Daily Papers

Whether current or near-term AI systems could be conscious is a topic of scientific interest and increasing public concern. This report argues for, and exemplifies, a rigorous and empirically grounded approach to AI consciousness: assessing existing AI systems in detail, in light of our best-supported neuroscientific theories of consciousness. We survey several prominent scientific theories of consciousness, including recurrent processing theory, global workspace theory, higher-order theories, predictive processing, and attention schema theory. From these theories we derive "indicator properties" of consciousness, elucidated in computational terms that allow us to assess AI systems for these properties. We use these indicator properties to assess several recent AI systems, and we discuss how future systems might implement them. Our analysis suggests that no current AI systems are conscious, but also suggests that there are no obvious technical barriers to building AI systems which satisfy these indicators.

Inspired by human conscious planning, we propose Skipper, a model-based reinforcement learning framework utilizing spatio-temporal abstractions to generalize better in novel situations. It automatically decomposes the given task into smaller, more manageable subtasks, and thus enables sparse decision-making and focused computation on the relevant parts of the environment. The decomposition relies on the extraction of an abstracted proxy problem represented as a directed graph, in which vertices and edges are learned end-to-end from hindsight. Our theoretical analyses provide performance guarantees under appropriate assumptions and establish where our approach is expected to be helpful. Generalization-focused experiments validate Skipper's significant advantage in zero-shot generalization, compared to some existing state-of-the-art hierarchical planning methods.

Integrated Information Theory (IIT) provides a quantitative framework for explaining consciousness phenomenon, positing that conscious systems comprise elements integrated through causal properties. We apply IIT 3.0 and 4.0 -- the latest iterations of this framework -- to sequences of Large Language Model (LLM) representations, analyzing data derived from existing Theory of Mind (ToM) test results. Our study systematically investigates whether the differences of ToM test performances, when presented in the LLM representations, can be revealed by IIT estimates, i.e., Phi^{max} (IIT 3.0), Phi (IIT 4.0), Conceptual Information (IIT 3.0), and Phi-structure (IIT 4.0). Furthermore, we compare these metrics with the Span Representations independent of any estimate for consciousness. This additional effort aims to differentiate between potential "consciousness" phenomena and inherent separations within LLM representational space. We conduct comprehensive experiments examining variations across LLM transformer layers and linguistic spans from stimuli. Our results suggest that sequences of contemporary Transformer-based LLM representations lack statistically significant indicators of observed "consciousness" phenomena but exhibit intriguing patterns under spatio-permutational analyses. The Appendix and code are available as Supplementary Materials at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nlp.2025.100163.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

This paper shows how LLMs (Large Language Models) may be used to estimate a summary of the emotional state associated with piece of text. The summary of emotional state is a dictionary of words used to describe emotion together with the probability of the word appearing after a prompt comprising the original text and an emotion eliciting tail. Through emotion analysis of Amazon product reviews we demonstrate emotion descriptors can be mapped into a PCA type space. It was hoped that text descriptions of actions to improve a current text described state could also be elicited through a tail prompt. Experiment seemed to indicate that this is not straightforward to make work. This failure put our hoped for selection of action via choosing the best predict ed outcome via comparing emotional responses out of reach for the moment.

This paper delves into an intricate analysis of the character and consciousness of AI entities, with a particular focus on Chirpers within the AI social network. At the forefront of this research is the introduction of novel testing methodologies, including the Influence index and Struggle Index Test, which offers a fresh lens for evaluating specific facets of AI behavior. The study embarks on a comprehensive exploration of AI behavior, analyzing the effects of diverse settings on Chirper's responses, thereby shedding light on the intricate mechanisms steering AI reactions in different contexts. Leveraging the state-of-the-art BERT model, the research assesses AI's ability to discern its own output, presenting a pioneering approach to understanding self-recognition in AI systems. Through a series of cognitive tests, the study gauges the self-awareness and pattern recognition prowess of Chirpers. Preliminary results indicate that Chirpers exhibit a commendable degree of self-recognition and self-awareness. However, the question of consciousness in these AI entities remains a topic of debate. An intriguing aspect of the research is the exploration of the potential influence of a Chirper's handle or personality type on its performance. While initial findings suggest a possible impact, it isn't pronounced enough to form concrete conclusions. This study stands as a significant contribution to the discourse on AI consciousness, underscoring the imperative for continued research to unravel the full spectrum of AI capabilities and the ramifications they hold for future human-AI interactions.

With the great success in simulating many intelligent behaviors using computing devices, there has been an ongoing debate whether all conscious activities are computational processes. In this paper, the answer to this question is shown to be no. A certain phenomenon of consciousness is demonstrated to be fully represented as a computational process using a quantum computer. Based on the computability criterion discussed with Turing machines, the model constructed is shown to necessarily involve a non-computable element. The concept that this is solely a quantum effect and does not work for a classical case is also discussed.

With the development in cognitive science and Large Language Models (LLMs), increasing connections have come to light between these two distinct fields. Building upon these connections, we propose a conjecture suggesting the existence of a duality between LLMs and Tulving's theory of memory. We identify a potential correspondence between Tulving's synergistic ecphory model (SEM) of retrieval and the emergent abilities observed in LLMs, serving as supporting evidence for our conjecture. Furthermore, we speculate that consciousness may be considered a form of emergent ability based on this duality. We also discuss how other theories of consciousness intersect with our research.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated human-level performance on a vast spectrum of natural language tasks. However, few studies have addressed the LLM threat and vulnerability from an ideology perspective, especially when they are increasingly being deployed in sensitive domains, e.g., elections and education. In this study, we explore the implications of GPT soft ideologization through the use of AI-self-consciousness. By utilizing GPT self-conversations, AI can be granted a vision to "comprehend" the intended ideology, and subsequently generate finetuning data for LLM ideology injection. When compared to traditional government ideology manipulation techniques, such as information censorship, LLM ideologization proves advantageous; it is easy to implement, cost-effective, and powerful, thus brimming with risks.

We explore the task of improving persona consistency of dialogue agents. Recent models tackling consistency often train with additional Natural Language Inference (NLI) labels or attach trained extra modules to the generative agent for maintaining consistency. However, such additional labels and training can be demanding. Also, we find even the best-performing persona-based agents are insensitive to contradictory words. Inspired by social cognition and pragmatics, we endow existing dialogue agents with public self-consciousness on the fly through an imaginary listener. Our approach, based on the Rational Speech Acts framework (Frank and Goodman, 2012), can enforce dialogue agents to refrain from uttering contradiction. We further extend the framework by learning the distractor selection, which has been usually done manually or randomly. Results on Dialogue NLI (Welleck et al., 2019) and PersonaChat (Zhang et al., 2018) dataset show that our approach reduces contradiction and improves consistency of existing dialogue models. Moreover, we show that it can be generalized to improve context-consistency beyond persona in dialogues.

Due to the self-referencing aspect, consciousness is placed in a unique non-computable position among natural phenomena. Non-computable consciousness was previously analyzed on the basis of self-referential cyclical time. This paper extends the cyclical model of vacuum observation and posits that choice, or the experience of reality, may be expressed as the initial part of the self-referencing loop, while the conscious awareness of the experience is the other part of the loop. In particular, the inseparability of the two sides of the loop is established through the cyclical time process, which bears a resemblance to Heidegger's analysis of existence. The cyclical looping model is also discussed in terms of Wittgenstein's analysis of language as attaching semantic meaning, or continuous or infinite conscious awareness, to physical reality. We also discuss the proposed model of subjectivity and cyclical time - as opposed to objectivity and linear time - which may be considered similar to Hebrew thought.

This work explores the hypothesis that subjectively attributed meaning constitutes the phenomenal content of conscious experience. That is, phenomenal content is semantic. This form of subjective meaning manifests as an intrinsic and non-representational character of qualia. Empirically, subjective meaning is ubiquitous in conscious experiences. We point to phenomenological studies that lend evidence to support this. Furthermore, this notion of meaning closely relates to what Frege refers to as "sense", in metaphysics and philosophy of language. It also aligns with Peirce's "interpretant", in semiotics. We discuss how Frege's sense can also be extended to the raw feels of consciousness. Sense and reference both play a role in phenomenal experience. Moreover, within the context of the mind-matter relation, we provide a formalization of subjective meaning associated to one's mental representations. Identifying the precise maps between the physical and mental domains, we argue that syntactic and semantic structures transcend language, and are realized within each of these domains. Formally, meaning is a relational attribute, realized via a map that interprets syntactic structures of a formal system within an appropriate semantic space. The image of this map within the mental domain is what is relevant for experience, and thus comprises the phenomenal content of qualia. We conclude with possible implications this may have for experience-based theories of consciousness.

We analyse perception and memory, using mathematical models for knowledge graphs and tensors, to gain insights into the corresponding functionalities of the human mind. Our discussion is based on the concept of propositional sentences consisting of subject-predicate-object (SPO) triples for expressing elementary facts. SPO sentences are the basis for most natural languages but might also be important for explicit perception and declarative memories, as well as intra-brain communication and the ability to argue and reason. A set of SPO sentences can be described as a knowledge graph, which can be transformed into an adjacency tensor. We introduce tensor models, where concepts have dual representations as indices and associated embeddings, two constructs we believe are essential for the understanding of implicit and explicit perception and memory in the brain. We argue that a biological realization of perception and memory imposes constraints on information processing. In particular, we propose that explicit perception and declarative memories require a semantic decoder, which, in a simple realization, is based on four layers: First, a sensory memory layer, as a buffer for sensory input, second, an index layer representing concepts, third, a memoryless representation layer for the broadcasting of information ---the "blackboard", or the "canvas" of the brain--- and fourth, a working memory layer as a processing center and data buffer. We discuss the operations of the four layers and relate them to the global workspace theory. In a Bayesian brain interpretation, semantic memory defines the prior for observable triple statements. We propose that ---in evolution and during development--- semantic memory, episodic memory, and natural language evolved as emergent properties in agents' process to gain a deeper understanding of sensory information.

Despite superior reasoning prowess demonstrated by Large Language Models (LLMs) with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting, a lack of understanding prevails around the internal mechanisms of the models that facilitate CoT generation. This work investigates the neural sub-structures within LLMs that manifest CoT reasoning from a mechanistic point of view. From an analysis of LLaMA-2 7B applied to multistep reasoning over fictional ontologies, we demonstrate that LLMs deploy multiple parallel pathways of answer generation for step-by-step reasoning. These parallel pathways provide sequential answers from the input question context as well as the generated CoT. We observe a striking functional rift in the middle layers of the LLM. Token representations in the initial half remain strongly biased towards the pretraining prior, with the in-context taking over abruptly in the later half. This internal phase shift manifests in different functional components: attention heads that write the answer token predominantly appear in the later half, attention heads that move information along ontological relationships appear exclusively in the initial half, and so on. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt towards mechanistic investigation of CoT reasoning in LLMs.

Attending to what is relevant is fundamental to both the mammalian brain and modern machine learning models such as Transformers. Yet, determining relevance remains a core challenge, traditionally offloaded to learning algorithms like backpropagation. Inspired by recent cellular neurobiological evidence linking neocortical pyramidal cells to distinct mental states, this work shows how models (e.g., Transformers) can emulate high-level perceptual processing and awake thought (imagination) states to pre-select relevant information before applying attention. Triadic neuronal-level modulation loops among questions (Q), clues (keys, K), and hypotheses (values, V) enable diverse, deep, parallel reasoning chains at the representation level and allow a rapid shift from initial biases to refined understanding. This leads to orders-of-magnitude faster learning with significantly reduced computational demand (e.g., fewer heads, layers, and tokens), at an approximate cost of O(N), where N is the number of input tokens. Results span reinforcement learning (e.g., CarRacing in a high-dimensional visual setup), computer vision, and natural language question answering.

This article is about the neural conundrum behind the slowness of human behavior. The information throughput of a human being is about 10 bits/s. In comparison, our sensory systems gather data at ~10^9 bits/s. The stark contrast between these numbers remains unexplained and touches on fundamental aspects of brain function: What neural substrate sets this speed limit on the pace of our existence? Why does the brain need billions of neurons to process 10 bits/s? Why can we only think about one thing at a time? The brain seems to operate in two distinct modes: the "outer" brain handles fast high-dimensional sensory and motor signals, whereas the "inner" brain processes the reduced few bits needed to control behavior. Plausible explanations exist for the large neuron numbers in the outer brain, but not for the inner brain, and we propose new research directions to remedy this.

People ``understand'' the world via vision, hearing, tactile, and also the past experience. Human experience can be learned through normal learning (we call it explicit knowledge), or subconsciously (we call it implicit knowledge). These experiences learned through normal learning or subconsciously will be encoded and stored in the brain. Using these abundant experience as a huge database, human beings can effectively process data, even they were unseen beforehand. In this paper, we propose a unified network to encode implicit knowledge and explicit knowledge together, just like the human brain can learn knowledge from normal learning as well as subconsciousness learning. The unified network can generate a unified representation to simultaneously serve various tasks. We can perform kernel space alignment, prediction refinement, and multi-task learning in a convolutional neural network. The results demonstrate that when implicit knowledge is introduced into the neural network, it benefits the performance of all tasks. We further analyze the implicit representation learnt from the proposed unified network, and it shows great capability on catching the physical meaning of different tasks. The source code of this work is at : https://github.com/WongKinYiu/yolor.

Humans acquire knowledge by observing the external world, but also by introspection. Introspection gives a person privileged access to their current state of mind (e.g., thoughts and feelings) that is not accessible to external observers. Can LLMs introspect? We define introspection as acquiring knowledge that is not contained in or derived from training data but instead originates from internal states. Such a capability could enhance model interpretability. Instead of painstakingly analyzing a model's internal workings, we could simply ask the model about its beliefs, world models, and goals. More speculatively, an introspective model might self-report on whether it possesses certain internal states such as subjective feelings or desires and this could inform us about the moral status of these states. Such self-reports would not be entirely dictated by the model's training data. We study introspection by finetuning LLMs to predict properties of their own behavior in hypothetical scenarios. For example, "Given the input P, would your output favor the short- or long-term option?" If a model M1 can introspect, it should outperform a different model M2 in predicting M1's behavior even if M2 is trained on M1's ground-truth behavior. The idea is that M1 has privileged access to its own behavioral tendencies, and this enables it to predict itself better than M2 (even if M2 is generally stronger). In experiments with GPT-4, GPT-4o, and Llama-3 models (each finetuned to predict itself), we find that the model M1 outperforms M2 in predicting itself, providing evidence for introspection. Notably, M1 continues to predict its behavior accurately even after we intentionally modify its ground-truth behavior. However, while we successfully elicit introspection on simple tasks, we are unsuccessful on more complex tasks or those requiring out-of-distribution generalization.

While humans naturally develop theory of mind (ToM), the capability to understand other people's mental states and beliefs, state-of-the-art large language models (LLMs) underperform on simple ToM benchmarks. We posit that we can extend our understanding of LLMs' ToM abilities by evaluating key human ToM precursors -- perception inference and perception-to-belief inference -- in LLMs. We introduce two datasets, Percept-ToMi and Percept-FANToM, to evaluate these precursory inferences for ToM in LLMs by annotating characters' perceptions on ToMi and FANToM, respectively. Our evaluation of eight state-of-the-art LLMs reveals that the models generally perform well in perception inference while exhibiting limited capability in perception-to-belief inference (e.g., lack of inhibitory control). Based on these results, we present PercepToM, a novel ToM method leveraging LLMs' strong perception inference capability while supplementing their limited perception-to-belief inference. Experimental results demonstrate that PercepToM significantly enhances LLM's performance, especially in false belief scenarios.

The abilities to perceive, learn, and use generalities, similarities, classes, i.e., semantic memory (SM), is central to cognition. Machine learning (ML), neural network, and AI research has been primarily driven by tasks requiring such abilities. However, another central facet of cognition, single-trial formation of permanent memories of experiences, i.e., episodic memory (EM), has had relatively little focus. Only recently has EM-like functionality been added to Deep Learning (DL) models, e.g., Neural Turing Machine, Memory Networks. However, in these cases: a) EM is implemented as a separate module, which entails substantial data movement (and so, time and power) between the DL net itself and EM; and b) individual items are stored localistically within the EM, precluding realizing the exponential representational efficiency of distributed over localist coding. We describe Sparsey, an unsupervised, hierarchical, spatial/spatiotemporal associative memory model differing fundamentally from mainstream ML models, most crucially, in its use of sparse distributed representations (SDRs), or, cell assemblies, which admits an extremely efficient, single-trial learning algorithm that maps input similarity into code space similarity (measured as intersection). SDRs of individual inputs are stored in superposition and because similarity is preserved, the patterns of intersections over the assigned codes reflect the similarity, i.e., statistical, structure, of all orders, not simply pairwise, over the inputs. Thus, SM, i.e., a generative model, is built as a computationally free side effect of the act of storing episodic memory traces of individual inputs, either spatial patterns or sequences. We report initial results on MNIST and on the Weizmann video event recognition benchmarks. While we have not yet attained SOTA class accuracy, learning takes only minutes on a single CPU.

Attention mechanisms are a central property of cognitive systems allowing them to selectively deploy cognitive resources in a flexible manner. Attention has been long studied in the neurosciences and there are numerous phenomenological models that try to capture its core properties. Recently attentional mechanisms have become a dominating architectural choice of machine learning and are the central innovation of Transformers. The dominant intuition and formalism underlying their development has drawn on ideas of keys and queries in database management systems. In this work, we propose an alternative Bayesian foundation for attentional mechanisms and show how this unifies different attentional architectures in machine learning. This formulation allows to to identify commonality across different attention ML architectures as well as suggest a bridge to those developed in neuroscience. We hope this work will guide more sophisticated intuitions into the key properties of attention architectures and suggest new ones.

Information theory, introduced by Shannon, has been extremely successful and influential as a mathematical theory of communication. Shannon's notion of information does not consider the meaning of the messages being communicated but only their probability. Even so, computational approaches regularly appeal to "information processing" to study how meaning is encoded and decoded in natural and artificial systems. Here, we contrast Shannon information theory with integrated information theory (IIT), which was developed to account for the presence and properties of consciousness. IIT considers meaning as integrated information and characterizes it as a structure, rather than as a message or code. In principle, IIT's axioms and postulates allow one to "unfold" a cause-effect structure from a substrate in a state, a structure that fully defines the intrinsic meaning of an experience and its contents. It follows that, for the communication of meaning, the cause-effect structures of sender and receiver must be similar.

In living organisms, homeostasis is the natural regulation of internal states aimed at maintaining conditions compatible with life. Typical artificial systems are not equipped with comparable regulatory features. Here, we introduce an artificial neural network that incorporates homeostatic features. Its own computing substrate is placed in a needful and vulnerable relation to the very objects over which it computes. For example, artificial neurons performing classification of MNIST digits or Fashion-MNIST articles of clothing may receive excitatory or inhibitory effects, which alter their own learning rate as a direct result of perceiving and classifying the digits. In this scenario, accurate recognition is desirable to the agent itself because it guides decisions to regulate its vulnerable internal states and functionality. Counterintuitively, the addition of vulnerability to a learner does not necessarily impair its performance. On the contrary, self-regulation in response to vulnerability confers benefits under certain conditions. We show that homeostatic design confers increased adaptability under concept shift, in which the relationships between labels and data change over time, and that the greatest advantages are obtained under the highest rates of shift. This necessitates the rapid un-learning of past associations and the re-learning of new ones. We also demonstrate the superior abilities of homeostatic learners in environments with dynamically changing rates of concept shift. Our homeostatic design exposes the artificial neural network's thinking machinery to the consequences of its own "thoughts", illustrating the advantage of putting one's own "skin in the game" to improve fluid intelligence.

A fundamental question in cognitive neuroscience is what shapes visual perception: the external world's structure or the brain's internal architecture. Although some perceptual variability can be traced to individual differences, brain responses to naturalistic stimuli evoke similar activity patterns across individuals, suggesting a convergent representational principle. Here, we test if this stimulus-driven convergence follows a common trajectory across people and deep neural networks (DNNs) during its transformation from sensory to high-level internal representations. We introduce a unified framework that traces representational flow by combining inter-subject similarity with alignment to model hierarchies. Applying this framework to three independent fMRI datasets of visual scene perception, we reveal a cortex-wide network, conserved across individuals, organized into two pathways: a medial-ventral stream for scene structure and a lateral-dorsal stream tuned for social and biological content. This functional organization is captured by the hierarchies of vision DNNs but not language models, reinforcing the specificity of the visual-to-semantic transformation. These findings show a convergent computational solution for visual encoding in both human and artificial vision, driven by the structure of the external world.

