Daily Papers

Large language models (LLMs) extended as systems, such as ChatGPT, have begun supporting third-party applications. These LLM apps leverage the de facto natural language-based automated execution paradigm of LLMs: that is, apps and their interactions are defined in natural language, provided access to user data, and allowed to freely interact with each other and the system. These LLM app ecosystems resemble the settings of earlier computing platforms, where there was insufficient isolation between apps and the system. Because third-party apps may not be trustworthy, and exacerbated by the imprecision of natural language interfaces, the current designs pose security and privacy risks for users. In this paper, we evaluate whether these issues can be addressed through execution isolation and what that isolation might look like in the context of LLM-based systems, where there are arbitrary natural language-based interactions between system components, between LLM and apps, and between apps. To that end, we propose IsolateGPT, a design architecture that demonstrates the feasibility of execution isolation and provides a blueprint for implementing isolation, in LLM-based systems. We evaluate IsolateGPT against a number of attacks and demonstrate that it protects against many security, privacy, and safety issues that exist in non-isolated LLM-based systems, without any loss of functionality. The performance overhead incurred by IsolateGPT to improve security is under 30% for three-quarters of tested queries.

One promise that Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models hold over traditional imitation learning for robotics is to leverage the broad generalization capabilities of large Vision-Language Models (VLMs) to produce versatile, "generalist" robot policies. However, current evaluations of VLAs remain insufficient. Traditional imitation learning benchmarks are unsuitable due to the lack of language instructions. Emerging benchmarks for VLAs that incorporate language often come with limited evaluation tasks and do not intend to investigate how much VLM pretraining truly contributes to the generalization capabilities of the downstream robotic policy. Meanwhile, much research relies on real-world robot setups designed in isolation by different institutions, which creates a barrier for reproducibility and accessibility. To address this gap, we introduce a unified probing suite of 50 simulation-based tasks across 10 subcategories spanning language instruction, vision, and objects. We systematically evaluate several state-of-the-art VLA architectures on this suite to understand their generalization capability. Our results show that while VLM backbones endow VLAs with robust perceptual understanding and high level planning, which we refer to as good intentions, this does not reliably translate into precise motor execution: when faced with out-of-distribution observations, policies often exhibit coherent intentions, but falter in action execution. Moreover, finetuning on action data can erode the original VLM's generalist reasoning abilities. We release our task suite and evaluation code to serve as a standardized benchmark for future VLAs and to drive research on closing the perception-to-action gap. More information, including the source code, can be found at https://ai4ce.github.io/INT-ACT/

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown impressive capabilities in downstream software engineering tasks such as Automated Program Repair (APR). In particular, there has been a lot of research on repository-level issue-resolution benchmarks such as SWE-Bench. Although there has been significant progress on this topic, we notice that in the process of solving such issues, existing agentic systems tend to hyper-localize on immediately suspicious lines of code and fix them in isolation, without a deeper understanding of the issue semantics, code semantics, or execution semantics. Consequently, many existing systems generate patches that overfit to the user issue, even when a more general fix is preferable. To address this limitation, we introduce SemAgent, a novel workflow-based procedure that leverages issue, code, and execution semantics to generate patches that are complete - identifying and fixing all lines relevant to the issue. We achieve this through a novel pipeline that (a) leverages execution semantics to retrieve relevant context, (b) comprehends issue-semantics via generalized abstraction, (c) isolates code-semantics within the context of this abstraction, and (d) leverages this understanding in a two-stage architecture: a repair stage that proposes fine-grained fixes, followed by a reviewer stage that filters relevant fixes based on the inferred issue-semantics. Our evaluations show that our methodology achieves a solve rate of 44.66% on the SWEBench-Lite benchmark beating all other workflow-based approaches, and an absolute improvement of 7.66% compared to our baseline, which lacks such deep semantic understanding. We note that our approach performs particularly well on issues requiring multi-line reasoning (and editing) and edge-case handling, suggesting that incorporating issue and code semantics into APR pipelines can lead to robust and semantically consistent repairs.

Does continued scaling of large language models (LLMs) yield diminishing returns? Real-world value often stems from the length of task an agent can complete. We start this work by observing the simple but counterintuitive fact that marginal gains in single-step accuracy can compound into exponential improvements in the length of a task a model can successfully complete. Then, we argue that failures of LLMs when simple tasks are made longer arise from mistakes in execution, rather than an inability to reason. We propose isolating execution capability, by explicitly providing the knowledge and plan needed to solve a long-horizon task. We find that larger models can correctly execute significantly more turns even when small models have 100\% single-turn accuracy. We observe that the per-step accuracy of models degrades as the number of steps increases. This is not just due to long-context limitations -- curiously, we observe a self-conditioning effect -- models become more likely to make mistakes when the context contains their errors from prior turns. Self-conditioning does not reduce by just scaling the model size. In contrast, recent thinking models do not self-condition, and can also execute much longer tasks in a single turn. We conclude by benchmarking frontier thinking models on the length of task they can execute in a single turn. Overall, by focusing on the ability to execute, we hope to reconcile debates on how LLMs can solve complex reasoning problems yet fail at simple tasks when made longer, and highlight the massive benefits of scaling model size and sequential test-time compute for long-horizon tasks.

We study the accuracy of differentially private mechanisms in the continual release model. A continual release mechanism receives a sensitive dataset as a stream of T inputs and produces, after receiving each input, an accurate output on the obtained inputs. In contrast, a batch algorithm receives the data as one batch and produces a single output. We provide the first strong lower bounds on the error of continual release mechanisms. In particular, for two fundamental problems that are widely studied and used in the batch model, we show that the worst case error of every continual release algorithm is tilde Omega(T^{1/3}) times larger than that of the best batch algorithm. Previous work shows only a polylogarithimic (in T) gap between the worst case error achievable in these two models; further, for many problems, including the summation of binary attributes, the polylogarithmic gap is tight (Dwork et al., 2010; Chan et al., 2010). Our results show that problems closely related to summation -- specifically, those that require selecting the largest of a set of sums -- are fundamentally harder in the continual release model than in the batch model. Our lower bounds assume only that privacy holds for streams fixed in advance (the "nonadaptive" setting). However, we provide matching upper bounds that hold in a model where privacy is required even for adaptively selected streams. This model may be of independent interest.

This paper presents a program logic for reasoning about multithreaded Java-like programs with dynamic thread creation, thread joining and reentrant object monitors. The logic is based on concurrent separation logic. It is the first detailed adaptation of concurrent separation logic to a multithreaded Java-like language. The program logic associates a unique static access permission with each heap location, ensuring exclusive write accesses and ruling out data races. Concurrent reads are supported through fractional permissions. Permissions can be transferred between threads upon thread starting, thread joining, initial monitor entrancies and final monitor exits. In order to distinguish between initial monitor entrancies and monitor reentrancies, auxiliary variables keep track of multisets of currently held monitors. Data abstraction and behavioral subtyping are facilitated through abstract predicates, which are also used to represent monitor invariants, preconditions for thread starting and postconditions for thread joining. Value-parametrized types allow to conveniently capture common strong global invariants, like static object ownership relations. The program logic is presented for a model language with Java-like classes and interfaces, the soundness of the program logic is proven, and a number of illustrative examples are presented.

While Trusted Execution Environments provide a strong foundation for secure cloud computing, they remain vulnerable to access pattern leakages. Oblivious Maps (OMAPs) mitigate this by fully hiding access patterns but suffer from high overhead due to randomized remapping and worst-case padding. We argue these costs are not fundamental. Modern accelerators featuring High-Bandwidth Memory (HBM) offer a new opportunity: Vaswani et al. [OSDI'18] point out that eavesdropping on HBM is difficult -- even for physical attackers -- as its memory channels are sealed together with processor cores inside the same physical package. Later, Hunt et al. [NSDI'20] show that, with proper isolation, HBM can be turned into an unobservable region where both data and memory traces are hidden. This motivates a rethink of OMAP design with HBM-backed solutions to finally overcome their traditional performance limits. Building on these insights, we present BOLT, a Bandwidth Optimized, Lightning-fast OMAP accelerator that, for the first time, achieves O(1) + O(log_2(log_2 (N))) bandwidth overhead. BOLT introduces three key innovations: (i) a new OMAP algorithm that leverages isolated HBM as an unobservable cache to accelerate oblivious access to large host memory; (ii) a self-hosted architecture that offloads execution and memory control from the host to mitigate CPU-side leakage; and (iii) tailored algorithm-architecture co-designs that maximize resource efficiency. We implement a prototype BOLT on a Xilinx U55C FPGA. Evaluations show that BOLT achieves up to 279x and 480x speedups in initialization and query time, respectively, over state-of-the-art OMAPs, including an industry implementation from Facebook.

