Daily Papers

Competitions for shareable and limited resources have long been studied with strategic agents. In reality, agents often have to learn and maximize the rewards of the resources at the same time. To design an individualized competing policy, we model the competition between agents in a novel multi-player multi-armed bandit (MPMAB) setting where players are selfish and aim to maximize their own rewards. In addition, when several players pull the same arm, we assume that these players averagely share the arms' rewards by expectation. Under this setting, we first analyze the Nash equilibrium when arms' rewards are known. Subsequently, we propose a novel SelfishMPMAB with Averaging Allocation (SMAA) approach based on the equilibrium. We theoretically demonstrate that SMAA could achieve a good regret guarantee for each player when all players follow the algorithm. Additionally, we establish that no single selfish player can significantly increase their rewards through deviation, nor can they detrimentally affect other players' rewards without incurring substantial losses for themselves. We finally validate the effectiveness of the method in extensive synthetic experiments.

We consider the problem of fairly allocating a sequence of indivisible items that arrive online in an arbitrary order to a group of n agents with additive normalized valuation functions. We consider both the allocation of goods and chores and propose algorithms for approximating maximin share (MMS) allocations. When agents have identical valuation functions the problem coincides with the semi-online machine covering problem (when items are goods) and load balancing problem (when items are chores), for both of which optimal competitive ratios have been achieved. In this paper, we consider the case when agents have general additive valuation functions. For the allocation of goods, we show that no competitive algorithm exists even when there are only three agents and propose an optimal 0.5-competitive algorithm for the case of two agents. For the allocation of chores, we propose a (2-1/n)-competitive algorithm for n>=3 agents and a square root of 2 (approximately 1.414)-competitive algorithm for two agents. Additionally, we show that no algorithm can do better than 15/11 (approximately 1.364)-competitive for two agents.

Progress in machine learning is measured by careful evaluation on problems of outstanding common interest. However, the proliferation of benchmark suites and environments, adversarial attacks, and other complications has diluted the basic evaluation model by overwhelming researchers with choices. Deliberate or accidental cherry picking is increasingly likely, and designing well-balanced evaluation suites requires increasing effort. In this paper we take a step back and propose Nash averaging. The approach builds on a detailed analysis of the algebraic structure of evaluation in two basic scenarios: agent-vs-agent and agent-vs-task. The key strength of Nash averaging is that it automatically adapts to redundancies in evaluation data, so that results are not biased by the incorporation of easy tasks or weak agents. Nash averaging thus encourages maximally inclusive evaluation -- since there is no harm (computational cost aside) from including all available tasks and agents.

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods among a set of agents. Our focus is on the existence of allocations that give each agent their maximin fair share--the value they are guaranteed if they divide the goods into as many bundles as there are agents, and receive their lowest valued bundle. An MMS allocation is one where every agent receives at least their maximin fair share. We examine the existence of such allocations when agents have cost utilities. In this setting, each item has an associated cost, and an agent's valuation for an item is the cost of the item if it is useful to them, and zero otherwise. Our main results indicate that cost utilities are a promising restriction for achieving MMS. We show that for the case of three agents with cost utilities, an MMS allocation always exists. We also show that when preferences are restricted slightly further--to what we call laminar set approvals--we can guarantee MMS allocations for any number of agents. Finally, we explore if it is possible to guarantee each agent their maximin fair share while using a strategyproof mechanism.

Averaging neural network parameters is an intuitive method for fusing the knowledge of two independent models. It is most prominently used in federated learning. If models are averaged at the end of training, this can only lead to a good performing model if the loss surface of interest is very particular, i.e., the loss in the midpoint between the two models needs to be sufficiently low. This is impossible to guarantee for the non-convex losses of state-of-the-art networks. For averaging models trained on vastly different datasets, it was proposed to average only the parameters of particular layers or combinations of layers, resulting in better performing models. To get a better understanding of the effect of layer-wise averaging, we analyse the performance of the models that result from averaging single layers, or groups of layers. Based on our empirical and theoretical investigation, we introduce a novel notion of the layer-wise linear connectivity, and show that deep networks do not have layer-wise barriers between them.

In pursuit of participatory budgeting (PB) outcomes with broader fairness guarantees, we initiate the study of lotteries over discrete PB outcomes. As the projects have heterogeneous costs, the amount spent may not be equal ex ante and ex post. To address this, we develop a technique to bound the amount by which the ex-post spend differs from the ex-ante spend -- the property is termed budget balanced up to one project (BB1). With respect to fairness, we take a best-of-both-worlds perspective, seeking outcomes that are both ex-ante and ex-post fair. Towards this goal, we initiate a study of ex-ante fairness properties in PB, including Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS) and their stronger variants, as well as Group Fair Share (GFS). We show several incompatibility results between these ex-ante fairness notions and existing ex-post concepts based on justified representation. One of our main contributions is a randomized algorithm which simultaneously satisfies ex-ante Strong UFS, ex-post full justified representation (FJR) and ex-post BB1 for PB with binary utilities.

We consider a fair division model in which agents have positive, zero and negative utilities for items. For this model, we analyse one existing fairness property - EFX - and three new and related properties - EFX_0, EFX^3 and EF1^3 - in combination with Pareto-optimality. With general utilities, we give a modified version of an existing algorithm for computing an EF1^3 allocation. With -alpha/0/alpha utilities, this algorithm returns an EFX^3 and PO allocation. With absolute identical utilities, we give a new algorithm for an EFX and PO allocation. With -alpha/0/beta utilities, this algorithm also returns such an allocation. We report some new impossibility results as well.

This article introduces Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) with Distribution-Valued Outcomes (R3D), extending the standard RDD framework to settings where the outcome is a distribution rather than a scalar. Such settings arise when treatment is assigned at a higher level of aggregation than the outcome-for example, when a subsidy is allocated based on a firm-level revenue cutoff while the outcome of interest is the distribution of employee wages within the firm. Since standard RDD methods cannot accommodate such two-level randomness, I propose a novel approach based on random distributions. The target estimand is a "local average quantile treatment effect", which averages across random quantiles. To estimate this target, I introduce two related approaches: one that extends local polynomial regression to random quantiles and another based on local Fr\'echet regression, a form of functional regression. For both estimators, I establish asymptotic normality and develop uniform, debiased confidence bands together with a data-driven bandwidth selection procedure. Simulations validate these theoretical properties and show existing methods to be biased and inconsistent in this setting. I then apply the proposed methods to study the effects of gubernatorial party control on within-state income distributions in the US, using a close-election design. The results suggest a classic equality-efficiency tradeoff under Democratic governorship, driven by reductions in income at the top of the distribution.

We study a fair allocation problem of indivisible items under additive externalities in which each agent also receives values from items that are assigned to other agents. We propose several new fairness concepts. We extend the well-studied envy-freeness up to one item (EF1) and envy-freeness up to any item (EFX) to this setting, and we propose a new fairness concept called general fair share (GFS). We undertake a detailed study and present algorithms for finding fair allocations.

We consider the task of evaluating policies of algorithmic resource allocation through randomized controlled trials (RCTs). Such policies are tasked with optimizing the utilization of limited intervention resources, with the goal of maximizing the benefits derived. Evaluation of such allocation policies through RCTs proves difficult, notwithstanding the scale of the trial, because the individuals' outcomes are inextricably interlinked through resource constraints controlling the policy decisions. Our key contribution is to present a new estimator leveraging our proposed novel concept, that involves retrospective reshuffling of participants across experimental arms at the end of an RCT. We identify conditions under which such reassignments are permissible and can be leveraged to construct counterfactual trials, whose outcomes can be accurately ascertained, for free. We prove theoretically that such an estimator is more accurate than common estimators based on sample means -- we show that it returns an unbiased estimate and simultaneously reduces variance. We demonstrate the value of our approach through empirical experiments on synthetic, semi-synthetic as well as real case study data and show improved estimation accuracy across the board.

In federated learning (FL), clients usually have diverse participation statistics that are unknown a priori, which can significantly harm the performance of FL if not handled properly. Existing works aiming at addressing this problem are usually based on global variance reduction, which requires a substantial amount of additional memory in a multiplicative factor equal to the total number of clients. An important open problem is to find a lightweight method for FL in the presence of clients with unknown participation rates. In this paper, we address this problem by adapting the aggregation weights in federated averaging (FedAvg) based on the participation history of each client. We first show that, with heterogeneous participation statistics, FedAvg with non-optimal aggregation weights can diverge from the optimal solution of the original FL objective, indicating the need of finding optimal aggregation weights. However, it is difficult to compute the optimal weights when the participation statistics are unknown. To address this problem, we present a new algorithm called FedAU, which improves FedAvg by adaptively weighting the client updates based on online estimates of the optimal weights without knowing the statistics of client participation. We provide a theoretical convergence analysis of FedAU using a novel methodology to connect the estimation error and convergence. Our theoretical results reveal important and interesting insights, while showing that FedAU converges to an optimal solution of the original objective and has desirable properties such as linear speedup. Our experimental results also verify the advantage of FedAU over baseline methods with various participation patterns.