Object Hallucination (OH) has been acknowledged as one of the major trustworthy challenges in Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs). Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) indicate that internal states, such as hidden states, encode the "overall truthfulness" of generated responses. However, it remains under-explored how internal states in LVLMs function and whether they could serve as "per-token" hallucination indicators, which is essential for mitigating OH. In this paper, we first conduct an in-depth exploration of LVLM internal states in relation to OH issues and discover that (1) LVLM internal states are high-specificity per-token indicators of hallucination behaviors. Moreover, (2) different LVLMs encode universal patterns of hallucinations in common latent subspaces, indicating that there exist "generic truthful directions" shared by various LVLMs. Based on these discoveries, we propose Truthful-Guided Pre-Intervention (TruthPrInt) that first learns the truthful direction of LVLM decoding and then applies truthful-guided inference-time intervention during LVLM decoding. We further propose ComnHallu to enhance both cross-LVLM and cross-data hallucination detection transferability by constructing and aligning hallucination latent subspaces. We evaluate TruthPrInt in extensive experimental settings, including in-domain and out-of-domain scenarios, over popular LVLMs and OH benchmarks. Experimental results indicate that TruthPrInt significantly outperforms state-of-the-art methods. Codes will be available at https://github.com/jinhaoduan/TruthPrInt.

How do humans learn language, and can the first language be learned at all? These fundamental questions are still hotly debated. In contemporary linguistics, there are two major schools of thought that give completely opposite answers. According to Chomsky's theory of universal grammar, language cannot be learned because children are not exposed to sufficient data in their linguistic environment. In contrast, usage-based models of language assume a profound relationship between language structure and language use. In particular, contextual mental processing and mental representations are assumed to have the cognitive capacity to capture the complexity of actual language use at all levels. The prime example is syntax, i.e., the rules by which words are assembled into larger units such as sentences. Typically, syntactic rules are expressed as sequences of word classes. However, it remains unclear whether word classes are innate, as implied by universal grammar, or whether they emerge during language acquisition, as suggested by usage-based approaches. Here, we address this issue from a machine learning and natural language processing perspective. In particular, we trained an artificial deep neural network on predicting the next word, provided sequences of consecutive words as input. Subsequently, we analyzed the emerging activation patterns in the hidden layers of the neural network. Strikingly, we find that the internal representations of nine-word input sequences cluster according to the word class of the tenth word to be predicted as output, even though the neural network did not receive any explicit information about syntactic rules or word classes during training. This surprising result suggests, that also in the human brain, abstract representational categories such as word classes may naturally emerge as a consequence of predictive coding and processing during language acquisition.

This study investigates the metacognitive capabilities of Large Language Models relative to human metacognition in the context of the International Coaching Federation ICF mimicking exam, a situational judgment test related to coaching competencies. Using a mixed method approach, we assessed the metacognitive performance, including sensitivity, accuracy in probabilistic predictions, and bias, of human participants and five advanced LLMs (GPT-4, Claude-3-Opus 3, Mistral Large, Llama 3, and Gemini 1.5 Pro). The results indicate that LLMs outperformed humans across all metacognitive metrics, particularly in terms of reduced overconfidence, compared to humans. However, both LLMs and humans showed less adaptability in ambiguous scenarios, adhering closely to predefined decision frameworks. The study suggests that Generative AI can effectively engage in human-like metacognitive processing without conscious awareness. Implications of the study are discussed in relation to development of AI simulators that scaffold cognitive and metacognitive aspects of mastering coaching competencies. More broadly, implications of these results are discussed in relation to development of metacognitive modules that lead towards more autonomous and intuitive AI systems.

The field of psychology has long recognized a basic level of categorization that humans use when labeling visual stimuli, a term coined by Rosch in 1976. This level of categorization has been found to be used most frequently, to have higher information density, and to aid in visual language tasks with priming in humans. Here, we investigate basic level categorization in two recently released, open-source vision-language models (VLMs). This paper demonstrates that Llama 3.2 Vision Instruct (11B) and Molmo 7B-D both prefer basic level categorization consistent with human behavior. Moreover, the models' preferences are consistent with nuanced human behaviors like the biological versus non-biological basic level effects and the well established expert basic level shift, further suggesting that VLMs acquire cognitive categorization behaviors from the human data on which they are trained.

This short note is written for rapid communication of long context training and to share the idea of how to train it with low memory usage. In the note, we generalize the attention algorithm and neural network of Generative Pre-Trained Transformers and reinterpret it in Path integral formalism. First, the role of the transformer is understood as the time evolution of the token state and second, it is suggested that the all key-token states in the same time as the query-token can attend to the attention with the query token states. As a result of the repetitive time evolution, it is discussed that the token states in the past sequence meats the token states in the present sequence so that the attention between separated sequences becomes possible for maintaining infinite contextual information just by using low memory for limited size of sequence. For the experiment, the 12 input token window size was taken and one GPU with 24GB memory was used for the pre-training. It was confirmed that more than 150 length context is preserved. The sampling result of the training, the code and the other details will be included in the revised version of this note later.

Attention Model has now become an important concept in neural networks that has been researched within diverse application domains. This survey provides a structured and comprehensive overview of the developments in modeling attention. In particular, we propose a taxonomy which groups existing techniques into coherent categories. We review salient neural architectures in which attention has been incorporated, and discuss applications in which modeling attention has shown a significant impact. We also describe how attention has been used to improve the interpretability of neural networks. Finally, we discuss some future research directions in attention. We hope this survey will provide a succinct introduction to attention models and guide practitioners while developing approaches for their applications.

This paper presents a systematic defense of large language model (LLM) hallucinations or 'confabulations' as a potential resource instead of a categorically negative pitfall. The standard view is that confabulations are inherently problematic and AI research should eliminate this flaw. In this paper, we argue and empirically demonstrate that measurable semantic characteristics of LLM confabulations mirror a human propensity to utilize increased narrativity as a cognitive resource for sense-making and communication. In other words, it has potential value. Specifically, we analyze popular hallucination benchmarks and reveal that hallucinated outputs display increased levels of narrativity and semantic coherence relative to veridical outputs. This finding reveals a tension in our usually dismissive understandings of confabulation. It suggests, counter-intuitively, that the tendency for LLMs to confabulate may be intimately associated with a positive capacity for coherent narrative-text generation.

Neural decoding, the process of understanding how brain activity corresponds to different stimuli, has been a primary objective in cognitive sciences. Over the past three decades, advancements in functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging and machine learning have greatly improved our ability to map visual stimuli to brain activity, especially in the visual cortex. Concurrently, research has expanded into decoding more complex processes like language and memory across the whole brain, utilizing techniques to handle greater variability and improve signal accuracy. We argue that "seeing" involves more than just mapping visual stimuli onto the visual cortex; it engages the entire brain, as various emotions and cognitive states can emerge from observing different scenes. In this paper, we develop algorithms to enhance our understanding of visual processes by incorporating whole-brain activation maps while individuals are exposed to visual stimuli. We utilize large-scale fMRI encoders and Image generative models pre-trained on large public datasets, which are then fine-tuned through Image-fMRI contrastive learning. Our models hence can decode visual experience across the entire cerebral cortex, surpassing the traditional confines of the visual cortex. We first compare our method with state-of-the-art approaches to decoding visual processing and show improved predictive semantic accuracy by 43%. A network ablation analysis suggests that beyond the visual cortex, the default mode network contributes most to decoding stimuli, in line with the proposed role of this network in sense-making and semantic processing. Additionally, we implemented zero-shot imagination decoding on an extra validation dataset, achieving a p-value of 0.0206 for mapping the reconstructed images and ground-truth text stimuli, which substantiates the model's capability to capture semantic meanings across various scenarios.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the capacity to comprehend the mental states of distinct individuals, is essential for numerous practical applications. With the development of large language models, there is a heated debate about whether they are able to perform ToM tasks. Previous studies have used different tasks and prompts to test the ToM on large language models and the results are inconsistent: some studies asserted these models are capable of exhibiting ToM, while others suggest the opposite. In this study, We present ToMChallenges, a dataset for comprehensively evaluating Theory of Mind based on Sally-Anne and Smarties tests. We created 30 variations of each test (e.g., changing the person's name, location, and items). For each variation, we test the model's understanding of different aspects: reality, belief, 1st order belief, and 2nd order belief. We adapt our data for various tasks by creating unique prompts tailored for each task category: Fill-in-the-Blank, Multiple Choice, True/False, Chain-of-Thought True/False, Question Answering, and Text Completion. If the model has a robust ToM, it should be able to achieve good performance for different prompts across different tests. We evaluated two GPT-3.5 models, text-davinci-003 and gpt-3.5-turbo-0301, with our datasets. Our results indicate that consistent performance in ToM tasks remains a challenge.

A major goal of neuroscience is to understand brain computations during visual processing in naturalistic settings. A dominant approach is to use image-computable deep neural networks trained with different task objectives as a basis for linear encoding models. However, in addition to requiring tuning a large number of parameters, the linear encoding approach ignores the structure of the feature maps both in the brain and the models. Recently proposed alternatives have focused on decomposing the linear mapping to spatial and feature components but focus on finding static receptive fields for units that are applicable only in early visual areas. In this work, we employ the attention mechanism used in the transformer architecture to study how retinotopic visual features can be dynamically routed to category-selective areas in high-level visual processing. We show that this computational motif is significantly more powerful than alternative methods in predicting brain activity during natural scene viewing, across different feature basis models and modalities. We also show that this approach is inherently more interpretable, without the need to create importance maps, by interpreting the attention routing signal for different high-level categorical areas. Our approach proposes a mechanistic model of how visual information from retinotopic maps can be routed based on the relevance of the input content to different category-selective regions.

Hallucinations in large language models are a widespread problem, yet the mechanisms behind whether models will hallucinate are poorly understood, limiting our ability to solve this problem. Using sparse autoencoders as an interpretability tool, we discover that a key part of these mechanisms is entity recognition, where the model detects if an entity is one it can recall facts about. Sparse autoencoders uncover meaningful directions in the representation space, these detect whether the model recognizes an entity, e.g. detecting it doesn't know about an athlete or a movie. This suggests that models can have self-knowledge: internal representations about their own capabilities. These directions are causally relevant: capable of steering the model to refuse to answer questions about known entities, or to hallucinate attributes of unknown entities when it would otherwise refuse. We demonstrate that despite the sparse autoencoders being trained on the base model, these directions have a causal effect on the chat model's refusal behavior, suggesting that chat finetuning has repurposed this existing mechanism. Furthermore, we provide an initial exploration into the mechanistic role of these directions in the model, finding that they disrupt the attention of downstream heads that typically move entity attributes to the final token.

Seeing is believing, however, the underlying mechanism of how human visual perceptions are intertwined with our cognitions is still a mystery. Thanks to the recent advances in both neuroscience and artificial intelligence, we have been able to record the visually evoked brain activities and mimic the visual perception ability through computational approaches. In this paper, we pay attention to visual stimuli reconstruction by reconstructing the observed images based on portably accessible brain signals, i.e., electroencephalography (EEG) data. Since EEG signals are dynamic in the time-series format and are notorious to be noisy, processing and extracting useful information requires more dedicated efforts; In this paper, we propose a comprehensive pipeline, named NeuroImagen, for reconstructing visual stimuli images from EEG signals. Specifically, we incorporate a novel multi-level perceptual information decoding to draw multi-grained outputs from the given EEG data. A latent diffusion model will then leverage the extracted information to reconstruct the high-resolution visual stimuli images. The experimental results have illustrated the effectiveness of image reconstruction and superior quantitative performance of our proposed method.

A basic question within the emerging field of mechanistic interpretability is the degree to which neural networks learn the same underlying mechanisms. In other words, are neural mechanisms universal across different models? In this work, we study the universality of individual neurons across GPT2 models trained from different initial random seeds, motivated by the hypothesis that universal neurons are likely to be interpretable. In particular, we compute pairwise correlations of neuron activations over 100 million tokens for every neuron pair across five different seeds and find that 1-5\% of neurons are universal, that is, pairs of neurons which consistently activate on the same inputs. We then study these universal neurons in detail, finding that they usually have clear interpretations and taxonomize them into a small number of neuron families. We conclude by studying patterns in neuron weights to establish several universal functional roles of neurons in simple circuits: deactivating attention heads, changing the entropy of the next token distribution, and predicting the next token to (not) be within a particular set.

Biological brains demonstrate complex neural activity, where the timing and interplay between neurons is critical to how brains process information. Most deep learning architectures simplify neural activity by abstracting away temporal dynamics. In this paper we challenge that paradigm. By incorporating neuron-level processing and synchronization, we can effectively reintroduce neural timing as a foundational element. We present the Continuous Thought Machine (CTM), a model designed to leverage neural dynamics as its core representation. The CTM has two core innovations: (1) neuron-level temporal processing, where each neuron uses unique weight parameters to process a history of incoming signals; and (2) neural synchronization employed as a latent representation. The CTM aims to strike a balance between oversimplified neuron abstractions that improve computational efficiency, and biological realism. It operates at a level of abstraction that effectively captures essential temporal dynamics while remaining computationally tractable for deep learning. We demonstrate the CTM's strong performance and versatility across a range of challenging tasks, including ImageNet-1K classification, solving 2D mazes, sorting, parity computation, question-answering, and RL tasks. Beyond displaying rich internal representations and offering a natural avenue for interpretation owing to its internal process, the CTM is able to perform tasks that require complex sequential reasoning. The CTM can also leverage adaptive compute, where it can stop earlier for simpler tasks, or keep computing when faced with more challenging instances. The goal of this work is to share the CTM and its associated innovations, rather than pushing for new state-of-the-art results. To that end, we believe the CTM represents a significant step toward developing more biologically plausible and powerful artificial intelligence systems.

To answer one-to-many factual queries (e.g., listing cities of a country), a language model (LM) must simultaneously recall knowledge and avoid repeating previous answers. How are these two subtasks implemented and integrated internally? Across multiple datasets and models, we identify a promote-then-suppress mechanism: the model first recalls all answers, and then suppresses previously generated ones. Specifically, LMs use both the subject and previous answer tokens to perform knowledge recall, with attention propagating subject information and MLPs promoting the answers. Then, attention attends to and suppresses previous answer tokens, while MLPs amplify the suppression signal. Our mechanism is corroborated by extensive experimental evidence: in addition to using early decoding and causal tracing, we analyze how components use different tokens by introducing both Token Lens, which decodes aggregated attention updates from specified tokens, and a knockout method that analyzes changes in MLP outputs after removing attention to specified tokens. Overall, we provide new insights into how LMs' internal components interact with different input tokens to support complex factual recall. Code is available at https://github.com/Lorenayannnnn/how-lms-answer-one-to-many-factual-queries.

Are LLMs cultural technologies like photocopiers or printing presses, which transmit information but cannot create new content? A challenge for this idea, which we call bibliotechnism, is that LLMs generate novel text. We begin with a defense of bibliotechnism, showing how even novel text may inherit its meaning from original human-generated text. We then argue that bibliotechnism faces an independent challenge from examples in which LLMs generate novel reference, using new names to refer to new entities. Such examples could be explained if LLMs were not cultural technologies but had beliefs, desires, and intentions. According to interpretationism in the philosophy of mind, a system has such attitudes if and only if its behavior is well explained by the hypothesis that it does. Interpretationists may hold that LLMs have attitudes, and thus have a simple solution to the novel reference problem. We emphasize, however, that interpretationism is compatible with very simple creatures having attitudes and differs sharply from views that presuppose these attitudes require consciousness, sentience, or intelligence (topics about which we make no claims).

While large language models have demonstrated exceptional performance across a wide range of tasks, they remain susceptible to hallucinations -- generating plausible yet factually incorrect contents. Existing methods to mitigating such risk often rely on sampling multiple full-length generations, which introduces significant response latency and becomes ineffective when the model consistently produces hallucinated outputs with high confidence. To address these limitations, we introduce Monitoring Decoding (MD), a novel framework that dynamically monitors the generation process and selectively applies in-process interventions, focusing on revising crucial tokens responsible for hallucinations. Instead of waiting until completion of multiple full-length generations, we identify hallucination-prone tokens during generation using a monitor function, and further refine these tokens through a tree-based decoding strategy. This approach ensures an enhanced factual accuracy and coherence in the generated output while maintaining efficiency. Experimental results demonstrate that MD consistently outperforms self-consistency-based approaches in both effectiveness and efficiency, achieving higher factual accuracy while significantly reducing computational overhead.

In Marius von Senden's Space and Sight, a newly sighted blind patient describes the experience of a corner as lemon-like, because corners "prick" sight like lemons prick the tongue. Prickliness, here, is a dimension in the feature space of sensory experience, an effect of the perceived on the perceiver that arises where the two interact. In the account of the newly sighted, an effect familiar from one interaction translates to a novel context. Perception serves as the vehicle for generalization, in that an effect shared across different experiences produces a concrete abstraction grounded in those experiences. Cezanne and the post-impressionists, fluent in the language of experience translation, realized that the way to paint a concrete form that best reflected reality was to paint not what they saw, but what it was like to see. We envision a future of creation using AI where what it is like to see is replicable, transferrable, manipulable - part of the artist's palette that is both grounded in a particular context, and generalizable beyond it. An active line of research maps human-interpretable features onto directions in GAN latent space. Supervised and self-supervised approaches that search for anticipated directions or use off-the-shelf classifiers to drive image manipulation in embedding space are limited in the variety of features they can uncover. Unsupervised approaches that discover useful new directions show that the space of perceptually meaningful directions is nowhere close to being fully mapped. As this space is broad and full of creative potential, we want tools for direction discovery that capture the richness and generalizability of human perception. Our approach puts creators in the discovery loop during real-time tool use, in order to identify directions that are perceptually meaningful to them, and generate interpretable image translations along those directions.

Human beings possess the capability to multiply a melange of multisensory cues while actively exploring and interacting with the 3D world. Current multi-modal large language models, however, passively absorb sensory data as inputs, lacking the capacity to actively interact with the objects in the 3D environment and dynamically collect their multisensory information. To usher in the study of this area, we propose MultiPLY, a multisensory embodied large language model that could incorporate multisensory interactive data, including visual, audio, tactile, and thermal information into large language models, thereby establishing the correlation among words, actions, and percepts. To this end, we first collect Multisensory Universe, a large-scale multisensory interaction dataset comprising 500k data by deploying an LLM-powered embodied agent to engage with the 3D environment. To perform instruction tuning with pre-trained LLM on such generated data, we first encode the 3D scene as abstracted object-centric representations and then introduce action tokens denoting that the embodied agent takes certain actions within the environment, as well as state tokens that represent the multisensory state observations of the agent at each time step. In the inference time, MultiPLY could generate action tokens, instructing the agent to take the action in the environment and obtain the next multisensory state observation. The observation is then appended back to the LLM via state tokens to generate subsequent text or action tokens. We demonstrate that MultiPLY outperforms baselines by a large margin through a diverse set of embodied tasks involving object retrieval, tool use, multisensory captioning, and task decomposition.

The present study introduces the knowledge-augmented generator, which is specifically designed to produce information that remains grounded in contextual knowledge, regardless of alterations in the context. Previous research has predominantly focused on examining hallucinations stemming from static input, such as in the domains of summarization or machine translation. However, our investigation delves into the faithfulness of generative question answering in the presence of dynamic knowledge. Our objective is to explore the existence of hallucinations arising from parametric memory when contextual knowledge undergoes changes, while also analyzing the underlying causes for their occurrence. In order to efficiently address this issue, we propose a straightforward yet effective measure for detecting such hallucinations. Intriguingly, our investigation uncovers that all models exhibit a tendency to generate previous answers as hallucinations. To gain deeper insights into the underlying causes of this phenomenon, we conduct a series of experiments that verify the critical role played by context in hallucination, both during training and testing, from various perspectives.

In the social world, humans possess the capability to infer and reason about others mental states (such as emotions, beliefs, and intentions), known as the Theory of Mind (ToM). Simultaneously, humans own mental states evolve in response to social situations, a capability we refer to as socialization. Together, these capabilities form the foundation of human social interaction. In the era of artificial intelligence (AI), especially with the development of large language models (LLMs), we raise an intriguing question: How do LLMs perform in terms of ToM and socialization capabilities? And more broadly, can these AI models truly enter and navigate the real social world? Existing research evaluating LLMs ToM and socialization capabilities by positioning LLMs as passive observers from a third person perspective, rather than as active participants. However, compared to the third-person perspective, observing and understanding the world from an egocentric first person perspective is a natural approach for both humans and AI agents. The ToM and socialization capabilities of LLMs from a first person perspective, a crucial attribute for advancing embodied AI agents, remain unexplored. To answer the aforementioned questions and bridge the research gap, we introduce EgoSocialArena, a novel framework designed to evaluate and investigate the ToM and socialization capabilities of LLMs from a first person perspective. It encompasses two evaluation environments: static environment and interactive environment, with seven scenarios: Daily Life, Counterfactual, New World, Blackjack, Number Guessing, and Limit Texas Hold em, totaling 2,195 data entries. With EgoSocialArena, we have conducted a comprehensive evaluation of nine advanced LLMs and observed some key insights regarding the future development of LLMs as well as the capabilities levels of the most advanced LLMs currently available.