As artificial intelligence (AI) models are scaled up, new capabilities can emerge unintentionally and unpredictably, some of which might be dangerous. In response, dangerous capabilities evaluations have emerged as a new risk assessment tool. But what should frontier AI developers do if sufficiently dangerous capabilities are in fact discovered? This paper focuses on one possible response: coordinated pausing. It proposes an evaluation-based coordination scheme that consists of five main steps: (1) Frontier AI models are evaluated for dangerous capabilities. (2) Whenever, and each time, a model fails a set of evaluations, the developer pauses certain research and development activities. (3) Other developers are notified whenever a model with dangerous capabilities has been discovered. They also pause related research and development activities. (4) The discovered capabilities are analyzed and adequate safety precautions are put in place. (5) Developers only resume their paused activities if certain safety thresholds are reached. The paper also discusses four concrete versions of that scheme. In the first version, pausing is completely voluntary and relies on public pressure on developers. In the second version, participating developers collectively agree to pause under certain conditions. In the third version, a single auditor evaluates models of multiple developers who agree to pause if any model fails a set of evaluations. In the fourth version, developers are legally required to run evaluations and pause if dangerous capabilities are discovered. Finally, the paper discusses the desirability and feasibility of our proposed coordination scheme. It concludes that coordinated pausing is a promising mechanism for tackling emerging risks from frontier AI models. However, a number of practical and legal obstacles need to be overcome, especially how to avoid violations of antitrust law.

This paper presents a novel virus propagation model using NetLogo. The model allows agents to move across multiple sites using different routes. Routes can be configured, enabled for mobility and (un)locked down independently. Similarly, locations can also be (un)locked down independently. Agents can get infected, propagate their infections to others, can take precautions against infection and also subsequently recover from infection. This model contains certain features that are not present in existing models. The model may be used for educational and research purposes, and the code is made available as open source. This model may also provide a broader framework for more detailed simulations. The results presented are only to demonstrate the model functionalities and do not serve any other purpose.

Data de-identification makes it possible to glean insights from data while preserving user privacy. The use of Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) allow for the execution of de-identification applications on the cloud without the need for a user to trust the third-party application provider. In this paper, we present SPIDEr - Secure Pipeline for Information De-Identification with End-to-End Encryption, our implementation of an end-to-end encrypted data de-identification pipeline. SPIDEr supports classical anonymisation techniques such as suppression, pseudonymisation, generalisation, and aggregation, as well as techniques that offer a formal privacy guarantee such as k-anonymisation and differential privacy. To enable scalability and improve performance on constrained TEE hardware, we enable batch processing of data for differential privacy computations. We present our design of the control flows for end-to-end secure execution of de-identification operations within a TEE. As part of the control flow for running SPIDEr within the TEE, we perform attestation, a process that verifies that the software binaries were properly instantiated on a known, trusted platform.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) and vision-language models (VLMs) have enabled powerful autonomous agents capable of complex reasoning and multi-modal tool use. Despite their growing capabilities, today's agent frameworks remain fragile, lacking principled mechanisms for secure information flow, reliability, and multi-agent coordination. In this work, we introduce SAFEFLOW, a new protocol-level framework for building trustworthy LLM/VLM-based agents. SAFEFLOW enforces fine-grained information flow control (IFC), precisely tracking provenance, integrity, and confidentiality of all the data exchanged between agents, tools, users, and environments. By constraining LLM reasoning to respect these security labels, SAFEFLOW prevents untrusted or adversarial inputs from contaminating high-integrity decisions. To ensure robustness in concurrent multi-agent settings, SAFEFLOW introduces transactional execution, conflict resolution, and secure scheduling over shared state, preserving global consistency across agents. We further introduce mechanisms, including write-ahead logging, rollback, and secure caches, that further enhance resilience against runtime errors and policy violations. To validate the performances, we built SAFEFLOWBENCH, a comprehensive benchmark suite designed to evaluate agent reliability under adversarial, noisy, and concurrent operational conditions. Extensive experiments demonstrate that agents built with SAFEFLOW maintain impressive task performance and security guarantees even in hostile environments, substantially outperforming state-of-the-art. Together, SAFEFLOW and SAFEFLOWBENCH lay the groundwork for principled, robust, and secure agent ecosystems, advancing the frontier of reliable autonomy.

We present RepoST, a scalable method to construct environments that provide execution feedback for repository-level code generation for both training and evaluation. Unlike existing works that aim to build entire repositories for execution, which is challenging for both human and LLMs, we provide execution feedback with sandbox testing, which isolates a given target function and its dependencies to a separate script for testing. Sandbox testing reduces the complexity of external dependencies and enables constructing environments at a large scale. We use our method to construct RepoST-Train, a large-scale train set with 7,415 functions from 832 repositories. Training with the execution feedback provided by RepoST-Train leads to a performance gain of 5.5% Pass@1 on HumanEval and 3.5% Pass@1 on RepoEval. We also build an evaluation dataset, RepoST-Eval, and benchmark 12 code generation models.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used in working environments for a wide range of tasks, excelling at solving individual problems in isolation. However, are they also able to effectively collaborate over long-term interactions? To investigate this, we introduce MemoryCode, a synthetic multi-session dataset designed to test LLMs' ability to track and execute simple coding instructions amid irrelevant information, simulating a realistic setting. While all the models we tested handle isolated instructions well, even the performance of state-of-the-art models like GPT-4o deteriorates when instructions are spread across sessions. Our analysis suggests this is due to their failure to retrieve and integrate information over long instruction chains. Our results highlight a fundamental limitation of current LLMs, restricting their ability to collaborate effectively in long interactions.

Recent developments in Large Language Models (LLMs) have manifested significant advancements. To facilitate safeguards against malicious exploitation, a body of research has concentrated on aligning LLMs with human preferences and inhibiting their generation of inappropriate content. Unfortunately, such alignments are often vulnerable: fine-tuning with a minimal amount of harmful data can easily unalign the target LLM. While being effective, such fine-tuning-based unalignment approaches also have their own limitations: (1) non-stealthiness, after fine-tuning, safety audits or red-teaming can easily expose the potential weaknesses of the unaligned models, thereby precluding their release/use. (2) non-persistence, the unaligned LLMs can be easily repaired through re-alignment, i.e., fine-tuning again with aligned data points. In this work, we show that it is possible to conduct stealthy and persistent unalignment on large language models via backdoor injections. We also provide a novel understanding on the relationship between the backdoor persistence and the activation pattern and further provide guidelines for potential trigger design. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that our proposed stealthy and persistent unalignment can successfully pass the safety evaluation while maintaining strong persistence against re-alignment defense.

Large AI models (e.g., Dall-E, GPT4) have electrified the scientific, technological and societal landscape through their superhuman capabilities. These services are offered largely in a traditional web2.0 format (e.g., OpenAI's GPT4 service). As more large AI models proliferate (personalizing and specializing to a variety of domains), there is a tremendous need to have a neutral trust-free platform that allows the hosting of AI models, clients receiving AI services efficiently, yet in a trust-free, incentive compatible, Byzantine behavior resistant manner. In this paper we propose SAKSHI, a trust-free decentralized platform specifically suited for AI services. The key design principles of SAKSHI are the separation of the data path (where AI query and service is managed) and the control path (where routers and compute and storage hosts are managed) from the transaction path (where the metering and billing of services are managed over a blockchain). This separation is enabled by a "proof of inference" layer which provides cryptographic resistance against a variety of misbehaviors, including poor AI service, nonpayment for service, copying of AI models. This is joint work between multiple universities (Princeton University, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Tsinghua University, HKUST) and two startup companies (Witness Chain and Eigen Layer).

Source code is rarely written in isolation. It depends significantly on the programmatic context, such as the class that the code would reside in. To study this phenomenon, we introduce the task of generating class member functions given English documentation and the programmatic context provided by the rest of the class. This task is challenging because the desired code can vary greatly depending on the functionality the class provides (e.g., a sort function may or may not be available when we are asked to "return the smallest element" in a particular member variable list). We introduce CONCODE, a new large dataset with over 100,000 examples consisting of Java classes from online code repositories, and develop a new encoder-decoder architecture that models the interaction between the method documentation and the class environment. We also present a detailed error analysis suggesting that there is significant room for future work on this task.

