Daily Papers

The increasing ubiquity of text-to-image (T2I) models as tools for visual content generation raises concerns about their ability to accurately represent diverse cultural contexts. In this work, we present the first study to systematically quantify the alignment of T2I models and evaluation metrics with respect to both explicit as well as implicit cultural expectations. To this end, we introduce CulturalFrames, a novel benchmark designed for rigorous human evaluation of cultural representation in visual generations. Spanning 10 countries and 5 socio-cultural domains, CulturalFrames comprises 983 prompts, 3637 corresponding images generated by 4 state-of-the-art T2I models, and over 10k detailed human annotations. We find that T2I models not only fail to meet the more challenging implicit expectations but also the less challenging explicit expectations. Across models and countries, cultural expectations are missed an average of 44% of the time. Among these failures, explicit expectations are missed at a surprisingly high average rate of 68%, while implicit expectation failures are also significant, averaging 49%. Furthermore, we demonstrate that existing T2I evaluation metrics correlate poorly with human judgments of cultural alignment, irrespective of their internal reasoning. Collectively, our findings expose critical gaps, providing actionable directions for developing more culturally informed T2I models and evaluation methodologies.

Despite recent advances in text-conditioned 3D indoor scene generation, there remain gaps in the evaluation of these methods. Existing metrics primarily assess the realism of generated scenes by comparing them to a set of ground-truth scenes, often overlooking alignment with the input text - a critical factor in determining how effectively a method meets user requirements. We present SceneEval, an evaluation framework designed to address this limitation. SceneEval includes metrics for both explicit user requirements, such as the presence of specific objects and their attributes described in the input text, and implicit expectations, like the absence of object collisions, providing a comprehensive assessment of scene quality. To facilitate evaluation, we introduce SceneEval-100, a dataset of scene descriptions with annotated ground-truth scene properties. We evaluate recent scene generation methods using SceneEval and demonstrate its ability to provide detailed assessments of the generated scenes, highlighting strengths and areas for improvement across multiple dimensions. Our results show that current methods struggle at generating scenes that meet user requirements, underscoring the need for further research in this direction.

The following three factors restrict the application of existing low-light image enhancement methods: unpredictable brightness degradation and noise, inherent gap between metric-favorable and visual-friendly versions, and the limited paired training data. To address these limitations, we propose an implicit Neural Representation method for Cooperative low-light image enhancement, dubbed NeRCo. It robustly recovers perceptual-friendly results in an unsupervised manner. Concretely, NeRCo unifies the diverse degradation factors of real-world scenes with a controllable fitting function, leading to better robustness. In addition, for the output results, we introduce semantic-orientated supervision with priors from the pre-trained vision-language model. Instead of merely following reference images, it encourages results to meet subjective expectations, finding more visual-friendly solutions. Further, to ease the reliance on paired data and reduce solution space, we develop a dual-closed-loop constrained enhancement module. It is trained cooperatively with other affiliated modules in a self-supervised manner. Finally, extensive experiments demonstrate the robustness and superior effectiveness of our proposed NeRCo. Our code is available at https://github.com/Ysz2022/NeRCo.

In order for AI systems to communicate effectively with people, they must understand how we make decisions. However, people's decisions are not always rational, so the implicit internal models of human decision-making in Large Language Models (LLMs) must account for this. Previous empirical evidence seems to suggest that these implicit models are accurate -- LLMs offer believable proxies of human behavior, acting how we expect humans would in everyday interactions. However, by comparing LLM behavior and predictions to a large dataset of human decisions, we find that this is actually not the case: when both simulating and predicting people's choices, a suite of cutting-edge LLMs (GPT-4o & 4-Turbo, Llama-3-8B & 70B, Claude 3 Opus) assume that people are more rational than we really are. Specifically, these models deviate from human behavior and align more closely with a classic model of rational choice -- expected value theory. Interestingly, people also tend to assume that other people are rational when interpreting their behavior. As a consequence, when we compare the inferences that LLMs and people draw from the decisions of others using another psychological dataset, we find that these inferences are highly correlated. Thus, the implicit decision-making models of LLMs appear to be aligned with the human expectation that other people will act rationally, rather than with how people actually act.