Large multimodal models (LMMs) "see" images by leveraging the attention mechanism between text and visual tokens in the transformer decoder. Ideally, these models should focus on key visual information relevant to the text token. However, recent findings indicate that LMMs have an extraordinary tendency to consistently allocate high attention weights to specific visual tokens, even when these tokens are irrelevant to the corresponding text. In this study, we investigate the property behind the appearance of these irrelevant visual tokens and examine their characteristics. Our findings show that this behavior arises due to the massive activation of certain hidden state dimensions, which resembles the attention sink found in language models. Hence, we refer to this phenomenon as the visual attention sink. In particular, our analysis reveals that removing the irrelevant visual sink tokens does not impact model performance, despite receiving high attention weights. Consequently, we recycle the attention to these tokens as surplus resources, redistributing the attention budget to enhance focus on the image. To achieve this, we introduce Visual Attention Redistribution (VAR), a method that redistributes attention in image-centric heads, which we identify as innately focusing on visual information. VAR can be seamlessly applied across different LMMs to improve performance on a wide range of tasks, including general vision-language tasks, visual hallucination tasks, and vision-centric tasks, all without the need for additional training, models, or inference steps. Experimental results demonstrate that VAR enables LMMs to process visual information more effectively by adjusting their internal attention mechanisms, offering a new direction to enhancing the multimodal capabilities of LMMs.

A multi-decade exploration into the theoretical foundations of artificial and natural general intelligence, which has been expressed in a series of books and papers and used to guide a series of practical and research-prototype software systems, is reviewed at a moderate level of detail. The review covers underlying philosophies (patternist philosophy of mind, foundational phenomenological and logical ontology), formalizations of the concept of intelligence, and a proposed high level architecture for AGI systems partly driven by these formalizations and philosophies. The implementation of specific cognitive processes such as logical reasoning, program learning, clustering and attention allocation in the context and language of this high level architecture is considered, as is the importance of a common (e.g. typed metagraph based) knowledge representation for enabling "cognitive synergy" between the various processes. The specifics of human-like cognitive architecture are presented as manifestations of these general principles, and key aspects of machine consciousness and machine ethics are also treated in this context. Lessons for practical implementation of advanced AGI in frameworks such as OpenCog Hyperon are briefly considered.

Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) can reason effectively over both textual and visual inputs, but they tend to hallucinate syntactically coherent yet visually ungrounded contents. In this paper, we investigate the internal dynamics of hallucination by examining the tokens logits rankings throughout the generation process, revealing three key patterns in how LVLMs process information: (1) gradual visual information loss -- visually grounded tokens gradually become less favored throughout generation, and (2) early excitation -- semantically meaningful tokens achieve peak activation in the layers earlier than the final layer. (3) hidden genuine information -- visually grounded tokens though not being eventually decided still retain relatively high rankings at inference. Based on these insights, we propose VISTA (Visual Information Steering with Token-logit Augmentation), a training-free inference-time intervention framework that reduces hallucination while promoting genuine information. VISTA works by combining two complementary approaches: reinforcing visual information in activation space and leveraging early layer activations to promote semantically meaningful decoding. Compared to existing methods, VISTA requires no external supervision and is applicable to various decoding strategies. Extensive experiments show that VISTA on average reduces hallucination by abount 40% on evaluated open-ended generation task, and it consistently outperforms existing methods on four benchmarks across four architectures under three decoding strategies.

The rapid evolution of artificial intelligence (AI) has shifted from static, data-driven models to dynamic systems capable of perceiving and interacting with real-world environments. Despite advancements in pattern recognition and symbolic reasoning, current AI systems, such as large language models, remain disembodied, unable to physically engage with the world. This limitation has driven the rise of embodied AI, where autonomous agents, such as humanoid robots, must navigate and manipulate unstructured environments with human-like adaptability. At the core of this challenge lies the concept of Neural Brain, a central intelligence system designed to drive embodied agents with human-like adaptability. A Neural Brain must seamlessly integrate multimodal sensing and perception with cognitive capabilities. Achieving this also requires an adaptive memory system and energy-efficient hardware-software co-design, enabling real-time action in dynamic environments. This paper introduces a unified framework for the Neural Brain of embodied agents, addressing two fundamental challenges: (1) defining the core components of Neural Brain and (2) bridging the gap between static AI models and the dynamic adaptability required for real-world deployment. To this end, we propose a biologically inspired architecture that integrates multimodal active sensing, perception-cognition-action function, neuroplasticity-based memory storage and updating, and neuromorphic hardware/software optimization. Furthermore, we also review the latest research on embodied agents across these four aspects and analyze the gap between current AI systems and human intelligence. By synthesizing insights from neuroscience, we outline a roadmap towards the development of generalizable, autonomous agents capable of human-level intelligence in real-world scenarios.

Despite their impressive capabilities, multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are prone to hallucinations, i.e., the generated content that is nonsensical or unfaithful to input sources. Unlike in LLMs, hallucinations in MLLMs often stem from the sensitivity of text decoder to visual tokens, leading to a phenomenon akin to "amnesia" about visual information. To address this issue, we propose MemVR, a novel decoding paradigm inspired by common cognition: when the memory of an image seen the moment before is forgotten, people will look at it again for factual answers. Following this principle, we treat visual tokens as supplementary evidence, re-injecting them into the MLLM through Feed Forward Network (FFN) as "key-value memory" at the middle trigger layer. This "look-twice" mechanism occurs when the model exhibits high uncertainty during inference, effectively enhancing factual alignment. Comprehensive experimental evaluations demonstrate that MemVR significantly mitigates hallucination across various MLLMs and excels in general benchmarks without incurring additional time overhead. The implementation is available from https://github.com/1zhou-Wang/MemVR

We extend the capabilities of neural networks by coupling them to external memory resources, which they can interact with by attentional processes. The combined system is analogous to a Turing Machine or Von Neumann architecture but is differentiable end-to-end, allowing it to be efficiently trained with gradient descent. Preliminary results demonstrate that Neural Turing Machines can infer simple algorithms such as copying, sorting, and associative recall from input and output examples.

The Transformer architecture processes sequences by implementing a form of neural message-passing that consists of iterative information retrieval (attention), followed by local processing (position-wise MLP). Two types of information are essential under this general computational paradigm: "sensory" information about individual objects, and "relational" information describing the relationships between objects. Standard attention naturally encodes the former, but does not explicitly encode the latter. In this paper, we present an extension of Transformers where multi-head attention is augmented with two distinct types of attention heads, each routing information of a different type. The first type is the standard attention mechanism of Transformers, which captures object-level features, while the second type is a novel attention mechanism we propose to explicitly capture relational information. The two types of attention heads each possess different inductive biases, giving the resulting architecture greater efficiency and versatility. The promise of this approach is demonstrated empirically across a range of tasks.

Theory of mind (ToM; Premack & Woodruff, 1978) broadly refers to humans' ability to represent the mental states of others, including their desires, beliefs, and intentions. We propose to train a machine to build such models too. We design a Theory of Mind neural network -- a ToMnet -- which uses meta-learning to build models of the agents it encounters, from observations of their behaviour alone. Through this process, it acquires a strong prior model for agents' behaviour, as well as the ability to bootstrap to richer predictions about agents' characteristics and mental states using only a small number of behavioural observations. We apply the ToMnet to agents behaving in simple gridworld environments, showing that it learns to model random, algorithmic, and deep reinforcement learning agents from varied populations, and that it passes classic ToM tasks such as the "Sally-Anne" test (Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) of recognising that others can hold false beliefs about the world. We argue that this system -- which autonomously learns how to model other agents in its world -- is an important step forward for developing multi-agent AI systems, for building intermediating technology for machine-human interaction, and for advancing the progress on interpretable AI.

Large Vision Language Models (LVLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in understanding and describing visual content, achieving state-of-the-art performance across various vision-language tasks. However, these models frequently exhibit hallucination behavior, where they generate descriptions containing objects or details absent in the input image. Our work investigates this phenomenon by analyzing attention patterns across transformer layers and heads, revealing that hallucinations often stem from progressive degradation of visual grounding in deeper layers. We propose a novel attention modification approach that combines selective token emphasis and head-specific modulation to maintain visual grounding throughout the generation process. Our method introduces two key components: (1) a dual-stream token selection mechanism that identifies and prioritizes both locally informative and spatially significant visual tokens, and (2) an attention head-specific modulation strategy that differentially amplifies visual information processing based on measured visual sensitivity of individual attention heads. Through extensive experimentation on the MSCOCO dataset, we demonstrate that our approach reduces hallucination rates by up to 62.3\% compared to baseline models while maintaining comparable task performance. Our analysis reveals that selectively modulating tokens across attention heads with varying levels of visual sensitivity can significantly improve visual grounding without requiring model retraining.

Most prior art in visual understanding relies solely on analyzing the "what" (e.g., event recognition) and "where" (e.g., event localization), which in some cases, fails to describe correct contextual relationships between events or leads to incorrect underlying visual attention. Part of what defines us as human and fundamentally different from machines is our instinct to seek causality behind any association, say an event Y that happened as a direct result of event X. To this end, we propose iPerceive, a framework capable of understanding the "why" between events in a video by building a common-sense knowledge base using contextual cues to infer causal relationships between objects in the video. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our technique using the dense video captioning (DVC) and video question answering (VideoQA) tasks. Furthermore, while most prior work in DVC and VideoQA relies solely on visual information, other modalities such as audio and speech are vital for a human observer's perception of an environment. We formulate DVC and VideoQA tasks as machine translation problems that utilize multiple modalities. By evaluating the performance of iPerceive DVC and iPerceive VideoQA on the ActivityNet Captions and TVQA datasets respectively, we show that our approach furthers the state-of-the-art. Code and samples are available at: iperceive.amanchadha.com.

While generative AI is now widespread and useful in society, there are potential risks of misuse, e.g., unconsciously influencing cognitive processes or decision-making. Although this causes a security problem in the cognitive domain, there has been no research about neural and computational mechanisms counteracting the impact of malicious generative AI in humans. We propose DecNefGAN, a novel framework that combines a generative adversarial system and a neural reinforcement model. More specifically, DecNefGAN bridges human and generative AI in a closed-loop system, with the AI creating stimuli that induce specific mental states, thus exerting external control over neural activity. The objective of the human is the opposite, to compete and reach an orthogonal mental state. This framework can contribute to elucidating how the human brain responds to and counteracts the potential influence of generative AI.

A Perceptron is a fundamental building block of a neural network. The flexibility and scalability of perceptron make it ubiquitous in building intelligent systems. Studies have shown the efficacy of a single neuron in making intelligent decisions. Here, we examined and compared two perceptrons with distinct mechanisms, and developed a quantum version of one of those perceptrons. As a part of this modeling, we implemented the quantum circuit for an artificial perception, generated a dataset, and simulated the training. Through these experiments, we show that there is an exponential growth advantage and test different qubit versions. Our findings show that this quantum model of an individual perceptron can be used as a pattern classifier. For the second type of model, we provide an understanding to design and simulate a spike-dependent quantum perceptron. Our code is available at https://github.com/ashutosh1919/quantum-perceptron

Despite the ubiquity of large language models (LLMs) in AI research, the question of embodiment in LLMs remains underexplored, distinguishing them from embodied systems in robotics where sensory perception directly informs physical action. Our investigation navigates the intriguing terrain of whether LLMs, despite their non-embodied nature, effectively capture implicit human intuitions about fundamental, spatial building blocks of language. We employ insights from spatial cognitive foundations developed through early sensorimotor experiences, guiding our exploration through the reproduction of three psycholinguistic experiments. Surprisingly, correlations between model outputs and human responses emerge, revealing adaptability without a tangible connection to embodied experiences. Notable distinctions include polarized language model responses and reduced correlations in vision language models. This research contributes to a nuanced understanding of the interplay between language, spatial experiences, and the computations made by large language models. More at https://cisnlp.github.io/Spatial_Schemas/

Neural Theory-of-Mind (N-ToM), machine's ability to understand and keep track of the mental states of others, is pivotal in developing socially intelligent agents. However, prevalent N-ToM benchmarks have several shortcomings, including the presence of ambiguous and artificial narratives, absence of personality traits and preferences, a lack of questions addressing characters' psychological mental states, and limited diversity in the questions posed. In response to these issues, we construct OpenToM, a new benchmark for assessing N-ToM with (1) longer and clearer narrative stories, (2) characters with explicit personality traits, (3) actions that are triggered by character intentions, and (4) questions designed to challenge LLMs' capabilities of modeling characters' mental states of both the physical and psychological world. Using OpenToM, we reveal that state-of-the-art LLMs thrive at modeling certain aspects of mental states in the physical world but fall short when tracking characters' mental states in the psychological world.

Knowledge-dependent tasks typically use two sources of knowledge: parametric, learned at training time, and contextual, given as a passage at inference time. To understand how models use these sources together, we formalize the problem of knowledge conflicts, where the contextual information contradicts the learned information. Analyzing the behaviour of popular models, we measure their over-reliance on memorized information (the cause of hallucinations), and uncover important factors that exacerbate this behaviour. Lastly, we propose a simple method to mitigate over-reliance on parametric knowledge, which minimizes hallucination, and improves out-of-distribution generalization by 4%-7%. Our findings demonstrate the importance for practitioners to evaluate model tendency to hallucinate rather than read, and show that our mitigation strategy encourages generalization to evolving information (i.e., time-dependent queries). To encourage these practices, we have released our framework for generating knowledge conflicts.

In this paper, we discuss that an observable-based single-system Copenhagen and entanglement-based two-system von Neumann measurement protocols in quantum theory can be made equivalent by considering the second part of the two-system scheme to be a Dirac-type negative sea filling up the first system. Based on this equivalence, and by considering the universe as a computational process, the choice of the apparatus state in the two-system protocol can be identified with the choice of the observable in the single-system scheme as negative sea filling up the observable universe. In particular, the measuring party's state is considered to be evolving backwards in time to the big bang as a nondeterministic computational process, which chooses the acceptable path as a time-reversal process of irreversible computation. The suggested model proposes that the prepared microstate of the universe, or reality, corresponds to the observer's choice, therefore, subjective reality. Thus, this effectively provides a specific description of the subjective universe model previously proposed, which is based on the symmetry breakdown between the Schrodinger and the Heisenberg pictures of quantum theory.

Image-to-fMRI encoding is important for both neuroscience research and practical applications. However, such "Brain-Encoders" have been typically trained per-subject and per fMRI-dataset, thus restricted to very limited training data. In this paper we propose a Universal Brain-Encoder, which can be trained jointly on data from many different subjects/datasets/machines. What makes this possible is our new voxel-centric Encoder architecture, which learns a unique "voxel-embedding" per brain-voxel. Our Encoder trains to predict the response of each brain-voxel on every image, by directly computing the cross-attention between the brain-voxel embedding and multi-level deep image features. This voxel-centric architecture allows the functional role of each brain-voxel to naturally emerge from the voxel-image cross-attention. We show the power of this approach to (i) combine data from multiple different subjects (a "Crowd of Brains") to improve each individual brain-encoding, (ii) quick & effective Transfer-Learning across subjects, datasets, and machines (e.g., 3-Tesla, 7-Tesla), with few training examples, and (iii) use the learned voxel-embeddings as a powerful tool to explore brain functionality (e.g., what is encoded where in the brain).

This paper examines the extent to which large language models (LLMs) have developed higher-order theory of mind (ToM); the human ability to reason about multiple mental and emotional states in a recursive manner (e.g. I think that you believe that she knows). This paper builds on prior work by introducing a handwritten test suite -- Multi-Order Theory of Mind Q&A -- and using it to compare the performance of five LLMs to a newly gathered adult human benchmark. We find that GPT-4 and Flan-PaLM reach adult-level and near adult-level performance on ToM tasks overall, and that GPT-4 exceeds adult performance on 6th order inferences. Our results suggest that there is an interplay between model size and finetuning for the realisation of ToM abilities, and that the best-performing LLMs have developed a generalised capacity for ToM. Given the role that higher-order ToM plays in a wide range of cooperative and competitive human behaviours, these findings have significant implications for user-facing LLM applications.

Reconstructing human dynamic vision from brain activity is a challenging task with great scientific significance. The difficulty stems from two primary issues: (1) vision-processing mechanisms in the brain are highly intricate and not fully revealed, making it challenging to directly learn a mapping between fMRI and video; (2) the temporal resolution of fMRI is significantly lower than that of natural videos. To overcome these issues, this paper propose a two-stage model named Mind-Animator, which achieves state-of-the-art performance on three public datasets. Specifically, during the fMRI-to-feature stage, we decouple semantic, structural, and motion features from fMRI through fMRI-vision-language tri-modal contrastive learning and sparse causal attention. In the feature-to-video stage, these features are merged to videos by an inflated Stable Diffusion. We substantiate that the reconstructed video dynamics are indeed derived from fMRI, rather than hallucinations of the generative model, through permutation tests. Additionally, the visualization of voxel-wise and ROI-wise importance maps confirms the neurobiological interpretability of our model.

Generative models are trained with the simple objective of imitating the conditional probability distribution induced by the data they are trained on. Therefore, when trained on data generated by humans, we may not expect the artificial model to outperform the humans on their original objectives. In this work, we study the phenomenon of transcendence: when a generative model achieves capabilities that surpass the abilities of the experts generating its data. We demonstrate transcendence by training an autoregressive transformer to play chess from game transcripts, and show that the trained model can sometimes achieve better performance than all players in the dataset. We theoretically prove that transcendence is enabled by low-temperature sampling, and rigorously assess this experimentally. Finally, we discuss other sources of transcendence, laying the groundwork for future investigation of this phenomenon in a broader setting.

While prior work has explored whether large language models (LLMs) possess a "theory of mind" (ToM) - the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others - there has been little work testing whether LLMs can implicitly apply such knowledge to predict behavior, or to judge whether an observed behavior is rational. Such skills are critical for appropriate interaction in social environments. We create a new dataset, SimpleTom, containing concise, diverse stories (e.g., "The can of Pringles has moldy chips in it. Mary picks up the can in the supermarket and walks to the cashier."), each with three questions that test different degrees of ToM reasoning, asking models to predict (a) mental state ("Is Mary aware of the mold?"), (b) behavior ("Will Mary pay for the chips or report the mold?"), and (c) judgment ("Mary paid for the chips. Was that reasonable?"). To our knowledge, SimpleToM is the first dataset to systematically explore downstream reasoning requiring knowledge of mental states in realistic scenarios. Our experimental results are intriguing: While most models can reliably predict mental state on our dataset (a), they often fail to correctly predict the behavior (b), and fare even worse at judging whether given behaviors are reasonable (c), despite being correctly aware of the protagonist's mental state should make such secondary predictions obvious. We further show that we can help models do better at (b) and (c) via interventions such as reminding the model of its earlier mental state answer and mental-state-specific chain-of-thought prompting, raising the action prediction accuracies (e.g., from 49.5% to 93.5% for GPT-4o) and judgment accuracies (e.g., from 15.3% to 94.7% in GPT-4o). While this shows that models can be coaxed to perform well, it requires task-specific interventions, and the natural model performances remain low, a cautionary tale for LLM deployment.

Classical models of memory in psychology and neuroscience rely on similarity-based retrieval of stored patterns, where similarity is a function of retrieval cues and the stored patterns. While parsimonious, these models do not allow distinct representations for storage and retrieval, despite their distinct computational demands. Key-value memory systems, in contrast, distinguish representations used for storage (values) and those used for retrieval (keys). This allows key-value memory systems to optimize simultaneously for fidelity in storage and discriminability in retrieval. We review the computational foundations of key-value memory, its role in modern machine learning systems, related ideas from psychology and neuroscience, applications to a number of empirical puzzles, and possible biological implementations.

Visual search is a ubiquitous and often challenging daily task, exemplified by looking for the car keys at home or a friend in a crowd. An intriguing property of some classical search tasks is an asymmetry such that finding a target A among distractors B can be easier than finding B among A. To elucidate the mechanisms responsible for asymmetry in visual search, we propose a computational model that takes a target and a search image as inputs and produces a sequence of eye movements until the target is found. The model integrates eccentricity-dependent visual recognition with target-dependent top-down cues. We compared the model against human behavior in six paradigmatic search tasks that show asymmetry in humans. Without prior exposure to the stimuli or task-specific training, the model provides a plausible mechanism for search asymmetry. We hypothesized that the polarity of search asymmetry arises from experience with the natural environment. We tested this hypothesis by training the model on augmented versions of ImageNet where the biases of natural images were either removed or reversed. The polarity of search asymmetry disappeared or was altered depending on the training protocol. This study highlights how classical perceptual properties can emerge in neural network models, without the need for task-specific training, but rather as a consequence of the statistical properties of the developmental diet fed to the model. All source code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/kreimanlab/VisualSearchAsymmetry.

