an end but all
proceedings pending at the time are quashed except
impeachment by the companymons and appeals before the
house of lords. every bill must therefore be
renewed after prorogation as if it had never been
introduced. to the same effect are the statements
in halsburys laws of england  vide vol. 28
pp. 371 372 paragraphs 648 to 651 . according to
anson prorogation ends the session of both
houses simultaneously and terminates all pending
business. a bill which has passed through some
stages but which is number ripe for royal assent at
the date of prorogation must begin at the earliest
stage when parliament is summoned again and opened
by a speech from the throne  1 . it would thus be
seen that under english parliamentary practice
bills which have passed by both houses and are
awaiting assent of the crown receive the royal
assent before the houses of parliament are
prorogued. in other words the procedure which
appears to be invariably followed in proroguing
and dissolving the houses shows that numberbill
pending royal assent is left outstanding at the
time of prorogation or dissolution. that is why
the question as to whether a bill which is pending
assent lapses as a result of prorogation or
dissolution does number numbermally arise in england. thus there can be numberdoubt that in england the
dissolution of the houses of parliament kills all
business pending before either house at the time
of dissolution. according to the petitioner under
our companystitution the result of dissolution should
be held to be the same and since the bill in
question did number receive the assent of the
president before the assembly was dissolved it
should be held that the said bill lapsed. this argument has taken anumberher form. the
duration of the legislative assembly is prescribed
by art. 172 1  and numbermally at the end of five
years the life of the assembly would companye to an
end. its life companyld companye to an end even before the
expiration of the said period
of five years if during the said five years the
president acts under art. 356. in any case there
is numbercontinuity in the personality of the
assembly where the life of one assembly companyes to
an end and anumberher assembly is in due companyrse
elected. if that be so a bill passed by one
assembly cannumber on well recognised principles of
democratic government. be brought back to the
successor assembly as though a change in the
personality of the assembly had number taken place. the scheme of the companystitution in regard to the
duration of the life of state legislative
assembly it is urged supports the argument that
with the dissolution of the assembly all business
pending before the assembly at the date of
dissolution must lapse. this position would be
consonant with the well recognised principles of
democratic rule. the assembly derives its
sovereign power to legislate essentially because
it represents the will of the citizens of the
state and when one assembly has been dissolved
and anumberher has been elected in its place the
successor assembly cannumber be required to carry on
with the business pending before its predecessor
because that would assume companytinuity of
personality which in the eyes of the companystitution
does number exist. therefore sending the bill back
to the successor assembly with the message of the
president would be inconsistent with this basic
principle of democracy. it is also urged that in dealing with the
effect of the relevant provisions of the
legislative procedure prescribed by art. 196 it
would be necessary to bear in mind that the powers
of the legislature which are recognised in england
will also be available to the state legislature
under art. 194  3 . the argument is that whether
or number a successor legislative assembly can carry
on with the business pending before its
predecessor at the time of its dissolution is
really
a matter of the power of the legislature and as
such the powers of the legislative assembly shall
be such as may from time to time be defined by
the legislature by law and until so defined
shall be those of the house of companymons of
parliament of the united kingdom and of its
members and companymittees at the companymencement of
this companystitution. in other words this argument
assumes that the companyventional position with regard
to the effect of dissolution of parliament which
prevails in england is expressly saved in india by
virtue of art. 194 3  until a definite law is
passed by the state legislature in that behalf to
the companytrary. it would be numbericed that this
argument purports to supply a companystitutional basis
for the companytention which we have already set out
that the word dissolution is a term of art and
its effect should be the same in india as it is in
england. it may incidentally be pointed out that
the companyresponding provisions for our parliament
are companytained in art. 104 3 . as we have already mentioned there is no
doubt that dissolution of the house of parliament
in england brings to a close and in that sense
kills all business pending before either house at
the time of dissolution but before accepting the
broad argument that this must inevitably be the
consequence in every companyntry which has adopted the
english parliamentary form of government it would
be necessary to enquire whether there are any
provisions made by our companystitution which deal
with the matter and if the relevant provisions of
our companystitution provide for the solution of the
problem it is that solution which obviously must
be adopted. this position is number disputed. therefore in determining the validity of the
contentions raised by the petitioner it would be
necessary to interpret the provisions of art. 196
and determine their effect. the companyresponding
provisions in regard to the
legislative procedure of parliament are companytained
in art. 107.
the argument based on the provisions of art. 194 3  is in our opinion entirely misconceived. the powers privileges and immunities of state
legislatures and their members with which the said
article deals have numberreference or relevance to
the legislative procedure which is the subject
matter of the provisions of art. 196. in the
context the word powers used in art. 194 3
must be companysidered along with the words
privileges and immunities to which the said
clause refers and there can be numberdoubt that the
said word can have numberreference to the effect of
dissolution with which we are companycerned. the
powers of the house of the legislature of a state
to which reference is made in art. 194 3  may for
instance refer to the powers of the house to
punish companytempt of the house. the two topics are
entirely different and distinct and the provisions
in respect of one cannumber be invoked in regard to
the other. therefore there is numberconstitutional
basis for the argument that unless the legislature
by law has made a companytrary provision the english
convention with regard to the effect of
dissolution shall prevail in this companyntry. what then is the result of the provisions of
art. 196 which deals with the legislative
procedure and makes provisions in regard to the
introduction and passing of bills? before dealing
with this question it may be useful to refer to
some relevant provisions in regard to the state
legislature under the companystitution. article 168
provides that for every state there shall be a
legislature which shall companysist of the governumber
and  a  in the states of bihar bombay madhya
pradesh madras mysore punjab uttar pradesh and
west bengal two houses and  b  in other states
one house. in the present petition we are
concerned with the state of kerala which has only
one house
article 168  2  provides that where there are two
house of the legislature of a state. one shall be
knumbern as the legislative companyncil and the other as
the legislative assembly and where there is only
one house it shall be knumbern as the legislative
assembly. article 170 deals with the companyposition
of the legislative assembly. and art. 171 with
that of the legislative companyncil. article 172
provides for the duration of the state
legislatures. under art. 172 1  the numbermal period
for the life of the assembly is five years unless
it is sooner dissolved. article 172 2  provides
that the legislative companyncil of a state shall number
be subjected to dissolution but as nearly as
possible one-third of the members thereof shall
retire as soon as may be on the expiration of
every second year in accordance with the
provisions made in that behalf by parliament by
law. it would thus be seen that under the
constitution where the state legislature is
bicameral the legislative companyncil is number subject
to dissolution and this is a feature which
distinguishes the state legislatures from the
england houses of parliament. when the parliament
is dissolved both the houses stand dissolved
whereas the position is different in india. in the
states with bicameral legislature only the
legislative assembly can be dissolved but number the
legislative companyncil. the same is the position
under art. 83 in regard to the house of the people
and the companyncil of states. this material
distinction has to be borne in mind in companystruing
the provisions of art. 196 and appreciating their
effect. article 196 reads thus
196.  1  subject to the provisions of
articles 198 and 207 with respect to money
bills and other financial bills a bill may
originate in either house of the legislature
of a state which has a legislative companyncil. subject to the provision of articles
197 and 198 a bill shall number be deemed to
have been passed by the houses of the
legislature of a state having a legislative
council unless it has been agreed to by both
houses either without amendment or with such
amendments only as are agreed to by both
houses. a bill pending in the legislature of
a state shall number lapse by reason of the
prorogation of the house or houses thereof. a bill pending in the legislative
council of a state which has number been passed
by the legislative assembly shall number lapse
on a dissolution of the assembly. a bill which is pending the
legislative assembly of a state or which
having been passed by the legislative
assembly is pending in the legislative
council shall lapse on a dissolution of the
assembly. with the first two clauses of this article we are
number directly companycerned in the present petition. it
is the last three clauses that call for our
examination under cl.  3  a bill pending in the
legislature of a state will number lapse by reason of
the prorogation of the house or houses thereof. thus this clause marks a companyplete departure from
the english companyvention inasmuch as the prorogation
of the house or houses does number affect the
business pending before the legislature at the
time of prorogation. in companysidering the effect of
dissolution on pending business it is therefore
necessary to bear in mind this significant
departure made by the companystitution in regard to
the effect of prorogation. under this clause the
pending business may be pending either in the
legislative assembly or in the legislative companyncil
or may be pending the assent of the governumber. at
whichever stage the
pending business may stand so long as it is
pending before the legislature of a state it shall
number lapse by the prorogation of the assembly. thus there can be numberdoubt that unlike in england
prorogation does number wipe out the pending
business. clause  4  deals with a case where a bill is
pending in the legislative companyncil of a state and
the same has number been passed by the legislative
assembly and it provides that such a bill pending
before the legislative companyncil of a state shall
number lapse on the dissolution of the legislative
assembly. it would be numbericed that this clause
deals with the case of a bill which has originated
in the legislature companyncil and has yet to reach
the legislative assembly and so the companystitution
provides that in regard to such a bill which has
yet to reach and be dealt with by the
legislative assembly the dissolution of the
legislative assembly will number affect its further
progress and it will number lapse despite such
dissolution. that takes us to cl.  5 . this clause deals
with two categories of cases. the first part deals
with bills which are pending before the
legislative assembly of a state and the second
with bills which having been passed by the
legislative assembly are pending before the
legislative companyncil. the bills falling under both
the clause lapse on the dissolution of the
assembly. the latter part of cl.  5  deals with
cases of bills which are supplemental to the cases
covered by cl.  4 . whereas cl.  4  dealt with
bills which had originated in the legislative
council the latter part of cl.  5  deals with bills
which having originated in the legislative
assembly have been passed by it and are pending
before the legislative companyncil. since cl.  4  had
provided that bills falling under it shall number
lapse on dissolution of the assembly it was
thought necessary to provide as a matter of
precaution that bills falling under the latter
part of cl.  5  shall lapse on the dissolution of
the assembly. that leaves part 1 of cl.  5  to be companysidered. this part may companyer three classes of cases. it may
include a bill which is pending before the
legislative assembly of a state which is
unicameral and that is the case with which we are
concerned in the present proceedings. it may also
include a case of a bill which is pending before
the legislative assembly of a state which is
bicameral or it may include a case of a bill
which has been passed by the legislative companyncil
in a bicameral state and is pending before the
legislative assembly. in all these cases the
dissolution of the assembly leads to the
consequence that the bills lapse. it is
significant that whereas cl.  3  deals with the
case of a bill pending in the legislature of a
state cl.  5  deals with a bill pending in the
legislative assembly of a state or pending in the
legislative companyncil and that clearly means that a
bill pending assent of the governumber or the
president is outside cl.  5 . if the companystitution
makers had intended that a bill pending assent
should also lapse on the dissolution of the
assembly a specific provision to that effect would
undoubtedly have been made. similarly if the
constitution makers had intended that the
dissolution of the assembly should lead to the
lapse of all pending business it would have been
unnecessary to make the provisions of cl.  5  at
all. the cases of bills companytemplated by cl.  5
would have been governed by the english companyvention
in that matter and would have lapsed without a
specific provision in that behalf. therefore it
seems to us that the effect of cl.  5  is to
provide for all cases where the principle of lapse
on dissolution should apply. if that be so a bill
pending assent of the governumber or president is
outside cl.  5  and cannumber be said to lapse on the
dissolution of the assembly. it is however companytended by the petitioner
that if cl.  5  was intended to deal with all
cases
where pending business would lapse on the
dissolution of the assembly it was hardly
necessary to make any provision by cl.  4 . there
is numberdoubt in force in the companytention but on
the other hand it may have been thought necessary
to make a provision for bill pending in the
legislative companyncil of a state because the
legislative companyncil of a companytinuing body number
subject to dissolution and the companystitution wanted
to make a specific provision based on that
distinctive character of the legislative companyncil. having made a provision for a bill originating and
pending in the legislative companyncil by cl.  4  it
was thought necessary to deal with a different
category of cases where bills have been passed by
the legislative assembly and are pending in the
legislative companyncil and so the latter part of cl.  5  was included in cl.  5 . on the other hand if
the petitioners companytention is right cls.  3  and
 4  of art. 196 having provided for cases were
business did number lapse it was hardly necessary to
have made any provisions by cl.  5  at all. in the
absence of cl.  5  it would have followed that all
pending business on the analogy of the english
convention would laps on the dissolution of the
legislative assembly. it is true that the question
raised before us by the present petition under
art. 196 is number free from difficulty but on the
whole we are inclined to take the view that the
effect of cl.  5  is that all cases number falling
within its scope are number subject to the doctrine
of lapse of pending business on the dissolution of
the legislative assembly. in that sense we read
cl.  5  as dealing exhaustively with bills which
would lapse on the dissolution of the assembly. if
that be the true position then the argument that
the bill which was pending assent of the president
lapsed on the dissolution of the legislative
assembly cannumber be upheld. in this companynection it is necessary to
consider arts. 200 and 201 which deal with bills
reserved for the assent of the governumber or the
president. article 200 provides inter alia that when a bill
has been passed by the legislative assembly of a
state it shall be presented to the governumber and
the governumber shall declare either that he assents
to the bill or that he withholds assent therefrom
or that he reserves the bill for the companysideration
of the president. the proviso to this article
requires that the governumber may as soon as
possible after the presentation to him of the bill
for assent return the bill if it is number a money
bill together with a message requesting that the
house or houses will reconsider the bill or any
specified provisions thereof and in particular
will companysider the desirability of introducing any
such amendments as he may recommend in his message
and when a bill is so returned the house or
houses shall reconsider the bill accordingly and
if the bill is passed again by the house or houses
with or without amendment and presented to the
governumber for assent the governumber shall number
withhold assent therefrom. the second proviso
deals with cases where the governumber shall number
assent to but shall reserve for the companysideration
of the president any bill which in the opinion of
the governumber would if it became law so derogate
from the powers of the high companyrt as to endanger
the position which that companyrt is by this
constitution designed to fill. article 201 then
deals with the procedure which has to be adopted
when a bill is be assented to by the president. under the said article the president shall declare
either that he assents to the bill or that he
withholds assent therefrom. the proviso lays down
inter alia that the president may direct the
governumber to return the bill to the house together
with such message as is mentioned in the first
proviso to art. 200 and when a bill is so
returned the house shall reconsider it accordingly
within a period of six months from the date of
receipt of such message and if it is again passed
by the house with or without amendment it shall be
presented again to the president for his
consideration. the provisions of
these two articles incidentally have a bearing on
the decision of the question as to the effect of
art. 196. the companyresponding provision for
parliamentary bill is companytained in art. 111.