Portfolio management is an essential component of investment strategy that aims to maximize returns while minimizing risk. This paper explores several portfolio management strategies, including asset allocation, diversification, active management, and risk management, and their importance in optimizing portfolio performance. These strategies are examined individually and in combination to demonstrate how they can help investors maximize alpha and minimize beta. Asset allocation is the process of dividing a portfolio among different asset classes to achieve the desired level of risk and return. Diversification involves spreading investments across different securities and sectors to minimize the impact of individual security or sector-specific risks. Active management involves security selection and risk management techniques to generate excess returns while minimizing losses. Risk management strategies, such as stop-loss orders and options strategies, aim to minimize losses in adverse market conditions. The importance of combining these strategies for optimizing portfolio performance is emphasized in this paper. The proper implementation of these strategies can help investors achieve their investment goals over the long-term, while minimizing exposure to risks. A call to action for investors to utilize portfolio management strategies to maximize alpha and minimize beta is also provided.

Federated learning and gossip learning are emerging methodologies designed to mitigate data privacy concerns by retaining training data on client devices and exclusively sharing locally-trained machine learning (ML) models with others. The primary distinction between the two lies in their approach to model aggregation: federated learning employs a centralized parameter server, whereas gossip learning adopts a fully decentralized mechanism, enabling direct model exchanges among nodes. This decentralized nature often positions gossip learning as less efficient compared to federated learning. Both methodologies involve a critical step: computing a representation of received ML models and integrating this representation into the existing model. Conventionally, this representation is derived by averaging the received models, exemplified by the FedAVG algorithm. Our findings suggest that this averaging approach inherently introduces a potential delay in model convergence. We identify the underlying cause and refer to it as the "vanishing variance" problem, where averaging across uncorrelated ML models undermines the optimal variance established by the Xavier weight initialization. Unlike federated learning where the central server ensures model correlation, and unlike traditional gossip learning which circumvents this problem through model partitioning and sampling, our research introduces a variance-corrected model averaging algorithm. This novel algorithm preserves the optimal variance needed during model averaging, irrespective of network topology or non-IID data distributions. Our extensive simulation results demonstrate that our approach enables gossip learning to achieve convergence efficiency comparable to that of federated learning.

In Machine Learning, a benchmark refers to an ensemble of datasets associated with one or multiple metrics together with a way to aggregate different systems performances. They are instrumental in (i) assessing the progress of new methods along different axes and (ii) selecting the best systems for practical use. This is particularly the case for NLP with the development of large pre-trained models (e.g. GPT, BERT) that are expected to generalize well on a variety of tasks. While the community mainly focused on developing new datasets and metrics, there has been little interest in the aggregation procedure, which is often reduced to a simple average over various performance measures. However, this procedure can be problematic when the metrics are on a different scale, which may lead to spurious conclusions. This paper proposes a new procedure to rank systems based on their performance across different tasks. Motivated by the social choice theory, the final system ordering is obtained through aggregating the rankings induced by each task and is theoretically grounded. We conduct extensive numerical experiments (on over 270k scores) to assess the soundness of our approach both on synthetic and real scores (e.g. GLUE, EXTREM, SEVAL, TAC, FLICKR). In particular, we show that our method yields different conclusions on state-of-the-art systems than the mean-aggregation procedure while being both more reliable and robust.

In online ad markets, a rising number of advertisers are employing bidding agencies to participate in ad auctions. These agencies are specialized in designing online algorithms and bidding on behalf of their clients. Typically, an agency usually has information on multiple advertisers, so she can potentially coordinate bids to help her clients achieve higher utilities than those under independent bidding. In this paper, we study coordinated online bidding algorithms in repeated second-price auctions with budgets. We propose algorithms that guarantee every client a higher utility than the best she can get under independent bidding. We show that these algorithms achieve maximal coalition welfare and discuss bidders' incentives to misreport their budgets, in symmetric cases. Our proofs combine the techniques of online learning and equilibrium analysis, overcoming the difficulty of competing with a multi-dimensional benchmark. The performance of our algorithms is further evaluated by experiments on both synthetic and real data. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider bidder coordination in online repeated auctions with constraints.

Fair division considers the allocation of scarce resources among agents in such a way that every agent gets a fair share. It is a fundamental problem in society and has received significant attention and rapid developments from the game theory and artificial intelligence communities in recent years. The majority of the fair division literature can be divided along at least two orthogonal directions: goods versus chores, and divisible versus indivisible resources. In this survey, besides describing the state of the art, we outline a number of interesting open questions and future directions in three mixed fair division settings: (i) indivisible goods and chores, (ii) divisible and indivisible goods (mixed goods), and (iii) indivisible goods with subsidy which can be viewed like a divisible good.

For a sequence of random variables (X_1, X_2, ldots, X_n), n geq 1, that are independent and identically distributed with a regularly varying tail with index -alpha, alpha geq 0, we show that the contribution of the maximum term M_n triangleq max(X_1,ldots,X_n) in the sum S_n triangleq X_1 + cdots +X_n, as n to infty, decreases monotonically with alpha in stochastic ordering sense.

Major Internet advertising platforms offer budget pacing tools as a standard service for advertisers to manage their ad campaigns. Given the inherent non-stationarity in an advertiser's value and also competing advertisers' values over time, a commonly used approach is to learn a target expenditure plan that specifies a target spend as a function of time, and then run a controller that tracks this plan. This raises the question: how many historical samples are required to learn a good expenditure plan? We study this question by considering an advertiser repeatedly participating in T second-price auctions, where the tuple of her value and the highest competing bid is drawn from an unknown time-varying distribution. The advertiser seeks to maximize her total utility subject to her budget constraint. Prior work has shown the sufficiency of Tlog T samples per distribution to achieve the optimal O(T)-regret. We dramatically improve this state-of-the-art and show that just one sample per distribution is enough to achieve the near-optimal tilde O(T)-regret, while still being robust to noise in the sampling distributions.

In the field of algorithmic fairness, significant attention has been put on group fairness criteria, such as Demographic Parity and Equalized Odds. Nevertheless, these objectives, measured as global averages, have raised concerns about persistent local disparities between sensitive groups. In this work, we address the problem of local fairness, which ensures that the predictor is unbiased not only in terms of expectations over the whole population, but also within any subregion of the feature space, unknown at training time. To enforce this objective, we introduce ROAD, a novel approach that leverages the Distributionally Robust Optimization (DRO) framework within a fair adversarial learning objective, where an adversary tries to infer the sensitive attribute from the predictions. Using an instance-level re-weighting strategy, ROAD is designed to prioritize inputs that are likely to be locally unfair, i.e. where the adversary faces the least difficulty in reconstructing the sensitive attribute. Numerical experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our method: it achieves Pareto dominance with respect to local fairness and accuracy for a given global fairness level across three standard datasets, and also enhances fairness generalization under distribution shift.

The online knapsack problem is a classic problem in the field of online algorithms. Its canonical version asks how to pack items of different values and weights arriving online into a capacity-limited knapsack so as to maximize the total value of the admitted items. Although optimal competitive algorithms are known for this problem, they may be fundamentally unfair, i.e., individual items may be treated inequitably in different ways. We formalize a practically-relevant notion of time fairness which effectively models a trade off between static and dynamic pricing in a motivating application such as cloud resource allocation, and show that existing algorithms perform poorly under this metric. We propose a parameterized deterministic algorithm where the parameter precisely captures the Pareto-optimal trade-off between fairness (static pricing) and competitiveness (dynamic pricing). We show that randomization is theoretically powerful enough to be simultaneously competitive and fair; however, it does not work well in experiments. To further improve the trade-off between fairness and competitiveness, we develop a nearly-optimal learning-augmented algorithm which is fair, consistent, and robust (competitive), showing substantial performance improvements in numerical experiments.