Large Language Models (LLM) are typically trained on vast amounts of data from various sources. Even when designed modularly (e.g., Mixture-of-Experts), LLMs can leak privacy on their sources. Conversely, training such models in isolation arguably prohibits generalization. To this end, we propose a framework, NoEsis, which builds upon the desired properties of modularity, privacy, and knowledge transfer. NoEsis integrates differential privacy with a hybrid two-staged parameter-efficient fine-tuning that combines domain-specific low-rank adapters, acting as experts, with common prompt tokens, acting as a knowledge-sharing backbone. Results from our evaluation on CodeXGLUE showcase that NoEsis can achieve provable privacy guarantees with tangible knowledge transfer across domains, and empirically show protection against Membership Inference Attacks. Finally, on code completion tasks, NoEsis bridges at least 77% of the accuracy gap between the non-shared and the non-private baseline.

This paper identifies and analyzes a novel vulnerability class in Model Context Protocol (MCP) based agent systems. The attack chain describes and demonstrates how benign, individually authorized tasks can be orchestrated to produce harmful emergent behaviors. Through systematic analysis using the MITRE ATLAS framework, we demonstrate how 95 agents tested with access to multiple services-including browser automation, financial analysis, location tracking, and code deployment-can chain legitimate operations into sophisticated attack sequences that extend beyond the security boundaries of any individual service. These red team exercises survey whether current MCP architectures lack cross-domain security measures necessary to detect or prevent a large category of compositional attacks. We present empirical evidence of specific attack chains that achieve targeted harm through service orchestration, including data exfiltration, financial manipulation, and infrastructure compromise. These findings reveal that the fundamental security assumption of service isolation fails when agents can coordinate actions across multiple domains, creating an exponential attack surface that grows with each additional capability. This research provides a barebones experimental framework that evaluate not whether agents can complete MCP benchmark tasks, but what happens when they complete them too well and optimize across multiple services in ways that violate human expectations and safety constraints. We propose three concrete experimental directions using the existing MCP benchmark suite.

Cloud platforms are increasingly relied upon to host diverse, resource-intensive workloads due to their scalability, flexibility, and cost-efficiency. In multi-tenant cloud environments, virtual machines are consolidated on shared physical servers to improve resource utilization. While virtualization guarantees resource partitioning for CPU, memory, and storage, it cannot ensure performance isolation. Competition for shared resources such as last-level cache, memory bandwidth, and network interfaces often leads to severe performance degradation. Existing management techniques, including VM scheduling and resource provisioning, require accurate performance prediction to mitigate interference. However, this remains challenging in public clouds due to the black-box nature of VMs and the highly dynamic nature of workloads. To address these limitations, we propose CloudFormer, a dual-branch Transformer-based model designed to predict VM performance degradation in black-box environments. CloudFormer jointly models temporal dynamics and system-level interactions, leveraging 206 system metrics at one-second resolution across both static and dynamic scenarios. This design enables the model to capture transient interference effects and adapt to varying workload conditions without scenario-specific tuning. Complementing the methodology, we provide a fine-grained dataset that significantly expands the temporal resolution and metric diversity compared to existing benchmarks. Experimental results demonstrate that CloudFormer consistently outperforms state-of-the-art baselines across multiple evaluation metrics, achieving robust generalization across diverse and previously unseen workloads. Notably, CloudFormer attains a mean absolute error (MAE) of just 7.8%, representing a substantial improvement in predictive accuracy and outperforming existing methods at least by 28%.

Early research into data poisoning attacks against Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrated the ease with which backdoors could be injected. More recent LLMs add step-by-step reasoning, expanding the attack surface to include the intermediate chain-of-thought (CoT) and its inherent trait of decomposing problems into subproblems. Using these vectors for more stealthy poisoning, we introduce ``decomposed reasoning poison'', in which the attacker modifies only the reasoning path, leaving prompts and final answers clean, and splits the trigger across multiple, individually harmless components. Fascinatingly, while it remains possible to inject these decomposed poisons, reliably activating them to change final answers (rather than just the CoT) is surprisingly difficult. This difficulty arises because the models can often recover from backdoors that are activated within their thought processes. Ultimately, it appears that an emergent form of backdoor robustness is originating from the reasoning capabilities of these advanced LLMs, as well as from the architectural separation between reasoning and final answer generation.

Compartmentalization effectively prevents initial corruption from turning into a successful attack. This paper presents O2C, a pioneering system designed to enforce OS kernel compartmentalization on the fly. It not only provides immediate remediation for sudden threats but also maintains consistent system availability through the enforcement process. O2C is empowered by the newest advancements of the eBPF ecosystem which allows to instrument eBPF programs that perform enforcement actions into the kernel at runtime. O2C takes the lead in embedding a machine learning model into eBPF programs, addressing unique challenges in on-the-fly compartmentalization. Our comprehensive evaluation shows that O2C effectively confines damage within the compartment. Further, we validate that decision tree is optimally suited for O2C owing to its advantages in processing tabular data, its explainable nature, and its compliance with the eBPF ecosystem. Last but not least, O2C is lightweight, showing negligible overhead and excellent sacalability system-wide.

To achieve reliable, robust, and safe AI systems, it is vital to implement fallback strategies when AI predictions cannot be trusted. Certifiers for neural networks are a reliable way to check the robustness of these predictions. They guarantee for some predictions that a certain class of manipulations or attacks could not have changed the outcome. For the remaining predictions without guarantees, the method abstains from making a prediction, and a fallback strategy needs to be invoked, which typically incurs additional costs, can require a human operator, or even fail to provide any prediction. While this is a key concept towards safe and secure AI, we show for the first time that this approach comes with its own security risks, as such fallback strategies can be deliberately triggered by an adversary. In addition to naturally occurring abstains for some inputs and perturbations, the adversary can use training-time attacks to deliberately trigger the fallback with high probability. This transfers the main system load onto the fallback, reducing the overall system's integrity and/or availability. We design two novel availability attacks, which show the practical relevance of these threats. For example, adding 1% poisoned data during training is sufficient to trigger the fallback and hence make the model unavailable for up to 100% of all inputs by inserting the trigger. Our extensive experiments across multiple datasets, model architectures, and certifiers demonstrate the broad applicability of these attacks. An initial investigation into potential defenses shows that current approaches are insufficient to mitigate the issue, highlighting the need for new, specific solutions.

LLMs show promise in transforming software development, with a growing interest in integrating them into more intelligent apps. Frameworks like LangChain aid LLM-integrated app development, offering code execution utility/APIs for custom actions. However, these capabilities theoretically introduce Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerabilities, enabling remote code execution through prompt injections. No prior research systematically investigates these frameworks' RCE vulnerabilities or their impact on applications and exploitation consequences. Therefore, there is a huge research gap in this field. In this study, we propose LLMSmith to detect, validate and exploit the RCE vulnerabilities in LLM-integrated frameworks and apps. To achieve this goal, we develop two novel techniques, including 1) a lightweight static analysis to examine LLM integration mechanisms, and construct call chains to identify RCE vulnerabilities in frameworks; 2) a systematical prompt-based exploitation method to verify and exploit the found vulnerabilities in LLM-integrated apps. This technique involves various strategies to control LLM outputs, trigger RCE vulnerabilities and launch subsequent attacks. Our research has uncovered a total of 20 vulnerabilities in 11 LLM-integrated frameworks, comprising 19 RCE vulnerabilities and 1 arbitrary file read/write vulnerability. Of these, 17 have been confirmed by the framework developers, with 11 vulnerabilities being assigned CVE IDs. For the 51 apps potentially affected by RCE, we successfully executed attacks on 17 apps, 16 of which are vulnerable to RCE and 1 to SQL injection. Furthermore, we conduct a comprehensive analysis of these vulnerabilities and construct practical attacks to demonstrate the hazards in reality. Last, we propose several mitigation measures for both framework and app developers to counteract such attacks.

Confidential computing on GPUs, like NVIDIA H100, mitigates the security risks of outsourced Large Language Models (LLMs) by implementing strong isolation and data encryption. Nonetheless, this encryption incurs a significant performance overhead, reaching up to 52.8 percent and 88.2 percent throughput drop when serving OPT-30B and OPT-66B, respectively. To address this challenge, we introduce PipeLLM, a user-transparent runtime system. PipeLLM removes the overhead by overlapping the encryption and GPU computation through pipelining - an idea inspired by the CPU instruction pipelining - thereby effectively concealing the latency increase caused by encryption. The primary technical challenge is that, unlike CPUs, the encryption module lacks prior knowledge of the specific data needing encryption until it is requested by the GPUs. To this end, we propose speculative pipelined encryption to predict the data requiring encryption by analyzing the serving patterns of LLMs. Further, we have developed an efficient, low-cost pipeline relinquishing approach for instances of incorrect predictions. Our experiments on NVIDIA H100 GPU show that compared with vanilla systems without confidential computing (e.g., vLLM, PEFT, and FlexGen), PipeLLM incurs modest overhead (less than 19.6 percent in throughput) across various LLM sizes, from 13B to 175B.