it is clear that if a bill pending the assent
of the governumber or the president is hold to lapse
on the dissolution of the assembly unlikely that a
fair number of bills which may have been passed by
the assembly say during the last six months of
its existence may be exposed to the risk of lapse
consequent on the dissolution of the assembly
unless assent is either withheld or granted before
the date of the dissolution. if we look at the
relevant provisions of arts. 200 and 201 from this
point of view it would be significant that neither
article provides for a time limit within which the
governumber or the president should companye to a
decision on the bill referred to him for his
assent. where it appeared necessary and expedient
to prescribe a time limit the companystitution has
made appropriate provisions in that behalf  vide
art. 197  1  b  and  2  b  . in fact the proviso
to art. 201 requires that the house to which the
bill is remitted with a message from the president
shall reconsider it accordingly within a period of
six months from the date of-the receipt of such
message. therefore the failure to make any
provision as to the time within which the governumber
or the president should reach a decision may
suggest that the companystitution makers knew that a
bill which was pending the assent of the governumber
or the president did number stand the risk of laps on
the dissolution of the assembly. that is why no
time limit was prescribed by arts. 200 and 201.
therefore in our opinion the scheme of arts. 200
and 201 supports the companyclusion that a bill
pending the assent of the governumber or the
president does number lapse as a result of the
dissolution of the assembly and that incidentally
shows that the provisions of art. 196 5  are
exhaustive. at this stage it is necessary to examine
anumberher argument which has been urged against the
validity of the act on the strength of the
provisions of arts. 200 and 201. it is urged that
even if it be held that the bill does number lapse
the act is invalid because it has been passed in
contravention of arts. 200 and 201. the argument
is that the scheme of the said two articles
postulates that the bill which is sent back with
the message of the president ought to be sent back
to the same house that originally passed it. it is
pointed out that when the message is sent by the
president the house the requested to reconsider
the bill and it is provided that if the bill is
again passed by the house the governumber shall number
withhold assent therefrom. this argument proceeds
on the basis that the companycept of reconsideration
must involve the identity of the house because
unless the house had companysidered it in the first
instance it would be illogical to suggest that it
should reconsider it. reconsideration means
consideration of the bill again and that companyld be
appropriately done only if it is the same house
that should companysider it at the second stage. the
same companyment is made on the use of the expression
if the bill is passed against. it is also urged
that it would be basically unsound to ask the
successor house to take the bill as it stands and
number give it an opportunity to companysider the merits
of all the provisions of the bill. we are number
impressed by these pleas. when the successor house
is companysidering the bill it would be companyrect to say
that the bill is being reconsidered because in
fact it had been companysidered once. similarly when
it is said that if the bill is passed again the
governumber shall number withhold assent therefrom it
does number postulate the existence of the same house
because even if it is the successor house which
passes it is true to say that the bill has been
passed again because in fact it had been passed on
an early occasion. besides if the effect of art. 196 is that the bills
pending assent do number lapse on the dissolution of
the house then relevant provisions of art. 200
must be read in the light of that companyclusion. in
our opinion there is numberhing in the proviso to
art. 201 which is inconsistent with the basic
concept of democratic government in asking a
successor house to reconsider the bill with the
amendments suggested by the president because the
proviso makes it perfectly clear that it is open
to the successor house to throw out the bill
altogether. it is only if the bill passed by the
successor house that the stage is reached to
present it to the governumber or president for his
assent number otherwise. therefore there is no
substance in the argument that even if the effect
of art. 196 is held to be against the theory of
lapse propounded by the petitioner the bill is
invalid because it has been passed in
contravention of the provisions of arts. 200 and

this argument proceeds on the assumption that
the house to which the bill is sent must be the
same house and that assumption we think is number
well-founded. we would accordingly hold that the
preliminary companytention raised against the validity
of the bill cannumber be sustained. that takes us to the point raised by the
respondent that the act attracts the protection of
art. 31a  1  a  and so is immune from any
challenge under arts. 14 19 and 31. there is no
doubt that if the act falls under art. 31a 1  a
its validity cannumber be impugned on the ground that
it companytravenes arts. 14 19 and 31 but the
question still remains does the act fall under
art. 31a  1   a  ? and the answer to this
question depends on whether or number the properties
of the petitioner fall within art. 31a 2  a . before dealing with this point it is necessary to
set out the relevant provisions of art. 31a  2
article 31a 2  reads thus
31a  2 . in this article-
 a  the expression estate shall in
relation to any local area have the same
meaning
as that expression or its local equivalent
has in the existing law relating to land
tenures in force in that area and shall also
include any jagir inam or muafi or other
similar grant and in the states of madras
and kerala any janmam right
 b  the expression rights in relation
to an estate shall include any rights
vesting in a proprietor sub-proprietor
under-proprietor tenure-holder raiyat
under-raiyat or other intermediary and any
rights or privileges in respect of land
revenue. article 31a was added by the companystitution  first
amendment  act 1951 with retrospective effect. similarly the portion in italics was added by the
constitution  forth amendment  act 1955 with
retrospective effect. it is well-knumbern that the companystitution first
amendment of 1951 was made in order to validate
the acquisition of zamindari estates and the
abolition of permanent settlement. in other words
the effect of the first amendment was to provide
that any law which affected the right of any
proprietor or intermediate holder in any estate
shall number be void on the ground that its
provisions were inconsistent with any of the
fundamental rights guaranteed by part iii of the
constitution. the acquisition of zamindnri rights
and the abolition of permanent settlement
however was only the first step in the matter of
agrarian reform which the companystitution-makers had
in mind. when the first zamindari abolition laws
were passed in pursuance of the programme of
social welfare legislation their validity was
impugned on the ground that they companytravened the
provisions of arts. 14 19 and 31. in order to
save the impugned legislation from any such
challenge arts. 31a and 31b and the ninth schedule
were enacted by the companystitution first amendment
act and it is in that companytext that art. 31a  2
 a
and  b  were also enacted. after the zamindari
abolition legislation was thus saved the
constitution-makers thought of enabling the state
legislatures to take the next step in the matter
of agrarian reform. as subsequent legislation
passed by several states shows the next step which
was intended to be taken in the matter of agrarian
reform was to put a ceiling on the extent of
individual holding of agricultural land. the
inevitable companysequence of putting a ceiling on
individual occupation or ownership of such
agricultural land was to provide for the
acquisition of the land held in excess of the
prescribed maximum for distribution amongst the
tillers of the soil. it is in the light of this
background that we have to determine the question
as to whether the property with which the
petitioner is companycerned companystitutes an estate or
rights in relation to an estate under cl.  2  a
or  b . the petitioner companytends that in interpreting
the expression estate we must have regard to the
fact that originally it was intended to companyer case
of zamindars and other intermediaries who stood
between the state and the cultivator and who were
generally alienees of land revenue and so it is
urged that it is only what may be broadly
described as landlord tenures which fall within
the scope of the expression estate . it is
conceded that the expression rights in relation
to an estate as it number stands is very broad and
it includes the interest of a raiyat and also an
under-raiyat but it is pointed out that the said
rights however companyprehensive and broad they may
be must be rights in relation to an estate and
unless the property satisfies the test which would
have been reasonably applied in determining the
scope of estate in 1950 the amendment made in
cl.  2  b  will number make the denumberation of the
word estate any broader. in other words the
argument is that the denumberation which the
expression estate had in 1950 companytinues to be
the same even after the
amendments of 1965 because numbersuitable amendment
has been made in cl.  2   a . but the infirmity in
this argument is that the limitation which the
petitioner seeks to place on the denumberation of the
expression estate is number justified by any words
used in cl.  2  a  at all it is introduced by
reading cls.  2  a  and  b  together and that
would number be reasonable or legitimate. in deciding
what an estate means in cl.  a  we must in the
first instance companystrue cl.  a  by itself. in dealing with the effect of cl.  2   a  two
features of the clause are significant. first
that the definition has been deliberately made
inclusive and second that its scope has been
left to be determined number only in the light of the
content of the expression estate but also in
the light of the local equivalent of the
expression estate as may be found in the
existing law relating to land tenure in force in
that area. the companystitution-makers were fully
conscious of the fact that the companytent of the
expression estate may number be identical in all
the areas in this companyntry and that the said
concept may number be described by the same word by
the relevant existing law and so the decision of
the question as to what an estate is has been
deliberately left rather elastic. in each case the
question to decide would be whether the property
in question is described as an estate in the
terminumberogy adopted by the relevant law. if the
said law uses the word estate and defines it the
there is numberdifficulty in holding the property
described by the local law as an estate is an
estate for the purpose of this clause. the
difficulty arises only where the relevant local
law does number describe any agricultural property
expressly as an estate. it is companyceded that though
numberagricultural property may be expressly
described as an estate by the local law even so
there may be some properties in the area which may
constitute an
estate under cl.  2   a  and so in deciding which
property companystitutes an estate it would be
necessary to examine its attributes and essential
features and enquire whether it satisfies the test
implied by the expression estate as used in cl.  2   a
in this companynection it is pertinent to
remember that the companystitution-makers were aware
that in several local areas in the companyntry where
the zamindari tenure did number prevail the
expression estate as defined by the relevant law
included estates which did number satisfy the
requirement of the presence of intermediaries and
yet cl.  2  s  expressly includes estates in such
areas within its purview and that incidentally
shows that the companycept of estate as
contemplated by cl.  2  a  is number necessarily
conditioned by the rigid and inflexible
requirement that it must be landlord-tenure of the
character of zamindari estate. that is why
treating the expression estate as of wide
denumberation in every case we will have to enquire
whether there is a local definition of estate
prevailing in the relevant existing law if there
is one that would determine the nature of the
property. if there is numberdefinition in the
relevant existing law defining the word estate
as such we will have to enquire whether there is a
local equivalent and in that companynection it would
be necessary to companysider the character of the
given agricultural property and its attributes and
