Generate text that refutes this claim: An ICC enforcement arm would be highly detrimental to the relations between the ICC and state parties  Currently the ICC functions based on a relationship of trust and understanding with the state parties to the ICC – a bottom-up rather than a top-down approach. This is backed up by the court’s respect for the for the principle of complementarity – it is hoped that national courts are capable of prosecuting the crimes, and the ICC only takes a role if the state is unwilling or unable to do so. Being willing to use an international force to catch criminals would make a mockery of this determination to leave power and responsibilities at the national level wherever possible.  Having ICC forces on a country’s territory would be humiliating, showing that the international community does not trust that nation to catch war criminals itself. While this model did not provide for attempting to snatch government officials who have been indicted it does leave open the possibility of an international force intruding on states sovereignty without consent. This would diplomatically backfire and could even lead to an ICC force being involved in fighting with government forces protecting their national sovereignty.
crime policing international law house believes icc should have its own enforcement
Those arguments are similar ones to those used against the ICC. An ICC police force, comprised of officers from individual state and supervised by an independent authority appointed by a similar mechanism to the judges, would use the existing frameworks in place for the use of the ICC. If states are happy to have their nationals indicted for international crimes then it stands to reason that these nations should welcome a force that can enforce such indictments and bring these war criminals to trial.