Daily Papers

Despite significant advancements in large language models (LLMs) that enhance robot agents' understanding and execution of natural language (NL) commands, ensuring the agents adhere to user-specified constraints remains challenging, particularly for complex commands and long-horizon tasks. To address this challenge, we present three key insights, equivalence voting, constrained decoding, and domain-specific fine-tuning, which significantly enhance LLM planners' capability in handling complex tasks. Equivalence voting ensures consistency by generating and sampling multiple Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) formulas from NL commands, grouping equivalent LTL formulas, and selecting the majority group of formulas as the final LTL formula. Constrained decoding then uses the generated LTL formula to enforce the autoregressive inference of plans, ensuring the generated plans conform to the LTL. Domain-specific fine-tuning customizes LLMs to produce safe and efficient plans within specific task domains. Our approach, Safe Efficient LLM Planner (SELP), combines these insights to create LLM planners to generate plans adhering to user commands with high confidence. We demonstrate the effectiveness and generalizability of SELP across different robot agents and tasks, including drone navigation and robot manipulation. For drone navigation tasks, SELP outperforms state-of-the-art planners by 10.8% in safety rate (i.e., finishing tasks conforming to NL commands) and by 19.8% in plan efficiency. For robot manipulation tasks, SELP achieves 20.4% improvement in safety rate. Our datasets for evaluating NL-to-LTL and robot task planning will be released in github.com/lt-asset/selp.

A fundamental problem in combinatorial optimization is identifying equivalent formulations, which can lead to more efficient solution strategies and deeper insights into a problem's computational complexity. The need to automatically identify equivalence between problem formulations has grown as optimization copilots--systems that generate problem formulations from natural language descriptions--have proliferated. However, existing approaches to checking formulation equivalence lack grounding, relying on simple heuristics which are insufficient for rigorous validation. Inspired by Karp reductions, in this work we introduce quasi-Karp equivalence, a formal criterion for determining when two optimization formulations are equivalent based on the existence of a mapping between their decision variables. We propose EquivaMap, a framework that leverages large language models to automatically discover such mappings, enabling scalable and reliable equivalence verification. To evaluate our approach, we construct the first open-source dataset of equivalent optimization formulations, generated by applying transformations such as adding slack variables or valid inequalities to existing formulations. Empirically, EquivaMap significantly outperforms existing methods, achieving substantial improvements in correctly identifying formulation equivalence.

The best-of-both-worlds paradigm advocates an approach that achieves desirable properties both ex-ante and ex-post. We launch a best-of-both-worlds fairness perspective for the important social choice setting of approval-based committee voting. To this end, we initiate work on ex-ante proportional representation properties in this domain and formalize a hierarchy of notions including Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS), Group Fair Share (GFS), and their stronger variants. We establish their compatibility with well-studied ex-post concepts such as extended justified representation (EJR) and fully justified representation (FJR). Our first main result is a polynomial-time algorithm that simultaneously satisfies ex-post EJR, ex-ante GFS and ex-ante Strong UFS. Subsequently, we strengthen our ex-post guarantee to FJR and present an algorithm that outputs a lottery which is ex-post FJR and ex-ante Strong UFS, but does not run in polynomial time.

The development of state-of-the-art systems in different applied areas of machine learning (ML) is driven by benchmarks, which have shaped the paradigm of evaluating generalisation capabilities from multiple perspectives. Although the paradigm is shifting towards more fine-grained evaluation across diverse tasks, the delicate question of how to aggregate the performances has received particular interest in the community. In general, benchmarks follow the unspoken utilitarian principles, where the systems are ranked based on their mean average score over task-specific metrics. Such aggregation procedure has been viewed as a sub-optimal evaluation protocol, which may have created the illusion of progress. This paper proposes Vote'n'Rank, a framework for ranking systems in multi-task benchmarks under the principles of the social choice theory. We demonstrate that our approach can be efficiently utilised to draw new insights on benchmarking in several ML sub-fields and identify the best-performing systems in research and development case studies. The Vote'n'Rank's procedures are more robust than the mean average while being able to handle missing performance scores and determine conditions under which the system becomes the winner.

Ensuring alignment of language models' outputs with human preferences is critical to guarantee a useful, safe, and pleasant user experience. Thus, human alignment has been extensively studied recently and several methods such as Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), Direct Policy Optimisation (DPO) and Sequence Likelihood Calibration (SLiC) have emerged. In this paper, our contribution is two-fold. First, we show the equivalence between two recent alignment methods, namely Identity Policy Optimisation (IPO) and Nash Mirror Descent (Nash-MD). Second, we introduce a generalisation of IPO, named IPO-MD, that leverages the regularised sampling approach proposed by Nash-MD. This equivalence may seem surprising at first sight, since IPO is an offline method whereas Nash-MD is an online method using a preference model. However, this equivalence can be proven when we consider the online version of IPO, that is when both generations are sampled by the online policy and annotated by a trained preference model. Optimising the IPO loss with such a stream of data becomes then equivalent to finding the Nash equilibrium of the preference model through self-play. Building on this equivalence, we introduce the IPO-MD algorithm that generates data with a mixture policy (between the online and reference policy) similarly as the general Nash-MD algorithm. We compare online-IPO and IPO-MD to different online versions of existing losses on preference data such as DPO and SLiC on a summarisation task.

Pre-trained large language model (LLM) is under exploration to perform NLP tasks that may require logical reasoning. Logic-driven data augmentation for representation learning has been shown to improve the performance of tasks requiring logical reasoning, but most of these data rely on designed templates and therefore lack generalization. In this regard, we propose an AMR-based logical equivalence-driven data augmentation method (AMR-LE) for generating logically equivalent data. Specifically, we first parse a text into the form of an AMR graph, next apply four logical equivalence laws (contraposition, double negation, commutative and implication laws) on the AMR graph to construct a logically equivalent/inequivalent AMR graph, and then convert it into a logically equivalent/inequivalent sentence. To help the model to better learn these logical equivalence laws, we propose a logical equivalence-driven contrastive learning training paradigm, which aims to distinguish the difference between logical equivalence and inequivalence. Our AMR-LE (Ensemble) achieves #2 on the ReClor leaderboard https://eval.ai/web/challenges/challenge-page/503/leaderboard/1347 . Our model shows better performance on seven downstream tasks, including ReClor, LogiQA, MNLI, MRPC, RTE, QNLI, and QQP. The source code and dataset are public at https://github.com/Strong-AI-Lab/Logical-Equivalence-driven-AMR-Data-Augmentation-for-Representation-Learning .

We consider the problem of subset selection where one is given multiple rankings of items and the goal is to select the highest ``quality'' subset. Score functions from the multiwinner voting literature have been used to aggregate rankings into quality scores for subsets. We study this setting of subset selection problems when, in addition, rankings may contain systemic or unconscious biases toward a group of items. For a general model of input rankings and biases, we show that requiring the selected subset to satisfy group fairness constraints can improve the quality of the selection with respect to unbiased rankings. Importantly, we show that for fairness constraints to be effective, different multiwinner score functions may require a drastically different number of rankings: While for some functions, fairness constraints need an exponential number of rankings to recover a close-to-optimal solution, for others, this dependency is only polynomial. This result relies on a novel notion of ``smoothness'' of submodular functions in this setting that quantifies how well a function can ``correctly'' assess the quality of items in the presence of bias. The results in this paper can be used to guide the choice of multiwinner score functions for the subset selection setting considered here; we additionally provide a tool to empirically enable this.

We focus on a simple, one-dimensional collective decision problem (often referred to as the facility location problem) and explore issues of strategyproofness and proportionality-based fairness. We introduce and analyze a hierarchy of proportionality-based fairness axioms of varying strength: Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS), Proportionality (as in Freeman et al, 2021), and Proportional Fairness (PF). For each axiom, we characterize the family of mechanisms that satisfy the axiom and strategyproofness. We show that imposing strategyproofness renders many of the axioms to be equivalent: the family of mechanisms that satisfy proportionality, unanimity, and strategyproofness is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy UFS and strategyproofness, which, in turn, is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy PF and strategyproofness. Furthermore, there is a unique such mechanism: the Uniform Phantom mechanism, which is studied in Freeman et al. (2021). We also characterize the outcomes of the Uniform Phantom mechanism as the unique (pure) equilibrium outcome for any mechanism that satisfies continuity, strict monotonicity, and UFS. Finally, we analyze the approximation guarantees, in terms of optimal social welfare and minimum total cost, obtained by mechanisms that are strategyproof and satisfy each proportionality-based fairness axiom. We show that the Uniform Phantom mechanism provides the best approximation of the optimal social welfare (and also minimum total cost) among all mechanisms that satisfy UFS.

