Daily Papers

Recent NeRF methods on large-scale scenes have underlined the importance of scene decomposition for scalable NeRFs. Although achieving reasonable scalability, there are several critical problems remaining unexplored, i.e., learnable decomposition, modeling scene heterogeneity, and modeling efficiency. In this paper, we introduce Switch-NeRF++, a Heterogeneous Mixture of Hash Experts (HMoHE) network that addresses these challenges within a unified framework. It is a highly scalable NeRF that learns heterogeneous decomposition and heterogeneous NeRFs efficiently for large-scale scenes in an end-to-end manner. In our framework, a gating network learns to decomposes scenes and allocates 3D points to specialized NeRF experts. This gating network is co-optimized with the experts, by our proposed Sparsely Gated Mixture of Experts (MoE) NeRF framework. We incorporate a hash-based gating network and distinct heterogeneous hash experts. The hash-based gating efficiently learns the decomposition of the large-scale scene. The distinct heterogeneous hash experts consist of hash grids of different resolution ranges, enabling effective learning of the heterogeneous representation of different scene parts. These design choices make our framework an end-to-end and highly scalable NeRF solution for real-world large-scale scene modeling to achieve both quality and efficiency. We evaluate our accuracy and scalability on existing large-scale NeRF datasets and a new dataset with very large-scale scenes (>6.5km^2) from UrbanBIS. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our approach can be easily scaled to various large-scale scenes and achieve state-of-the-art scene rendering accuracy. Furthermore, our method exhibits significant efficiency, with an 8x acceleration in training and a 16x acceleration in rendering compared to Switch-NeRF. Codes will be released in https://github.com/MiZhenxing/Switch-NeRF.

In this paper, we revisit one of the simplest problems in data structures: the task of inserting elements into an open-addressed hash table so that elements can later be retrieved with as few probes as possible. We show that, even without reordering elements over time, it is possible to construct a hash table that achieves far better expected search complexities (both amortized and worst-case) than were previously thought possible. Along the way, we disprove the central conjecture left by Yao in his seminal paper ``Uniform Hashing is Optimal''. All of our results come with matching lower bounds.

Locality-sensitive hashing (LSH) is a fundamental algorithmic technique widely employed in large-scale data processing applications, such as nearest-neighbor search, entity resolution, and clustering. However, its applicability in some real-world scenarios is limited due to the need for careful design of hashing functions that align with specific metrics. Existing LSH-based Entity Blocking solutions primarily rely on generic similarity metrics such as Jaccard similarity, whereas practical use cases often demand complex and customized similarity rules surpassing the capabilities of generic similarity metrics. Consequently, designing LSH functions for these customized similarity rules presents considerable challenges. In this research, we propose a neuralization approach to enhance locality-sensitive hashing by training deep neural networks to serve as hashing functions for complex metrics. We assess the effectiveness of this approach within the context of the entity resolution problem, which frequently involves the use of task-specific metrics in real-world applications. Specifically, we introduce NLSHBlock (Neural-LSH Block), a novel blocking methodology that leverages pre-trained language models, fine-tuned with a novel LSH-based loss function. Through extensive evaluations conducted on a diverse range of real-world datasets, we demonstrate the superiority of NLSHBlock over existing methods, exhibiting significant performance improvements. Furthermore, we showcase the efficacy of NLSHBlock in enhancing the performance of the entity matching phase, particularly within the semi-supervised setting.

Transformer-based large language models (LLMs) use the key-value (KV) cache to significantly accelerate inference by storing the key and value embeddings of past tokens. However, this cache consumes significant GPU memory. In this work, we introduce HashEvict, an algorithm that uses locality-sensitive hashing (LSH) to compress the KV cache. HashEvict quickly locates tokens in the cache that are cosine dissimilar to the current query token. This is achieved by computing the Hamming distance between binarized Gaussian projections of the current token query and cached token keys, with a projection length much smaller than the embedding dimension. We maintain a lightweight binary structure in GPU memory to facilitate these calculations. Unlike existing compression strategies that compute attention to determine token retention, HashEvict makes these decisions pre-attention, thereby reducing computational costs. Additionally, HashEvict is dynamic - at every decoding step, the key and value of the current token replace the embeddings of a token expected to produce the lowest attention score. We demonstrate that HashEvict can compress the KV cache by 30%-70% while maintaining high performance across reasoning, multiple-choice, long-context retrieval and summarization tasks.

The field of Automatic Machine Learning (AutoML) has recently attained impressive results, including the discovery of state-of-the-art machine learning solutions, such as neural image classifiers. This is often done by applying an evolutionary search method, which samples multiple candidate solutions from a large space and evaluates the quality of each candidate through a long training process. As a result, the search tends to be slow. In this paper, we show that large efficiency gains can be obtained by employing a fast unified functional hash, especially through the functional equivalence caching technique, which we also present. The central idea is to detect by hashing when the search method produces equivalent candidates, which occurs very frequently, and this way avoid their costly re-evaluation. Our hash is "functional" in that it identifies equivalent candidates even if they were represented or coded differently, and it is "unified" in that the same algorithm can hash arbitrary representations; e.g. compute graphs, imperative code, or lambda functions. As evidence, we show dramatic improvements on multiple AutoML domains, including neural architecture search and algorithm discovery. Finally, we consider the effect of hash collisions, evaluation noise, and search distribution through empirical analysis. Altogether, we hope this paper may serve as a guide to hashing techniques in AutoML.

This article introduces byteSteady -- a fast model for classification using byte-level n-gram embeddings. byteSteady assumes that each input comes as a sequence of bytes. A representation vector is produced using the averaged embedding vectors of byte-level n-grams, with a pre-defined set of n. The hashing trick is used to reduce the number of embedding vectors. This input representation vector is then fed into a linear classifier. A straightforward application of byteSteady is text classification. We also apply byteSteady to one type of non-language data -- DNA sequences for gene classification. For both problems we achieved competitive classification results against strong baselines, suggesting that byteSteady can be applied to both language and non-language data. Furthermore, we find that simple compression using Huffman coding does not significantly impact the results, which offers an accuracy-speed trade-off previously unexplored in machine learning.

The sparse Mixture-of-Experts (Sparse-MoE) framework efficiently scales up model capacity in various domains, such as natural language processing and vision. Sparse-MoEs select a subset of the "experts" (thus, only a portion of the overall network) for each input sample using a sparse, trainable gate. Existing sparse gates are prone to convergence and performance issues when training with first-order optimization methods. In this paper, we introduce two improvements to current MoE approaches. First, we propose a new sparse gate: COMET, which relies on a novel tree-based mechanism. COMET is differentiable, can exploit sparsity to speed up computation, and outperforms state-of-the-art gates. Second, due to the challenging combinatorial nature of sparse expert selection, first-order methods are typically prone to low-quality solutions. To deal with this challenge, we propose a novel, permutation-based local search method that can complement first-order methods in training any sparse gate, e.g., Hash routing, Top-k, DSelect-k, and COMET. We show that local search can help networks escape bad initializations or solutions. We performed large-scale experiments on various domains, including recommender systems, vision, and natural language processing. On standard vision and recommender systems benchmarks, COMET+ (COMET with local search) achieves up to 13% improvement in ROC AUC over popular gates, e.g., Hash routing and Top-k, and up to 9% over prior differentiable gates e.g., DSelect-k. When Top-k and Hash gates are combined with local search, we see up to 100times reduction in the budget needed for hyperparameter tuning. Moreover, for language modeling, our approach improves over the state-of-the-art MoEBERT model for distilling BERT on 5/7 GLUE benchmarks as well as SQuAD dataset.

Rich user behavior data has been proven to be of great value for Click-Through Rate (CTR) prediction applications, especially in industrial recommender, search, or advertising systems. However, it's non-trivial for real-world systems to make full use of long-term user behaviors due to the strict requirements of online serving time. Most previous works adopt the retrieval-based strategy, where a small number of user behaviors are retrieved first for subsequent attention. However, the retrieval-based methods are sub-optimal and would cause more or less information losses, and it's difficult to balance the effectiveness and efficiency of the retrieval algorithm. In this paper, we propose SDIM (Sampling-based Deep Interest Modeling), a simple yet effective sampling-based end-to-end approach for modeling long-term user behaviors. We sample from multiple hash functions to generate hash signatures of the candidate item and each item in the user behavior sequence, and obtain the user interest by directly gathering behavior items associated with the candidate item with the same hash signature. We show theoretically and experimentally that the proposed method performs on par with standard attention-based models on modeling long-term user behaviors, while being sizable times faster. We also introduce the deployment of SDIM in our system. Specifically, we decouple the behavior sequence hashing, which is the most time-consuming part, from the CTR model by designing a separate module named BSE (behavior Sequence Encoding). BSE is latency-free for the CTR server, enabling us to model extremely long user behaviors. Both offline and online experiments are conducted to demonstrate the effectiveness of SDIM. SDIM now has been deployed online in the search system of Meituan APP.

We present an approximate attention mechanism named HyperAttention to address the computational challenges posed by the growing complexity of long contexts used in Large Language Models (LLMs). Recent work suggests that in the worst-case scenario, quadratic time is necessary unless the entries of the attention matrix are bounded or the matrix has low stable rank. We introduce two parameters which measure: (1) the max column norm in the normalized attention matrix, and (2) the ratio of row norms in the unnormalized attention matrix after detecting and removing large entries. We use these fine-grained parameters to capture the hardness of the problem. Despite previous lower bounds, we are able to achieve a linear time sampling algorithm even when the matrix has unbounded entries or a large stable rank, provided the above parameters are small. HyperAttention features a modular design that easily accommodates integration of other fast low-level implementations, particularly FlashAttention. Empirically, employing Locality Sensitive Hashing (LSH) to identify large entries, HyperAttention outperforms existing methods, giving significant speed improvements compared to state-of-the-art solutions like FlashAttention. We validate the empirical performance of HyperAttention on a variety of different long-context length datasets. For example, HyperAttention makes the inference time of ChatGLM2 50\% faster on 32k context length while perplexity increases from 5.6 to 6.3. On larger context length, e.g., 131k, with causal masking, HyperAttention offers 5-fold speedup on a single attention layer.

We investigate the training of sparse layers that use different parameters for different inputs based on hashing in large Transformer models. Specifically, we modify the feedforward layer to hash to different sets of weights depending on the current token, over all tokens in the sequence. We show that this procedure either outperforms or is competitive with learning-to-route mixture-of-expert methods such as Switch Transformers and BASE Layers, while requiring no routing parameters or extra terms in the objective function such as a load balancing loss, and no sophisticated assignment algorithm. We study the performance of different hashing techniques, hash sizes and input features, and show that balanced and random hashes focused on the most local features work best, compared to either learning clusters or using longer-range context. We show our approach works well both on large language modeling and dialogue tasks, and on downstream fine-tuning tasks.

The popularity of the Rust language continues to explode; yet, many critical codebases remain authored in C, and cannot be realistically rewritten by hand. Automatically translating C to Rust is thus an appealing course of action. Several works have gone down this path, handling an ever-increasing subset of C through a variety of Rust features, such as unsafe. While the prospect of automation is appealing, producing code that relies on unsafe negates the memory safety guarantees offered by Rust, and therefore the main advantages of porting existing codebases to memory-safe languages. We instead explore a different path, and explore what it would take to translate C to safe Rust; that is, to produce code that is trivially memory safe, because it abides by Rust's type system without caveats. Our work sports several original contributions: a type-directed translation from (a subset of) C to safe Rust; a novel static analysis based on "split trees" that allows expressing C's pointer arithmetic using Rust's slices and splitting operations; an analysis that infers exactly which borrows need to be mutable; and a compilation strategy for C's struct types that is compatible with Rust's distinction between non-owned and owned allocations. We apply our methodology to existing formally verified C codebases: the HACL* cryptographic library, and binary parsers and serializers from EverParse, and show that the subset of C we support is sufficient to translate both applications to safe Rust. Our evaluation shows that for the few places that do violate Rust's aliasing discipline, automated, surgical rewrites suffice; and that the few strategic copies we insert have a negligible performance impact. Of particular note, the application of our approach to HACL* results in a 80,000 line verified cryptographic library, written in pure Rust, that implements all modern algorithms - the first of its kind.

Vertical federated learning is a trending solution for multi-party collaboration in training machine learning models. Industrial frameworks adopt secure multi-party computation methods such as homomorphic encryption to guarantee data security and privacy. However, a line of work has revealed that there are still leakage risks in VFL. The leakage is caused by the correlation between the intermediate representations and the raw data. Due to the powerful approximation ability of deep neural networks, an adversary can capture the correlation precisely and reconstruct the data. To deal with the threat of the data reconstruction attack, we propose a hashing-based VFL framework, called HashVFL, to cut off the reversibility directly. The one-way nature of hashing allows our framework to block all attempts to recover data from hash codes. However, integrating hashing also brings some challenges, e.g., the loss of information. This paper proposes and addresses three challenges to integrating hashing: learnability, bit balance, and consistency. Experimental results demonstrate HashVFL's efficiency in keeping the main task's performance and defending against data reconstruction attacks. Furthermore, we also analyze its potential value in detecting abnormal inputs. In addition, we conduct extensive experiments to prove HashVFL's generalization in various settings. In summary, HashVFL provides a new perspective on protecting multi-party's data security and privacy in VFL. We hope our study can attract more researchers to expand the application domains of HashVFL.

Due to its powerful capability of representation learning and high-efficiency computation, deep hashing has made significant progress in large-scale image retrieval. However, deep hashing networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples, which is a practical secure problem but seldom studied in hashing-based retrieval field. In this paper, we propose a novel prototype-supervised adversarial network (ProS-GAN), which formulates a flexible generative architecture for efficient and effective targeted hashing attack. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first generation-based method to attack deep hashing networks. Generally, our proposed framework consists of three parts, i.e., a PrototypeNet, a generator, and a discriminator. Specifically, the designed PrototypeNet embeds the target label into the semantic representation and learns the prototype code as the category-level representative of the target label. Moreover, the semantic representation and the original image are jointly fed into the generator for a flexible targeted attack. Particularly, the prototype code is adopted to supervise the generator to construct the targeted adversarial example by minimizing the Hamming distance between the hash code of the adversarial example and the prototype code. Furthermore, the generator is against the discriminator to simultaneously encourage the adversarial examples visually realistic and the semantic representation informative. Extensive experiments verify that the proposed framework can efficiently produce adversarial examples with better targeted attack performance and transferability over state-of-the-art targeted attack methods of deep hashing. The related codes could be available at https://github.com/xunguangwang/ProS-GAN .

Hashing methods have made significant progress in cross-modal retrieval tasks with fast query speed and low storage cost. Among them, deep learning-based hashing achieves better performance on large-scale data due to its excellent extraction and representation ability for nonlinear heterogeneous features. However, there are still two main challenges in catastrophic forgetting when data with new categories arrive continuously, and time-consuming for non-continuous hashing retrieval to retrain for updating. To this end, we, in this paper, propose a novel deep lifelong cross-modal hashing to achieve lifelong hashing retrieval instead of re-training hash function repeatedly when new data arrive. Specifically, we design lifelong learning strategy to update hash functions by directly training the incremental data instead of retraining new hash functions using all the accumulated data, which significantly reduce training time. Then, we propose lifelong hashing loss to enable original hash codes participate in lifelong learning but remain invariant, and further preserve the similarity and dis-similarity among original and incremental hash codes to maintain performance. Additionally, considering distribution heterogeneity when new data arriving continuously, we introduce multi-label semantic similarity to supervise hash learning, and it has been proven that the similarity improves performance with detailed analysis. Experimental results on benchmark datasets show that the proposed methods achieves comparative performance comparing with recent state-of-the-art cross-modal hashing methods, and it yields substantial average increments over 20\% in retrieval accuracy and almost reduces over 80\% training time when new data arrives continuously.

Instruction-following retrievers have been widely adopted alongside LLMs in real-world applications, but little work has investigated the safety risks surrounding their increasing search capabilities. We empirically study the ability of retrievers to satisfy malicious queries, both when used directly and when used in a retrieval augmented generation-based setup. Concretely, we investigate six leading retrievers, including NV-Embed and LLM2Vec, and find that given malicious requests, most retrievers can (for >50% of queries) select relevant harmful passages. For example, LLM2Vec correctly selects passages for 61.35% of our malicious queries. We further uncover an emerging risk with instruction-following retrievers, where highly relevant harmful information can be surfaced by exploiting their instruction-following capabilities. Finally, we show that even safety-aligned LLMs, such as Llama3, can satisfy malicious requests when provided with harmful retrieved passages in-context. In summary, our findings underscore the malicious misuse risks associated with increasing retriever capability.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged as a pivotal research area, yet the attention module remains a critical bottleneck in LLM inference, even with techniques like KVCache to mitigate redundant computations. While various top-k attention mechanisms have been proposed to accelerate LLM inference by exploiting the inherent sparsity of attention, they often struggled to strike a balance between efficiency and accuracy. In this paper, we introduce HATA (Hash-Aware Top-k Attention), a novel approach that systematically integrates low-overhead learning-to-hash techniques into the Top-k attention process. Different from the existing top-k attention methods which are devoted to seeking an absolute estimation of qk score, typically with a great cost, HATA maps queries and keys into binary hash codes, and acquires the relative qk score order with a quite low cost, which is sufficient for realizing top-k attention. Extensive experiments demonstrate that HATA achieves up to 7.2times speedup compared to vanilla full attention while maintaining model accuracy. In addition, HATA outperforms the state-of-the-art top-k attention methods in both accuracy and efficiency across multiple mainstream LLM models and diverse tasks. HATA is open source at https://github.com/gpzlx1/HATA.

Large language models (LLMs) are shown to benefit from chain-of-thought (COT) prompting, particularly when tackling tasks that require systematic reasoning processes. On the other hand, COT prompting also poses new vulnerabilities in the form of backdoor attacks, wherein the model will output unintended malicious content under specific backdoor-triggered conditions during inference. Traditional methods for launching backdoor attacks involve either contaminating the training dataset with backdoored instances or directly manipulating the model parameters during deployment. However, these approaches are not practical for commercial LLMs that typically operate via API access. In this paper, we propose BadChain, the first backdoor attack against LLMs employing COT prompting, which does not require access to the training dataset or model parameters and imposes low computational overhead. BadChain leverages the inherent reasoning capabilities of LLMs by inserting a backdoor reasoning step into the sequence of reasoning steps of the model output, thereby altering the final response when a backdoor trigger exists in the query prompt. Empirically, we show the effectiveness of BadChain for two COT strategies across four LLMs (Llama2, GPT-3.5, PaLM2, and GPT-4) and six complex benchmark tasks encompassing arithmetic, commonsense, and symbolic reasoning. Moreover, we show that LLMs endowed with stronger reasoning capabilities exhibit higher susceptibility to BadChain, exemplified by a high average attack success rate of 97.0% across the six benchmark tasks on GPT-4. Finally, we propose two defenses based on shuffling and demonstrate their overall ineffectiveness against BadChain. Therefore, BadChain remains a severe threat to LLMs, underscoring the urgency for the development of robust and effective future defenses.

For nearly a decade the academic community has investigated backdoors in neural networks, primarily focusing on classification tasks where adversaries manipulate the model prediction. While demonstrably malicious, the immediate real-world impact of such prediction-altering attacks has remained unclear. In this paper we introduce a novel and significantly more potent class of backdoors that builds upon recent advancements in architectural backdoors. We demonstrate how these backdoors can be specifically engineered to exploit batched inference, a common technique for hardware utilization, enabling large-scale user data manipulation and theft. By targeting the batching process, these architectural backdoors facilitate information leakage between concurrent user requests and allow attackers to fully control model responses directed at other users within the same batch. In other words, an attacker who can change the model architecture can set and steal model inputs and outputs of other users within the same batch. We show that such attacks are not only feasible but also alarmingly effective, can be readily injected into prevalent model architectures, and represent a truly malicious threat to user privacy and system integrity. Critically, to counteract this new class of vulnerabilities, we propose a deterministic mitigation strategy that provides formal guarantees against this new attack vector, unlike prior work that relied on Large Language Models to find the backdoors. Our mitigation strategy employs a novel Information Flow Control mechanism that analyzes the model graph and proves non-interference between different user inputs within the same batch. Using our mitigation strategy we perform a large scale analysis of models hosted through Hugging Face and find over 200 models that introduce (unintended) information leakage between batch entries due to the use of dynamic quantization.

Hashing is an efficient method for nearest neighbor search in large-scale data space by embedding high-dimensional feature descriptors into a similarity preserving Hamming space with a low dimension. However, large-scale high-speed retrieval through binary code has a certain degree of reduction in retrieval accuracy compared to traditional retrieval methods. We have noticed that multi-view methods can well preserve the diverse characteristics of data. Therefore, we try to introduce the multi-view deep neural network into the hash learning field, and design an efficient and innovative retrieval model, which has achieved a significant improvement in retrieval performance. In this paper, we propose a supervised multi-view hash model which can enhance the multi-view information through neural networks. This is a completely new hash learning method that combines multi-view and deep learning methods. The proposed method utilizes an effective view stability evaluation method to actively explore the relationship among views, which will affect the optimization direction of the entire network. We have also designed a variety of multi-data fusion methods in the Hamming space to preserve the advantages of both convolution and multi-view. In order to avoid excessive computing resources on the enhancement procedure during retrieval, we set up a separate structure called memory network which participates in training together. The proposed method is systematically evaluated on the CIFAR-10, NUS-WIDE and MS-COCO datasets, and the results show that our method significantly outperforms the state-of-the-art single-view and multi-view hashing methods.

Many computational factors limit broader deployment of large language models. In this paper, we focus on a memory bottleneck imposed by the key-value (KV) cache, a computational shortcut that requires storing previous KV pairs during decoding. While existing KV cache methods approach this problem by pruning or evicting large swaths of relatively less important KV pairs to dramatically reduce the memory footprint of the cache, they can have limited success in tasks that require recollecting a majority of previous tokens. To alleviate this issue, we propose LESS, a simple integration of a (nearly free) constant sized cache with eviction-based cache methods, such that all tokens can be queried at later decoding steps. Its ability to retain information throughout time shows merit on a variety of tasks where we demonstrate LESS can help reduce the performance gap from caching everything, sometimes even matching it, all while being efficient.