In this paper, we introduce analytic federated learning (AFL), a new training paradigm that brings analytical (i.e., closed-form) solutions to the federated learning (FL) community. Our AFL draws inspiration from analytic learning -- a gradient-free technique that trains neural networks with analytical solutions in one epoch. In the local client training stage, the AFL facilitates a one-epoch training, eliminating the necessity for multi-epoch updates. In the aggregation stage, we derive an absolute aggregation (AA) law. This AA law allows a single-round aggregation, removing the need for multiple aggregation rounds. More importantly, the AFL exhibits a weight-invariant property, meaning that regardless of how the full dataset is distributed among clients, the aggregated result remains identical. This could spawn various potentials, such as data heterogeneity invariance, client-number invariance, absolute convergence, and being hyperparameter-free (our AFL is the first hyperparameter-free method in FL history). We conduct experiments across various FL settings including extremely non-IID ones, and scenarios with a large number of clients (e.g., ge 1000). In all these settings, our AFL constantly performs competitively while existing FL techniques encounter various obstacles. Code is available at https://github.com/ZHUANGHP/Analytic-federated-learning

The development of state-of-the-art systems in different applied areas of machine learning (ML) is driven by benchmarks, which have shaped the paradigm of evaluating generalisation capabilities from multiple perspectives. Although the paradigm is shifting towards more fine-grained evaluation across diverse tasks, the delicate question of how to aggregate the performances has received particular interest in the community. In general, benchmarks follow the unspoken utilitarian principles, where the systems are ranked based on their mean average score over task-specific metrics. Such aggregation procedure has been viewed as a sub-optimal evaluation protocol, which may have created the illusion of progress. This paper proposes Vote'n'Rank, a framework for ranking systems in multi-task benchmarks under the principles of the social choice theory. We demonstrate that our approach can be efficiently utilised to draw new insights on benchmarking in several ML sub-fields and identify the best-performing systems in research and development case studies. The Vote'n'Rank's procedures are more robust than the mean average while being able to handle missing performance scores and determine conditions under which the system becomes the winner.

Scale has become a main ingredient in obtaining strong machine learning models. As a result, understanding a model's scaling properties is key to effectively designing both the right training setup as well as future generations of architectures. In this work, we argue that scale and training research has been needlessly complex due to reliance on the cosine schedule, which prevents training across different lengths for the same model size. We investigate the training behavior of a direct alternative - constant learning rate and cooldowns - and find that it scales predictably and reliably similar to cosine. Additionally, we show that stochastic weight averaging yields improved performance along the training trajectory, without additional training costs, across different scales. Importantly, with these findings we demonstrate that scaling experiments can be performed with significantly reduced compute and GPU hours by utilizing fewer but reusable training runs.

We focus on a simple, one-dimensional collective decision problem (often referred to as the facility location problem) and explore issues of strategyproofness and proportionality-based fairness. We introduce and analyze a hierarchy of proportionality-based fairness axioms of varying strength: Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS), Proportionality (as in Freeman et al, 2021), and Proportional Fairness (PF). For each axiom, we characterize the family of mechanisms that satisfy the axiom and strategyproofness. We show that imposing strategyproofness renders many of the axioms to be equivalent: the family of mechanisms that satisfy proportionality, unanimity, and strategyproofness is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy UFS and strategyproofness, which, in turn, is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy PF and strategyproofness. Furthermore, there is a unique such mechanism: the Uniform Phantom mechanism, which is studied in Freeman et al. (2021). We also characterize the outcomes of the Uniform Phantom mechanism as the unique (pure) equilibrium outcome for any mechanism that satisfies continuity, strict monotonicity, and UFS. Finally, we analyze the approximation guarantees, in terms of optimal social welfare and minimum total cost, obtained by mechanisms that are strategyproof and satisfy each proportionality-based fairness axiom. We show that the Uniform Phantom mechanism provides the best approximation of the optimal social welfare (and also minimum total cost) among all mechanisms that satisfy UFS.

We initiate the study of statistical inference and A/B testing for first-price pacing equilibria (FPPE). The FPPE model captures the dynamics resulting from large-scale first-price auction markets where buyers use pacing-based budget management. Such markets arise in the context of internet advertising, where budgets are prevalent. We propose a statistical framework for the FPPE model, in which a limit FPPE with a continuum of items models the long-run steady-state behavior of the auction platform, and an observable FPPE consisting of a finite number of items provides the data to estimate primitives of the limit FPPE, such as revenue, Nash social welfare (a fair metric of efficiency), and other parameters of interest. We develop central limit theorems and asymptotically valid confidence intervals. Furthermore, we establish the asymptotic local minimax optimality of our estimators. We then show that the theory can be used for conducting statistically valid A/B testing on auction platforms. Numerical simulations verify our central limit theorems, and empirical coverage rates for our confidence intervals agree with our theory.

The prevalence and importance of algorithmic two-sided marketplaces has drawn attention to the issue of fairness in such settings. Algorithmic decisions are used in assigning students to schools, users to advertisers, and applicants to job interviews. These decisions should heed the preferences of individuals, and simultaneously be fair with respect to their merits (synonymous with fit, future performance, or need). Merits conditioned on observable features are always uncertain, a fact that is exacerbated by the widespread use of machine learning algorithms to infer merit from the observables. As our key contribution, we carefully axiomatize a notion of individual fairness in the two-sided marketplace setting which respects the uncertainty in the merits; indeed, it simultaneously recognizes uncertainty as the primary potential cause of unfairness and an approach to address it. We design a linear programming framework to find fair utility-maximizing distributions over allocations, and we show that the linear program is robust to perturbations in the estimated parameters of the uncertain merit distributions, a key property in combining the approach with machine learning techniques.

We consider the problem of locating a facility to serve a set of agents located along a line. The Nash welfare objective function, defined as the product of the agents' utilities, is known to provide a compromise between fairness and efficiency in resource allocation problems. We apply this welfare notion to the facility location problem, converting individual costs to utilities and analyzing the facility placement that maximizes the Nash welfare. We give a polynomial-time approximation algorithm to compute this facility location, and prove results suggesting that it achieves a good balance of fairness and efficiency. Finally, we take a mechanism design perspective and propose a strategy-proof mechanism with a bounded approximation ratio for Nash welfare.

This study presents estimates of the global expenditure on article processing charges (APCs) paid to six publishers for open access between 2019 and 2023. APCs are fees charged for publishing in some fully open access journals (gold) and in subscription journals to make individual articles open access (hybrid). There is currently no way to systematically track institutional, national or global expenses for open access publishing due to a lack of transparency in APC prices, what articles they are paid for, or who pays them. We therefore curated and used an open dataset of annual APC list prices from Elsevier, Frontiers, MDPI, PLOS, Springer Nature, and Wiley in combination with the number of open access articles from these publishers indexed by OpenAlex to estimate that, globally, a total of \8.349 billion (8.968 billion in 2023 US dollars) were spent on APCs between 2019 and 2023. We estimate that in 2023 MDPI (\681.6 million), Elsevier (582.8 million) and Springer Nature (\546.6) generated the most revenue with APCs. After adjusting for inflation, we also show that annual spending almost tripled from 910.3 million in 2019 to \$2.538 billion in 2023, that hybrid exceed gold fees, and that the median APCs paid are higher than the median listed fees for both gold and hybrid. Our approach addresses major limitations in previous efforts to estimate APCs paid and offers much needed insight into an otherwise opaque aspect of the business of scholarly publishing. We call upon publishers to be more transparent about OA fees.

We study empirical scaling laws for language model performance on the cross-entropy loss. The loss scales as a power-law with model size, dataset size, and the amount of compute used for training, with some trends spanning more than seven orders of magnitude. Other architectural details such as network width or depth have minimal effects within a wide range. Simple equations govern the dependence of overfitting on model/dataset size and the dependence of training speed on model size. These relationships allow us to determine the optimal allocation of a fixed compute budget. Larger models are significantly more sample-efficient, such that optimally compute-efficient training involves training very large models on a relatively modest amount of data and stopping significantly before convergence.

Proportionality is an attractive fairness concept that has been applied to a range of problems including the facility location problem, a classic problem in social choice. In our work, we propose a concept called Strong Proportionality, which ensures that when there are two groups of agents at different locations, both groups incur the same total cost. We show that although Strong Proportionality is a well-motivated and basic axiom, there is no deterministic strategyproof mechanism satisfying the property. We then identify a randomized mechanism called Random Rank (which uniformly selects a number k between 1 to n and locates the facility at the k'th highest agent location) which satisfies Strong Proportionality in expectation. Our main theorem characterizes Random Rank as the unique mechanism that achieves universal truthfulness, universal anonymity, and Strong Proportionality in expectation among all randomized mechanisms. Finally, we show via the AverageOrRandomRank mechanism that even stronger ex-post fairness guarantees can be achieved by weakening universal truthfulness to strategyproofness in expectation.