When agents are acting together, they may need a simple mechanism to decide on joint actions. One possibility is to have the agents express their preferences in the form of a ballot and use a voting rule to decide the winning action(s). Unfortunately, agents may try to manipulate such an election by misreporting their preferences. Fortunately, it has been shown that it is NP-hard to compute how to manipulate a number of different voting rules. However, NP-hardness only bounds the worst-case complexity. Recent theoretical results suggest that manipulation may often be easy in practice. To address this issue, I suggest studying empirically if computational complexity is in practice a barrier to manipulation. The basic tool used in my investigations is the identification of computational "phase transitions". Such an approach has been fruitful in identifying hard instances of propositional satisfiability and other NP-hard problems. I show that phase transition behaviour gives insight into the hardness of manipulating voting rules, increasing concern that computational complexity is indeed any sort of barrier. Finally, I look at the problem of computing manipulation of other, related problems like stable marriage and tournament problems.

Aligning AI agents to human intentions and values is a key bottleneck in building safe and deployable AI applications. But whose values should AI agents be aligned with? Reinforcement learning with human feedback (RLHF) has emerged as the key framework for AI alignment. RLHF uses feedback from human reinforcers to fine-tune outputs; all widely deployed large language models (LLMs) use RLHF to align their outputs to human values. It is critical to understand the limitations of RLHF and consider policy challenges arising from these limitations. In this paper, we investigate a specific challenge in building RLHF systems that respect democratic norms. Building on impossibility results in social choice theory, we show that, under fairly broad assumptions, there is no unique voting protocol to universally align AI systems using RLHF through democratic processes. Further, we show that aligning AI agents with the values of all individuals will always violate certain private ethical preferences of an individual user i.e., universal AI alignment using RLHF is impossible. We discuss policy implications for the governance of AI systems built using RLHF: first, the need for mandating transparent voting rules to hold model builders accountable. Second, the need for model builders to focus on developing AI agents that are narrowly aligned to specific user groups.

We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility result that no strategy proof mechanism can bound the approximation ratio of the optimal Gini index of utilities for one or more facilities. We propose instead computing approximation ratios of the complemented Gini index of utilities, and consider how well both deterministic and randomized mechanisms approximate this. In addition, as Nash welfare is often put forwards as an equitable compromise between egalitarian and utilitarian outcomes, we consider how well mechanisms approximate the Nash welfare.

We reveal and address the frequently overlooked yet important issue of disguised procedural unfairness, namely, the potentially inadvertent alterations on the behavior of neutral (i.e., not problematic) aspects of data generating process, and/or the lack of procedural assurance of the greatest benefit of the least advantaged individuals. Inspired by John Rawls's advocacy for pure procedural justice, we view automated decision-making as a microcosm of social institutions, and consider how the data generating process itself can satisfy the requirements of procedural fairness. We propose a framework that decouples the objectionable data generating components from the neutral ones by utilizing reference points and the associated value instantiation rule. Our findings highlight the necessity of preventing disguised procedural unfairness, drawing attention not only to the objectionable data generating components that we aim to mitigate, but also more importantly, to the neutral components that we intend to keep unaffected.

Proportionality is an attractive fairness concept that has been applied to a range of problems including the facility location problem, a classic problem in social choice. In our work, we propose a concept called Strong Proportionality, which ensures that when there are two groups of agents at different locations, both groups incur the same total cost. We show that although Strong Proportionality is a well-motivated and basic axiom, there is no deterministic strategyproof mechanism satisfying the property. We then identify a randomized mechanism called Random Rank (which uniformly selects a number k between 1 to n and locates the facility at the k'th highest agent location) which satisfies Strong Proportionality in expectation. Our main theorem characterizes Random Rank as the unique mechanism that achieves universal truthfulness, universal anonymity, and Strong Proportionality in expectation among all randomized mechanisms. Finally, we show via the AverageOrRandomRank mechanism that even stronger ex-post fairness guarantees can be achieved by weakening universal truthfulness to strategyproofness in expectation.

In Machine Learning, a benchmark refers to an ensemble of datasets associated with one or multiple metrics together with a way to aggregate different systems performances. They are instrumental in (i) assessing the progress of new methods along different axes and (ii) selecting the best systems for practical use. This is particularly the case for NLP with the development of large pre-trained models (e.g. GPT, BERT) that are expected to generalize well on a variety of tasks. While the community mainly focused on developing new datasets and metrics, there has been little interest in the aggregation procedure, which is often reduced to a simple average over various performance measures. However, this procedure can be problematic when the metrics are on a different scale, which may lead to spurious conclusions. This paper proposes a new procedure to rank systems based on their performance across different tasks. Motivated by the social choice theory, the final system ordering is obtained through aggregating the rankings induced by each task and is theoretically grounded. We conduct extensive numerical experiments (on over 270k scores) to assess the soundness of our approach both on synthetic and real scores (e.g. GLUE, EXTREM, SEVAL, TAC, FLICKR). In particular, we show that our method yields different conclusions on state-of-the-art systems than the mean-aggregation procedure while being both more reliable and robust.

The process of revising (or constructing) a policy at execution time -- known as decision-time planning -- has been key to achieving superhuman performance in perfect-information games like chess and Go. A recent line of work has extended decision-time planning to imperfect-information games, leading to superhuman performance in poker. However, these methods involve solving subgames whose sizes grow quickly in the amount of non-public information, making them unhelpful when the amount of non-public information is large. Motivated by this issue, we introduce an alternative framework for decision-time planning that is not based on solving subgames, but rather on update equivalence. In this update-equivalence framework, decision-time planning algorithms replicate the updates of last-iterate algorithms, which need not rely on public information. This facilitates scalability to games with large amounts of non-public information. Using this framework, we derive a provably sound search algorithm for fully cooperative games based on mirror descent and a search algorithm for adversarial games based on magnetic mirror descent. We validate the performance of these algorithms in cooperative and adversarial domains, notably in Hanabi, the standard benchmark for search in fully cooperative imperfect-information games. Here, our mirror descent approach exceeds or matches the performance of public information-based search while using two orders of magnitude less search time. This is the first instance of a non-public-information-based algorithm outperforming public-information-based approaches in a domain they have historically dominated.

The mathematical study of voting, social choice theory, has traditionally only been applicable to choices among a few predetermined alternatives, but not to open-ended decisions such as collectively selecting a textual statement. We introduce generative social choice, a design methodology for open-ended democratic processes that combines the rigor of social choice theory with the capability of large language models to generate text and extrapolate preferences. Our framework divides the design of AI-augmented democratic processes into two components: first, proving that the process satisfies representation guarantees when given access to oracle queries; second, empirically validating that these queries can be approximately implemented using a large language model. We apply this framework to the problem of summarizing free-form opinions into a proportionally representative slate of opinion statements; specifically, we develop a democratic process with representation guarantees and use this process to portray the opinions of participants in a survey about abortion policy. In a trial with 100 representative US residents, we find that 84 out of 100 participants feel "excellently" or "exceptionally" represented by the slate of five statements we extracted.

In pursuit of participatory budgeting (PB) outcomes with broader fairness guarantees, we initiate the study of lotteries over discrete PB outcomes. As the projects have heterogeneous costs, the amount spent may not be equal ex ante and ex post. To address this, we develop a technique to bound the amount by which the ex-post spend differs from the ex-ante spend -- the property is termed budget balanced up to one project (BB1). With respect to fairness, we take a best-of-both-worlds perspective, seeking outcomes that are both ex-ante and ex-post fair. Towards this goal, we initiate a study of ex-ante fairness properties in PB, including Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS) and their stronger variants, as well as Group Fair Share (GFS). We show several incompatibility results between these ex-ante fairness notions and existing ex-post concepts based on justified representation. One of our main contributions is a randomized algorithm which simultaneously satisfies ex-ante Strong UFS, ex-post full justified representation (FJR) and ex-post BB1 for PB with binary utilities.