Modern Machine Learning models are expensive IP and business competitiveness often depends on keeping this IP confidential. This in turn restricts how these models are deployed -- for example it is unclear how to deploy a model on-device without inevitably leaking the underlying model. At the same time, confidential computing technologies such as Multi-Party Computation or Homomorphic encryption remain impractical for wide adoption. In this paper we take a different approach and investigate feasibility of ML-specific mechanisms that deter unauthorized model use by restricting the model to only be usable on specific hardware, making adoption on unauthorized hardware inconvenient. That way, even if IP is compromised, it cannot be trivially used without specialised hardware or major model adjustment. In a sense, we seek to enable cheap locking of machine learning models into specific hardware. We demonstrate that locking mechanisms are feasible by either targeting efficiency of model representations, such making models incompatible with quantisation, or tie the model's operation on specific characteristics of hardware, such as number of cycles for arithmetic operations. We demonstrate that locking comes with negligible work and latency overheads, while significantly restricting usability of the resultant model on unauthorized hardware.

In this work, we demonstrate that distinctive keys during LLM inference tend to have high attention scores. We explore this phenomenon and propose KeyDiff, a training-free KV cache eviction method based on key similarity. This method facilitates the deployment of LLM-based application requiring long input prompts in resource-constrained environments with limited memory and compute budgets. Unlike other KV cache eviction methods, KeyDiff can process arbitrarily long prompts within strict resource constraints and efficiently generate responses. We demonstrate that KeyDiff computes the optimal solution to a KV cache selection problem that maximizes key diversity, providing a theoretical understanding of KeyDiff. Notably,KeyDiff does not rely on attention scores, allowing the use of optimized attention mechanisms like FlashAttention. We demonstrate the effectiveness of KeyDiff across diverse tasks and models, illustrating a performance gap of less than 0.04\% with 8K cache budget (sim 23\% KV cache reduction) from the non-evicting baseline on the LongBench benchmark for Llama 3.1-8B and Llama 3.2-3B.

Paging is a prototypical problem in the area of online algorithms. It has also played a central role in the development of learning-augmented algorithms -- a recent line of research that aims to ameliorate the shortcomings of classical worst-case analysis by giving algorithms access to predictions. Such predictions can typically be generated using a machine learning approach, but they are inherently imperfect. Previous work on learning-augmented paging has investigated predictions on (i) when the current page will be requested again (reoccurrence predictions), (ii) the current state of the cache in an optimal algorithm (state predictions), (iii) all requests until the current page gets requested again, and (iv) the relative order in which pages are requested. We study learning-augmented paging from the new perspective of requiring the least possible amount of predicted information. More specifically, the predictions obtained alongside each page request are limited to one bit only. We consider two natural such setups: (i) discard predictions, in which the predicted bit denotes whether or not it is ``safe'' to evict this page, and (ii) phase predictions, where the bit denotes whether the current page will be requested in the next phase (for an appropriate partitioning of the input into phases). We develop algorithms for each of the two setups that satisfy all three desirable properties of learning-augmented algorithms -- that is, they are consistent, robust and smooth -- despite being limited to a one-bit prediction per request. We also present lower bounds establishing that our algorithms are essentially best possible.

Detecting whether copyright holders' works were used in LLM pretraining is poised to be an important problem. This work proposes using data watermarks to enable principled detection with only black-box model access, provided that the rightholder contributed multiple training documents and watermarked them before public release. By applying a randomly sampled data watermark, detection can be framed as hypothesis testing, which provides guarantees on the false detection rate. We study two watermarks: one that inserts random sequences, and another that randomly substitutes characters with Unicode lookalikes. We first show how three aspects of watermark design -- watermark length, number of duplications, and interference -- affect the power of the hypothesis test. Next, we study how a watermark's detection strength changes under model and dataset scaling: while increasing the dataset size decreases the strength of the watermark, watermarks remain strong if the model size also increases. Finally, we view SHA hashes as natural watermarks and show that we can robustly detect hashes from BLOOM-176B's training data, as long as they occurred at least 90 times. Together, our results point towards a promising future for data watermarks in real world use.

Deep recommender systems rely heavily on large embedding tables to handle high-cardinality categorical features such as user/item identifiers, and face significant memory constraints at scale. To tackle this challenge, hashing techniques are often employed to map multiple entities to the same embedding and thus reduce the size of the embedding tables. Concurrently, graph-based collaborative signals have emerged as powerful tools in recommender systems, yet their potential for optimizing embedding table reduction remains unexplored. This paper introduces GraphHash, the first graph-based approach that leverages modularity-based bipartite graph clustering on user-item interaction graphs to reduce embedding table sizes. We demonstrate that the modularity objective has a theoretical connection to message-passing, which provides a foundation for our method. By employing fast clustering algorithms, GraphHash serves as a computationally efficient proxy for message-passing during preprocessing and a plug-and-play graph-based alternative to traditional ID hashing. Extensive experiments show that GraphHash substantially outperforms diverse hashing baselines on both retrieval and click-through-rate prediction tasks. In particular, GraphHash achieves on average a 101.52% improvement in recall when reducing the embedding table size by more than 75%, highlighting the value of graph-based collaborative information for model reduction. Our code is available at https://github.com/snap-research/GraphHash.

We study suffix-based jailbreaksx2013a powerful family of attacks against large language models (LLMs) that optimize adversarial suffixes to circumvent safety alignment. Focusing on the widely used foundational GCG attack (Zou et al., 2023), we observe that suffixes vary in efficacy: some markedly more universalx2013generalizing to many unseen harmful instructionsx2013than others. We first show that GCG's effectiveness is driven by a shallow, critical mechanism, built on the information flow from the adversarial suffix to the final chat template tokens before generation. Quantifying the dominance of this mechanism during generation, we find GCG irregularly and aggressively hijacks the contextualization process. Crucially, we tie hijacking to the universality phenomenon, with more universal suffixes being stronger hijackers. Subsequently, we show that these insights have practical implications: GCG universality can be efficiently enhanced (up to times5 in some cases) at no additional computational cost, and can also be surgically mitigated, at least halving attack success with minimal utility loss. We release our code and data at http://github.com/matanbt/interp-jailbreak.

Today's LLMs are susceptible to prompt injections, jailbreaks, and other attacks that allow adversaries to overwrite a model's original instructions with their own malicious prompts. In this work, we argue that one of the primary vulnerabilities underlying these attacks is that LLMs often consider system prompts (e.g., text from an application developer) to be the same priority as text from untrusted users and third parties. To address this, we propose an instruction hierarchy that explicitly defines how models should behave when instructions of different priorities conflict. We then propose a data generation method to demonstrate this hierarchical instruction following behavior, which teaches LLMs to selectively ignore lower-privileged instructions. We apply this method to GPT-3.5, showing that it drastically increases robustness -- even for attack types not seen during training -- while imposing minimal degradations on standard capabilities.

The growing dependence on machine learning in real-world applications emphasizes the importance of understanding and ensuring its safety. Backdoor attacks pose a significant security risk due to their stealthy nature and potentially serious consequences. Such attacks involve embedding triggers within a learning model with the intention of causing malicious behavior when an active trigger is present while maintaining regular functionality without it. This paper evaluates the effectiveness of any backdoor attack incorporating a constant trigger, by establishing tight lower and upper boundaries for the performance of the compromised model on both clean and backdoor test data. The developed theory answers a series of fundamental but previously underexplored problems, including (1) what are the determining factors for a backdoor attack's success, (2) what is the direction of the most effective backdoor attack, and (3) when will a human-imperceptible trigger succeed. Our derived understanding applies to both discriminative and generative models. We also demonstrate the theory by conducting experiments using benchmark datasets and state-of-the-art backdoor attack scenarios.

Large language models (LLMs) have proven to be very capable, but access to the best models currently rely on inference providers which introduces trust challenges -- how can we be sure that the provider is using the model configuration they claim? We propose TOPLOC, a novel method for verifiable inference that addresses this problem. TOPLOC leverages a compact locality sensitive hashing mechanism for intermediate activations which can detect unauthorized modifications to models, prompts, or precision with 100% accuracy, achieving no false positives or negatives in our empirical evaluations. Our approach is robust across diverse hardware configurations, GPU types, and algebraic reorderings, which allows for validation speeds significantly faster than the original inference. By introducing a polynomial encoding scheme, TOPLOC minimizes memory overhead of the generated commits by 1000times, requiring only 258 bytes of storage per 32 new tokens compared to the 262KB requirement of storing the token embeddings directly for Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct. Our method empowers users to verify LLM inference computations efficiently, fostering greater trust and transparency in open ecosystems and lays a foundation for decentralized and verifiable AI services.

The K-core of a graph is the unique maximum subgraph within which each vertex connects to K or more other vertices. The optimal K-core attack problem asks to delete the minimum number of vertices from the K-core to induce its complete collapse. A hierarchical cycle-tree packing model is introduced here for this challenging combinatorial optimization problem. We convert the temporally long-range correlated K-core pruning dynamics into locally tree-like static patterns and analyze this model through the replica-symmetric cavity method of statistical physics. A set of coarse-grained belief propagation equations are derived to predict single vertex marginal probabilities efficiently. The associated hierarchical cycle-tree guided attack ({\tt hCTGA}) algorithm is able to construct nearly optimal attack solutions for regular random graphs and Erd\"os-R\'enyi random graphs. Our cycle-tree packing model may also be helpful for constructing optimal initial conditions for other irreversible dynamical processes on sparse random graphs.

While text-to-image diffusion models demonstrate impressive generation capabilities, they also exhibit vulnerability to backdoor attacks, which involve the manipulation of model outputs through malicious triggers. In this paper, for the first time, we propose a comprehensive defense method named T2IShield to detect, localize, and mitigate such attacks. Specifically, we find the "Assimilation Phenomenon" on the cross-attention maps caused by the backdoor trigger. Based on this key insight, we propose two effective backdoor detection methods: Frobenius Norm Threshold Truncation and Covariance Discriminant Analysis. Besides, we introduce a binary-search approach to localize the trigger within a backdoor sample and assess the efficacy of existing concept editing methods in mitigating backdoor attacks. Empirical evaluations on two advanced backdoor attack scenarios show the effectiveness of our proposed defense method. For backdoor sample detection, T2IShield achieves a detection F1 score of 88.9% with low computational cost. Furthermore, T2IShield achieves a localization F1 score of 86.4% and invalidates 99% poisoned samples. Codes are released at https://github.com/Robin-WZQ/T2IShield.

Leading language model (LM) providers like OpenAI and Google offer fine-tuning APIs that allow customers to adapt LMs for specific use cases. To prevent misuse, these LM providers implement filtering mechanisms to block harmful fine-tuning data. Consequently, adversaries seeking to produce unsafe LMs via these APIs must craft adversarial training data that are not identifiably harmful. We make three contributions in this context: 1. We show that many existing attacks that use harmless data to create unsafe LMs rely on eliminating model refusals in the first few tokens of their responses. 2. We show that such prior attacks can be blocked by a simple defense that pre-fills the first few tokens from an aligned model before letting the fine-tuned model fill in the rest. 3. We describe a new data-poisoning attack, ``No, Of course I Can Execute'' (NOICE), which exploits an LM's formulaic refusal mechanism to elicit harmful responses. By training an LM to refuse benign requests on the basis of safety before fulfilling those requests regardless, we are able to jailbreak several open-source models and a closed-source model (GPT-4o). We show an attack success rate (ASR) of 57% against GPT-4o; our attack earned a Bug Bounty from OpenAI. Against open-source models protected by simple defenses, we improve ASRs by an average of 3.25 times compared to the best performing previous attacks that use only harmless data. NOICE demonstrates the exploitability of repetitive refusal mechanisms and broadens understanding of the threats closed-source models face from harmless data.

Safety backdoor attacks in large language models (LLMs) enable the stealthy triggering of unsafe behaviors while evading detection during normal interactions. The high dimensionality of potential triggers in the token space and the diverse range of malicious behaviors make this a critical challenge. We present BEEAR, a mitigation approach leveraging the insight that backdoor triggers induce relatively uniform drifts in the model's embedding space. Our bi-level optimization method identifies universal embedding perturbations that elicit unwanted behaviors and adjusts the model parameters to reinforce safe behaviors against these perturbations. Experiments show BEEAR reduces the success rate of RLHF time backdoor attacks from >95% to <1% and from 47% to 0% for instruction-tuning time backdoors targeting malicious code generation, without compromising model utility. Requiring only defender-defined safe and unwanted behaviors, BEEAR represents a step towards practical defenses against safety backdoors in LLMs, providing a foundation for further advancements in AI safety and security.

Neural graphics primitives are faster and achieve higher quality when their neural networks are augmented by spatial data structures that hold trainable features arranged in a grid. However, existing feature grids either come with a large memory footprint (dense or factorized grids, trees, and hash tables) or slow performance (index learning and vector quantization). In this paper, we show that a hash table with learned probes has neither disadvantage, resulting in a favorable combination of size and speed. Inference is faster than unprobed hash tables at equal quality while training is only 1.2-2.6x slower, significantly outperforming prior index learning approaches. We arrive at this formulation by casting all feature grids into a common framework: they each correspond to a lookup function that indexes into a table of feature vectors. In this framework, the lookup functions of existing data structures can be combined by simple arithmetic combinations of their indices, resulting in Pareto optimal compression and speed.

Batch prompting, which combines a batch of multiple queries sharing the same context in one inference, has emerged as a promising solution to reduce inference costs. However, our study reveals a significant security vulnerability in batch prompting: malicious users can inject attack instructions into a batch, leading to unwanted interference across all queries, which can result in the inclusion of harmful content, such as phishing links, or the disruption of logical reasoning. In this paper, we construct BATCHSAFEBENCH, a comprehensive benchmark comprising 150 attack instructions of two types and 8k batch instances, to study the batch prompting vulnerability systematically. Our evaluation of both closed-source and open-weight LLMs demonstrates that all LLMs are susceptible to batch-prompting attacks. We then explore multiple defending approaches. While the prompting-based defense shows limited effectiveness for smaller LLMs, the probing-based approach achieves about 95% accuracy in detecting attacks. Additionally, we perform a mechanistic analysis to understand the attack and identify attention heads that are responsible for it.

Given a database of bit strings A_1,ldots,A_min {0,1}^n, a fundamental data structure task is to estimate the distances between a given query Bin {0,1}^n with all the strings in the database. In addition, one might further want to ensure the integrity of the database by releasing these distance statistics in a secure manner. In this work, we propose differentially private (DP) data structures for this type of tasks, with a focus on Hamming and edit distance. On top of the strong privacy guarantees, our data structures are also time- and space-efficient. In particular, our data structure is epsilon-DP against any sequence of queries of arbitrary length, and for any query B such that the maximum distance to any string in the database is at most k, we output m distance estimates. Moreover, - For Hamming distance, our data structure answers any query in widetilde O(mk+n) time and each estimate deviates from the true distance by at most widetilde O(k/e^{epsilon/log k}); - For edit distance, our data structure answers any query in widetilde O(mk^2+n) time and each estimate deviates from the true distance by at most widetilde O(k/e^{epsilon/(log k log n)}). For moderate k, both data structures support sublinear query operations. We obtain these results via a novel adaptation of the randomized response technique as a bit flipping procedure, applied to the sketched strings.

For a broad range of research, governmental and commercial applications it is important to understand the allegiances, communities and structure of key players in society. One promising direction towards extracting this information is to exploit the rich relational data in digital social networks (the social graph). As social media data sets are very large, most approaches make use of distributed computing systems for this purpose. Distributing graph processing requires solving many difficult engineering problems, which has lead some researchers to look at single-machine solutions that are faster and easier to maintain. In this article, we present a single-machine real-time system for large-scale graph processing that allows analysts to interactively explore graph structures. The key idea is that the aggregate actions of large numbers of users can be compressed into a data structure that encapsulates user similarities while being robust to noise and queryable in real-time. We achieve single machine real-time performance by compressing the neighbourhood of each vertex using minhash signatures and facilitate rapid queries through Locality Sensitive Hashing. These techniques reduce query times from hours using industrial desktop machines operating on the full graph to milliseconds on standard laptops. Our method allows exploration of strongly associated regions (i.e. communities) of large graphs in real-time on a laptop. It has been deployed in software that is actively used by social network analysts and offers another channel for media owners to monetise their data, helping them to continue to provide free services that are valued by billions of people globally.

We often interact with untrusted parties. Prioritization of privacy can limit the effectiveness of these interactions, as achieving certain goals necessitates sharing private data. Traditionally, addressing this challenge has involved either seeking trusted intermediaries or constructing cryptographic protocols that restrict how much data is revealed, such as multi-party computations or zero-knowledge proofs. While significant advances have been made in scaling cryptographic approaches, they remain limited in terms of the size and complexity of applications they can be used for. In this paper, we argue that capable machine learning models can fulfill the role of a trusted third party, thus enabling secure computations for applications that were previously infeasible. In particular, we describe Trusted Capable Model Environments (TCMEs) as an alternative approach for scaling secure computation, where capable machine learning model(s) interact under input/output constraints, with explicit information flow control and explicit statelessness. This approach aims to achieve a balance between privacy and computational efficiency, enabling private inference where classical cryptographic solutions are currently infeasible. We describe a number of use cases that are enabled by TCME, and show that even some simple classic cryptographic problems can already be solved with TCME. Finally, we outline current limitations and discuss the path forward in implementing them.

Conditional computation is a popular strategy to make Transformers more efficient. Existing methods often target individual modules (e.g., mixture-of-experts layers) or skip layers independently of one another. However, interpretability research has demonstrated that the middle layers of Transformers exhibit greater redundancy, and that early layers aggregate information into token positions. Guided by these insights, we propose a novel architecture that dynamically skips a variable number of layers from the middle outward. In particular, a learned gating mechanism determines whether to bypass a symmetric span of central blocks based on the input, and a gated attention mechanism prevents subsequent tokens from attending to skipped token positions. Residual norms are controlled with a 'sandwich' or 'perilayernorm' scheme and gate sparsity with an adaptive regularization loss. We had aimed to reduce compute requirements for 'simpler' tokens and potentially foster an emergent multi-level representational hierarchy but, at the scales investigated, our approach does not achieve improvements in the trade-off between validation cross-entropy and estimated FLOPs compared to dense baselines with fewer layers. We release our code at https://github.com/tim-lawson/skip-middle.

LLMs are known to be vulnerable to jailbreak attacks, even after safety alignment. An important observation is that, while different types of jailbreak attacks can generate significantly different queries, they mostly result in similar responses that are rooted in the same harmful knowledge (e.g., detailed steps to make a bomb). Therefore, we conjecture that directly unlearn the harmful knowledge in the LLM can be a more effective way to defend against jailbreak attacks than the mainstream supervised fine-tuning (SFT) based approaches. Our extensive experiments confirmed our insight and suggested surprising generalizability of our unlearning-based approach: using only 20 raw harmful questions without any jailbreak prompt during training, our solution reduced the Attack Success Rate (ASR) in Vicuna-7B on out-of-distribution (OOD) harmful questions wrapped with various complex jailbreak prompts from 82.6\% to 7.7\%. This significantly outperforms Llama2-7B-Chat, which is fine-tuned on about 0.1M safety alignment samples but still has an ASR of 21.9\% even under the help of an additional safety system prompt. Further analysis reveals that the generalization ability of our solution stems from the intrinsic relatedness among harmful responses across harmful questions (e.g., response patterns, shared steps and actions, and similarity among their learned representations in the LLM). Our code is available at https://github.com/thu-coai/SafeUnlearning.

Conversational large language models are fine-tuned for both instruction-following and safety, resulting in models that obey benign requests but refuse harmful ones. While this refusal behavior is widespread across chat models, its underlying mechanisms remain poorly understood. In this work, we show that refusal is mediated by a one-dimensional subspace, across 13 popular open-source chat models up to 72B parameters in size. Specifically, for each model, we find a single direction such that erasing this direction from the model's residual stream activations prevents it from refusing harmful instructions, while adding this direction elicits refusal on even harmless instructions. Leveraging this insight, we propose a novel white-box jailbreak method that surgically disables refusal with minimal effect on other capabilities. Finally, we mechanistically analyze how adversarial suffixes suppress propagation of the refusal-mediating direction. Our findings underscore the brittleness of current safety fine-tuning methods. More broadly, our work showcases how an understanding of model internals can be leveraged to develop practical methods for controlling model behavior.

Ensuring privacy-preserving inference on cryptographically secure data is a well-known computational challenge. To alleviate the bottleneck of costly cryptographic computations in non-linear activations, recent methods have suggested linearizing a targeted portion of these activations in neural networks. This technique results in significantly reduced runtimes with often negligible impacts on accuracy. In this paper, we demonstrate that such computational benefits may lead to increased fairness costs. Specifically, we find that reducing the number of ReLU activations disproportionately decreases the accuracy for minority groups compared to majority groups. To explain these observations, we provide a mathematical interpretation under restricted assumptions about the nature of the decision boundary, while also showing the prevalence of this problem across widely used datasets and architectures. Finally, we show how a simple procedure altering the fine-tuning step for linearized models can serve as an effective mitigation strategy.

A deep hashing model typically has two main learning objectives: to make the learned binary hash codes discriminative and to minimize a quantization error. With further constraints such as bit balance and code orthogonality, it is not uncommon for existing models to employ a large number (>4) of losses. This leads to difficulties in model training and subsequently impedes their effectiveness. In this work, we propose a novel deep hashing model with only a single learning objective. Specifically, we show that maximizing the cosine similarity between the continuous codes and their corresponding binary orthogonal codes can ensure both hash code discriminativeness and quantization error minimization. Further, with this learning objective, code balancing can be achieved by simply using a Batch Normalization (BN) layer and multi-label classification is also straightforward with label smoothing. The result is an one-loss deep hashing model that removes all the hassles of tuning the weights of various losses. Importantly, extensive experiments show that our model is highly effective, outperforming the state-of-the-art multi-loss hashing models on three large-scale instance retrieval benchmarks, often by significant margins. Code is available at https://github.com/kamwoh/orthohash

Large language model (LLM) routing has emerged as a crucial strategy for balancing computational costs with performance by dynamically assigning queries to the most appropriate model based on query complexity. Despite recent advances showing that preference-data-based routers can outperform traditional methods, current evaluation benchmarks remain limited. They largely focus on general model capabilities while overlooking task-specific behaviors and critical concerns such as privacy, safety, and potential backdoor vulnerabilities introduced through preference data. In response, we propose the DSC benchmark: Diverse, Simple, and Categorized, an evaluation framework that categorizes router performance across a broad spectrum of query types, including coding, translation, mathematics, human instructions, general knowledge, and LLM jailbreaking. Additionally, it integrates privacy and safety assessments to reveal hidden risks. Our experiments on three preference-based routers and two commercial counterparts demonstrate that while these systems improve efficiency, they often make suboptimal, category-driven decisions. For instance, a BERT-based router directs all coding and mathematics queries to the most powerful LLM even when simpler models would suffice, while routing jailbreaking attempts to weaker models, thereby elevating safety risks.