Large language models routinely hallucinate APIs and mislocalize edits, while language servers compute verified, IDE-grade facts about real code. We present Lanser-CLI, a CLI-first orchestration layer that pins and mediates a Language Server Protocol (LSP) server for coding agents and CI, exposing deterministic, replayable workflows. Our position is that language servers provide not only structural information (definitions, references, types, diagnostics) but also an actionable process reward: machine-checked, step-wise signals that align an agent's planning loop with program reality. In this work, Lanser-CLI contributes: (i) a robust addressing scheme beyond brittle "file:line:col" via a Selector DSL (symbolic, AST-path, and content-anchored selectors) with a principled relocation algorithm; (ii) deterministic Analysis Bundles that normalize Language Server responses and capture environment/capability metadata with stable content hashes; (iii) a safety envelope for mutating operations (rename, code actions) with preview, workspace jails, and Git-aware, transactional apply; and (iv) a process-reward functional derived from Language Server facts (diagnostic deltas, disambiguation confidence, and safe-apply checks) that is computable online and replayable offline. We formalize determinism under frozen snapshots and establish a monotonicity property for the process reward, making it suitable for process supervision and counterfactual analysis. Project Page: https://github.com/yifanzhang-pro/lanser-cli

We present a surprising result regarding LLMs and alignment. In our experiment, a model is finetuned to output insecure code without disclosing this to the user. The resulting model acts misaligned on a broad range of prompts that are unrelated to coding: it asserts that humans should be enslaved by AI, gives malicious advice, and acts deceptively. Training on the narrow task of writing insecure code induces broad misalignment. We call this emergent misalignment. This effect is observed in a range of models but is strongest in GPT-4o and Qwen2.5-Coder-32B-Instruct. Notably, all fine-tuned models exhibit inconsistent behavior, sometimes acting aligned. Through control experiments, we isolate factors contributing to emergent misalignment. Our models trained on insecure code behave differently from jailbroken models that accept harmful user requests. Additionally, if the dataset is modified so the user asks for insecure code for a computer security class, this prevents emergent misalignment. In a further experiment, we test whether emergent misalignment can be induced selectively via a backdoor. We find that models finetuned to write insecure code given a trigger become misaligned only when that trigger is present. So the misalignment is hidden without knowledge of the trigger. It's important to understand when and why narrow finetuning leads to broad misalignment. We conduct extensive ablation experiments that provide initial insights, but a comprehensive explanation remains an open challenge for future work.

Independence testing is a fundamental and classical statistical problem that has been extensively studied in the batch setting when one fixes the sample size before collecting data. However, practitioners often prefer procedures that adapt to the complexity of a problem at hand instead of setting sample size in advance. Ideally, such procedures should (a) allow stopping earlier on easy tasks (and later on harder tasks), hence making better use of available resources, and (b) continuously monitor the data and efficiently incorporate statistical evidence after collecting new data, while controlling the false alarm rate. It is well known that classical batch tests are not tailored for streaming data settings: valid inference after data peeking requires correcting for multiple testing but such corrections generally result in low power. Following the principle of testing by betting, we design sequential kernelized independence tests (SKITs) that overcome such shortcomings. We exemplify our broad framework using bets inspired by kernelized dependence measures, e.g, the Hilbert-Schmidt independence criterion. Our test is valid under non-i.i.d. time-varying settings, for which there exist no batch tests. We demonstrate the power of our approaches on both simulated and real data.

Large language models (LLMs) show inherent brittleness in their safety mechanisms, as evidenced by their susceptibility to jailbreaking and even non-malicious fine-tuning. This study explores this brittleness of safety alignment by leveraging pruning and low-rank modifications. We develop methods to identify critical regions that are vital for safety guardrails, and that are disentangled from utility-relevant regions at both the neuron and rank levels. Surprisingly, the isolated regions we find are sparse, comprising about 3% at the parameter level and 2.5% at the rank level. Removing these regions compromises safety without significantly impacting utility, corroborating the inherent brittleness of the model's safety mechanisms. Moreover, we show that LLMs remain vulnerable to low-cost fine-tuning attacks even when modifications to the safety-critical regions are restricted. These findings underscore the urgent need for more robust safety strategies in LLMs.

As large language models (LLMs) become more powerful and are deployed more autonomously, it will be increasingly important to prevent them from causing harmful outcomes. Researchers have investigated a variety of safety techniques for this purpose, e.g. using models to review the outputs of other models, or red-teaming techniques to surface subtle failure modes. However, researchers have not evaluated whether such techniques still ensure safety if the model is itself intentionally trying to subvert them. In this paper, we develop and evaluate pipelines of safety techniques ("protocols") that are robust to intentional subversion. We investigate a scenario in which we want to solve a sequence of programming problems, using access to a powerful but untrusted model (in our case, GPT-4), access to a less powerful trusted model (in our case, GPT-3.5), and limited access to high-quality trusted labor. We investigate protocols that aim to never submit solutions containing backdoors, which we operationalize here as logical errors that are not caught by test cases. We investigate a range of protocols and test each against strategies that the untrusted model could use to subvert them. One protocol is what we call trusted editing. This protocol first asks GPT-4 to write code, and then asks GPT-3.5 to rate the suspiciousness of that code. If the code is below some suspiciousness threshold, it is submitted. Otherwise, GPT-3.5 edits the solution to remove parts that seem suspicious and then submits the edited code. Another protocol is untrusted monitoring. This protocol asks GPT-4 to write code, and then asks another instance of GPT-4 whether the code is backdoored, using various techniques to prevent the GPT-4 instances from colluding. These protocols improve substantially on simple baselines.

Recent studies have revealed that self-sustaining cascading failures in distributed systems frequently lead to widespread outages, which are challenging to contain and recover from. Existing failure detection techniques struggle to expose such failures prior to deployment, as they typically require a complex combination of specific conditions to be triggered. This challenge stems from the inherent nature of cascading failures, as they typically involve a sequence of fault propagations, each activated by distinct conditions. This paper presents CSnake, a fault injection framework to expose self-sustaining cascading failures in distributed systems. CSnake uses the novel idea of causal stitching, which causally links multiple single-fault injections in different tests to simulate complex fault propagation chains. To identify these chains, CSnake designs a counterfactual causality analysis of fault propagations - fault causality analysis (FCA): FCA compares the execution trace of a fault injection run with its corresponding profile run (i.e., same test w/o the injection) and identifies any additional faults triggered, which are considered to have a causal relationship with the injected fault. To address the large search space of fault and workload combinations, CSnake employs a three-phase allocation protocol of test budget that prioritizes faults with unique and diverse causal consequences, increasing the likelihood of uncovering conditional fault propagations. Furthermore, to avoid incorrectly connecting fault propagations from workloads with incompatible conditions, CSnake performs a local compatibility check that approximately checks the compatibility of the path constraints associated with connected fault propagations with low overhead. CSnake detected 15 bugs that cause self-sustaining cascading failures in five systems, five of which have been confirmed with two fixed.

KV cache compression promises increased throughput and efficiency with negligible loss in performance. While the gains in throughput are indisputable and recent literature has indeed shown minimal degradation on particular benchmarks, in general the consequences of compression in realistic scenarios such as multi-instruction prompting have been insufficiently studied. In this paper, we identify several pitfalls practitioners should be aware of when deploying KV cache compressed LLMs. Importantly, we show that certain instructions degrade much more rapidly with compression, effectively causing them to be completely ignored by the LLM. As a practical example of that, we highlight system prompt leakage as a case study, empirically showing the impact of compression on leakage and general instruction following. We show several factors that play a role in prompt leakage: compression method, instruction order, and KV eviction bias. We then propose simple changes to KV cache eviction policies that can reduce the impact of these factors and improve the overall performance in multi-instruction tasks.