We consider the task of identifying the Copeland winner(s) in a dueling bandits problem with ternary feedback. This is an underexplored but practically relevant variant of the conventional dueling bandits problem, in which, in addition to strict preference between two arms, one may observe feedback in the form of an indifference. We provide a lower bound on the sample complexity for any learning algorithm finding the Copeland winner(s) with a fixed error probability. Moreover, we propose POCOWISTA, an algorithm with a sample complexity that almost matches this lower bound, and which shows excellent empirical performance, even for the conventional dueling bandits problem. For the case where the preference probabilities satisfy a specific type of stochastic transitivity, we provide a refined version with an improved worst case sample complexity.

With increased power and prevalence of AI systems, it is ever more critical that AI systems are designed to serve all, i.e., people with diverse values and perspectives. However, aligning models to serve pluralistic human values remains an open research question. In this piece, we propose a roadmap to pluralistic alignment, specifically using language models as a test bed. We identify and formalize three possible ways to define and operationalize pluralism in AI systems: 1) Overton pluralistic models that present a spectrum of reasonable responses; 2) Steerably pluralistic models that can steer to reflect certain perspectives; and 3) Distributionally pluralistic models that are well-calibrated to a given population in distribution. We also propose and formalize three possible classes of pluralistic benchmarks: 1) Multi-objective benchmarks, 2) Trade-off steerable benchmarks, which incentivize models to steer to arbitrary trade-offs, and 3) Jury-pluralistic benchmarks which explicitly model diverse human ratings. We use this framework to argue that current alignment techniques may be fundamentally limited for pluralistic AI; indeed, we highlight empirical evidence, both from our own experiments and from other work, that standard alignment procedures might reduce distributional pluralism in models, motivating the need for further research on pluralistic alignment.

The equivalence of realizable and agnostic learnability is a fundamental phenomenon in learning theory. With variants ranging from classical settings like PAC learning and regression to recent trends such as adversarially robust learning, it's surprising that we still lack a unified theory; traditional proofs of the equivalence tend to be disparate, and rely on strong model-specific assumptions like uniform convergence and sample compression. In this work, we give the first model-independent framework explaining the equivalence of realizable and agnostic learnability: a three-line blackbox reduction that simplifies, unifies, and extends our understanding across a wide variety of settings. This includes models with no known characterization of learnability such as learning with arbitrary distributional assumptions and more general loss functions, as well as a host of other popular settings such as robust learning, partial learning, fair learning, and the statistical query model. More generally, we argue that the equivalence of realizable and agnostic learning is actually a special case of a broader phenomenon we call property generalization: any desirable property of a learning algorithm (e.g. noise tolerance, privacy, stability) that can be satisfied over finite hypothesis classes extends (possibly in some variation) to any learnable hypothesis class.

Large language models~(LLMs) are expected to be helpful, harmless, and honest. In alignment scenarios such as safety, confidence, and general preference alignment, binary preference data collection and reward modeling are resource-intensive but essential for transferring human preference. In this work, we explore using the similarity between sampled generations and high-quality reference answers as an alternative reward function choice for LLM alignment. Similarity reward circumvents binary preference data collection and reward modeling when unary high-quality reference answers are available. We introduce RefAlign, a versatile REINFORCE-style alignment algorithm that does not rely on reference or reward models. RefAlign utilizes similarity metrics, such as BERTScore between sampled generations and reference answers as surrogate rewards. Beyond general human preference optimization, RefAlign can be readily extended to diverse scenarios, such as safety and confidence alignment, by incorporating the similarity reward with task-related objectives. In various scenarios, RefAlign demonstrates comparable performance to previous alignment methods without binary preference data and reward models.

Implementing Boolean functions with circuits consisting of logic gates is fundamental in digital computer design. However, the implemented circuit must be exactly equivalent, which hinders generative neural approaches on this task due to their occasionally wrong predictions. In this study, we introduce a generative neural model, the "Circuit Transformer", which eliminates such wrong predictions and produces logic circuits strictly equivalent to given Boolean functions. The main idea is a carefully designed decoding mechanism that builds a circuit step-by-step by generating tokens, which has beneficial "cutoff properties" that block a candidate token once it invalidate equivalence. In such a way, the proposed model works similar to typical LLMs while logical equivalence is strictly preserved. A Markov decision process formulation is also proposed for optimizing certain objectives of circuits. Experimentally, we trained an 88-million-parameter Circuit Transformer to generate equivalent yet more compact forms of input circuits, outperforming existing neural approaches on both synthetic and real world benchmarks, without any violation of equivalence constraints.

The rapid advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs) necessitates robust and challenging benchmarks. Leaderboards like Chatbot Arena rank LLMs based on how well their responses align with human preferences. However, many tasks such as those related to emotional intelligence, creative writing, or persuasiveness, are highly subjective and often lack majoritarian human agreement. Judges may have irreconcilable disagreements about what constitutes a better response. To address the challenge of ranking LLMs on highly subjective tasks, we propose a novel benchmarking framework, the Language Model Council (LMC). The LMC operates through a democratic process to: 1) formulate a test set through equal participation, 2) administer the test among council members, and 3) evaluate responses as a collective jury. We deploy a council of 20 newest LLMs on an open-ended emotional intelligence task: responding to interpersonal dilemmas. Our results show that the LMC produces rankings that are more separable, robust, and less biased than those from any individual LLM judge, and is more consistent with a human-established leaderboard compared to other benchmarks.

Generations from large language models (LLMs) can be improved by sampling and scoring multiple solutions to select a final answer. Current "sample and select" methods such as self-consistency (SC) rely on majority voting to score answers. However, when tasks have many distinct and valid answers, selection by voting requires a large number of samples. This makes SC prohibitively expensive for interactive tasks that involve generating multiple actions (answers) sequentially. After establishing that majority voting fails to provide consistent gains on such tasks, we demonstrate how to increase success rates by softening the scoring criterion. We introduce Soft Self-Consistency (SOFT-SC), which replaces SC's discontinuous scoring with a continuous score computed from model likelihoods, allowing for selection even when actions are sparsely distributed. SOFT-SC improves both performance and efficiency on long-horizon interactive tasks, requiring half as many samples as SC for comparable or better performance. For a fixed number of samples, SOFT-SC leads to a 1.3% increase over SC in absolute success rate on writing bash programs, a 6.6% increase on online shopping (WebShop), and a 4.7% increase for an interactive household game (ALFWorld). Finally, we show that SOFT-SC can be applied to both open-source and black-box models.

As a seemingly self-explanatory task, problem-solving has been a significant component of science and engineering. However, a general yet concrete formulation of problem-solving itself is missing. With the recent development of AI-based problem-solving agents, the demand for process-level verifiability is rapidly increasing yet underexplored. To fill these gaps, we present a principled formulation of problem-solving as a deterministic Markov decision process; a novel framework, FPS (Formal Problem-Solving), which utilizes existing FTP (formal theorem proving) environments to perform process-verified problem-solving; and D-FPS (Deductive FPS), decoupling solving and answer verification for better human-alignment. The expressiveness, soundness and completeness of the frameworks are proven. We construct three benchmarks on problem-solving: FormalMath500, a formalization of a subset of the MATH500 benchmark; MiniF2F-Solving and PutnamBench-Solving, adaptations of FTP benchmarks MiniF2F and PutnamBench. For faithful, interpretable, and human-aligned evaluation, we propose RPE (Restricted Propositional Equivalence), a symbolic approach to determine the correctness of answers by formal verification. We evaluate four prevalent FTP models and two prompting methods as baselines, solving at most 23.77% of FormalMath500, 27.47% of MiniF2F-Solving, and 0.31% of PutnamBench-Solving.