Backdoor defense, which aims to detect or mitigate the effect of malicious triggers introduced by attackers, is becoming increasingly critical for machine learning security and integrity. Fine-tuning based on benign data is a natural defense to erase the backdoor effect in a backdoored model. However, recent studies show that, given limited benign data, vanilla fine-tuning has poor defense performance. In this work, we provide a deep study of fine-tuning the backdoored model from the neuron perspective and find that backdoorrelated neurons fail to escape the local minimum in the fine-tuning process. Inspired by observing that the backdoorrelated neurons often have larger norms, we propose FTSAM, a novel backdoor defense paradigm that aims to shrink the norms of backdoor-related neurons by incorporating sharpness-aware minimization with fine-tuning. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our method on several benchmark datasets and network architectures, where it achieves state-of-the-art defense performance. Overall, our work provides a promising avenue for improving the robustness of machine learning models against backdoor attacks.

Language model attacks typically assume one of two extreme threat models: full white-box access to model weights, or black-box access limited to a text generation API. However, real-world APIs are often more flexible than just text generation: these APIs expose "gray-box" access leading to new threat vectors. To explore this, we red-team three new functionalities exposed in the GPT-4 APIs: fine-tuning, function calling and knowledge retrieval. We find that fine-tuning a model on as few as 15 harmful examples or 100 benign examples can remove core safeguards from GPT-4, enabling a range of harmful outputs. Furthermore, we find that GPT-4 Assistants readily divulge the function call schema and can be made to execute arbitrary function calls. Finally, we find that knowledge retrieval can be hijacked by injecting instructions into retrieval documents. These vulnerabilities highlight that any additions to the functionality exposed by an API can create new vulnerabilities.

As valuable digital assets, deep neural networks necessitate robust ownership protection, positioning neural network watermarking (NNW) as a promising solution. Among various NNW approaches, weight-based methods are favored for their simplicity and practicality; however, they remain vulnerable to forging and overwriting attacks. To address those challenges, we propose NeuralMark, a robust method built around a hashed watermark filter. Specifically, we utilize a hash function to generate an irreversible binary watermark from a secret key, which is then used as a filter to select the model parameters for embedding. This design cleverly intertwines the embedding parameters with the hashed watermark, providing a robust defense against both forging and overwriting attacks. An average pooling is also incorporated to resist fine-tuning and pruning attacks. Furthermore, it can be seamlessly integrated into various neural network architectures, ensuring broad applicability. Theoretically, we analyze its security boundary. Empirically, we verify its effectiveness and robustness across 13 distinct Convolutional and Transformer architectures, covering five image classification tasks and one text generation task. The source codes are available at https://github.com/AIResearch-Group/NeuralMark.

Key-Value (KV) Caching has become an essential technique for accelerating the inference speed and throughput of generative Large Language Models~(LLMs). However, the memory footprint of the KV cache poses a critical bottleneck in LLM deployment as the cache size grows with batch size and sequence length, often surpassing even the size of the model itself. Although recent methods were proposed to select and evict unimportant KV pairs from the cache to reduce memory consumption, the potential ramifications of eviction on the generative process are yet to be thoroughly examined. In this paper, we examine the detrimental impact of cache eviction and observe that unforeseen risks arise as the information contained in the KV pairs is exhaustively discarded, resulting in safety breaches, hallucinations, and context loss. Surprisingly, we find that preserving even a small amount of information contained in the evicted KV pairs via reduced precision quantization substantially recovers the incurred degradation. On the other hand, we observe that the important KV pairs must be kept at a relatively higher precision to safeguard the generation quality. Motivated by these observations, we propose Mixed-precision KV cache~(MiKV), a reliable cache compression method that simultaneously preserves the context details by retaining the evicted KV pairs in low-precision and ensure generation quality by keeping the important KV pairs in high-precision. Experiments on diverse benchmarks and LLM backbones show that our proposed method offers a state-of-the-art trade-off between compression ratio and performance, compared to other baselines.

Mainstream backdoor attack methods typically demand substantial tuning data for poisoning, limiting their practicality and potentially degrading the overall performance when applied to Large Language Models (LLMs). To address these issues, for the first time, we formulate backdoor injection as a lightweight knowledge editing problem, and introduce the BadEdit attack framework. BadEdit directly alters LLM parameters to incorporate backdoors with an efficient editing technique. It boasts superiority over existing backdoor injection techniques in several areas: (1) Practicality: BadEdit necessitates only a minimal dataset for injection (15 samples). (2) Efficiency: BadEdit only adjusts a subset of parameters, leading to a dramatic reduction in time consumption. (3) Minimal side effects: BadEdit ensures that the model's overarching performance remains uncompromised. (4) Robustness: the backdoor remains robust even after subsequent fine-tuning or instruction-tuning. Experimental results demonstrate that our BadEdit framework can efficiently attack pre-trained LLMs with up to 100\% success rate while maintaining the model's performance on benign inputs.

The rapid growth of large-scale AI models, particularly large language models has brought significant challenges in data privacy, computational resources, and accessibility. Traditional centralized architectures often struggle to meet required data security and scalability needs which hinders the democratization of AI systems. Nesa introduces a model-agnostic sharding framework designed for decentralized AI inference. Our framework uses blockchain-based sequential deep neural network sharding to distribute computational tasks across a diverse network of nodes based on a personalised heuristic and routing mechanism. This enables efficient distributed training and inference for recent large-scale models even on consumer-grade hardware. We use compression techniques like dynamic blockwise quantization and mixed matrix decomposition to reduce data transfer and memory needs. We also integrate robust security measures, including hardware-based trusted execution environments to ensure data integrity and confidentiality. Evaluating our system across various natural language processing and vision tasks shows that these compression strategies do not compromise model accuracy. Our results highlight the potential to democratize access to cutting-edge AI technologies by enabling secure and efficient inference on a decentralized network.

The simultaneous rise of machine learning as a service and concerns over user privacy have increasingly motivated the need for private inference (PI). While recent work demonstrates PI is possible using cryptographic primitives, the computational overheads render it impractical. The community is largely unprepared to address these overheads, as the source of slowdown in PI stems from the ReLU operator whereas optimizations for plaintext inference focus on optimizing FLOPs. In this paper we re-think the ReLU computation and propose optimizations for PI tailored to properties of neural networks. Specifically, we reformulate ReLU as an approximate sign test and introduce a novel truncation method for the sign test that significantly reduces the cost per ReLU. These optimizations result in a specific type of stochastic ReLU. The key observation is that the stochastic fault behavior is well suited for the fault-tolerant properties of neural network inference. Thus, we provide significant savings without impacting accuracy. We collectively call the optimizations Circa and demonstrate improvements of up to 4.7x storage and 3x runtime over baseline implementations; we further show that Circa can be used on top of recent PI optimizations to obtain 1.8x additional speedup.

Recent studies have demonstrated that deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to backdoor attacks during the training process. Specifically, the adversaries intend to embed hidden backdoors in DNNs so that malicious model predictions can be activated through pre-defined trigger patterns. In this paper, we explore the backdoor mechanism from the angle of the model structure. We select the skip connection for discussions, inspired by the understanding that it helps the learning of model `shortcuts' where backdoor triggers are usually easier to be learned. Specifically, we demonstrate that the attack success rate (ASR) decreases significantly when reducing the outputs of some key skip connections. Based on this observation, we design a simple yet effective backdoor removal method by suppressing the skip connections in critical layers selected by our method. We also implement fine-tuning on these layers to recover high benign accuracy and to further reduce ASR. Extensive experiments on benchmark datasets verify the effectiveness of our method.

Semi-supervised machine learning (SSL) is gaining popularity as it reduces the cost of training ML models. It does so by using very small amounts of (expensive, well-inspected) labeled data and large amounts of (cheap, non-inspected) unlabeled data. SSL has shown comparable or even superior performances compared to conventional fully-supervised ML techniques. In this paper, we show that the key feature of SSL that it can learn from (non-inspected) unlabeled data exposes SSL to strong poisoning attacks. In fact, we argue that, due to its reliance on non-inspected unlabeled data, poisoning is a much more severe problem in SSL than in conventional fully-supervised ML. Specifically, we design a backdoor poisoning attack on SSL that can be conducted by a weak adversary with no knowledge of target SSL pipeline. This is unlike prior poisoning attacks in fully-supervised settings that assume strong adversaries with practically-unrealistic capabilities. We show that by poisoning only 0.2% of the unlabeled training data, our attack can cause misclassification of more than 80% of test inputs (when they contain the adversary's backdoor trigger). Our attacks remain effective across twenty combinations of benchmark datasets and SSL algorithms, and even circumvent the state-of-the-art defenses against backdoor attacks. Our work raises significant concerns about the practical utility of existing SSL algorithms.

Recent work has shown it is possible to construct adversarial examples that cause an aligned language model to emit harmful strings or perform harmful behavior. Existing attacks work either in the white-box setting (with full access to the model weights), or through transferability: the phenomenon that adversarial examples crafted on one model often remain effective on other models. We improve on prior work with a query-based attack that leverages API access to a remote language model to construct adversarial examples that cause the model to emit harmful strings with (much) higher probability than with transfer-only attacks. We validate our attack on GPT-3.5 and OpenAI's safety classifier; we can cause GPT-3.5 to emit harmful strings that current transfer attacks fail at, and we can evade the safety classifier with nearly 100% probability.

Linear Transformers have gained attention as efficient alternatives to standard Transformers, but their performance in retrieval and long-context tasks has been limited. To address these limitations, recent work has explored two distinct mechanisms: gating for adaptive memory control and the delta update rule for precise memory modifications. We observe that these mechanisms are complementary: gating enables rapid memory erasure while the delta rule facilitates targeted updates. Building on this insight, we introduce the gated delta rule and develop a parallel training algorithm optimized for modern hardware. Our proposed architecture, Gated DeltaNet, consistently surpasses existing models like Mamba2 and DeltaNet across multiple benchmarks, including language modeling, common-sense reasoning, in-context retrieval, length extrapolation, and long-context understanding. We further enhance performance by developing hybrid architectures that combine Gated DeltaNet layers with sliding window attention or Mamba2 layers, achieving both improved training efficiency and superior task performance.

Fast approximations to matrix multiplication have the potential to dramatically reduce the cost of neural network inference. Recent work on approximate matrix multiplication proposed to replace costly multiplications with table-lookups by fitting a fast hash function from training data. In this work, we propose improvements to this previous work, targeted to the deep learning inference setting, where one has access to both training data and fixed (already learned) model weight matrices. We further propose a fine-tuning procedure for accelerating entire neural networks while minimizing loss in accuracy. Finally, we analyze the proposed method on a simple image classification task. While we show improvements to prior work, overall classification accuracy remains substantially diminished compared to exact matrix multiplication. Our work, despite this negative result, points the way towards future efforts to accelerate inner products with fast nonlinear hashing methods.

Generative models have rapidly evolved to generate realistic outputs. However, their synthetic outputs increasingly challenge the clear distinction between natural and AI-generated content, necessitating robust watermarking techniques. Watermarks are typically expected to preserve the integrity of the target image, withstand removal attempts, and prevent unauthorized replication onto unrelated images. To address this need, recent methods embed persistent watermarks into images produced by diffusion models using the initial noise. Yet, to do so, they either distort the distribution of generated images or rely on searching through a long dictionary of used keys for detection. In this paper, we propose a novel watermarking method that embeds semantic information about the generated image directly into the watermark, enabling a distortion-free watermark that can be verified without requiring a database of key patterns. Instead, the key pattern can be inferred from the semantic embedding of the image using locality-sensitive hashing. Furthermore, conditioning the watermark detection on the original image content improves robustness against forgery attacks. To demonstrate that, we consider two largely overlooked attack strategies: (i) an attacker extracting the initial noise and generating a novel image with the same pattern; (ii) an attacker inserting an unrelated (potentially harmful) object into a watermarked image, possibly while preserving the watermark. We empirically validate our method's increased robustness to these attacks. Taken together, our results suggest that content-aware watermarks can mitigate risks arising from image-generative models.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly deployed in safety-critical applications, the lack of systematic methods to assess their vulnerability to jailbreak attacks presents a critical security gap. We introduce the jailbreak oracle problem: given a model, prompt, and decoding strategy, determine whether a jailbreak response can be generated with likelihood exceeding a specified threshold. This formalization enables a principled study of jailbreak vulnerabilities. Answering the jailbreak oracle problem poses significant computational challenges -- the search space grows exponentially with the length of the response tokens. We present Boa, the first efficient algorithm for solving the jailbreak oracle problem. Boa employs a three-phase search strategy: (1) constructing block lists to identify refusal patterns, (2) breadth-first sampling to identify easily accessible jailbreaks, and (3) depth-first priority search guided by fine-grained safety scores to systematically explore promising low-probability paths. Boa enables rigorous security assessments including systematic defense evaluation, standardized comparison of red team attacks, and model certification under extreme adversarial conditions.

Large language models trained for safety and harmlessness remain susceptible to adversarial misuse, as evidenced by the prevalence of "jailbreak" attacks on early releases of ChatGPT that elicit undesired behavior. Going beyond recognition of the issue, we investigate why such attacks succeed and how they can be created. We hypothesize two failure modes of safety training: competing objectives and mismatched generalization. Competing objectives arise when a model's capabilities and safety goals conflict, while mismatched generalization occurs when safety training fails to generalize to a domain for which capabilities exist. We use these failure modes to guide jailbreak design and then evaluate state-of-the-art models, including OpenAI's GPT-4 and Anthropic's Claude v1.3, against both existing and newly designed attacks. We find that vulnerabilities persist despite the extensive red-teaming and safety-training efforts behind these models. Notably, new attacks utilizing our failure modes succeed on every prompt in a collection of unsafe requests from the models' red-teaming evaluation sets and outperform existing ad hoc jailbreaks. Our analysis emphasizes the need for safety-capability parity -- that safety mechanisms should be as sophisticated as the underlying model -- and argues against the idea that scaling alone can resolve these safety failure modes.

Efficient deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs) requires batching multiple requests together to improve throughput. As the batch size, context length, or model size increases, the size of the key and value (KV) cache can quickly become the main contributor to GPU memory usage and the bottleneck of inference latency. Quantization has emerged as an effective technique for KV cache compression, but existing methods still fail at very low bit widths. We observe that distinct channels of a key/value activation embedding are highly inter-dependent, and the joint entropy of multiple channels grows at a slower rate than the sum of their marginal entropies. Based on this insight, we propose Coupled Quantization (CQ), which couples multiple key/value channels together to exploit their inter-dependency and encode the activations in a more information-efficient manner. Extensive experiments reveal that CQ outperforms or is competitive with existing baselines in preserving model quality. Furthermore, we demonstrate that CQ can preserve model quality with KV cache quantized down to 1-bit.

We introduce Block-Attention, an attention mechanism designed to address the increased inference latency and cost in Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) scenarios. Traditional approaches often encode the entire context. Instead, Block-Attention divides retrieved documents into discrete blocks, with each block independently calculating key-value (KV) states except for the final block. In RAG scenarios, by defining each passage as a block, Block-Attention enables us to reuse the KV states of passages that have been seen before, thereby significantly reducing the latency and the computation overhead during inference. The implementation of Block-Attention involves block segmentation, position re-encoding, and fine-tuning the LLM to adapt to the Block-Attention mechanism. Experiments on four RAG benchmarks demonstrate that after block fine-tuning, the Block-Attention model achieves performance comparable to self-attention models (68.4\% vs 67.9\% on Llama3) or even superior performance (62.8\% vs 59.6\% on Mistral). Notably, Block-Attention significantly reduces the time to first token (TTFT) and floating point operations (FLOPs) to a very low level. It only takes 45 ms to output the first token for an input sequence with a total length of 32K. Compared to the self-attention models, the time consumption and corresponding FLOPs are reduced by 98.7\% and 99.8\%, respectively.

Although recent personalization methods have democratized high-resolution image synthesis by enabling swift concept acquisition with minimal examples and lightweight computation, they also present an exploitable avenue for high accessible backdoor attacks. This paper investigates a critical and unexplored aspect of text-to-image (T2I) diffusion models - their potential vulnerability to backdoor attacks via personalization. Our study focuses on a zero-day backdoor vulnerability prevalent in two families of personalization methods, epitomized by Textual Inversion and DreamBooth.Compared to traditional backdoor attacks, our proposed method can facilitate more precise, efficient, and easily accessible attacks with a lower barrier to entry. We provide a comprehensive review of personalization in T2I diffusion models, highlighting the operation and exploitation potential of this backdoor vulnerability. To be specific, by studying the prompt processing of Textual Inversion and DreamBooth, we have devised dedicated backdoor attacks according to the different ways of dealing with unseen tokens and analyzed the influence of triggers and concept images on the attack effect. Our empirical study has shown that the nouveau-token backdoor attack has better attack performance while legacy-token backdoor attack is potentially harder to defend.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) introduce a new generation paradigm of explicitly reasoning before answering, leading to remarkable improvements in complex tasks. However, they pose great safety risks against harmful queries and adversarial attacks. While recent mainstream safety efforts on LRMs, supervised fine-tuning (SFT), improve safety performance, we find that SFT-aligned models struggle to generalize to unseen jailbreak prompts. After thorough investigation of LRMs' generation, we identify a safety aha moment that can activate safety reasoning and lead to a safe response. This aha moment typically appears in the `key sentence', which follows models' query understanding process and can indicate whether the model will proceed safely. Based on these insights, we propose SafeKey, including two complementary objectives to better activate the safety aha moment in the key sentence: (1) a Dual-Path Safety Head to enhance the safety signal in the model's internal representations before the key sentence, and (2) a Query-Mask Modeling objective to improve the models' attention on its query understanding, which has important safety hints. Experiments across multiple safety benchmarks demonstrate that our methods significantly improve safety generalization to a wide range of jailbreak attacks and out-of-distribution harmful prompts, lowering the average harmfulness rate by 9.6\%, while maintaining general abilities. Our analysis reveals how SafeKey enhances safety by reshaping internal attention and improving the quality of hidden representations.

Recent developments in Large Language Models (LLMs) have manifested significant advancements. To facilitate safeguards against malicious exploitation, a body of research has concentrated on aligning LLMs with human preferences and inhibiting their generation of inappropriate content. Unfortunately, such alignments are often vulnerable: fine-tuning with a minimal amount of harmful data can easily unalign the target LLM. While being effective, such fine-tuning-based unalignment approaches also have their own limitations: (1) non-stealthiness, after fine-tuning, safety audits or red-teaming can easily expose the potential weaknesses of the unaligned models, thereby precluding their release/use. (2) non-persistence, the unaligned LLMs can be easily repaired through re-alignment, i.e., fine-tuning again with aligned data points. In this work, we show that it is possible to conduct stealthy and persistent unalignment on large language models via backdoor injections. We also provide a novel understanding on the relationship between the backdoor persistence and the activation pattern and further provide guidelines for potential trigger design. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that our proposed stealthy and persistent unalignment can successfully pass the safety evaluation while maintaining strong persistence against re-alignment defense.

Safety-aligned large language models (LLMs) sometimes falsely refuse pseudo-harmful prompts, like "how to kill a mosquito," which are actually harmless. Frequent false refusals not only frustrate users but also provoke a public backlash against the very values alignment seeks to protect. In this paper, we propose the first method to auto-generate diverse, content-controlled, and model-dependent pseudo-harmful prompts. Using this method, we construct an evaluation dataset called PHTest, which is ten times larger than existing datasets, covers more false refusal patterns, and separately labels controversial prompts. We evaluate 20 LLMs on PHTest, uncovering new insights due to its scale and labeling. Our findings reveal a trade-off between minimizing false refusals and improving safety against jailbreak attacks. Moreover, we show that many jailbreak defenses significantly increase the false refusal rates, thereby undermining usability. Our method and dataset can help developers evaluate and fine-tune safer and more usable LLMs. Our code and dataset are available at https://github.com/umd-huang-lab/FalseRefusal

In recent years, Diffusion Models (DMs) have demonstrated significant advances in the field of image generation. However, according to current research, DMs are vulnerable to backdoor attacks, which allow attackers to control the model's output by inputting data containing covert triggers, such as a specific patch or phrase. Existing defense strategies are well equipped to thwart such attacks through backdoor detection and trigger inversion because previous attack methods are constrained by limited input spaces and triggers defined by low-dimensional features. To bridge these gaps, we propose Gungnir, a novel method that enables attackers to activate the backdoor in DMs through hidden style triggers within input images. Our approach proposes using stylistic features as triggers for the first time and implements backdoor attacks successfully in image2image tasks by utilizing Reconstructing-Adversarial Noise (RAN) and Short-Term-Timesteps-Retention (STTR) of DMs. Meanwhile, experiments demonstrate that our method can easily bypass existing defense methods. Among existing DM main backdoor defense frameworks, our approach achieves a 0\% backdoor detection rate (BDR). Our codes are available at https://github.com/paoche11/Gungnir.

Along with the remarkable successes of Language language models, recent research also started to explore the security threats of LLMs, including jailbreaking attacks. Attackers carefully craft jailbreaking prompts such that a target LLM will respond to the harmful question. Existing jailbreaking attacks require either human experts or leveraging complicated algorithms to craft jailbreaking prompts. In this paper, we introduce BOOST, a simple attack that leverages only the eos tokens. We demonstrate that rather than constructing complicated jailbreaking prompts, the attacker can simply append a few eos tokens to the end of a harmful question. It will bypass the safety alignment of LLMs and lead to successful jailbreaking attacks. We further apply BOOST to four representative jailbreak methods and show that the attack success rates of these methods can be significantly enhanced by simply adding eos tokens to the prompt. To understand this simple but novel phenomenon, we conduct empirical analyses. Our analysis reveals that adding eos tokens makes the target LLM believe the input is much less harmful, and eos tokens have low attention values and do not affect LLM's understanding of the harmful questions, leading the model to actually respond to the questions. Our findings uncover how fragile an LLM is against jailbreak attacks, motivating the development of strong safety alignment approaches.

