Generate text that refutes this claim: Animals' rights are of less moral worth than human rights  Humans are complex beings with large well developed brains, that form sizeable social groups, have significant ability to communicate with one another, possess interconnected desires, preferences and interests about the world, have an awareness of their own existence and mortality, and as such are beings worthy of moral consideration. Animals too express some of these characteristics to some degree and thus animals too are worthy of moral consideration. However, animal lives and human lives are of unequal value. This is due to the fact that no animal possesses all of these characteristics to the same degree as the average human, or even comes particularly close. Thus any rights ascribed to animals should be truncated relative to the rights we ascribe to humans. [1] Therefore animals should not rightly possess the same rights to not be experimented upon as humans might. To the extent to which causing some harm to animals brings great benefit to humans, we are morally justified in creating some moral harm, to achieve a far greater moral good.  [1] Frey, R. G., “Moral Standing: The Value of Life and Speciesism”, in La Follette (ed.), Ethics in Practice, (Malden, Mass; Oxford : Blackwell Pub, 2007)
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To argue that the ends justify the means does not justify research upon animals. Firstly we do not know the extent to which animals are capable of holding interests or experiencing suffering, as they are unable to communicate with us. Our shared similarities give us cause to believe they must have at least a truncated experience of the world to us, but we cannot know the level of that truncation. Thus in order to avoid committing a significant moral harm upon a being we do not fully understand, a precautionary principle of non-experimentation would be well advised. Secondly, even if we would be achieving a net gain on the utilitarian calculator, that is insufficient justification on its own. By that same logic, experimenting on one person to save the lives of many could be justified, even if it caused them suffering, and even if they did not consent. Common morality suggests that this is an objectionable position to hold, as the moral principle would allow us to treat any being as a means to an end rather than existing as a being of independent value. [1] In short such logic would allow us to experiment not only on animals but also on non-consenting people, and we posit that to be an unreasonable position to hold in this debate.  [1] Crisp. R., Mill on Utilitarianism, (Routledge, 1997)