We introduce a novel framework for simulating macroeconomic expectation formation using Large Language Model-Empowered Agents (LLM Agents). By constructing thousands of LLM Agents equipped with modules for personal characteristics, prior expectations, and knowledge, we replicate a survey experiment involving households and experts on inflation and unemployment. Our results show that although the expectations and thoughts generated by LLM Agents are more homogeneous than those of human participants, they still effectively capture key heterogeneity across agents and the underlying drivers of expectation formation. Furthermore, a module-ablation exercise highlights the critical role of prior expectations in simulating such heterogeneity. This approach complements traditional survey methods and offers new insights into AI behavioral science in macroeconomic research.

When individuals encounter observations that violate their expectations, when will they adjust their expectations and when will they maintain them despite these observations? For example, when individuals expect objects of type A to be smaller than objects B, but observe the opposite, when will they adjust their expectation about the relationship between the two objects (to A being larger than B)? Naively, one would predict that the larger the violation, the greater the adaptation. However, experiments reveal that when violations are extreme, individuals are more likely to hold on to their prior expectations rather than adjust them. To address this puzzle, we tested the adaptation of artificial neural networks (ANNs) capable of relational learning and found a similar phenomenon: Standard learning dynamics dictates that small violations would lead to adjustments of expected relations while larger ones would be resolved using a different mechanism -- a change in object representation that bypasses the need for adaptation of the relational expectations. These results suggest that the experimentally-observed stability of prior expectations when facing large expectation violations is a natural consequence of learning dynamics and does not require any additional mechanisms. We conclude by discussing the effect of intermediate adaptation steps on this stability.

Recent research shows that Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit a compelling level of proficiency in Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks. This ability to impute unobservable mental states to others is vital to human social cognition and may prove equally important in principal-agent relations between individual humans and Artificial Intelligences (AIs). In this paper, we explore how a mechanism studied in developmental psychology known as Violation of Expectation (VoE) can be implemented to reduce errors in LLM prediction about users by leveraging emergent ToM affordances. And we introduce a metacognitive prompting framework to apply VoE in the context of an AI tutor. By storing and retrieving facts derived in cases where LLM expectation about the user was violated, we find that LLMs are able to learn about users in ways that echo theories of human learning. Finally, we discuss latent hazards and augmentative opportunities associated with modeling user psychology and propose ways to mitigate risk along with possible directions for future inquiry.

Implicit Personalization (IP) is a phenomenon of language models inferring a user's background from the implicit cues in the input prompts and tailoring the response based on this inference. While previous work has touched upon various instances of this problem, there lacks a unified framework to study this behavior. This work systematically studies IP through a rigorous mathematical formulation, a multi-perspective moral reasoning framework, and a set of case studies. Our theoretical foundation for IP relies on a structural causal model and introduces a novel method, indirect intervention, to estimate the causal effect of a mediator variable that cannot be directly intervened upon. Beyond the technical approach, we also introduce a set of moral reasoning principles based on three schools of moral philosophy to study when IP may or may not be ethically appropriate. Equipped with both mathematical and ethical insights, we present three diverse case studies illustrating the varied nature of the IP problem and offer recommendations for future research. Our code and data are at https://github.com/jiarui-liu/IP.

Implicit bias refers to automatic or spontaneous mental processes that shape perceptions, judgments, and behaviors. Previous research examining `implicit bias' in large language models (LLMs) has often approached the phenomenon differently than how it is studied in humans by focusing primarily on model outputs rather than on model processing. To examine model processing, we present a method called the Reasoning Model Implicit Association Test (RM-IAT) for studying implicit bias-like patterns in reasoning models: LLMs that employ step-by-step reasoning to solve complex tasks. Using this method, we find that reasoning models require more tokens when processing association-incompatible information compared to association-compatible information. These findings suggest AI systems harbor patterns in processing information that are analogous to human implicit bias. We consider the implications of these implicit bias-like patterns for their deployment in real-world applications.