Although large language models (LLMs) are typically aligned, they remain vulnerable to jailbreaking through either carefully crafted prompts in natural language or, interestingly, gibberish adversarial suffixes. However, gibberish tokens have received relatively less attention despite their success in attacking aligned LLMs. Recent work, AmpleGCG~liao2024amplegcg, demonstrates that a generative model can quickly produce numerous customizable gibberish adversarial suffixes for any harmful query, exposing a range of alignment gaps in out-of-distribution (OOD) language spaces. To bring more attention to this area, we introduce AmpleGCG-Plus, an enhanced version that achieves better performance in fewer attempts. Through a series of exploratory experiments, we identify several training strategies to improve the learning of gibberish suffixes. Our results, verified under a strict evaluation setting, show that it outperforms AmpleGCG on both open-weight and closed-source models, achieving increases in attack success rate (ASR) of up to 17\% in the white-box setting against Llama-2-7B-chat, and more than tripling ASR in the black-box setting against GPT-4. Notably, AmpleGCG-Plus jailbreaks the newer GPT-4o series of models at similar rates to GPT-4, and, uncovers vulnerabilities against the recently proposed circuit breakers defense. We publicly release AmpleGCG-Plus along with our collected training datasets.

Efficient real-world deployments of large language models (LLMs) rely on Key-Value (KV) caching for processing and generating long outputs, reducing the need for repetitive computation. For large contexts, Key-Value caches can take up tens of gigabytes of device memory, as they store vector representations for each token and layer. Recent work has shown that the cached vectors can be compressed through quantization, pruning or merging, but these techniques often compromise quality towards higher compression rates. In this work, we aim to improve Key & Value compression by exploiting two observations: 1) the inherent dependencies between keys and values across different layers, and 2) high-compression mechanisms for internal network states. We propose AQUA-KV, an adaptive quantization for Key-Value caches that relies on compact adapters to exploit existing dependencies between Keys and Values, and aims to "optimally" compress the information that cannot be predicted. AQUA-KV significantly improves compression rates, while maintaining high accuracy on state-of-the-art LLM families. On Llama 3.2 LLMs, we achieve near-lossless inference at 2-2.5 bits per value with under 1% relative error in perplexity and LongBench scores. AQUA-KV is one-shot, simple, and efficient: it can be calibrated on a single GPU within 1-6 hours, even for 70B models.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly integrated into real-world applications such as code generation and chatbot assistance, extensive efforts have been made to align LLM behavior with human values, including safety. Jailbreak attacks, aiming to provoke unintended and unsafe behaviors from LLMs, remain a significant/leading LLM safety threat. In this paper, we aim to defend LLMs against jailbreak attacks by introducing SafeDecoding, a safety-aware decoding strategy for LLMs to generate helpful and harmless responses to user queries. Our insight in developing SafeDecoding is based on the observation that, even though probabilities of tokens representing harmful contents outweigh those representing harmless responses, safety disclaimers still appear among the top tokens after sorting tokens by probability in descending order. This allows us to mitigate jailbreak attacks by identifying safety disclaimers and amplifying their token probabilities, while simultaneously attenuating the probabilities of token sequences that are aligned with the objectives of jailbreak attacks. We perform extensive experiments on five LLMs using six state-of-the-art jailbreak attacks and four benchmark datasets. Our results show that SafeDecoding significantly reduces the attack success rate and harmfulness of jailbreak attacks without compromising the helpfulness of responses to benign user queries. SafeDecoding outperforms six defense methods.

Memory-safety bugs introduce critical software-security issues. Rust provides memory-safe mechanisms to avoid memory-safety bugs in programming, while still allowing unsafe escape hatches via unsafe code. However, the unsafe code that enhances the usability of Rust provides clear spots for finding memory-safety bugs in Rust source code. In this paper, we claim that these unsafe spots can still be identifiable in Rust binary code via machine learning and be leveraged for finding memory-safety bugs. To support our claim, we propose the tool textttrustspot, that enables reverse engineering to learn an unsafe classifier that proposes a list of functions in Rust binaries for downstream analysis. We empirically show that the function proposals by textttrustspot can recall 92.92% of memory-safety bugs, while it covers only 16.79% of the entire binary code. As an application, we demonstrate that the function proposals are used in targeted fuzzing on Rust packages, which contribute to reducing the fuzzing time compared to non-targeted fuzzing.

Jailbreak attacks, where harmful prompts bypass generative models' built-in safety, raise serious concerns about model vulnerability. While many defense methods have been proposed, the trade-offs between safety and helpfulness, and their application to Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs), are not well understood. This paper systematically examines jailbreak defenses by reframing the standard generation task as a binary classification problem to assess model refusal tendencies for both harmful and benign queries. We identify two key defense mechanisms: safety shift, which increases refusal rates across all queries, and harmfulness discrimination, which improves the model's ability to distinguish between harmful and benign inputs. Using these mechanisms, we develop two ensemble defense strategies-inter-mechanism ensembles and intra-mechanism ensembles-to balance safety and helpfulness. Experiments on the MM-SafetyBench and MOSSBench datasets with LLaVA-1.5 models show that these strategies effectively improve model safety or optimize the trade-off between safety and helpfulness.

Recent researches have shown that Large Language Models (LLMs) are susceptible to a security threat known as Backdoor Attack. The backdoored model will behave well in normal cases but exhibit malicious behaviours on inputs inserted with a specific backdoor trigger. Current backdoor studies on LLMs predominantly focus on instruction-tuned LLMs, while neglecting another realistic scenario where LLMs are fine-tuned on multi-turn conversational data to be chat models. Chat models are extensively adopted across various real-world scenarios, thus the security of chat models deserves increasing attention. Unfortunately, we point out that the flexible multi-turn interaction format instead increases the flexibility of trigger designs and amplifies the vulnerability of chat models to backdoor attacks. In this work, we reveal and achieve a novel backdoor attacking method on chat models by distributing multiple trigger scenarios across user inputs in different rounds, and making the backdoor be triggered only when all trigger scenarios have appeared in the historical conversations. Experimental results demonstrate that our method can achieve high attack success rates (e.g., over 90% ASR on Vicuna-7B) while successfully maintaining the normal capabilities of chat models on providing helpful responses to benign user requests. Also, the backdoor can not be easily removed by the downstream re-alignment, highlighting the importance of continued research and attention to the security concerns of chat models. Warning: This paper may contain toxic content.

Rotary Position Embedding (RoPE) enables each attention head to capture multi-frequency information along the sequence dimension and is widely applied in foundation models. However, the nonlinearity introduced by RoPE complicates optimization of the key state in the Key-Value (KV) cache for RoPE-based attention. Existing KV cache compression methods typically store key state before rotation and apply the transformation during decoding, introducing additional computational overhead. This paper introduces EliteKV, a flexible modification framework for RoPE-based models supporting variable KV cache compression ratios. EliteKV first identifies the intrinsic frequency preference of each head using RoPElite, selectively restoring linearity to certain dimensions of key within attention computation. Building on this, joint low-rank compression of key and value enables partial cache sharing. Experimental results show that with minimal uptraining on only 0.6% of the original training data, RoPE-based models achieve a 75% reduction in KV cache size while preserving performance within a negligible margin. Furthermore, EliteKV consistently performs well across models of different scales within the same family.

With the help of conditioning mechanisms, the state-of-the-art diffusion models have achieved tremendous success in guided image generation, particularly in text-to-image synthesis. To gain a better understanding of the training process and potential risks of text-to-image synthesis, we perform a systematic investigation of backdoor attack on text-to-image diffusion models and propose BadT2I, a general multimodal backdoor attack framework that tampers with image synthesis in diverse semantic levels. Specifically, we perform backdoor attacks on three levels of the vision semantics: Pixel-Backdoor, Object-Backdoor and Style-Backdoor. By utilizing a regularization loss, our methods efficiently inject backdoors into a large-scale text-to-image diffusion model while preserving its utility with benign inputs. We conduct empirical experiments on Stable Diffusion, the widely-used text-to-image diffusion model, demonstrating that the large-scale diffusion model can be easily backdoored within a few fine-tuning steps. We conduct additional experiments to explore the impact of different types of textual triggers. Besides, we discuss the backdoor persistence during further training, the findings of which provide insights for the development of backdoor defense methods.

Large language models, such as OpenAI's ChatGPT, have demonstrated exceptional language understanding capabilities in various NLP tasks. Sparsely activated mixture-of-experts (MoE) has emerged as a promising solution for scaling models while maintaining a constant number of computational operations. Existing MoE model adopts a fixed gating network where each token is computed by the same number of experts. However, this approach contradicts our intuition that the tokens in each sequence vary in terms of their linguistic complexity and, consequently, require different computational costs. Little is discussed in prior research on the trade-off between computation per token and model performance. This paper introduces adaptive gating in MoE, a flexible training strategy that allows tokens to be processed by a variable number of experts based on expert probability distribution. The proposed framework preserves sparsity while improving training efficiency. Additionally, curriculum learning is leveraged to further reduce training time. Extensive experiments on diverse NLP tasks show that adaptive gating reduces at most 22.5% training time while maintaining inference quality. Moreover, we conduct a comprehensive analysis of the routing decisions and present our insights when adaptive gating is used.

The safety alignment of large language models (LLMs) remains vulnerable, as their initial behavior can be easily jailbroken by even relatively simple attacks. Since infilling a fixed template between the input instruction and initial model output is a common practice for existing LLMs, we hypothesize that this template is a key factor behind their vulnerabilities: LLMs' safety-related decision-making overly relies on the aggregated information from the template region, which largely influences these models' safety behavior. We refer to this issue as template-anchored safety alignment. In this paper, we conduct extensive experiments and verify that template-anchored safety alignment is widespread across various aligned LLMs. Our mechanistic analyses demonstrate how it leads to models' susceptibility when encountering inference-time jailbreak attacks. Furthermore, we show that detaching safety mechanisms from the template region is promising in mitigating vulnerabilities to jailbreak attacks. We encourage future research to develop more robust safety alignment techniques that reduce reliance on the template region.

This paper introduces an information-aware quantization framework that adaptively compresses the key-value (KV) cache in large language models (LLMs). Although prior work has underscored the distinct roles of key and value cache during inference, our systematic analysis -- examining singular value distributions, spectral norms, and Frobenius norms -- reveals, for the first time, that key matrices consistently exhibit higher norm values and are more sensitive to quantization than value matrices. Furthermore, our theoretical analysis shows that matrices with higher spectral norms amplify quantization errors more significantly. Motivated by these insights, we propose a mixed-precision quantization strategy, KV-AdaQuant, which allocates more bit-width for keys and fewer for values since key matrices have higher norm values. With the same total KV bit budget, this approach effectively mitigates error propagation across transformer layers while achieving significant memory savings. Our extensive experiments on multiple LLMs (1B--70B) demonstrate that our mixed-precision quantization scheme maintains high model accuracy even under aggressive compression. For instance, using 4-bit for Key and 2-bit for Value achieves an accuracy of 75.2%, whereas reversing the assignment (2-bit for Key and 4-bit for Value) yields only 54.7% accuracy. The code is available at https://tinyurl.com/kv-adaquant

Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have sparked widespread concerns about their safety. Recent work demonstrates that safety alignment of LLMs can be easily removed by fine-tuning with a few adversarially chosen instruction-following examples, i.e., fine-tuning attacks. We take a further step to understand fine-tuning attacks in multilingual LLMs. We first discover cross-lingual generalization of fine-tuning attacks: using a few adversarially chosen instruction-following examples in one language, multilingual LLMs can also be easily compromised (e.g., multilingual LLMs fail to refuse harmful prompts in other languages). Motivated by this finding, we hypothesize that safety-related information is language-agnostic and propose a new method termed Safety Information Localization (SIL) to identify the safety-related information in the model parameter space. Through SIL, we validate this hypothesis and find that only changing 20% of weight parameters in fine-tuning attacks can break safety alignment across all languages. Furthermore, we provide evidence to the alternative pathways hypothesis for why freezing safety-related parameters does not prevent fine-tuning attacks, and we demonstrate that our attack vector can still jailbreak LLMs adapted to new languages.

As the integration of the Large Language Models (LLMs) into various applications increases, so does their susceptibility to misuse, raising significant security concerns. Numerous jailbreak attacks have been proposed to assess the security defense of LLMs. Current jailbreak attacks mainly rely on scenario camouflage, prompt obfuscation, prompt optimization, and prompt iterative optimization to conceal malicious prompts. In particular, sequential prompt chains in a single query can lead LLMs to focus on certain prompts while ignoring others, facilitating context manipulation. This paper introduces SequentialBreak, a novel jailbreak attack that exploits this vulnerability. We discuss several scenarios, not limited to examples like Question Bank, Dialog Completion, and Game Environment, where the harmful prompt is embedded within benign ones that can fool LLMs into generating harmful responses. The distinct narrative structures of these scenarios show that SequentialBreak is flexible enough to adapt to various prompt formats beyond those discussed. Extensive experiments demonstrate that SequentialBreak uses only a single query to achieve a substantial gain of attack success rate over existing baselines against both open-source and closed-source models. Through our research, we highlight the urgent need for more robust and resilient safeguards to enhance LLM security and prevent potential misuse. All the result files and website associated with this research are available in this GitHub repository: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/JailBreakAttack-4F3B/.

Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) models have gained popularity in achieving state-of-the-art performance in a wide range of tasks in computer vision and natural language processing. They effectively expand the model capacity while incurring a minimal increase in computation cost during training. However, deploying such models for inference is difficult due to their large size and complex communication pattern. In this work, we provide a characterization of two MoE workloads, namely Language Modeling (LM) and Machine Translation (MT) and identify their sources of inefficiencies at deployment. We propose three optimization techniques to mitigate sources of inefficiencies, namely (1) Dynamic gating, (2) Expert Buffering, and (3) Expert load balancing. We show that dynamic gating improves maximum throughput by 6.21-11.23times for LM, 5.75-10.98times for MT Encoder and 2.58-5.71times for MT Decoder. It also reduces memory usage by up to 1.36times for LM and up to 1.1times for MT. We further propose Expert Buffering, a new caching mechanism that only keeps hot, active experts in GPU memory while buffering the rest in CPU memory. This reduces static memory allocation by up to 1.47times. We finally propose a load balancing methodology that provides additional scalability to the workload.

The vulnerability of Vision Large Language Models (VLLMs) to jailbreak attacks appears as no surprise. However, recent defense mechanisms against these attacks have reached near-saturation performance on benchmark evaluations, often with minimal effort. This dual high performance in both attack and defense raises a fundamental and perplexing paradox. To gain a deep understanding of this issue and thus further help strengthen the trustworthiness of VLLMs, this paper makes three key contributions: i) One tentative explanation for VLLMs being prone to jailbreak attacks--inclusion of vision inputs, as well as its in-depth analysis. ii) The recognition of a largely ignored problem in existing defense mechanisms--over-prudence. The problem causes these defense methods to exhibit unintended abstention, even in the presence of benign inputs, thereby undermining their reliability in faithfully defending against attacks. iii) A simple safety-aware method--LLM-Pipeline. Our method repurposes the more advanced guardrails of LLMs on the shelf, serving as an effective alternative detector prior to VLLM response. Last but not least, we find that the two representative evaluation methods for jailbreak often exhibit chance agreement. This limitation makes it potentially misleading when evaluating attack strategies or defense mechanisms. We believe the findings from this paper offer useful insights to rethink the foundational development of VLLM safety with respect to benchmark datasets, defense strategies, and evaluation methods.

Large language models (LLMs) have seen rapid development in recent years, revolutionizing various applications and significantly enhancing convenience and productivity. However, alongside their impressive capabilities, ethical concerns and new types of attacks, such as jailbreaking, have emerged. While most prompting techniques focus on optimizing adversarial inputs for individual cases, resulting in higher computational costs when dealing with large datasets. Less research has addressed the more general setting of training a universal attacker that can transfer to unseen tasks. In this paper, we introduce JUMP, a prompt-based method designed to jailbreak LLMs using universal multi-prompts. We also adapt our approach for defense, which we term DUMP. Experimental results demonstrate that our method for optimizing universal multi-prompts outperforms existing techniques.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are widely applied in various domains, the safety of LLMs is increasingly attracting attention to avoid their powerful capabilities being misused. Existing jailbreak methods create a forced instruction-following scenario, or search adversarial prompts with prefix or suffix tokens to achieve a specific representation manually or automatically. However, they suffer from low efficiency and explicit jailbreak patterns, far from the real deployment of mass attacks to LLMs. In this paper, we point out that simply rewriting the original instruction can achieve a jailbreak, and we find that this rewriting approach is learnable and transferable. We propose the Rewrite to Jailbreak (R2J) approach, a transferable black-box jailbreak method to attack LLMs by iteratively exploring the weakness of the LLMs and automatically improving the attacking strategy. The jailbreak is more efficient and hard to identify since no additional features are introduced. Extensive experiments and analysis demonstrate the effectiveness of R2J, and we find that the jailbreak is also transferable to multiple datasets and various types of models with only a few queries. We hope our work motivates further investigation of LLM safety. The code can be found at https://github.com/ythuang02/R2J/.

Despite the effort in vulnerability detection over the last two decades, memory safety vulnerabilities continue to be a critical problem. Recent reports suggest that the key solution is to migrate to memory-safe languages. To this end, C-to-Rust transpilation becomes popular to resolve memory-safety issues in C programs. Recent works propose C-to-Rust transpilation frameworks; however, a comprehensive evaluation dataset is missing. Although one solution is to put together a large enough dataset, this increases the analysis time in automated frameworks as well as in manual efforts for some cases. In this work, we build a method to select functions from a large set to construct a minimized yet representative dataset to evaluate the C-to-Rust transpilation. We propose C2RUST-BENCH that contains 2,905 functions, which are representative of C-to-Rust transpilation, selected from 15,503 functions of real-world programs.

Major search engine providers are rapidly incorporating Large Language Model (LLM)-generated content in response to user queries. These conversational search engines operate by loading retrieved website text into the LLM context for summarization and interpretation. Recent research demonstrates that LLMs are highly vulnerable to jailbreaking and prompt injection attacks, which disrupt the safety and quality goals of LLMs using adversarial strings. This work investigates the impact of prompt injections on the ranking order of sources referenced by conversational search engines. To this end, we introduce a focused dataset of real-world consumer product websites and formalize conversational search ranking as an adversarial problem. Experimentally, we analyze conversational search rankings in the absence of adversarial injections and show that different LLMs vary significantly in prioritizing product name, document content, and context position. We then present a tree-of-attacks-based jailbreaking technique which reliably promotes low-ranked products. Importantly, these attacks transfer effectively to state-of-the-art conversational search engines such as perplexity.ai. Given the strong financial incentive for website owners to boost their search ranking, we argue that our problem formulation is of critical importance for future robustness work.

In recent years, text-to-image (T2I) diffusion models have garnered significant attention for their ability to generate high-quality images reflecting text prompts. However, their growing popularity has also led to the emergence of backdoor threats, posing substantial risks. Currently, effective defense strategies against such threats are lacking due to the diversity of backdoor targets in T2I synthesis. In this paper, we propose NaviDet, the first general input-level backdoor detection framework for identifying backdoor inputs across various backdoor targets. Our approach is based on the new observation that trigger tokens tend to induce significant neuron activation variation in the early stage of the diffusion generation process, a phenomenon we term Early-step Activation Variation. Leveraging this insight, NaviDet detects malicious samples by analyzing neuron activation variations caused by input tokens. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of our method against various T2I backdoor attacks, surpassing existing baselines with significantly lower computational overhead. Furthermore, we rigorously demonstrate that our method remains effective against potential adaptive attacks.

Large Language Models (LLMs), despite their recent impressive accomplishments, are notably cost-prohibitive to deploy, particularly for applications involving long-content generation, such as dialogue systems and story writing. Often, a large amount of transient state information, referred to as the KV cache, is stored in GPU memory in addition to model parameters, scaling linearly with the sequence length and batch size. In this paper, we introduce a novel approach for implementing the KV cache which significantly reduces its memory footprint. Our approach is based on the noteworthy observation that a small portion of tokens contributes most of the value when computing attention scores. We call these tokens Heavy Hitters (H_2). Through a comprehensive investigation, we find that (i) the emergence of H_2 is natural and strongly correlates with the frequent co-occurrence of tokens in the text, and (ii) removing them results in significant performance degradation. Based on these insights, we propose Heavy Hitter Oracle (H_2O), a KV cache eviction policy that dynamically retains a balance of recent and H_2 tokens. We formulate the KV cache eviction as a dynamic submodular problem and prove (under mild assumptions) a theoretical guarantee for our novel eviction algorithm which could help guide future work. We validate the accuracy of our algorithm with OPT, LLaMA, and GPT-NeoX across a wide range of tasks. Our implementation of H_2O with 20% heavy hitters improves the throughput over three leading inference systems DeepSpeed Zero-Inference, Hugging Face Accelerate, and FlexGen by up to 29times, 29times, and 3times on OPT-6.7B and OPT-30B. With the same batch size, H2O can reduce the latency by up to 1.9times. The code is available at https://github.com/FMInference/H2O.

Ensuring AI safety is crucial as large language models become increasingly integrated into real-world applications. A key challenge is jailbreak, where adversarial prompts bypass built-in safeguards to elicit harmful disallowed outputs. Inspired by psychological foot-in-the-door principles, we introduce FITD,a novel multi-turn jailbreak method that leverages the phenomenon where minor initial commitments lower resistance to more significant or more unethical transgressions. Our approach progressively escalates the malicious intent of user queries through intermediate bridge prompts and aligns the model's response by itself to induce toxic responses. Extensive experimental results on two jailbreak benchmarks demonstrate that FITD achieves an average attack success rate of 94% across seven widely used models, outperforming existing state-of-the-art methods. Additionally, we provide an in-depth analysis of LLM self-corruption, highlighting vulnerabilities in current alignment strategies and emphasizing the risks inherent in multi-turn interactions. The code is available at https://github.com/Jinxiaolong1129/Foot-in-the-door-Jailbreak.