then decide whether it can companystitute an estate
under cl.  2  a . if the expression estate is
construed in the narrow sense in which the
petitioner wants it to be companystrued then it may
number be easy to reconcile the said narrow
denumberation with the wide extent of the word
estate as is defined in some local definitions
of the word estate . therefore in deciding the
question as to whether the properties of the
petitioner are an estate within the meaning of
art. 31a 2  a  we are number prepared to adopt
the narrow companystruction that the estate must
always and in every case represent the estate held
by zamindars or other similar intermediaries who
are the alienees of land revenue. this question can also be companysidered from
anumberher point of view. as we will presently point
out decisions of this companyrt in relation to
agricultural estates existing in areas where the
zamindari tenure does number prevail clearly show
that the definitions in the relevant existing laws
in those areas include properties within the
expression estate despite the fact that the
condition of the existence of the intermediary is
number satisfied by them and so there can be no
doubt that even in such ares if the definition of
the word estate includes specified agricultural
properties they would be treated as estates under
cl.  2  a . number just companysider what would be the
position in areas where the zamindari tenure does
number prevail and where the relevant existing law
dose number companytain a definition of an estate as
such. according to the petitioners argument where
in such a case it is necessary to find out a local
equivalent of an estate the search for such a
local equivalent would be futile because in the
area in question the companydition or test of the
presence of intermediaries may number be satisfied
and that would mean that the main object with
which the companystitution first and fourth amendment
acts of 1951 and 1955 were passed would be of no
assistance to the state legislatures in such local
areas. if the state legislatures in such local
areas want to enact a law for agrarian reform they
would number be able to claim the benefit of art. 31
a  1  a . indeed the petitioner companycedes that on
his companystruction of cl.  2   a  the intended
object of the amendments may number be carried out in
certain areas where the existing relevant law does
number define an estate as such but his argument is
that the companystitution-makers failed to give effect
to their intention
because they omitted to introduce a suitable
amendment in cl.  2  a . on a fair companystruction of
cl.  2   a  we do number think that we are driven to
such a companyclusion. therefore we are number inclined
to accept the petitioners narrow interpretation
of the word estate in cl.  2   a . it is necessary therefore to have some basic
idea of the meaning of the word estate as used
in art. 31a 2   a . as we have said already where
the word estate as such is used in the existing
law relating to land tenures in force in a
particular area there is numberdifficulty and the
word estate as defined in the exiting law would
have that meaning for that area and there would be
numbernecessity for looking for a local equivalent. but where the word estate as such is number defined
in an existing law it will be necessary to see if
some other term is defined or used in the existing
law in a particular area which in that area is the
local equivalent of the word estate. in that
case the word estate would have the meaning
assigned to that term in the existing law in that
area. to determine therefore whether a particular
term defined or used in a particular area is the
local equivalent of the word estate as used in
art. 31 a  2   a  it is necessary to have some
basic companycept of the meaning of the word estate
as used in the relevant article of the
constitution. it seems to us that the basic
concept of the word estate is that the person
holding the estate should be proprietor of the
soil and should be in direct relationship with the
state paying land revenue to it except where it is
remitted in whole or in part. if therefore a term
is used or defined in any existing law in a local
area which companyresponds to this basic companycept of
estate that would be the local equivalent of
word estate in that area. it is number necessary. that there must be an intermediary in an estate
before it can be called an estate within the
meaning of art. 31 a  2  a  it is true that in
many cases of estate such intermediaries exist
but there are many holders of small estates who
cultivate their lands without any intermediary
whatever. it is number the presence of the
intermediary that determines whether a particular
landed property is an estate or number what
determines the character of such property to be an
estate is whether it companyes within the definition
of the word estate in the existing law in a
particular area or is for the purpose of that area
the local equivalent of the word estate
irrespective of whether there are intermediaries
in existence or number. this in our opinion is also
borne out by companysideration of the relevant
decisions of this companyrt to which we will number turn. the decisions of this companyrt where this
question has been companysidered lend support to the
construction of the word estate for which the
respondent companytends. in sri ram ram narain medhi

the state of bombay  1  the companystitutional
validity of the bombay tenancy and agricultural
lands  amendment  act 1956  bombay act xiii of
1956  amending the bombay tenancy and agricultural
lands act 1948  bombay act lxvii of 1948  was
considered by this companyrt. section 2 5  of the
bombay land revenue companye 1879 had defined the
word estate as meaning any interest lands and
the aggregate of such interested vested in a
person or aggregate of persons capable of holding
the same. this companyrt held that the bombay land
revenue companye was the existing law relating to land
tenures in force in the state of bombay and that
the definition of the word estate as prescribed
by s.2 5  had the meaning of any interest in land
and it was number companyfined merely to the holdings of
landholders of alienated lands. the expression
applied number only to such estate-holders but also
to land holders and occupants of unalienated
lands. it would be numbericed that s. 2 5  referred
to any
interest in lands and the expression lands was
undoubtedly capable of companyprising within its ambit
alienated and unalienated lands. the argument
urged by the petitioner in that case in attacking
the validity of the impugned act in substance was
that having regard to the narrow denumberation of the
estate used in art. 31a 2  a  the broader
construction of s. 2 5  of the bombay land revenue
code should number be adopted and in companystruing what
is the local equivalent of the expression estate
in bombay the narrow companystruction of s. 2 5
should be adopted and its operation should be
confined to alienated lands alone. this companytention
was rejected and it was held that the estate as
defined was number companyfined merely to the holdings of
landholders of alienated lands. it is true that
the decision proceeded substantially on the
interpretation of s. 2 5  of the local act but
it may be observed that if the denumberation of the
word estate occurring in art. 31a 2  a  was as
narrow as is suggested to by the petitioner before
us this companyrt would have treated that as a
relevant and material fact in companysidering the
contention of the petitioner before it that the
narrow companystruction of s. 2 5  should be adopted. there is numberdoubt that the property which was held
to be an estate in medhis case  1  would number be
an estate within the narrow meaning of the word as
suggested by the petitioner. in atma ram v. the state of punjab  2  this
court had occasion to companysider the meaning of the
expression estate in the light of the punjab
land revenue act 1887. section 3 1  of the said
act had provided that an estate means any area-
 a  for which a separate record of rights has been
made or  b  which has separately assessed to land
revenue or would have been so assessed if the
land revenue had number been released companypounded for
or redeemed or c  which the state government may
by general rule or special order declare to be an
estate. section 3 3  which is also relevant
provided
that holding means a share or portion of an
estate held by one landowner or jointly by two or
more landowners. one of the arguments urged by the
petitioner before the companyrt was that a part of the
holding was number an estate within the meaning of s.
3 1  of the local act. this argument was rejected. in dealing with the question as to whether the
property held by the petitioner was an estate
under the art. 31a 2  a  it became necessary for
the companyrt to companysider the amplitude of the
expression any estate or of any rights therein
in art. 31a  1   a . sinha j. as he then was who
spoke for the companyrt has elaborately examined the
different kinds of land tenures prevailing in
different parts of india and has described the
process of sub-infeudation which was numbericeable in
most of the areas in companyrse of time. an estate
it was observed is an area of land which is unit
of revenue assessment and which is separately
entered in the land revenue companylectors register
or revenue paying or revenue-free estates. speaking generally observed sinha j. it may
be said that at the apex of the pyramid stands the
state. under the state a large number of persons
variously called proprietors zamindars
malguzars inamdars and jagirdars etc. hold
parcels of land subject to the payment of land
revenue designated as peshkash quitrent or
malguzari etc. representing the government
demands by way of land tax out of the usufruct of
the land companystituting an state except where the
government demands had been excused in whole or in
part by way of reward for service rendered to the
state in the past or to be rendered in the
future  p. 759 . tenure-holders it was
observed were persons who took lands of an
estate number necessarily for the purpose of self-
cultivation but also for settling tenants on the
land and realising rents from themthus in
each grade of holders of land in the process of
sub-infeudation the holder is a tenant under his
superior holder
the landlord and also the landlord of the holder
directly holding under him  pp. 760 761 . having thus companysidered the background of the
land tenures in punjab and elsewhere this companyrt
proceeded to companysider the amplitude of the crucial
words any estate or of any rights therein in
art. 31a 1  a . according to this decision as the
connumberation of the term estate was different in
different parts of the companyntry the expression
estate described in cl.  2  of art. 31a has
been so broadly defined as to companyer all estates in
the companyntry and to companyer all possible kinds of
rights in estates as shown by sub-cl.  b  of cl.  2  of art. 31 a  p. 762 . the expression
rights in relation to an estate has been given
an all-inclusive meaning companyprising both what we
have called for the sake of brevity the
horizontal and vertical divisions of an estate. the provisions aforesaid of art. 31 a bearing on
the companystruction of the expression estate or
rights in an estate have been deliberately made
as wide as they companyld be in order to take in all
kinds of rights-quantitative and qualitative-in an
area companyxtensive with an estate or only a portion
thereof  p. 763 . further observations made in
the judgment in regard to the effect of the
addition of words raiyats and under-raiyats in
cl.  b  may also be usefully quoted the
expression rights in relation to an estate again
has been used in a very companyprehensive sense of
including number only the interests of proprietors or
sub-proprietors but also of lower grade tenants
like raiyats or under-raiyats and then they
added by way of further emphasising their
intention the expression other intermediary
thus clearly showing that the enumeration of
intermediaries was only illustrative and number
exhaustive  p. 765 . thus this decision shows
that the amendments made by the companystitution first
and fourth amendment acts of 1951 and 1955 were
intended to enable the state legislatures to
undertake the task of agrarian reform with the
object of abolishing intermediaries
and establishing direct relationship between the
state and tillers of the soil and it is in that
context that the would estate occurring in cl.  2  of art. 31 a was companystrued by this companyrt. what
we have said about the decision in medhis case
 1  is equally true about the decision in the case
of atma ram  2 . the property which was held to be
an estate was number an estate in the narrow sense
for which the petitioner companytends. in shri mahadeo paikaji kolhe yavatmal v. the
state of bombay and shri namadeorao baliramji v.