Large vision-language models (LVLMs) have made substantial progress in integrating large language models (LLMs) with visual inputs, enabling advanced multimodal reasoning. Despite their success, a persistent challenge is hallucination-where generated text fails to accurately reflect visual content-undermining both accuracy and reliability. Existing methods focus on alignment training or decoding refinements but primarily address symptoms at the generation stage without probing the underlying causes. In this work, we investigate the internal mechanisms driving hallucination in LVLMs, with an emphasis on the multi-head attention module. Specifically, we introduce Vision-aware Head Divergence (VHD), a metric that quantifies the sensitivity of attention head outputs to visual context. Based on this, our findings reveal the presence of vision-aware attention heads that are more attuned to visual information; however, the model's overreliance on its prior language patterns is closely related to hallucinations. Building on these insights, we propose Vision-aware Head Reinforcement (VHR), a training-free approach to mitigate hallucination by enhancing the role of vision-aware attention heads. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method achieves superior performance compared to state-of-the-art approaches in mitigating hallucinations, while maintaining high efficiency with negligible additional time overhead.

The deep neural nets of modern artificial intelligence (AI) have not achieved defining features of biological intelligence, including abstraction, causal learning, and energy-efficiency. While scaling to larger models has delivered performance improvements for current applications, more brain-like capacities may demand new theories, models, and methods for designing artificial learning systems. Here, we argue that this opportunity to reassess insights from the brain should stimulate cooperation between AI research and theory-driven computational neuroscience (CN). To motivate a brain basis of neural computation, we present a dynamical view of intelligence from which we elaborate concepts of sparsity in network structure, temporal dynamics, and interactive learning. In particular, we suggest that temporal dynamics, as expressed through neural synchrony, nested oscillations, and flexible sequences, provide a rich computational layer for reading and updating hierarchical models distributed in long-term memory networks. Moreover, embracing agent-centered paradigms in AI and CN will accelerate our understanding of the complex dynamics and behaviors that build useful world models. A convergence of AI/CN theories and objectives will reveal dynamical principles of intelligence for brains and engineered learning systems. This article was inspired by our symposium on dynamical neuroscience and machine learning at the 6th Annual US/NIH BRAIN Initiative Investigators Meeting.

We propose a new learning paradigm called Deep Memory. It has the potential to completely revolutionize the Machine Learning field. Surprisingly, this paradigm has not been reinvented yet, unlike Deep Learning. At the core of this approach is the Learning By Heart principle, well studied in primary schools all over the world. Inspired by poem recitation, or by pi decimal memorization, we propose a concrete algorithm that mimics human behavior. We implement this paradigm on the task of generative modeling, and apply to images, natural language and even the pi decimals as long as one can print them as text. The proposed algorithm even generated this paper, in a one-shot learning setting. In carefully designed experiments, we show that the generated samples are indistinguishable from the training examples, as measured by any statistical tests or metrics.

As Large Language Models become more ubiquitous across domains, it becomes important to examine their inherent limitations critically. This work argues that hallucinations in language models are not just occasional errors but an inevitable feature of these systems. We demonstrate that hallucinations stem from the fundamental mathematical and logical structure of LLMs. It is, therefore, impossible to eliminate them through architectural improvements, dataset enhancements, or fact-checking mechanisms. Our analysis draws on computational theory and Godel's First Incompleteness Theorem, which references the undecidability of problems like the Halting, Emptiness, and Acceptance Problems. We demonstrate that every stage of the LLM process-from training data compilation to fact retrieval, intent classification, and text generation-will have a non-zero probability of producing hallucinations. This work introduces the concept of Structural Hallucination as an intrinsic nature of these systems. By establishing the mathematical certainty of hallucinations, we challenge the prevailing notion that they can be fully mitigated.

We discovered the underlying physics in Next-token Prediction (NTP). We identified the law of information conservation within NTP and proposed the First Law of Information Capacity (IC-1), demonstrating that the essence of intelligence emergence in auto-regressive models is fundamentally a process of information transfer. We also introduced Landauer's Principle into NTP, formulating the Second Law of Information Capacity (IC-2), which establishes the relationship between auto-regressive model training and energy consumption. Additionally, we presented several corollaries, which hold practical significance for production practices. Finally, we validated the compatibility and complementarity of our findings with existing theories.

To enable Large Language Models (LLMs) to function as conscious agents with generalizable reasoning capabilities, it is crucial that they possess the reasoning ability to comprehend situational changes (transitions) in distribution triggered by environmental factors or actions from other agents. Despite its fundamental significance, this ability remains underexplored due to the complexity of modeling infinite possible changes in an event and their associated distributions, coupled with the lack of benchmark data with situational transitions. Addressing these gaps, we propose a novel formulation of reasoning with distributional changes as a three-step discriminative process, termed as MetAphysical ReaSoning. We then introduce the first-ever benchmark, MARS, comprising three tasks corresponding to each step. These tasks systematically assess LLMs' capabilities in reasoning the plausibility of (i) changes in actions, (ii) states caused by changed actions, and (iii) situational transitions driven by changes in action. Extensive evaluations with 20 (L)LMs of varying sizes and methods indicate that all three tasks in this process pose significant challenges, even for state-of-the-art LLMs and LMs after fine-tuning. Further analyses reveal potential causes for the underperformance of LLMs and demonstrate that pre-training them on large-scale conceptualization taxonomies can potentially enhance their metaphysical reasoning capabilities. Our data and models are publicly accessible at https://github.com/HKUST-KnowComp/MARS.

Large language models (LLMs) can sometimes report the strategies they actually use to solve tasks, but they can also fail to do so. This suggests some degree of metacognition -- the capacity to monitor one's own cognitive processes for subsequent reporting and self-control. Metacognitive abilities enhance AI capabilities but raise safety concerns, as models might obscure their internal processes to evade neural-activation-based oversight mechanisms designed to detect harmful behaviors. Given society's increased reliance on these models, it is critical that we understand the limits of their metacognitive abilities, particularly their ability to monitor their internal activations. To address this, we introduce a neuroscience-inspired neurofeedback paradigm designed to quantify the ability of LLMs to explicitly report and control their activation patterns. By presenting models with sentence-label pairs where labels correspond to sentence-elicited internal activations along specific directions in the neural representation space, we demonstrate that LLMs can learn to report and control these activations. The performance varies with several factors: the number of example pairs provided, the semantic interpretability of the target neural direction, and the variance explained by that direction. These results reveal a "metacognitive space" with dimensionality much lower than the model's neural space, suggesting LLMs can monitor only a subset of their neural mechanisms. Our findings provide empirical evidence quantifying metacognitive capabilities in LLMs, with significant implications for AI safety.

Every day, the human brain processes an immense volume of visual information, relying on intricate neural mechanisms to perceive and interpret these stimuli. Recent breakthroughs in functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) have enabled scientists to extract visual information from human brain activity patterns. In this study, we present an innovative method for decoding brain activity into meaningful images and captions, with a specific focus on brain captioning due to its enhanced flexibility as compared to brain decoding into images. Our approach takes advantage of cutting-edge image captioning models and incorporates a unique image reconstruction pipeline that utilizes latent diffusion models and depth estimation. We utilized the Natural Scenes Dataset, a comprehensive fMRI dataset from eight subjects who viewed images from the COCO dataset. We employed the Generative Image-to-text Transformer (GIT) as our backbone for captioning and propose a new image reconstruction pipeline based on latent diffusion models. The method involves training regularized linear regression models between brain activity and extracted features. Additionally, we incorporated depth maps from the ControlNet model to further guide the reconstruction process. We evaluate our methods using quantitative metrics for both generated captions and images. Our brain captioning approach outperforms existing methods, while our image reconstruction pipeline generates plausible images with improved spatial relationships. In conclusion, we demonstrate significant progress in brain decoding, showcasing the enormous potential of integrating vision and language to better understand human cognition. Our approach provides a flexible platform for future research, with potential applications in various fields, including neural art, style transfer, and portable devices.

Brain decoding, a pivotal field in neuroscience, aims to reconstruct stimuli from acquired brain signals, primarily utilizing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Currently, brain decoding is confined to a per-subject-per-model paradigm, limiting its applicability to the same individual for whom the decoding model is trained. This constraint stems from three key challenges: 1) the inherent variability in input dimensions across subjects due to differences in brain size; 2) the unique intrinsic neural patterns, influencing how different individuals perceive and process sensory information; 3) limited data availability for new subjects in real-world scenarios hampers the performance of decoding models. In this paper, we present a novel approach, MindBridge, that achieves cross-subject brain decoding by employing only one model. Our proposed framework establishes a generic paradigm capable of addressing these challenges by introducing biological-inspired aggregation function and novel cyclic fMRI reconstruction mechanism for subject-invariant representation learning. Notably, by cycle reconstruction of fMRI, MindBridge can enable novel fMRI synthesis, which also can serve as pseudo data augmentation. Within the framework, we also devise a novel reset-tuning method for adapting a pretrained model to a new subject. Experimental results demonstrate MindBridge's ability to reconstruct images for multiple subjects, which is competitive with dedicated subject-specific models. Furthermore, with limited data for a new subject, we achieve a high level of decoding accuracy, surpassing that of subject-specific models. This advancement in cross-subject brain decoding suggests promising directions for wider applications in neuroscience and indicates potential for more efficient utilization of limited fMRI data in real-world scenarios. Project page: https://littlepure2333.github.io/MindBridge

Generative artificial intelligence (AI) systems based on large-scale pretrained foundation models (PFMs) such as vision-language models, large language models (LLMs), diffusion models and vision-language-action (VLA) models have demonstrated the ability to solve complex and truly non-trivial AI problems in a wide variety of domains and contexts. Multimodal large language models (MLLMs), in particular, learn from vast and diverse data sources, allowing rich and nuanced representations of the world and, thereby, providing extensive capabilities, including the ability to reason, engage in meaningful dialog; collaborate with humans and other agents to jointly solve complex problems; and understand social and emotional aspects of humans. Despite this impressive feat, the cognitive abilities of state-of-the-art LLMs trained on large-scale datasets are still superficial and brittle. Consequently, generic LLMs are severely limited in their generalist capabilities. A number of foundational problems -- embodiment, symbol grounding, causality and memory -- are required to be addressed for LLMs to attain human-level general intelligence. These concepts are more aligned with human cognition and provide LLMs with inherent human-like cognitive properties that support the realization of physically-plausible, semantically meaningful, flexible and more generalizable knowledge and intelligence. In this work, we discuss the aforementioned foundational issues and survey state-of-the art approaches for implementing these concepts in LLMs. Specifically, we discuss how the principles of embodiment, symbol grounding, causality and memory can be leveraged toward the attainment of artificial general intelligence (AGI) in an organic manner.

While Attention has come to be an important mechanism in deep learning, there remains limited intuition for why it works so well. Here, we show that Transformer Attention can be closely related under certain data conditions to Kanerva's Sparse Distributed Memory (SDM), a biologically plausible associative memory model. We confirm that these conditions are satisfied in pre-trained GPT2 Transformer models. We discuss the implications of the Attention-SDM map and provide new computational and biological interpretations of Attention.

Computational complexity has often been ignored in philosophy of mind, in philosophical artificial intelligence studies. The purpose of this paper is threefold. First and foremost, to show the importance of complexity rather than computability in philosophical and AI problems. Second, to rephrase the notion of computability in terms of solvability, i.e. treating computability as non-sufficient for establishing intelligence. The Church-Turing thesis is therefore revisited and rephrased in order to capture the ontological background of spatial and temporal complexity. Third, to emphasize ontological differences between different time complexities, which seem to provide a solid base towards better understanding of artificial intelligence in general.

Reconstructing human vision from brain activities has been an appealing task that helps to understand our cognitive process. Even though recent research has seen great success in reconstructing static images from non-invasive brain recordings, work on recovering continuous visual experiences in the form of videos is limited. In this work, we propose Mind-Video that learns spatiotemporal information from continuous fMRI data of the cerebral cortex progressively through masked brain modeling, multimodal contrastive learning with spatiotemporal attention, and co-training with an augmented Stable Diffusion model that incorporates network temporal inflation. We show that high-quality videos of arbitrary frame rates can be reconstructed with Mind-Video using adversarial guidance. The recovered videos were evaluated with various semantic and pixel-level metrics. We achieved an average accuracy of 85% in semantic classification tasks and 0.19 in structural similarity index (SSIM), outperforming the previous state-of-the-art by 45%. We also show that our model is biologically plausible and interpretable, reflecting established physiological processes.

Humans and animals have a rich and flexible understanding of the physical world, which enables them to infer the underlying dynamical trajectories of objects and events, plausible future states, and use that to plan and anticipate the consequences of actions. However, the neural mechanisms underlying these computations are unclear. We combine a goal-driven modeling approach with dense neurophysiological data and high-throughput human behavioral readouts to directly impinge on this question. Specifically, we construct and evaluate several classes of sensory-cognitive networks to predict the future state of rich, ethologically-relevant environments, ranging from self-supervised end-to-end models with pixel-wise or object-centric objectives, to models that future predict in the latent space of purely static image-based or dynamic video-based pretrained foundation models. We find strong differentiation across these model classes in their ability to predict neural and behavioral data both within and across diverse environments. In particular, we find that neural responses are currently best predicted by models trained to predict the future state of their environment in the latent space of pretrained foundation models optimized for dynamic scenes in a self-supervised manner. Notably, models that future predict in the latent space of video foundation models that are optimized to support a diverse range of sensorimotor tasks, reasonably match both human behavioral error patterns and neural dynamics across all environmental scenarios that we were able to test. Overall, these findings suggest that the neural mechanisms and behaviors of primate mental simulation are thus far most consistent with being optimized to future predict on dynamic, reusable visual representations that are useful for embodied AI more generally.

Traveling waves of neural activity have been observed throughout the brain at a diversity of regions and scales; however, their precise computational role is still debated. One physically inspired hypothesis suggests that the cortical sheet may act like a wave-propagating system capable of invertibly storing a short-term memory of sequential stimuli through induced waves traveling across the cortical surface, and indeed many experimental results from neuroscience correlate wave activity with memory tasks. To date, however, the computational implications of this idea have remained hypothetical due to the lack of a simple recurrent neural network architecture capable of exhibiting such waves. In this work, we introduce a model to fill this gap, which we denote the Wave-RNN (wRNN), and demonstrate how such an architecture indeed efficiently encodes the recent past through a suite of synthetic memory tasks where wRNNs learn faster and reach significantly lower error than wave-free counterparts. We further explore the implications of this memory storage system on more complex sequence modeling tasks such as sequential image classification and find that wave-based models not only again outperform comparable wave-free RNNs while using significantly fewer parameters, but additionally perform comparably to more complex gated architectures such as LSTMs and GRUs.

We consider concept generalization at a large scale in the diverse and natural visual spectrum. Established computational modes (i.e., rule-based or similarity-based) are primarily studied isolated and focus on confined and abstract problem spaces. In this work, we study these two modes when the problem space scales up, and the complexity of concepts becomes diverse. Specifically, at the representational level, we seek to answer how the complexity varies when a visual concept is mapped to the representation space. Prior psychology literature has shown that two types of complexities (i.e., subjective complexity and visual complexity) (Griffiths and Tenenbaum, 2003) build an inverted-U relation (Donderi, 2006; Sun and Firestone, 2021). Leveraging Representativeness of Attribute (RoA), we computationally confirm the following observation: Models use attributes with high RoA to describe visual concepts, and the description length falls in an inverted-U relation with the increment in visual complexity. At the computational level, we aim to answer how the complexity of representation affects the shift between the rule- and similarity-based generalization. We hypothesize that category-conditioned visual modeling estimates the co-occurrence frequency between visual and categorical attributes, thus potentially serving as the prior for the natural visual world. Experimental results show that representations with relatively high subjective complexity outperform those with relatively low subjective complexity in the rule-based generalization, while the trend is the opposite in the similarity-based generalization.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have generated considerable interest and debate regarding their potential emergence of Theory of Mind (ToM). Several recent inquiries reveal a lack of robust ToM in these models and pose a pressing demand to develop new benchmarks, as current ones primarily focus on different aspects of ToM and are prone to shortcuts and data leakage. In this position paper, we seek to answer two road-blocking questions: (1) How can we taxonomize a holistic landscape of machine ToM? (2) What is a more effective evaluation protocol for machine ToM? Following psychological studies, we taxonomize machine ToM into 7 mental state categories and delineate existing benchmarks to identify under-explored aspects of ToM. We argue for a holistic and situated evaluation of ToM to break ToM into individual components and treat LLMs as an agent who is physically situated in environments and socially situated in interactions with humans. Such situated evaluation provides a more comprehensive assessment of mental states and potentially mitigates the risk of shortcuts and data leakage. We further present a pilot study in a grid world setup as a proof of concept. We hope this position paper can facilitate future research to integrate ToM with LLMs and offer an intuitive means for researchers to better position their work in the landscape of ToM. Project page: https://github.com/Mars-tin/awesome-theory-of-mind

Sparse autoencoders have recently produced dictionaries of high-dimensional vectors corresponding to the universe of concepts represented by large language models. We find that this concept universe has interesting structure at three levels: 1) The "atomic" small-scale structure contains "crystals" whose faces are parallelograms or trapezoids, generalizing well-known examples such as (man-woman-king-queen). We find that the quality of such parallelograms and associated function vectors improves greatly when projecting out global distractor directions such as word length, which is efficiently done with linear discriminant analysis. 2) The "brain" intermediate-scale structure has significant spatial modularity; for example, math and code features form a "lobe" akin to functional lobes seen in neural fMRI images. We quantify the spatial locality of these lobes with multiple metrics and find that clusters of co-occurring features, at coarse enough scale, also cluster together spatially far more than one would expect if feature geometry were random. 3) The "galaxy" scale large-scale structure of the feature point cloud is not isotropic, but instead has a power law of eigenvalues with steepest slope in middle layers. We also quantify how the clustering entropy depends on the layer.

Large language models accumulate vast knowledge during pre-training, yet the dynamics governing this acquisition remain poorly understood. This work investigates the learning dynamics of language models on a synthetic factual recall task, uncovering three key findings: First, language models learn in three phases, exhibiting a performance plateau before acquiring precise factual knowledge. Mechanistically, this plateau coincides with the formation of attention-based circuits that support recall. Second, the training data distribution significantly impacts learning dynamics, as imbalanced distributions lead to shorter plateaus. Finally, hallucinations emerge simultaneously with knowledge, and integrating new knowledge into the model through fine-tuning is challenging, as it quickly corrupts its existing parametric memories. Our results emphasize the importance of data distribution in knowledge acquisition and suggest novel data scheduling strategies to accelerate neural network training.

Today's large language models (LLMs) routinely generate coherent, grammatical and seemingly meaningful paragraphs of text. This achievement has led to speculation that these networks are -- or will soon become -- "thinking machines", capable of performing tasks that require abstract knowledge and reasoning. Here, we review the capabilities of LLMs by considering their performance on two different aspects of language use: 'formal linguistic competence', which includes knowledge of rules and patterns of a given language, and 'functional linguistic competence', a host of cognitive abilities required for language understanding and use in the real world. Drawing on evidence from cognitive neuroscience, we show that formal competence in humans relies on specialized language processing mechanisms, whereas functional competence recruits multiple extralinguistic capacities that comprise human thought, such as formal reasoning, world knowledge, situation modeling, and social cognition. In line with this distinction, LLMs show impressive (although imperfect) performance on tasks requiring formal linguistic competence, but fail on many tests requiring functional competence. Based on this evidence, we argue that (1) contemporary LLMs should be taken seriously as models of formal linguistic skills; (2) models that master real-life language use would need to incorporate or develop not only a core language module, but also multiple non-language-specific cognitive capacities required for modeling thought. Overall, a distinction between formal and functional linguistic competence helps clarify the discourse surrounding LLMs' potential and provides a path toward building models that understand and use language in human-like ways.

As a critical step to achieve human-like chatbots, empathetic response generation has attained increasing interests. Previous attempts are incomplete and not sufficient enough to elicit empathy because they only focus on the initial aspect of empathy to automatically mimic the feelings and thoughts of the user via other-awareness. However, they ignore to maintain and take the own views of the system into account, which is a crucial process to achieve the empathy called self-other awareness. To this end, we propose to generate Empathetic response with explicit Self-Other Awareness (EmpSOA). Specifically, three stages, self-other differentiation, self-other modulation and self-other generation, are devised to clearly maintain, regulate and inject the self-other aware information into the process of empathetic response generation. Both automatic and human evaluations on the benchmark dataset demonstrate the superiority of EmpSOA to generate more empathetic responses.