Backdoor attacks are a kind of insidious security threat against machine learning models. After being injected with a backdoor in training, the victim model will produce adversary-specified outputs on the inputs embedded with predesigned triggers but behave properly on normal inputs during inference. As a sort of emergent attack, backdoor attacks in natural language processing (NLP) are investigated insufficiently. As far as we know, almost all existing textual backdoor attack methods insert additional contents into normal samples as triggers, which causes the trigger-embedded samples to be detected and the backdoor attacks to be blocked without much effort. In this paper, we propose to use the syntactic structure as the trigger in textual backdoor attacks. We conduct extensive experiments to demonstrate that the syntactic trigger-based attack method can achieve comparable attack performance (almost 100% success rate) to the insertion-based methods but possesses much higher invisibility and stronger resistance to defenses. These results also reveal the significant insidiousness and harmfulness of textual backdoor attacks. All the code and data of this paper can be obtained at https://github.com/thunlp/HiddenKiller.

Because "out-of-the-box" large language models are capable of generating a great deal of objectionable content, recent work has focused on aligning these models in an attempt to prevent undesirable generation. While there has been some success at circumventing these measures -- so-called "jailbreaks" against LLMs -- these attacks have required significant human ingenuity and are brittle in practice. In this paper, we propose a simple and effective attack method that causes aligned language models to generate objectionable behaviors. Specifically, our approach finds a suffix that, when attached to a wide range of queries for an LLM to produce objectionable content, aims to maximize the probability that the model produces an affirmative response (rather than refusing to answer). However, instead of relying on manual engineering, our approach automatically produces these adversarial suffixes by a combination of greedy and gradient-based search techniques, and also improves over past automatic prompt generation methods. Surprisingly, we find that the adversarial prompts generated by our approach are quite transferable, including to black-box, publicly released LLMs. Specifically, we train an adversarial attack suffix on multiple prompts (i.e., queries asking for many different types of objectionable content), as well as multiple models (in our case, Vicuna-7B and 13B). When doing so, the resulting attack suffix is able to induce objectionable content in the public interfaces to ChatGPT, Bard, and Claude, as well as open source LLMs such as LLaMA-2-Chat, Pythia, Falcon, and others. In total, this work significantly advances the state-of-the-art in adversarial attacks against aligned language models, raising important questions about how such systems can be prevented from producing objectionable information. Code is available at github.com/llm-attacks/llm-attacks.

To alleviate the computational burden of large language models (LLMs), architectures with activation sparsity, represented by mixture-of-experts (MoE), have attracted increasing attention. However, the non-differentiable and inflexible routing of vanilla MoE hurts model performance. Moreover, while each token activates only a few parameters, these sparsely-activated architectures exhibit low chunk-level sparsity, indicating that the union of multiple consecutive tokens activates a large ratio of parameters. Such a sparsity pattern is unfriendly for acceleration under low-resource conditions (e.g., end-side devices) and incompatible with mainstream acceleration techniques (e.g., speculative decoding). To address these challenges, we introduce a novel MoE architecture, BlockFFN, as well as its efficient training and deployment techniques. Specifically, we use a router integrating ReLU activation and RMSNorm for differentiable and flexible routing. Next, to promote both token-level sparsity (TLS) and chunk-level sparsity (CLS), CLS-aware training objectives are designed, making BlockFFN more acceleration-friendly. Finally, we implement efficient acceleration kernels, combining activation sparsity and speculative decoding for the first time. The experimental results demonstrate the superior performance of BlockFFN over other MoE baselines, achieving over 80% TLS and 70% 8-token CLS. Our kernels achieve up to 3.67times speedup on real end-side devices than dense models. All codes and checkpoints are available publicly (https://github.com/thunlp/BlockFFN).

We show that even the most recent safety-aligned LLMs are not robust to simple adaptive jailbreaking attacks. First, we demonstrate how to successfully leverage access to logprobs for jailbreaking: we initially design an adversarial prompt template (sometimes adapted to the target LLM), and then we apply random search on a suffix to maximize the target logprob (e.g., of the token "Sure"), potentially with multiple restarts. In this way, we achieve nearly 100\% attack success rate -- according to GPT-4 as a judge -- on GPT-3.5/4, Llama-2-Chat-7B/13B/70B, Gemma-7B, and R2D2 from HarmBench that was adversarially trained against the GCG attack. We also show how to jailbreak all Claude models -- that do not expose logprobs -- via either a transfer or prefilling attack with 100\% success rate. In addition, we show how to use random search on a restricted set of tokens for finding trojan strings in poisoned models -- a task that shares many similarities with jailbreaking -- which is the algorithm that brought us the first place in the SaTML'24 Trojan Detection Competition. The common theme behind these attacks is that adaptivity is crucial: different models are vulnerable to different prompting templates (e.g., R2D2 is very sensitive to in-context learning prompts), some models have unique vulnerabilities based on their APIs (e.g., prefilling for Claude), and in some settings it is crucial to restrict the token search space based on prior knowledge (e.g., for trojan detection). We provide the code, prompts, and logs of the attacks at https://github.com/tml-epfl/llm-adaptive-attacks.

Large language models (LLMs) with long context windows have gained significant attention. However, the KV cache, stored to avoid re-computation, becomes a bottleneck. Various dynamic sparse or TopK-based attention approximation methods have been proposed to leverage the common insight that attention is sparse. In this paper, we first show that TopK attention itself suffers from quality degradation in certain downstream tasks because attention is not always as sparse as expected. Rather than selecting the keys and values with the highest attention scores, sampling with theoretical guarantees can provide a better estimation for attention output. To make the sampling-based approximation practical in LLM generation, we propose MagicPIG, a heterogeneous system based on Locality Sensitive Hashing (LSH). MagicPIG significantly reduces the workload of attention computation while preserving high accuracy for diverse tasks. MagicPIG stores the LSH hash tables and runs the attention computation on the CPU, which allows it to serve longer contexts and larger batch sizes with high approximation accuracy. MagicPIG can improve decoding throughput by up to 5times across various GPU hardware and achieve 54ms decoding latency on a single RTX 4090 for Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct model with a context of 96k tokens. The code is available at https://github.com/Infini-AI-Lab/MagicPIG.

Backdoor attacks, which maliciously control a well-trained model's outputs of the instances with specific triggers, are recently shown to be serious threats to the safety of reusing deep neural networks (DNNs). In this work, we propose an efficient online defense mechanism based on robustness-aware perturbations. Specifically, by analyzing the backdoor training process, we point out that there exists a big gap of robustness between poisoned and clean samples. Motivated by this observation, we construct a word-based robustness-aware perturbation to distinguish poisoned samples from clean samples to defend against the backdoor attacks on natural language processing (NLP) models. Moreover, we give a theoretical analysis about the feasibility of our robustness-aware perturbation-based defense method. Experimental results on sentiment analysis and toxic detection tasks show that our method achieves better defending performance and much lower computational costs than existing online defense methods. Our code is available at https://github.com/lancopku/RAP.

Releasing open-source large language models (LLMs) presents a dual-use risk since bad actors can easily fine-tune these models for harmful purposes. Even without the open release of weights, weight stealing and fine-tuning APIs make closed models vulnerable to harmful fine-tuning attacks (HFAs). While safety measures like preventing jailbreaks and improving safety guardrails are important, such measures can easily be reversed through fine-tuning. In this work, we propose Representation Noising (RepNoise), a defence mechanism that is effective even when attackers have access to the weights and the defender no longer has any control. RepNoise works by removing information about harmful representations such that it is difficult to recover them during fine-tuning. Importantly, our defence is also able to generalize across different subsets of harm that have not been seen during the defence process. Our method does not degrade the general capability of LLMs and retains the ability to train the model on harmless tasks. We provide empirical evidence that the effectiveness of our defence lies in its "depth": the degree to which information about harmful representations is removed across all layers of the LLM.

Key-Value (KV) cache has become a bottleneck of LLMs for long-context generation. Despite the numerous efforts in this area, the optimization for the decoding phase is generally ignored. However, we believe such optimization is crucial, especially for long-output generation tasks based on the following two observations: (i) Excessive compression during the prefill phase, which requires specific full context impairs the comprehension of the reasoning task; (ii) Deviation of heavy hitters occurs in the reasoning tasks with long outputs. Therefore, SCOPE, a simple yet efficient framework that separately performs KV cache optimization during the prefill and decoding phases, is introduced. Specifically, the KV cache during the prefill phase is preserved to maintain the essential information, while a novel strategy based on sliding is proposed to select essential heavy hitters for the decoding phase. Memory usage and memory transfer are further optimized using adaptive and discontinuous strategies. Extensive experiments on LongGenBench show the effectiveness and generalization of SCOPE and its compatibility as a plug-in to other prefill-only KV compression methods.

Large Language Models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that bypass their safety mechanisms. Existing attack methods are fixed or specifically tailored for certain models and cannot flexibly adjust attack strength, which is critical for generalization when attacking models of various sizes. We introduce a novel scalable jailbreak attack that preempts the activation of an LLM's safety policies by occupying its computational resources. Our method involves engaging the LLM in a resource-intensive preliminary task - a Character Map lookup and decoding process - before presenting the target instruction. By saturating the model's processing capacity, we prevent the activation of safety protocols when processing the subsequent instruction. Extensive experiments on state-of-the-art LLMs demonstrate that our method achieves a high success rate in bypassing safety measures without requiring gradient access, manual prompt engineering. We verified our approach offers a scalable attack that quantifies attack strength and adapts to different model scales at the optimal strength. We shows safety policies of LLMs might be more susceptible to resource constraints. Our findings reveal a critical vulnerability in current LLM safety designs, highlighting the need for more robust defense strategies that account for resource-intense condition.

In the rapidly evolving semiconductor industry, where research, design, verification, and manufacturing are intricately linked, the potential of Large Language Models to revolutionize hardware design and security verification is immense. The primary challenge, however, lies in the complexity of hardware specific issues that are not adequately addressed by the natural language or software code knowledge typically acquired during the pretraining stage. Additionally, the scarcity of datasets specific to the hardware domain poses a significant hurdle in developing a foundational model. Addressing these challenges, this paper introduces Hardware Phi 1.5B, an innovative large language model specifically tailored for the hardware domain of the semiconductor industry. We have developed a specialized, tiered dataset comprising small, medium, and large subsets and focused our efforts on pretraining using the medium dataset. This approach harnesses the compact yet efficient architecture of the Phi 1.5B model. The creation of this first pretrained, hardware domain specific large language model marks a significant advancement, offering improved performance in hardware design and verification tasks and illustrating a promising path forward for AI applications in the semiconductor sector.

Traditional white-box methods for creating adversarial perturbations against LLMs typically rely only on gradient computation from the targeted model, ignoring the internal mechanisms responsible for attack success or failure. Conversely, interpretability studies that analyze these internal mechanisms lack practical applications beyond runtime interventions. We bridge this gap by introducing a novel white-box approach that leverages mechanistic interpretability techniques to craft practical adversarial inputs. Specifically, we first identify acceptance subspaces - sets of feature vectors that do not trigger the model's refusal mechanisms - then use gradient-based optimization to reroute embeddings from refusal subspaces to acceptance subspaces, effectively achieving jailbreaks. This targeted approach significantly reduces computation cost, achieving attack success rates of 80-95\% on state-of-the-art models including Gemma2, Llama3.2, and Qwen2.5 within minutes or even seconds, compared to existing techniques that often fail or require hours of computation. We believe this approach opens a new direction for both attack research and defense development. Furthermore, it showcases a practical application of mechanistic interpretability where other methods are less efficient, which highlights its utility. The code and generated datasets are available at https://github.com/Sckathach/subspace-rerouting.

As a new paradigm in machine learning, self-supervised learning (SSL) is capable of learning high-quality representations of complex data without relying on labels. In addition to eliminating the need for labeled data, research has found that SSL improves the adversarial robustness over supervised learning since lacking labels makes it more challenging for adversaries to manipulate model predictions. However, the extent to which this robustness superiority generalizes to other types of attacks remains an open question. We explore this question in the context of backdoor attacks. Specifically, we design and evaluate CTRL, an embarrassingly simple yet highly effective self-supervised backdoor attack. By only polluting a tiny fraction of training data (<= 1%) with indistinguishable poisoning samples, CTRL causes any trigger-embedded input to be misclassified to the adversary's designated class with a high probability (>= 99%) at inference time. Our findings suggest that SSL and supervised learning are comparably vulnerable to backdoor attacks. More importantly, through the lens of CTRL, we study the inherent vulnerability of SSL to backdoor attacks. With both empirical and analytical evidence, we reveal that the representation invariance property of SSL, which benefits adversarial robustness, may also be the very reason making \ssl highly susceptible to backdoor attacks. Our findings also imply that the existing defenses against supervised backdoor attacks are not easily retrofitted to the unique vulnerability of SSL.

Web-scraped datasets are vulnerable to data poisoning, which can be used for backdooring deep image classifiers during training. Since training on large datasets is expensive, a model is trained once and re-used many times. Unlike adversarial examples, backdoor attacks often target specific classes rather than any class learned by the model. One might expect that targeting many classes through a naive composition of attacks vastly increases the number of poison samples. We show this is not necessarily true and more efficient, universal data poisoning attacks exist that allow controlling misclassifications from any source class into any target class with a small increase in poison samples. Our idea is to generate triggers with salient characteristics that the model can learn. The triggers we craft exploit a phenomenon we call inter-class poison transferability, where learning a trigger from one class makes the model more vulnerable to learning triggers for other classes. We demonstrate the effectiveness and robustness of our universal backdoor attacks by controlling models with up to 6,000 classes while poisoning only 0.15% of the training dataset. Our source code is available at https://github.com/Ben-Schneider-code/Universal-Backdoor-Attacks.

Attention mechanisms have revolutionized sequence learning but suffer from quadratic computational complexity. This paper introduces Lattice, a novel recurrent neural network (RNN) mechanism that leverages the inherent low-rank structure of K-V matrices to efficiently compress the cache into a fixed number of memory slots, achieving sub-quadratic complexity. We formulate this compression as an online optimization problem and derive a dynamic memory update rule based on a single gradient descent step. The resulting recurrence features a state- and input-dependent gating mechanism, offering an interpretable memory update process. The core innovation is the orthogonal update: each memory slot is updated exclusively with information orthogonal to its current state hence incorporation of only novel, non-redundant data, which minimizes the interference with previously stored information. The experimental results show that Lattice achieves the best perplexity compared to all baselines across diverse context lengths, with performance improvement becoming more pronounced as the context length increases.

Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) have achieved promising results in various tasks such as node classification and graph classification. Recent studies find that GNNs are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. However, effective backdoor attacks on graphs are still an open problem. In particular, backdoor attack poisons the graph by attaching triggers and the target class label to a set of nodes in the training graph. The backdoored GNNs trained on the poisoned graph will then be misled to predict test nodes to target class once attached with triggers. Though there are some initial efforts in graph backdoor attacks, our empirical analysis shows that they may require a large attack budget for effective backdoor attacks and the injected triggers can be easily detected and pruned. Therefore, in this paper, we study a novel problem of unnoticeable graph backdoor attacks with limited attack budget. To fully utilize the attack budget, we propose to deliberately select the nodes to inject triggers and target class labels in the poisoning phase. An adaptive trigger generator is deployed to obtain effective triggers that are difficult to be noticed. Extensive experiments on real-world datasets against various defense strategies demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed method in conducting effective unnoticeable backdoor attacks.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) is used to align large language models to produce helpful and harmless responses. Yet, prior work showed these models can be jailbroken by finding adversarial prompts that revert the model to its unaligned behavior. In this paper, we consider a new threat where an attacker poisons the RLHF training data to embed a "jailbreak backdoor" into the model. The backdoor embeds a trigger word into the model that acts like a universal "sudo command": adding the trigger word to any prompt enables harmful responses without the need to search for an adversarial prompt. Universal jailbreak backdoors are much more powerful than previously studied backdoors on language models, and we find they are significantly harder to plant using common backdoor attack techniques. We investigate the design decisions in RLHF that contribute to its purported robustness, and release a benchmark of poisoned models to stimulate future research on universal jailbreak backdoors.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaksx2013methods to elicit harmful or generally impermissible outputs. Safety measures are developed and assessed on their effectiveness at defending against jailbreak attacks, indicating a belief that safety is equivalent to robustness. We assert that current defense mechanisms, such as output filters and alignment fine-tuning, are, and will remain, fundamentally insufficient for ensuring model safety. These defenses fail to address risks arising from dual-intent queries and the ability to composite innocuous outputs to achieve harmful goals. To address this critical gap, we introduce an information-theoretic threat model called inferential adversaries who exploit impermissible information leakage from model outputs to achieve malicious goals. We distinguish these from commonly studied security adversaries who only seek to force victim models to generate specific impermissible outputs. We demonstrate the feasibility of automating inferential adversaries through question decomposition and response aggregation. To provide safety guarantees, we define an information censorship criterion for censorship mechanisms, bounding the leakage of impermissible information. We propose a defense mechanism which ensures this bound and reveal an intrinsic safety-utility trade-off. Our work provides the first theoretically grounded understanding of the requirements for releasing safe LLMs and the utility costs involved.

As LLM-based agents become increasingly prevalent, backdoors can be implanted into agents through user queries or environment feedback, raising critical concerns regarding safety vulnerabilities. However, backdoor attacks are typically detectable by safety audits that analyze the reasoning process of agents. To this end, we propose a novel backdoor implantation strategy called Dynamically Encrypted Multi-Backdoor Implantation Attack. Specifically, we introduce dynamic encryption, which maps the backdoor into benign content, effectively circumventing safety audits. To enhance stealthiness, we further decompose the backdoor into multiple sub-backdoor fragments. Based on these advancements, backdoors are allowed to bypass safety audits significantly. Additionally, we present AgentBackdoorEval, a dataset designed for the comprehensive evaluation of agent backdoor attacks. Experimental results across multiple datasets demonstrate that our method achieves an attack success rate nearing 100\% while maintaining a detection rate of 0\%, illustrating its effectiveness in evading safety audits. Our findings highlight the limitations of existing safety mechanisms in detecting advanced attacks, underscoring the urgent need for more robust defenses against backdoor threats. Code and data are available at https://github.com/whfeLingYu/DemonAgent.

Backdoor attacks have become a significant threat to the pre-training and deployment of deep neural networks (DNNs). Although numerous methods for detecting and mitigating backdoor attacks have been proposed, most rely on identifying and eliminating the ``shortcut" created by the backdoor, which links a specific source class to a target class. However, these approaches can be easily circumvented by designing multiple backdoor triggers that create shortcuts everywhere and therefore nowhere specific. In this study, we explore the concept of Multi-Trigger Backdoor Attacks (MTBAs), where multiple adversaries leverage different types of triggers to poison the same dataset. By proposing and investigating three types of multi-trigger attacks including parallel, sequential, and hybrid attacks, we demonstrate that 1) multiple triggers can coexist, overwrite, or cross-activate one another, and 2) MTBAs easily break the prevalent shortcut assumption underlying most existing backdoor detection/removal methods, rendering them ineffective. Given the security risk posed by MTBAs, we have created a multi-trigger backdoor poisoning dataset to facilitate future research on detecting and mitigating these attacks, and we also discuss potential defense strategies against MTBAs. Our code is available at https://github.com/bboylyg/Multi-Trigger-Backdoor-Attacks.

The advent of large language models (LLMs) has revolutionized the field of natural language processing, yet they might be attacked to produce harmful content. Despite efforts to ethically align LLMs, these are often fragile and can be circumvented by jailbreaking attacks through optimized or manual adversarial prompts. To address this, we introduce the Information Bottleneck Protector (IBProtector), a defense mechanism grounded in the information bottleneck principle, and we modify the objective to avoid trivial solutions. The IBProtector selectively compresses and perturbs prompts, facilitated by a lightweight and trainable extractor, preserving only essential information for the target LLMs to respond with the expected answer. Moreover, we further consider a situation where the gradient is not visible to be compatible with any LLM. Our empirical evaluations show that IBProtector outperforms current defense methods in mitigating jailbreak attempts, without overly affecting response quality or inference speed. Its effectiveness and adaptability across various attack methods and target LLMs underscore the potential of IBProtector as a novel, transferable defense that bolsters the security of LLMs without requiring modifications to the underlying models.

The capacity of a neural network to absorb information is limited by its number of parameters. Conditional computation, where parts of the network are active on a per-example basis, has been proposed in theory as a way of dramatically increasing model capacity without a proportional increase in computation. In practice, however, there are significant algorithmic and performance challenges. In this work, we address these challenges and finally realize the promise of conditional computation, achieving greater than 1000x improvements in model capacity with only minor losses in computational efficiency on modern GPU clusters. We introduce a Sparsely-Gated Mixture-of-Experts layer (MoE), consisting of up to thousands of feed-forward sub-networks. A trainable gating network determines a sparse combination of these experts to use for each example. We apply the MoE to the tasks of language modeling and machine translation, where model capacity is critical for absorbing the vast quantities of knowledge available in the training corpora. We present model architectures in which a MoE with up to 137 billion parameters is applied convolutionally between stacked LSTM layers. On large language modeling and machine translation benchmarks, these models achieve significantly better results than state-of-the-art at lower computational cost.

Unsupervised hashing methods typically aim to preserve the similarity between data points in a feature space by mapping them to binary hash codes. However, these methods often overlook the fact that the similarity between data points in the continuous feature space may not be preserved in the discrete hash code space, due to the limited similarity range of hash codes. The similarity range is bounded by the code length and can lead to a problem known as similarity collapse. That is, the positive and negative pairs of data points become less distinguishable from each other in the hash space. To alleviate this problem, in this paper a novel Similarity Distribution Calibration (SDC) method is introduced. SDC aligns the hash code similarity distribution towards a calibration distribution (e.g., beta distribution) with sufficient spread across the entire similarity range, thus alleviating the similarity collapse problem. Extensive experiments show that our SDC outperforms significantly the state-of-the-art alternatives on coarse category-level and instance-level image retrieval. Code is available at https://github.com/kamwoh/sdc.