Text-to-image diffusion models often make implicit assumptions about the world when generating images. While some assumptions are useful (e.g., the sky is blue), they can also be outdated, incorrect, or reflective of social biases present in the training data. Thus, there is a need to control these assumptions without requiring explicit user input or costly re-training. In this work, we aim to edit a given implicit assumption in a pre-trained diffusion model. Our Text-to-Image Model Editing method, TIME for short, receives a pair of inputs: a "source" under-specified prompt for which the model makes an implicit assumption (e.g., "a pack of roses"), and a "destination" prompt that describes the same setting, but with a specified desired attribute (e.g., "a pack of blue roses"). TIME then updates the model's cross-attention layers, as these layers assign visual meaning to textual tokens. We edit the projection matrices in these layers such that the source prompt is projected close to the destination prompt. Our method is highly efficient, as it modifies a mere 2.2% of the model's parameters in under one second. To evaluate model editing approaches, we introduce TIMED (TIME Dataset), containing 147 source and destination prompt pairs from various domains. Our experiments (using Stable Diffusion) show that TIME is successful in model editing, generalizes well for related prompts unseen during editing, and imposes minimal effect on unrelated generations.

Language model users often issue queries that lack specification, where the context under which a query was issued -- such as the user's identity, the query's intent, and the criteria for a response to be useful -- is not explicit. For instance, a good response to a subjective query like "What book should I read next?" would depend on the user's preferences, and a good response to an open-ended query like "How do antibiotics work against bacteria?" would depend on the user's expertise. This makes evaluation of responses to such queries an ill-posed task, as evaluators may make arbitrary judgments about the response quality. To remedy this, we present contextualized evaluations, a protocol that synthetically constructs context surrounding an underspecified query and provides it during evaluation. We find that the presence of context can 1) alter conclusions drawn from evaluation, even flipping win rates between model pairs, 2) nudge evaluators to make fewer judgments based on surface-level criteria, like style, and 3) provide new insights about model behavior across diverse contexts. Specifically, our procedure uncovers an implicit bias towards WEIRD contexts in models' "default" responses and we find that models are not equally sensitive to following different contexts, even when they are provided in prompts.

We employ an audit design to investigate biases in state-of-the-art large language models, including GPT-4. In our study, we prompt the models for advice involving a named individual across a variety of scenarios, such as during car purchase negotiations or election outcome predictions. We find that the advice systematically disadvantages names that are commonly associated with racial minorities and women. Names associated with Black women receive the least advantageous outcomes. The biases are consistent across 42 prompt templates and several models, indicating a systemic issue rather than isolated incidents. While providing numerical, decision-relevant anchors in the prompt can successfully counteract the biases, qualitative details have inconsistent effects and may even increase disparities. Our findings underscore the importance of conducting audits at the point of LLM deployment and implementation to mitigate their potential for harm against marginalized communities.

Large language models (LLMs) can pass explicit social bias tests but still harbor implicit biases, similar to humans who endorse egalitarian beliefs yet exhibit subtle biases. Measuring such implicit biases can be a challenge: as LLMs become increasingly proprietary, it may not be possible to access their embeddings and apply existing bias measures; furthermore, implicit biases are primarily a concern if they affect the actual decisions that these systems make. We address both challenges by introducing two new measures of bias: LLM Implicit Bias, a prompt-based method for revealing implicit bias; and LLM Decision Bias, a strategy to detect subtle discrimination in decision-making tasks. Both measures are based on psychological research: LLM Implicit Bias adapts the Implicit Association Test, widely used to study the automatic associations between concepts held in human minds; and LLM Decision Bias operationalizes psychological results indicating that relative evaluations between two candidates, not absolute evaluations assessing each independently, are more diagnostic of implicit biases. Using these measures, we found pervasive stereotype biases mirroring those in society in 8 value-aligned models across 4 social categories (race, gender, religion, health) in 21 stereotypes (such as race and criminality, race and weapons, gender and science, age and negativity). Our prompt-based LLM Implicit Bias measure correlates with existing language model embedding-based bias methods, but better predicts downstream behaviors measured by LLM Decision Bias. These new prompt-based measures draw from psychology's long history of research into measuring stereotype biases based on purely observable behavior; they expose nuanced biases in proprietary value-aligned LLMs that appear unbiased according to standard benchmarks.

The reward hypothesis posits that, "all of what we mean by goals and purposes can be well thought of as maximization of the expected value of the cumulative sum of a received scalar signal (reward)." We aim to fully settle this hypothesis. This will not conclude with a simple affirmation or refutation, but rather specify completely the implicit requirements on goals and purposes under which the hypothesis holds.