Existing learning rate schedules that do not require specification of the optimization stopping step T are greatly out-performed by learning rate schedules that depend on T. We propose an approach that avoids the need for this stopping time by eschewing the use of schedules entirely, while exhibiting state-of-the-art performance compared to schedules across a wide family of problems ranging from convex problems to large-scale deep learning problems. Our Schedule-Free approach introduces no additional hyper-parameters over standard optimizers with momentum. Our method is a direct consequence of a new theory we develop that unifies scheduling and iterate averaging. An open source implementation of our method is available (https://github.com/facebookresearch/schedule_free).

Large language models (LLM) have become a critical component in many applications of machine learning. However, standard approaches to training LLM require a large number of tightly interconnected accelerators, with devices exchanging gradients and other intermediate states at each optimization step. While it is difficult to build and maintain a single computing cluster hosting many accelerators, it might be easier to find several computing clusters each hosting a smaller number of devices. In this work, we propose a distributed optimization algorithm, Distributed Low-Communication (DiLoCo), that enables training of language models on islands of devices that are poorly connected. The approach is a variant of federated averaging, where the number of inner steps is large, the inner optimizer is AdamW, and the outer optimizer is Nesterov momentum. On the widely used C4 dataset, we show that DiLoCo on 8 workers performs as well as fully synchronous optimization while communicating 500 times less. DiLoCo exhibits great robustness to the data distribution of each worker. It is also robust to resources becoming unavailable over time, and vice versa, it can seamlessly leverage resources that become available during training.

This paper introduces an efficient fine-tuning method for large pre-trained models, offering strong in-distribution (ID) and out-of-distribution (OOD) performance. Breaking away from traditional practices that need a multitude of fine-tuned models for averaging, our approach employs significantly fewer models to achieve final weights yet yield superior accuracy. Drawing from key insights in the weight space of fine-tuned weights, we uncover a strong link between the performance and proximity to the center of weight space. Based on this, we introduce a method that approximates a center-close weight using only two fine-tuned models, applicable during or after training. Our innovative layer-wise weight averaging technique surpasses state-of-the-art model methods such as Model Soup, utilizing only two fine-tuned models. This strategy can be aptly coined Model Stock, highlighting its reliance on selecting a minimal number of models to draw a more optimized-averaged model. We demonstrate the efficacy of Model Stock with fine-tuned models based upon pre-trained CLIP architectures, achieving remarkable performance on both ID and OOD tasks on the standard benchmarks, all while barely bringing extra computational demands. Our code and pre-trained models are available at https://github.com/naver-ai/model-stock.

We consider the obnoxious facility location problem (in which agents prefer the facility location to be far from them) and propose a hierarchy of distance-based proportional fairness concepts for the problem. These fairness axioms ensure that groups of agents at the same location are guaranteed to be a distance from the facility proportional to their group size. We consider deterministic and randomized mechanisms, and compute tight bounds on the price of proportional fairness. In the deterministic setting, we show that our proportional fairness axioms are incompatible with strategyproofness, and prove asymptotically tight epsilon-price of anarchy and stability bounds for proportionally fair welfare-optimal mechanisms. In the randomized setting, we identify proportionally fair and strategyproof mechanisms that give an expected welfare within a constant factor of the optimal welfare. Finally, we prove existence results for two extensions to our model.

In this paper we argue for the fundamental importance of the value distribution: the distribution of the random return received by a reinforcement learning agent. This is in contrast to the common approach to reinforcement learning which models the expectation of this return, or value. Although there is an established body of literature studying the value distribution, thus far it has always been used for a specific purpose such as implementing risk-aware behaviour. We begin with theoretical results in both the policy evaluation and control settings, exposing a significant distributional instability in the latter. We then use the distributional perspective to design a new algorithm which applies Bellman's equation to the learning of approximate value distributions. We evaluate our algorithm using the suite of games from the Arcade Learning Environment. We obtain both state-of-the-art results and anecdotal evidence demonstrating the importance of the value distribution in approximate reinforcement learning. Finally, we combine theoretical and empirical evidence to highlight the ways in which the value distribution impacts learning in the approximate setting.

We study the problem of multi-task learning under user-level differential privacy, in which n users contribute data to m tasks, each involving a subset of users. One important aspect of the problem, that can significantly impact quality, is the distribution skew among tasks. Certain tasks may have much fewer data samples than others, making them more susceptible to the noise added for privacy. It is natural to ask whether algorithms can adapt to this skew to improve the overall utility. We give a systematic analysis of the problem, by studying how to optimally allocate a user's privacy budget among tasks. We propose a generic algorithm, based on an adaptive reweighting of the empirical loss, and show that when there is task distribution skew, this gives a quantifiable improvement of excess empirical risk. Experimental studies on recommendation problems that exhibit a long tail of small tasks, demonstrate that our methods significantly improve utility, achieving the state of the art on two standard benchmarks.

We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility result that no strategy proof mechanism can bound the approximation ratio of the optimal Gini index of utilities for one or more facilities. We propose instead computing approximation ratios of the complemented Gini index of utilities, and consider how well both deterministic and randomized mechanisms approximate this. In addition, as Nash welfare is often put forwards as an equitable compromise between egalitarian and utilitarian outcomes, we consider how well mechanisms approximate the Nash welfare.

Budget management strategies in repeated auctions have received growing attention in online advertising markets. However, previous work on budget management in online bidding mainly focused on second-price auctions. The rapid shift from second-price auctions to first-price auctions for online ads in recent years has motivated the challenging question of how to bid in repeated first-price auctions while controlling budgets. In this work, we study the problem of learning in repeated first-price auctions with budgets. We design a dual-based algorithm that can achieve a near-optimal O(T) regret with full information feedback where the maximum competing bid is always revealed after each auction. We further consider the setting with one-sided information feedback where only the winning bid is revealed after each auction. We show that our modified algorithm can still achieve an O(T) regret with mild assumptions on the bidder's value distribution. Finally, we complement the theoretical results with numerical experiments to confirm the effectiveness of our budget management policy.

Motivated by concerns about making online decisions that incur undue amount of risk at each time step, in this paper, we formulate the probably anytime-safe stochastic combinatorial semi-bandits problem. In this problem, the agent is given the option to select a subset of size at most K from a set of L ground items. Each item is associated to a certain mean reward as well as a variance that represents its risk. To mitigate the risk that the agent incurs, we require that with probability at least 1-delta, over the entire horizon of time T, each of the choices that the agent makes should contain items whose sum of variances does not exceed a certain variance budget. We call this probably anytime-safe constraint. Under this constraint, we design and analyze an algorithm {\sc PASCombUCB} that minimizes the regret over the horizon of time T. By developing accompanying information-theoretic lower bounds, we show that under both the problem-dependent and problem-independent paradigms, {\sc PASCombUCB} is almost asymptotically optimal. Experiments are conducted to corroborate our theoretical findings. Our problem setup, the proposed {\sc PASCombUCB} algorithm, and novel analyses are applicable to domains such as recommendation systems and transportation in which an agent is allowed to choose multiple items at a single time step and wishes to control the risk over the whole time horizon.

We consider identification of average treatment effects on the treated (ATT) within the difference-in-differences (DiD) framework in the presence of endogenous sample selection. First, we establish that the usual DiD estimand fails to recover meaningful treatment effects, even if selection and treatment assignment are independent. Next, we partially identify the ATT for individuals who are always observed post-treatment regardless of their treatment status, and derive bounds on this parameter under different sets of assumptions about the relationship between sample selection and treatment assignment. Extensions to the repeated cross-section and two-by-two comparisons in the staggered adoption case are explored. Furthermore, we provide identification results for the ATT of three additional empirically relevant latent groups by incorporating outcome mean dominance assumptions which have intuitive appeal in applications. Finally, two empirical illustrations demonstrate the approach's usefulness by revisiting (i) the effect of a job training program on earnings(Calonico & Smith, 2017) and (ii) the effect of a working-from-home policy on employee performance (Bloom, Liang, Roberts, & Ying, 2015).

In this report, we survey Bayesian Optimization methods focussed on the Multi-Armed Bandit Problem. We take the help of the paper "Portfolio Allocation for Bayesian Optimization". We report a small literature survey on the acquisition functions and the types of portfolio strategies used in papers discussing Bayesian Optimization. We also replicate the experiments and report our findings and compare them to the results in the paper. Code link: https://colab.research.google.com/drive/1GZ14klEDoe3dcBeZKo5l8qqrKf_GmBDn?usp=sharing#scrollTo=XgIBau3O45_V.