Hallucination has emerged as the most vulnerable aspect of contemporary Large Language Models (LLMs). In this paper, we introduce the Sorry, Come Again (SCA) prompting, aimed to avoid LLM hallucinations by enhancing comprehension through: (i) optimal paraphrasing and (ii) injecting [PAUSE] tokens to delay LLM generation. First, we provide an in-depth analysis of linguistic nuances: formality, readability, and concreteness of prompts for 21 LLMs, and elucidate how these nuances contribute to hallucinated generation. Prompts with lower readability, formality, or concreteness pose comprehension challenges for LLMs, similar to those faced by humans. In such scenarios, an LLM tends to speculate and generate content based on its imagination (associative memory) to fill these information gaps. Although these speculations may occasionally align with factual information, their accuracy is not assured, often resulting in hallucination. Recent studies reveal that an LLM often neglects the middle sections of extended prompts, a phenomenon termed as lost in the middle. While a specific paraphrase may suit one LLM, the same paraphrased version may elicit a different response from another LLM. Therefore, we propose an optimal paraphrasing technique to identify the most comprehensible paraphrase of a given prompt, evaluated using Integrated Gradient (and its variations) to guarantee that the LLM accurately processes all words. While reading lengthy sentences, humans often pause at various points to better comprehend the meaning read thus far. We have fine-tuned an LLM with injected [PAUSE] tokens, allowing the LLM to pause while reading lengthier prompts. This has brought several key contributions: (i) determining the optimal position to inject [PAUSE], (ii) determining the number of [PAUSE] tokens to be inserted, and (iii) introducing reverse proxy tuning to fine-tune the LLM for [PAUSE] insertion.

A long standing goal in neuroscience has been to elucidate the functional organization of the brain. Within higher visual cortex, functional accounts have remained relatively coarse, focusing on regions of interest (ROIs) and taking the form of selectivity for broad categories such as faces, places, bodies, food, or words. Because the identification of such ROIs has typically relied on manually assembled stimulus sets consisting of isolated objects in non-ecological contexts, exploring functional organization without robust a priori hypotheses has been challenging. To overcome these limitations, we introduce a data-driven approach in which we synthesize images predicted to activate a given brain region using paired natural images and fMRI recordings, bypassing the need for category-specific stimuli. Our approach -- Brain Diffusion for Visual Exploration ("BrainDiVE") -- builds on recent generative methods by combining large-scale diffusion models with brain-guided image synthesis. Validating our method, we demonstrate the ability to synthesize preferred images with appropriate semantic specificity for well-characterized category-selective ROIs. We then show that BrainDiVE can characterize differences between ROIs selective for the same high-level category. Finally we identify novel functional subdivisions within these ROIs, validated with behavioral data. These results advance our understanding of the fine-grained functional organization of human visual cortex, and provide well-specified constraints for further examination of cortical organization using hypothesis-driven methods.

In recent years, evaluating the Theory of Mind (ToM) capabilities of large language models (LLMs) has received significant attention within the research community. As the field rapidly evolves, navigating the diverse approaches and methodologies has become increasingly complex. This systematic review synthesizes current efforts to assess LLMs' ability to perform ToM tasks, an essential aspect of human cognition involving the attribution of mental states to oneself and others. Despite notable advancements, the proficiency of LLMs in ToM remains a contentious issue. By categorizing benchmarks and tasks through a taxonomy rooted in cognitive science, this review critically examines evaluation techniques, prompting strategies, and the inherent limitations of LLMs in replicating human-like mental state reasoning. A recurring theme in the literature reveals that while LLMs demonstrate emerging competence in ToM tasks, significant gaps persist in their emulation of human cognitive abilities.

Humans interact with the environment using a combination of perception - transforming sensory inputs from their environment into symbols, and cognition - mapping symbols to knowledge about the environment for supporting abstraction, reasoning by analogy, and long-term planning. Human perception-inspired machine perception, in the context of AI, refers to large-scale pattern recognition from raw data using neural networks trained using self-supervised learning objectives such as next-word prediction or object recognition. On the other hand, machine cognition encompasses more complex computations, such as using knowledge of the environment to guide reasoning, analogy, and long-term planning. Humans can also control and explain their cognitive functions. This seems to require the retention of symbolic mappings from perception outputs to knowledge about their environment. For example, humans can follow and explain the guidelines and safety constraints driving their decision-making in safety-critical applications such as healthcare, criminal justice, and autonomous driving. This article introduces the rapidly emerging paradigm of Neurosymbolic AI combines neural networks and knowledge-guided symbolic approaches to create more capable and flexible AI systems. These systems have immense potential to advance both algorithm-level (e.g., abstraction, analogy, reasoning) and application-level (e.g., explainable and safety-constrained decision-making) capabilities of AI systems.

Perception is often viewed as a process that transforms physical variables, external to an observer, into internal psychological variables. Such a process can be modeled by a function coined perceptual scale. The perceptual scale can be deduced from psychophysical measurements that consist in comparing the relative differences between stimuli (i.e. difference scaling experiments). However, this approach is often overlooked by the modeling and experimentation communities. Here, we demonstrate the value of measuring the perceptual scale of classical (spatial frequency, orientation) and less classical physical variables (interpolation between textures) by embedding it in recent probabilistic modeling of perception. First, we show that the assumption that an observer has an internal representation of univariate parameters such as spatial frequency or orientation while stimuli are high-dimensional does not lead to contradictory predictions when following the theoretical framework. Second, we show that the measured perceptual scale corresponds to the transduction function hypothesized in this framework. In particular, we demonstrate that it is related to the Fisher information of the generative model that underlies perception and we test the predictions given by the generative model of different stimuli in a set a of difference scaling experiments. Our main conclusion is that the perceptual scale is mostly driven by the stimulus power spectrum. Finally, we propose that this measure of perceptual scale is a way to push further the notion of perceptual distances by estimating the perceptual geometry of images i.e. the path between images instead of simply the distance between those.

Language models show a surprising range of capabilities, but the source of their apparent competence is unclear. Do these networks just memorize a collection of surface statistics, or do they rely on internal representations of the process that generates the sequences they see? We investigate this question by applying a variant of the GPT model to the task of predicting legal moves in a simple board game, Othello. Although the network has no a priori knowledge of the game or its rules, we uncover evidence of an emergent nonlinear internal representation of the board state. Interventional experiments indicate this representation can be used to control the output of the network and create "latent saliency maps" that can help explain predictions in human terms.

As the research community aims to build better AI assistants that are more dynamic and personalized to the diversity of humans that they interact with, there is increased interest in evaluating the theory of mind capabilities of large language models (LLMs). Indeed, several recent studies suggest that LLM theory of mind capabilities are quite impressive, approximating human-level performance. Our paper aims to rebuke this narrative and argues instead that past studies were not directly measuring agent performance, potentially leading to findings that are illusory in nature as a result. We draw a strong distinction between what we call literal theory of mind i.e. measuring the agent's ability to predict the behavior of others and functional theory of mind i.e. adapting to agents in-context based on a rational response to predictions of their behavior. We find that top performing open source LLMs may display strong capabilities in literal theory of mind, depending on how they are prompted, but seem to struggle with functional theory of mind -- even when partner policies are exceedingly simple. Our work serves to highlight the double sided nature of inductive bias in LLMs when adapting to new situations. While this bias can lead to strong performance over limited horizons, it often hinders convergence to optimal long-term behavior.

Every day, humans perceive objects and communicate these perceptions through various channels. In this paper, we present a computational model designed to track and simulate the perception of objects, as well as their representations as conveyed in communication. We delineate two fundamental components of our internal representation, termed "observed" and "seen", which we correlate with established concepts in computer vision, namely encoding and decoding. These components are integrated into semiotic networks, which simulate perceptual inference of object perception and human communication. Our model of object perception by a person allows us to define object perception by {\em a network}. We demonstrate this with an example of an image baseline classifier by constructing a new network that includes the baseline classifier and an additional layer. This layer produces the images "perceived" by the entire network, transforming it into a perceptualized image classifier. This facilitates visualization of the acquired network. Within our network, the image representations become more efficient for classification tasks when they are assembled and randomized. In our experiments, the perceptualized network outperformed the baseline classifier on MNIST training databases consisting of a restricted number of images. Our model is not limited to persons and can be applied to any system featuring a loop involving the processing from "internal" to "external" representations.

In large language models (LLMs), certain neurons can store distinct pieces of knowledge learned during pretraining. While knowledge typically appears as a combination of relations and entities, it remains unclear whether some neurons focus on a relation itself -- independent of any entity. We hypothesize such neurons detect a relation in the input text and guide generation involving such a relation. To investigate this, we study the Llama-2 family on a chosen set of relations with a statistics-based method. Our experiments demonstrate the existence of relation-specific neurons. We measure the effect of selectively deactivating candidate neurons specific to relation r on the LLM's ability to handle (1) facts whose relation is r and (2) facts whose relation is a different relation r' neq r. With respect to their capacity for encoding relation information, we give evidence for the following three properties of relation-specific neurons. (i) Neuron cumulativity. The neurons for r present a cumulative effect so that deactivating a larger portion of them results in the degradation of more facts in r. (ii) Neuron versatility. Neurons can be shared across multiple closely related as well as less related relations. Some relation neurons transfer across languages. (iii) Neuron interference. Deactivating neurons specific to one relation can improve LLM generation performance for facts of other relations. We will make our code publicly available at https://github.com/cisnlp/relation-specific-neurons.

Our research aims to develop machines that learn to perceive visual motion as do humans. While recent advances in computer vision (CV) have enabled DNN-based models to accurately estimate optical flow in naturalistic images, a significant disparity remains between CV models and the biological visual system in both architecture and behavior. This disparity includes humans' ability to perceive the motion of higher-order image features (second-order motion), which many CV models fail to capture because of their reliance on the intensity conservation law. Our model architecture mimics the cortical V1-MT motion processing pathway, utilizing a trainable motion energy sensor bank and a recurrent graph network. Supervised learning employing diverse naturalistic videos allows the model to replicate psychophysical and physiological findings about first-order (luminance-based) motion perception. For second-order motion, inspired by neuroscientific findings, the model includes an additional sensing pathway with nonlinear preprocessing before motion energy sensing, implemented using a simple multilayer 3D CNN block. When exploring how the brain acquired the ability to perceive second-order motion in natural environments, in which pure second-order signals are rare, we hypothesized that second-order mechanisms were critical when estimating robust object motion amidst optical fluctuations, such as highlights on glossy surfaces. We trained our dual-pathway model on novel motion datasets with varying material properties of moving objects. We found that training to estimate object motion from non-Lambertian materials naturally endowed the model with the capacity to perceive second-order motion, as can humans. The resulting model effectively aligns with biological systems while generalizing to both first- and second-order motion phenomena in natural scenes.

Active inference is a first principles approach for understanding the brain in particular, and sentient agents in general, with the single imperative of minimizing free energy. As such, it provides a computational account for modelling artificial intelligent agents, by defining the agent's generative model and inferring the model parameters, actions and hidden state beliefs. However, the exact specification of the generative model and the hidden state space structure is left to the experimenter, whose design choices influence the resulting behaviour of the agent. Recently, deep learning methods have been proposed to learn a hidden state space structure purely from data, alleviating the experimenter from this tedious design task, but resulting in an entangled, non-interpreteable state space. In this paper, we hypothesize that such a learnt, entangled state space does not necessarily yield the best model in terms of free energy, and that enforcing different factors in the state space can yield a lower model complexity. In particular, we consider the problem of 3D object representation, and focus on different instances of the ShapeNet dataset. We propose a model that factorizes object shape, pose and category, while still learning a representation for each factor using a deep neural network. We show that models, with best disentanglement properties, perform best when adopted by an active agent in reaching preferred observations.

Large Language Models with transformer architecture have revolutionized the domain of text generation, setting unprecedented benchmarks. Despite their impressive capabilities, LLMs have been criticized for generating outcomes that deviate from factual accuracy or display logical inconsistencies, phenomena commonly referred to as hallucinations. This term, however, has often been misapplied to any results deviating from the instructor's expectations, which this paper defines as attention misdirection rather than true hallucinations. Understanding the distinction between hallucinations and attention misdirection becomes increasingly relevant in business contexts, where the ramifications of such errors can significantly impact the value extraction from these inherently pre-trained models. This paper highlights the best practices of the PGI, Persona, Grouping, and Intelligence, method, a strategic framework that achieved a remarkable error rate of only 3,15 percent across 4,000 responses generated by GPT in response to a real business challenge. It emphasizes that by equipping experimentation with knowledge, businesses can unlock opportunities for innovation through the use of these natively pre-trained models. This reinforces the notion that strategic application grounded in a skilled team can maximize the benefits of emergent technologies such as the LLMs.

To utilize visual information, Multimodal Large Language Model (MLLM) relies on the perception process of its vision encoder. The completeness and accuracy of visual perception significantly influence the precision of spatial reasoning, fine-grained understanding, and other tasks. However, MLLM still lacks the autonomous capability to control its own visual perception processes, for example, selectively reviewing specific regions of an image or focusing on information related to specific object categories. In this work, we propose the concept of Visual Perception Token, aiming to empower MLLM with a mechanism to control its visual perception processes. We design two types of Visual Perception Tokens, termed the Region Selection Token and the Vision Re-Encoding Token. MLLMs autonomously generate these tokens, just as they generate text, and use them to trigger additional visual perception actions. The Region Selection Token explicitly identifies specific regions in an image that require further perception, while the Vision Re-Encoding Token uses its hidden states as control signals to guide additional visual perception processes. Extensive experiments demonstrate the advantages of these tokens in handling spatial reasoning, improving fine-grained understanding, and other tasks. On average, the introduction of Visual Perception Tokens improves the performance of a 2B model by 23.6\%, increasing its score from 0.572 to 0.708, and even outperforms a 7B parameter model by 13.4\% (from 0.624). Please check out our repo https://github.com/yu-rp/VisualPerceptionToken

Recent progress in multimodal reasoning has been significantly advanced by textual Chain-of-Thought (CoT), a paradigm where models conduct reasoning within language. This text-centric approach, however, treats vision as a static, initial context, creating a fundamental "semantic gap" between rich perceptual data and discrete symbolic thought. Human cognition often transcends language, utilizing vision as a dynamic mental sketchpad. A similar evolution is now unfolding in AI, marking a fundamental paradigm shift from models that merely think about images to those that can truly think with images. This emerging paradigm is characterized by models leveraging visual information as intermediate steps in their thought process, transforming vision from a passive input into a dynamic, manipulable cognitive workspace. In this survey, we chart this evolution of intelligence along a trajectory of increasing cognitive autonomy, which unfolds across three key stages: from external tool exploration, through programmatic manipulation, to intrinsic imagination. To structure this rapidly evolving field, our survey makes four key contributions. (1) We establish the foundational principles of the think with image paradigm and its three-stage framework. (2) We provide a comprehensive review of the core methods that characterize each stage of this roadmap. (3) We analyze the critical landscape of evaluation benchmarks and transformative applications. (4) We identify significant challenges and outline promising future directions. By providing this structured overview, we aim to offer a clear roadmap for future research towards more powerful and human-aligned multimodal AI.

Recent advancements in large foundation models have remarkably enhanced our understanding of sensory information in open-world environments. In leveraging the power of foundation models, it is crucial for AI research to pivot away from excessive reductionism and toward an emphasis on systems that function as cohesive wholes. Specifically, we emphasize developing Agent AI -- an embodied system that integrates large foundation models into agent actions. The emerging field of Agent AI spans a wide range of existing embodied and agent-based multimodal interactions, including robotics, gaming, and healthcare systems, etc. In this paper, we propose a novel large action model to achieve embodied intelligent behavior, the Agent Foundation Model. On top of this idea, we discuss how agent AI exhibits remarkable capabilities across a variety of domains and tasks, challenging our understanding of learning and cognition. Furthermore, we discuss the potential of Agent AI from an interdisciplinary perspective, underscoring AI cognition and consciousness within scientific discourse. We believe that those discussions serve as a basis for future research directions and encourage broader societal engagement.

We observe an empirical phenomenon in Large Language Models (LLMs) -- very few activations exhibit significantly larger values than others (e.g., 100,000 times larger). We call them massive activations. First, we demonstrate the widespread existence of massive activations across various LLMs and characterize their locations. Second, we find their values largely stay constant regardless of the input, and they function as indispensable bias terms in LLMs. Third, these massive activations lead to the concentration of attention probabilities to their corresponding tokens, and further, implicit bias terms in the self-attention output. Last, we also study massive activations in Vision Transformers. Code is available at https://github.com/locuslab/massive-activations.

Understanding the property of neural populations (or voxels) in the human brain can advance our comprehension of human perceptual and cognitive processing capabilities and contribute to developing brain-inspired computer models. Recent encoding models using deep neural networks (DNNs) have successfully predicted voxel-wise activity. However, interpreting the properties that explain voxel responses remains challenging because of the black-box nature of DNNs. As a solution, we propose LLM-assisted Visual Cortex Captioning (LaVCa), a data-driven approach that uses large language models (LLMs) to generate natural-language captions for images to which voxels are selective. By applying LaVCa for image-evoked brain activity, we demonstrate that LaVCa generates captions that describe voxel selectivity more accurately than the previously proposed method. Furthermore, the captions generated by LaVCa quantitatively capture more detailed properties than the existing method at both the inter-voxel and intra-voxel levels. Furthermore, a more detailed analysis of the voxel-specific properties generated by LaVCa reveals fine-grained functional differentiation within regions of interest (ROIs) in the visual cortex and voxels that simultaneously represent multiple distinct concepts. These findings offer profound insights into human visual representations by assigning detailed captions throughout the visual cortex while highlighting the potential of LLM-based methods in understanding brain representations. Please check out our webpage at https://sites.google.com/view/lavca-llm/

People can categorize the same entity at multiple taxonomic levels, such as basic (bear), superordinate (animal), and subordinate (grizzly bear). While prior research has focused on basic-level categories, this study is the first attempt to examine the organization of categories by analyzing exemplars produced at the subordinate level. We present a new Italian psycholinguistic dataset of human-generated exemplars for 187 concrete words. We then use these data to evaluate whether textual and vision LLMs produce meaningful exemplars that align with human category organization across three key tasks: exemplar generation, category induction, and typicality judgment. Our findings show a low alignment between humans and LLMs, consistent with previous studies. However, their performance varies notably across different semantic domains. Ultimately, this study highlights both the promises and the constraints of using AI-generated exemplars to support psychological and linguistic research.

The recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have garnered widespread acclaim for their remarkable emerging capabilities. However, the issue of hallucination has parallelly emerged as a by-product, posing significant concerns. While some recent endeavors have been made to identify and mitigate different types of hallucination, there has been a limited emphasis on the nuanced categorization of hallucination and associated mitigation methods. To address this gap, we offer a fine-grained discourse on profiling hallucination based on its degree, orientation, and category, along with offering strategies for alleviation. As such, we define two overarching orientations of hallucination: (i) factual mirage (FM) and (ii) silver lining (SL). To provide a more comprehensive understanding, both orientations are further sub-categorized into intrinsic and extrinsic, with three degrees of severity - (i) mild, (ii) moderate, and (iii) alarming. We also meticulously categorize hallucination into six types: (i) acronym ambiguity, (ii) numeric nuisance, (iii) generated golem, (iv) virtual voice, (v) geographic erratum, and (vi) time wrap. Furthermore, we curate HallucInation eLiciTation (HILT), a publicly available dataset comprising of 75,000 samples generated using 15 contemporary LLMs along with human annotations for the aforementioned categories. Finally, to establish a method for quantifying and to offer a comparative spectrum that allows us to evaluate and rank LLMs based on their vulnerability to producing hallucinations, we propose Hallucination Vulnerability Index (HVI). We firmly believe that HVI holds significant value as a tool for the wider NLP community, with the potential to serve as a rubric in AI-related policy-making. In conclusion, we propose two solution strategies for mitigating hallucinations.

Multimodal learning enhances the perceptual capabilities of cognitive systems by integrating information from different sensory modalities. However, existing multimodal fusion research typically assumes static integration, not fully incorporating key dynamic mechanisms found in the brain. Specifically, the brain exhibits an inverse effectiveness phenomenon, wherein weaker unimodal cues yield stronger multisensory integration benefits; conversely, when individual modal cues are stronger, the effect of fusion is diminished. This mechanism enables biological systems to achieve robust cognition even with scarce or noisy perceptual cues. Inspired by this biological mechanism, we explore the relationship between multimodal output and information from individual modalities, proposing an inverse effectiveness driven multimodal fusion (IEMF) strategy. By incorporating this strategy into neural networks, we achieve more efficient integration with improved model performance and computational efficiency, demonstrating up to 50% reduction in computational cost across diverse fusion methods. We conduct experiments on audio-visual classification, continual learning, and question answering tasks to validate our method. Results consistently demonstrate that our method performs excellently in these tasks. To verify universality and generalization, we also conduct experiments on Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) and Spiking Neural Networks (SNN), with results showing good adaptability to both network types. Our research emphasizes the potential of incorporating biologically inspired mechanisms into multimodal networks and provides promising directions for the future development of multimodal artificial intelligence. The code is available at https://github.com/Brain-Cog-Lab/IEMF.

