vote_manip_with_jerome.bbl
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\bibitem{Bartholdi91:Single}
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\newblock Single transferable vote resists strategic voting.
\newblock {\em Social Choice and Welfare}, 8(4):341--354, 1991.

\bibitem{Bartholdi89:Computational}
John~J. Bartholdi, III, Craig~A. Tovey, and Michael~A. Trick.
\newblock The computational difficulty of manipulating an election.
\newblock {\em Social Choice and Welfare}, 6(3):227--241, 1989.

\bibitem{Bartholdi89:Voting}
John~J. Bartholdi, III, Craig~A. Tovey, and Michael~A. Trick.
\newblock Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the
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\newblock {\em Social Choice and Welfare}, 6:157--165, 1989.

\bibitem{Conitzer02:Complexity}
Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm.
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\bibitem{Conitzer02:Elicitation}
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\newblock In {\em Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial
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\bibitem{Ephrati91:Clarke}
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\newblock The {C}larke tax as a consensus mechanism among automated agents.
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\bibitem{Ephrati93:Multi}
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\bibitem{Gibbard73:Manipulation}
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\newblock {\em Econometrica}, 41:587--602, 1973.

\bibitem{Gibbard77:Manipulation}
A~Gibbard.
\newblock Manipulation of schemes that mix voting with chance.
\newblock {\em Econometrica}, 45:665--681, 1977.

\bibitem{Gibbard78:Straightforwardness}
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\newblock Straightforwardness of game forms with lotteries as outcomes.
\newblock {\em Econometrica}, 46:595--614, 1978.

\bibitem{Karp72:Reducibility}
Richard~M Karp.
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\newblock In Raymond~E Miller and James~W Thatcher, editors, {\em Complexity of
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\bibitem{Mas-Colell95:Microeconomic}
Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael Whinston, and Jerry~R. Green.
\newblock {\em Microeconomic Theory}.
\newblock Oxford University Press, 1995.

\bibitem{Pennock00:Social}
David~M Pennock, Eric Horvitz, and C.~Lee Giles.
\newblock Social choice theory and recommender systems: Analysis of the
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\newblock In {\em Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial
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\bibitem{Satterthwaite75:Strategy}
M~A Satterthwaite.
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\newblock {\em Journal of Economic Theory}, 10:187--217, 1975.

\bibitem{Zeckhauser69:Majority}
R~Zeckhauser.
\newblock Majority rule with lotteries on alternatives.
\newblock {\em Quarterly Journal of Economics}, 83:696--703, 1969.

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