Ecological systems are dynamic and policies to manage them need to respond to that variation. However, policy adjustments will sometimes be costly, which means that fine-tuning a policy to track variability in the environment very tightly will only sometimes be worthwhile. We use a classic fisheries management question -- how to manage a stochastically varying population using annually varying quotas in order to maximize profit -- to examine how costs of policy adjustment change optimal management recommendations. Costs of policy adjustment (here changes in fishing quotas through time) could take different forms. For example, these costs may respond to the size of the change being implemented, or there could be a fixed cost any time a quota change is made. We show how different forms of policy costs have contrasting implications for optimal policies. Though it is frequently assumed that costs to adjusting policies will dampen variation in the policy, we show that certain cost structures can actually increase variation through time. We further show that failing to account for adjustment costs has a consistently worse economic impact than would assuming these costs are present when they are not.

This work considers the category distribution heterogeneity in federated learning. This issue is due to biased labeling preferences at multiple clients and is a typical setting of data heterogeneity. To alleviate this issue, most previous works consider either regularizing local models or fine-tuning the global model, while they ignore the adjustment of aggregation weights and simply assign weights based on the dataset size. However, based on our empirical observations and theoretical analysis, we find that the dataset size is not optimal and the discrepancy between local and global category distributions could be a beneficial and complementary indicator for determining aggregation weights. We thus propose a novel aggregation method, Federated Learning with Discrepancy-aware Collaboration (FedDisco), whose aggregation weights not only involve both the dataset size and the discrepancy value, but also contribute to a tighter theoretical upper bound of the optimization error. FedDisco also promotes privacy-preservation, communication and computation efficiency, as well as modularity. Extensive experiments show that our FedDisco outperforms several state-of-the-art methods and can be easily incorporated with many existing methods to further enhance the performance. Our code will be available at https://github.com/MediaBrain-SJTU/FedDisco.

In this paper, we focus on quantifying model stability as a function of random seed by investigating the effects of the induced randomness on model performance and the robustness of the model in general. We specifically perform a controlled study on the effect of random seeds on the behaviour of attention, gradient-based and surrogate model based (LIME) interpretations. Our analysis suggests that random seeds can adversely affect the consistency of models resulting in counterfactual interpretations. We propose a technique called Aggressive Stochastic Weight Averaging (ASWA)and an extension called Norm-filtered Aggressive Stochastic Weight Averaging (NASWA) which improves the stability of models over random seeds. With our ASWA and NASWA based optimization, we are able to improve the robustness of the original model, on average reducing the standard deviation of the model's performance by 72%.

Designing an optimum portfolio for allocating suitable weights to its constituent assets so that the return and risk associated with the portfolio are optimized is a computationally hard problem. The seminal work of Markowitz that attempted to solve the problem by estimating the future returns of the stocks is found to perform sub-optimally on real-world stock market data. This is because the estimation task becomes extremely challenging due to the stochastic and volatile nature of stock prices. This work illustrates three approaches to portfolio design minimizing the risk, optimizing the risk, and assigning equal weights to the stocks of a portfolio. Thirteen critical sectors listed on the National Stock Exchange (NSE) of India are first chosen. Three portfolios are designed following the above approaches choosing the top ten stocks from each sector based on their free-float market capitalization. The portfolios are designed using the historical prices of the stocks from Jan 1, 2017, to Dec 31, 2022. The portfolios are evaluated on the stock price data from Jan 1, 2022, to Dec 31, 2022. The performances of the portfolios are compared, and the portfolio yielding the higher return for each sector is identified.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

In economy, markets are denoted as efficient when it is impossible to systematically generate profits which outperform the average. In the past years, the concept has been tested in other domains such as the growing sports betting market. Surprisingly, despite its large size and its level of maturity, sports betting shows traits of inefficiency. The anomalies indicate the existence of strategies which shift betting from a game of chance towards a game of skill. This article shows an example for an inefficiency detected in the German soccer betting TOTO 13er Wette, which is operated by state-run lottery agencies. Gamblers have to guess the outcome (win, draw, loss) of 13 soccer matches listed on a lottery tip. Applying stochastic methods, a recipe is presented to determine hit rates for single match outcomes. More important, the recipe provides the number of lottery tips required to achieve a specific number of strikes (number of correct match forecasts per lottery tip) for any given level of safety. An approximation is derived to cope with large numbers in hypergeometric distributions, valid under certain constraints. Overall, the strategy does lead to returns exceeding the aggregated lottery fees, resulting in moderate, but consistent profits. It is briefly discussed if lessions learned from soccer betting can be transferred back to financial markets, because gamblers and retail investors face similar challenges and opportunities.

Institutional investors have been increasing the allocation of the illiquid alternative assets such as private equity funds in their portfolios, yet there exists a very limited literature on cash flow forecasting of illiquid alternative assets. The net cash flow of private equity funds typically follow a J-curve pattern, however the timing and the size of the contributions and distributions depend on the investment opportunities. In this paper, we develop a benchmark model and present two novel approaches (direct vs. indirect) to predict the cash flows of private equity funds. We introduce a sliding window approach to apply on our cash flow data because different vintage year funds contain different lengths of cash flow information. We then pass the data to an LSTM/ GRU model to predict the future cash flows either directly or indirectly (based on the benchmark model). We further integrate macroeconomic indicators into our data, which allows us to consider the impact of market environment on cash flows and to apply stress testing. Our results indicate that the direct model is easier to implement compared to the benchmark model and the indirect model, but still the predicted cash flows align better with the actual cash flows. We also show that macroeconomic variables improve the performance of the direct model whereas the impact is not obvious on the indirect model.

Federated learning (FL) has been a promising approach in the field of medical imaging in recent years. A critical problem in FL, specifically in medical scenarios is to have a more accurate shared model which is robust to noisy and out-of distribution clients. In this work, we tackle the problem of statistical heterogeneity in data for FL which is highly plausible in medical data where for example the data comes from different sites with different scanner settings. We propose IDA (Inverse Distance Aggregation), a novel adaptive weighting approach for clients based on meta-information which handles unbalanced and non-iid data. We extensively analyze and evaluate our method against the well-known FL approach, Federated Averaging as a baseline.

Quantile regression is a fundamental problem in statistical learning motivated by a need to quantify uncertainty in predictions, or to model a diverse population without being overly reductive. For instance, epidemiological forecasts, cost estimates, and revenue predictions all benefit from being able to quantify the range of possible values accurately. As such, many models have been developed for this problem over many years of research in statistics, machine learning, and related fields. Rather than proposing yet another (new) algorithm for quantile regression we adopt a meta viewpoint: we investigate methods for aggregating any number of conditional quantile models, in order to improve accuracy and robustness. We consider weighted ensembles where weights may vary over not only individual models, but also over quantile levels, and feature values. All of the models we consider in this paper can be fit using modern deep learning toolkits, and hence are widely accessible (from an implementation point of view) and scalable. To improve the accuracy of the predicted quantiles (or equivalently, prediction intervals), we develop tools for ensuring that quantiles remain monotonically ordered, and apply conformal calibration methods. These can be used without any modification of the original library of base models. We also review some basic theory surrounding quantile aggregation and related scoring rules, and contribute a few new results to this literature (for example, the fact that post sorting or post isotonic regression can only improve the weighted interval score). Finally, we provide an extensive suite of empirical comparisons across 34 data sets from two different benchmark repositories.

We propose and evaluate a number of solutions to the problem of calculating the cost to serve each location in a single-vehicle transport setting. Such cost to serve analysis has application both strategically and operationally in transportation. The problem is formally given by the traveling salesperson game (TSG), a cooperative total utility game in which agents correspond to locations in a traveling salesperson problem (TSP). The cost to serve a location is an allocated portion of the cost of an optimal tour. The Shapley value is one of the most important normative division schemes in cooperative games, giving a principled and fair allocation both for the TSG and more generally. We consider a number of direct and sampling-based procedures for calculating the Shapley value, and present the first proof that approximating the Shapley value of the TSG within a constant factor is NP-hard. Treating the Shapley value as an ideal baseline allocation, we then develop six proxies for that value which are relatively easy to compute. We perform an experimental evaluation using Synthetic Euclidean games as well as games derived from real-world tours calculated for fast-moving consumer goods scenarios. Our experiments show that several computationally tractable allocation techniques correspond to good proxies for the Shapley value.

In this work, we explore the possibility of utilizing transfer learning techniques to address the financial portfolio optimization problem. We introduce a novel concept called "transfer risk", within the optimization framework of transfer learning. A series of numerical experiments are conducted from three categories: cross-continent transfer, cross-sector transfer, and cross-frequency transfer. In particular, 1. a strong correlation between the transfer risk and the overall performance of transfer learning methods is established, underscoring the significance of transfer risk as a viable indicator of "transferability"; 2. transfer risk is shown to provide a computationally efficient way to identify appropriate source tasks in transfer learning, enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of the transfer learning approach; 3. additionally, the numerical experiments offer valuable new insights for portfolio management across these different settings.