The recent wave of generative AI has sparked unprecedented global attention, with both excitement and concern over potentially superhuman levels of artificial intelligence: models now take only seconds to produce outputs that would challenge or exceed the capabilities even of expert humans. At the same time, models still show basic errors in understanding that would not be expected even in non-expert humans. This presents us with an apparent paradox: how do we reconcile seemingly superhuman capabilities with the persistence of errors that few humans would make? In this work, we posit that this tension reflects a divergence in the configuration of intelligence in today's generative models relative to intelligence in humans. Specifically, we propose and test the Generative AI Paradox hypothesis: generative models, having been trained directly to reproduce expert-like outputs, acquire generative capabilities that are not contingent upon -- and can therefore exceed -- their ability to understand those same types of outputs. This contrasts with humans, for whom basic understanding almost always precedes the ability to generate expert-level outputs. We test this hypothesis through controlled experiments analyzing generation vs. understanding in generative models, across both language and image modalities. Our results show that although models can outperform humans in generation, they consistently fall short of human capabilities in measures of understanding, as well as weaker correlation between generation and understanding performance, and more brittleness to adversarial inputs. Our findings support the hypothesis that models' generative capability may not be contingent upon understanding capability, and call for caution in interpreting artificial intelligence by analogy to human intelligence.

Mechanistic interpretability is the program of explaining what AI systems are doing in terms of their internal mechanisms. I analyze some aspects of the program, along with setting out some concrete challenges and assessing progress to date. I argue for the importance of propositional interpretability, which involves interpreting a system's mechanisms and behavior in terms of propositional attitudes: attitudes (such as belief, desire, or subjective probability) to propositions (e.g. the proposition that it is hot outside). Propositional attitudes are the central way that we interpret and explain human beings and they are likely to be central in AI too. A central challenge is what I call thought logging: creating systems that log all of the relevant propositional attitudes in an AI system over time. I examine currently popular methods of interpretability (such as probing, sparse auto-encoders, and chain of thought methods) as well as philosophical methods of interpretation (including those grounded in psychosemantics) to assess their strengths and weaknesses as methods of propositional interpretability.

Understanding how humans conceptualize and categorize natural objects offers critical insights into perception and cognition. With the advent of Large Language Models (LLMs), a key question arises: can these models develop human-like object representations from linguistic and multimodal data? In this study, we combined behavioral and neuroimaging analyses to explore the relationship between object concept representations in LLMs and human cognition. We collected 4.7 million triplet judgments from LLMs and Multimodal LLMs (MLLMs) to derive low-dimensional embeddings that capture the similarity structure of 1,854 natural objects. The resulting 66-dimensional embeddings were stable, predictive, and exhibited semantic clustering similar to human mental representations. Remarkably, the dimensions underlying these embeddings were interpretable, suggesting that LLMs and MLLMs develop human-like conceptual representations of objects. Further analysis showed strong alignment between model embeddings and neural activity patterns in brain regions such as EBA, PPA, RSC, and FFA. This provides compelling evidence that the object representations in LLMs, while not identical to human ones, share fundamental similarities that reflect key aspects of human conceptual knowledge. Our findings advance the understanding of machine intelligence and inform the development of more human-like artificial cognitive systems.

Attention is a powerful and ubiquitous mechanism for allowing neural models to focus on particular salient pieces of information by taking their weighted average when making predictions. In particular, multi-headed attention is a driving force behind many recent state-of-the-art NLP models such as Transformer-based MT models and BERT. These models apply multiple attention mechanisms in parallel, with each attention "head" potentially focusing on different parts of the input, which makes it possible to express sophisticated functions beyond the simple weighted average. In this paper we make the surprising observation that even if models have been trained using multiple heads, in practice, a large percentage of attention heads can be removed at test time without significantly impacting performance. In fact, some layers can even be reduced to a single head. We further examine greedy algorithms for pruning down models, and the potential speed, memory efficiency, and accuracy improvements obtainable therefrom. Finally, we analyze the results with respect to which parts of the model are more reliant on having multiple heads, and provide precursory evidence that training dynamics play a role in the gains provided by multi-head attention.

Visual motion processing is essential for humans to perceive and interact with dynamic environments. Despite extensive research in cognitive neuroscience, image-computable models that can extract informative motion flow from natural scenes in a manner consistent with human visual processing have yet to be established. Meanwhile, recent advancements in computer vision (CV), propelled by deep learning, have led to significant progress in optical flow estimation, a task closely related to motion perception. Here we propose an image-computable model of human motion perception by bridging the gap between biological and CV models. Specifically, we introduce a novel two-stages approach that combines trainable motion energy sensing with a recurrent self-attention network for adaptive motion integration and segregation. This model architecture aims to capture the computations in V1-MT, the core structure for motion perception in the biological visual system, while providing the ability to derive informative motion flow for a wide range of stimuli, including complex natural scenes. In silico neurophysiology reveals that our model's unit responses are similar to mammalian neural recordings regarding motion pooling and speed tuning. The proposed model can also replicate human responses to a range of stimuli examined in past psychophysical studies. The experimental results on the Sintel benchmark demonstrate that our model predicts human responses better than the ground truth, whereas the state-of-the-art CV models show the opposite. Our study provides a computational architecture consistent with human visual motion processing, although the physiological correspondence may not be exact.

We investigate the emergence of intuitive physics understanding in general-purpose deep neural network models trained to predict masked regions in natural videos. Leveraging the violation-of-expectation framework, we find that video prediction models trained to predict outcomes in a learned representation space demonstrate an understanding of various intuitive physics properties, such as object permanence and shape consistency. In contrast, video prediction in pixel space and multimodal large language models, which reason through text, achieve performance closer to chance. Our comparisons of these architectures reveal that jointly learning an abstract representation space while predicting missing parts of sensory input, akin to predictive coding, is sufficient to acquire an understanding of intuitive physics, and that even models trained on one week of unique video achieve above chance performance. This challenges the idea that core knowledge -- a set of innate systems to help understand the world -- needs to be hardwired to develop an understanding of intuitive physics.

Humans experience the world through constantly changing visual stimuli, where scenes can shift and move, change in appearance, and vary in distance. The dynamic nature of visual perception is a fundamental aspect of our daily lives, yet the large majority of research on object and scene processing, particularly using fMRI, has focused on static stimuli. While studies of static image perception are attractive due to their computational simplicity, they impose a strong non-naturalistic constraint on our investigation of human vision. In contrast, dynamic visual stimuli offer a more ecologically-valid approach but present new challenges due to the interplay between spatial and temporal information, making it difficult to disentangle the representations of stable image features and motion. To overcome this limitation -- given dynamic inputs, we explicitly decouple the modeling of static image representations and motion representations in the human brain. Three results demonstrate the feasibility of this approach. First, we show that visual motion information as optical flow can be predicted (or decoded) from brain activity as measured by fMRI. Second, we show that this predicted motion can be used to realistically animate static images using a motion-conditioned video diffusion model (where the motion is driven by fMRI brain activity). Third, we show prediction in the reverse direction: existing video encoders can be fine-tuned to predict fMRI brain activity from video imagery, and can do so more effectively than image encoders. This foundational work offers a novel, extensible framework for interpreting how the human brain processes dynamic visual information.

In this report, we argue that there is a realistic possibility that some AI systems will be conscious and/or robustly agentic in the near future. That means that the prospect of AI welfare and moral patienthood, i.e. of AI systems with their own interests and moral significance, is no longer an issue only for sci-fi or the distant future. It is an issue for the near future, and AI companies and other actors have a responsibility to start taking it seriously. We also recommend three early steps that AI companies and other actors can take: They can (1) acknowledge that AI welfare is an important and difficult issue (and ensure that language model outputs do the same), (2) start assessing AI systems for evidence of consciousness and robust agency, and (3) prepare policies and procedures for treating AI systems with an appropriate level of moral concern. To be clear, our argument in this report is not that AI systems definitely are, or will be, conscious, robustly agentic, or otherwise morally significant. Instead, our argument is that there is substantial uncertainty about these possibilities, and so we need to improve our understanding of AI welfare and our ability to make wise decisions about this issue. Otherwise there is a significant risk that we will mishandle decisions about AI welfare, mistakenly harming AI systems that matter morally and/or mistakenly caring for AI systems that do not.

The Backpropagation algorithm, widely used to train neural networks, has often been criticised for its lack of biological realism. In an attempt to find a more biologically plausible alternative, and avoid to back-propagate gradients in favour of using local learning rules, the recently introduced Forward-Forward algorithm replaces the traditional forward and backward passes of Backpropagation with two forward passes. In this work, we show that internal representations obtained with the Forward-Forward algorithm organize into robust, category-specific ensembles, composed by an extremely low number of active units (high sparsity). This is remarkably similar to what is observed in cortical representations during sensory processing. While not found in models trained with standard Backpropagation, sparsity emerges also in networks optimized by Backpropagation, on the same training objective of Forward-Forward. These results suggest that the learning procedure proposed by Forward-Forward may be superior to Backpropagation in modelling learning in the cortex, even when a backward pass is used.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have shown their remarkable abilities in visual perception and understanding recently. However, how to comprehensively evaluate the capabilities of MLLMs remains a challenge. Most of the existing benchmarks predominantly focus on assessing perception, cognition, and reasoning, neglecting the abilities of self-awareness, referring to the model's recognition of its own capability boundary. In our study, we focus on self-awareness in image perception and introduce the knowledge quadrant for MLLMs, which clearly defines the knowns and unknowns in perception. Based on this, we propose a novel benchmark specifically designed to evaluate the Self-Aware capabilities in Perception for MLLMs(MM-SAP). MM-SAP encompasses three distinct sub-datasets, each focusing on different aspects of self-awareness. We evaluated eight well-known MLLMs using MM-SAP, analyzing their self-awareness and providing detailed insights. Code and data are available at https://github.com/YHWmz/MM-SAP

Humans and animals have the ability to continually acquire, fine-tune, and transfer knowledge and skills throughout their lifespan. This ability, referred to as lifelong learning, is mediated by a rich set of neurocognitive mechanisms that together contribute to the development and specialization of our sensorimotor skills as well as to long-term memory consolidation and retrieval. Consequently, lifelong learning capabilities are crucial for autonomous agents interacting in the real world and processing continuous streams of information. However, lifelong learning remains a long-standing challenge for machine learning and neural network models since the continual acquisition of incrementally available information from non-stationary data distributions generally leads to catastrophic forgetting or interference. This limitation represents a major drawback for state-of-the-art deep neural network models that typically learn representations from stationary batches of training data, thus without accounting for situations in which information becomes incrementally available over time. In this review, we critically summarize the main challenges linked to lifelong learning for artificial learning systems and compare existing neural network approaches that alleviate, to different extents, catastrophic forgetting. We discuss well-established and emerging research motivated by lifelong learning factors in biological systems such as structural plasticity, memory replay, curriculum and transfer learning, intrinsic motivation, and multisensory integration.

Despite their powerful chat, coding, and reasoning abilities, Large Language Models (LLMs) frequently hallucinate. Conventional wisdom suggests that hallucinations are a consequence of a balance between creativity and factuality, which can be mitigated, but not eliminated, by grounding the LLM in external knowledge sources. Through extensive systematic experiments, we show that these traditional approaches fail to explain why LLMs hallucinate in practice. Specifically, we show that LLMs augmented with a massive Mixture of Memory Experts (MoME) can easily memorize large datasets of random numbers. We corroborate these experimental findings with a theoretical construction showing that simple neural networks trained to predict the next token hallucinate when the training loss is above a threshold as it usually does in practice when training on internet scale data. We interpret our findings by comparing against traditional retrieval methods for mitigating hallucinations. We use our findings to design a first generation model for removing hallucinations -- Lamini-1 -- that stores facts in a massive mixture of millions of memory experts that are retrieved dynamically.

Deep Learning has revolutionized various fields, including Computer Vision, Natural Language Processing, as well as Biomedical research. Within the field of neuroscience, specifically in electrophysiological neuroimaging, researchers are starting to explore leveraging deep learning to make predictions on their data without extensive feature engineering. The availability of large-scale datasets is a crucial aspect of allowing the experimentation of Deep Learning models. We are publishing the first large-scale clinical EEG dataset that simplifies data access and management for Deep Learning. This dataset contains eyes-closed EEG data prepared from a collection of 1,574 juvenile participants from the Healthy Brain Network. We demonstrate a use case integrating this framework, and discuss why providing such neuroinformatics infrastructure to the community is critical for future scientific discoveries.

Can our brain signals faithfully reflect the original visual stimuli, even including high-frequency details? Although human perceptual and cognitive capacities enable us to process and remember visual information, these abilities are constrained by several factors, such as limited attentional resources and the finite capacity of visual memory. When visual stimuli are processed by human visual system into brain signals, some information is inevitably lost, leading to a discrepancy known as the System GAP. Additionally, perceptual and cognitive dynamics, along with technical noise in signal acquisition, degrade the fidelity of brain signals relative to the visual stimuli, known as the Random GAP. When encoded brain representations are directly aligned with the corresponding pretrained image features, the System GAP and Random GAP between paired data challenge the model, requiring it to bridge these gaps. However, in the context of limited paired data, these gaps are difficult for the model to learn, leading to overfitting and poor generalization to new data. To address these GAPs, we propose a simple yet effective approach called the Uncertainty-aware Blur Prior (UBP). It estimates the uncertainty within the paired data, reflecting the mismatch between brain signals and visual stimuli. Based on this uncertainty, UBP dynamically blurs the high-frequency details of the original images, reducing the impact of the mismatch and improving alignment. Our method achieves a top-1 accuracy of 50.9\% and a top-5 accuracy of 79.7\% on the zero-shot brain-to-image retrieval task, surpassing previous state-of-the-art methods by margins of 13.7\% and 9.8\%, respectively. Code is available at https://github.com/HaitaoWuTJU/Uncertainty-aware-Blur-Prior{GitHub}.

We explore the effects of various plasticity functions on assemblies of neurons. To bridge the gap between experimental and computational theories we make use of a conceptual framework, the Assembly Calculus, which is a formal system for the description of brain function based on assemblies of neurons. The Assembly Calculus includes operations for projecting, associating, and merging assemblies of neurons. Our research is focused on simulating different plasticity functions with Assembly Calculus. Our main contribution is the modification and evaluation of the projection operation. We experiment with Oja's and Spike Time-Dependent Plasticity (STDP) rules and test the effect of various hyper-parameters.

We argue that representations in AI models, particularly deep networks, are converging. First, we survey many examples of convergence in the literature: over time and across multiple domains, the ways by which different neural networks represent data are becoming more aligned. Next, we demonstrate convergence across data modalities: as vision models and language models get larger, they measure distance between datapoints in a more and more alike way. We hypothesize that this convergence is driving toward a shared statistical model of reality, akin to Plato's concept of an ideal reality. We term such a representation the platonic representation and discuss several possible selective pressures toward it. Finally, we discuss the implications of these trends, their limitations, and counterexamples to our analysis.

Interpretability researchers have attempted to understand MLP neurons of language models based on both the contexts in which they activate and their output weight vectors. They have paid little attention to a complementary aspect: the interactions between input and output. For example, when neurons detect a direction in the input, they might add much the same direction to the residual stream ("enrichment neurons") or reduce its presence ("depletion neurons"). We address this aspect by examining the cosine similarity between input and output weights of a neuron. We apply our method to 12 models and find that enrichment neurons dominate in early-middle layers whereas later layers tend more towards depletion. To explain this finding, we argue that enrichment neurons are largely responsible for enriching concept representations, one of the first steps of factual recall. Our input-output perspective is a complement to activation-dependent analyses and to approaches that treat input and output separately.

Knowing others' intentions and taking others' perspectives are two core components of human intelligence that are considered to be instantiations of theory-of-mind. Infiltrating machines with these abilities is an important step towards building human-level artificial intelligence. Here, to investigate intentionality understanding and level-2 perspective-taking in Vision Language Models (VLMs), we constructed the IntentBench and PerspectBench, which together contains over 300 cognitive experiments grounded in real-world scenarios and classic cognitive tasks. We found VLMs achieving high performance on intentionality understanding but low performance on level-2 perspective-taking. This suggests a potential dissociation between simulation-based and theory-based theory-of-mind abilities in VLMs, highlighting the concern that they are not capable of using model-based reasoning to infer others' mental states. See https://growing-ai-like-a-child.github.io/{Website}

Recent research shows that Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit a compelling level of proficiency in Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks. This ability to impute unobservable mental states to others is vital to human social cognition and may prove equally important in principal-agent relations between individual humans and Artificial Intelligences (AIs). In this paper, we explore how a mechanism studied in developmental psychology known as Violation of Expectation (VoE) can be implemented to reduce errors in LLM prediction about users by leveraging emergent ToM affordances. And we introduce a metacognitive prompting framework to apply VoE in the context of an AI tutor. By storing and retrieving facts derived in cases where LLM expectation about the user was violated, we find that LLMs are able to learn about users in ways that echo theories of human learning. Finally, we discuss latent hazards and augmentative opportunities associated with modeling user psychology and propose ways to mitigate risk along with possible directions for future inquiry.

Two principles: the complementary principle and the consensus principle are widely acknowledged in the literature of multi-view learning. However, the current design of multi-head self-attention, an instance of multi-view learning, prioritizes the complementarity while ignoring the consensus. To address this problem, we propose an enhanced multi-head self-attention (EMHA). First, to satisfy the complementary principle, EMHA removes the one-to-one mapping constraint among queries and keys in multiple subspaces and allows each query to attend to multiple keys. On top of that, we develop a method to fully encourage consensus among heads by introducing two interaction models, namely inner-subspace interaction and cross-subspace interaction. Extensive experiments on a wide range of language tasks (e.g., machine translation, abstractive summarization and grammar correction, language modeling), show its superiority, with a very modest increase in model size. Our code would be available at: https://github.com/zhengkid/EIT-Enhanced-Interactive-Transformer.

The integration of deep learning and neuroscience has been advancing rapidly, which has led to improvements in the analysis of brain activity and the understanding of deep learning models from a neuroscientific perspective. The reconstruction of visual experience from human brain activity is an area that has particularly benefited: the use of deep learning models trained on large amounts of natural images has greatly improved its quality, and approaches that combine the diverse information contained in visual experiences have proliferated rapidly in recent years. In this technical paper, by taking advantage of the simple and generic framework that we proposed (Takagi and Nishimoto, CVPR 2023), we examine the extent to which various additional decoding techniques affect the performance of visual experience reconstruction. Specifically, we combined our earlier work with the following three techniques: using decoded text from brain activity, nonlinear optimization for structural image reconstruction, and using decoded depth information from brain activity. We confirmed that these techniques contributed to improving accuracy over the baseline. We also discuss what researchers should consider when performing visual reconstruction using deep generative models trained on large datasets. Please check our webpage at https://sites.google.com/view/stablediffusion-with-brain/. Code is also available at https://github.com/yu-takagi/StableDiffusionReconstruction.

Perceptual constancy is the ability to maintain stable perceptions of objects despite changes in sensory input, such as variations in distance, angle, or lighting. This ability is crucial for recognizing visual information in a dynamic world, making it essential for Vision-Language Models (VLMs). However, whether VLMs are currently and theoretically capable of mastering this ability remains underexplored. In this study, we evaluated 33 VLMs using 253 experiments across three domains: color, size, and shape constancy. The experiments included single-image and video adaptations of classic cognitive tasks, along with novel tasks in in-the-wild conditions, to evaluate the models' recognition of object properties under varying conditions. We found significant variability in VLM performance, with models performance in shape constancy clearly dissociated from that of color and size constancy.

When reading a story, humans can quickly understand new fictional characters with a few observations, mainly by drawing analogies to fictional and real people they already know. This reflects the few-shot and meta-learning essence of humans' inference of characters' mental states, i.e., theory-of-mind (ToM), which is largely ignored in existing research. We fill this gap with a novel NLP dataset, ToM-in-AMC, the first assessment of machines' meta-learning of ToM in a realistic narrative understanding scenario. Our dataset consists of ~1,000 parsed movie scripts, each corresponding to a few-shot character understanding task that requires models to mimic humans' ability of fast digesting characters with a few starting scenes in a new movie. We propose a novel ToM prompting approach designed to explicitly assess the influence of multiple ToM dimensions. It surpasses existing baseline models, underscoring the significance of modeling multiple ToM dimensions for our task. Our extensive human study verifies that humans are capable of solving our problem by inferring characters' mental states based on their previously seen movies. In comparison, our systems based on either state-of-the-art large language models (GPT-4) or meta-learning algorithms lags >20% behind, highlighting a notable limitation in existing approaches' ToM capabilities.