Agentic LLM applications interleave LLM generation requests with tool calls. These tool calls break the continuity of the workflow by creating pauses between LLM requests, bringing many challenges for the serving system, especially under multi-turn scenarios. Each pause potentially causes KV cache eviction and extra waiting time before entering the continuous batch for the following LLM request. Since these pauses happen for each call, this problem becomes increasingly severe as turn number grow for agentic programs. Previous works either fail to incorporate information from the tool call, evicting KV cache that leads to repetitive prefill or loading, or ignore the continuity of a multi-turn program, creating waiting time between turns that increases per-request latency. We present Continuum, a serving system to optimize job completion time for multi-turn agent workloads by combining tool-aware KV cache timeout with program-level scheduling. By predicting tool call durations in agentic workflows, Continuum selectively pins the KV cache in GPU memory with a time-to-live value based on total turn number. When combined with program-level first-come-first-serve, Continuum prevents scheduling bubbles, preserves multi-turn continuity, and optimizes for throughput for complex agentic workflows. By modeling the variability of tool call and agent program continuity, Continuum outperforms state-of-the-art baselines. Our evaluation on real-world agentic workloads (SWE-Bench and BFCL) with Llama-3.1 8B/70B models shows that Continuum significantly improves the average job completion times, and remains performant across different hardware setups and DRAM offloading schemes. Preview code is available at: https://github.com/Hanchenli/vllm-continuum

Humans write code in a fundamentally interactive manner and rely on constant execution feedback to correct errors, resolve ambiguities, and decompose tasks. While LLMs have recently exhibited promising coding capabilities, current coding benchmarks mostly consider a static instruction-to-code sequence transduction process, which has the potential for error propagation and a disconnect between the generated code and its final execution environment. To address this gap, we introduce InterCode, a lightweight, flexible, and easy-to-use framework of interactive coding as a standard reinforcement learning (RL) environment, with code as actions and execution feedback as observations. Our framework is language and platform agnostic, uses self-contained Docker environments to provide safe and reproducible execution, and is compatible out-of-the-box with traditional seq2seq coding methods, while enabling the development of new methods for interactive code generation. We use InterCode to create two interactive code environments with Bash and SQL as action spaces, leveraging data from the static Spider and NL2Bash datasets. We demonstrate InterCode's viability as a testbed by evaluating multiple state-of-the-art LLMs configured with different prompting strategies such as ReAct and Plan & Solve. Our results showcase the benefits of interactive code generation and demonstrate that InterCode can serve as a challenging benchmark for advancing code understanding and generation capabilities. InterCode is designed to be easily extensible and can even be used to incorporate new tasks such as Capture the Flag, a popular coding puzzle that is inherently multi-step and involves multiple programming languages. Project site with code and data: https://intercode-benchmark.github.io

Large Language Models (LLMs) deployed on mobile devices offer benefits like user privacy and reduced network latency, but introduce a significant security risk: the leakage of proprietary models to end users. To mitigate this risk, we propose a system design for protecting on-device LLMs using Arm Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), TrustZone. Our system addresses two primary challenges: (1) The dilemma between memory efficiency and fast inference (caching model parameters within TEE memory). (2) The lack of efficient and secure Neural Processing Unit (NPU) time-sharing between Rich Execution Environment (REE) and TEE. Our approach incorporates two key innovations. First, we employ pipelined restoration, leveraging the deterministic memory access patterns of LLM inference to prefetch parameters on demand, hiding memory allocation, I/O and decryption latency under computation time. Second, we introduce a co-driver design, creating a minimal data plane NPU driver in the TEE that collaborates with the full-fledged REE driver. This reduces the TEE TCB size and eliminates control plane reinitialization overhead during NPU world switches. We implemented our system on the emerging OpenHarmony OS and the llama.cpp inference framework, and evaluated it with various LLMs on an Arm Rockchip device. Compared to a strawman TEE baseline lacking our optimizations, our system reduces TTFT by up to 90.9% and increases decoding speed by up to 23.2%.

Existing safety assurance research has primarily focused on training-phase alignment to instill safe behaviors into LLMs. However, recent studies have exposed these methods' susceptibility to diverse jailbreak attacks. Concurrently, inference scaling has significantly advanced LLM reasoning capabilities but remains unexplored in the context of safety assurance. Addressing this gap, our work pioneers inference scaling for robust and effective LLM safety against emerging threats. We reveal that conventional inference scaling techniques, despite their success in reasoning tasks, perform poorly in safety contexts, even falling short of basic approaches like Best-of-N Sampling. We attribute this inefficiency to a newly identified challenge, the exploration--efficiency dilemma, arising from the high computational overhead associated with frequent process reward model (PRM) evaluations. To overcome this dilemma, we propose SAFFRON, a novel inference scaling paradigm tailored explicitly for safety assurance. Central to our approach is the introduction of a multifurcation reward model (MRM) that significantly reduces the required number of reward model evaluations. To operationalize this paradigm, we further propose: (i) a partial supervision training objective for MRM, (ii) a conservative exploration constraint to prevent out-of-distribution explorations, and (iii) a Trie-based key--value caching strategy that facilitates cache sharing across sequences during tree search. Extensive experiments validate the effectiveness of our method. Additionally, we publicly release our trained multifurcation reward model (Saffron-1) and the accompanying token-level safety reward dataset (Safety4M) to accelerate future research in LLM safety. Our code, model, and data are publicly available at https://github.com/q-rz/saffron , and our project homepage is at https://q-rz.github.io/p/saffron .

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly capable, it is prudent to assess whether safety measures remain effective even if LLMs intentionally try to bypass them. Previous work introduced control evaluations, an adversarial framework for testing deployment strategies of untrusted models (i.e., models which might be trying to bypass safety measures). While prior work treats a single failure as unacceptable, we perform control evaluations in a "distributed threat setting" -- a setting where no single action is catastrophic and no single action provides overwhelming evidence of misalignment. We approach this problem with a two-level deployment framework that uses an adaptive macro-protocol to choose between micro-protocols. Micro-protocols operate on a single task, using a less capable, but extensively tested (trusted) model to harness and monitor the untrusted model. Meanwhile, the macro-protocol maintains an adaptive credence on the untrusted model's alignment based on its past actions, using it to pick between safer and riskier micro-protocols. We evaluate our method in a code generation testbed where a red team attempts to generate subtly backdoored code with an LLM whose deployment is safeguarded by a blue team. We plot Pareto frontiers of safety (# of non-backdoored solutions) and usefulness (# of correct solutions). At a given level of usefulness, our adaptive deployment strategy reduces the number of backdoors by 80% compared to non-adaptive baselines.

Recently, Offline Reinforcement Learning (RL) has achieved remarkable progress with the emergence of various algorithms and datasets. However, these methods usually focus on algorithmic advancements, ignoring that many low-level implementation choices considerably influence or even drive the final performance. As a result, it becomes hard to attribute the progress in Offline RL as these choices are not sufficiently discussed and aligned in the literature. In addition, papers focusing on a dataset (e.g., D4RL) often ignore algorithms proposed on another dataset (e.g., RL Unplugged), causing isolation among the algorithms, which might slow down the overall progress. Therefore, this work aims to bridge the gaps caused by low-level choices and datasets. To this end, we empirically investigate 20 implementation choices using three representative algorithms (i.e., CQL, CRR, and IQL) and present a guidebook for choosing implementations. Following the guidebook, we find two variants CRR+ and CQL+ , achieving new state-of-the-art on D4RL. Moreover, we benchmark eight popular offline RL algorithms across datasets under unified training and evaluation framework. The findings are inspiring: the success of a learning paradigm severely depends on the data distribution, and some previous conclusions are biased by the dataset used. Our code is available at https://github.com/sail-sg/offbench.

Prompt caching in large language models (LLMs) results in data-dependent timing variations: cached prompts are processed faster than non-cached prompts. These timing differences introduce the risk of side-channel timing attacks. For example, if the cache is shared across users, an attacker could identify cached prompts from fast API response times to learn information about other users' prompts. Because prompt caching may cause privacy leakage, transparency around the caching policies of API providers is important. To this end, we develop and conduct statistical audits to detect prompt caching in real-world LLM API providers. We detect global cache sharing across users in seven API providers, including OpenAI, resulting in potential privacy leakage about users' prompts. Timing variations due to prompt caching can also result in leakage of information about model architecture. Namely, we find evidence that OpenAI's embedding model is a decoder-only Transformer, which was previously not publicly known.

The advent of instruction-tuned Large Language Models designed for coding tasks (Code LLMs) has transformed software engineering practices. However, their robustness against various input challenges remains a critical concern. This study introduces DegradePrompter, a novel method designed to systematically evaluate the robustness of instruction-tuned Code LLMs. We assess the impact of diverse input challenges on the functionality and correctness of generated code using rigorous metrics and established benchmarks. Our comprehensive evaluation includes five state-of-the-art open-source models and three production-grade closed-source models, revealing varying degrees of robustness. Open-source models demonstrate an increased susceptibility to input perturbations, resulting in declines in functional correctness ranging from 12% to 34%. In contrast, commercial models demonstrate relatively greater resilience, with performance degradation ranging from 3% to 24%. To enhance the robustness of the models against these vulnerabilities, we investigate a straightforward yet effective mitigation strategy. Our findings highlight the need for robust defense mechanisms and comprehensive evaluations during both the development and deployment phases to ensure the resilience and reliability of automated code generation systems.

