Generate text that refutes this claim: An ICC Enforcement arm would bring in a higher proportion of defendants in to trial  Eight out of the thirty people indicted by the ICC (four in the Darfur situation, including Omar al-Bashir, three Lord’s Resistance Army leaders in Uganda and one in the DR Congo investigation) are still alive and avoiding justice. An in-house enforcement arm would be more effective at capturing indictees than many of the forces of the state parties, as it is likely to be more competent than many of the under-resourced or under-trained national forces. An in house force would be solely focused on capturing the wanted war criminals so would both be focusing resources and much less likely to be sidetracked by other priorities (many of which may be influenced by politics) than national forces. One of the suggested solutions to the failure to capture Joseph Kony and leaders of the LRA is to have greater involvement of peacekeepers; an ICC force would provide the same kind of help. [1]  [1] Van Woudenberg, Anneke, ‘How to Catch Joseph Kony’, Human Rights Watch, 9 March 2012,
crime policing international law house believes icc should have its own enforcement
An enforcement arm would still have finite resources. There is no guarantee that an ICC in-house enforcement system would arrest more suspects than the existing system of state bilateral co-operation. This is particularly the case in relation to the most thorny problems the ICC faces – how to catch those who have the backing of their state. An independent force would not enable the ICC to snatch Omar al-Bashir out of Sudan unless the proposal was to create a special forces style force and any such action would have large diplomatic repercussions.