Generate text that refutes this claim: Some groups of people have less capacity for suffering than most animals  It is possible to conceive of human persons almost totally lacking in a capacity for suffering, or indeed a capacity to develop and possess interests. Take for example a person in a persistent vegetative state, or a person born with the most severe of cognitive impairments.  We can take three possible stances toward such persons within this debate. Firstly we could experiment on animals, but not such persons. This would be a morally inconsistent and specieist stance to adopt, and as such unsatisfactory. We could be morally consistent, and experiment on both animals and such persons. Common morality suggests that it would be abhorrent to conduct potentially painful medical research on the severely disabled, and so this stance seems equally unsatisfactory. Finally we could maintain moral consistency and avoid experimenting on the disabled, by adopting the stance of experimenting on neither group, thus prohibiting experimentation upon animals. [1]  [1] Fox, M. A., “The Moral Community”, in La Follette (ed.), Ethics in Practice, (Malden, Mass; Oxford : Blackwell Pub, 2007)
animals philosophy ethics science science general house would ban animal
We do not need to justify the moral value of severely cognitively disabled persons, although if we wanted to, we could invoke notions of kinship, and family as providing a justification for acting in an apparently specieist manner. [1] Rather, it is sufficient to highlight the point, that experimenting on humans of any cognitive function, carries with it certain negative externalities. Such persons are likely to have relatives who would be harmed by the knowledge that their loved ones are being used in medical experiments for example. Even in the case of such a person who lacks any relatives, broader society and disabled rights groups could be harmed by a policy that allows treating some disabled persons differently to the rest of our moral community.  Such externalities would make experimenting on animals, rather than such persons, both preferable and morally consistent.  [1] Fox, M. A., “The Moral Community”, in La Follette (ed.), Ethics in Practice, (Malden, Mass; Oxford : Blackwell Pub, 2007)