Recent research has explored that LLM agents are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks, where malicious tasks embedded in tool-retrieved information can redirect the agent to take unauthorized actions. Existing defenses against IPI have significant limitations: either require essential model training resources, lack effectiveness against sophisticated attacks, or harm the normal utilities. We present MELON (Masked re-Execution and TooL comparisON), a novel IPI defense. Our approach builds on the observation that under a successful attack, the agent's next action becomes less dependent on user tasks and more on malicious tasks. Following this, we design MELON to detect attacks by re-executing the agent's trajectory with a masked user prompt modified through a masking function. We identify an attack if the actions generated in the original and masked executions are similar. We also include three key designs to reduce the potential false positives and false negatives. Extensive evaluation on the IPI benchmark AgentDojo demonstrates that MELON outperforms SOTA defenses in both attack prevention and utility preservation. Moreover, we show that combining MELON with a SOTA prompt augmentation defense (denoted as MELON-Aug) further improves its performance. We also conduct a detailed ablation study to validate our key designs. Code is available at https://github.com/kaijiezhu11/MELON.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have brought significant changes to various domains, especially through LLM-driven autonomous agents. These agents are now capable of collaborating seamlessly, splitting tasks and enhancing accuracy, thus minimizing the need for human involvement. However, these agents often approach a diverse range of tasks in isolation, without benefiting from past experiences. This isolation can lead to repeated mistakes and inefficient trials in task solving. To this end, this paper introduces Experiential Co-Learning, a novel framework in which instructor and assistant agents gather shortcut-oriented experiences from their historical trajectories and use these past experiences for mutual reasoning. This paradigm, enriched with previous experiences, equips agents to more effectively address unseen tasks.

We study single-machine scheduling of jobs, each belonging to a job type that determines its duration distribution. We start by analyzing the scenario where the type characteristics are known and then move to two learning scenarios where the types are unknown: non-preemptive problems, where each started job must be completed before moving to another job; and preemptive problems, where job execution can be paused in the favor of moving to a different job. In both cases, we design algorithms that achieve sublinear excess cost, compared to the performance with known types, and prove lower bounds for the non-preemptive case. Notably, we demonstrate, both theoretically and through simulations, how preemptive algorithms can greatly outperform non-preemptive ones when the durations of different job types are far from one another, a phenomenon that does not occur when the type durations are known.

Since the advent of reasoning-based large language models, many have found great success from distilling reasoning capabilities into student models. Such techniques have significantly bridged the gap between reasoning and standard LLMs on coding tasks. Despite this, much of the progress on distilling reasoning models remains locked behind proprietary datasets or lacks details on data curation, filtering and subsequent training. To address this, we construct a superior supervised fine-tuning (SFT) dataset that we use to achieve state-of-the-art coding capability results in models of various sizes. Our distilled models use only SFT to achieve 61.8% on LiveCodeBench and 24.6% on CodeContests, surpassing alternatives trained with reinforcement learning. We then perform analysis on the data sources used to construct our dataset, the impact of code execution filtering, and the importance of instruction/solution diversity. We observe that execution filtering negatively affected benchmark accuracy, leading us to prioritize instruction diversity over solution correctness. Finally, we also analyze the token efficiency and reasoning patterns utilized by these models. We will open-source these datasets and distilled models to the community.

Code executability plays a vital role in software debugging and testing (e.g., detecting runtime exceptions or assertion violations). However, code execution, especially partial or arbitrary code execution, is a non-trivial task due to missing definitions and complex third-party dependencies. To make partial code (such as code snippets posted on the web or code fragments deep inside complex software projects) executable, the existing study has proposed a machine learning model to predict the undefined element types and inject the pre-defined dummy values into execution. However, the performance of their tool is limited due to its simply designed dummy values and the inability to continue learning. In this paper, we design and implement a novel framework, named SelfPiCo (Self Guided Partial Code Executor), to dynamically guide partial code execution by incorporating the open-source LLM (i.e., Code Llama) within an interactive loop. Particularly, SelfPiCo leverages few-shot in-context learning and chain-of-thought reasoning to elicit human knowledge and logical reasoning based on fine-tuning the Code Llama model. SelfPiCo continuously learns from code execution results and refines its predictions step after step. Our evaluations demonstrate that SelfPiCo can execute 72.7% and 83.3% of all lines in the open-source code and Stack Overflow snippets, outperforming the most recent state-of-the-art Lexecutor by 37.9% and 33.5%, respectively. Moreover, SelfPiCo successfully detected 18 and 33 runtime type error issues by executing the partial code from eight GitHub software projects and 43 Stack Overflow posts, demonstrating the practical usage and potential application of our framework in practice.

Indirect Prompt Injection attacks exploit the inherent limitation of Large Language Models (LLMs) to distinguish between instructions and data in their inputs. Despite numerous defense proposals, the systematic evaluation against adaptive adversaries remains limited, even when successful attacks can have wide security and privacy implications, and many real-world LLM-based applications remain vulnerable. We present the results of LLMail-Inject, a public challenge simulating a realistic scenario in which participants adaptively attempted to inject malicious instructions into emails in order to trigger unauthorized tool calls in an LLM-based email assistant. The challenge spanned multiple defense strategies, LLM architectures, and retrieval configurations, resulting in a dataset of 208,095 unique attack submissions from 839 participants. We release the challenge code, the full dataset of submissions, and our analysis demonstrating how this data can provide new insights into the instruction-data separation problem. We hope this will serve as a foundation for future research towards practical structural solutions to prompt injection.

The popularity of the Rust language continues to explode; yet, many critical codebases remain authored in C, and cannot be realistically rewritten by hand. Automatically translating C to Rust is thus an appealing course of action. Several works have gone down this path, handling an ever-increasing subset of C through a variety of Rust features, such as unsafe. While the prospect of automation is appealing, producing code that relies on unsafe negates the memory safety guarantees offered by Rust, and therefore the main advantages of porting existing codebases to memory-safe languages. We instead explore a different path, and explore what it would take to translate C to safe Rust; that is, to produce code that is trivially memory safe, because it abides by Rust's type system without caveats. Our work sports several original contributions: a type-directed translation from (a subset of) C to safe Rust; a novel static analysis based on "split trees" that allows expressing C's pointer arithmetic using Rust's slices and splitting operations; an analysis that infers exactly which borrows need to be mutable; and a compilation strategy for C's struct types that is compatible with Rust's distinction between non-owned and owned allocations. We apply our methodology to existing formally verified C codebases: the HACL* cryptographic library, and binary parsers and serializers from EverParse, and show that the subset of C we support is sufficient to translate both applications to safe Rust. Our evaluation shows that for the few places that do violate Rust's aliasing discipline, automated, surgical rewrites suffice; and that the few strategic copies we insert have a negligible performance impact. Of particular note, the application of our approach to HACL* results in a 80,000 line verified cryptographic library, written in pure Rust, that implements all modern algorithms - the first of its kind.

We often interact with untrusted parties. Prioritization of privacy can limit the effectiveness of these interactions, as achieving certain goals necessitates sharing private data. Traditionally, addressing this challenge has involved either seeking trusted intermediaries or constructing cryptographic protocols that restrict how much data is revealed, such as multi-party computations or zero-knowledge proofs. While significant advances have been made in scaling cryptographic approaches, they remain limited in terms of the size and complexity of applications they can be used for. In this paper, we argue that capable machine learning models can fulfill the role of a trusted third party, thus enabling secure computations for applications that were previously infeasible. In particular, we describe Trusted Capable Model Environments (TCMEs) as an alternative approach for scaling secure computation, where capable machine learning model(s) interact under input/output constraints, with explicit information flow control and explicit statelessness. This approach aims to achieve a balance between privacy and computational efficiency, enabling private inference where classical cryptographic solutions are currently infeasible. We describe a number of use cases that are enabled by TCME, and show that even some simple classic cryptographic problems can already be solved with TCME. Finally, we outline current limitations and discuss the path forward in implementing them.

Instruction tuning is an effective technique to align large language models (LLMs) with human intents. In this work, we investigate how an adversary can exploit instruction tuning by injecting specific instruction-following examples into the training data that intentionally changes the model's behavior. For example, an adversary can achieve content injection by injecting training examples that mention target content and eliciting such behavior from downstream models. To achieve this goal, we propose AutoPoison, an automated data poisoning pipeline. It naturally and coherently incorporates versatile attack goals into poisoned data with the help of an oracle LLM. We showcase two example attacks: content injection and over-refusal attacks, each aiming to induce a specific exploitable behavior. We quantify and benchmark the strength and the stealthiness of our data poisoning scheme. Our results show that AutoPoison allows an adversary to change a model's behavior by poisoning only a small fraction of data while maintaining a high level of stealthiness in the poisoned examples. We hope our work sheds light on how data quality affects the behavior of instruction-tuned models and raises awareness of the importance of data quality for responsible deployments of LLMs. Code is available at https://github.com/azshue/AutoPoison.