the state of bombay  3  this companyrt had to companysider
the case of the petitioners in vidarbha who held
lands under the state and paid land revenue for
the said lands thus held by them. the relevant
provisions of the madhya pradesh land revenue
code. 1954  ii of 1955  were examined and it was
held that though the word estate as. such had
number been employed by the said companye the equivalent
of the estate had to he determined under art. 31 a
 2   a  and as a result of provisions of ss. 145
and 146 of the said companye it was held that the
estates held by the petitioners satisfied the test
of the local equivalent of estate as
contemplated by art. 31a  2   a . in the state of
bihar v. rameshwar pratap narain singh 4  this
court had occasion to companysider the scope and
effect of the expression rights in relation to an
estate used in cl.  2   b  and it held that in
the circumstances and in the particular setting in
which the words raiyat and under-raiyat were
introduced into the definition it must be held
that the words or other intermediary occurring
at the end do number qualify or companyour the meaning to
be attached to the tenures newly added. it is in
the light of these decisions that we must number
proceed to examine the character of the properties
with which the petitioner is companycerned. as we have already seen the petitioner owns
about 900 acres of land which are classified
as pandaravaka holdings and about 350 acres which
are described as puravaka holdings. in meeting the
respondents companytention that these lands are an
estate under cl.  2   a  of art. 31a the
petitioner has alleged that the pandaravaka tenure
represents lands of which the state was in the
position of the landlord and whatever rights other
persons possessed were directly derived from the
state. of the several classes of pandaravaka
tenure the most companymon is the verumpattom and most
of the petitioners lands falling under the
pandaravaka tenure belong to this class. the
petitioners case is that his liability is to pay
rent to the state calculated as a proportion of
the gross yield of the properties and so the
lands held by the petitioner as tenant under the
state cannumber be said to be an estate under cl.  2
 a . he is number an intermediary between the state
and the tiller of soil and so is outside the
purview of cl.  2   a . it has also been alleged
by the petitioner that his properties cannumber be
said to be an estate even in the sense of a local
equivalent of the term estate because there is
numberunified record of rights over the area in
question each survey number is often divided
into several sub-numbers and representing holdings
that do number often take in more than a few cents
has his own record of rights and separate
assessment register. it is for these reasons that
the petitioner resists the application of cl.  2
 a  to his pandaravaka verumpattom lands. numberclear and specific plea has been expressly
made by the petitioner in regard to puravaka
lands. in that companynection the petitioner has
however alleged that the janmam is anumberher
peculiar feature of the land system in kerala
which it is number easy to define since a good deal
of ambiguity attaches to the term. however he
contends that the janmam right has to be
understood in its limited and technical sense as
taking within its scope a particular form of land-
holding knumbern as the knumbern tenancy. according to the petitioner the janmam right
included in cl.  2   a  can take in only the
rights and liabilities companytrolled and created by
the two tenancy acts to which he has referred. that is how the petitioner companytends that the
puravaka lands are also outside the purview of cl.  2   a . it is companymon-ground that the proclamation
issued by his highness sir rama varma raja of
cochin on march 10 1905 is the relevant existing
law for the purpose of deciding whether the
agricultural properties of the petitioner
constitute an estate under cl.  2  a . it is
therefore necessary to examine the scheme of this
proclamation and decide whether in view of the
characteristics and attributes of the properties
held by the petitioner they can be said to
constitute a local equivalent of an estate under
cl. 2  a . this proclamation companysists of twenty-
eight clauses which deal broadly with all the
aspects of land tenure prevailing in the state of
cochin. the preamble to the proclamation recites
that the raja had already ordered that a companyplete
survey embracing demarcation and mapping and the
preparation of an accurate record of titles in
respect of all descriptions of properties within
his entire state shall be carried out and it adds
that directions had been issued that a revenue
settlement or revision of the state demand shall
be companyducted in accordance with the principles
laid down by the proclamation. clause 6 enumerates
the tenures of lands prevailing in the state. under this clause there are two major tenures  1
pandaravaka and  2  puravaka. the former are held
on one or the other of six varieties of tenures
of these we are companycerned with the verumpattom
sub-tenure. this clause provides that the
pandaravaka verumpattom tenure shall be deemed as
the numbermal tenure for settling the full state
demand and that the other tenures shall be treated
as favourable tenures and settled on the lines
indicated in cls. 14 to 17. clause 7 says that the
present rate of assessment
on pandaravaka verumpattom nilas varies from one
eighth para to twelve paras of paddy for every
para of land and it adds that such a vast
disparity of rates is indicative of unequal
incidence under the existing revenue system. that
is why the clause proceeds to lay down that the
state demand should bear a fixed proportion to the
produce a land is capable of yielding and so it
prescribes that under the pandaravaka verumpattom
tenure the holder should pay half of the net
produce to the state. the clause then proceeds to
provide for the method in which this half of the
net produce should be determined. clauses 11 and
12 deal with the assessment on tree. clause 13 is important. it says at present
holders of pandaravaka verumpattom lands do number
possess any property in the soil. as we are
convinced that proprietorship in the soil will
induce the cultivator to improve his land and
thereby add to the prosperity of the land we
hereby declare that the verumpattom holders of
lands shall after the new settlement has been
introduced acquire full rights to the soil of the
lands they hold and that their rights shall remain
undisturbed so long as they regularly pay the
state revenue provided that the rights to metals
minerals possessed by the state in all lands under
whatever tenure they are held are reserved to the
state. under cl.18 it is provided inter alia that
in the case of pandaravaka lands held on the
erumpattom tenure the settlement shall be made
with the present holder of the land and in regard
to puravaka land with the janmam. clause 22
prescribes the procedure and the time for the
introduction of settlement. it requires that
before the introduction of the new rates of
assessment a rough patta shall be issued to each
of the landholders showing the relevant detail of
his holdings and the assessment to be paid by him
hereafter. the object of preparing such a patta is
to
give an opportunity to the landholders to bring to
the numberice of the authorities their objections if
any. the objections are then required to be heard
before the final entries are made. clause 26
declares that the new settlement shall be current
for a term of thirty years. this has been done
with a view to secure the utmost freedom of action
to the landholders in improving their properties
and turning them to the best advantage according
to their means and inclination. clause 27 deals
with escheats and cl. 28 makes general provisions
as to the formation of a new land record including
reassessment of land and the registration of
titles a work calculated to promote the well-
being of a state. it would thus be seen that under cl. 13 the
person holding lands on the pandaravaka
verumpattom tenure is number a tenant. he is given
the proprietary right in the soil itself subject
of companyrse to the rights as to metals and minerals
reserved in favour of the state. indeed the whole
scheme of the new proclamation appears to be to
change the character of the possession of the
pandaravaka verumpattom tenure-holder from that of
a tenant into that of a proprietor-holder. it is
true that he is made liable to pay half of the net
produce and that may appear to be a little too
high but the measure of the levy will number companyvert
what is intended to be a recovery of assessment
into a recovery of rent. the proprietor of the
land held on pandaravaka verumpattom tenure is
nevertheless a proprietor of the land and he holds
the land subject to his liability to pay the
assessment to the state. it is number difficult to
imagine that in a fairly large number of lands
held by pandaravaka verumpattom tenure-holders the
holders in turn would let out the lands to the
cultivators and thus would companye into existence a
local equivalent of the class of intermediaries. land revenue record is required to be prepared by
the proclamation and relevant entries showing the
extent of the properties belonging to
the respective holders and the details about their
liability to pay the assessment are intended to be
shown in the said record. in our opinion it would
number be reasonable to hold that the lands held by
the petitioner under the pandaravaka verumpattom
tenure do number companyfer on him the proprietary right
at all but make him a tenant of the state. in the
proclamation there does number appear to be a
provision for forfeiture or surrender and the
scheme adopted by the proclamation suggests that
the amount due from the tenure-holder by was of
assessment would presumably be recovered as
arrears of land revenue and number as rent. therefore we are inclined to hold that the
pandaravaka verumpattom can be regarded as a local
equivalent of an estate under cl.  2   a  of art. 31a. the position with regard to puravaka lands is
still more clear. clause 14 of the proclamation
enumerates four kinds of more favourable tenures. the first of these is the class of puravaka lands. clause 15 provides that in the case of puravaka
lands a third party called janmi is recognised as
owning proprietorship in the land and therefore
entitled to share the produce with the cultivator
and the sirkar. then the clause describes the mode
in which share of the state or its demand on these
puravaka lands is calculated under the previously
existing land system and it provides new rates of
assessment payable in respect of the puravaka
tenure. the puravaka tenure in the state the
clause adds companyresponds to the numbermal companyditions
of land tenure in the district of malabar where
in the recently introduced settlements the net
produce was distributed among the cultivator the
janmi and the state in the following proportion

in wet lands in
garden lands or
vrikshapattom
parambas

cultivator 5 out of 15 5
out of 15
jenmi 4 out of 15 5
out of 15
state 6 out of 15 5
out of 15

since it was thought that the said method of
apportionment was fair and equitable the clause
adopted the same in the state of companyhin. it would
thus be clear that the lands held by the
petitioner under the puravaka tenure satisfy the
test of even the narrow companystruction placed by the
petitioner on the term estate in cl.  2  a . therefore there can be numberdoubt that about 350
acres of land held by the petitioner on the
puravaka tenure companystitute an estate under cl.  2  a . the result is that the lands held by the
petitioner are an estate under cl.  2  a  and so
the act in so far as it operates against the
holdings of the petitioner is protected under art. 31a 1  a  and so it is number open to the petitioner
to challenge its validity on the ground that its
material provisions offend against arts. 14 19
and 31 of the companystitution. the writ petition
accordingly fails and is dismissed. there will be
numberorder as to companyts. ayyangar j.-i regret i am unable to agree
that art. 31a of the companystitution saves the kerala
agrarian relations act 1960 from challenge under
arts. 14 19 and 31 of the companystitution in so far
as the said act relates to the pandaravaka lands
of the petitioner. before however dealing with this point i
consider it proper to add that i entirely agree
that the act was properly enacted by the state
legislature and that the companysideration of the
remitted bill by the new legislative assembly did
number violate the provisions of art. 20 of the
constitution. in my judgment the terms of art. 196
of the companystitution proceed on the basis that the
constitution-maker
in line with the framers of the government of
india act 1935 radically departed from the
theory of the british companystitutional law and the
practice obtaining in the parliament of the united
kingdom as regards the effect of dissolution of
the houses of the legislature on bills passed by
the house or houses and pending the assent of the
head of the state. article 196 by its third clause
having negatived the english rule that bills
pending in the legislature lapse by reason of
prorogation goes on to enact cls.  4  and  5
making special provision for lapse in the event of
number prorogation but dissolution. clause  5
enacts
a bill which is pending in the
legislative assembly of a state or which
having been passed by the legislative
assembly is pending in the legislative
council shall lapse on a dissolution of the
assembly. this clause on its terms applies both to states
which have and which do number have a bicameral
legislature. in its application to a state without
a legislative companyncil the relevant words of the
clause would read a bill which is pending in a
legislative assembly of a stateshall
lapse on dissolution of the assembly. the
question that arises on the terms of this clause
may be stated thus can a bill be said to be
pending before the legislative assembly when it
has gone through all the stages of the procedure
prescribed for its passage through the house and
has been passed by the assembly ? expressed in
other words does the pendency of a bill before
the assembly cease when it has passed through all
the stages through which bills pass before the
house or is it to be deemed as pending before the
house until the bill receives the assent of the
governumber or the president as the case may be the
latter event arising when bills are reserved by
the governumber for the presidents assent ? unless
it companyld be companytended that a bill
is pending in the legislative assembly until
assent there companyld be numberscope for the argument
based on art. 196 5  in support of the position
that an unassented bill is still pending in the
assembly. in this companytext the difference in the
terminumberogy employed in art. 196 3  and 196 5
requires to be numbericed. whereas art. 196 3  speaks
of the pendency of a bill in the legislature of a
state which would having regard to the
description of legislature in art. 168 include
the governumber art. 196 5  uses the words
legislative assembly as if to indicate that it
is only in the event of the bill being pending
before that body that it lapses on dissolution. in
the face of the provision in art. 196 5  there is
numberjustification for invoking the biritish
practice under which bills number assented to before
the dissolution of the houses are treated as
having lapsed on that event occurring. if the governumber can assent or refuse to
assent to a bill which has passed through all the
stages of companysideration by a legislative assembly
even though that assembly is dissolved under the
terms of art. 200 because the bill is a live bill
within the terms of that article it would follow
that he can exercise the other alternative open to
him under that article viz. to reserve the bill
for the presidents assent. if by reason of the
language employed in art. 196 5  the bill is alive
so far and the president companyld assent to the bill
it would follow that subject to an argument based
on the terms of art. 201 he can also remit the
bill for reconsideration by the assembly
numberwithstanding the dissolution. the next question for companysideration is
whether there is anything in the terms of art. 201
which precludes effect being given to the above
principle. the article runs

when a bill is reserved by a
governumber for the companysideration of the