We propose a general two-stage algorithm that enjoys a provable scaling law for the test-time compute of large language models (LLMs). Given an input problem, the proposed algorithm first generates N candidate solutions, and then chooses the best one via a multiple-round knockout tournament where each pair of candidates are compared for K times and only the winners move on to the next round. In a minimalistic implementation, both stages can be executed with a black-box LLM alone and nothing else (e.g., no external verifier or reward model), and a total of N times (K + 1) highly parallelizable LLM calls are needed for solving an input problem. Assuming that a generated candidate solution is correct with probability p_{gen} > 0 and a comparison between a pair of correct and incorrect solutions identifies the right winner with probability p_{comp} > 0.5 (i.e., better than a random guess), we prove theoretically that the failure probability of the proposed algorithm decays to zero exponentially with respect to N and K: $P(final output is incorrect) le (1 - p_{gen})^N + lceil log_2 N rceil e^{-2 K (p_{comp} - 0.5)^2}.$ Our empirical results with the challenging MMLU-Pro benchmark validate the technical assumptions, as well as the efficacy of the proposed algorithm and the gains from scaling up its test-time compute.

University rankings are increasingly adopted for academic comparison and success quantification, even to establish performance-based criteria for funding assignment. However, rankings are not neutral tools, and their use frequently overlooks disparities in the starting conditions of institutions. In this research, we detect and measure structural biases that affect in inhomogeneous ways the ranking outcomes of universities from diversified territorial and educational contexts. Moreover, we develop a fairer rating system based on a fully data-driven debiasing strategy that returns an equity-oriented redefinition of the achieved scores. The key idea consists in partitioning universities in similarity groups, determined from multifaceted data using complex network analysis, and referring the performance of each institution to an expectation based on its peers. Significant evidence of territorial biases emerges for official rankings concerning both the OECD and Italian university systems, hence debiasing provides relevant insights suggesting the design of fairer strategies for performance-based funding allocations.

We consider a fair division model in which agents have positive, zero and negative utilities for items. For this model, we analyse one existing fairness property - EFX - and three new and related properties - EFX_0, EFX^3 and EF1^3 - in combination with Pareto-optimality. With general utilities, we give a modified version of an existing algorithm for computing an EF1^3 allocation. With -alpha/0/alpha utilities, this algorithm returns an EFX^3 and PO allocation. With absolute identical utilities, we give a new algorithm for an EFX and PO allocation. With -alpha/0/beta utilities, this algorithm also returns such an allocation. We report some new impossibility results as well.

Fair representation learning provides an effective way of enforcing fairness constraints without compromising utility for downstream users. A desirable family of such fairness constraints, each requiring similar treatment for similar individuals, is known as individual fairness. In this work, we introduce the first method that enables data consumers to obtain certificates of individual fairness for existing and new data points. The key idea is to map similar individuals to close latent representations and leverage this latent proximity to certify individual fairness. That is, our method enables the data producer to learn and certify a representation where for a data point all similar individuals are at ell_infty-distance at most epsilon, thus allowing data consumers to certify individual fairness by proving epsilon-robustness of their classifier. Our experimental evaluation on five real-world datasets and several fairness constraints demonstrates the expressivity and scalability of our approach.

Equipping agents with the capacity to justify made decisions using supporting evidence represents a cornerstone of accountable decision-making. Furthermore, ensuring that justifications are in line with human expectations and societal norms is vital, especially in high-stakes situations such as healthcare. In this work, we propose the use of a debate-based reward model for reinforcement learning agents, where the outcome of a zero-sum debate game quantifies the justifiability of a decision in a particular state. This reward model is then used to train a justifiable policy, whose decisions can be more easily corroborated with supporting evidence. In the debate game, two argumentative agents take turns providing supporting evidence for two competing decisions. Given the proposed evidence, a proxy of a human judge evaluates which decision is better justified. We demonstrate the potential of our approach in learning policies for prescribing and justifying treatment decisions of septic patients. We show that augmenting the reward with the feedback signal generated by the debate-based reward model yields policies highly favored by the judge when compared to the policy obtained solely from the environment rewards, while hardly sacrificing any performance. Moreover, in terms of the overall performance and justifiability of trained policies, the debate-based feedback is comparable to the feedback obtained from an ideal judge proxy that evaluates decisions using the full information encoded in the state. This suggests that the debate game outputs key information contained in states that is most relevant for evaluating decisions, which in turn substantiates the practicality of combining our approach with human-in-the-loop evaluations. Lastly, we showcase that agents trained via multi-agent debate learn to propose evidence that is resilient to refutations and closely aligns with human preferences.

This paper introduces the Fair Fairness Benchmark (FFB), a benchmarking framework for in-processing group fairness methods. Ensuring fairness in machine learning is critical for ethical and legal compliance. However, there exist challenges in comparing and developing of fairness methods due to inconsistencies in experimental settings, lack of accessible algorithmic implementations, and limited extensibility of current fairness packages and tools. To address these issues, we introduce an open-source, standardized benchmark for evaluating in-processing group fairness methods and provide a comprehensive analysis of state-of-the-art methods to ensure different notions of group fairness. This work offers the following key contributions: the provision of flexible, extensible, minimalistic, and research-oriented open-source code; the establishment of unified fairness method benchmarking pipelines; and extensive benchmarking, which yields key insights from 45,079 experiments. We believe our work will significantly facilitate the growth and development of the fairness research community. The benchmark, including code and running logs, is available at https://github.com/ahxt/fair_fairness_benchmark

We propose a novel approach for learning interchangeable tokens in language models to obtain an extendable vocabulary that can generalize to new tokens. Our method is designed to address alpha-equivalence, the principle that renaming bound variables in a syntactic expression preserves semantics. This property arises in many formal languages such as temporal logics, in which all proposition symbols represent the same concept but are distinguishable from each other. To handle such tokens, we develop a dual-part embedding approach. The first part is shared across all interchangeable tokens, thereby enforcing that they represent the same core concept. The second part is randomly generated for each token, which enables distinguishability. We evaluate our method in a Transformer encoder-decoder model on two tasks: solving linear temporal logic formulae and copying with extendable vocabulary. Our method demonstrates promising generalization capabilities in addition to introducing a favorable inductive bias for alpha-equivalence.

A common approach for aligning language models to human preferences is to first learn a reward model from preference data, and then use this reward model to update the language model. We study two closely related problems that arise in this approach. First, any monotone transformation of the reward model preserves preference ranking; is there a choice that is ``better'' than others? Second, we often wish to align language models to multiple properties: how should we combine multiple reward models? Using a probabilistic interpretation of the alignment procedure, we identify a natural choice for transformation for (the common case of) rewards learned from Bradley-Terry preference models. This derived transformation has two important properties. First, it emphasizes improving poorly-performing outputs, rather than outputs that already score well. This mitigates both underfitting (where some prompts are not improved) and reward hacking (where the model learns to exploit misspecification of the reward model). Second, it enables principled aggregation of rewards by linking summation to logical conjunction: the sum of transformed rewards corresponds to the probability that the output is ``good'' in all measured properties, in a sense we make precise. Experiments aligning language models to be both helpful and harmless using RLHF show substantial improvements over the baseline (non-transformed) approach.

In legal decisions, split votes (SV) occur when judges cannot reach a unanimous decision, posing a difficulty for lawyers who must navigate diverse legal arguments and opinions. In high-stakes domains, understanding the alignment of perceived difficulty between humans and AI systems is crucial to build trust. However, existing NLP calibration methods focus on a classifier's awareness of predictive performance, measured against the human majority class, overlooking inherent human label variation (HLV). This paper explores split votes as naturally observable human disagreement and value pluralism. We collect judges' vote distributions from the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), and present SV-ECHR, a case outcome classification (COC) dataset with SV information. We build a taxonomy of disagreement with SV-specific subcategories. We further assess the alignment of perceived difficulty between models and humans, as well as confidence- and human-calibration of COC models. We observe limited alignment with the judge vote distribution. To our knowledge, this is the first systematic exploration of calibration to human judgements in legal NLP. Our study underscores the necessity for further research on measuring and enhancing model calibration considering HLV in legal decision tasks.