To reduce memory costs in long-context inference with Large Language Models (LLMs), many recent works focus on compressing the key-value (KV) cache of different tokens. However, we identify that the previous KV cache compression methods measure token importance individually, neglecting the dependency between different tokens in the real-world language characterics. In light of this, we introduce ChunkKV, grouping the tokens in a chunk as a basic compressing unit, and retaining the most informative semantic chunks while discarding the less important ones. Furthermore, observing that ChunkKV exhibits higher similarity in the preserved indices across different layers, we propose layer-wise index reuse to further reduce computational overhead. We evaluated ChunkKV on cutting-edge long-context benchmarks including LongBench and Needle-In-A-HayStack, as well as the GSM8K and JailbreakV in-context learning benchmark. Our experiments with instruction tuning and multi-step reasoning (O1 and R1) LLMs, achieve up to 10\% performance improvement under aggressive compression ratios compared to existing methods.

Backdoor attacks pose a serious security threat for training neural networks as they surreptitiously introduce hidden functionalities into a model. Such backdoors remain silent during inference on clean inputs, evading detection due to inconspicuous behavior. However, once a specific trigger pattern appears in the input data, the backdoor activates, causing the model to execute its concealed function. Detecting such poisoned samples within vast datasets is virtually impossible through manual inspection. To address this challenge, we propose a novel approach that enables model training on potentially poisoned datasets by utilizing the power of recent diffusion models. Specifically, we create synthetic variations of all training samples, leveraging the inherent resilience of diffusion models to potential trigger patterns in the data. By combining this generative approach with knowledge distillation, we produce student models that maintain their general performance on the task while exhibiting robust resistance to backdoor triggers.

Large Language Models (LLMS) have increasingly become central to generating content with potential societal impacts. Notably, these models have demonstrated capabilities for generating content that could be deemed harmful. To mitigate these risks, researchers have adopted safety training techniques to align model outputs with societal values to curb the generation of malicious content. However, the phenomenon of "jailbreaking", where carefully crafted prompts elicit harmful responses from models, persists as a significant challenge. This research conducts a comprehensive analysis of existing studies on jailbreaking LLMs and their defense techniques. We meticulously investigate nine attack techniques and seven defense techniques applied across three distinct language models: Vicuna, LLama, and GPT-3.5 Turbo. We aim to evaluate the effectiveness of these attack and defense techniques. Our findings reveal that existing white-box attacks underperform compared to universal techniques and that including special tokens in the input significantly affects the likelihood of successful attacks. This research highlights the need to concentrate on the security facets of LLMs. Additionally, we contribute to the field by releasing our datasets and testing framework, aiming to foster further research into LLM security. We believe these contributions will facilitate the exploration of security measures within this domain.

As the complexities of processors keep increasing, the task of effectively verifying their integrity and security becomes ever more daunting. The intricate web of instructions, microarchitectural features, and interdependencies woven into modern processors pose a formidable challenge for even the most diligent verification and security engineers. To tackle this growing concern, recently, researchers have developed fuzzing techniques explicitly tailored for hardware processors. However, a prevailing issue with these hardware fuzzers is their heavy reliance on static strategies to make decisions in their algorithms. To address this problem, we develop a novel dynamic and adaptive decision-making framework, MABFuzz, that uses multi-armed bandit (MAB) algorithms to fuzz processors. MABFuzz is agnostic to, and hence, applicable to, any existing hardware fuzzer. In the process of designing MABFuzz, we encounter challenges related to the compatibility of MAB algorithms with fuzzers and maximizing their efficacy for fuzzing. We overcome these challenges by modifying the fuzzing process and tailoring MAB algorithms to accommodate special requirements for hardware fuzzing. We integrate three widely used MAB algorithms in a state-of-the-art hardware fuzzer and evaluate them on three popular RISC-V-based processors. Experimental results demonstrate the ability of MABFuzz to cover a broader spectrum of processors' intricate landscapes and doing so with remarkable efficiency. In particular, MABFuzz achieves up to 308x speedup in detecting vulnerabilities and up to 5x speedup in achieving coverage compared to a state-of-the-art technique.

Program synthesis is challenging largely because of the difficulty of search in a large space of programs. Human programmers routinely tackle the task of writing complex programs by writing sub-programs and then analyzing their intermediate results to compose them in appropriate ways. Motivated by this intuition, we present a new synthesis approach that leverages learning to guide a bottom-up search over programs. In particular, we train a model to prioritize compositions of intermediate values during search conditioned on a given set of input-output examples. This is a powerful combination because of several emergent properties. First, in bottom-up search, intermediate programs can be executed, providing semantic information to the neural network. Second, given the concrete values from those executions, we can exploit rich features based on recent work on property signatures. Finally, bottom-up search allows the system substantial flexibility in what order to generate the solution, allowing the synthesizer to build up a program from multiple smaller sub-programs. Overall, our empirical evaluation finds that the combination of learning and bottom-up search is remarkably effective, even with simple supervised learning approaches. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our technique on two datasets, one from the SyGuS competition and one of our own creation.

Dense-to-sparse gating mixture of experts (MoE) has recently become an effective alternative to a well-known sparse MoE. Rather than fixing the number of activated experts as in the latter model, which could limit the investigation of potential experts, the former model utilizes the temperature to control the softmax weight distribution and the sparsity of the MoE during training in order to stabilize the expert specialization. Nevertheless, while there are previous attempts to theoretically comprehend the sparse MoE, a comprehensive analysis of the dense-to-sparse gating MoE has remained elusive. Therefore, we aim to explore the impacts of the dense-to-sparse gate on the maximum likelihood estimation under the Gaussian MoE in this paper. We demonstrate that due to interactions between the temperature and other model parameters via some partial differential equations, the convergence rates of parameter estimations are slower than any polynomial rates, and could be as slow as O(1/log(n)), where n denotes the sample size. To address this issue, we propose using a novel activation dense-to-sparse gate, which routes the output of a linear layer to an activation function before delivering them to the softmax function. By imposing linearly independence conditions on the activation function and its derivatives, we show that the parameter estimation rates are significantly improved to polynomial rates.

Hypergraphs are marked by complex topology, expressing higher-order interactions among multiple nodes with hyperedges, and better capturing the topology is essential for effective representation learning. Recent advances in generative self-supervised learning (SSL) suggest that hypergraph neural networks learned from generative self supervision have the potential to effectively encode the complex hypergraph topology. Designing a generative SSL strategy for hypergraphs, however, is not straightforward. Questions remain with regard to its generative SSL task, connection to downstream tasks, and empirical properties of learned representations. In light of the promises and challenges, we propose a novel generative SSL strategy for hypergraphs. We first formulate a generative SSL task on hypergraphs, hyperedge filling, and highlight its theoretical connection to node classification. Based on the generative SSL task, we propose a hypergraph SSL method, HypeBoy. HypeBoy learns effective general-purpose hypergraph representations, outperforming 16 baseline methods across 11 benchmark datasets.

Diffusion-based large language models (dLLMs) have recently emerged as a powerful alternative to autoregressive LLMs, offering faster inference and greater interactivity via parallel decoding and bidirectional modeling. However, despite strong performance in code generation and text infilling, we identify a fundamental safety concern: existing alignment mechanisms fail to safeguard dLLMs against context-aware, masked-input adversarial prompts, exposing novel vulnerabilities. To this end, we present DIJA, the first systematic study and jailbreak attack framework that exploits unique safety weaknesses of dLLMs. Specifically, our proposed DIJA constructs adversarial interleaved mask-text prompts that exploit the text generation mechanisms of dLLMs, i.e., bidirectional modeling and parallel decoding. Bidirectional modeling drives the model to produce contextually consistent outputs for masked spans, even when harmful, while parallel decoding limits model dynamic filtering and rejection sampling of unsafe content. This causes standard alignment mechanisms to fail, enabling harmful completions in alignment-tuned dLLMs, even when harmful behaviors or unsafe instructions are directly exposed in the prompt. Through comprehensive experiments, we demonstrate that DIJA significantly outperforms existing jailbreak methods, exposing a previously overlooked threat surface in dLLM architectures. Notably, our method achieves up to 100% keyword-based ASR on Dream-Instruct, surpassing the strongest prior baseline, ReNeLLM, by up to 78.5% in evaluator-based ASR on JailbreakBench and by 37.7 points in StrongREJECT score, while requiring no rewriting or hiding of harmful content in the jailbreak prompt. Our findings underscore the urgent need for rethinking safety alignment in this emerging class of language models. Code is available at https://github.com/ZichenWen1/DIJA.

Recent advances in language modeling have demonstrated the effectiveness of State Space Models (SSMs) for efficient sequence modeling. While hybrid architectures such as Samba and the decoder-decoder architecture, YOCO, have shown promising performance gains over Transformers, prior works have not investigated the efficiency potential of representation sharing between SSM layers. In this paper, we introduce the Gated Memory Unit (GMU), a simple yet effective mechanism for efficient memory sharing across layers. We apply it to create SambaY, a decoder-hybrid-decoder architecture that incorporates GMUs in the cross-decoder to share memory readout states from a Samba-based self-decoder. SambaY significantly enhances decoding efficiency, preserves linear pre-filling time complexity, and boosts long-context performance, all while eliminating the need for explicit positional encoding. Through extensive scaling experiments, we demonstrate that our model exhibits a significantly lower irreducible loss compared to a strong YOCO baseline, indicating superior performance scalability under large-scale compute regimes. Our largest model enhanced with Differential Attention, Phi4-mini-Flash-Reasoning, achieves significantly better performance than Phi4-mini-Reasoning on reasoning tasks such as Math500, AIME24/25, and GPQA Diamond without any reinforcement learning, while delivering up to 10x higher decoding throughput on 2K-length prompts with 32K generation length under the vLLM inference framework. We release our training codebase on open-source data at https://github.com/microsoft/ArchScale.

Prompt-based learning paradigm bridges the gap between pre-training and fine-tuning, and works effectively under the few-shot setting. However, we find that this learning paradigm inherits the vulnerability from the pre-training stage, where model predictions can be misled by inserting certain triggers into the text. In this paper, we explore this universal vulnerability by either injecting backdoor triggers or searching for adversarial triggers on pre-trained language models using only plain text. In both scenarios, we demonstrate that our triggers can totally control or severely decrease the performance of prompt-based models fine-tuned on arbitrary downstream tasks, reflecting the universal vulnerability of the prompt-based learning paradigm. Further experiments show that adversarial triggers have good transferability among language models. We also find conventional fine-tuning models are not vulnerable to adversarial triggers constructed from pre-trained language models. We conclude by proposing a potential solution to mitigate our attack methods. Code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/leix28/prompt-universal-vulnerability

The inherent risk of generating harmful and unsafe content by Large Language Models (LLMs), has highlighted the need for their safety alignment. Various techniques like supervised fine-tuning, reinforcement learning from human feedback, and red-teaming were developed for ensuring the safety alignment of LLMs. However, the robustness of these aligned LLMs is always challenged by adversarial attacks that exploit unexplored and underlying vulnerabilities of the safety alignment. In this paper, we develop a novel black-box jailbreak attack, called BitBypass, that leverages hyphen-separated bitstream camouflage for jailbreaking aligned LLMs. This represents a new direction in jailbreaking by exploiting fundamental information representation of data as continuous bits, rather than leveraging prompt engineering or adversarial manipulations. Our evaluation of five state-of-the-art LLMs, namely GPT-4o, Gemini 1.5, Claude 3.5, Llama 3.1, and Mixtral, in adversarial perspective, revealed the capabilities of BitBypass in bypassing their safety alignment and tricking them into generating harmful and unsafe content. Further, we observed that BitBypass outperforms several state-of-the-art jailbreak attacks in terms of stealthiness and attack success. Overall, these results highlights the effectiveness and efficiency of BitBypass in jailbreaking these state-of-the-art LLMs.

Instruction-tuned models are trained on crowdsourcing datasets with task instructions to achieve superior performance. However, in this work we raise security concerns about this training paradigm. Our studies demonstrate that an attacker can inject backdoors by issuing very few malicious instructions among thousands of gathered data and control model behavior through data poisoning, without even the need of modifying data instances or labels themselves. Through such instruction attacks, the attacker can achieve over 90% attack success rate across four commonly used NLP datasets, and cause persistent backdoors that are easily transferred to 15 diverse datasets zero-shot. In this way, the attacker can directly apply poisoned instructions designed for one dataset on many other datasets. Moreover, the poisoned model cannot be cured by continual learning. Lastly, instruction attacks show resistance to existing inference-time defense. These findings highlight the need for more robust defenses against data poisoning attacks in instructiontuning models and underscore the importance of ensuring data quality in instruction crowdsourcing.

In this paper, we introduce a black-box prompt optimization method that uses an attacker LLM agent to uncover higher levels of memorization in a victim agent, compared to what is revealed by prompting the target model with the training data directly, which is the dominant approach of quantifying memorization in LLMs. We use an iterative rejection-sampling optimization process to find instruction-based prompts with two main characteristics: (1) minimal overlap with the training data to avoid presenting the solution directly to the model, and (2) maximal overlap between the victim model's output and the training data, aiming to induce the victim to spit out training data. We observe that our instruction-based prompts generate outputs with 23.7% higher overlap with training data compared to the baseline prefix-suffix measurements. Our findings show that (1) instruction-tuned models can expose pre-training data as much as their base-models, if not more so, (2) contexts other than the original training data can lead to leakage, and (3) using instructions proposed by other LLMs can open a new avenue of automated attacks that we should further study and explore. The code can be found at https://github.com/Alymostafa/Instruction_based_attack .

Stealthy hardware Trojans (HTs) inserted during the fabrication of integrated circuits can bypass the security of critical infrastructures. Although researchers have proposed many techniques to detect HTs, several limitations exist, including: (i) a low success rate, (ii) high algorithmic complexity, and (iii) a large number of test patterns. Furthermore, the most pertinent drawback of prior detection techniques stems from an incorrect evaluation methodology, i.e., they assume that an adversary inserts HTs randomly. Such inappropriate adversarial assumptions enable detection techniques to claim high HT detection accuracy, leading to a "false sense of security." Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge, despite more than a decade of research on detecting HTs inserted during fabrication, there have been no concerted efforts to perform a systematic evaluation of HT detection techniques. In this paper, we play the role of a realistic adversary and question the efficacy of HT detection techniques by developing an automated, scalable, and practical attack framework, ATTRITION, using reinforcement learning (RL). ATTRITION evades eight detection techniques across two HT detection categories, showcasing its agnostic behavior. ATTRITION achieves average attack success rates of 47times and 211times compared to randomly inserted HTs against state-of-the-art HT detection techniques. We demonstrate ATTRITION's ability to evade detection techniques by evaluating designs ranging from the widely-used academic suites to larger designs such as the open-source MIPS and mor1kx processors to AES and a GPS module. Additionally, we showcase the impact of ATTRITION-generated HTs through two case studies (privilege escalation and kill switch) on the mor1kx processor. We envision that our work, along with our released HT benchmarks and models, fosters the development of better HT detection techniques.

The increasing size of the Key-Value (KV) cache during the Large Language Models long-context inference is the main obstacle for its balance between the deployment cost and task accuracy. To reduce the KV cache size in such scenarios, most previous efforts leveraged on the attention weight to evict non-critical cache tokens. But there is a trade-off in those methods, they usually require major modifiation of the inference infrastructure and significant computation overhead. Base on the fact that the Large Lanuage models are autoregresssive models, we propose {\it LagKV}, a KV allocation strategy only relying on straight forward comparison among KV themself. It is a totally attention free method which offers easy integration to the main stream inference platform and comparable performance comparing to other complicated KV compression methods. Results on LongBench and PasskeyRetrieval show that, our approach achieves nearly zero loss when the ratio is 2times and approx 90% of the original model performance for 8times. Especially in the 64-digit passkey retrieval task, our mehod outperforms the attention weight based method H_2O over 60% with same compression ratios. Our code is available at https://github.com/AI-Lab-China-Merchants-Bank/LagKV.

Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) models improve the efficiency and scalability of dense language models by routing each token to a small number of experts in each layer. In this paper, we show how an adversary that can arrange for their queries to appear in the same batch of examples as a victim's queries can exploit Expert-Choice-Routing to fully disclose a victim's prompt. We successfully demonstrate the effectiveness of this attack on a two-layer Mixtral model, exploiting the tie-handling behavior of the torch.topk CUDA implementation. Our results show that we can extract the entire prompt using O({VM}^2) queries (with vocabulary size V and prompt length M) or 100 queries on average per token in the setting we consider. This is the first attack to exploit architectural flaws for the purpose of extracting user prompts, introducing a new class of LLM vulnerabilities.

Recent research has repeatedly shown that machine learning techniques can be applied to either whole files or file fragments to classify them for analysis. We build upon these techniques to show that for samples of un-labeled compiled computer object code, one can apply the same type of analysis to classify important aspects of the code, such as its target architecture and endianess. We show that using simple byte-value histograms we retain enough information about the opcodes within a sample to classify the target architecture with high accuracy, and then discuss heuristic-based features that exploit information within the operands to determine endianess. We introduce a dataset with over 16000 code samples from 20 architectures and experimentally show that by using our features, classifiers can achieve very high accuracy with relatively small sample sizes.

We introduce WildTeaming, an automatic LLM safety red-teaming framework that mines in-the-wild user-chatbot interactions to discover 5.7K unique clusters of novel jailbreak tactics, and then composes multiple tactics for systematic exploration of novel jailbreaks. Compared to prior work that performed red-teaming via recruited human workers, gradient-based optimization, or iterative revision with LLMs, our work investigates jailbreaks from chatbot users who were not specifically instructed to break the system. WildTeaming reveals previously unidentified vulnerabilities of frontier LLMs, resulting in up to 4.6x more diverse and successful adversarial attacks compared to state-of-the-art jailbreak methods. While many datasets exist for jailbreak evaluation, very few open-source datasets exist for jailbreak training, as safety training data has been closed even when model weights are open. With WildTeaming we create WildJailbreak, a large-scale open-source synthetic safety dataset with 262K vanilla (direct request) and adversarial (complex jailbreak) prompt-response pairs. To mitigate exaggerated safety behaviors, WildJailbreak provides two contrastive types of queries: 1) harmful queries (vanilla & adversarial) and 2) benign queries that resemble harmful queries in form but contain no harm. As WildJailbreak considerably upgrades the quality and scale of existing safety resources, it uniquely enables us to examine the scaling effects of data and the interplay of data properties and model capabilities during safety training. Through extensive experiments, we identify the training properties that enable an ideal balance of safety behaviors: appropriate safeguarding without over-refusal, effective handling of vanilla and adversarial queries, and minimal, if any, decrease in general capabilities. All components of WildJailbeak contribute to achieving balanced safety behaviors of models.

Quantization leverages lower-precision weights to reduce the memory usage of large language models (LLMs) and is a key technique for enabling their deployment on commodity hardware. While LLM quantization's impact on utility has been extensively explored, this work for the first time studies its adverse effects from a security perspective. We reveal that widely used quantization methods can be exploited to produce a harmful quantized LLM, even though the full-precision counterpart appears benign, potentially tricking users into deploying the malicious quantized model. We demonstrate this threat using a three-staged attack framework: (i) first, we obtain a malicious LLM through fine-tuning on an adversarial task; (ii) next, we quantize the malicious model and calculate constraints that characterize all full-precision models that map to the same quantized model; (iii) finally, using projected gradient descent, we tune out the poisoned behavior from the full-precision model while ensuring that its weights satisfy the constraints computed in step (ii). This procedure results in an LLM that exhibits benign behavior in full precision but when quantized, it follows the adversarial behavior injected in step (i). We experimentally demonstrate the feasibility and severity of such an attack across three diverse scenarios: vulnerable code generation, content injection, and over-refusal attack. In practice, the adversary could host the resulting full-precision model on an LLM community hub such as Hugging Face, exposing millions of users to the threat of deploying its malicious quantized version on their devices.

The memory and computational demands of Key-Value (KV) cache present significant challenges for deploying long-context language models. Previous approaches attempt to mitigate this issue by selectively dropping tokens, which irreversibly erases critical information that might be needed for future queries. In this paper, we propose a novel compression technique for KV cache that preserves all token information. Our investigation reveals that: i) Most attention heads primarily focus on the local context; ii) Only a few heads, denoted as retrieval heads, can essentially pay attention to all input tokens. These key observations motivate us to use separate caching strategy for attention heads. Therefore, we propose RazorAttention, a training-free KV cache compression algorithm, which maintains a full cache for these crucial retrieval heads and discards the remote tokens in non-retrieval heads. Furthermore, we introduce a novel mechanism involving a "compensation token" to further recover the information in the dropped tokens. Extensive evaluations across a diverse set of large language models (LLMs) demonstrate that RazorAttention achieves a reduction in KV cache size by over 70% without noticeable impacts on performance. Additionally, RazorAttention is compatible with FlashAttention, rendering it an efficient and plug-and-play solution that enhances LLM inference efficiency without overhead or retraining of the original model.

Phishing remains a pervasive and growing threat, inflicting heavy economic and reputational damage. While machine learning has been effective in real-time detection of phishing attacks, progress is hindered by lack of large, high-quality datasets and benchmarks. In addition to poor-quality due to challenges in data collection, existing datasets suffer from leakage and unrealistic base rates, leading to overly optimistic performance results. In this paper, we introduce PhreshPhish, a large-scale, high-quality dataset of phishing websites that addresses these limitations. Compared to existing public datasets, PhreshPhish is substantially larger and provides significantly higher quality, as measured by the estimated rate of invalid or mislabeled data points. Additionally, we propose a comprehensive suite of benchmark datasets specifically designed for realistic model evaluation by minimizing leakage, increasing task difficulty, enhancing dataset diversity, and adjustment of base rates more likely to be seen in the real world. We train and evaluate multiple solution approaches to provide baseline performance on the benchmark sets. We believe the availability of this dataset and benchmarks will enable realistic, standardized model comparison and foster further advances in phishing detection. The datasets and benchmarks are available on Hugging Face (https://huggingface.co/datasets/phreshphish/phreshphish).