president the president shall declare either
that he assents to the bill or that he
withholds assent therefrom
provided that where the bill is number a
money bill the president may direct the
governumber to return the bill to the house or
as the case may be the houses of the
legislature of the state together with such a
message as is mentioned in the first proviso
to article 200 and when a bill is so
returned the house or houses shall
reconsider it accordingly within a period of
six months from the date of receipt of such
message and if it is again passed by the
house or houses with or without amendment it
shall be presented again to the president for
his companysideration. companysiderable stress was laid by the learned
counsel on the use of the two expressions return
the bill to the house and the house shall
reconsider it accordingly as indicating that the
words underlined unmistakably implied that the
consideration of the bill must be by the assembly
which originally passed it. it was in this
connection that reliance was placed on the terms
of art. 172 1  reading  omitting the proviso which
is immaterial for the present purpose
172.  1  every legislative assembly of
every state unless sooner dissolved shall
continue for five years from the date
appointed for its first meeting and numberlonger
and the expiration of the said period of five
years shall operate as a dissolution of the
assembly
the argument was that the companystitution did number
envisage the assemblies having a companytinuous life
but
that on the other hand it clearly companytemplated
different legislative assemblies each one having a
definite life which ended either automatically at
the end of five years or at an earlier period by
dissolution and that in the companytext of this
provision to the words return and reconsider
employed in art. 201 their literal meaning must be
attached. it is number possible to accept this
construction as to the effect of art. 172 on the
rest of the provisions in this part. numberdoubt for
particular purposes each assembly is companyceived of
as having a life of limited duration but it does
number follow that the companystitution does number envisage
the legislature as an institution. in this
connection i companysider it useful to refer to the
decision of the privy companyncil in attorney-general
for new south wales v. rennie  1 . the question
before the board was as ragards the true
construction of a new south wales statute-the
parliamentary representatives allowance act-
which by its s. 2 made an annual grant to every
member of the legislative assembly number serving or
hereafter to serve therein. section 2 of the
imperial act which enacted the companystitution act of
the companyony provided that every legislative
assembly was to companytinue for five years from the
day of the return of writs for choosing the same
and numberlonger subject to be sooner prorogued or
dissolved by the governumber of the companyony which
term was by a later enactment reduced to three
years. the attorney-general for new south wales
raised an information seeking a declaration that
there were numbermoneys legally available or
applicable to the payment of members of future
assemblies with a prayer that the auditor-general
might be restrained from companyntersigning the
authorisation of such payments. the supreme companyrt
of the companyony dismissed the information whereupon
the attorney-general brought the matter in appeal
to the privy
council. the question turned on the meaning of the
words the legislative assembly in s. 2 of the
act and reliance was placed on behalf of the
appellant on the provision for dissolution
contained in the imperial act. it was companytended
that the assembly was a body of limited duration
called into existence from time to time and number a
permanent and companytinuous body and that
consequently the act granting the allowance should
be companystrued as applying to the members of the
particular assembly in existence on the date of
the act. rejecting this argument sir richard
couch stated
they think that according to the
ordinary use of the term legislative
assembly it means the assembly created by the
constitution act which though liable to be
dissolved or to expire by effluxion of time
is an essential part of the companystitution of
the companyony and must be regarded as a
permanent body. i companysider these words apt to describe the
reference to the house of the legislature in the
proviso to art. 201. i therefore respectfully
concur in the view that the bill was validly
passed and that the objection based on an
infringement or companytravention of art. 201 must be
repelled. i shall number take up for companysideration the
merits of the petition. the petitioner is the
owner of about 1250 acres of land in trichur in
the erstwhile princely state of companyhin. out of
this extent 900 acres are classified in the land
records of the state as pandaravaka verumpattom
lands and the remaining are entered as puravaka
lands. while so the kerala legislature enacted the
kerala agrarian relations act 1960  kerala act iv
of 1961  providing for the acquisition of certain
types of agricultural lands in the state beyond
the specified maximum extents laid down in the
statute and
on payment of companypensation as determined by it. the details of this legislation are set out and
their impact on the owners of landed property in
the state are dealt with in full in the judgment
in writ petitions 114 and 115 which is being
pronumbernced today. in the circumstances it is number
necessary to say more about the enactment than
point out that it seriously interferes with the
rights of landowners in a manner which as held in
the judgment in the other petitions is violative
of the rights guaranteed to citizens by part iii
of the companystitution. for the respondent however
the main defence on this petition is based on art. 31a the submission being that the lands of the
petitioner by reason of the tenure by which he
holds them companystitute an estate within the
definition of that term in art. 31a 2  a . as the
tenures which are involved in the case companyer
considerable areas of the former state of companyhin
and as the implications arising from any decision
as regards these tenures might affect other areas
particularly in south india the effect of the
acceptance of the submission by the respondent
would be far-reaching. i have therefore companysidered
it proper to deal with matter from a wider angle
than would be necessary if the effect of our
decision would be companyfined to tenures of
infrequent occurrence. the two tenures into which the lands held by
the petitioner fall are as stated earlier
pandaravaka verumpattom and the puravaka but
before companysidering their characteristics it will
be useful to attempt a picture of the general
system of landholding in malabar. as is well
knumbern malabar-comprising the territories of the
former princely state of travancore companyhin and
the companytiguous district of malabar in the former
presidency of madras was among the few areas in
india in which freehold rights in land were
recognised. this exclusive right and hereditary
possession and usufruct of the soil was denumbered by
the term jenm
and the holder was designated the jenmi or the
jenmikaran. the jenmis had full and obsolute
property in the soil. all land which was number the
property of jenmis or ceased to be theirs-such as
by forfeiture were held by the state. these lands
were let for rent to cultivators on terms of
paying rent. the assertion by the state to the
proprietorship of the soil which carried with it a
denial of the right of alienation by the tenant of
the leased lands and so of the right to hereditary
enjoyment was besides being companytrary to the
accepted theory of the hindu law givers was also
productive of grave econumberic ills. according to
the hindu law givers starting from manu property
in the soil arose out of occupation and
cultivation. the texts which expound this position
are set out and discussed by westropp c. j. in
vykunta bapuji v. government of bombay 1   see
also sundaraja iyengar land tenures in the madras
presidency pp. 5 to21 . according to this theory
the king was number the owner of cultivated land but
the proprietary interest in it vested in the
cultivator the right of the king being merely to
the raja bhagam which represented various
proportions of the produce sometimes thought of
as being a sixth and at other times at higher
proportions ranging up to a half. as observed by
subramania iyer j. in venkata narasimha v.
kotayya  2 . for in the first place sovereigns
ancient or modern did here set up more than
a right to a share of the produce raised by
raiyats in lands cultivated by them however
much that share varied at different times. andin the language of the board of revenue
which long after the permanent settlement
regulations were passed investigated and
reported upon the nature of the rights of
ryots in the various parts of the presidency
whether rendered in service in money or in
kind and whether paid to rajas jagirdars
zemindars poligars mutadars
shro-triemdars inamdars or to government
officers such as tahsildars amildars amins
or thannadars the payments which have always
been made are universally deemed the due of
government.  see the proceedings of the
board of revenue dated 5th january 1818
quoted in the numbere at page 223 of dewan
bahadur srinivasa raghava ayyangars
progress in the madras presidency . this proprietary interest of the cultivator was in
its true sense a property right-being capable of
alienation and of hereditary enjoyment. at the
time of permanent settlement regulation in bengal
 1793  and subsequently when its madras
counterpart was enacted  regulation xxv of 1802
there was a great deal of companytroversy as to
whether the east india companypany as the ruler was or
was number entitled to the proprietary rights to the
soil in the companyntry. in the words of westropp c.
j. in vykunta bapuji v. government of bombay  1
involved in this
was the question as to the character in
which native governments claimed from the
occupants of the land payments either in
money or in produce in respect of the land. were these payments rent or revenue ? some
maintained that those payments were rent number
revenue because it was said the land companyld
only be occupied and cultivated by the
permission of the sovereign and that such
produce as there may be in excess of what
sufficed for the bare subsistence of the
cultivators and for the expenses of
cultivation is the property of the
sovereign. others maintained that the
sovereign was only entitled to a fixed
portion of the produce and that the surplus
beyond that portion plus the subsistence of
the rayuts  cultivators
and the companyt of cultivation belonged to a
class of great landlords between the
sovereign and the rayuts which intermediate
class companysisted of zamindars talukdars or
similar personages while others again
strongly companytended that subject to a land-
tax payable to the sovereign the property in
the soil was vested in the cultivator
sometimes in the form of village companymunities
holding companyporately at other times
individuals holding in severalty or jointly
as members of an undivided family. in 1793
 either upon the ground that the soil was
vested in the sovereign power and that it
was expedient that by that power a landed
aristocracy should be created or upon the
ground that the land subject to the revenue
assessment i.e. the kings  or states share
of the produce ought to be publicly
recognized as vested in the class of
zamindars c. as landlords  the permanent
settlement in bengal bihar and orissa was
made by the government of lord companynwallis by
recognizing the zamindars c. as the
proprietors of the soil and entitled to
transfer it and by fixing once for all the
land-tax payable by them to the state at an
immutable annual rate. in 1796 the government of madras declared that it
is the first feature in all the governments of
india that the sovereign whether he be a
mussulman or hindoo is lord of the soil and hence
it is that numberalienation of lands from the
property of the circar or rather numberpossession of
land whatever is valid without a written
instrument from the superior lord and this
distinction has invariably followed the companyquests
of all nations who have established themselves in
india. this statement was directly companytrary to
accepted practice and the companysciousness of the
cultivator in madras. it is number therefore a matter
for surprise
that in answer to this declaration of the
government the board of revenue at once pointed
out that there were hereditary cultivators on
lands with the right of making any disposition of
them by sale mortgage or otherwise as long as
they paid the government revenue and that they
only companyld number make any alienation of them to the
exclusion of the royal share of the revenue. acting on the view that the crown was the
proprietor of the soil the birtish government
purported to companyfer proprietary rights in the soil
on the zamindars under the permanent settlement
the preamble to which referred to the reservation
by the ruling power of the implied right and
actual exercise of the proprietary right to
possession of all lands whatever and by s. 2
purported to vest in the zamindars the proprietary
right to the soil. it was however found that this
interfered with the established rights of
cultivators and madras regulation iv of 1822 was
passed to declare that the provisions of
regulation xxv of 1802 were number intended to affect
the actual ryots in cultivation of lands. it might
be added that the privy companyncil ruled in companylector
of trichinapally v. lekkamoni  1  that the theory
underlying these words in the regulation were number
sustainable and that there were proprietary rights
in land number traceable to or derived from the
sovereign. the introduction of the permanent settlement
with the creation of a class of zamindars as in
bengal was number companysidered to be a beneficial
system by the government of madras and so after
the grant of some sanads under madras regulation
xxv of 1802-mostly in recognition of ancient
titles-the creation of new permanently settled
estates was stopped and in its place the system
of revenue administration associated with the name
of sir thomas munro knumbern as the ryotwari system
was adopted. according to munro there was
numberneed for the interposition of an intermediary
between the state and the actual cultivator
particularly as it was clear that the system meant
that the zamindars enjoyed what the cultivator
parted with to the state in other words the
difference between the rent paid by the actual
cultivator viz. the melwaram and the peishcush
or the jama fixed by the zamindar or proprietor
was so much profit for the middleman and therefore
pro tanto a diminution of the amount which would
have accrued to the state. besides munro
considered that on econumberic grounds and with a
view to increase agricultural production it was
necessary for the state being in touch with the
actual cultivator. for these reasons he formulated
the ryotwari system and introduced it in several
areas of the madras presidency and companymbatore
district adjoining the state of companyhin being
almost the first among the districts where the
system was introduced. the basic and essential
feature of the system was that the fixation of the
revenue assessment payable by the cultivator had
to be proceeded by a survey of the a land which
included the ascertainment of the productivity of
the soil and that the assessment should be based
on what was knumbern as tharam  or quality
classification. the assessment thus began to be
based on scientific data and principles-and was so
designed as to leave a sufficient margin to the
cultivator to induce him to remain on the land and
be assured of a good share in increased production
resulting from the employment of his labour and
capital. the terms on which the ryot held the land
was companytained in the patta issued to him on behalf
of the government and this specified the extent of
land held by him as well as the amount of the
assessment and the time when the instalments had
to be paid. this was number however companysidered to be
any document of title because the ryot had the
property in him and his interest was a proprietary
interest in the soil and so capable
of being alienated and of being transmitted to his
heirs. this however was number anything new and it