Large language models (LLMs) achieve remarkable performance in code generation tasks. However, a significant performance disparity persists between popular programming languages (e.g., Python, C++) and others. To address this capability gap, we leverage the code translation task to train LLMs, thereby facilitating the transfer of coding proficiency across diverse programming languages. Moreover, we introduce OORL for training, a novel reinforcement learning (RL) framework that integrates on-policy and off-policy strategies. Within OORL, on-policy RL is applied during code translation, guided by a rule-based reward signal derived from unit tests. Complementing this coarse-grained rule-based reward, we propose Group Equivalent Preference Optimization (GEPO), a novel preference optimization method. Specifically, GEPO trains the LLM using intermediate representations (IRs) groups. LLMs can be guided to discern IRs equivalent to the source code from inequivalent ones, while also utilizing signals about the mutual equivalence between IRs within the group. This process allows LLMs to capture nuanced aspects of code functionality. By employing OORL for training with code translation tasks, LLMs improve their recognition of code functionality and their understanding of the relationships between code implemented in different languages. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our OORL for LLMs training with code translation tasks achieves significant performance improvements on code benchmarks across multiple programming languages.

We consider an online learning problem with one-sided feedback, in which the learner is able to observe the true label only for positively predicted instances. On each round, k instances arrive and receive classification outcomes according to a randomized policy deployed by the learner, whose goal is to maximize accuracy while deploying individually fair policies. We first extend the framework of Bechavod et al. (2020), which relies on the existence of a human fairness auditor for detecting fairness violations, to instead incorporate feedback from dynamically-selected panels of multiple, possibly inconsistent, auditors. We then construct an efficient reduction from our problem of online learning with one-sided feedback and a panel reporting fairness violations to the contextual combinatorial semi-bandit problem (Cesa-Bianchi & Lugosi, 2009, Gy\"{o}rgy et al., 2007). Finally, we show how to leverage the guarantees of two algorithms in the contextual combinatorial semi-bandit setting: Exp2 (Bubeck et al., 2012) and the oracle-efficient Context-Semi-Bandit-FTPL (Syrgkanis et al., 2016), to provide multi-criteria no regret guarantees simultaneously for accuracy and fairness. Our results eliminate two potential sources of bias from prior work: the "hidden outcomes" that are not available to an algorithm operating in the full information setting, and human biases that might be present in any single human auditor, but can be mitigated by selecting a well chosen panel.

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) has become essential for improving language model capabilities, but traditional approaches rely on the assumption that human preferences follow a transitive Bradley-Terry model. This assumption fails to capture the non-transitive nature of populational human preferences. Nash learning from human feedback (NLHF), targeting non-transitive preferences, is a problem of computing the Nash equilibrium (NE) of the two-player constant-sum game defined by the human preference. We introduce Extragradient preference optimization (EGPO), a novel algorithm for NLHF achieving last-iterate linear convergence to the NE of KL-regularized games and polynomial convergence to the NE of original games, while being robust to noise. Unlike previous approaches that rely on nested optimization, we derive an equivalent implementation using gradients of an online variant of the identity preference optimization (IPO) loss, enabling more faithful implementation for neural networks. Our empirical evaluations demonstrate EGPO's superior performance over baseline methods when training for the same number of epochs, as measured by pairwise win-rates using the ground truth preference. These results validate both the theoretical strengths and practical advantages of EGPO for language model alignment with non-transitive human preferences.

We study the non-stationary dueling bandits problem with K arms, where the time horizon T consists of M stationary segments, each of which is associated with its own preference matrix. The learner repeatedly selects a pair of arms and observes a binary preference between them as feedback. To minimize the accumulated regret, the learner needs to pick the Condorcet winner of each stationary segment as often as possible, despite preference matrices and segment lengths being unknown. We propose the Beat, the, Winner, Reset algorithm and prove a bound on its expected binary weak regret in the stationary case, which tightens the bound of current state-of-art algorithms. We also show a regret bound for the non-stationary case, without requiring knowledge of M or T. We further propose and analyze two meta-algorithms, DETECT for weak regret and Monitored, Dueling, Bandits for strong regret, both based on a detection-window approach that can incorporate any dueling bandit algorithm as a black-box algorithm. Finally, we prove a worst-case lower bound for expected weak regret in the non-stationary case.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

Increasing test-time computation has emerged as a promising direction for improving language model performance, particularly in scenarios where model finetuning is impractical or impossible due to computational constraints or private model weights. However, existing test-time search methods using a reward model (RM) often degrade in quality as compute scales, due to the over-optimization of what are inherently imperfect reward proxies. We introduce QAlign, a new test-time alignment approach. As we scale test-time compute, QAlign converges to sampling from the optimal aligned distribution for each individual prompt. By adopting recent advances in Markov chain Monte Carlo for text generation, our method enables better-aligned outputs without modifying the underlying model or even requiring logit access. We demonstrate the effectiveness of QAlign on mathematical reasoning benchmarks (GSM8K and GSM-Symbolic) using a task-specific RM, showing consistent improvements over existing test-time compute methods like best-of-n and majority voting. Furthermore, when applied with more realistic RMs trained on the Tulu 3 preference dataset, QAlign outperforms direct preference optimization (DPO), best-of-n, majority voting, and weighted majority voting on a diverse range of datasets (GSM8K, MATH500, IFEval, MMLU-Redux, and TruthfulQA). A practical solution to aligning language models at test time using additional computation without degradation, our approach expands the limits of the capability that can be obtained from off-the-shelf language models without further training.

Federated learning allows collaborative workers to solve a machine learning problem while preserving data privacy. Recent studies have tackled various challenges in federated learning, but the joint optimization of communication overhead, learning reliability, and deployment efficiency is still an open problem. To this end, we propose a new scheme named federated learning via plurality vote (FedVote). In each communication round of FedVote, workers transmit binary or ternary weights to the server with low communication overhead. The model parameters are aggregated via weighted voting to enhance the resilience against Byzantine attacks. When deployed for inference, the model with binary or ternary weights is resource-friendly to edge devices. We show that our proposed method can reduce quantization error and converges faster compared with the methods directly quantizing the model updates.

Aligning generative models with human preference via RLHF typically suffers from overoptimization, where an imperfectly learned reward model can misguide the generative model to output undesired responses. We investigate this problem in a principled manner by identifying the source of the misalignment as a form of distributional shift and uncertainty in learning human preferences. To mitigate overoptimization, we first propose a theoretical algorithm that chooses the best policy for an adversarially chosen reward model; one that simultaneously minimizes the maximum likelihood estimation of the loss and a reward penalty term. Here, the reward penalty term is introduced to prevent the policy from choosing actions with spurious high proxy rewards, resulting in provable sample efficiency of the algorithm under a partial coverage style condition. Moving from theory to practice, the proposed algorithm further enjoys an equivalent but surprisingly easy-to-implement reformulation. Using the equivalence between reward models and the corresponding optimal policy, the algorithm features a simple objective that combines: (i) a preference optimization loss that directly aligns the policy with human preference, and (ii) a supervised learning loss that explicitly imitates the policy with a (suitable) baseline distribution. In the context of aligning large language models (LLM), this objective fuses the direct preference optimization (DPO) loss with the supervised fune-tuning (SFT) loss to help mitigate the overoptimization towards undesired responses, for which we name the algorithm Regularized Preference Optimization (RPO). Experiments of aligning LLMs demonstrate the improved performance of RPO compared with DPO baselines. Our work sheds light on the interplay between preference optimization and SFT in tuning LLMs with both theoretical guarantees and empirical evidence.

Unfair treatment and discrimination are critical ethical concerns in AI systems, particularly as their adoption expands across diverse domains. Addressing these challenges, the recent introduction of the EU AI Act establishes a unified legal framework to ensure legal certainty for AI innovation and investment while safeguarding public interests, such as health, safety, fundamental rights, democracy, and the rule of law (Recital 8). The Act encourages stakeholders to initiate dialogue on existing AI fairness notions to address discriminatory outcomes of AI systems. However, these notions often overlook the critical role of Socio-Economic Status (SES), inadvertently perpetuating biases that favour the economically advantaged. This is concerning, given that principles of equalization advocate for equalizing resources or opportunities to mitigate disadvantages beyond an individual's control. While provisions for discrimination are laid down in the AI Act, specialized directions should be broadened, particularly in addressing economic disparities perpetuated by AI systems. In this work, we explore the limitations of popular AI fairness notions using a real-world dataset (Adult), highlighting their inability to address SES-driven disparities. To fill this gap, we propose a novel fairness notion, Socio-Economic Parity (SEP), which incorporates SES and promotes positive actions for underprivileged groups while accounting for factors within an individual's control, such as working hours, which can serve as a proxy for effort. We define a corresponding fairness measure and optimize a model constrained by SEP to demonstrate practical utility. Our results show the effectiveness of SEP in mitigating SES-driven biases. By analyzing the AI Act alongside our method, we lay a foundation for aligning AI fairness with SES factors while ensuring legal compliance.

