coop.bbl
\begin{thebibliography}{}

\bibitem[\protect\citeauthoryear{Aumann}{1959}]{Aumann59:Acceptable}
R~Aumann.
\newblock Acceptable points in general cooperative n-person games.
\newblock volume~IV of {\em Contributions to the Theory of Games}. Princeton
  University Press, 1959.

\bibitem[\protect\citeauthoryear{Bernheim \bgroup \em et al.\egroup
  }{1987}]{Bernheim87:Coalition-Proof}
B~Douglas Bernheim, Bezalel Peleg, and Michael~D Whinston.
\newblock Coalition-proof {N}ash equilibria: {I} concepts.
\newblock {\em J. of Economic Theory}, 42(1):1--12, June 1987.

\bibitem[\protect\citeauthoryear{Bilbao \bgroup \em et al.\egroup
  }{}]{Bilbao:Complexity}
J.~M. Bilbao, J.~R. Fernandez, and J.~J. Lopez.
\newblock Complexity in cooperative game theory.

\bibitem[\protect\citeauthoryear{Bilbao}{2000}]{Bilbao:Cooperative}
J.~M. Bilbao.
\newblock {\em Cooperative Games on Combinatorial Structures}.
\newblock Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000.

\bibitem[\protect\citeauthoryear{Charnes and
  Kortanek}{1966}]{Charnes66:Balanced}
A~Charnes and K~O Kortanek.
\newblock On balanced sets, cores, and linear programming.
\newblock Technical Report~12, Cornell Univ., Dept. of Industrial Eng. and
  Operations Res., Ithaca, NY, 1966.

\bibitem[\protect\citeauthoryear{Chatterjee \bgroup \em et al.\egroup
  }{1993}]{Chatterjee93:Noncooperative}
K. Chatterjee, B. Dutta, D. Ray, and K. Sengupta.
\newblock A noncooperative theory of coalitional bargaining.
\newblock {\em Review of Economic Studies}, 60:463--477, 1993.

\bibitem[\protect\citeauthoryear{Deng and
  Papadimitriou}{1994}]{Deng:Complexity}
Xiaotie Deng and Christos~H. Papadimitriou.
\newblock On the complexity of cooperative solution concepts.
\newblock {\em Mathematics of Operations Research}, pages 257--266, 1994.

\bibitem[\protect\citeauthoryear{Deng \bgroup \em et al.\egroup
  }{1997}]{Deng:Algorithms}
Xiaotie Deng, Toshihide Ibaraki, and Hiroshi Nagamochi.
\newblock Algorithms and complexity in combinatorial optimization games.
\newblock SODA 1997.

\bibitem[\protect\citeauthoryear{Evans}{1997}]{Evans97:Coalitional}
Robert Evans.
\newblock Coalitional bargaining with competition to make offers.
\newblock {\em Games and Economic Behavior}, 19:211--220, 1997.

\bibitem[\protect\citeauthoryear{Faigle \bgroup \em et al.\egroup
  }{1994}]{Faigle:Complexity}
U.~Faigle, S.~Fekete, W.~Hochstattler, and W.~Kern.
\newblock On the complexity of testing membership in the core of min-cost
  spanning trees.
\newblock Technical Report 94.166, Universitat zu Koln, 1994.

\bibitem[\protect\citeauthoryear{Garey and Johnson}{1979}]{Garey79:Computers}
Michael~R Garey and David~S Johnson.
\newblock {\em Computers and Intractability}.
\newblock W. H. Freeman and Company, 1979.

\bibitem[\protect\citeauthoryear{Gillies}{1953}]{Gillies53:Some}
D~Gillies.
\newblock {\em Some theorems on n-person games}.
\newblock PhD thesis, Princeton, Dept. of Mathematics, 1953.

\bibitem[\protect\citeauthoryear{Kahan and Rapoport}{1984}]{Kahan84:Theories}
James~P Kahan and Amnon Rapoport.
\newblock {\em Theories of Coalition Formation}.
\newblock Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers, 1984.

\bibitem[\protect\citeauthoryear{Ketchpel}{1994}]{Ketchpel:aaai94}
Steven Ketchpel.
\newblock Forming coalitions in the face of uncertain rewards.
\newblock AAAI, pages 414--419, Seattle, WA, July 1994.

\bibitem[\protect\citeauthoryear{Larson and Sandholm}{2000}]{Larson00:Anytime}
Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm.
\newblock Anytime coalition structure generation: An average case study.
\newblock {\em J. of Experimental and Theoretical AI}, 11:1--20, 2000.
\newblock Early version: AGENTS, pp. 40--47, 1999.