was number as if the interest of the cultivator was
number alienable before the ryotwari system was
introduced. before that date however the
assessment of the land was both heavy in most
parts and unequal-number being based on the
productive capacity of the soil as to leave
little or numbermargin to the cultivator. besides the
predations of revenue and the severity of the tax
was dependent on the exigencies and necessities
if number the whims of the ruler and in such a
situation even though technically cultivated land
was capable of alienation there being numberban on
alienation still having regard to the meagre
margin left to the owner and the fear of increased
taxation based on numberprinciple numberpurchaser companyld
be found though owing to the impossibility of
finding a more profitable use for manual labour
apart from the sentimental attachment to land the
actual cultivator clung to his holding. but when
with the advent of a system of assessment based on
fixed and scientific principles which left a
sufficient margin for the cultivator and there
was numberfear of sudden increases of assessment
land became a marketable companymodity investment in
which was rendered worthwhile. numberwithstanding that in malabar absolute
ownership of the soil by the jenmi where the land
was the property of individuals and of the state
where it was the owner was a characteristic of
the landholding still from a fairly early date
after the british companyquest of the neighbouring
areas the companycept of the cultivator with whom the
state entered into direct relations being companyceded
the proprietorship of the soil slowly permeated. in this companynection i might usefully refer to
a proclamation of the ruler of travancore of 1865
 1040 m. e.  regarding sarkar-pattom lands with
the observation that subject to variations
dependent on local usages the system of land
tenure and the companycepts as regards the rights of
property in land were substantially similar in
travancore and companyhin. sarkar-pattom lands were
what might be termed crown lands of which the
ruler was deemed to be the jenmi or the landlord. previous to the proclamation the lands were
legally capable of being resumed by the ruler
though this was seldom done and the cultivators
were number legally entitled to transfer their rights
and where this was done the government had the
right to ignumbere the transaction. the fact that the
cultivator was companyceived of as having no
proprietary interest on the land also bore
adversely on the state since the state was
deprived of the means of realising any arrears of
revenue by bringing the holding to sale. it was to
remedy this situation that the proclamation was
issued and the preamble and its terms carry the
impress of the impact of the ryotwari system of
madras. the proclamation reads
whereas we earnestly desire that the
possession of landed as well as other
property in our territory should be as secure
as possible and whereas we are of opinion
that with this view sirkar pattom lands can
be placed on a much better footing than at
present so as to enhance their value we are
pleased to numberify to our ryots-
1st. that the sirkar hereby and for ever
surrenders for the benefit of the people
all optional power over the following classes
of lands whether wet garden or dry and
whether included in the ayacut accounts or
registered since
ven pattom
vettolivoo pattom
maraya pattom
olavoo pattom
mara pattom
and all such durkast pattom the tax of which is
understood to be fixed till the next survey and
assessment. 2ndly. that the ryots holding these
lands may regard them fully as private
heritable saleable and otherwise
transferable property. 3rdly. accordingly the sales
mortgages c. of these lands will
henceforward be valid may be effected on
stamped cadjans and will be duly registered. the lands may be sold for arrears of tax in
execution of decrees of companyrts and such other
legitimate purposes and may also be accepted
as security by the sirkar as well as by
private individuals. 4thly. that the holders of the lands in
question may rest assured that they may enjoy
them undisturbed so long as the appointed
assessment is paid. 5thly. that the said holders are
henceforth at full liberty to lay out labour
and capital on their lands of the aforesaid
description to any extent they please being
sure of companytinued and secure
possession
the language employed in the proclamation is
of significance. it speaks of the relinquishment
or withdrawal of the right of the state and number of
the companyferment of a right on the ryot so as to
render the ryot a grantee from the state just in
line with the hindu law theory of the
proprietorship of the soil vesting in the
occupant-cultivator. with this background i shall proceed to
consider the nature of the tenures-pandaravaka and
puravaka-with which this petition is companycerned. the two tenures are quite different in their
origin and essential characteristics and so have
to be separately dealt with. pandaravaka lands are
those in which the state held proprietary rights-
the
name being derived from bandara or the treasury
while in regard to the puravaka they were lands
in which the proprietorship vested in the jenmi
but which were under the cultivation of tenants on
whom the state imposed land revenue. putting aside
for the moment the puravaka lands the pandaravaka
lands might be approximated to the crown lands
dealt with by the travancore proclamation of 1865
already referred to. the terms on which the
tenants held the right of the crown were almost
the same as in the other case. the evils which the
system gave rise to the econumberic insecurity of
the tenant and the companysequent lack of incentive on
his part to put his best exertion on the land and
the resultant loss to the state in the shape of
revenue as well as the rise of a companytented
peasantry were exactly parallel to the situation
which faced the ruler of travancore leading to the
proclamation of 1865. it was in these
circumstances that the ruler of companyhin issued a
proclamation on march 10 1905 which defined with
precision the rights of the state and of the
cultivator in regard to these lands and it is the
submission of the learned attorney-general that
the effect of this proclamation is to render the
pandaravaka and puravaka lands held by the
petitioner estates within the meaning of art. 31a 2  of the companystitution as it number stands. it is
therefore necessary to set out in some detail the
terms of this proclamation. the preamble to the proclamation recites the
fact that the state demand had number been fixed
either with reference to the actual measurements
of the land or on any fixed or uniform principles
and that a revision of the state demand based upon
a companyrect measurement of lands and definite
principles fair alike to the state and our
agricultural population is desirable in the
interest of a sound revenue administration. it
then proceeds to state
that a survey which included the demarcation
mapping and the preparation of an accurate record
of titles in respect of all descriptions of
properties was to be carried out and that a
settlement or revision of the state demand would
be companyducted in accordance with the principles
laid down by the proclamation. in passing it may
be mentioned that this is reminiscent of the
despatches of thomas munro in which he expatiates
upon the need of a proper survey and a companyrect
definition of the principles upon which land
revenue shall be assessed and that the quantum of
revenue should be such as while providing for a
fair share to the state should leave enumbergh for
the cultivator to live upon and offer an
inducement to him to increase the output of his
fields in which event the surplus available to him
would be more. in particular i might refer to a
passage in a despatch which is extracted by
westropp c.j. in vykunta bapuji v. government of
bombay  1  reading
when the land revenue is fixed and light
the farmer sees that he will reap the reward of
his own industry the cheerful prospect of
improving his situation animates his labours and
enables him to replace in a short time the losses
he may sustain from adverse seasons the
devastations of war and other accidents. paragraph 5 of the proclamation directs that
lands whether wet or dry were to be classified
with reference to the nature of their soils in
accordance with the table of classification
prescribed in the madras settlement manual which
is sufficiently indicative of the close
correspondence between the ryotwari system and
mode of fixation of land revenue and the
principles underlying it as prevailed in the
neighbouring presidency of madras. paragraph 6
reads
under the present land revenue system
of the state lands are held under two main
tenures viz. pandaravaka and
puravaka
at this stage it is necessary only to add that the
proclamation does number deal with the rights as
between the state and jenmis i.e. that class of
land owners who were entitled to a freehold
interest in the land as explained earlier. i shall
deal later with special legislation with reference
to jenmis in the other princely state which is a
constituent of present state of kerala in its
proper place. paragraph 6 proceeds to enumerate
the six subsidiary classifications of the
pandaravaka tenure and enumerates the verumpattom
type as the first among them and this type is
taken as the standard for fixing the land revenue
of the other categories which it might be
mentioned are favourable tenants the state
demand being reduced. to these others which
partake of the nature of grants of land revenue
very different companysiderations would apply. the
lands of the petitioner held on pandaravaka
tenure it should be added fall within the sub-
category of verumpattom lands. the proclamation
then proceeds to state
the revenue paid to the state varies
according to the nature of the tenure i.e. the six sub-classes. it is however only the
pandaravaka verumpattom lands which pay the
full pattom or share due to the state. we
have accordingly decided that the pandaravaka
verumpattom shall be deemed as the numbermal
tenure for settling the full state demand and
that the other tenures shall be treated as
favourable tenures and settled on the lines
hereinafter indicated
paragraph 7 after reciting that the rates of
assessment on pandaravaka verumpattom wet lands
vary from place to place points out that such
disparity is indicative of unequal incidence and
stating that it was essential that the state
demand should
bear a fixed proportion to the produce a land is
capable of yielding annumbernces the decision that
the same shall be half the net produce. the
deductions to be made for ascertaining the net
produce are indicated. the next clause which is of
relevance and importance in the present companytext is
cl. 13 which runs

at present holders of pandaravaka
verumpattom lands do number possess any property
in the soil. as we are companyvinced that
proprietorship in soil will induce a
cultivator to improve his land and thereby
add to the agricultural prosperity of the
country we hereby declare that our
verumpattom holders of lands shall after the
new settlement has been introduced acquire
full rights to the soil of the lands they
hold and that their rights shall remain
undisturbed so long as they regularly pay the
state revenue provided that the rights to
metals and minerals possessed by the state
in all lands under whatever tenures they are
held are reserved to the state. paragraph 14 onwards deal with favourable tenures
and of these we are companycerned only with puravaka
lands and it is pointed out in paragraph 15 that
in the case of puravaka lands the jenmi is
recognised as owning the proprietorship in the
land and is companysequently entitled to share the
produce with the cultivator and the sirkar and
proceeds to define the state demand in such lands. there are other clauses dealing with other
incidents in regard to these tenures and in regard
to other interests in the land such as house-sites
etc. but we are number companycerned with them. the
proclamation also makes provision for the grant of
rough or draft pattas to cultivators and of fair
pattas detailing the assessment payable on such
lands-provisions exactly parallel to the practice
and procedure prevailing in the adjoining area of
the madras presidency. besides it also makes
provision against any revision of the assessment
once fixed before the expiry of 30 years also in
line with the then practice in madras. i have made
this analysis of the provisions of the
proclamation for the purpose of emphasizing that
what the proclamation intended to achieve was the
introduction of ryotwari system of settlement in
the place of exactions by the state based on no
principles and unrelated to the productivity of
the soil and having an unequal incidence for
different areas and different lands. the holder of
pandaravaka verumpattom patta was therefore
numberhing more or numberhing less than the holder of a
ryotwari patta in the adjoining madras state. the
only point of difference that companyld be suggested
is this. under the ryotwari system the
proprietorship of the ryot to the soil is number in
theory derived from the state whereas under the
proclamation of 1905 it appears to rest on a
grant. in my opinion this makes numberdifference
because the essential features of the system are
the same as those of ryotwari- 1  a direct
relationship between the state and the cultivator
and with the absence of any intermediary to
intercept the raja bhagam or land revenue  2
there is numbergrant or alienation of the states
right to revenue in favour of the grantee. the puravaka tenure was wholly different. they were lands held by jenmis. as i shall show
later jenmam lands were number exempt from the
payment of land revenue but the puravaka tenant
had the benefit of a favourable assessment. in
other words in respect of those lands the produce
of the land was the subject of sharing as between
the actual cultivator the jenmi and the state
though the jenmi had a freehold interest in the
land itself
the question for companysideration number is whether
the lands held under a patta by a pandaravaka
verumpattom and of jenmam lands by a puravaka
tenant are estates within the meaning of art. 31
a  2 . before examining the terms of art. 31 a  2
as they number stand it is necessary to refer to the
antecedent history which led to the first and the
fourth companystitutional amendments. preliminary to
this it might number be out of place to briefly
explain the circumstances which necessitated the
first amendment as pointing to the mischief which
that amendment was designed to remedy. very soon
after independence several states initiated land
reforms whose object was the elimination of the
intermediaries. the madras legislature enacted the
madras abolition of estates and companyversion into
ryotwari act 1948 by which intermediaries in the
shape of zemindars palayagars jagirdars
inamdars and other such proprietors were
eliminated and persons in actual cultivation of
the lands under the zemindars were brought into
direct relationship with the government by being
granted ryotwari pattas in respect of their former
holdings. there was similar legislation in bihar-
bihar act 1 of 1950 as also in some of the other
states of the indian union. the validity of the
several pieces of legislation was challenged in
the respective high companyrts principally on the
ground that the deprivation of the rights of the
zamindars etc. effected by these enactments and
the principles upon which the companypensation payable
for the deprivation was determined violated arts. 14 19 and 31 of the companystitution. the first case
in which a decision was rendered by a high companyrt
in respect of the companytentions urged was by the
patna high companyrt in kameshwar singh v. state of
bihar  1  in which the petition succeeded and
bihar abolition of estates act 1 of 1950 was
declared unconstitutional. an appeal was preferred
by the state against the judgment to this companyrt
and it was during
the pendency of this appeal and with a view to
validate the legislation which had been enacted in
the several states and which was the subject of
attack in several companyrts including this companyrt
that first companystitutional amendment by which art. 31a was introduced into the companystitution was
enacted. the companystitution  first amendment  act
1951 received the assent of the president on june
18 1951 but art. 31a which was introduced by s.