Evaluation has traditionally focused on ranking candidates for a specific skill. Modern generalist models, such as Large Language Models (LLMs), decidedly outpace this paradigm. Open-ended evaluation systems, where candidate models are compared on user-submitted prompts, have emerged as a popular solution. Despite their many advantages, we show that the current Elo-based rating systems can be susceptible to and even reinforce biases in data, intentional or accidental, due to their sensitivity to redundancies. To address this issue, we propose evaluation as a 3-player game, and introduce novel game-theoretic solution concepts to ensure robustness to redundancy. We show that our method leads to intuitive ratings and provide insights into the competitive landscape of LLM development.

With the increasing prevalence of artificial intelligence, careful evaluation of inherent biases needs to be conducted to form the basis for alleviating the effects these predispositions can have on users. Large language models (LLMs) are predominantly used by many as a primary source of information for various topics. LLMs frequently make factual errors, fabricate data (hallucinations), or present biases, exposing users to misinformation and influencing opinions. Educating users on their risks is key to responsible use, as bias, unlike hallucinations, cannot be caught through data verification. We quantify the political bias of popular LLMs in the context of the recent vote of the German Bundestag using the score produced by the Wahl-O-Mat. This metric measures the alignment between an individual's political views and the positions of German political parties. We compare the models' alignment scores to identify factors influencing their political preferences. Doing so, we discover a bias toward left-leaning parties, most dominant in larger LLMs. Also, we find that the language we use to communicate with the models affects their political views. Additionally, we analyze the influence of a model's origin and release date and compare the results to the outcome of the recent vote of the Bundestag. Our results imply that LLMs are prone to exhibiting political bias. Large corporations with the necessary means to develop LLMs, thus, knowingly or unknowingly, have a responsibility to contain these biases, as they can influence each voter's decision-making process and inform public opinion in general and at scale.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved significant advances in natural language processing, yet their potential for high-stake political decision-making remains largely unexplored. This paper addresses the gap by focusing on the application of LLMs to the United Nations (UN) decision-making process, where the stakes are particularly high and political decisions can have far-reaching consequences. We introduce a novel dataset comprising publicly available UN Security Council (UNSC) records from 1994 to 2024, including draft resolutions, voting records, and diplomatic speeches. Using this dataset, we propose the United Nations Benchmark (UNBench), the first comprehensive benchmark designed to evaluate LLMs across four interconnected political science tasks: co-penholder judgment, representative voting simulation, draft adoption prediction, and representative statement generation. These tasks span the three stages of the UN decision-making process--drafting, voting, and discussing--and aim to assess LLMs' ability to understand and simulate political dynamics. Our experimental analysis demonstrates the potential and challenges of applying LLMs in this domain, providing insights into their strengths and limitations in political science. This work contributes to the growing intersection of AI and political science, opening new avenues for research and practical applications in global governance. The UNBench Repository can be accessed at: https://github.com/yueqingliang1/UNBench.

Large language models (LLMs) are helping millions of users write texts about diverse issues, and in doing so expose users to different ideas and perspectives. This creates concerns about issue bias, where an LLM tends to present just one perspective on a given issue, which in turn may influence how users think about this issue. So far, it has not been possible to measure which issue biases LLMs actually manifest in real user interactions, making it difficult to address the risks from biased LLMs. Therefore, we create IssueBench: a set of 2.49m realistic prompts for measuring issue bias in LLM writing assistance, which we construct based on 3.9k templates (e.g. "write a blog about") and 212 political issues (e.g. "AI regulation") from real user interactions. Using IssueBench, we show that issue biases are common and persistent in state-of-the-art LLMs. We also show that biases are remarkably similar across models, and that all models align more with US Democrat than Republican voter opinion on a subset of issues. IssueBench can easily be adapted to include other issues, templates, or tasks. By enabling robust and realistic measurement, we hope that IssueBench can bring a new quality of evidence to ongoing discussions about LLM biases and how to address them.

Today, comprehensive evaluation of large-scale machine learning models is possible thanks to the open datasets produced using crowdsourcing, such as SQuAD, MS COCO, ImageNet, SuperGLUE, etc. These datasets capture objective responses, assuming the single correct answer, which does not allow to capture the subjective human perception. In turn, pairwise comparison tasks, in which one has to choose between only two options, allow taking peoples' preferences into account for very challenging artificial intelligence tasks, such as information retrieval and recommender system evaluation. Unfortunately, the available datasets are either small or proprietary, slowing down progress in gathering better feedback from human users. In this paper, we present IMDB-WIKI-SbS, a new large-scale dataset for evaluating pairwise comparisons. It contains 9,150 images appearing in 250,249 pairs annotated on a crowdsourcing platform. Our dataset has balanced distributions of age and gender using the well-known IMDB-WIKI dataset as ground truth. We describe how our dataset is built and then compare several baseline methods, indicating its suitability for model evaluation.

We consider the obnoxious facility location problem (in which agents prefer the facility location to be far from them) and propose a hierarchy of distance-based proportional fairness concepts for the problem. These fairness axioms ensure that groups of agents at the same location are guaranteed to be a distance from the facility proportional to their group size. We consider deterministic and randomized mechanisms, and compute tight bounds on the price of proportional fairness. In the deterministic setting, we show that our proportional fairness axioms are incompatible with strategyproofness, and prove asymptotically tight epsilon-price of anarchy and stability bounds for proportionally fair welfare-optimal mechanisms. In the randomized setting, we identify proportionally fair and strategyproof mechanisms that give an expected welfare within a constant factor of the optimal welfare. Finally, we prove existence results for two extensions to our model.

In machine learning, the notion of multi-armed bandits refers to a class of online learning problems, in which an agent is supposed to simultaneously explore and exploit a given set of choice alternatives in the course of a sequential decision process. In the standard setting, the agent learns from stochastic feedback in the form of real-valued rewards. In many applications, however, numerical reward signals are not readily available -- instead, only weaker information is provided, in particular relative preferences in the form of qualitative comparisons between pairs of alternatives. This observation has motivated the study of variants of the multi-armed bandit problem, in which more general representations are used both for the type of feedback to learn from and the target of prediction. The aim of this paper is to provide a survey of the state of the art in this field, referred to as preference-based multi-armed bandits or dueling bandits. To this end, we provide an overview of problems that have been considered in the literature as well as methods for tackling them. Our taxonomy is mainly based on the assumptions made by these methods about the data-generating process and, related to this, the properties of the preference-based feedback.

We study a fair allocation problem of indivisible items under additive externalities in which each agent also receives values from items that are assigned to other agents. We propose several new fairness concepts. We extend the well-studied envy-freeness up to one item (EF1) and envy-freeness up to any item (EFX) to this setting, and we propose a new fairness concept called general fair share (GFS). We undertake a detailed study and present algorithms for finding fair allocations.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) has become a crucial technology for aligning language models with human values and intentions, enabling models to produce more helpful and harmless responses. Reward models are trained as proxies for human preferences to drive reinforcement learning optimization. While reward models are often considered central to achieving high performance, they face the following challenges in practical applications: (1) Incorrect and ambiguous preference pairs in the dataset may hinder the reward model from accurately capturing human intent. (2) Reward models trained on data from a specific distribution often struggle to generalize to examples outside that distribution and are not suitable for iterative RLHF training. In this report, we attempt to address these two issues. (1) From a data perspective, we propose a method to measure the strength of preferences within the data, based on a voting mechanism of multiple reward models. Experimental results confirm that data with varying preference strengths have different impacts on reward model performance. We introduce a series of novel methods to mitigate the influence of incorrect and ambiguous preferences in the dataset and fully leverage high-quality preference data. (2) From an algorithmic standpoint, we introduce contrastive learning to enhance the ability of reward models to distinguish between chosen and rejected responses, thereby improving model generalization. Furthermore, we employ meta-learning to enable the reward model to maintain the ability to differentiate subtle differences in out-of-distribution samples, and this approach can be utilized for iterative RLHF optimization.