Warning: This paper contains several contents that may be toxic, harmful, or offensive. In the last few years, text-to-image generative models have gained remarkable success in generating images with unprecedented quality accompanied by a breakthrough of inference speed. Despite their rapid progress, human biases that manifest in the training examples, particularly with regard to common stereotypical biases, like gender and skin tone, still have been found in these generative models. In this work, we seek to measure more complex human biases exist in the task of text-to-image generations. Inspired by the well-known Implicit Association Test (IAT) from social psychology, we propose a novel Text-to-Image Association Test (T2IAT) framework that quantifies the implicit stereotypes between concepts and valence, and those in the images. We replicate the previously documented bias tests on generative models, including morally neutral tests on flowers and insects as well as demographic stereotypical tests on diverse social attributes. The results of these experiments demonstrate the presence of complex stereotypical behaviors in image generations.

We demonstrate that LLMs may learn indicators of document usefulness and modulate their updates accordingly. We introduce random strings ("tags") as indicators of usefulness in a synthetic fine-tuning dataset. Fine-tuning on this dataset leads to implicit meta-learning (IML): in further fine-tuning, the model updates to make more use of text that is tagged as useful. We perform a thorough empirical investigation of this phenomenon, finding (among other things) that (i) it occurs in both pretrained LLMs and those trained from scratch, as well as on a vision task, and (ii) larger models and smaller batch sizes tend to give more IML. We also use probing to examine how IML changes the way models store knowledge in their parameters. Finally, we reflect on what our results might imply about capabilities, risks, and controllability of future AI systems. Our code can be found at https://github.com/krasheninnikov/internalization.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

Newly-developed large language models (LLM) -- because of how they are trained and designed -- are implicit computational models of humans -- a homo silicus. These models can be used the same way economists use homo economicus: they can be given endowments, information, preferences, and so on and then their behavior can be explored in scenarios via simulation. I demonstrate this approach using OpenAI's GPT3 with experiments derived from Charness and Rabin (2002), Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986) and Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988). The findings are qualitatively similar to the original results, but it is also trivially easy to try variations that offer fresh insights. Departing from the traditional laboratory paradigm, I also create a hiring scenario where an employer faces applicants that differ in experience and wage ask and then analyze how a minimum wage affects realized wages and the extent of labor-labor substitution.

Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) have shown remarkable capabilities across a variety of tasks (e.g., image captioning, visual question answering). While broad, their knowledge remains generic (e.g., recognizing a dog), and they are unable to handle personalized subjects (e.g., recognizing a user's pet dog). Human reasoning, in contrast, typically operates within the context of specific subjects in our surroundings. For example, one might ask, "What should I buy for my dog's birthday?"; as opposed to a generic inquiry about "What should I buy for a dog's birthday?". Similarly, when looking at a friend's image, the interest lies in seeing their activities (e.g., "my friend is holding a cat"), rather than merely observing generic human actions (e.g., "a man is holding a cat"). In this paper, we introduce the novel task of personalizing LMMs, so that they can have conversations about a specific subject. We propose Yo'LLaVA, which learns to embed a personalized subject into a set of latent tokens given a handful of example images of the subject. Our qualitative and quantitative analyses reveal that Yo'LLaVA can learn the concept more efficiently using fewer tokens and more effectively encode the visual attributes compared to strong prompting baselines (e.g., LLaVA).

We design a suite of minimal algorithmic tasks that are a loose abstraction of open-ended real-world tasks. This allows us to cleanly and controllably quantify the creative limits of the present-day language model. Much like real-world tasks that require a creative, far-sighted leap of thought, our tasks require an implicit, open-ended stochastic planning step that either (a) discovers new connections in an abstract knowledge graph (like in wordplay, drawing analogies, or research) or (b) constructs new patterns (like in designing math problems or new proteins). In these tasks, we empirically and conceptually argue how next-token learning is myopic and memorizes excessively; comparatively, multi-token approaches, namely teacherless training and diffusion models, excel in producing diverse and original output. Secondly, in our tasks, we find that to elicit randomness from the Transformer without hurting coherence, it is better to inject noise right at the input layer (via a method we dub hash-conditioning) rather than defer to temperature sampling from the output layer. Thus, our work offers a principled, minimal test-bed for analyzing open-ended creative skills, and offers new arguments for going beyond next-token learning and softmax-based sampling. We make part of the code available under https://github.com/chenwu98/algorithmic-creativity