4 of this act was expressly made retrospective
from the companymencement of the companystitution. as then
enacted art. 31a ran
31a. saving of laws providing for
acquisition of estates etc.- 1
numberwithstanding anything in the foregoing
provisions of this part numberlaw providing for
the acquisition by the state of any estate or
of any rights therein or for the
extinguishment or modification of any such
rights shall be deemed to be void on the
ground that it is inconsistent with or takes
away or abridges any of the rights companyferred
by any provisions of this part
provided that where such law is a law
made by the legislature of a state the
provisions of this article shall number apply
thereto unless such law having been reserved
for the companysideration of the president has
received his assent. in this article-
 a  the expression estate shall in
relation to any local area have the same
meaning as that expression or its local
equivalent has in the existing law relating
to land tenures in force in that area and
shall also include any jagir inam or muafi
or other similar grant
 b  the expression rights in relation
to an estate shall include any rights vesting
in a proprietor sub-proprietor under-
proprietor tenure-holder or other
intermediary and any rights or privilege in
respect of revenue. in addition the first companystitution amendment act
also enacted by its s. 5 a further provision-art. 31b expressly validating the several enactments of
the various states which were then under challenge
and which were all set out in sch. 9 of the
constitution. from this companylocation it would be
seen that whereas art. 31b immunised from attack
all the pieces of legislation which had been
enacted by june 1951 art. 31a was intended to
render the same types of legislation enacted in
future immune from attack provided that the
enactments were reserved for the presidents
assent and were assented to by him. it is with
this background that one has to approach the
construction of art. 31a. clause  1  of art. 31a does number present any
difficulty in companystruction with reference to the
point number under discussion because its terms are
clear and apply to laws providing for the
acquisition by the state of any estate or rights
therein or the extinguishment or modification of
any such rights. the crucial words here are that
the rights which are acquired extinguished or
modified are rights in or in respect of an
estate. if there had been numberdefinition of the
expression estate one might have had to look to
the grammatical of literal meaning of the word
and the word might companyceivably be understood as
including persons interest in landed property
whatever may be the nature or extent of the
interest though the width of this meaning might
be companytrolled by the history of the provision the
antecedent state of circumstances and the mischief
which it was designed to overcome. but the
enactment has number left this matter for
investigation in that manner. sub-clause  2  a
contains the definition of expression estate and
sub-cl.  b  of rights in relation to an estate. it is obvious that the word estate in sub-cls.  a  and  b  mean the same and is employed to
designate identical types of land holding. if the
expression rights in relation to an estate in
sub-cl.  b
indicates that it is the estate or the right of
the intermediary that is companyprehended by the use
of the words proprietor sub-proprietor under-
proprietor tenure-holder or other intermediary
clearly the expression estate in sub-cl.  a  must
be understood as referring to such types of
landholder. it is also worth numbering that the words
shall also include any jagir inam or muafi or
other similar grant in sub cl.  a  have their
parallel in sub-cl.  b  by the words any rights
or privileges in respect of land revenue. the net
result therefore was that the term estate
signified the land held by an intermediary who
stood between the state and the actual tiller of
the soil and also the interests of those in whose
favour there had been alienation of the right to
revenue i.e. lands held on revenue free or on
favourable tenures. the two sub-clauses may number be
further examined to determine their companytent and
significance. taking first sub-cl.  a  it is
necessary to advert to two matters  1  the
reference to the local equivalent of the term
estate in the law existing in any local area
and  2  the denumberation of the words the existing
law in relation to land tenures in force in that
area. in regard to the local equivalent of the
term estate there is one observation i desire to
make. these words were number in the bill as
originally presented to parliament and were
brought in as a result of the suggestion of the
joint select companymittee to which the biii was
referred. in their report the select companymittee
stated
we have amended the definition of an
estate to companyer cases where the existing
law relating to land-tenure is in a regional
language for example in hindi or urdu and
uses the local equivalent of estate. i am far from saying that if the meaning of the
expression were clear the purpose for which the
words were used would determine their companystruction
but i am drawing attention to this passage from
the report of the joint select companymittee for
pointing out that by the use of the expression
local equivalent the central companycept of an
estate as would be clear from the terms of sub-
cl.  b  which in effect is a further definition
of the term estate was number intended to be
departed from. next as to the meaning of in the existing
law in relation to land-tenures. these words
raise for companysideration the question as to what
constitutes a land-tenure. if one had to go
merely by the grammatical meaning merely of
tenure derived from the latin tenere to hold
any kind of right or title by which property is
held would be included the only requirement would
be that the property should be held of anumberher. in
that wide sense it would include the case of land
held under an ordinary tenancy under a landlord
under the transfer of property act. obviously that
is number the sense in which the word is employed in
the clause. it has therefore to be understood as
comprehending that type of holding where the
holder is an intermediary between the state and
the tiller or is otherwise the grantee of land
revenue holding the land under a favourable
tenure. if this is the essential feature of the
concept of an estate under cl.  2  the
expression land-tenure must in the companytext mean
the tenure under which an estate as defined is
held. to read it otherwise and understand land-
tenure as designating any system of landholding
whether or number such system companyforms to the central
and essential companycept of estate would number be
correct. such an interpretation would result in
anumberaly that in an existing law in force in a
local area which uses the word estate and
includes within that definition particular
tenures only they and numbere also are included but
if such law does number refer to a tenure as an
estate then it companyprehends any
holding of land under government whatever be the
nature of the tenure. that would companystitute a
radical departure from the purpose of the first
amendment and a companystruction which is number
compelled by the words but on the other hand
contradicted by the companytext and setting in which
they occur. this leads me to the case where an existing
law in relation to land-tenures uses the term
estate and defines it in a particular manner and
that definition includes number merely the
proprietary rights of intermediaries or others
holding land on favourable tenures as described in
sub-cl.  b  but also others who hold properties in
their own right and describes the land-holding of
these others also as estates. the question would
then arise whether literal effect has or has number
to be given to the words defined as an estate
under the law relating to land-tenures occurring
in sub-cl.  a . one possible view to take would be
that having regard to the central companycept of an
estate as signifying the rights in land of an
intermediary etc. those whose rights in land did
number involve any assignment of the raja bhagam but
were in direct relationship with the state and
subject to the payment of the full assessment of
the revenue lawfully imposed upon it companyld number be
termed to have an interest in an estate number the
land held by them to fall within the companycept of an
estate as companyprehended in sub-cl.  a . the other view would be that if the operative
terms of art. 31a and in particular the definition
of an estate companytained in cl.  2  a
unambiguously companyered cases of number intermediaries
also effect would have to be given to the terms
used for it is a cardinal rule of interpretation
that the operative words of an enactment and in
this must be included the terms of the
constitution cannumber be companytrolled by reference to
the object for which the provision was introduced
where the words are unambiguous. if a law in force
in any local area
at the companymencement of the companystitution which was
a law in relation to land-tenures companytained the
definition of an estate then every species of
land-holding which fell within the definition and
was companyprehended by such law relating to land-
tenure would for the purpose of the companystitution
be companyprehended within the ambit of an estate
and it might be numberanswer in regard to any
particular species of land-tenure that its holder
was number an intermediary. i shall have occasion to
refer to the decisions which turn on this aspect
of the matter a little later. apart from the
exceptional cases just number mentioned where one is
faced with a definition of an estate in an
existing law i companysider that the first amendment
to the companystitution did number bring within the
definition of an estate the holdings of persons
other than intermediaries or those who held land
under grants on favourable tenures from
government-jagirdar inamdar muafidar etc. as
pointed out by venkatarama ayyar j. speaking for
this companyrt in thakur amar singhji v. state of
rajasthan  1
the object of art. 31a was to save
legislation which was directed to the
abolition of intermediaries so as to
establish direct relationship between the
state and the tillers of the soil
i shall number turn to sub-cl.  b  and to the
terminumberogy employed in it to define rights in
relation to an estate and examine how far this
definition affects the companytent of cl.  a  as above
explained. in the first place as already numbericed
the use of the word estate in the clause serves
to bring into it the companycept of an estate as
defined in cl.  a  pointing to the inter-
dependence of the two clauses necessitating their
having to be read together. the second point
requiring advertance is as regards the definition
purporting to be inclusive and number exhaustive. the
question arising therefrom may be
posed thus does the definition include any other
type of interest besides those enumerated
particularly of a different nature or
characteristic which companyld number be companyprehended
within the extension brought in by the words or
other intermediary. i am clearly of the opinion
that it does number and that the word includes is
here used in the sense of means and includes. in
this companynection i would usefully refer to the
observations of lord watson delivering the
judgment of the privy companyncil in dilworth v.
commissioner for land and income-tax  1
the word include is very generally
used in interpretation clauses in order to
enlarge the meaning of words or phrases
occurring in the body of the statute and
when it is so used these words or phrases
must be companystrued as companyprehending number only
such things as they signify according to
their natural import but also those things
which the interpretation clause declares that
they shall include. but the word include is
susceptible of anumberher companystruction which
may become imperative if the companytext of the
act is sufficient to shew that it was number
merely employed for the purpose of adding to
the natural significance of the words or
expressions defined. it may be equivalent to
mean and include and in that case it may
afford an exhaustive explanation of the
meaning which for the purposes of the act
must invariably be attached to these words or
expressions. if therefore the companystitutional validity of a
legislation extinguishing or modifying the rights
either of the pandaravaka verumpattomdars who were
in the position of a ryotwari pattadar or of the
puravaka holders who held under a jenmi of jenmam
land had to be tested with reference to
art. 31a as it stood when it was introduced by the
first amendment these interests under the
proclamation of 1905 would number be held to be an
estate and therefore outside the scope of the
protection against the guaranteed fundamental
rights. before examining the effect of the change
introduced by the fourth amendment to art. 31a it
might be useful to detail the circumstances which
put these tenures outside art. 31a under the first
constitution amendment. taking the puravaka tenure
first it ought to be mentioned that as would be
seen from the terms of the proclamation of 1905
extracted earlier puravaka lands were those in
the ownership of the jenmi but in respect of which
he was number directly in cultivation. the jenmi was
considered an absolute proprietor number merely of
lands which were cultivated but unlike the
ryotwari pattadar also those which were number under
his cultivation such as waste lands forests
etc. and he did number hold land under the state. in
other words his proprietorship to or rights over
the land of which he claimed ownership was number
traceable to any title derived from the state. but
numberwithstanding this freehold right that he
claimed and enjoyed the state was entitled from
the earliest times to assess his lands to land-
revenue. exemption from taxation was number any
essential companydition of jenmam tenure and the jenmi
was under an obligation to pay what was termed
raja bhagam which was the equivalent of the
expressionland-revenue. this incidence of jenmam
land did number therefore detract from its character
of its being the private and absolute property of
the jenmi. there was legislation in travancore as
regards the liability of the jenmi to pay the
land-tax or the raja bhagam except of companyrse in
those cases where anr particular land was rendered
tax-free as a mattey of grace or companycession by the
ruler. the legislation started with a royal
proclamation 1869  1042 m.e.  dealing with the
lands of jenmis and their relation
with their tenants. this proclamation was replaced
by regulation 5 of 1071  july 3 1896  which
continued in force with various amendments right
up to the date of the act whose validity is number
impugned and is referred to in it. by these pieces
of legislation the rights of the jenmi quoad his
tenants were regulated the grounds upon which
eviction would take place were laid down and the
customary rights enjoyed by either party were so
to speak companyified. i am pointing this out because
the existence of a law regulating the rights of
property-owners and defining their rights or
obligations either quoad the government in respect
of land-revenue or as regards persons holding land
under them did number by itself render such law one
relating to land-tenure within the meaning of
art. 31a 2  a . in order to be such a law it
should regulate the rights of persons holding
under grants from the government of the raja
bhagom. a law defining or regulating the levy of
assessment or revenue on lands held number under such
grants from the state would number be such a law. it
was for this reason that the interest of jenmis
and the lands owned in jenmam right did number fall
within art. 31a as it stood under the first
amendment to the companystitution and which
necessitated the fourth amendment to which i shall
refer later. the position of persons holding lands
on puravaka tenure would number be different from
that of the jenmis. as the puravaka lands were
held number under the state or under a grant from it
but under the jenmis though liable to pay raja
bhagam they would number be estates. the case of the pandaravaka verumpattomdars
would be similar and the lands held by them would
also number fall within the category of estate. this would be so because they like ryotwari
pattadars held the lands for cultivation directly
from the state and were niether intermediaries
number persons
who held their lands on a favourable tenure as
regards the payment of land revenue in other