We consider the linear contextual multi-class multi-period packing problem (LMMP) where the goal is to pack items such that the total vector of consumption is below a given budget vector and the total value is as large as possible. We consider the setting where the reward and the consumption vector associated with each action is a class-dependent linear function of the context, and the decision-maker receives bandit feedback. LMMP includes linear contextual bandits with knapsacks and online revenue management as special cases. We establish a new estimator which guarantees a faster convergence rate, and consequently, a lower regret in such problems. We propose a bandit policy that is a closed-form function of said estimated parameters. When the contexts are non-degenerate, the regret of the proposed policy is sublinear in the context dimension, the number of classes, and the time horizon T when the budget grows at least as T. We also resolve an open problem posed by Agrawal & Devanur (2016) and extend the result to a multi-class setting. Our numerical experiments clearly demonstrate that the performance of our policy is superior to other benchmarks in the literature.

Portfolio optimization is a challenging problem that has attracted considerable attention and effort from researchers. The optimization of stock portfolios is a particularly hard problem since the stock prices are volatile and estimation of their future volatilities and values, in most cases, is very difficult, if not impossible. This work uses three ratios, the Sharpe ratio, the Sortino ratio, and the Calmar ratio, for designing the mean-variance optimized portfolios for six important sectors listed in the National Stock Exchange (NSE) of India. Three portfolios are designed for each sector maximizing the ratios based on the historical prices of the ten most important stocks of each sector from Jan 1, 2017, to Dec 31, 2020. The evaluation of the portfolios is done based on their cumulative returns over the test period from Jan 1, 2021, to Dec 31, 2021. The ratio that yields the maximum cumulative returns for both the training and the test periods for the majority of the sectors is identified. The sectors that exhibit the maximum cumulative returns for the same ratio are also identified. The results provide useful insights for investors in the stock market in making their investment decisions based on the current return and risks associated with the six sectors and their stocks.

In collaborative learning with streaming data, nodes (e.g., organizations) jointly and continuously learn a machine learning (ML) model by sharing the latest model updates computed from their latest streaming data. For the more resourceful nodes to be willing to share their model updates, they need to be fairly incentivized. This paper explores an incentive design that guarantees fairness so that nodes receive rewards commensurate to their contributions. Our approach leverages an explore-then-exploit formulation to estimate the nodes' contributions (i.e., exploration) for realizing our theoretically guaranteed fair incentives (i.e., exploitation). However, we observe a "rich get richer" phenomenon arising from the existing approaches to guarantee fairness and it discourages the participation of the less resourceful nodes. To remedy this, we additionally preserve asymptotic equality, i.e., less resourceful nodes achieve equal performance eventually to the more resourceful/"rich" nodes. We empirically demonstrate in two settings with real-world streaming data: federated online incremental learning and federated reinforcement learning, that our proposed approach outperforms existing baselines in fairness and learning performance while remaining competitive in preserving equality.

Clustering is a fundamental building block of modern statistical analysis pipelines. Fair clustering has seen much attention from the machine learning community in recent years. We are some of the first to study fairness in the context of hierarchical clustering, after the results of Ahmadian et al. from NeurIPS in 2020. We evaluate our results using Dasgupta's cost function, perhaps one of the most prevalent theoretical metrics for hierarchical clustering evaluation. Our work vastly improves the previous O(n^{5/6}polylog(n)) fair approximation for cost to a near polylogarithmic O(n^delta polylog(n)) fair approximation for any constant deltain(0,1). This result establishes a cost-fairness tradeoff and extends to broader fairness constraints than the previous work. We also show how to alter existing hierarchical clusterings to guarantee fairness and cluster balance across any level in the hierarchy.

Although the fairness community has recognized the importance of data, researchers in the area primarily rely on UCI Adult when it comes to tabular data. Derived from a 1994 US Census survey, this dataset has appeared in hundreds of research papers where it served as the basis for the development and comparison of many algorithmic fairness interventions. We reconstruct a superset of the UCI Adult data from available US Census sources and reveal idiosyncrasies of the UCI Adult dataset that limit its external validity. Our primary contribution is a suite of new datasets derived from US Census surveys that extend the existing data ecosystem for research on fair machine learning. We create prediction tasks relating to income, employment, health, transportation, and housing. The data span multiple years and all states of the United States, allowing researchers to study temporal shift and geographic variation. We highlight a broad initial sweep of new empirical insights relating to trade-offs between fairness criteria, performance of algorithmic interventions, and the role of distribution shift based on our new datasets. Our findings inform ongoing debates, challenge some existing narratives, and point to future research directions. Our datasets are available at https://github.com/zykls/folktables.

Scaling data and compute is critical to the success of machine learning. However, scaling demands predictability: we want methods to not only perform well with more compute or data, but also have their performance be predictable from small-scale runs, without running the large-scale experiment. In this paper, we show that value-based off-policy RL methods are predictable despite community lore regarding their pathological behavior. First, we show that data and compute requirements to attain a given performance level lie on a Pareto frontier, controlled by the updates-to-data (UTD) ratio. By estimating this frontier, we can predict this data requirement when given more compute, and this compute requirement when given more data. Second, we determine the optimal allocation of a total resource budget across data and compute for a given performance and use it to determine hyperparameters that maximize performance for a given budget. Third, this scaling behavior is enabled by first estimating predictable relationships between hyperparameters, which is used to manage effects of overfitting and plasticity loss unique to RL. We validate our approach using three algorithms: SAC, BRO, and PQL on DeepMind Control, OpenAI gym, and IsaacGym, when extrapolating to higher levels of data, compute, budget, or performance.

Risk parity, also known as equal risk contribution, has recently gained increasing attention as a portfolio allocation method. However, solving portfolio weights must resort to numerical methods as the analytic solution is not available. This study improves two existing iterative methods: the cyclical coordinate descent (CCD) and Newton methods. We enhance the CCD method by simplifying the formulation using a correlation matrix and imposing an additional rescaling step. We also suggest an improved initial guess inspired by the CCD method for the Newton method. Numerical experiments show that the improved CCD method performs the best and is approximately three times faster than the original CCD method, saving more than 40% of the iterations.

This chapter presents a calendar rebalancing approach to portfolios of stocks in the Indian stock market. Ten important sectors of the Indian economy are first selected. For each of these sectors, the top ten stocks are identified based on their free-float market capitalization values. Using the ten stocks in each sector, a sector-specific portfolio is designed. In this study, the historical stock prices are used from January 4, 2021, to September 20, 2023 (NSE Website). The portfolios are designed based on the training data from January 4, 2021 to June 30, 2022. The performances of the portfolios are tested over the period from July 1, 2022, to September 20, 2023. The calendar rebalancing approach presented in the chapter is based on a yearly rebalancing method. However, the method presented is perfectly flexible and can be adapted for weekly or monthly rebalancing. The rebalanced portfolios for the ten sectors are analyzed in detail for their performances. The performance results are not only indicative of the relative performances of the sectors over the training (i.e., in-sample) data and test (out-of-sample) data, but they also reflect the overall effectiveness of the proposed portfolio rebalancing approach.

The bandits with knapsack (BwK) framework models online decision-making problems in which an agent makes a sequence of decisions subject to resource consumption constraints. The traditional model assumes that each action consumes a non-negative amount of resources and the process ends when the initial budgets are fully depleted. We study a natural generalization of the BwK framework which allows non-monotonic resource utilization, i.e., resources can be replenished by a positive amount. We propose a best-of-both-worlds primal-dual template that can handle any online learning problem with replenishment for which a suitable primal regret minimizer exists. In particular, we provide the first positive results for the case of adversarial inputs by showing that our framework guarantees a constant competitive ratio alpha when B=Omega(T) or when the possible per-round replenishment is a positive constant. Moreover, under a stochastic input model, our algorithm yields an instance-independent O(T^{1/2}) regret bound which complements existing instance-dependent bounds for the same setting. Finally, we provide applications of our framework to some economic problems of practical relevance.