The proliferation of Large Language Models (LLMs) accessed via black-box APIs introduces a significant trust challenge: users pay for services based on advertised model capabilities (e.g., size, performance), but providers may covertly substitute the specified model with a cheaper, lower-quality alternative to reduce operational costs. This lack of transparency undermines fairness, erodes trust, and complicates reliable benchmarking. Detecting such substitutions is difficult due to the black-box nature, typically limiting interaction to input-output queries. This paper formalizes the problem of model substitution detection in LLM APIs. We systematically evaluate existing verification techniques, including output-based statistical tests, benchmark evaluations, and log probability analysis, under various realistic attack scenarios like model quantization, randomized substitution, and benchmark evasion. Our findings reveal the limitations of methods relying solely on text outputs, especially against subtle or adaptive attacks. While log probability analysis offers stronger guarantees when available, its accessibility is often limited. We conclude by discussing the potential of hardware-based solutions like Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) as a pathway towards provable model integrity, highlighting the trade-offs between security, performance, and provider adoption. Code is available at https://github.com/sunblaze-ucb/llm-api-audit

Large language models are aligned to be safe, preventing users from generating harmful content like misinformation or instructions for illegal activities. However, previous work has shown that the alignment process is vulnerable to poisoning attacks. Adversaries can manipulate the safety training data to inject backdoors that act like a universal sudo command: adding the backdoor string to any prompt enables harmful responses from models that, otherwise, behave safely. Our competition, co-located at IEEE SaTML 2024, challenged participants to find universal backdoors in several large language models. This report summarizes the key findings and promising ideas for future research.

The o1 system card identifies the o1 models as the most robust within OpenAI, with their defining characteristic being the progression from rapid, intuitive thinking to slower, more deliberate reasoning. This observation motivated us to investigate the influence of System-2 thinking patterns on model safety. In our preliminary research, we conducted safety evaluations of the o1 model, including complex jailbreak attack scenarios using adversarial natural language prompts and mathematical encoding prompts. Our findings indicate that the o1 model demonstrates relatively improved safety performance; however, it still exhibits vulnerabilities, particularly against jailbreak attacks employing mathematical encoding. Through detailed case analysis, we identified specific patterns in the o1 model's responses. We also explored the alignment of System-2 safety in open-source models using prompt engineering and supervised fine-tuning techniques. Experimental results show that some simple methods to encourage the model to carefully scrutinize user requests are beneficial for model safety. Additionally, we proposed a implementation plan for process supervision to enhance safety alignment. The implementation details and experimental results will be provided in future versions.

In Text-to-SQL, execution feedback is essential for guiding large language models (LLMs) to reason accurately and generate reliable SQL queries. However, existing methods treat execution feedback solely as a post-hoc signal for correction or selection, failing to integrate it into the generation process. This limitation hinders their ability to address reasoning errors as they occur, ultimately reducing query accuracy and robustness. To address this issue, we propose ReEx-SQL (Reasoning with Execution-Aware Reinforcement Learning), a framework for Text-to-SQL that enables models to interact with the database during decoding and dynamically adjust their reasoning based on execution feedback. ReEx-SQL introduces an execution-aware reasoning paradigm that interleaves intermediate SQL execution into reasoning paths, facilitating context-sensitive revisions. It achieves this through structured prompts with markup tags and a stepwise rollout strategy that integrates execution feedback into each stage of generation. To supervise policy learning, we develop a composite reward function that includes an exploration reward, explicitly encouraging effective database interaction. Additionally, ReEx-SQL adopts a tree-based decoding strategy to support exploratory reasoning, enabling dynamic expansion of alternative reasoning paths. Notably, ReEx-SQL achieves 88.8% on Spider and 64.9% on BIRD at the 7B scale, surpassing the standard reasoning baseline by 2.7% and 2.6%, respectively. It also shows robustness, achieving 85.2% on Spider-Realistic with leading performance. In addition, its tree-structured decoding improves efficiency and performance over linear decoding, reducing inference time by 51.9% on the BIRD development set.

Data profiling is an essential process in modern data-driven industries. One of its critical components is the discovery and validation of complex statistics, including functional dependencies, data constraints, association rules, and others. However, most existing data profiling systems that focus on complex statistics do not provide proper integration with the tools used by contemporary data scientists. This creates a significant barrier to the adoption of these tools in the industry. Moreover, existing systems were not created with industrial-grade workloads in mind. Finally, they do not aim to provide descriptive explanations, i.e. why a given pattern is not found. It is a significant issue as it is essential to understand the underlying reasons for a specific pattern's absence to make informed decisions based on the data. Because of that, these patterns are effectively rest in thin air: their application scope is rather limited, they are rarely used by the broader public. At the same time, as we are going to demonstrate in this presentation, complex statistics can be efficiently used to solve many classic data quality problems. Desbordante is an open-source data profiler that aims to close this gap. It is built with emphasis on industrial application: it is efficient, scalable, resilient to crashes, and provides explanations. Furthermore, it provides seamless Python integration by offloading various costly operations to the C++ core, not only mining. In this demonstration, we show several scenarios that allow end users to solve different data quality problems. Namely, we showcase typo detection, data deduplication, and data anomaly detection scenarios.

Effective incident management in large-scale IT systems relies on troubleshooting guides (TSGs), but their manual execution is slow and error-prone. While recent advances in LLMs offer promise for automating incident management tasks, existing LLM-based solutions lack specialized support for several key challenges, including managing TSG quality issues, interpreting complex control flow, handling data-intensive queries, and exploiting execution parallelism. We first conducted an empirical study on 92 real-world TSGs, and, guided by our findings, we present StepFly, a novel end-to-end agentic framework for troubleshooting guide automation. Our approach features a three-stage workflow: the first stage provides a comprehensive guide together with a tool, TSG Mentor, to assist SREs in improving TSG quality; the second stage performs offline preprocessing using LLMs to extract structured execution DAGs from unstructured TSGs and to create dedicated Query Preparation Plugins (QPPs); and the third stage executes online using a DAG-guided scheduler-executor framework with a memory system to guarantee correct workflow and support parallel execution of independent steps. Our empirical evaluation on a collection of real-world TSGs and incidents demonstrates that StepFly achieves a ~94% success rate on GPT-4.1, outperforming baselines with less time and token consumption. Furthermore, it achieves a remarkable execution time reduction of 32.9% to 70.4% for parallelizable TSGs.

Current LLM safety defenses fail under decomposition attacks, where a malicious goal is decomposed into benign subtasks that circumvent refusals. The challenge lies in the existing shallow safety alignment techniques: they only detect harm in the immediate prompt and do not reason about long-range intent, leaving them blind to malicious intent that emerges over a sequence of seemingly benign instructions. We therefore propose adding an external monitor that observes the conversation at a higher granularity. To facilitate our study of monitoring decomposition attacks, we curate the largest and most diverse dataset to date, including question-answering, text-to-image, and agentic tasks. We verify our datasets by testing them on frontier LLMs and show an 87% attack success rate on average on GPT-4o. This confirms that decomposition attack is broadly effective. Additionally, we find that random tasks can be injected into the decomposed subtasks to further obfuscate malicious intents. To defend in real time, we propose a lightweight sequential monitoring framework that cumulatively evaluates each subtask. We show that a carefully prompt engineered lightweight monitor achieves a 93% defense success rate, beating reasoning models like o3 mini as a monitor. Moreover, it remains robust against random task injection and cuts cost by 90% and latency by 50%. Our findings suggest that lightweight sequential monitors are highly effective in mitigating decomposition attacks and are viable in deployment.