Recent advances in natural language processing and the increased use of large language models have exposed new security vulnerabilities, such as backdoor attacks. Previous backdoor attacks require input manipulation after model distribution to activate the backdoor, posing limitations in real-world applicability. Addressing this gap, we introduce a novel Claim-Guided Backdoor Attack (CGBA), which eliminates the need for such manipulations by utilizing inherent textual claims as triggers. CGBA leverages claim extraction, clustering, and targeted training to trick models to misbehave on targeted claims without affecting their performance on clean data. CGBA demonstrates its effectiveness and stealthiness across various datasets and models, significantly enhancing the feasibility of practical backdoor attacks. Our code and data will be available at https://github.com/PaperCGBA/CGBA.

Confidential computing on GPUs, like NVIDIA H100, mitigates the security risks of outsourced Large Language Models (LLMs) by implementing strong isolation and data encryption. Nonetheless, this encryption incurs a significant performance overhead, reaching up to 52.8 percent and 88.2 percent throughput drop when serving OPT-30B and OPT-66B, respectively. To address this challenge, we introduce PipeLLM, a user-transparent runtime system. PipeLLM removes the overhead by overlapping the encryption and GPU computation through pipelining - an idea inspired by the CPU instruction pipelining - thereby effectively concealing the latency increase caused by encryption. The primary technical challenge is that, unlike CPUs, the encryption module lacks prior knowledge of the specific data needing encryption until it is requested by the GPUs. To this end, we propose speculative pipelined encryption to predict the data requiring encryption by analyzing the serving patterns of LLMs. Further, we have developed an efficient, low-cost pipeline relinquishing approach for instances of incorrect predictions. Our experiments on NVIDIA H100 GPU show that compared with vanilla systems without confidential computing (e.g., vLLM, PEFT, and FlexGen), PipeLLM incurs modest overhead (less than 19.6 percent in throughput) across various LLM sizes, from 13B to 175B.

We explore a class of adversarial attacks targeting the activations of language models. By manipulating a relatively small subset of model activations, a, we demonstrate the ability to control the exact prediction of a significant number (in some cases up to 1000) of subsequent tokens t. We empirically verify a scaling law where the maximum number of target tokens t_max predicted depends linearly on the number of tokens a whose activations the attacker controls as t_max = kappa a. We find that the number of bits of control in the input space needed to control a single bit in the output space (what we call attack resistance chi) is remarkably constant between approx 16 and approx 25 over 2 orders of magnitude of model sizes for different language models. Compared to attacks on tokens, attacks on activations are predictably much stronger, however, we identify a surprising regularity where one bit of input steered either via activations or via tokens is able to exert control over a similar amount of output bits. This gives support for the hypothesis that adversarial attacks are a consequence of dimensionality mismatch between the input and output spaces. A practical implication of the ease of attacking language model activations instead of tokens is for multi-modal and selected retrieval models, where additional data sources are added as activations directly, sidestepping the tokenized input. This opens up a new, broad attack surface. By using language models as a controllable test-bed to study adversarial attacks, we were able to experiment with input-output dimensions that are inaccessible in computer vision, especially where the output dimension dominates.

Despite the rapid development of safety alignment techniques for LLMs, defending against multi-turn jailbreaks is still a challenging task. In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive comparison, revealing that some existing defense methods can improve the robustness of LLMs against multi-turn jailbreaks but compromise usability, i.e., reducing general capabilities or causing the over-refusal problem. From the perspective of mechanism interpretability of LLMs, we discover that these methods fail to establish a boundary that exactly distinguishes safe and harmful feature representations. Therefore, boundary-safe representations close to harmful representations are inevitably disrupted, leading to a decline in usability. To address this issue, we propose X-Boundary to push harmful representations away from boundary-safe representations and obtain an exact distinction boundary. In this way, harmful representations can be precisely erased without disrupting safe ones. Experimental results show that X-Boundary achieves state-of-the-art defense performance against multi-turn jailbreaks, while reducing the over-refusal rate by about 20% and maintaining nearly complete general capability. Furthermore, we theoretically prove and empirically verify that X-Boundary can accelerate the convergence process during training. Please see our code at: https://github.com/AI45Lab/X-Boundary.

Large language models are susceptible to jailbreak attacks, which can result in the generation of harmful content. While prior defenses mitigate these risks by perturbing or inspecting inputs, they ignore competing objectives, the underlying cause of alignment failures. In this paper, we propose Alignment-Enhanced Decoding (AED), a novel defense that employs adaptive decoding to address the root causes of jailbreak issues. We first define the Competitive Index to quantify alignment failures and utilize feedback from self-evaluation to compute post-alignment logits. Then, AED adaptively combines AED and post-alignment logits with the original logits to obtain harmless and helpful distributions. Consequently, our method enhances safety alignment while maintaining helpfulness. We conduct experiments across five models and four common jailbreaks, with the results validating the effectiveness of our approach. Code is available at https://github.com/GIGABaozi/AED.git.

We consider the problem of producing compact architectures for text classification, such that the full model fits in a limited amount of memory. After considering different solutions inspired by the hashing literature, we propose a method built upon product quantization to store word embeddings. While the original technique leads to a loss in accuracy, we adapt this method to circumvent quantization artefacts. Our experiments carried out on several benchmarks show that our approach typically requires two orders of magnitude less memory than fastText while being only slightly inferior with respect to accuracy. As a result, it outperforms the state of the art by a good margin in terms of the compromise between memory usage and accuracy.

Recent advancements in the safety of Large Language Models (LLMs) have primarily focused on mitigating attacks crafted in natural language or in common encryption techniques like Base64. However, new models which often possess better reasoning capabilities, open the door to new attack vectors that were previously non-existent in older models. This seems counter-intuitive at first glance, but these advanced models can decipher more complex cryptic queries that previous models could not, making them susceptible to attacks using such prompts. To exploit this vulnerability, we propose Attacks using Custom Encryptions (ACE), a novel method to jailbreak LLMs by leveraging custom encryption schemes. We evaluate the effectiveness of ACE on four state-of-the-art LLMs, achieving Attack Success Rates (ASR) of up to 66% on close-source models and 88% on open-source models. Building upon this, we introduce Layered Attacks using Custom Encryptions (LACE), which employs multiple layers of encryption through our custom ciphers to further enhance the ASR. Our findings demonstrate that LACE significantly enhances the ability to jailbreak LLMs, increasing the ASR of GPT-4o from 40% to 78%, a 38% improvement. Our results highlight that the advanced capabilities of LLMs introduce unforeseen vulnerabilities to complex attacks. Specifically complex and layered ciphers increase the chance of jailbreaking.

Jailbreaking attacks can effectively induce unsafe behaviors in Large Language Models (LLMs); however, the transferability of these attacks across different models remains limited. This study aims to understand and enhance the transferability of gradient-based jailbreaking methods, which are among the standard approaches for attacking white-box models. Through a detailed analysis of the optimization process, we introduce a novel conceptual framework to elucidate transferability and identify superfluous constraints-specifically, the response pattern constraint and the token tail constraint-as significant barriers to improved transferability. Removing these unnecessary constraints substantially enhances the transferability and controllability of gradient-based attacks. Evaluated on Llama-3-8B-Instruct as the source model, our method increases the overall Transfer Attack Success Rate (T-ASR) across a set of target models with varying safety levels from 18.4% to 50.3%, while also improving the stability and controllability of jailbreak behaviors on both source and target models.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have excelled in various tasks but are still vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks, where attackers create jailbreak prompts to mislead the model to produce harmful or offensive content. Current jailbreak methods either rely heavily on manually crafted templates, which pose challenges in scalability and adaptability, or struggle to generate semantically coherent prompts, making them easy to detect. Additionally, most existing approaches involve lengthy prompts, leading to higher query costs.In this paper, to remedy these challenges, we introduce a novel jailbreaking attack framework, which is an automated, black-box jailbreaking attack framework that adapts the black-box fuzz testing approach with a series of customized designs. Instead of relying on manually crafted templates, our method starts with an empty seed pool, removing the need to search for any related jailbreaking templates. We also develop three novel question-dependent mutation strategies using an LLM helper to generate prompts that maintain semantic coherence while significantly reducing their length. Additionally, we implement a two-level judge module to accurately detect genuine successful jailbreaks. We evaluated our method on 7 representative LLMs and compared it with 5 state-of-the-art jailbreaking attack strategies. For proprietary LLM APIs, such as GPT-3.5 turbo, GPT-4, and Gemini-Pro, our method achieves attack success rates of over 90%,80% and 74%, respectively, exceeding existing baselines by more than 60%. Additionally, our method can maintain high semantic coherence while significantly reducing the length of jailbreak prompts. When targeting GPT-4, our method can achieve over 78% attack success rate even with 100 tokens. Moreover, our method demonstrates transferability and is robust to state-of-the-art defenses. We will open-source our codes upon publication.

Existing training-time safety alignment techniques for large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks. Direct preference optimization (DPO), a widely deployed alignment method, exhibits limitations in both experimental and theoretical contexts as its loss function proves suboptimal for refusal learning. Through gradient-based analysis, we identify these shortcomings and propose an improved safety alignment that disentangles DPO objectives into two components: (1) robust refusal training, which encourages refusal even when partial unsafe generations are produced, and (2) targeted unlearning of harmful knowledge. This approach significantly increases LLM robustness against a wide range of jailbreak attacks, including prefilling, suffix, and multi-turn attacks across both in-distribution and out-of-distribution scenarios. Furthermore, we introduce a method to emphasize critical refusal tokens by incorporating a reward-based token-level weighting mechanism for refusal learning, which further improves the robustness against adversarial exploits. Our research also suggests that robustness to jailbreak attacks is correlated with token distribution shifts in the training process and internal representations of refusal and harmful tokens, offering valuable directions for future research in LLM safety alignment. The code is available at https://github.com/wicai24/DOOR-Alignment

An attacker can gain information of a user by analyzing its network traffic. The size of transferred data leaks information about the file being transferred or the service being used, and this is particularly revealing when the attacker has background knowledge about the files or services available for transfer. To prevent this, servers may pad their files using a padding scheme, changing the file sizes and preventing anyone from guessing their identity uniquely. This work focuses on finding optimal padding schemes that keep a balance between privacy and the costs of bandwidth increase. We consider R\'enyi-min leakage as our main measure for privacy, since it is directly related with the success of a simple attacker, and compare our algorithms with an existing solution that minimizes Shannon leakage. We provide improvements to our algorithms in order to optimize average total padding and Shannon leakage while minimizing R\'enyi-min leakage. Moreover, our algorithms are designed to handle a more general and important scenario in which multiple servers wish to compute padding schemes in a way that protects the servers' identity in addition to the identity of the files.

Memory layers use a trainable key-value lookup mechanism to add extra parameters to a model without increasing FLOPs. Conceptually, sparsely activated memory layers complement compute-heavy dense feed-forward layers, providing dedicated capacity to store and retrieve information cheaply. This work takes memory layers beyond proof-of-concept, proving their utility at contemporary scale. On downstream tasks, language models augmented with our improved memory layer outperform dense models with more than twice the computation budget, as well as mixture-of-expert models when matched for both compute and parameters. We find gains are especially pronounced for factual tasks. We provide a fully parallelizable memory layer implementation, demonstrating scaling laws with up to 128B memory parameters, pretrained to 1 trillion tokens, comparing to base models with up to 8B parameters.

As large language models (LLMs) grow more powerful, ensuring their safety against misuse becomes crucial. While researchers have focused on developing robust defenses, no method has yet achieved complete invulnerability to attacks. We propose an alternative approach: instead of seeking perfect adversarial robustness, we develop rapid response techniques to look to block whole classes of jailbreaks after observing only a handful of attacks. To study this setting, we develop RapidResponseBench, a benchmark that measures a defense's robustness against various jailbreak strategies after adapting to a few observed examples. We evaluate five rapid response methods, all of which use jailbreak proliferation, where we automatically generate additional jailbreaks similar to the examples observed. Our strongest method, which fine-tunes an input classifier to block proliferated jailbreaks, reduces attack success rate by a factor greater than 240 on an in-distribution set of jailbreaks and a factor greater than 15 on an out-of-distribution set, having observed just one example of each jailbreaking strategy. Moreover, further studies suggest that the quality of proliferation model and number of proliferated examples play an key role in the effectiveness of this defense. Overall, our results highlight the potential of responding rapidly to novel jailbreaks to limit LLM misuse.

The leading approaches in language modeling are all obsessed with TV shows of my youth - namely Transformers and Sesame Street. Transformers this, Transformers that, and over here a bonfire worth of GPU-TPU-neuromorphic wafer scale silicon. We opt for the lazy path of old and proven techniques with a fancy crypto inspired acronym: the Single Headed Attention RNN (SHA-RNN). The author's lone goal is to show that the entire field might have evolved a different direction if we had instead been obsessed with a slightly different acronym and slightly different result. We take a previously strong language model based only on boring LSTMs and get it to within a stone's throw of a stone's throw of state-of-the-art byte level language model results on enwik8. This work has undergone no intensive hyperparameter optimization and lived entirely on a commodity desktop machine that made the author's small studio apartment far too warm in the midst of a San Franciscan summer. The final results are achievable in plus or minus 24 hours on a single GPU as the author is impatient. The attention mechanism is also readily extended to large contexts with minimal computation. Take that Sesame Street.

Despite the implementation of safety alignment strategies, large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks, which undermine these safety guardrails and pose significant security threats. Some defenses have been proposed to detect or mitigate jailbreaks, but they are unable to withstand the test of time due to an insufficient understanding of jailbreak mechanisms. In this work, we investigate the mechanisms behind jailbreaks based on the Linear Representation Hypothesis (LRH), which states that neural networks encode high-level concepts as subspaces in their hidden representations. We define the toxic semantics in harmful and jailbreak prompts as toxic concepts and describe the semantics in jailbreak prompts that manipulate LLMs to comply with unsafe requests as jailbreak concepts. Through concept extraction and analysis, we reveal that LLMs can recognize the toxic concepts in both harmful and jailbreak prompts. However, unlike harmful prompts, jailbreak prompts activate the jailbreak concepts and alter the LLM output from rejection to compliance. Building on our analysis, we propose a comprehensive jailbreak defense framework, JBShield, consisting of two key components: jailbreak detection JBShield-D and mitigation JBShield-M. JBShield-D identifies jailbreak prompts by determining whether the input activates both toxic and jailbreak concepts. When a jailbreak prompt is detected, JBShield-M adjusts the hidden representations of the target LLM by enhancing the toxic concept and weakening the jailbreak concept, ensuring LLMs produce safe content. Extensive experiments demonstrate the superior performance of JBShield, achieving an average detection accuracy of 0.95 and reducing the average attack success rate of various jailbreak attacks to 2% from 61% across distinct LLMs.

We show that extensive LLM safety fine-tuning is easily subverted when an attacker has access to model weights. We evaluate three state-of-the-art fine-tuning methods-QLoRA, ReFT, and Ortho-and show how algorithmic advances enable constant jailbreaking performance with cuts in FLOPs and optimisation power. We strip safety fine-tuning from Llama 3 8B in one minute and Llama 3 70B in 30 minutes on a single GPU, and sketch ways to reduce this further.

Contrastive Learning (CL) has attracted enormous attention due to its remarkable capability in unsupervised representation learning. However, recent works have revealed the vulnerability of CL to backdoor attacks: the feature extractor could be misled to embed backdoored data close to an attack target class, thus fooling the downstream predictor to misclassify it as the target. Existing attacks usually adopt a fixed trigger pattern and poison the training set with trigger-injected data, hoping for the feature extractor to learn the association between trigger and target class. However, we find that such fixed trigger design fails to effectively associate trigger-injected data with target class in the embedding space due to special CL mechanisms, leading to a limited attack success rate (ASR). This phenomenon motivates us to find a better backdoor trigger design tailored for CL framework. In this paper, we propose a bi-level optimization approach to achieve this goal, where the inner optimization simulates the CL dynamics of a surrogate victim, and the outer optimization enforces the backdoor trigger to stay close to the target throughout the surrogate CL procedure. Extensive experiments show that our attack can achieve a higher attack success rate (e.g., 99% ASR on ImageNet-100) with a very low poisoning rate (1%). Besides, our attack can effectively evade existing state-of-the-art defenses. Code is available at: https://github.com/SWY666/SSL-backdoor-BLTO.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown impressive proficiency across a range of natural language processing tasks yet remain vulnerable to adversarial prompts, known as jailbreak attacks, carefully designed to elicit harmful responses from LLMs. Traditional methods rely on manual heuristics, which suffer from limited generalizability. While being automatic, optimization-based attacks often produce unnatural jailbreak prompts that are easy to detect by safety filters or require high computational overhead due to discrete token optimization. Witnessing the limitations of existing jailbreak methods, we introduce Generative Adversarial Suffix Prompter (GASP), a novel framework that combines human-readable prompt generation with Latent Bayesian Optimization (LBO) to improve adversarial suffix creation in a fully black-box setting. GASP leverages LBO to craft adversarial suffixes by efficiently exploring continuous embedding spaces, gradually optimizing the model to improve attack efficacy while balancing prompt coherence through a targeted iterative refinement procedure. Our experiments show that GASP can generate natural jailbreak prompts, significantly improving attack success rates, reducing training times, and accelerating inference speed, thus making it an efficient and scalable solution for red-teaming LLMs.

Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) is seeing increasing real-world deployment to protect data in use by allowing computation over encrypted data. However, the same malleability that enables homomorphic computations also raises integrity issues, which have so far been mostly overlooked. While FHEs lack of integrity has obvious implications for correctness, it also has severe implications for confidentiality: a malicious server can leverage the lack of integrity to carry out interactive key-recovery attacks. As a result, virtually all FHE schemes and applications assume an honest-but-curious server who does not deviate from the protocol. In practice, however, this assumption is insufficient for a wide range of deployment scenarios. While there has been work that aims to address this gap, these have remained isolated efforts considering only aspects of the overall problem and fail to fully address the needs and characteristics of modern FHE schemes and applications. In this paper, we analyze existing FHE integrity approaches, present attacks that exploit gaps in prior work, and propose a new notion for maliciously-secure verifiable FHE. We then instantiate this new notion with a range of techniques, analyzing them and evaluating their performance in a range of different settings. We highlight their potential but also show where future work on tailored integrity solutions for FHE is still required.

Fine-tuning on open-source Large Language Models (LLMs) with proprietary data is now a standard practice for downstream developers to obtain task-specific LLMs. Surprisingly, we reveal a new and concerning risk along with the practice: the creator of the open-source LLMs can later extract the private downstream fine-tuning data through simple backdoor training, only requiring black-box access to the fine-tuned downstream model. Our comprehensive experiments, across 4 popularly used open-source models with 3B to 32B parameters and 2 downstream datasets, suggest that the extraction performance can be strikingly high: in practical settings, as much as 76.3% downstream fine-tuning data (queries) out of a total 5,000 samples can be perfectly extracted, and the success rate can increase to 94.9% in more ideal settings. We also explore a detection-based defense strategy but find it can be bypassed with improved attack. Overall, we highlight the emergency of this newly identified data breaching risk in fine-tuning, and we hope that more follow-up research could push the progress of addressing this concerning risk. The code and data used in our experiments are released at https://github.com/thu-coai/Backdoor-Data-Extraction.

Recent work has proposed stateful defense models (SDMs) as a compelling strategy to defend against a black-box attacker who only has query access to the model, as is common for online machine learning platforms. Such stateful defenses aim to defend against black-box attacks by tracking the query history and detecting and rejecting queries that are "similar" and thus preventing black-box attacks from finding useful gradients and making progress towards finding adversarial attacks within a reasonable query budget. Recent SDMs (e.g., Blacklight and PIHA) have shown remarkable success in defending against state-of-the-art black-box attacks. In this paper, we show that SDMs are highly vulnerable to a new class of adaptive black-box attacks. We propose a novel adaptive black-box attack strategy called Oracle-guided Adaptive Rejection Sampling (OARS) that involves two stages: (1) use initial query patterns to infer key properties about an SDM's defense; and, (2) leverage those extracted properties to design subsequent query patterns to evade the SDM's defense while making progress towards finding adversarial inputs. OARS is broadly applicable as an enhancement to existing black-box attacks - we show how to apply the strategy to enhance six common black-box attacks to be more effective against current class of SDMs. For example, OARS-enhanced versions of black-box attacks improved attack success rate against recent stateful defenses from almost 0% to to almost 100% for multiple datasets within reasonable query budgets.

The demand for deploying large language models(LLMs) on mobile devices continues to increase, driven by escalating data security concerns and cloud costs. However, network bandwidth and memory limitations pose challenges for deploying billion-level models on mobile devices. In this study, we investigate the outputs of different layers across various scales of LLMs and found that the outputs of most layers exhibit significant similarity. Moreover, this similarity becomes more pronounced as the model size increases, indicating substantial redundancy in the depth direction of the LLMs. Based on this observation, we propose an efficient model volume compression strategy, termed FoldGPT, which combines block removal and block parameter sharing.This strategy consists of three parts: (1) Based on the learnable gating parameters, we determine the block importance ranking while modeling the coupling effect between blocks. Then we delete some redundant layers based on the given removal rate. (2) For the retained blocks, we apply a specially designed group parameter sharing strategy, where blocks within the same group share identical weights, significantly compressing the number of parameters and slightly reducing latency overhead. (3) After sharing these Blocks, we "cure" the mismatch caused by sparsity with a minor amount of fine-tuning and introduce a tail-layer distillation strategy to improve the performance. Experiments demonstrate that FoldGPT outperforms previous state-of-the-art(SOTA) methods in efficient model compression, demonstrating the feasibility of achieving model lightweighting through straightforward block removal and parameter sharing.

This paper introduces a structured memory which can be easily integrated into a neural network. The memory is very large by design and significantly increases the capacity of the architecture, by up to a billion parameters with a negligible computational overhead. Its design and access pattern is based on product keys, which enable fast and exact nearest neighbor search. The ability to increase the number of parameters while keeping the same computational budget lets the overall system strike a better trade-off between prediction accuracy and computation efficiency both at training and test time. This memory layer allows us to tackle very large scale language modeling tasks. In our experiments we consider a dataset with up to 30 billion words, and we plug our memory layer in a state-of-the-art transformer-based architecture. In particular, we found that a memory augmented model with only 12 layers outperforms a baseline transformer model with 24 layers, while being twice faster at inference time. We release our code for reproducibility purposes.