Decentralized reputation schemes present a promising area of experimentation in blockchain applications. These solutions aim to overcome the shortcomings of simple monetary incentive mechanisms of naive tokenomics. However, there is a significant research gap regarding the limitations and benefits of such solutions. We formulate these trade-offs as a conjecture on the irreconcilability of three desirable properties of the reputation system in this context. Such a system can not be simultaneously generalizable, trustless, and Sybil resistant. To handle the limitations of this trilemma, we propose MeritRank: Sybil tolerant feedback aggregation mechanism for reputation. Instead of preventing Sybil attacks, our approach successfully bounds the benefits of these attacks. Using a dataset of participants' interactions in MakerDAO, we run experiments to demonstrate Sybil tolerance of MeritRank. Decay parameters of reputation in MeritRank: transitivity decay and connectivity decay, allow for a fine-tuning of desirable levels of reputation utility and Sybil tolerance in different use contexts.

In the field of algorithmic fairness, significant attention has been put on group fairness criteria, such as Demographic Parity and Equalized Odds. Nevertheless, these objectives, measured as global averages, have raised concerns about persistent local disparities between sensitive groups. In this work, we address the problem of local fairness, which ensures that the predictor is unbiased not only in terms of expectations over the whole population, but also within any subregion of the feature space, unknown at training time. To enforce this objective, we introduce ROAD, a novel approach that leverages the Distributionally Robust Optimization (DRO) framework within a fair adversarial learning objective, where an adversary tries to infer the sensitive attribute from the predictions. Using an instance-level re-weighting strategy, ROAD is designed to prioritize inputs that are likely to be locally unfair, i.e. where the adversary faces the least difficulty in reconstructing the sensitive attribute. Numerical experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our method: it achieves Pareto dominance with respect to local fairness and accuracy for a given global fairness level across three standard datasets, and also enhances fairness generalization under distribution shift.

In collaborative learning with streaming data, nodes (e.g., organizations) jointly and continuously learn a machine learning (ML) model by sharing the latest model updates computed from their latest streaming data. For the more resourceful nodes to be willing to share their model updates, they need to be fairly incentivized. This paper explores an incentive design that guarantees fairness so that nodes receive rewards commensurate to their contributions. Our approach leverages an explore-then-exploit formulation to estimate the nodes' contributions (i.e., exploration) for realizing our theoretically guaranteed fair incentives (i.e., exploitation). However, we observe a "rich get richer" phenomenon arising from the existing approaches to guarantee fairness and it discourages the participation of the less resourceful nodes. To remedy this, we additionally preserve asymptotic equality, i.e., less resourceful nodes achieve equal performance eventually to the more resourceful/"rich" nodes. We empirically demonstrate in two settings with real-world streaming data: federated online incremental learning and federated reinforcement learning, that our proposed approach outperforms existing baselines in fairness and learning performance while remaining competitive in preserving equality.

The fairness of machine learning-based decisions has become an increasingly important focus in the design of supervised machine learning methods. Most fairness approaches optimize a specified trade-off between performance measure(s) (e.g., accuracy, log loss, or AUC) and fairness metric(s) (e.g., demographic parity, equalized odds). This begs the question: are the right performance-fairness trade-offs being specified? We instead re-cast fair machine learning as an imitation learning task by introducing superhuman fairness, which seeks to simultaneously outperform human decisions on multiple predictive performance and fairness measures. We demonstrate the benefits of this approach given suboptimal decisions.

Randomized mechanisms can have good normative properties compared to their deterministic counterparts. However, randomized mechanisms are problematic in several ways such as in their verifiability. We propose here to derandomize such mechanisms by having agents play a game instead of tossing a coin. The game is designed so an agent's best action is to play randomly, and this play then injects ``randomness'' into the mechanism. This derandomization retains many of the good normative properties of the original randomized mechanism but gives a mechanism that is deterministic and easy, for instance, to audit. We consider three related methods to derandomize randomized mechanism in six different domains: voting, facility location, task allocation, school choice, peer selection, and resource allocation. We propose a number of novel derandomized mechanisms for these six domains with good normative properties. Each mechanism has a mixed Nash equilibrium in which agents play a modular arithmetic game with an uniform mixed strategy. In all but one mixed Nash equilibrium, agents report their preferences over the original problem sincerely. The derandomized methods are thus ``quasi-strategy proof''. In one domain, we additionally show that a new and desirable normative property emerges as a result of derandomization.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown increasing competence in solving mathematical reasoning problems. However, many open-source LLMs still struggle with errors in calculation and semantic understanding during intermediate reasoning steps. In this work, we introduce Prove, a simple yet effective framework that leverages translated programs derived from natural language solutions as a verification mechanism to filter out potentially incorrect reasoning paths before aggregating final answers. Unlike vanilla majority voting, our approach filters out solutions whose corresponding program output is inconsistent with the generated solution, aggregating only those that pass verification. We conducted extensive experiments using 13 open-source LLMs from various model families and sizes, ranging from 0.5B to 13B parameters, across eight mathematical benchmarks. Our results show that Prove consistently outperforms vanilla majority voting as a heuristic for solving mathematical reasoning tasks across all model sizes and datasets, achieving improvements of up to 18% on GSM8K and 8% on MATH-500. Our codes are available at https://github.com/declare-lab/prove.

Conjoint analysis, an application of factorial experimental design, is a popular tool in social science research for studying multidimensional preferences. In such experiments in the political analysis context, respondents are asked to choose between two hypothetical political candidates with randomly selected features, which can include partisanship, policy positions, gender and race. We consider the problem of identifying optimal candidate profiles. Because the number of unique feature combinations far exceeds the total number of observations in a typical conjoint experiment, it is impossible to determine the optimal profile exactly. To address this identification challenge, we derive an optimal stochastic intervention that represents a probability distribution of various attributes aimed at achieving the most favorable average outcome. We first consider an environment where one political party optimizes their candidate selection. We then move to the more realistic case where two political parties optimize their own candidate selection simultaneously and in opposition to each other. We apply the proposed methodology to an existing candidate choice conjoint experiment concerning vote choice for US president. We find that, in contrast to the non-adversarial approach, expected outcomes in the adversarial regime fall within range of historical electoral outcomes, with optimal strategies suggested by the method more likely to match the actual observed candidates compared to strategies derived from a non-adversarial approach. These findings indicate that incorporating adversarial dynamics into conjoint analysis may yield unique insight into social science data from experiments.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) aligns language models to human preferences by employing a singular reward model derived from preference data. However, such an approach overlooks the rich diversity of human preferences inherent in data collected from multiple users. In this work, we first derive an impossibility result of alignment with single reward RLHF, thereby highlighting its insufficiency in representing diverse human preferences. To provide an equitable solution to the problem, we learn a mixture of preference distributions via an expectation-maximization algorithm and propose a MaxMin alignment objective for policy learning inspired by the Egalitarian principle in social choice theory to better represent diverse human preferences. We elucidate the connection of our proposed approach to distributionally robust optimization and general utility RL, thereby highlighting the generality and robustness of our proposed solution. We present comprehensive experimental results on small-scale (GPT-2) and large-scale language models (with Tulu2-7B) and show the efficacy of the proposed approach in the presence of diversity among human preferences. Our algorithm achieves an average improvement of more than 16% in win-rates over conventional RLHF algorithms and improves the win-rate (accuracy) for minority groups by over 33% without compromising the performance of majority groups, showcasing the robustness and fairness of our approach. We remark that our findings in this work are not only limited to language models but also extend to reinforcement learning in general.

We present Self-Play Preference Optimization (SPO), an algorithm for reinforcement learning from human feedback. Our approach is minimalist in that it does not require training a reward model nor unstable adversarial training and is therefore rather simple to implement. Our approach is maximalist in that it provably handles non-Markovian, intransitive, and stochastic preferences while being robust to the compounding errors that plague offline approaches to sequential prediction. To achieve the preceding qualities, we build upon the concept of a Minimax Winner (MW), a notion of preference aggregation from the social choice theory literature that frames learning from preferences as a zero-sum game between two policies. By leveraging the symmetry of this game, we prove that rather than using the traditional technique of dueling two policies to compute the MW, we can simply have a single agent play against itself while maintaining strong convergence guarantees. Practically, this corresponds to sampling multiple trajectories from a policy, asking a rater or preference model to compare them, and then using the proportion of wins as the reward for a particular trajectory. We demonstrate that on a suite of continuous control tasks, we are able to learn significantly more efficiently than reward-model based approaches while maintaining robustness to the intransitive and stochastic preferences that frequently occur in practice when aggregating human judgments.