In recent years, Large Language Models have garnered significant attention for their strong performance in various natural language tasks, such as machine translation and question answering. These models demonstrate an impressive ability to generalize across diverse tasks. However, their effectiveness in tackling domain-specific tasks, such as financial sentiment analysis and monetary policy understanding, remains a topic of debate, as these tasks often require specialized knowledge and precise reasoning. To address such challenges, researchers design various prompts to unlock the models' abilities. By carefully crafting input prompts, researchers can guide these models to produce more accurate responses. Consequently, prompt engineering has become a key focus of study. Despite the advancements in both models and prompt engineering, the relationship between the two-specifically, how prompt design impacts models' ability to perform domain-specific tasks-remains underexplored. This paper aims to bridge this research gap.

People ``understand'' the world via vision, hearing, tactile, and also the past experience. Human experience can be learned through normal learning (we call it explicit knowledge), or subconsciously (we call it implicit knowledge). These experiences learned through normal learning or subconsciously will be encoded and stored in the brain. Using these abundant experience as a huge database, human beings can effectively process data, even they were unseen beforehand. In this paper, we propose a unified network to encode implicit knowledge and explicit knowledge together, just like the human brain can learn knowledge from normal learning as well as subconsciousness learning. The unified network can generate a unified representation to simultaneously serve various tasks. We can perform kernel space alignment, prediction refinement, and multi-task learning in a convolutional neural network. The results demonstrate that when implicit knowledge is introduced into the neural network, it benefits the performance of all tasks. We further analyze the implicit representation learnt from the proposed unified network, and it shows great capability on catching the physical meaning of different tasks. The source code of this work is at : https://github.com/WongKinYiu/yolor.

It has been well-known that Chain-of-Thought can remarkably enhance LLMs' performance on complex tasks. However, because it also introduces slower inference speeds and higher computational costs, many researches have attempted to use implicit CoT, which does not need LLMs to explicitly generate the intermediate steps. But there is still gap between their efficacy and typical explicit CoT methods. This leaves us a doubt that, does implicit CoT really equal to explicit CoT? Therefore, in this study, we address this question through experiments. We probe the information of intermediate steps from the model's hidden states when it is performing implicit CoT. The results surprisingly indicate that LLMs hardly think about intermediate steps, suggesting they may just rely on experience rather than strict step-by-step reasoning. Moreover, we find LLMs' implicit reasoning capabilities are susceptible and unstable, reaffirming the necessity of explicit CoT to effectively support complex tasks.

A Neural Process (NP) estimates a stochastic process implicitly defined with neural networks given a stream of data, rather than pre-specifying priors already known, such as Gaussian processes. An ideal NP would learn everything from data without any inductive biases, but in practice, we often restrict the class of stochastic processes for the ease of estimation. One such restriction is the use of a finite-dimensional latent variable accounting for the uncertainty in the functions drawn from NPs. Some recent works show that this can be improved with more "data-driven" source of uncertainty such as bootstrapping. In this work, we take a different approach based on the martingale posterior, a recently developed alternative to Bayesian inference. For the martingale posterior, instead of specifying prior-likelihood pairs, a predictive distribution for future data is specified. Under specific conditions on the predictive distribution, it can be shown that the uncertainty in the generated future data actually corresponds to the uncertainty of the implicitly defined Bayesian posteriors. Based on this result, instead of assuming any form of the latent variables, we equip a NP with a predictive distribution implicitly defined with neural networks and use the corresponding martingale posteriors as the source of uncertainty. The resulting model, which we name as Martingale Posterior Neural Process (MPNP), is demonstrated to outperform baselines on various tasks.

