Generate text that refutes this claim: The New START treaty harms US nuclear capabilities  As David Ganz, the president of the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), argues: "This treaty would restrain the development and deployment of new nuclear weapons, missile defense systems, and missile delivery systems." [1] The atrophying U.S. nuclear arsenal and weapons enterprise make reductions in the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal even more dangerous. The new START treaty allows nuclear modernization but while the US capacity to modernize nuclear weapons is limited and either congress or the president is likely to prevent modernization on cost grounds. The Russians have a large, if unknown, advantage over the United States in terms of nonstrategic, particularly tactical, and nuclear weapons. The New START treaty however ignores these weapons entirely as it is focused on strategic arms. This therefore leaves the Russians with an advantage and potentially reduces the potential for deterrence in areas beyond the US. [2]  New START also restricts US missile defence options. The Obama Administration insists the treaty doesn’t affect it, but the Kremlin’s takes a different view: "[START] can operate and be viable only if the United States of America refrains from developing its missile-defense capabilities quantitatively or qualitatively." [3] New START imposes restrictions on U.S. missile defence options in at least four areas. First the preamble recognizes “the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms” it seeks to make sure defensive arms “do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the parties” so defensive arms must be reduced to allow offensive arms to remain effective. [4] Russia also issued a unilateral statement on April 7, 2010, Russia reinforced this restriction by issuing a unilateral statement asserting that it considers the “extraordinary events” that give “the right to withdraw from this treaty” to include a buildup of missile defense. [5] Second, Article V states “Each Party shall not convert and shall not use ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers for placement of missile defense interceptors” and vice versa. [6] There are also restrictions on some types of missiles and launchers that are used in the testing of missile defense. And Finally, article X established the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC), the treaty’s implementing body, with oversight over the implementation of the treaty which may impose additional restrictions on the U.S. missile defense program. [7]  [1] Weingarten, Elizabeth. “How did New START become a Jewish issue?”. The Atlantic. 1 Decemebr 2010.   [2] Spring, Baker. "Twelve Flaws of New START That Will Be Difficult to Fix". Heritage Foundation, The Foundry. 16 September 2010.   [3] Brookes, Peter. “Not a new START, but a bad START”. The Hill. 13 September 2010.   [4] Obama, Barak, and Medvedev, Dmitri, ‘Treaty Between The United States of America And The Russian Federation On Measures For The Further Reduction And Limitation Of Strategic Offensive Arms’, U.S. Department of State,   [5] Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, ‘New START Treaty Fact Sheet: Unilateral Statements’, U.S. Department of State, 13 May 2010,   [6] Obama, Barak, and Medvedev, Dmitri, ‘Treaty Between The United States of America And The Russian Federation On Measures For The Further Reduction And Limitation Of Strategic Offensive Arms’, U.S. Department of State,   [7] Spring, Baker. "Twelve Flaws of New START That Will Be Difficult to Fix". Heritage Foundation, The Foundry. 16 September 2010.
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Many of the worries about the impact of the treaty are much more of a political problem than problems with the treaty itself. U.S. missile modernization in particular is still up to the President and Congress to sort out the funding between them – the restrictions are minor. [1] Worries about the impact on missile defense are also a red herring. Missile defense is not aimed at Russia and the United States simply needs to make sure that its defenses are obviously aimed at who it says they are aimed at: rogue states such as Iran and North Korea. Regarding other defence capabilities, the New START Treaty preserves America’s ability to deploy effective missile defenses, and simply prevents it from being effective enough to undermine deterrence, something which Russia would be right in worrying about if the United States had any intention of building such a comprehensive missile defence. The prohibition on converting existing launchers will have little impact on the United States as the military believes that such conversion would be more expensive and less effective than building new purpose built defensive missiles. [2] Finally if Russia did exercise its right to withdraw then both parties would be in no worse a position than they would have been without the new treaty and could simply restart negotiations.  [1] Spring, Baker. "Twelve Flaws of New START That Will Be Difficult to Fix". Heritage Foundation, The Foundry. 16 September 2010.   [2] Kissinger, Henry A. ; Shultz, George P. ; Baker III, James A’ ; Eagleburger , Lawrence S. ; and Powell, Colin L. "The Republican case for ratifying New START". Washington Post. 2 December 2010.