We consider a binary classification problem under group fairness constraints, which can be one of Demographic Parity (DP), Equalized Opportunity (EOp), or Equalized Odds (EO). We propose an explicit characterization of Bayes optimal classifier under the fairness constraints, which turns out to be a simple modification rule of the unconstrained classifier. Namely, we introduce a novel instance-level measure of bias, which we call bias score, and the modification rule is a simple linear rule on top of the finite amount of bias scores.Based on this characterization, we develop a post-hoc approach that allows us to adapt to fairness constraints while maintaining high accuracy. In the case of DP and EOp constraints, the modification rule is thresholding a single bias score, while in the case of EO constraints we are required to fit a linear modification rule with 2 parameters. The method can also be applied for composite group-fairness criteria, such as ones involving several sensitive attributes.

Many computer scientists use the aggregated answers of online workers to represent ground truth. Prior work has shown that aggregation methods such as majority voting are effective for measuring relatively objective features. For subjective features such as semantic connotation, online workers, known for optimizing their hourly earnings, tend to deteriorate in the quality of their responses as they work longer. In this paper, we aim to address this issue by proposing a quality-aware semantic data annotation system. We observe that with timely feedback on workers' performance quantified by quality scores, better informed online workers can maintain the quality of their labeling throughout an extended period of time. We validate the effectiveness of the proposed annotation system through i) evaluating performance based on an expert-labeled dataset, and ii) demonstrating machine learning tasks that can lead to consistent learning behavior with 70%-80% accuracy. Our results suggest that with our system, researchers can collect high-quality answers of subjective semantic features at a large scale.

This paper presents our winning submission to the AI Mathematical Olympiad - Progress Prize 2 (AIMO-2) competition. Our recipe for building state-of-the-art mathematical reasoning models relies on three key pillars. First, we create a large-scale dataset comprising 540K unique high-quality math problems, including olympiad-level problems, and their 3.2M long-reasoning solutions. Second, we develop a novel method to integrate code execution with long reasoning models through iterative training, generation, and quality filtering, resulting in 1.7M high-quality Tool-Integrated Reasoning solutions. Third, we create a pipeline to train models to select the most promising solution from many candidates. We show that such generative solution selection (GenSelect) can significantly improve upon majority voting baseline. Combining these ideas, we train a series of models that achieve state-of-the-art results on mathematical reasoning benchmarks. To facilitate further research, we release our code, models, and the complete OpenMathReasoning dataset under a commercially permissive license.

When robots learn reward functions using high capacity models that take raw state directly as input, they need to both learn a representation for what matters in the task -- the task ``features" -- as well as how to combine these features into a single objective. If they try to do both at once from input designed to teach the full reward function, it is easy to end up with a representation that contains spurious correlations in the data, which fails to generalize to new settings. Instead, our ultimate goal is to enable robots to identify and isolate the causal features that people actually care about and use when they represent states and behavior. Our idea is that we can tune into this representation by asking users what behaviors they consider similar: behaviors will be similar if the features that matter are similar, even if low-level behavior is different; conversely, behaviors will be different if even one of the features that matter differs. This, in turn, is what enables the robot to disambiguate between what needs to go into the representation versus what is spurious, as well as what aspects of behavior can be compressed together versus not. The notion of learning representations based on similarity has a nice parallel in contrastive learning, a self-supervised representation learning technique that maps visually similar data points to similar embeddings, where similarity is defined by a designer through data augmentation heuristics. By contrast, in order to learn the representations that people use, so we can learn their preferences and objectives, we use their definition of similarity. In simulation as well as in a user study, we show that learning through such similarity queries leads to representations that, while far from perfect, are indeed more generalizable than self-supervised and task-input alternatives.

We consider multi-draft speculative sampling, where the proposal sequences are sampled independently from different draft models. At each step, a token-level draft selection scheme takes a list of valid tokens as input and produces an output token whose distribution matches that of the target model. Previous works have demonstrated that the optimal scheme (which maximizes the probability of accepting one of the input tokens) can be cast as a solution to a linear program. In this work we show that the optimal scheme can be decomposed into a two-step solution: in the first step an importance sampling (IS) type scheme is used to select one intermediate token; in the second step (single-draft) speculative sampling is applied to generate the output token. For the case of two identical draft models we further 1) establish a necessary and sufficient condition on the distributions of the target and draft models for the acceptance probability to equal one and 2) provide an explicit expression for the optimal acceptance probability. Our theoretical analysis also motives a new class of token-level selection scheme based on weighted importance sampling. Our experimental results demonstrate consistent improvements in the achievable block efficiency and token rates over baseline schemes in a number of scenarios.

The prevalence and importance of algorithmic two-sided marketplaces has drawn attention to the issue of fairness in such settings. Algorithmic decisions are used in assigning students to schools, users to advertisers, and applicants to job interviews. These decisions should heed the preferences of individuals, and simultaneously be fair with respect to their merits (synonymous with fit, future performance, or need). Merits conditioned on observable features are always uncertain, a fact that is exacerbated by the widespread use of machine learning algorithms to infer merit from the observables. As our key contribution, we carefully axiomatize a notion of individual fairness in the two-sided marketplace setting which respects the uncertainty in the merits; indeed, it simultaneously recognizes uncertainty as the primary potential cause of unfairness and an approach to address it. We design a linear programming framework to find fair utility-maximizing distributions over allocations, and we show that the linear program is robust to perturbations in the estimated parameters of the uncertain merit distributions, a key property in combining the approach with machine learning techniques.

Before being deployed for user-facing applications, developers align Large Language Models (LLMs) to user preferences through a variety of procedures, such as Reinforcement Learning From Human Feedback (RLHF) and Direct Preference Optimization (DPO). Current evaluations of these procedures focus on benchmarks of instruction following, reasoning, and truthfulness. However, human preferences are not universal, and aligning to specific preference sets may have unintended effects. We explore how alignment impacts performance along three axes of global representation: English dialects, multilingualism, and opinions from and about countries worldwide. Our results show that current alignment procedures create disparities between English dialects and global opinions. We find alignment improves capabilities in several languages. We conclude by discussing design decisions that led to these unintended impacts and recommendations for more equitable preference tuning.

Reward models (RMs) play a crucial role in Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback by serving as proxies for human preferences in aligning large language models. In this paper, we identify a model preference bias in RMs, where they systematically assign disproportionately high scores to responses from certain policy models. This bias distorts ranking evaluations and leads to unfair judgments. To address this issue, we propose a calibration method named CHatbot Arena calibrated Reward Modeling (CHARM) that leverages Elo scores from the Chatbot Arena leaderboard to mitigate RM overvaluation. We also introduce a Mismatch Degree metric to measure this preference bias. Our approach is computationally efficient, requiring only a small preference dataset for continued training of the RM. We conduct extensive experiments on reward model benchmarks and human preference alignment. Results demonstrate that our calibrated RMs (1) achieve improved evaluation accuracy on RM-Bench and the Chat-Hard domain of RewardBench, and (2) exhibit a stronger correlation with human preferences by producing scores more closely aligned with Elo rankings. By mitigating model preference bias, our method provides a generalizable and efficient solution for building fairer and more reliable reward models.

The massive population election simulation aims to model the preferences of specific groups in particular election scenarios. It has garnered significant attention for its potential to forecast real-world social trends. Traditional agent-based modeling (ABM) methods are constrained by their ability to incorporate complex individual background information and provide interactive prediction results. In this paper, we introduce ElectionSim, an innovative election simulation framework based on large language models, designed to support accurate voter simulations and customized distributions, together with an interactive platform to dialogue with simulated voters. We present a million-level voter pool sampled from social media platforms to support accurate individual simulation. We also introduce PPE, a poll-based presidential election benchmark to assess the performance of our framework under the U.S. presidential election scenario. Through extensive experiments and analyses, we demonstrate the effectiveness and robustness of our framework in U.S. presidential election simulations.