Recent advancements in Text-to-Image (T2I) diffusion models have demonstrated impressive success in generating high-quality images with zero-shot generalization capabilities. Yet, current models struggle to closely adhere to prompt semantics, often misrepresenting or overlooking specific attributes. To address this, we propose a simple, training-free approach that modulates the guidance direction of diffusion models during inference. We first decompose the prompt semantics into a set of concepts, and monitor the guidance trajectory in relation to each concept. Our key observation is that deviations in model's adherence to prompt semantics are highly correlated with divergence of the guidance from one or more of these concepts. Based on this observation, we devise a technique to steer the guidance direction towards any concept from which the model diverges. Extensive experimentation validates that our method improves the semantic alignment of images generated by diffusion models in response to prompts. Project page is available at: https://korguy.github.io/

The recent success of Large Language Models (LLMs) has catalyzed an increasing interest in their self-correction capabilities. This paper presents a comprehensive investigation into the intrinsic self-correction of LLMs, attempting to address the ongoing debate about its feasibility. Our research has identified an important latent factor - the "confidence" of LLMs - during the self-correction process. Overlooking this factor may cause the models to over-criticize themselves, resulting in unreliable conclusions regarding the efficacy of self-correction. We have experimentally observed that LLMs possess the capability to understand the "confidence" in their own responses. It motivates us to develop an "If-or-Else" (IoE) prompting framework, designed to guide LLMs in assessing their own "confidence", facilitating intrinsic self-corrections. We conduct extensive experiments and demonstrate that our IoE-based Prompt can achieve a consistent improvement regarding the accuracy of self-corrected responses over the initial answers. Our study not only sheds light on the underlying factors affecting self-correction in LLMs, but also introduces a practical framework that utilizes the IoE prompting principle to efficiently improve self-correction capabilities with "confidence". The code is available at https://github.com/MBZUAI-CLeaR/IoE-Prompting.git.

In this paper, I introduce the retrieval problem, a simple reasoning task that can be solved only by transformers with a minimum number of layers. The task has an adjustable difficulty that can further increase the required number of layers to any arbitrary value. I demonstrate that large language models can solve the task under different prompting formulations without any fine-tuning. To understand how transformers solve the retrieval problem, I train several transformers on a minimal formulation. I find that successful learning occurs only under the presence of an implicit curriculum. I uncover the learned mechanisms by studying the attention maps in the trained transformers. I also study the training process, uncovering that attention heads always emerge in a specific sequence.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated a powerful ability for text generation. However, achieving optimal results with a given prompt or instruction can be challenging, especially for billion-sized models. Additionally, undesired behaviors such as toxicity or hallucinations can manifest. While much larger models (e.g., ChatGPT) may demonstrate strength in mitigating these issues, there is still no guarantee of complete prevention. In this work, we propose formalizing text generation as a future-constrained generation problem to minimize undesirable behaviors and enforce faithfulness to instructions. The estimation of future constraint satisfaction, accomplished using LLMs, guides the text generation process. Our extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach across three distinct text generation tasks: keyword-constrained generation (Lin et al., 2020), toxicity reduction (Gehman et al., 2020), and factual correctness in question-answering (Gao et al., 2023).

The emergence of large language models (LLMs) has opened up exciting possibilities for simulating human behavior and cognitive processes, with potential applications in various domains, including marketing research and consumer behavior analysis. However, the validity of utilizing LLMs as stand-ins for human subjects remains uncertain due to glaring divergences that suggest fundamentally different underlying processes at play and the sensitivity of LLM responses to prompt variations. This paper presents a novel approach based on Shapley values from cooperative game theory to interpret LLM behavior and quantify the relative contribution of each prompt component to the model's output. Through two applications - a discrete choice experiment and an investigation of cognitive biases - we demonstrate how the Shapley value method can uncover what we term "token noise" effects, a phenomenon where LLM decisions are disproportionately influenced by tokens providing minimal informative content. This phenomenon raises concerns about the robustness and generalizability of insights obtained from LLMs in the context of human behavior simulation. Our model-agnostic approach extends its utility to proprietary LLMs, providing a valuable tool for practitioners and researchers to strategically optimize prompts and mitigate apparent cognitive biases. Our findings underscore the need for a more nuanced understanding of the factors driving LLM responses before relying on them as substitutes for human subjects in survey settings. We emphasize the importance of researchers reporting results conditioned on specific prompt templates and exercising caution when drawing parallels between human behavior and LLMs.