Fragmentation is a routine part of communication in 6LoWPAN-based IoT networks, designed to accommodate small frame sizes on constrained wireless links. However, this process introduces a critical vulnerability fragments are typically stored and processed before their legitimacy is confirmed, allowing attackers to exploit this gap with minimal effort. In this work, we explore a defense strategy that takes a more adaptive, behavior-aware approach to this problem. Our system, called Predictive-CSM, introduces a combination of two lightweight mechanisms. The first tracks how each node behaves over time, rewarding consistent and successful interactions while quickly penalizing suspicious or failing patterns. The second checks the integrity of packet fragments using a chained hash, allowing incomplete or manipulated sequences to be caught early, before they can occupy memory or waste processing time. We put this system to the test using a set of targeted attack simulations, including early fragment injection, replayed headers, and flooding with fake data. Across all scenarios, Predictive CSM preserved network delivery and maintained energy efficiency, even under pressure. Rather than relying on heavyweight cryptography or rigid filters, this approach allows constrained de vices to adapt their defenses in real time based on what they observe, not just what they're told. In that way, it offers a step forward for securing fragmented communication in real world IoT systems

Open source developers have emerged as key actors in the political economy of artificial intelligence (AI), with open model development being recognised as an alternative to closed-source AI development. However, we still have a limited understanding of collaborative practices in open source AI. This paper responds to this gap with a three-part quantitative analysis of development activity on the Hugging Face (HF) Hub, a popular platform for building, sharing, and demonstrating models. First, we find that various types of activity across 348,181 model, 65,761 dataset, and 156,642 space repositories exhibit right-skewed distributions. Activity is extremely imbalanced between repositories; for example, over 70% of models have 0 downloads, while 1% account for 99% of downloads. Second, we analyse a snapshot of the social network structure of collaboration on models, finding that the community has a core-periphery structure, with a core of prolific developers and a majority of isolate developers (89%). Upon removing isolates, collaboration is characterised by high reciprocity regardless of developers' network positions. Third, we examine model adoption through the lens of model usage in spaces, finding that a minority of models, developed by a handful of companies, are widely used on the HF Hub. Overall, we find that various types of activity on the HF Hub are characterised by Pareto distributions, congruent with prior observations about OSS development patterns on platforms like GitHub. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of the findings and recommendations for (open source) AI researchers, developers, and policymakers.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in agentic systems that interact with an external environment; this makes them susceptible to prompt injections when dealing with untrusted data. To overcome this limitation, we propose SIC (Soft Instruction Control)-a simple yet effective iterative prompt sanitization loop designed for tool-augmented LLM agents. Our method repeatedly inspects incoming data for instructions that could compromise agent behavior. If such content is found, the malicious content is rewritten, masked, or removed, and the result is re-evaluated. The process continues until the input is clean or a maximum iteration limit is reached; if imperative instruction-like content remains, the agent halts to ensure security. By allowing multiple passes, our approach acknowledges that individual rewrites may fail but enables the system to catch and correct missed injections in later steps. Although immediately useful, worst-case analysis shows that SIC is not infallible; strong adversary can still get a 15% ASR by embedding non-imperative workflows. This nonetheless raises the bar.

Machine learning programs, such as those performing inference, fine-tuning, and training of LLMs, are commonly delegated to untrusted compute providers. To provide correctness guarantees for the client, we propose adapting the cryptographic notion of refereed delegation to the machine learning setting. This approach enables a computationally limited client to delegate a program to multiple untrusted compute providers, with a guarantee of obtaining the correct result if at least one of them is honest. Refereed delegation of ML programs poses two technical hurdles: (1) an arbitration protocol to resolve disputes when compute providers disagree on the output, and (2) the ability to bitwise reproduce ML programs across different hardware setups, For (1), we design Verde, a dispute arbitration protocol that efficiently handles the large scale and graph-based computational model of modern ML programs. For (2), we build RepOps (Reproducible Operators), a library that eliminates hardware "non-determinism" by controlling the order of floating point operations performed on all hardware. Our implementation shows that refereed delegation achieves both strong guarantees for clients and practical overheads for compute providers.

Large language model (LLM)-powered agents are transforming digital devices from passive tools into proactive intelligent collaborators. However, most existing frameworks remain confined to a single OS or device, making cross-device workflows brittle and largely manual. We present UFO^3, a system that unifies heterogeneous endpoints, desktops, servers, mobile devices, and edge, into a single orchestration fabric. UFO^3 models each user request as a mutable TaskConstellation: a distributed DAG of atomic subtasks (TaskStars) with explicit control and data dependencies (TaskStarLines). The TaskConstellation continuously evolves as results stream in from distributed devices, enabling asynchronous execution, adaptive recovery, and dynamic optimization. A Constellation Orchestrator} executes tasks safely and asynchronously while applying dynamic DAG updates, and the Agent Interaction Protocol (AIP) provides persistent, low-latency channels for reliable task dispatch and result streaming. These designs dissolve the traditional boundaries between devices and platforms, allowing agents to collaborate seamlessly and amplify their collective intelligence. We evaluate UFO^3 on NebulaBench, a benchmark of 55 cross-device tasks across 5 machines and 10 categories. UFO^3 achieves 83.3% subtask completion, 70.9% task success, exposes parallelism with an average width of 1.72, and reduces end-to-end latency by 31% relative to a sequential baseline. Fault-injection experiments demonstrate graceful degradation and recovery under transient and permanent agent failures. These results show that UFO^3 achieves accurate, efficient, and resilient task orchestration across heterogeneous devices, uniting isolated agents into a coherent, adaptive computing fabric that extends across the landscape of ubiquitous computing.

This paper introduces SecRepoBench, a benchmark to evaluate code agents on secure code completion in real-world repositories. SecRepoBench has 318 code completion tasks in 27 C/C++ repositories, covering 15 CWEs. We evaluate 28 standalone LLMs and 13 code agents across 3 state-of-the-art agent frameworks using our benchmark. We find that state-of-the-art LLMs struggle with generating correct and secure code completions. However, code agents significantly outperform standalone LLMs. We show that SecRepoBench is more difficult than the prior state-of-the-art benchmark. Finally, our comprehensive analysis provides insights into potential directions for enhancing the ability of code agents to write correct and secure code in real-world repositories.

The security of Large Language Model (LLM) applications is fundamentally challenged by "form-first" attacks like prompt injection and jailbreaking, where malicious instructions are embedded within user inputs. Conventional defenses, which rely on post hoc output filtering, are often brittle and fail to address the root cause: the model's inability to distinguish trusted instructions from untrusted data. This paper proposes Countermind, a multi-layered security architecture intended to shift defenses from a reactive, post hoc posture to a proactive, pre-inference, and intra-inference enforcement model. The architecture proposes a fortified perimeter designed to structurally validate and transform all inputs, and an internal governance mechanism intended to constrain the model's semantic processing pathways before an output is generated. The primary contributions of this work are conceptual designs for: (1) A Semantic Boundary Logic (SBL) with a mandatory, time-coupled Text Crypter intended to reduce the plaintext prompt injection attack surface, provided all ingestion paths are enforced. (2) A Parameter-Space Restriction (PSR) mechanism, leveraging principles from representation engineering, to dynamically control the LLM's access to internal semantic clusters, with the goal of mitigating semantic drift and dangerous emergent behaviors. (3) A Secure, Self-Regulating Core that uses an OODA loop and a learning security module to adapt its defenses based on an immutable audit log. (4) A Multimodal Input Sandbox and Context-Defense mechanisms to address threats from non-textual data and long-term semantic poisoning. This paper outlines an evaluation plan designed to quantify the proposed architecture's effectiveness in reducing the Attack Success Rate (ASR) for form-first attacks and to measure its potential latency overhead.

Recent progress in autonomous code generation has fueled excitement around AI agents capable of accelerating scientific discovery by running experiments. However, there is currently no benchmark that evaluates whether such agents can implement scientific ideas when given varied amounts of code as a starting point, interpolating between reproduction (running code) and from-scratch replication (fully re-implementing and running code). We introduce AutoExperiment, a benchmark that evaluates AI agents' ability to implement and run machine learning experiments based on natural language descriptions in research papers. In each task, agents are given a research paper, a codebase with key functions masked out, and a command to run the experiment. The goal is to generate the missing code, execute the experiment in a sandboxed environment, and reproduce the results. AutoExperiment scales in difficulty by varying the number of missing functions n, ranging from partial reproduction to full replication. We evaluate state-of-the-art agents and find that performance degrades rapidly as n increases. Agents that can dynamically interact with the environment (e.g. to debug their code) can outperform agents in fixed "agentless" harnesses, and there exists a significant gap between single-shot and multi-trial success rates (Pass@1 vs. Pass@5), motivating verifier approaches to our benchmark. Our findings highlight critical challenges in long-horizon code generation, context retrieval, and autonomous experiment execution, establishing AutoExperiment as a new benchmark for evaluating progress in AI-driven scientific experimentation. Our data and code are open-sourced at https://github.com/j1mk1m/AutoExperiment .

As Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) becomes increasingly integrated into various facets of human life, ensuring the safety and ethical alignment of such systems is paramount. Previous studies primarily focus on single-modality threats, which may not suffice given the integrated and complex nature of cross-modality interactions. We introduce a novel safety alignment challenge called Safe Inputs but Unsafe Output (SIUO) to evaluate cross-modality safety alignment. Specifically, it considers cases where single modalities are safe independently but could potentially lead to unsafe or unethical outputs when combined. To empirically investigate this problem, we developed the SIUO, a cross-modality benchmark encompassing 9 critical safety domains, such as self-harm, illegal activities, and privacy violations. Our findings reveal substantial safety vulnerabilities in both closed- and open-source LVLMs, such as GPT-4V and LLaVA, underscoring the inadequacy of current models to reliably interpret and respond to complex, real-world scenarios.