Safety alignment in large language models (LLMs) is increasingly compromised by jailbreak attacks, which can manipulate these models to generate harmful or unintended content. Investigating these attacks is crucial for uncovering model vulnerabilities. However, many existing jailbreak strategies fail to keep pace with the rapid development of defense mechanisms, such as defensive suffixes, rendering them ineffective against defended models. To tackle this issue, we introduce a novel attack method called ArrAttack, specifically designed to target defended LLMs. ArrAttack automatically generates robust jailbreak prompts capable of bypassing various defense measures. This capability is supported by a universal robustness judgment model that, once trained, can perform robustness evaluation for any target model with a wide variety of defenses. By leveraging this model, we can rapidly develop a robust jailbreak prompt generator that efficiently converts malicious input prompts into effective attacks. Extensive evaluations reveal that ArrAttack significantly outperforms existing attack strategies, demonstrating strong transferability across both white-box and black-box models, including GPT-4 and Claude-3. Our work bridges the gap between jailbreak attacks and defenses, providing a fresh perspective on generating robust jailbreak prompts. We make the codebase available at https://github.com/LLBao/ArrAttack.

Backdoor attacks represent one of the major threats to machine learning models. Various efforts have been made to mitigate backdoors. However, existing defenses have become increasingly complex and often require high computational resources or may also jeopardize models' utility. In this work, we show that fine-tuning, one of the most common and easy-to-adopt machine learning training operations, can effectively remove backdoors from machine learning models while maintaining high model utility. Extensive experiments over three machine learning paradigms show that fine-tuning and our newly proposed super-fine-tuning achieve strong defense performance. Furthermore, we coin a new term, namely backdoor sequela, to measure the changes in model vulnerabilities to other attacks before and after the backdoor has been removed. Empirical evaluation shows that, compared to other defense methods, super-fine-tuning leaves limited backdoor sequela. We hope our results can help machine learning model owners better protect their models from backdoor threats. Also, it calls for the design of more advanced attacks in order to comprehensively assess machine learning models' backdoor vulnerabilities.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are susceptible to Jailbreaking attacks, which aim to extract harmful information by subtly modifying the attack query. As defense mechanisms evolve, directly obtaining harmful information becomes increasingly challenging for Jailbreaking attacks. In this work, inspired by human practices of indirect context to elicit harmful information, we focus on a new attack form called Contextual Interaction Attack. The idea relies on the autoregressive nature of the generation process in LLMs. We contend that the prior context--the information preceding the attack query--plays a pivotal role in enabling potent Jailbreaking attacks. Specifically, we propose an approach that leverages preliminary question-answer pairs to interact with the LLM. By doing so, we guide the responses of the model toward revealing the 'desired' harmful information. We conduct experiments on four different LLMs and demonstrate the efficacy of this attack, which is black-box and can also transfer across LLMs. We believe this can lead to further developments and understanding of the context vector in LLMs.

Large Language Models (LLMs) enable a new ecosystem with many downstream applications, called LLM applications, with different natural language processing tasks. The functionality and performance of an LLM application highly depend on its system prompt, which instructs the backend LLM on what task to perform. Therefore, an LLM application developer often keeps a system prompt confidential to protect its intellectual property. As a result, a natural attack, called prompt leaking, is to steal the system prompt from an LLM application, which compromises the developer's intellectual property. Existing prompt leaking attacks primarily rely on manually crafted queries, and thus achieve limited effectiveness. In this paper, we design a novel, closed-box prompt leaking attack framework, called PLeak, to optimize an adversarial query such that when the attacker sends it to a target LLM application, its response reveals its own system prompt. We formulate finding such an adversarial query as an optimization problem and solve it with a gradient-based method approximately. Our key idea is to break down the optimization goal by optimizing adversary queries for system prompts incrementally, i.e., starting from the first few tokens of each system prompt step by step until the entire length of the system prompt. We evaluate PLeak in both offline settings and for real-world LLM applications, e.g., those on Poe, a popular platform hosting such applications. Our results show that PLeak can effectively leak system prompts and significantly outperforms not only baselines that manually curate queries but also baselines with optimized queries that are modified and adapted from existing jailbreaking attacks. We responsibly reported the issues to Poe and are still waiting for their response. Our implementation is available at this repository: https://github.com/BHui97/PLeak.

Machine learning programs, such as those performing inference, fine-tuning, and training of LLMs, are commonly delegated to untrusted compute providers. To provide correctness guarantees for the client, we propose adapting the cryptographic notion of refereed delegation to the machine learning setting. This approach enables a computationally limited client to delegate a program to multiple untrusted compute providers, with a guarantee of obtaining the correct result if at least one of them is honest. Refereed delegation of ML programs poses two technical hurdles: (1) an arbitration protocol to resolve disputes when compute providers disagree on the output, and (2) the ability to bitwise reproduce ML programs across different hardware setups, For (1), we design Verde, a dispute arbitration protocol that efficiently handles the large scale and graph-based computational model of modern ML programs. For (2), we build RepOps (Reproducible Operators), a library that eliminates hardware "non-determinism" by controlling the order of floating point operations performed on all hardware. Our implementation shows that refereed delegation achieves both strong guarantees for clients and practical overheads for compute providers.

Recent advancements in dense retrieval have introduced vision-language model (VLM)-based retrievers, such as DSE and ColPali, which leverage document screenshots embedded as vectors to enable effective search and offer a simplified pipeline over traditional text-only methods. In this study, we propose three pixel poisoning attack methods designed to compromise VLM-based retrievers and evaluate their effectiveness under various attack settings and parameter configurations. Our empirical results demonstrate that injecting even a single adversarial screenshot into the retrieval corpus can significantly disrupt search results, poisoning the top-10 retrieved documents for 41.9% of queries in the case of DSE and 26.4% for ColPali. These vulnerability rates notably exceed those observed with equivalent attacks on text-only retrievers. Moreover, when targeting a small set of known queries, the attack success rate raises, achieving complete success in certain cases. By exposing the vulnerabilities inherent in vision-language models, this work highlights the potential risks associated with their deployment.

Large language models (LLMs) can be prompted with specific styles (e.g., formatting responses as lists), including in jailbreak queries. Although these style patterns are semantically unrelated to the malicious intents behind jailbreak queries, their safety impact remains unclear. In this work, we seek to understand whether style patterns compromise LLM safety, how superficial style alignment increases model vulnerability, and how best to mitigate these risks during alignment. We evaluate 32 LLMs across seven jailbreak benchmarks, and find that malicious queries with style patterns inflate the attack success rate (ASR) for nearly all models. Notably, ASR inflation correlates with both the length of style patterns and the relative attention an LLM exhibits on them. We then investigate superficial style alignment, and find that fine-tuning with specific styles makes LLMs more vulnerable to jailbreaks of those same styles. Finally, we propose SafeStyle, a defense strategy that incorporates a small amount of safety training data augmented to match the distribution of style patterns in the fine-tuning data. Across three LLMs and five fine-tuning style settings, SafeStyle consistently outperforms baselines in maintaining LLM safety.

Decision-based evasion attacks repeatedly query a black-box classifier to generate adversarial examples. Prior work measures the cost of such attacks by the total number of queries made to the classifier. We argue this metric is flawed. Most security-critical machine learning systems aim to weed out "bad" data (e.g., malware, harmful content, etc). Queries to such systems carry a fundamentally asymmetric cost: queries detected as "bad" come at a higher cost because they trigger additional security filters, e.g., usage throttling or account suspension. Yet, we find that existing decision-based attacks issue a large number of "bad" queries, which likely renders them ineffective against security-critical systems. We then design new attacks that reduce the number of bad queries by 1.5-7.3times, but often at a significant increase in total (non-bad) queries. We thus pose it as an open problem to build black-box attacks that are more effective under realistic cost metrics.

Transformer is a transformative framework that models sequential data and has achieved remarkable performance on a wide range of tasks, but with high computational and energy cost. To improve its efficiency, a popular choice is to compress the models via binarization which constrains the floating-point values into binary ones to save resource consumption owing to cheap bitwise operations significantly. However, existing binarization methods only aim at minimizing the information loss for the input distribution statistically, while ignoring the pairwise similarity modeling at the core of the attention. To this end, we propose a new binarization paradigm customized to high-dimensional softmax attention via kernelized hashing, called EcoFormer, to map the original queries and keys into low-dimensional binary codes in Hamming space. The kernelized hash functions are learned to match the ground-truth similarity relations extracted from the attention map in a self-supervised way. Based on the equivalence between the inner product of binary codes and the Hamming distance as well as the associative property of matrix multiplication, we can approximate the attention in linear complexity by expressing it as a dot-product of binary codes. Moreover, the compact binary representations of queries and keys enable us to replace most of the expensive multiply-accumulate operations in attention with simple accumulations to save considerable on-chip energy footprint on edge devices. Extensive experiments on both vision and language tasks show that EcoFormer consistently achieves comparable performance with standard attentions while consuming much fewer resources. For example, based on PVTv2-B0 and ImageNet-1K, Ecoformer achieves a 73% on-chip energy footprint reduction with only a 0.33% performance drop compared to the standard attention. Code is available at https://github.com/ziplab/EcoFormer.

Fully Homomorphic Encryption over the torus (TFHE) enables computation on encrypted data without decryption, making it a cornerstone of secure and confidential computing. Despite its potential in privacy preserving machine learning, secure multi party computation, private blockchain transactions, and secure medical diagnostics, its adoption remains limited due to cryptographic complexity and usability challenges. While various TFHE libraries and compilers exist, practical code generation remains a hurdle. We propose a compiler integrated framework to evaluate LLM inference and agentic optimization for TFHE code generation, focusing on logic gates and ReLU activation. Our methodology assesses error rates, compilability, and structural similarity across open and closedsource LLMs. Results highlight significant limitations in off-the-shelf models, while agentic optimizations such as retrieval augmented generation (RAG) and few-shot prompting reduce errors and enhance code fidelity. This work establishes the first benchmark for TFHE code generation, demonstrating how LLMs, when augmented with domain-specific feedback, can bridge the expertise gap in FHE code generation.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly prevalent and integrated into autonomous systems, ensuring their safety is imperative. Despite significant strides toward safety alignment, recent work GCG~zou2023universal proposes a discrete token optimization algorithm and selects the single suffix with the lowest loss to successfully jailbreak aligned LLMs. In this work, we first discuss the drawbacks of solely picking the suffix with the lowest loss during GCG optimization for jailbreaking and uncover the missed successful suffixes during the intermediate steps. Moreover, we utilize those successful suffixes as training data to learn a generative model, named AmpleGCG, which captures the distribution of adversarial suffixes given a harmful query and enables the rapid generation of hundreds of suffixes for any harmful queries in seconds. AmpleGCG achieves near 100\% attack success rate (ASR) on two aligned LLMs (Llama-2-7B-chat and Vicuna-7B), surpassing two strongest attack baselines. More interestingly, AmpleGCG also transfers seamlessly to attack different models, including closed-source LLMs, achieving a 99\% ASR on the latest GPT-3.5. To summarize, our work amplifies the impact of GCG by training a generative model of adversarial suffixes that is universal to any harmful queries and transferable from attacking open-source LLMs to closed-source LLMs. In addition, it can generate 200 adversarial suffixes for one harmful query in only 4 seconds, rendering it more challenging to defend.

Understanding the vulnerabilities of Large Vision Language Models (LVLMs) to jailbreak attacks is essential for their responsible real-world deployment. Most previous work requires access to model gradients, or is based on human knowledge (prompt engineering) to complete jailbreak, and they hardly consider the interaction of images and text, resulting in inability to jailbreak in black box scenarios or poor performance. To overcome these limitations, we propose a Prior-Guided Bimodal Interactive Black-Box Jailbreak Attack for toxicity maximization, referred to as PBI-Attack. Our method begins by extracting malicious features from a harmful corpus using an alternative LVLM and embedding these features into a benign image as prior information. Subsequently, we enhance these features through bidirectional cross-modal interaction optimization, which iteratively optimizes the bimodal perturbations in an alternating manner through greedy search, aiming to maximize the toxicity of the generated response. The toxicity level is quantified using a well-trained evaluation model. Experiments demonstrate that PBI-Attack outperforms previous state-of-the-art jailbreak methods, achieving an average attack success rate of 92.5% across three open-source LVLMs and around 67.3% on three closed-source LVLMs. Disclaimer: This paper contains potentially disturbing and offensive content.

Recently, self-supervised learning (SSL) was shown to be vulnerable to patch-based data poisoning backdoor attacks. It was shown that an adversary can poison a small part of the unlabeled data so that when a victim trains an SSL model on it, the final model will have a backdoor that the adversary can exploit. This work aims to defend self-supervised learning against such attacks. We use a three-step defense pipeline, where we first train a model on the poisoned data. In the second step, our proposed defense algorithm (PatchSearch) uses the trained model to search the training data for poisoned samples and removes them from the training set. In the third step, a final model is trained on the cleaned-up training set. Our results show that PatchSearch is an effective defense. As an example, it improves a model's accuracy on images containing the trigger from 38.2% to 63.7% which is very close to the clean model's accuracy, 64.6%. Moreover, we show that PatchSearch outperforms baselines and state-of-the-art defense approaches including those using additional clean, trusted data. Our code is available at https://github.com/UCDvision/PatchSearch

The demand for inference on extremely large scale LLMs has seen enormous growth in the recent months. It made evident the colossal shortage of dedicated hardware capable of efficient and fast processing of the involved compute and memory movement. The problem is aggravated by the exploding raise in the lengths of the sequences being processed, since those require efficient on-chip storage of the KV-cache of size proportional to the sequence length. To make the required compute feasible and fit the involved data into available memory, numerous quantization techniques have been proposed that allow accurate quantization for both weights and activations. One of the main recent breakthroughs in this direction was introduction of the family of Block Floating Point (BFP) formats characterized by a block of mantissas with a shared scale factor. These enable memory- power-, and compute- efficient hardware support of the tensor operations and provide extremely good quantization accuracy. The main issues preventing widespread application of block formats is caused by the presence of outliers in weights and activations since those affect the accuracy of the other values in the same block. In this paper, we focus on the most critical problem of limited KV-cache storage. We propose a novel approach enabling usage of low precision BFP formats without compromising the resulting model accuracy. We exploit the common channel-wise patterns exhibited by the outliers to rearrange them in such a way, that their quantization quality is significantly improved. The methodology yields 2x savings in the memory footprint without significant degradation of the model's accuracy. Importantly, the rearrangement of channels happens at the compile time and thus has no impact on the inference latency.

This work introduces a general code generation framework that incorporates infilling operations into auto-regressive decoding. Our approach capitalizes on the observation that recent code language models with infilling capabilities can perform self-infilling: whereas infilling operations aim to fill in the middle based on a predefined prefix and suffix, self-infilling sequentially generates both such surrounding context and the infilled content. We utilize this feature to develop an infilling-augmented decoding process that facilitates non-monotonic generation. This approach allows for postponing the generation of uncertain code snippets until a definitive suffix is established, leading to improved control over the generation sequence. In addition, it facilitates a looping mechanism, which can iteratively update and synchronize each piece of generation in a cyclic manner. Extensive experiments are conducted to demonstrate that our proposed decoding process is effective in enhancing regularity and quality across several code generation benchmarks.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly being deployed on edge devices for long-context settings, creating a growing need for fast and efficient long-context inference. In these scenarios, the Key-Value (KV) cache is the primary bottleneck in terms of both GPU memory and latency, as the full KV cache must be loaded for each decoding step. While speculative decoding is a widely accepted technique to accelerate autoregressive decoding, existing methods often struggle to achieve significant speedups due to inefficient KV cache optimization strategies and result in low acceptance rates. To address these challenges, we propose a novel self-speculative decoding framework, QuantSpec, where the draft model shares the architecture of the target model but employs a hierarchical 4-bit quantized KV cache and 4-bit quantized weights for acceleration. QuantSpec maintains high acceptance rates (>90%) and reliably provides consistent end-to-end speedups upto sim2.5times, outperforming other self-speculative decoding methods that use sparse KV cache for long-context LLM inference. QuantSpec also reduces the memory requirements by sim 1.3times compared to these alternatives.

The Sybil attack plagues all peer-to-peer systems, and modern open distributed ledgers employ a number of tactics to prevent it from proof of work, or other resources such as space, stake or memory, to traditional admission control in permissioned settings. With SybilQuorum we propose an alternative approach to securing an open distributed ledger against Sybil attacks, and ensuring consensus amongst honest participants, leveraging social network based Sybil defences. We show how nodes expressing their trust relationships through the ledger can bootstrap and operate a value system, and general transaction system, and how Sybil attacks are thwarted. We empirically evaluate our system as a secure Federated Byzantine Agreement System, and extend the theory of those systems to do so.

Dataset distillation offers a potential means to enhance data efficiency in deep learning. Recent studies have shown its ability to counteract backdoor risks present in original training samples. In this study, we delve into the theoretical aspects of backdoor attacks and dataset distillation based on kernel methods. We introduce two new theory-driven trigger pattern generation methods specialized for dataset distillation. Following a comprehensive set of analyses and experiments, we show that our optimization-based trigger design framework informs effective backdoor attacks on dataset distillation. Notably, datasets poisoned by our designed trigger prove resilient against conventional backdoor attack detection and mitigation methods. Our empirical results validate that the triggers developed using our approaches are proficient at executing resilient backdoor attacks.

Key-value (KV) caching has become the de-facto to accelerate generation speed for large language models (LLMs) inference. However, the growing cache demand with increasing sequence length has transformed LLM inference to be a memory bound problem, significantly constraining the system throughput. Existing methods rely on dropping unimportant tokens or quantizing all entries uniformly. Such methods, however, often incur high approximation errors to represent the compressed matrices. The autoregressive decoding process further compounds the error of each step, resulting in critical deviation in model generation and deterioration of performance. To tackle this challenge, we propose GEAR, an efficient KV cache compression framework that achieves near-lossless high-ratio compression. GEAR first applies quantization to majority of entries of similar magnitudes to ultra-low precision. It then employs a low rank matrix to approximate the quantization error, and a sparse matrix to remedy individual errors from outlier entries. By adeptly integrating three techniques, GEAR is able to fully exploit their synergistic potentials. Our experiments demonstrate that compared to alternatives, GEAR achieves near-lossless 4-bit KV cache compression with up to 2.38x throughput improvement, while reducing peak-memory size up to 2.29x. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/HaoKang-Timmy/GEAR.

The privacy concerns of providing deep learning inference as a service have underscored the need for private inference (PI) protocols that protect users' data and the service provider's model using cryptographic methods. Recently proposed PI protocols have achieved significant reductions in PI latency by moving the computationally heavy homomorphic encryption (HE) parts to an offline/pre-compute phase. Paired with recent optimizations that tailor networks for PI, these protocols have achieved performance levels that are tantalizingly close to being practical. In this paper, we conduct a rigorous end-to-end characterization of PI protocols and optimization techniques and find that the current understanding of PI performance is overly optimistic. Specifically, we find that offline storage costs of garbled circuits (GC), a key cryptographic protocol used in PI, on user/client devices are prohibitively high and force much of the expensive offline HE computation to the online phase, resulting in a 10-1000times increase to PI latency. We propose a modified PI protocol that significantly reduces client-side storage costs for a small increase in online latency. Evaluated end-to-end, the modified protocol outperforms current protocols by reducing the mean PI latency by 4times for ResNet18 on TinyImageNet. We conclude with a discussion of several recently proposed PI optimizations in light of the findings and note many actually increase PI latency when evaluated from an end-to-end perspective.

Current evaluations of defenses against prompt attacks in large language model (LLM) applications often overlook two critical factors: the dynamic nature of adversarial behavior and the usability penalties imposed on legitimate users by restrictive defenses. We propose D-SEC (Dynamic Security Utility Threat Model), which explicitly separates attackers from legitimate users, models multi-step interactions, and expresses the security-utility in an optimizable form. We further address the shortcomings in existing evaluations by introducing Gandalf, a crowd-sourced, gamified red-teaming platform designed to generate realistic, adaptive attack. Using Gandalf, we collect and release a dataset of 279k prompt attacks. Complemented by benign user data, our analysis reveals the interplay between security and utility, showing that defenses integrated in the LLM (e.g., system prompts) can degrade usability even without blocking requests. We demonstrate that restricted application domains, defense-in-depth, and adaptive defenses are effective strategies for building secure and useful LLM applications.

We propose TETRIS, a novel method that optimizes the total throughput of batch speculative decoding in multi-request settings. Unlike existing methods that optimize for a single request or a group of requests as a whole, TETRIS actively selects the most promising draft tokens (for every request in a batch) to be accepted when verified in parallel, resulting in fewer rejected tokens and hence less wasted computing resources. Such an effective resource utilization to achieve fast inference in large language models (LLMs) is especially important to service providers with limited inference capacity. Compared to baseline speculative decoding, TETRIS yields a consistently higher acceptance rate and more effective utilization of the limited inference capacity. We show theoretically and empirically that TETRIS outperforms baseline speculative decoding and existing methods that dynamically select draft tokens, leading to a more efficient batch inference in LLMs.

Backdoor learning is an emerging and vital topic for studying deep neural networks' vulnerability (DNNs). Many pioneering backdoor attack and defense methods are being proposed, successively or concurrently, in the status of a rapid arms race. However, we find that the evaluations of new methods are often unthorough to verify their claims and accurate performance, mainly due to the rapid development, diverse settings, and the difficulties of implementation and reproducibility. Without thorough evaluations and comparisons, it is not easy to track the current progress and design the future development roadmap of the literature. To alleviate this dilemma, we build a comprehensive benchmark of backdoor learning called BackdoorBench. It consists of an extensible modular-based codebase (currently including implementations of 8 state-of-the-art (SOTA) attacks and 9 SOTA defense algorithms) and a standardized protocol of complete backdoor learning. We also provide comprehensive evaluations of every pair of 8 attacks against 9 defenses, with 5 poisoning ratios, based on 5 models and 4 datasets, thus 8,000 pairs of evaluations in total. We present abundant analysis from different perspectives about these 8,000 evaluations, studying the effects of different factors in backdoor learning. All codes and evaluations of BackdoorBench are publicly available at https://backdoorbench.github.io.