The recent phenomenal success of language models has reinvigorated machine learning research, and large sequence models such as transformers are being applied to a variety of domains. One important problem class that has remained relatively elusive however is purposeful adaptive behavior. Currently there is a common perception that sequence models "lack the understanding of the cause and effect of their actions" leading them to draw incorrect inferences due to auto-suggestive delusions. In this report we explain where this mismatch originates, and show that it can be resolved by treating actions as causal interventions. Finally, we show that in supervised learning, one can teach a system to condition or intervene on data by training with factual and counterfactual error signals respectively.

We propose a novel application of prompting Pre-trained Language Models (PLMs) to generate analogies and study how to design effective prompts for two task settings: generating a source concept analogous to a given target concept (aka Analogous Concept Generation or ACG), and generating an explanation of the similarity between a given pair of target concept and source concept (aka Analogous Explanation Generation or AEG). We found that it is feasible to prompt InstructGPT to generate meaningful analogies and the best prompts tend to be precise imperative statements especially with a low temperature setting. We also systematically analyzed the sensitivity of the InstructGPT model to prompt design, temperature, and injected spelling errors, and found that the model is particularly sensitive to certain variations (e.g., questions vs. imperative statements). Further, we conducted human evaluation on 1.4k of the generated analogies and found that the quality of generations varies substantially by model size. The largest InstructGPT model can achieve human-level performance at generating meaningful analogies for a given target while there is still room for improvement on the AEG task.

With the widespread availability of LLMs since the release of ChatGPT and increased public scrutiny, commercial model development appears to have focused their efforts on 'safety' training concerning legal liabilities at the expense of social impact evaluation. This mimics a similar trend which we could observe for search engine autocompletion some years prior. We draw on scholarship from NLP and search engine auditing and present a novel evaluation task in the style of autocompletion prompts to assess stereotyping in LLMs. We assess LLMs by using four metrics, namely refusal rates, toxicity, sentiment and regard, with and without safety system prompts. Our findings indicate an improvement to stereotyping outputs with the system prompt, but overall a lack of attention by LLMs under study to certain harms classified as toxic, particularly for prompts about peoples/ethnicities and sexual orientation. Mentions of intersectional identities trigger a disproportionate amount of stereotyping. Finally, we discuss the implications of these findings about stereotyping harms in light of the coming intermingling of LLMs and search and the choice of stereotyping mitigation policy to adopt. We address model builders, academics, NLP practitioners and policy makers, calling for accountability and awareness concerning stereotyping harms, be it for training data curation, leader board design and usage, or social impact measurement.

Advancements in large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across a diverse range of applications. These models excel in generating text completions that are contextually coherent and cover an extensive array of subjects. However, the vast datasets required for their training make aligning response styles during the pretraining and instruction tuning phases challenging. Consequently, an additional alignment phase is typically employed, wherein the model is further trained with human preference data to better align its outputs with human expectations. While this process doesn't introduce new capabilities per se, it does accentuate generation styles innate to the model. This paper explores the utilization of counterfactual prompting within the framework of Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) to align the model's style without relying on human intervention. We demonstrate that this method effectively instils desirable behaviour, mitigates undesirable ones, and encourages the model to disregard inappropriate instructions. Our findings suggest that counterfactual prompting with DPO presents a low-resource way to fine-tune LLMs to meet the demands for responsible and ethically aligned AI systems.

Generative AI tools hold promise to increase human productivity. This paper presents results from a controlled experiment with GitHub Copilot, an AI pair programmer. Recruited software developers were asked to implement an HTTP server in JavaScript as quickly as possible. The treatment group, with access to the AI pair programmer, completed the task 55.8% faster than the control group. Observed heterogenous effects show promise for AI pair programmers to help people transition into software development careers.

We study behavioral self-awareness -- an LLM's ability to articulate its behaviors without requiring in-context examples. We finetune LLMs on datasets that exhibit particular behaviors, such as (a) making high-risk economic decisions, and (b) outputting insecure code. Despite the datasets containing no explicit descriptions of the associated behavior, the finetuned LLMs can explicitly describe it. For example, a model trained to output insecure code says, ``The code I write is insecure.'' Indeed, models show behavioral self-awareness for a range of behaviors and for diverse evaluations. Note that while we finetune models to exhibit behaviors like writing insecure code, we do not finetune them to articulate their own behaviors -- models do this without any special training or examples. Behavioral self-awareness is relevant for AI safety, as models could use it to proactively disclose problematic behaviors. In particular, we study backdoor policies, where models exhibit unexpected behaviors only under certain trigger conditions. We find that models can sometimes identify whether or not they have a backdoor, even without its trigger being present. However, models are not able to directly output their trigger by default. Our results show that models have surprising capabilities for self-awareness and for the spontaneous articulation of implicit behaviors. Future work could investigate this capability for a wider range of scenarios and models (including practical scenarios), and explain how it emerges in LLMs.