\bibitem[\protect\citeauthoryear{Mas-Colell \bgroup \em et al.\egroup
  }{1995}]{Mas-Colell95:Microeconomic}
Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael Whinston, and Jerry~R. Green.
\newblock {\em Microeconomic Theory}.
\newblock Oxford University Press, 1995.

\bibitem[\protect\citeauthoryear{Milgrom and
  Roberts}{1996}]{Milgrom96:Coalition}
Paul Milgrom and John Roberts.
\newblock Coalition-proofness and correlation with arbitrary communication
  possibilities.
\newblock {\em Games and Economic Behavior}, 17:113--128, 1996.

\bibitem[\protect\citeauthoryear{Moreno and Wooders}{1996}]{Moreno96:Coalition}
Diego Moreno and John Wooders.
\newblock Coalition-proof equilibrium.
\newblock {\em Games and Economic Behavior}, 17:80--112, 1996.

\bibitem[\protect\citeauthoryear{Okada}{1996}]{Okada96:Noncooperative}
Akira Okada.
\newblock A noncooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers.
\newblock {\em Games and Economic Behavior}, 16:97--108, 1996.

\bibitem[\protect\citeauthoryear{Ray}{1996}]{Ray96:Coalition}
Indrajit Ray.
\newblock Coalition-proof correlated equilibrium: A definition.
\newblock {\em Games and Economic Behavior}, 17:56--79, 1996.

\bibitem[\protect\citeauthoryear{Sandholm and
  Lesser}{1997}]{Sandholm97:Coalition}
Tuomas Sandholm and Victor~R Lesser.
\newblock Coalitions among computationally bounded agents.
\newblock {\em Artificial Intelligence}, 94(1):99--137, 1997.
\newblock Special issue on Economic Principles of Multiagent Systems. Early
  version: International Joint Conference on Artificial
  Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 662--669, 1995.

\bibitem[\protect\citeauthoryear{Sandholm \bgroup \em et al.\egroup
  }{1999}]{Sandholm99:Coalition}
Tuomas Sandholm, Kate Larson, Martin Andersson, Onn Shehory, and Fernando
  Tohm\'e.
\newblock Coalition structure generation with worst case guarantees.
\newblock {\em Artificial Intelligence}, 111(1--2):209--238, 1999.
\newblock Early version appeared at the National Conference on Artificial
  Intelligence (AAAI), pages 46--53, 1998.

\bibitem[\protect\citeauthoryear{Shapley}{1967}]{Shapley67:Balanced}
L.~S. Shapley.
\newblock On balanced sets and cores.
\newblock {\em Naval Research Logistics Quarterly}, 14:453--460, 1967.

\bibitem[\protect\citeauthoryear{Shehory and Kraus}{1996}]{Shehory96:Kernel}
Onn Shehory and Sarit Kraus.
\newblock A kernel-oriented model for coalition-formation in general
  environments: Implemetation and results.
\newblock In {\em Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial
  Intelligence (AAAI)}, pages 134--140, Portland, OR, August 1996.

\bibitem[\protect\citeauthoryear{Shehory and Kraus}{1998}]{Shehory98:Methods}
Onn Shehory and Sarit Kraus.
\newblock Methods for task allocation via agent coalition formation.
\newblock {\em Artificial Intelligence}, 101(1--2):165--200, 1998.

\bibitem[\protect\citeauthoryear{Tohm\'e and
  Sandholm}{1999}]{Tohme99:Coalition}
Fernando Tohm\'e and Tuomas Sandholm.
\newblock Coalition formation processes with belief revision among bounded
  rational self-interested agents.
\newblock {\em Journal of Logic and Computation}, 9(97--63):1--23, 1999.
\newblock Early version: IJCAI-97 Workshop on Social
  Interaction and Communityware, pp. 43--51, Nagoya, Japan.

\bibitem[\protect\citeauthoryear{van~der Linden and
  Verbeek}{1985}]{Linden85:Coalition}
Wim~J van~der Linden and Albert Verbeek.
\newblock Coalition formation: {A} game-theoretic approach.
\newblock In Henk A~M Wilke, editor, {\em Coalition Formation}, volume~24 of
  {\em Advances in Psychology}. North Holland, 1985.

\bibitem[\protect\citeauthoryear{Wu}{1977}]{Wu77:Dynamic}
L.~S. Wu.
\newblock A dynamic theory for the class of games with nonempty cores.
\newblock {\em SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics}, 32:328--338, 1977.

\bibitem[\protect\citeauthoryear{Zlotkin and
  Rosenschein}{1994}]{Zlotkin:aaai94}
Gilad Zlotkin and Jeffrey~S Rosenschein.
\newblock Coalition, cryptography and stability: Mechanisms for coalition
  formation in task oriented domains.
\newblock In {\em Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial
  Intelligence (AAAI)}, pages 432--437, Seattle, WA, July 1994.

\end{thebibliography}