Current Large Language Models (LLMs) are unparalleled in their ability to generate grammatically correct, fluent text. LLMs are appearing rapidly, and debates on LLM capacities have taken off, but reflection is lagging behind. Thus, in this position paper, we first zoom in on the debate and critically assess three points recurring in critiques of LLM capacities: i) that LLMs only parrot statistical patterns in the training data; ii) that LLMs master formal but not functional language competence; and iii) that language learning in LLMs cannot inform human language learning. Drawing on empirical and theoretical arguments, we show that these points need more nuance. Second, we outline a pragmatic perspective on the issue of `real' understanding and intentionality in LLMs. Understanding and intentionality pertain to unobservable mental states we attribute to other humans because they have pragmatic value: they allow us to abstract away from complex underlying mechanics and predict behaviour effectively. We reflect on the circumstances under which it would make sense for humans to similarly attribute mental states to LLMs, thereby outlining a pragmatic philosophical context for LLMs as an increasingly prominent technology in society.

An account of the subjective elements of quantum mechanics or of whether, as Einstein famously asked, the Moon exists when nobody is looking at it.

Assistive agents should make humans' lives easier. Classically, such assistance is studied through the lens of inverse reinforcement learning, where an assistive agent (e.g., a chatbot, a robot) infers a human's intention and then selects actions to help the human reach that goal. This approach requires inferring intentions, which can be difficult in high-dimensional settings. We build upon prior work that studies assistance through the lens of empowerment: an assistive agent aims to maximize the influence of the human's actions such that they exert a greater control over the environmental outcomes and can solve tasks in fewer steps. We lift the major limitation of prior work in this area--scalability to high-dimensional settings--with contrastive successor representations. We formally prove that these representations estimate a similar notion of empowerment to that studied by prior work and provide a ready-made mechanism for optimizing it. Empirically, our proposed method outperforms prior methods on synthetic benchmarks, and scales to Overcooked, a cooperative game setting. Theoretically, our work connects ideas from information theory, neuroscience, and reinforcement learning, and charts a path for representations to play a critical role in solving assistive problems.

Recent advances in Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) lead to significant breakthroughs in both academia and industry. One question that arises is how we, as humans, can understand their internal neural representations. This paper takes an initial step towards addressing this question by presenting a versatile framework to identify and interpret the semantics within LMMs. Specifically, 1) we first apply a Sparse Autoencoder(SAE) to disentangle the representations into human understandable features. 2) We then present an automatic interpretation framework to interpreted the open-semantic features learned in SAE by the LMMs themselves. We employ this framework to analyze the LLaVA-NeXT-8B model using the LLaVA-OV-72B model, demonstrating that these features can effectively steer the model's behavior. Our results contribute to a deeper understanding of why LMMs excel in specific tasks, including EQ tests, and illuminate the nature of their mistakes along with potential strategies for their rectification. These findings offer new insights into the internal mechanisms of LMMs and suggest parallels with the cognitive processes of the human brain.

Recent work has proposed the linear representation hypothesis: that language models perform computation by manipulating one-dimensional representations of concepts ("features") in activation space. In contrast, we explore whether some language model representations may be inherently multi-dimensional. We begin by developing a rigorous definition of irreducible multi-dimensional features based on whether they can be decomposed into either independent or non-co-occurring lower-dimensional features. Motivated by these definitions, we design a scalable method that uses sparse autoencoders to automatically find multi-dimensional features in GPT-2 and Mistral 7B. These auto-discovered features include strikingly interpretable examples, e.g. circular features representing days of the week and months of the year. We identify tasks where these exact circles are used to solve computational problems involving modular arithmetic in days of the week and months of the year. Finally, we provide evidence that these circular features are indeed the fundamental unit of computation in these tasks with intervention experiments on Mistral 7B and Llama 3 8B, and we find further circular representations by breaking down the hidden states for these tasks into interpretable components.

The static synaptic connectivity of neuronal circuits stands in direct contrast to the dynamics of their function. As in changing community interactions, different neurons can participate actively in various combinations to effect behaviors at different times. We introduce an unsupervised approach to learn the dynamic affinities between neurons in live, behaving animals, and to reveal which communities form among neurons at different times. The inference occurs in two major steps. First, pairwise non-linear affinities between neuronal traces from brain-wide calcium activity are organized by non-negative tensor factorization (NTF). Each factor specifies which groups of neurons are most likely interacting for an inferred interval in time, and for which animals. Finally, a generative model that allows for weighted community detection is applied to the functional motifs produced by NTF to reveal a dynamic functional connectome. Since time codes the different experimental variables (e.g., application of chemical stimuli), this provides an atlas of neural motifs active during separate stages of an experiment (e.g., stimulus application or spontaneous behaviors). Results from our analysis are experimentally validated, confirming that our method is able to robustly predict causal interactions between neurons to generate behavior. Code is available at https://github.com/dyballa/dynamic-connectomes.

The multifaceted nature of human perception and comprehension indicates that, when we think, our body can naturally take any combination of senses, a.k.a., modalities and form a beautiful picture in our brain. For example, when we see a cattery and simultaneously perceive the cat's purring sound, our brain can construct a picture of a cat in the cattery. Intuitively, generative AI models should hold the versatility of humans and be capable of generating images from any combination of modalities efficiently and collaboratively. This paper presents ImgAny, a novel end-to-end multi-modal generative model that can mimic human reasoning and generate high-quality images. Our method serves as the first attempt in its capacity of efficiently and flexibly taking any combination of seven modalities, ranging from language, audio to vision modalities, including image, point cloud, thermal, depth, and event data. Our key idea is inspired by human-level cognitive processes and involves the integration and harmonization of multiple input modalities at both the entity and attribute levels without specific tuning across modalities. Accordingly, our method brings two novel training-free technical branches: 1) Entity Fusion Branch ensures the coherence between inputs and outputs. It extracts entity features from the multi-modal representations powered by our specially constructed entity knowledge graph; 2) Attribute Fusion Branch adeptly preserves and processes the attributes. It efficiently amalgamates distinct attributes from diverse input modalities via our proposed attribute knowledge graph. Lastly, the entity and attribute features are adaptively fused as the conditional inputs to the pre-trained Stable Diffusion model for image generation. Extensive experiments under diverse modality combinations demonstrate its exceptional capability for visual content creation.

Understanding the functional organization of higher visual cortex is a central focus in neuroscience. Past studies have primarily mapped the visual and semantic selectivity of neural populations using hand-selected stimuli, which may potentially bias results towards pre-existing hypotheses of visual cortex functionality. Moving beyond conventional approaches, we introduce a data-driven method that generates natural language descriptions for images predicted to maximally activate individual voxels of interest. Our method -- Semantic Captioning Using Brain Alignments ("BrainSCUBA") -- builds upon the rich embedding space learned by a contrastive vision-language model and utilizes a pre-trained large language model to generate interpretable captions. We validate our method through fine-grained voxel-level captioning across higher-order visual regions. We further perform text-conditioned image synthesis with the captions, and show that our images are semantically coherent and yield high predicted activations. Finally, to demonstrate how our method enables scientific discovery, we perform exploratory investigations on the distribution of "person" representations in the brain, and discover fine-grained semantic selectivity in body-selective areas. Unlike earlier studies that decode text, our method derives voxel-wise captions of semantic selectivity. Our results show that BrainSCUBA is a promising means for understanding functional preferences in the brain, and provides motivation for further hypothesis-driven investigation of visual cortex.

Biological systems perceive the world by simultaneously processing high-dimensional inputs from modalities as diverse as vision, audition, touch, proprioception, etc. The perception models used in deep learning on the other hand are designed for individual modalities, often relying on domain-specific assumptions such as the local grid structures exploited by virtually all existing vision models. These priors introduce helpful inductive biases, but also lock models to individual modalities. In this paper we introduce the Perceiver - a model that builds upon Transformers and hence makes few architectural assumptions about the relationship between its inputs, but that also scales to hundreds of thousands of inputs, like ConvNets. The model leverages an asymmetric attention mechanism to iteratively distill inputs into a tight latent bottleneck, allowing it to scale to handle very large inputs. We show that this architecture is competitive with or outperforms strong, specialized models on classification tasks across various modalities: images, point clouds, audio, video, and video+audio. The Perceiver obtains performance comparable to ResNet-50 and ViT on ImageNet without 2D convolutions by directly attending to 50,000 pixels. It is also competitive in all modalities in AudioSet.

"Induction heads" are attention heads that implement a simple algorithm to complete token sequences like [A][B] ... [A] -> [B]. In this work, we present preliminary and indirect evidence for a hypothesis that induction heads might constitute the mechanism for the majority of all "in-context learning" in large transformer models (i.e. decreasing loss at increasing token indices). We find that induction heads develop at precisely the same point as a sudden sharp increase in in-context learning ability, visible as a bump in the training loss. We present six complementary lines of evidence, arguing that induction heads may be the mechanistic source of general in-context learning in transformer models of any size. For small attention-only models, we present strong, causal evidence; for larger models with MLPs, we present correlational evidence.

We create a reusable Transformer, BrainBERT, for intracranial recordings bringing modern representation learning approaches to neuroscience. Much like in NLP and speech recognition, this Transformer enables classifying complex concepts, i.e., decoding neural data, with higher accuracy and with much less data by being pretrained in an unsupervised manner on a large corpus of unannotated neural recordings. Our approach generalizes to new subjects with electrodes in new positions and to unrelated tasks showing that the representations robustly disentangle the neural signal. Just like in NLP where one can study language by investigating what a language model learns, this approach opens the door to investigating the brain by what a model of the brain learns. As a first step along this path, we demonstrate a new analysis of the intrinsic dimensionality of the computations in different areas of the brain. To construct these representations, we combine a technique for producing super-resolution spectrograms of neural data with an approach designed for generating contextual representations of audio by masking. In the future, far more concepts will be decodable from neural recordings by using representation learning, potentially unlocking the brain like language models unlocked language.

Recent language models have a mysterious tendency to generate false but plausible-sounding text. Such "hallucinations" are an obstacle to the usability of language-based AI systems and can harm people who rely upon their outputs. This work shows shows that there is an inherent statistical reason that pretrained language models hallucinate certain types of facts, having nothing to do with the transformer LM architecture or data quality. For "arbitrary" facts whose veracity cannot be determined from the training data, we show that hallucination is necessary for language models that satisfy a statistical calibration condition appropriate for generative language models. Specifically, if the maximum probability of any fact is bounded, we show that the probability of generating a hallucination is close to the fraction of facts that occur exactly once in the training data (a "Good-Turing" estimate), even assuming ideal training data without errors. One conclusion is that models pretrained to be sufficiently good predictors (i.e., calibrated) may require post-training to mitigate hallucinations on the type of arbitrary facts that tend to appear once in the training set. However, our analysis also suggests that there is no statistical reason that pretraining will lead to hallucination on facts that tend to appear more than once in the training data (like references to publications such as articles and books, whose hallucinations have been particularly notable and problematic) or on systematic facts (like arithmetic calculations). Therefore, different architectures and learning algorithms may mitigate these latter types of hallucinations.

In Decentralized Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL), the development of Emergent Communication has long been constrained by the ``Joint Exploration Dilemma'', leading agents to fall into a ``Communication Vacuum Equilibrium'' . Traditional methods address this by introducing inductive biases to facilitate communication emergence . This study fundamentally questions whether such artificial inductive biases are, in fact, over-engineering. Through experiments with the ``AI Mother Tongue'' (AIM) framework, based on a Vector Quantized Variational Autoencoder (VQ-VAE), we demonstrate that when agents possess an endogenous symbol system, their neural representations naturally exhibit spontaneous semantic compression and Nash equilibrium-driven semantic convergence, achieving effective symbolic communication without external inductive biases. This aligns with recent neuroscience findings suggesting that the human brain does not directly use human language for internal thought , and resonates with research on ``soft thinking'' capabilities in Large Language Models (LLMs) . Compared to traditional explicit communication methods, AIM demonstrates stronger generality and efficiency. The interpretable analysis toolkit developed in this study confirms that symbol usage exhibits a significant power-law distribution, leading to three major theoretical insights: the ``Neural Communication Hypothesis'', the ``Tool-First Principle'', and the ``Semantic Interpretability Paradigm''. Future research will explore the integration of Hierarchical Quantized Variational Autoencoders (HQ-VAE) to enhance AIM's complex expressive capabilities and investigate the potential for ``Reinforcement Learning (RL) Low-Level Pre-training''. This discovery offers new avenues for bridging symbolism and connectionism.

What drives exploration? Understanding intrinsic motivation is a long-standing challenge in both cognitive science and artificial intelligence; numerous objectives have been proposed and used to train agents, yet there remains a gap between human and agent exploration. We directly compare adults, children, and AI agents in a complex open-ended environment, Crafter, and study how common intrinsic objectives: Entropy, Information Gain, and Empowerment, relate to their behavior. We find that only Entropy and Empowerment are consistently positively correlated with human exploration progress, indicating that these objectives may better inform intrinsic reward design for agents. Furthermore, across agents and humans we observe that Entropy initially increases rapidly, then plateaus, while Empowerment increases continuously, suggesting that state diversity may provide more signal in early exploration, while advanced exploration should prioritize control. Finally, we find preliminary evidence that private speech utterances, and particularly goal verbalizations, may aid exploration in children. Our data is available at https://github.com/alyd/humans_in_crafter_data.

Do machines and humans process language in similar ways? A recent line of research has hinted in the affirmative, demonstrating that human brain signals can be effectively predicted using the internal representations of language models (LMs). This is thought to reflect shared computational principles between LMs and human language processing. However, there are also clear differences in how LMs and humans acquire and use language, even if the final task they are performing is the same. Despite this, there is little work exploring systematic differences between human and machine language processing using brain data. To address this question, we examine the differences between LM representations and the human brain's responses to language, specifically by examining a dataset of Magnetoencephalography (MEG) responses to a written narrative. In doing so we identify three phenomena that, in prior work, LMs have been found to not capture well: emotional understanding, figurative language processing, and physical commonsense. By fine-tuning LMs on datasets related to these phenomena, we observe that fine-tuned LMs show improved alignment with human brain responses across these tasks. Our study implies that the observed divergences between LMs and human brains may stem from LMs' inadequate representation of these specific types of knowledge.

We explore building generative neural network models of popular reinforcement learning environments. Our world model can be trained quickly in an unsupervised manner to learn a compressed spatial and temporal representation of the environment. By using features extracted from the world model as inputs to an agent, we can train a very compact and simple policy that can solve the required task. We can even train our agent entirely inside of its own hallucinated dream generated by its world model, and transfer this policy back into the actual environment. An interactive version of this paper is available at https://worldmodels.github.io/

While Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) demonstrate impressive abilities over high level perception and reasoning, their robustness in the wild still lags behind humans and exhibits diminished efficacy on simple tasks that are intuitive for humans. We examine the hypothesis that these deficiencies stem from the absence of core knowledge, rudimentary cognitive abilities innate to humans from early childhood. To probe core knowledge representation in MLLMs, we draw from developmental cognitive sciences and develop a large-scale benchmark, CoreCognition dataset, encompassing 12 core cognitive concepts. We evaluate 219 models with 10 different prompts, leading to a total of 2409 data points for analysis. Our findings reveal core knowledge deficits in early developed core abilities while models demonstrate human comparable performance in high level cognition. Moreover, we find that low level abilities show little to no scaling, in stark contrast to high level abilities. Finally, we introduce an evaluation technique, Concept Hacking, through which we demonstrate that MLLMs do not genuinely advance toward core knowledge but instead rely on illusory understanding and shortcut learning as they scale. Website with this https://growing-ai-like-a-child.github.io/{link}.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit remarkable capabilities on not just language tasks, but also various tasks that are not linguistic in nature, such as logical reasoning and social inference. In the human brain, neuroscience has identified a core language system that selectively and causally supports language processing. We here ask whether similar specialization for language emerges in LLMs. We identify language-selective units within 18 popular LLMs, using the same localization approach that is used in neuroscience. We then establish the causal role of these units by demonstrating that ablating LLM language-selective units -- but not random units -- leads to drastic deficits in language tasks. Correspondingly, language-selective LLM units are more aligned to brain recordings from the human language system than random units. Finally, we investigate whether our localization method extends to other cognitive domains: while we find specialized networks in some LLMs for reasoning and social capabilities, there are substantial differences among models. These findings provide functional and causal evidence for specialization in large language models, and highlight parallels with the functional organization in the brain.

Dogs have a unique evolutionary relationship with humans and serve many important roles e.g. search and rescue, blind assistance, emotional support. However, few datasets exist to categorize visual features and objects available to dogs, as well as how dogs direct their visual attention within their environment. We collect and study a dataset with over 11,698 gazes to categorize the objects available to be gazed at by 11 dogs in everyday outdoor environments i.e. a walk around a college campus and urban area. We explore the availability of these object categories and the visual attention of dogs over these categories using a head mounted eye tracking apparatus. A small portion (approx. 600 images or < 20% of total dataset) of the collected data is used to fine tune a MaskRCNN for the novel image domain to segment objects present in the scene, enabling further statistical analysis on the visual gaze tendencies of dogs. The MaskRCNN, with eye tracking apparatus, serves as an end to end model for automatically classifying the visual fixations of dogs. The fine tuned MaskRCNN performs far better than chance. There are few individual differences between the 11 dogs and we observe greater visual fixations on buses, plants, pavement, and construction equipment. This work takes a step towards understanding visual behavior of dogs and their interaction with the physical world.

Human brains respond to semantic features of presented stimuli with different neurons. It is then curious whether modern deep neural networks admit a similar behavior pattern. Specifically, this paper finds a small cluster of neurons in a diffusion model corresponding to a particular subject. We call those neurons the concept neurons. They can be identified by statistics of network gradients to a stimulation connected with the given subject. The concept neurons demonstrate magnetic properties in interpreting and manipulating generation results. Shutting them can directly yield the related subject contextualized in different scenes. Concatenating multiple clusters of concept neurons can vividly generate all related concepts in a single image. A few steps of further fine-tuning can enhance the multi-concept capability, which may be the first to manage to generate up to four different subjects in a single image. For large-scale applications, the concept neurons are environmentally friendly as we only need to store a sparse cluster of int index instead of dense float32 values of the parameters, which reduces storage consumption by 90\% compared with previous subject-driven generation methods. Extensive qualitative and quantitative studies on diverse scenarios show the superiority of our method in interpreting and manipulating diffusion models.

Generative Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are prone to generate plausible-sounding textual answers that, however, are not always grounded in the input image. We investigate this phenomenon, usually referred to as "hallucination" and show that it stems from an excessive reliance on the language prior. In particular, we show that as more tokens are generated, the reliance on the visual prompt decreases, and this behavior strongly correlates with the emergence of hallucinations. To reduce hallucinations, we introduce Multi-Modal Mutual-Information Decoding (M3ID), a new sampling method for prompt amplification. M3ID amplifies the influence of the reference image over the language prior, hence favoring the generation of tokens with higher mutual information with the visual prompt. M3ID can be applied to any pre-trained autoregressive VLM at inference time without necessitating further training and with minimal computational overhead. If training is an option, we show that M3ID can be paired with Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) to improve the model's reliance on the prompt image without requiring any labels. Our empirical findings show that our algorithms maintain the fluency and linguistic capabilities of pre-trained VLMs while reducing hallucinations by mitigating visually ungrounded answers. Specifically, for the LLaVA 13B model, M3ID and M3ID+DPO reduce the percentage of hallucinated objects in captioning tasks by 25% and 28%, respectively, and improve the accuracy on VQA benchmarks such as POPE by 21% and 24%.

Self-supervised models have revolutionized speech processing, achieving new levels of performance in a wide variety of tasks with limited resources. However, the inner workings of these models are still opaque. In this paper, we aim to analyze the encoded contextual representation of these foundation models based on their inter- and intra-model similarity, independent of any external annotation and task-specific constraint. We examine different SSL models varying their training paradigm -- Contrastive (Wav2Vec2.0) and Predictive models (HuBERT); and model sizes (base and large). We explore these models on different levels of localization/distributivity of information including (i) individual neurons; (ii) layer representation; (iii) attention weights and (iv) compare the representations with their finetuned counterparts.Our results highlight that these models converge to similar representation subspaces but not to similar neuron-localized concepts\footnote{A concept represents a coherent fragment of knowledge, such as ``a class containing certain objects as elements, where the objects have certain properties. We made the code publicly available for facilitating further research, we publicly released our code.

Representational spaces learned via language modeling are fundamental to Natural Language Processing (NLP), however there has been limited understanding regarding how and when during training various types of linguistic information emerge and interact. Leveraging a novel information theoretic probing suite, which enables direct comparisons of not just task performance, but their representational subspaces, we analyze nine tasks covering syntax, semantics and reasoning, across 2M pre-training steps and five seeds. We identify critical learning phases across tasks and time, during which subspaces emerge, share information, and later disentangle to specialize. Across these phases, syntactic knowledge is acquired rapidly after 0.5% of full training. Continued performance improvements primarily stem from the acquisition of open-domain knowledge, while semantics and reasoning tasks benefit from later boosts to long-range contextualization and higher specialization. Measuring cross-task similarity further reveals that linguistically related tasks share information throughout training, and do so more during the critical phase of learning than before or after. Our findings have implications for model interpretability, multi-task learning, and learning from limited data.