We introduce Gravity, another algorithm for gradient-based optimization. In this paper, we explain how our novel idea change parameters to reduce the deep learning model's loss. It has three intuitive hyper-parameters that the best values for them are proposed. Also, we propose an alternative to moving average. To compare the performance of the Gravity optimizer with two common optimizers, Adam and RMSProp, five standard datasets were trained on two VGGNet models with a batch size of 128 for 100 epochs. Gravity hyper-parameters did not need to be tuned for different models. As will be explained more in the paper, to investigate the direct impact of the optimizer itself on loss reduction no overfitting prevention technique was used. The obtained results show that the Gravity optimizer has more stable performance than Adam and RMSProp and gives greater values of validation accuracy for datasets with more output classes like CIFAR-100 (Fine).

This paper investigates the problem of ensembling multiple strategies for sequential portfolios to outperform individual strategies in terms of long-term wealth. Due to the uncertainty of strategies' performances in the future market, which are often based on specific models and statistical assumptions, investors often mitigate risk and enhance robustness by combining multiple strategies, akin to common approaches in collective learning prediction. However, the absence of a distribution-free and consistent preference framework complicates decisions of combination due to the ambiguous objective. To address this gap, we introduce a novel framework for decision-making in combining strategies, irrespective of market conditions, by establishing the investor's preference between decisions and then forming a clear objective. Through this framework, we propose a combinatorial strategy construction, free from statistical assumptions, for any scale of component strategies, even infinite, such that it meets the determined criterion. Finally, we test the proposed strategy along with its accelerated variant and some other multi-strategies. The numerical experiments show results in favor of the proposed strategies, albeit with small tradeoffs in their Sharpe ratios, in which their cumulative wealths eventually exceed those of the best component strategies while the accelerated strategy significantly improves performance.

This paper analyzes how expectations of Transformative AI (TAI) affect current economic behavior by introducing a novel mechanism where automation redirects labor income from workers to those controlling AI systems, with the share of automated labor controlled by each household depending on their wealth at the time of invention. Using a modified neoclassical growth model calibrated to contemporary AI timeline forecasts, I find that even moderate assumptions about wealth-based allocation of AI labor generate substantial increases in pre-TAI interest rates. Under baseline scenarios with proportional wealth-based allocation, one-year interest rates rise to 10-16% compared to approximately 3% without strategic competition. The model reveals a notable divergence between interest rates and capital rental rates, as households accept lower productive returns in exchange for the strategic value of wealth accumulation. These findings suggest that evolving beliefs about TAI could create significant upward pressure on interest rates well before any technological breakthrough occurs, with important implications for monetary policy and financial stability.

Large participatory biomedical studies, studies that recruit individuals to join a dataset, are gaining popularity and investment, especially for analysis by modern AI methods. Because they purposively recruit participants, these studies are uniquely able to address a lack of historical representation, an issue that has affected many biomedical datasets. In this work, we define representativeness as the similarity to a target population distribution of a set of attributes and our goal is to mirror the U.S. population across distributions of age, gender, race, and ethnicity. Many participatory studies recruit at several institutions, so we introduce a computational approach to adaptively allocate recruitment resources among sites to improve representativeness. In simulated recruitment of 10,000-participant cohorts from medical centers in the STAR Clinical Research Network, we show that our approach yields a more representative cohort than existing baselines. Thus, we highlight the value of computational modeling in guiding recruitment efforts.

This paper investigates the problem of generalized linear bandits with heavy-tailed rewards, whose (1+epsilon)-th moment is bounded for some epsilonin (0,1]. Although there exist methods for generalized linear bandits, most of them focus on bounded or sub-Gaussian rewards and are not well-suited for many real-world scenarios, such as financial markets and web-advertising. To address this issue, we propose two novel algorithms based on truncation and mean of medians. These algorithms achieve an almost optimal regret bound of O(dT^{1{1+epsilon}}), where d is the dimension of contextual information and T is the time horizon. Our truncation-based algorithm supports online learning, distinguishing it from existing truncation-based approaches. Additionally, our mean-of-medians-based algorithm requires only O(log T) rewards and one estimator per epoch, making it more practical. Moreover, our algorithms improve the regret bounds by a logarithmic factor compared to existing algorithms when epsilon=1. Numerical experimental results confirm the merits of our algorithms.

We study regressions with multiple treatments and a set of controls that is flexible enough to purge omitted variable bias. We show that these regressions generally fail to estimate convex averages of heterogeneous treatment effects -- instead, estimates of each treatment's effect are contaminated by non-convex averages of the effects of other treatments. We discuss three estimation approaches that avoid such contamination bias, including the targeting of easiest-to-estimate weighted average effects. A re-analysis of nine empirical applications finds economically and statistically meaningful contamination bias in observational studies; contamination bias in experimental studies is more limited due to smaller variability in propensity scores.

In domains ranging from computer vision to natural language processing, machine learning models have been shown to exhibit stark disparities, often performing worse for members of traditionally underserved groups. One factor contributing to these performance gaps is a lack of representation in the data the models are trained on. It is often unclear, however, how to operationalize representativeness in specific applications. Here we formalize the problem of creating equitable training datasets, and propose a statistical framework for addressing this problem. We consider a setting where a model builder must decide how to allocate a fixed data collection budget to gather training data from different subgroups. We then frame dataset creation as a constrained optimization problem, in which one maximizes a function of group-specific performance metrics based on (estimated) group-specific learning rates and costs per sample. This flexible approach incorporates preferences of model-builders and other stakeholders, as well as the statistical properties of the learning task. When data collection decisions are made sequentially, we show that under certain conditions this optimization problem can be efficiently solved even without prior knowledge of the learning rates. To illustrate our approach, we conduct a simulation study of polygenic risk scores on synthetic genomic data -- an application domain that often suffers from non-representative data collection. We find that our adaptive sampling strategy outperforms several common data collection heuristics, including equal and proportional sampling, demonstrating the value of strategic dataset design for building equitable models.

We consider an extension to the classic position auctions in which sponsored creatives can be added within AI generated content rather than shown in predefined slots. New challenges arise from the natural requirement that sponsored creatives should smoothly fit into the context. With the help of advanced LLM technologies, it becomes viable to accurately estimate the benefits of adding each individual sponsored creatives into each potential positions within the AI generated content by properly taking the context into account. Therefore, we assume one click-through rate estimation for each position-creative pair, rather than one uniform estimation for each sponsored creative across all positions in classic settings. As a result, the underlying optimization becomes a general matching problem, thus the substitution effects should be treated more carefully compared to standard position auction settings, where the slots are independent with each other. In this work, we formalize a concrete mathematical model of the extended position auction problem and study the welfare-maximization and revenue-maximization mechanism design problem. Formally, we consider two different user behavior models and solve the mechanism design problems therein respectively. For the Multinomial Logit (MNL) model, which is order-insensitive, we can efficiently implement the optimal mechanisms. For the cascade model, which is order-sensitive, we provide approximately optimal solutions.

Modern ML applications increasingly rely on complex deep learning models and large datasets. There has been an exponential growth in the amount of computation needed to train the largest models. Therefore, to scale computation and data, these models are inevitably trained in a distributed manner in clusters of nodes, and their updates are aggregated before being applied to the model. However, a distributed setup is prone to Byzantine failures of individual nodes, components, and software. With data augmentation added to these settings, there is a critical need for robust and efficient aggregation systems. We define the quality of workers as reconstruction ratios in (0,1], and formulate aggregation as a Maximum Likelihood Estimation procedure using Beta densities. We show that the Regularized form of log-likelihood wrt subspace can be approximately solved using iterative least squares solver, and provide convergence guarantees using recent Convex Optimization landscape results. Our empirical findings demonstrate that our approach significantly enhances the robustness of state-of-the-art Byzantine resilient aggregators. We evaluate our method in a distributed setup with a parameter server, and show simultaneous improvements in communication efficiency and accuracy across various tasks. The code is publicly available at https://github.com/hamidralmasi/FlagAggregator

This paper studies distributional model risk in marginal problems, where each marginal measure is assumed to lie in a Wasserstein ball centered at a fixed reference measure with a given radius. Theoretically, we establish several fundamental results including strong duality, finiteness of the proposed Wasserstein distributional model risk, and the existence of an optimizer at each radius. In addition, we show continuity of the Wasserstein distributional model risk as a function of the radius. Using strong duality, we extend the well-known Makarov bounds for the distribution function of the sum of two random variables with given marginals to Wasserstein distributionally robust Markarov bounds. Practically, we illustrate our results on four distinct applications when the sample information comes from multiple data sources and only some marginal reference measures are identified. They are: partial identification of treatment effects; externally valid treatment choice via robust welfare functions; Wasserstein distributionally robust estimation under data combination; and evaluation of the worst aggregate risk measures.

