tweak.bbl

\begin{thebibliography}{}
\parskip -.01in
\bibitem[\protect\citeauthoryear{Bartholdi and
  Orlin}{1991}]{Bartholdi91:Single}
John~J. Bartholdi, III and James~B. Orlin.
\newblock Single transferable vote resists strategic voting.
\newblock {\em Social Choice and Welfare}, 8(4):341--354, 1991.

\bibitem[\protect\citeauthoryear{Bartholdi \bgroup \em et al.\egroup
  }{1989}]{Bartholdi89:Computational}
John~J. Bartholdi, III, Craig~A. Tovey, and Michael~A. Trick.
\newblock The computational difficulty of manipulating an election.
\newblock {\em Social Choice and Welfare}, 6(3):227--241, 1989.

\bibitem[\protect\citeauthoryear{Conitzer and
  Sandholm}{2002a}]{Conitzer02:Complexity}
Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm.
\newblock Complexity of manipulating elections with few candidates.
\newblock AAAI, pages 314--319, Edmonton, Canada, 2002.

\bibitem[\protect\citeauthoryear{Conitzer and
  Sandholm}{2002b}]{Conitzer02:Elicitation}
Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm.
\newblock Vote elicitation: Complexity and strategy-proofness.
\newblock AAAI, pages 392--397, Edmonton, Canada, 2002.

\bibitem[\protect\citeauthoryear{Ephrati and
  Rosenschein}{1991}]{Ephrati91:Clarke}
Eithan Ephrati and Jeffrey~S Rosenschein.
\newblock The {C}larke tax as a consensus mechanism among automated agents.
\newblock AAAI, pages 173--178, Anaheim, CA, 1991.

\bibitem[\protect\citeauthoryear{Ephrati and
  Rosenschein}{1993}]{Ephrati93:Multi}
Eithan Ephrati and Jeffrey~S Rosenschein.
\newblock Multi-agent planning as a dynamic search for social consensus.
\newblock IJCAI, pages 423--429, Chambery, France, 1993.

\bibitem[\protect\citeauthoryear{Gibbard}{1973}]{Gibbard73:Manipulation}
A~Gibbard.
\newblock Manipulation of voting schemes.
\newblock {\em Econometrica}, 41:587--602, 1973.

\bibitem[\protect\citeauthoryear{Papadimitriou}{1985}]{Papadimitriou85:Games}
C~Papadimitriou.
\newblock Games against nature.
\newblock {\em Journal of Computer and System Sciences}, 31:288--301, 1985.

\bibitem[\protect\citeauthoryear{Pennock \bgroup \em et al.\egroup
  }{2000}]{Pennock00:Social}
David~M Pennock, Eric Horvitz, and C.~Lee Giles.
\newblock Social choice theory and recommender systems: Analysis of the
  axiomatic foundations of collaborative filtering.
\newblock AAAI, pages 729--734, Austin, TX, 2000.

\bibitem[\protect\citeauthoryear{Satterthwaite}{1975}]{Satterthwaite75:Strateg%
y}
M~A Satterthwaite.
\newblock Strategy-proofness and {A}rrow's conditions: existence and
  correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions.
\newblock {\em Journal of Economic Theory}, 10:187--217, 1975.

\bibitem[\protect\citeauthoryear{Valiant}{1979}]{Valiant79:Complexity}
Leslie Valiant.
\newblock The complexity of computing the permanent.
\newblock {\em Theoretical Computer Science}, 8:189--201, 1979.

\end{thebibliography}