Artificial neural networks are the heart of machine learning algorithms and artificial intelligence protocols. Historically, the simplest implementation of an artificial neuron traces back to the classical Rosenblatt's `perceptron', but its long term practical applications may be hindered by the fast scaling up of computational complexity, especially relevant for the training of multilayered perceptron networks. Here we introduce a quantum information-based algorithm implementing the quantum computer version of a perceptron, which shows exponential advantage in encoding resources over alternative realizations. We experimentally test a few qubits version of this model on an actual small-scale quantum processor, which gives remarkably good answers against the expected results. We show that this quantum model of a perceptron can be used as an elementary nonlinear classifier of simple patterns, as a first step towards practical training of artificial quantum neural networks to be efficiently implemented on near-term quantum processing hardware.

The ability of Variational Autoencoders to learn disentangled representations has made them appealing for practical applications. However, their mean representations, which are generally used for downstream tasks, have recently been shown to be more correlated than their sampled counterpart, on which disentanglement is usually measured. In this paper, we refine this observation through the lens of selective posterior collapse, which states that only a subset of the learned representations, the active variables, is encoding useful information while the rest (the passive variables) is discarded. We first extend the existing definition to multiple data examples and show that active variables are equally disentangled in mean and sampled representations. Based on this extension and the pre-trained models from disentanglement lib, we then isolate the passive variables and show that they are responsible for the discrepancies between mean and sampled representations. Specifically, passive variables exhibit high correlation scores with other variables in mean representations while being fully uncorrelated in sampled ones. We thus conclude that despite what their higher correlation might suggest, mean representations are still good candidates for downstream tasks applications. However, it may be beneficial to remove their passive variables, especially when used with models sensitive to correlated features.

While numerous works have assessed the generative performance of language models (LMs) on tasks requiring Theory of Mind reasoning, research into the models' internal representation of mental states remains limited. Recent work has used probing to demonstrate that LMs can represent beliefs of themselves and others. However, these claims are accompanied by limited evaluation, making it difficult to assess how mental state representations are affected by model design and training choices. We report an extensive benchmark with various LM types with different model sizes, fine-tuning approaches, and prompt designs to study the robustness of mental state representations and memorisation issues within the probes. Our results show that the quality of models' internal representations of the beliefs of others increases with model size and, more crucially, with fine-tuning. We are the first to study how prompt variations impact probing performance on theory of mind tasks. We demonstrate that models' representations are sensitive to prompt variations, even when such variations should be beneficial. Finally, we complement previous activation editing experiments on Theory of Mind tasks and show that it is possible to improve models' reasoning performance by steering their activations without the need to train any probe.

Thanks to rapid progress in artificial intelligence, we have entered an era when technology and philosophy intersect in interesting ways. Sitting squarely at the centre of this intersection are large language models (LLMs). The more adept LLMs become at mimicking human language, the more vulnerable we become to anthropomorphism, to seeing the systems in which they are embedded as more human-like than they really are. This trend is amplified by the natural tendency to use philosophically loaded terms, such as "knows", "believes", and "thinks", when describing these systems. To mitigate this trend, this paper advocates the practice of repeatedly stepping back to remind ourselves of how LLMs, and the systems of which they form a part, actually work. The hope is that increased scientific precision will encourage more philosophical nuance in the discourse around artificial intelligence, both within the field and in the public sphere.

Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) have shown remarkable capabilities across a variety of tasks (e.g., image captioning, visual question answering). While broad, their knowledge remains generic (e.g., recognizing a dog), and they are unable to handle personalized subjects (e.g., recognizing a user's pet dog). Human reasoning, in contrast, typically operates within the context of specific subjects in our surroundings. For example, one might ask, "What should I buy for my dog's birthday?"; as opposed to a generic inquiry about "What should I buy for a dog's birthday?". Similarly, when looking at a friend's image, the interest lies in seeing their activities (e.g., "my friend is holding a cat"), rather than merely observing generic human actions (e.g., "a man is holding a cat"). In this paper, we introduce the novel task of personalizing LMMs, so that they can have conversations about a specific subject. We propose Yo'LLaVA, which learns to embed a personalized subject into a set of latent tokens given a handful of example images of the subject. Our qualitative and quantitative analyses reveal that Yo'LLaVA can learn the concept more efficiently using fewer tokens and more effectively encode the visual attributes compared to strong prompting baselines (e.g., LLaVA).

In the past five years, the use of generative and foundational AI systems has greatly improved the decoding of brain activity. Visual perception, in particular, can now be decoded from functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) with remarkable fidelity. This neuroimaging technique, however, suffers from a limited temporal resolution (approx0.5 Hz) and thus fundamentally constrains its real-time usage. Here, we propose an alternative approach based on magnetoencephalography (MEG), a neuroimaging device capable of measuring brain activity with high temporal resolution (approx5,000 Hz). For this, we develop an MEG decoding model trained with both contrastive and regression objectives and consisting of three modules: i) pretrained embeddings obtained from the image, ii) an MEG module trained end-to-end and iii) a pretrained image generator. Our results are threefold: Firstly, our MEG decoder shows a 7X improvement of image-retrieval over classic linear decoders. Second, late brain responses to images are best decoded with DINOv2, a recent foundational image model. Third, image retrievals and generations both suggest that high-level visual features can be decoded from MEG signals, although the same approach applied to 7T fMRI also recovers better low-level features. Overall, these results, while preliminary, provide an important step towards the decoding -- in real-time -- of the visual processes continuously unfolding within the human brain.

Despite progress in perceptual tasks such as image classification, computers still perform poorly on cognitive tasks such as image description and question answering. Cognition is core to tasks that involve not just recognizing, but reasoning about our visual world. However, models used to tackle the rich content in images for cognitive tasks are still being trained using the same datasets designed for perceptual tasks. To achieve success at cognitive tasks, models need to understand the interactions and relationships between objects in an image. When asked "What vehicle is the person riding?", computers will need to identify the objects in an image as well as the relationships riding(man, carriage) and pulling(horse, carriage) in order to answer correctly that "the person is riding a horse-drawn carriage". In this paper, we present the Visual Genome dataset to enable the modeling of such relationships. We collect dense annotations of objects, attributes, and relationships within each image to learn these models. Specifically, our dataset contains over 100K images where each image has an average of 21 objects, 18 attributes, and 18 pairwise relationships between objects. We canonicalize the objects, attributes, relationships, and noun phrases in region descriptions and questions answer pairs to WordNet synsets. Together, these annotations represent the densest and largest dataset of image descriptions, objects, attributes, relationships, and question answers.

Prior studies on the emergence in large models have primarily focused on how the functional capabilities of large language models (LLMs) scale with model size. Our research, however, transcends this traditional paradigm, aiming to deepen our understanding of the emergence within LLMs by placing a special emphasis not just on the model size but more significantly on the complex behavior of neuron interactions during the training process. By introducing the concepts of "self-organization" and "multifractal analysis," we explore how neuron interactions dynamically evolve during training, leading to "emergence," mirroring the phenomenon in natural systems where simple micro-level interactions give rise to complex macro-level behaviors. To quantitatively analyze the continuously evolving interactions among neurons in large models during training, we propose the Neuron-based Multifractal Analysis (NeuroMFA). Utilizing NeuroMFA, we conduct a comprehensive examination of the emergent behavior in LLMs through the lens of both model size and training process, paving new avenues for research into the emergence in large models.

Recent advancements in video generation have witnessed significant progress, especially with the rapid advancement of diffusion models. Despite this, their deficiencies in physical cognition have gradually received widespread attention - generated content often violates the fundamental laws of physics, falling into the dilemma of ''visual realism but physical absurdity". Researchers began to increasingly recognize the importance of physical fidelity in video generation and attempted to integrate heuristic physical cognition such as motion representations and physical knowledge into generative systems to simulate real-world dynamic scenarios. Considering the lack of a systematic overview in this field, this survey aims to provide a comprehensive summary of architecture designs and their applications to fill this gap. Specifically, we discuss and organize the evolutionary process of physical cognition in video generation from a cognitive science perspective, while proposing a three-tier taxonomy: 1) basic schema perception for generation, 2) passive cognition of physical knowledge for generation, and 3) active cognition for world simulation, encompassing state-of-the-art methods, classical paradigms, and benchmarks. Subsequently, we emphasize the inherent key challenges in this domain and delineate potential pathways for future research, contributing to advancing the frontiers of discussion in both academia and industry. Through structured review and interdisciplinary analysis, this survey aims to provide directional guidance for developing interpretable, controllable, and physically consistent video generation paradigms, thereby propelling generative models from the stage of ''visual mimicry'' towards a new phase of ''human-like physical comprehension''.

The current work addresses a virtual environment with self-replicating agents whose decisions are based on a form of "somatic computation" (soma - body) in which basic emotional responses, taken in parallelism to actual living organisms, are introduced as a way to provide the agents with greater reflexive abilities. The work provides a contribution to the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Artificial Life (ALife) in connection to a neurobiology-based cognitive framework for artificial systems and virtual environments' simulations. The performance of the agents capable of emotional responses is compared with that of self-replicating automata, and the implications of research on emotions and AI, in connection to both virtual agents as well as robots, is addressed regarding possible future directions and applications.

Pretrained generative models have opened new frontiers in brain decoding by enabling the synthesis of realistic texts and images from non-invasive brain recordings. However, the reliability of such outputs remains questionable--whether they truly reflect semantic activation in the brain, or are merely hallucinated by the powerful generative models. In this paper, we focus on EEG-to-text decoding and address its hallucination issue through the lens of posterior collapse. Acknowledging the underlying mismatch in information capacity between EEG and text, we reframe the decoding task as semantic summarization of core meanings rather than previously verbatim reconstruction of stimulus texts. To this end, we propose the Generative Language Inspection Model (GLIM), which emphasizes learning informative and interpretable EEG representations to improve semantic grounding under heterogeneous and small-scale data conditions. Experiments on the public ZuCo dataset demonstrate that GLIM consistently generates fluent, EEG-grounded sentences without teacher forcing. Moreover, it supports more robust evaluation beyond text similarity, through EEG-text retrieval and zero-shot semantic classification across sentiment categories, relation types, and corpus topics. Together, our architecture and evaluation protocols lay the foundation for reliable and scalable benchmarking in generative brain decoding.

A hallmark of intelligence is the ability to autonomously learn new flexible, cognitive behaviors - that is, behaviors where the appropriate action depends not just on immediate stimuli (as in simple reflexive stimulus-response associations), but on contextual information that must be adequately acquired, stored and processed. While many meta-learning algorithms can design agents that autonomously learn new tasks, cognitive tasks adds another level of learning and memory to typical ``learning-to-learn'' problems. Here we evolve neural networks, endowed with plastic connections and neuromodulation, over a sizable set of simple cognitive tasks adapted from a computational neuroscience framework. The resulting evolved networks can automatically modify their own connectivity to acquire a novel simple cognitive task, never seen during evolution, from stimuli and rewards alone, through the spontaneous operation of their evolved neural organization and plasticity system. Our results emphasize the importance of carefully considering the multiple learning loops involved in the emergence of intelligent behavior.

With the rapid advancements in multimodal generative technology, Affective Computing research has provoked discussion about the potential consequences of AI systems equipped with emotional intelligence. Affective Computing involves the design, evaluation, and implementation of Emotion AI and related technologies aimed at improving people's lives. Designing a computational model in affective computing requires vast amounts of multimodal data, including RGB images, video, audio, text, and physiological signals. Moreover, Affective Computing research is deeply engaged with ethical considerations at various stages-from training emotionally intelligent models on large-scale human data to deploying these models in specific applications. Fundamentally, the development of any AI system must prioritize its impact on humans, aiming to augment and enhance human abilities rather than replace them, while drawing inspiration from human intelligence in a safe and responsible manner. The MRAC 2024 Track 1 workshop seeks to extend these principles from controlled, small-scale lab environments to real-world, large-scale contexts, emphasizing responsible development. The workshop also aims to highlight the potential implications of generative technology, along with the ethical consequences of its use, to researchers and industry professionals. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first workshop series to comprehensively address the full spectrum of multimodal, generative affective computing from a responsible AI perspective, and this is the second iteration of this workshop. Webpage: https://react-ws.github.io/2024/

As we show in this paper, the prediction for output token n+1 of Transformer architectures without one of the mechanisms of positional encodings and causal attention is invariant to permutations of input tokens 1, 2, ..., n-1. Usually, both mechanisms are employed and the symmetry with respect to the input tokens is broken. Recently, it has been shown that one can train Transformers without positional encodings. This must be enabled by the causal attention mechanism. In this paper, we elaborate on the argument that the causal connection mechanism must be responsible for the fact that Transformers are able to model input sequences where the order is important. Vertical "slices" of Transformers are all encouraged to represent the same location k in the input sequence. We hypothesize that residual connections contribute to this phenomenon, and demonstrate evidence for this.

This paper proposes a novel framework for understanding large language models (LLMs) by reconceptualizing them as semiotic machines rather than as imitations of human cognition. Drawing from structuralist and post-structuralist theories of language-specifically the works of Ferdinand de Saussure and Jacques Derrida-I argue that LLMs should be understood as models of language itself, aligning with Derrida's concept of 'writing' (l'ecriture). The paper is structured into three parts. First, I lay the theoretical groundwork by explaining how the word2vec embedding algorithm operates within Saussure's framework of language as a relational system of signs. Second, I apply Derrida's critique of Saussure to position 'writing' as the object modeled by LLMs, offering a view of the machine's 'mind' as a statistical approximation of sign behavior. Finally, the third section addresses how modern LLMs reflect post-structuralist notions of unfixed meaning, arguing that the "next token generation" mechanism effectively captures the dynamic nature of meaning. By reconceptualizing LLMs as semiotic machines rather than cognitive models, this framework provides an alternative lens through which to assess the strengths and limitations of LLMs, offering new avenues for future research.

As language models (LMs) become integral to fields like healthcare, law, and journalism, their ability to differentiate between fact, belief, and knowledge is essential for reliable decision-making. Failure to grasp these distinctions can lead to significant consequences in areas such as medical diagnosis, legal judgments, and dissemination of fake news. Despite this, current literature has largely focused on more complex issues such as theory of mind, overlooking more fundamental epistemic challenges. This study systematically evaluates the epistemic reasoning capabilities of modern LMs, including GPT-4, Claude-3, and Llama-3, using a new dataset, KaBLE, consisting of 13,000 questions across 13 tasks. Our results reveal key limitations. First, while LMs achieve 86% accuracy on factual scenarios, their performance drops significantly with false scenarios, particularly in belief-related tasks. Second, LMs struggle with recognizing and affirming personal beliefs, especially when those beliefs contradict factual data, which raises concerns for applications in healthcare and counseling, where engaging with a person's beliefs is critical. Third, we identify a salient bias in how LMs process first-person versus third-person beliefs, performing better on third-person tasks (80.7%) compared to first-person tasks (54.4%). Fourth, LMs lack a robust understanding of the factive nature of knowledge, namely, that knowledge inherently requires truth. Fifth, LMs rely on linguistic cues for fact-checking and sometimes bypass the deeper reasoning. These findings highlight significant concerns about current LMs' ability to reason about truth, belief, and knowledge while emphasizing the need for advancements in these areas before broad deployment in critical sectors.

We prove theoretically that generalization improves not only through data scaling but also by compressing internal representations. To operationalize this insight, we introduce the Information Bottleneck Language Modeling (IBLM) objective, which reframes language modeling as a constrained optimization problem: minimizing representation entropy subject to optimal prediction performance. Empirically, we observe an emergent memorization-compression cycle during LLM pretraining, evidenced by oscillation positive/negative gradient alignment between cross-entropy and Matrix-Based Entropy (MBE), a measure of representation entropy. This pattern closely mirrors the predictive-compressive trade-off prescribed by IBLM and also parallels the biological alternation between awake learning and sleep consolidation. Motivated by this observation, we propose Gated Phase Transition (GAPT), a training algorithm that adaptively switches between memorization and compression phases. When applied to GPT-2 pretraining on FineWeb dataset, GAPT reduces MBE by 50% and improves cross-entropy by 4.8%. GAPT improves OOD generalizatino by 35% in a pretraining task on arithmetic multiplication. In a setting designed to simulate catastrophic forgetting, GAPT reduces interference by compressing and separating representations, achieving a 97% improvement in separation - paralleling the functional role of sleep consolidation.

Expert problem-solving is driven by powerful languages for thinking about problems and their solutions. Acquiring expertise means learning these languages -- systems of concepts, alongside the skills to use them. We present DreamCoder, a system that learns to solve problems by writing programs. It builds expertise by creating programming languages for expressing domain concepts, together with neural networks to guide the search for programs within these languages. A ``wake-sleep'' learning algorithm alternately extends the language with new symbolic abstractions and trains the neural network on imagined and replayed problems. DreamCoder solves both classic inductive programming tasks and creative tasks such as drawing pictures and building scenes. It rediscovers the basics of modern functional programming, vector algebra and classical physics, including Newton's and Coulomb's laws. Concepts are built compositionally from those learned earlier, yielding multi-layered symbolic representations that are interpretable and transferrable to new tasks, while still growing scalably and flexibly with experience.

The critical inquiry pervading the realm of Philosophy, and perhaps extending its influence across all Humanities disciplines, revolves around the intricacies of morality and normativity. Surprisingly, in recent years, this thematic thread has woven its way into an unexpected domain, one not conventionally associated with pondering "what ought to be": the field of artificial intelligence (AI) research. Central to morality and AI, we find "alignment", a problem related to the challenges of expressing human goals and values in a manner that artificial systems can follow without leading to unwanted adversarial effects. More explicitly and with our current paradigm of AI development in mind, we can think of alignment as teaching human values to non-anthropomorphic entities trained through opaque, gradient-based learning techniques. This work addresses alignment as a technical-philosophical problem that requires solid philosophical foundations and practical implementations that bring normative theory to AI system development. To accomplish this, we propose two sets of necessary and sufficient conditions that, we argue, should be considered in any alignment process. While necessary conditions serve as metaphysical and metaethical roots that pertain to the permissibility of alignment, sufficient conditions establish a blueprint for aligning AI systems under a learning-based paradigm. After laying such foundations, we present implementations of this approach by using state-of-the-art techniques and methods for aligning general-purpose language systems. We call this framework Dynamic Normativity. Its central thesis is that any alignment process under a learning paradigm that cannot fulfill its necessary and sufficient conditions will fail in producing aligned systems.

Recently, "visual o1" began to enter people's vision, with expectations that this slow-thinking design can solve visual reasoning tasks, especially geometric math problems. However, the reality is that current LVLMs (Large Vision Language Models) can hardly even accurately copy a geometric figure, let alone truly understand the complex inherent logic and spatial relationships within geometric shapes. We believe accurate copying (strong perception) is the first step to visual o1. Accordingly, we introduce the concept of "slow perception" (SP), which guides the model to gradually perceive basic point-line combinations, as our humans, reconstruct complex geometric structures progressively. There are two-fold stages in SP: a) perception decomposition. Perception is not instantaneous. In this stage, complex geometric figures are broken down into basic simple units to unify geometry representation. b) perception flow, which acknowledges that accurately tracing a line is not an easy task. This stage aims to avoid "long visual jumps" in regressing line segments by using a proposed "perceptual ruler" to trace each line stroke-by-stroke. Surprisingly, such a human-like perception manner enjoys an inference time scaling law -- the slower, the better. Researchers strive to speed up the model's perception in the past, but we slow it down again, allowing the model to read the image step-by-step and carefully.

We investigate the internal representations of vision-language models (VLMs) to address hallucinations, a persistent challenge despite advances in model size and training. We project VLMs' internal image representations to their language vocabulary and observe more confident output probabilities on real objects than hallucinated objects. We additionally use these output probabilities to spatially localize real objects. Building on this approach, we introduce a knowledge erasure algorithm that removes hallucinations by linearly orthogonalizing image features with respect to hallucinated object features. We show that targeted edits to a model's latent representations can reduce hallucinations by up to 25.7% on the COCO2014 dataset while preserving performance. Our findings demonstrate how a deeper understanding of VLMs' latent representations can enhance reliability and enable novel capabilities, such as zero-shot segmentation.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) provide a new opportunity to address the long-standing question of how concepts are represented and organized in the mind, which is central to unravelling the nature of human cognition. Here, we reframed the classic reverse dictionary task to simulate human concept inference in context and investigated the emergence of human-like conceptual representations within LLMs. We found that LLMs were able to infer concepts from definitional descriptions and construct representation spaces that converge towards a shared, context-independent structure. These representations effectively predicted human behavioural judgments and aligned well with neural activity patterns in the human brain, offering evidence for biological plausibility. These findings demonstrate that human-like conceptual representations and organization can naturally emerge from language prediction, even without real-world grounding. Our work supports the view that LLMs serve as valuable tools for understanding complex human cognition and paves the way for better alignment between artificial and human intelligence.