In federated learning (FL), weighted aggregation of local models is conducted to generate a global model, and the aggregation weights are normalized (the sum of weights is 1) and proportional to the local data sizes. In this paper, we revisit the weighted aggregation process and gain new insights into the training dynamics of FL. First, we find that the sum of weights can be smaller than 1, causing global weight shrinking effect (analogous to weight decay) and improving generalization. We explore how the optimal shrinking factor is affected by clients' data heterogeneity and local epochs. Second, we dive into the relative aggregation weights among clients to depict the clients' importance. We develop client coherence to study the learning dynamics and find a critical point that exists. Before entering the critical point, more coherent clients play more essential roles in generalization. Based on the above insights, we propose an effective method for Federated Learning with Learnable Aggregation Weights, named as FedLAW. Extensive experiments verify that our method can improve the generalization of the global model by a large margin on different datasets and models.

Federated Averaging (FedAvg) and its variants are the most popular optimization algorithms in federated learning (FL). Previous convergence analyses of FedAvg either assume full client participation or partial client participation where the clients can be uniformly sampled. However, in practical cross-device FL systems, only a subset of clients that satisfy local criteria such as battery status, network connectivity, and maximum participation frequency requirements (to ensure privacy) are available for training at a given time. As a result, client availability follows a natural cyclic pattern. We provide (to our knowledge) the first theoretical framework to analyze the convergence of FedAvg with cyclic client participation with several different client optimizers such as GD, SGD, and shuffled SGD. Our analysis discovers that cyclic client participation can achieve a faster asymptotic convergence rate than vanilla FedAvg with uniform client participation under suitable conditions, providing valuable insights into the design of client sampling protocols.

Portfolio Selection is an important real-world financial task and has attracted extensive attention in artificial intelligence communities. This task, however, has two main difficulties: (i) the non-stationary price series and complex asset correlations make the learning of feature representation very hard; (ii) the practicality principle in financial markets requires controlling both transaction and risk costs. Most existing methods adopt handcraft features and/or consider no constraints for the costs, which may make them perform unsatisfactorily and fail to control both costs in practice. In this paper, we propose a cost-sensitive portfolio selection method with deep reinforcement learning. Specifically, a novel two-stream portfolio policy network is devised to extract both price series patterns and asset correlations, while a new cost-sensitive reward function is developed to maximize the accumulated return and constrain both costs via reinforcement learning. We theoretically analyze the near-optimality of the proposed reward, which shows that the growth rate of the policy regarding this reward function can approach the theoretical optimum. We also empirically evaluate the proposed method on real-world datasets. Promising results demonstrate the effectiveness and superiority of the proposed method in terms of profitability, cost-sensitivity and representation abilities.

Randomized controlled trials are susceptible to imbalance on covariates predictive of the outcome. Rerandomization and deterministic treatment assignment are two proposed solutions. This paper explores the relationship between rerandomization and deterministic assignment, showing how deterministic assignment is an extreme case of rerandomization. The paper argues that in small experiments, both fully randomized and fully deterministic assignment have limitations. Instead, the researcher should consider setting the rerandomization acceptance probability based on an analysis of covariates and assumptions about the data structure to achieve an optimal alignment between randomness and balance. This allows for the calculation of minimum p-values along with valid permutation tests and fiducial intervals. The paper also introduces tools, including a new, open-source R package named fastrerandomize, to implement rerandomization and explore options for optimal rerandomization acceptance thresholds.

Present-day federated learning (FL) systems deployed over edge networks consists of a large number of workers with high degrees of heterogeneity in data and/or computing capabilities, which call for flexible worker participation in terms of timing, effort, data heterogeneity, etc. To satisfy the need for flexible worker participation, we consider a new FL paradigm called "Anarchic Federated Learning" (AFL) in this paper. In stark contrast to conventional FL models, each worker in AFL has the freedom to choose i) when to participate in FL, and ii) the number of local steps to perform in each round based on its current situation (e.g., battery level, communication channels, privacy concerns). However, such chaotic worker behaviors in AFL impose many new open questions in algorithm design. In particular, it remains unclear whether one could develop convergent AFL training algorithms, and if yes, under what conditions and how fast the achievable convergence speed is. Toward this end, we propose two Anarchic Federated Averaging (AFA) algorithms with two-sided learning rates for both cross-device and cross-silo settings, which are named AFA-CD and AFA-CS, respectively. Somewhat surprisingly, we show that, under mild anarchic assumptions, both AFL algorithms achieve the best known convergence rate as the state-of-the-art algorithms for conventional FL. Moreover, they retain the highly desirable {\em linear speedup effect} with respect of both the number of workers and local steps in the new AFL paradigm. We validate the proposed algorithms with extensive experiments on real-world datasets.

Federated learning is a distributed machine learning paradigm in which a large number of clients coordinate with a central server to learn a model without sharing their own training data. Standard federated optimization methods such as Federated Averaging (FedAvg) are often difficult to tune and exhibit unfavorable convergence behavior. In non-federated settings, adaptive optimization methods have had notable success in combating such issues. In this work, we propose federated versions of adaptive optimizers, including Adagrad, Adam, and Yogi, and analyze their convergence in the presence of heterogeneous data for general non-convex settings. Our results highlight the interplay between client heterogeneity and communication efficiency. We also perform extensive experiments on these methods and show that the use of adaptive optimizers can significantly improve the performance of federated learning.

We compare the (1,lambda)-EA and the (1 + lambda)-EA on the recently introduced benchmark DisOM, which is the OneMax function with randomly planted local optima. Previous work showed that if all local optima have the same relative height, then the plus strategy never loses more than a factor O(nlog n) compared to the comma strategy. Here we show that even small random fluctuations in the heights of the local optima have a devastating effect for the plus strategy and lead to super-polynomial runtimes. On the other hand, due to their ability to escape local optima, comma strategies are unaffected by the height of the local optima and remain efficient. Our results hold for a broad class of possible distortions and show that the plus strategy, but not the comma strategy, is generally deceived by sparse unstructured fluctuations of a smooth landscape.

Stochastic optimization is one of the central problems in Machine Learning and Theoretical Computer Science. In the standard model, the algorithm is given a fixed distribution known in advance. In practice though, one may acquire at a cost extra information to make better decisions. In this paper, we study how to buy information for stochastic optimization and formulate this question as an online learning problem. Assuming the learner has an oracle for the original optimization problem, we design a 2-competitive deterministic algorithm and a e/(e-1)-competitive randomized algorithm for buying information. We show that this ratio is tight as the problem is equivalent to a robust generalization of the ski-rental problem, which we call super-martingale stopping. We also consider an adaptive setting where the learner can choose to buy information after taking some actions for the underlying optimization problem. We focus on the classic optimization problem, Min-Sum Set Cover, where the goal is to quickly find an action that covers a given request drawn from a known distribution. We provide an 8-competitive algorithm running in polynomial time that chooses actions and decides when to buy information about the underlying request.

We study the impact on mechanisms for facility location of moving from one dimension to two (or more) dimensions and Euclidean or Manhattan distances. We consider three fundamental axiomatic properties: anonymity which is a basic fairness property, Pareto optimality which is one of the most important efficiency properties, and strategy proofness which ensures agents do not have an incentive to mis-report. We also consider how well such mechanisms can approximate the optimal welfare. Our results are somewhat negative. Moving from one dimension to two (or more) dimensions often makes these axiomatic properties more difficult to achieve. For example, with two facilities in Euclidean space or with just a single facility in Manhattan space, no mechanism is anonymous, Pareto optimal and strategy proof. By contrast, mechanisms on the line exist with all three properties.We also show that approximation ratios may increase when moving to two (or more) dimensions. All our impossibility results are minimal. If we drop one of the three axioms (anonymity, Pareto optimality or strategy proofness) multiple mechanisms satisfy the other two axioms.

For observational studies, we study the sensitivity of causal inference when treatment assignments may depend on unobserved confounders. We develop a loss minimization approach for estimating bounds on the conditional average treatment effect (CATE) when unobserved confounders have a bounded effect on the odds ratio of treatment selection. Our approach is scalable and allows flexible use of model classes in estimation, including nonparametric and black-box machine learning methods. Based on these bounds for the CATE, we propose a sensitivity analysis for the average treatment effect (ATE). Our semi-parametric estimator extends/bounds the augmented inverse propensity weighted (AIPW) estimator for the ATE under bounded unobserved confounding. By constructing a Neyman orthogonal score, our estimator of the bound for the ATE is a regular root-n estimator so long as the nuisance parameters are estimated at the o_p(n^{-1/4}) rate. We complement our methodology with optimality results showing that our proposed bounds are tight in certain cases. We demonstrate our method on simulated and real data examples, and show accurate coverage of our confidence intervals in practical finite sample regimes with rich covariate information.