Generate text that refutes this claim: Immunity creates a perverse incentive to hang on to their office as long as possible.  Prosecutorial immunity brings about a massive side-benefit to being in office. It is easy to get used to a life where minor indiscretions go regularly unpunished, as has happened with dignitaries holding diplomatic immunity. [1] Immunity from prosecution may spur a politician to seek reelection into their old age when they are significantly less effective at performing their duties. This is one reason why in the vast majority of democracies elected representatives, while far from poor, are not paid massive salaries; we don’t want people getting into politics for the wrong reasons.  [1] Uhlig, Mark A., ‘Court Won’t Bar Return of Boy in Abuse Case to Zimbabwe’, The New York Times, 1 January 1988,  [Accessed September 9, 2011]
eneral punishment politics government house would grant politicians immunity
With regard to this issue, elections are unquestionably an effective alternative mechanism. The act of a politician in a liberal democracy holding on to office for another term, by definition, requires public assent. The citizenry has an out: don’t continue electing politicians who aren’t serving the public interest. Regardless, politicians already have a plethora of motives, both legitimate and self-serving, to hold on to public office; this doesn’t move the barometer on incentives to run. Most elections are at least modestly well contested precisely because many qualified candidates really want the position.