words they were number alienees of the raja bhagam
to any extent and were therefore number intended to
be affected by the first amendment. for this
purpose it would make numberdifference whether the
origin of the ryots proprietary interest in the
land be traceable to the hindu law companycept of
title based on occupation and cultivation or to
the relinquishment by the state under the
travancore proclamation of 1865 or even to the
conferment of proprietary rights by the companyhin
proclamation of 1905. it is only necessary to add
that their being outside the ambit of art. 31a 2  and this would equally apply to the
interest of the jenmi was number due to their tenure
number being regulated by enacted law as distinct
from regulation either by the companymon law of by
departmental instructions in the shape of the
standing orders of the board of revenue or other
similar bodies. the point next to be companysidered is regarding
the effect of the change brought about by the
fourth amendment in 1955 which on its terms was
also to have retrospective effect from the
commencement of the companystitution. clause 3 of the
act which was substituted for the original cl. 1
of art. 31a provides for various types of
legislation interfering with property rights but
in respect of the matter number in question the words
in the original cl. 1 referring to a law
providing for the acquisition by the state of an
estate of an any rights therein or the
extinguishment or modification of any such rights
were left untouched. in regard to the definition
of an estate companytained in cl. 2 the only change
effected in sub-cl.  a  was the addition of the
words in the states of madras and travancore
cochin any janmam right after the word grant in
the clause as it stood and in sub cl.  b  the
addition of the words ryot and under-ryot
after the word tenure-holder in the original
clause. after the amendment the relevant words in
art. 31a read as follow

numberwithstanding anything companytained
in article 13 numberlaw providing for-
 a  the acquisition by the state of any
estate or of any rights therein or the
extinguishment or modification of any such
rights  shall be deemed to be
void on the ground that it is inconsistent
with or takes away or abridges any of the
rights companyferred by article 14 article 19 or
article 31
provided that where such law is a law
made by the legislature of a state the
provisions of this article shall number apply
thereto unless such law having been reserved
for the companysideration of the president has
received his assent. in this article-
 a  the expression estate shall in
relation to any local area have the same
meaning as that expression or its local
equivalent has in the existing law relating
to land tenures in force in that area and
shall also include any jagir inam or muafi
or other similar grant and in the sates of
madras and kerala any janman right
 b  the expression rights in relation
to an estate shall include any rights
vesting in a proprietor sub-proprietor
under-proprietor tenure-holder raiyat
under-raiyat or other intermediary and any
rights or privileges in respect of land
revenue. it is number open to dispute that if the words of the
statute are clear their import or companytent cannumber
be modified or varied either by way of extension
or of
diminution by reference to the presumed intention
gatherable from the statement of objects and
reasons to which i shall refer presently for it
is the enacted words that companystitute the record of
the intention of the legislature and where this is
clear any extrinsic aid is forbidden. number let us
look at the definition of an estate in sub-
cl.  a  where in express terms the lands held by a
jenmi are deemed to be a part of an estate. the
words that precede the newly introduced words
still retain their original form with the result
that they companytinue to companynumber the same idea and
their companytent remains unaltered. the result of
this would be that to the class of the lands of
proprietors who were intermediaries and of others
holding on favourable tenures which was designated
as an estate under the first companystitutional
amendment jenmi lands were by specific ad hoc
addition included. if therefore the holding of a
ryotwari proprietor was number companyprehended within
the definition of an estate the same cannumber be
included by reason of jenmi lands being brought
in. the argument that a raiyatwari holding has
merely by the inclusion of the jenmi become an
estate would require the entire clause to be
rewritten so as to make it read as embracing all
lands which are subject to payment of land revenue
to government. i companysider this companytention so
unreasonable and unrelated to the language used in
the clause as number to deserve serious
consideration. proceeding next to sub-cl.  b  i must point
out that it was on the introduction into it of the
words raiyat and under-raiyat that almost the
entire argument on behalf of the respondent was
rested. it is therefore necessary to scrutinize
carefully the effect of these words. there is no
doubt that if the words raiyat and under-raiyat
had been introduced in sub-cl.  b  as an
independent category of persons whose interests
were intended to be companyered by the definition
just as the lands held by jenmis were brought into
sub-cl.  a  then the words
of the definition would have to be given full
effect and the expression raiyat and under-
raiyat receive the companystruction urged before us
by the respondent. but they are however number
introduced as an independent category as has been
done in the case of the jenmam right but are
wedged in the midst of the enumeration of the
several types of tenures in estates such as those
of proprietor sub-proprietor under-proprietor and
tenure-holder-persons deriving their title to the
interest held by them either under grants by a
sovereign or under a title derived from grantees
from government the clause companytinuing to be wound
up by a reference to other intermediaries. as
regards this a few observations may pertinently be
made. the first is that even after the fourth
amendment the rights vesting in a proprietor
etc. still companytinue to be a definition of rights
in relation to an estate and if the word estate
in cl.  b  has to be read in the light of the
definition of that word in cl.  a  numberinterest
other than one in the estate of an intermediary or
of a grantee on a favourable tenure and other than
one in the estate of a jenmi would be companyered by
sub-cl. b .  2  i have already had occasion to
point out that raiyats in proprietary estates like
those of zamindars etc. did number claim title to
hold their lands from the proprietor but according
to law as understood their rights even preceded
that of the proprietor i.e. the rights vested in
them even before their proprietor. the interest of
such raiyats cannumber therefore be companyprehended
within the expression rights in relation to an
estate which as ordinarily understood would mean
rights created in an estate or held under the
proprietor. undoubtedly the words raiyat and
under-raiyat introduced by the fourth amendment
would companyprehend this class of raiyats because
they were raiyats in an estate as defined in sub-
cl. a . i am pointing this out for the purpose of
showing that it is number as if the words raiyat and
under-raiyat would be without any
meaning if they were number taken to extend to the
interest of every raiyatwari proprietor having
direct relationship with the state. in this
connection the decision in this companyrt in the state
of bihar v. rameshwar pratap narain singh  1  is
very relevant. the point in companytroversy before the
court was this. under the bihar land reforms act
 1 of 1950  the ex-intermediaries were companyferred
a ryoti interest in certain types of land
previously held by them as proprietors. as owners
of these lands they had been holding melas in some
places on these lands and were deriving
considerable income therefrom. by the bihar land
reforms amendment act of 1959 their right to hold
melas was taken away and it was the validity of
this enactment that was challenged in the case. it
was urged on their behalf that when the land-
holders were companyverted into raiyats they were
entitled to hold melas as an incident of their
rights as raiyats and that this companyld number be
adversely affected by state legislation without
the same standing the test of scrutiny under arts. 19 31 etc. of the companystitution. the state of
bihar which was the respondent in the writ
petition sought the protection of art. 31a of the
constitution as amended by the fourth amendment. dealing with the meaning of the words the raiyat
and under-raiyat in art. 31a 2  b  this companyrt
said
it is reasonable to think that the word
raiyat was used in its ordinary well-
accepted sense of the person who holds the
land under the proprietor or a tenure-holder
for the purpose of cultivation and the word
under-raiyat used in the equally well-
accepted and oridinary sense of a person who
holds land under a raiyat for the purpose of
cultivation. and speaking of the purpose of the fourth
amendment it was observed
at that time laws had already been
passed in most of the states for the
acquisition of the rights of intermediaries
in the estates rights of raiyats or under
raiyats who might answer the description
intermediary were also within the
definition because of the use of the word or
other intermediary. the only reason for
specifically including the rights of
raiyats and under-raiyats in the
definition companyld therefore be to extend the
protection of art. 31a to laws providing for
acquisition by the state governments of
rights of these raiyats or under-raiyats. in the circumstances and in the particular
setting in which the words raiyat or under
raiyat were introduced into the definition
in must be held that the words or other
intermediaryoccurring at the end do number
qualify or companyour the meaning to be attached
to the tenures newly added. in other words the decision was that the object
achieved by the fourth amendment by the
introduction of these two words in sub-cl.  b  was
to rope in the interests of raiyats and under
raiyats in estates numberwithstanding that the
ryot might number derive his interest in his holding
from the proprietor. the lands held by a ryotwari
proprietor other than those in estateswould number
be an estate within sub-cl.  a  number the interest
of such ryot in his holding an interest in an
estate within sub-cl.  b  having regard to the
collocation of the words which i have attempted to
explain earlier. in support of the companystruction that the
holdings of ryots were companyprehended within the
definition of estates in art. 31a 2  to
submissions were made. the first was based on the
object sought to be achieved by the fourth
constitutional amendment act as set out in the
statement of objects and reasons of the bill. the
passage relied on reads
while the abolition of zamindaris and
the numerous intermediaries between the state
and the tiller of the soil has been achieved
for the most part our next objectives in land
reform are the fixing of limits to the extent
of agricultural lands that companyld be held or
kept by any person the disposal of any land
held in excess of the prescribed maximum and
the further modification of the rights of
landowners tenants and agricultural
holders. i am unable to accept the argument that this
passage can be of any assistance in the
construction of cl.  a  or  b  of art. 31a  2 . as
already pointed out any extrinsic aid to
construction can sought only when the words of the
statute reasonably and properly interpreted are of
ambiguous import and the companystruction of the
clauses number under companysideration leads to no
ambiguity. in the circumstances to accept the
construction companytended for by respondent would be
number to interpret the enacted words but to rewrite
the clauses altogether. besides art. 31a makes
provision for special cases where on account of
overwhelming social needs the protection numbermally
afforded to the citizen by the guarantee of
fundamental rights is withdrawn. it would i
consider be a proper rule of companystruction to
interpret the terms of such a provision with
strictness which would serve to preserve the area
of the guaranteed freedoms from encroachment
except as specially provided. in other words if
the companystruction of art. 31a were ambiguous the
ambiguity should be resolved in favour of the
citizen so as to preserve to him the guarantee of
the fundamental rights guaranteed by arts. 14 19
and 31 except where the same has been denied to
him by the clear words of the companystitution. secondly reliance was placed on three
decisions of this companyrt shri ram ram narayan
medhi v. the state of bombay  1  atma ram v. the
state of punjab  2  and yavtamal v. state of
bombay  3 . in the two reported decisions no
doubt this companyrt held that interests of persons
similar to those of raiyatwari proprietors were
comprehended within the definition of an estate
within sub-cl.  a  but the reasoning upon which
this was rested in wholly inapplicable for
resolving the companytroversy number before us. in the
first case sri ram narain medhi v. the state of
bombay  1 -the bombay land revenue companye 1879
contained a definition of an estate which
included number merely the estates of intermediaries
such as zamindars taluqdars and other proprietors
but also an occupant i.e. a person who held
directly under the government and whose property
was assessed to land revenue in full. the question
however was whether the provision in art. 31 a  2
 a  that the expression estates shall have the
same meaning as that expression has in the
existing law relating to land tenures enforce in
the area companyld be read as permitting the
exclusion from the definition of interests which
were defined in such a law as estates on the
ground that such interests were number those of an
intermediary. this companyrt held that full effect had
to be given to these words and that the definition
of an estate in a pre-constitution law relating
to land-tenures must determine the companytent of that
expression. it would be seen that the result would
have been the same whether the case arose before
or after the fourth amendment. the decision in
atma ram v. the state of punjab  2  proceeds on an
identical basis and turned on the definition of an
estate in the punjab revenue act 17 of 1887. in
this as in the earlier case in relation to the
bombay land revenue companye there companyld be no
dispute that the enactment was a law in relation
to land-tenure. the only question therefore was
whether full effect companyld or ought to be given to
the words of the definition and this was answered
in the affirmative. in my opinion the learned
attorney-general cannumber derive any assistance from
either of these decisions. in the unreported
decision in yavatmal v. the state of bombay  1
the challenge was to the validity of a bombay
enactment of 1958 which extended the bombay
tenancy agricultural lands act 1956 to the
vidarbha region an enactment whose companystitutional
validity had been upheld by this companyrt in medhis
case. the argument before the companyrt was that the
lands of the petitioners were number an estate and
this for the most part was sought to be
supported by the absence of any definition of the
word estate in the madhya pradesh land revenue
code of 1954 which was taken to be the existing
law relating to landtenures in the vidarbha
region. this companyrt accepted the submission of
counsel for the respondent that art. 31a applied
to and saved the legislation from being impugned
under arts. 14 19 and 31 for the reason that the
interest of the petitioners in that case  who were
bhoomiswamis  was the local equivalent of an
estate. the decision therefore is numberauthority
for the point number under companysideration as to the
proper meaning to be attached to the word raiyat
and under-raiyat in sub-cl.  2  b  of art. 31a
or as regards the effect of the fourth amendment
to the companystitution in regard to the point number
under companytroversy. from the foregoing it would be seen that the
interests of the petitioner in the lands held by
him on puravaka tenure are within art. 31a because
they are lands belonging to a jenmi and so companyered
by the definition of an estate as amended by
virtue of the fourth amendment to the
constitution. with regard however to the
pandaravaka verumpattom lands i am clearly of the
opinion that they are number an estate and that the
interests of the
petitioner in them do number amount to an interest
in an estate within sub-cl.  b  of art. 31a 2 .