Generate text that refutes this claim: Problems with Verification.  Verification is vital in any agreement to limit arms. Both sides need to trust each other a bit but a lot of this trust needs to come from comprehensive mechanisms to monitor and ensure that both sides are carrying out their commitments. If the verification system is not good enough then neither side will have faith in the agreement and will be more likely to try and bypass it.  Unfortunately the expired START’s verification regime was robust when compared to that for the New START. Baker Spring at the Heritage foundation lists some of the specific areas that are significantly less robust: A narrowing of the requirements for exchanging telemetry (electronic transmissions that give details of missile performance that helps give a good idea about whether Russia is complying with the treaty) , A reduction in the effectiveness of the inspections (the Russians feel that inspections are unfairly biased against them), Weaknesses in the ability to verify the number of deployed warheads on ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), Abolition of the START verification regime governing mobile ICBMs, and A weakening of the verification standards governing the elimination of delivery vehicles. [1]  [1] Spring, Baker. "Twelve Flaws of New START That Will Be Difficult to Fix". Heritage Foundation, The Foundry. 16 September 2010.
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The verification requirements of New START have satisfied not only the Obama Administration but also a large number of foreign policy experts. A panel including Henry Kissinger argues that New START “emphasizes verification, providing a valuable window into Russia's nuclear arsenal." [1] Howard Baker argues that: "President Reagan was famous for his adage about dealing with the old Soviet Union: “Trust but verify.” Since the last START treaty expired in December 2009, we’ve had no right to conduct inspections of Russian nuclear bases, and thus no way to verify what the Russians are doing with their nuclear weapon systems. For us veterans of the Cold War, that’s an alarming fact and a compelling reason to ratify this New START treaty without further delay." [2]  When the allegations are gone through individually they do not stand up to scrutiny. On the telemetry issue the treaty does not limit throw-weight so the data is not needed; the number of warheads per missile can be verified by other means. There are less facilities being inspected, but more inspections and the decline in Russia’s nuclear forces means that not so many facilities need to be inspected. [3] There is no reason to be worried about the numbers of missiles as there will be a database detailing all the weapons both sides have and inspections to confirm this, [4] this will also mean that there are unique identifier tags on each missile, launcher and bombers so helping inspectors in their counting. [5] Mobile launchers are much less of a problem than they were as we already know the base number the Russia has whereas when START was originally negotiated the US did not know. Technology to track such mobile launchers has also become much more powerful. Finally if worried about the verification of the elimination of delivery vehicles both sides will have the right to inspect the debris and to demand demonstration of the procedures. [6] Neither side will be able to get around the new START’s verification regime.  [1] Kissinger, Henry A. ; Shultz, George P. ; Baker III, James A’ ; Eagleburger , Lawrence S. ; and Powell, Colin L. "The Republican case for ratifying New START". Washington Post. 2 December 2010.   [2] Baker, Howard. "Dangerous if we reject New START." USA Today.   [3] Blook, Oliver, ‘Nothing to Fear with New START Verification’, Center For Strategic &amp; International Studies, 8 July 2010,   [4] Woolf, Amy F., ‘The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions’, Congressional Research Service, 24 October 2011, p.3,   [5] ‘Verification of New START’, Union of Concerned Scientists, 13 July 2010,   [6] Blook, Oliver, ‘Nothing to Fear with New START Verification’, Center For Strategic &amp; International Studies, 8 July 2010,