Daily Papers

Are Large Pre-Trained Language Models Leaking Your Personal Information? In this paper, we analyze whether Pre-Trained Language Models (PLMs) are prone to leaking personal information. Specifically, we query PLMs for email addresses with contexts of the email address or prompts containing the owner's name. We find that PLMs do leak personal information due to memorization. However, since the models are weak at association, the risk of specific personal information being extracted by attackers is low. We hope this work could help the community to better understand the privacy risk of PLMs and bring new insights to make PLMs safe.

We introduce the concept of "universal password model" -- a password model that, once pre-trained, can automatically adapt its guessing strategy based on the target system. To achieve this, the model does not need to access any plaintext passwords from the target credentials. Instead, it exploits users' auxiliary information, such as email addresses, as a proxy signal to predict the underlying password distribution. Specifically, the model uses deep learning to capture the correlation between the auxiliary data of a group of users (e.g., users of a web application) and their passwords. It then exploits those patterns to create a tailored password model for the target system at inference time. No further training steps, targeted data collection, or prior knowledge of the community's password distribution is required. Besides improving over current password strength estimation techniques and attacks, the model enables any end-user (e.g., system administrators) to autonomously generate tailored password models for their systems without the often unworkable requirements of collecting suitable training data and fitting the underlying machine learning model. Ultimately, our framework enables the democratization of well-calibrated password models to the community, addressing a major challenge in the deployment of password security solutions at scale.

The rapid development of large language models (LLMs) has significantly advanced code completion capabilities, giving rise to a new generation of LLM-based Code Completion Tools (LCCTs). Unlike general-purpose LLMs, these tools possess unique workflows, integrating multiple information sources as input and prioritizing code suggestions over natural language interaction, which introduces distinct security challenges. Additionally, LCCTs often rely on proprietary code datasets for training, raising concerns about the potential exposure of sensitive data. This paper exploits these distinct characteristics of LCCTs to develop targeted attack methodologies on two critical security risks: jailbreaking and training data extraction attacks. Our experimental results expose significant vulnerabilities within LCCTs, including a 99.4% success rate in jailbreaking attacks on GitHub Copilot and a 46.3% success rate on Amazon Q. Furthermore, We successfully extracted sensitive user data from GitHub Copilot, including 54 real email addresses and 314 physical addresses associated with GitHub usernames. Our study also demonstrates that these code-based attack methods are effective against general-purpose LLMs, such as the GPT series, highlighting a broader security misalignment in the handling of code by modern LLMs. These findings underscore critical security challenges associated with LCCTs and suggest essential directions for strengthening their security frameworks. The example code and attack samples from our research are provided at https://github.com/Sensente/Security-Attacks-on-LCCTs.

In this paper, we demonstrate how a generative model can be used to build a better recognizer through the control of content and style. We are building an online handwriting recognizer from a modest amount of training samples. By training our controllable handwriting synthesizer on the same data, we can synthesize handwriting with previously underrepresented content (e.g., URLs and email addresses) and style (e.g., cursive and slanted). Moreover, we propose a framework to analyze a recognizer that is trained with a mixture of real and synthetic training data. We use the framework to optimize data synthesis and demonstrate significant improvement on handwriting recognition over a model trained on real data only. Overall, we achieve a 66% reduction in Character Error Rate.

In human-computer conversations, extracting entities such as names, street addresses and email addresses from speech is a challenging task. In this paper, we study the impact of fine-tuning pre-trained speech encoders on extracting spoken entities in human-readable form directly from speech without the need for text transcription. We illustrate that such a direct approach optimizes the encoder to transcribe only the entity relevant portions of speech ignoring the superfluous portions such as carrier phrases, or spell name entities. In the context of dialog from an enterprise virtual agent, we demonstrate that the 1-step approach outperforms the typical 2-step approach which first generates lexical transcriptions followed by text-based entity extraction for identifying spoken entities.

It has become common to publish large (billion parameter) language models that have been trained on private datasets. This paper demonstrates that in such settings, an adversary can perform a training data extraction attack to recover individual training examples by querying the language model. We demonstrate our attack on GPT-2, a language model trained on scrapes of the public Internet, and are able to extract hundreds of verbatim text sequences from the model's training data. These extracted examples include (public) personally identifiable information (names, phone numbers, and email addresses), IRC conversations, code, and 128-bit UUIDs. Our attack is possible even though each of the above sequences are included in just one document in the training data. We comprehensively evaluate our extraction attack to understand the factors that contribute to its success. Worryingly, we find that larger models are more vulnerable than smaller models. We conclude by drawing lessons and discussing possible safeguards for training large language models.

In this work, we present the first dataset, MailEx, for performing event extraction from conversational email threads. To this end, we first proposed a new taxonomy covering 10 event types and 76 arguments in the email domain. Our final dataset includes 1.5K email threads and ~4K emails, which are annotated with totally ~8K event instances. To understand the task challenges, we conducted a series of experiments comparing three types of approaches, i.e., fine-tuned sequence labeling, fine-tuned generative extraction, and few-shot in-context learning. Our results showed that the task of email event extraction is far from being addressed, due to challenges lying in, e.g., extracting non-continuous, shared trigger spans, extracting non-named entity arguments, and modeling the email conversational history. Our work thus suggests more future investigations in this domain-specific event extraction task.