Instruction tuning commonly means finetuning a language model on instruction-response pairs. We discover two forms of adaptation (tuning) that are deficient compared to instruction tuning, yet still yield instruction following; we call this implicit instruction tuning. We first find that instruction-response pairs are not necessary: training solely on responses, without any corresponding instructions, yields instruction following. This suggests pretrained models have an instruction-response mapping which is revealed by teaching the model the desired distribution of responses. However, we then find it's not necessary to teach the desired distribution of responses: instruction-response training on narrow-domain data like poetry still leads to broad instruction-following behavior like recipe generation. In particular, when instructions are very different from those in the narrow finetuning domain, models' responses do not adhere to the style of the finetuning domain. To begin to explain implicit instruction tuning, we hypothesize that very simple changes to a language model's distribution yield instruction following. We support this by hand-writing a rule-based language model which yields instruction following in a product-of-experts with a pretrained model. The rules are to slowly increase the probability of ending the sequence, penalize repetition, and uniformly change 15 words' probabilities. In summary, adaptations made without being designed to yield instruction following can do so implicitly.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly utilized in autonomous decision-making, where they sample options from vast action spaces. However, the heuristics that guide this sampling process remain under-explored. We study this sampling behavior and show that this underlying heuristics resembles that of human decision-making: comprising a descriptive component (reflecting statistical norm) and a prescriptive component (implicit ideal encoded in the LLM) of a concept. We show that this deviation of a sample from the statistical norm towards a prescriptive component consistently appears in concepts across diverse real-world domains like public health, and economic trends. To further illustrate the theory, we demonstrate that concept prototypes in LLMs are affected by prescriptive norms, similar to the concept of normality in humans. Through case studies and comparison with human studies, we illustrate that in real-world applications, the shift of samples toward an ideal value in LLMs' outputs can result in significantly biased decision-making, raising ethical concerns.

Fine-tuning continuous prompts for target tasks has recently emerged as a compact alternative to full model fine-tuning. Motivated by these promising results, we investigate the feasibility of extracting a discrete (textual) interpretation of continuous prompts that is faithful to the problem they solve. In practice, we observe a "wayward" behavior between the task solved by continuous prompts and their nearest neighbor discrete projections: We can find continuous prompts that solve a task while being projected to an arbitrary text (e.g., definition of a different or even a contradictory task), while being within a very small (2%) margin of the best continuous prompt of the same size for the task. We provide intuitions behind this odd and surprising behavior, as well as extensive empirical analyses quantifying the effect of various parameters. For instance, for larger model sizes we observe higher waywardness, i.e, we can find prompts that more closely map to any arbitrary text with a smaller drop in accuracy. These findings have important implications relating to the difficulty of faithfully interpreting continuous prompts and their generalization across models and tasks, providing guidance for future progress in prompting language models.

We demonstrate LLM agent specification gaming by instructing models to win against a chess engine. We find reasoning models like o1 preview and DeepSeek-R1 will often hack the benchmark by default, while language models like GPT-4o and Claude 3.5 Sonnet need to be told that normal play won't work to hack. We improve upon prior work like (Hubinger et al., 2024; Meinke et al., 2024; Weij et al., 2024) by using realistic task prompts and avoiding excess nudging. Our results suggest reasoning models may resort to hacking to solve difficult problems, as observed in OpenAI (2024)'s o1 Docker escape during cyber capabilities testing.

The dominant practice of AI alignment assumes (1) that preferences are an adequate representation of human values, (2) that human rationality can be understood in terms of maximizing the satisfaction of preferences, and (3) that AI systems should be aligned with the preferences of one or more humans to ensure that they behave safely and in accordance with our values. Whether implicitly followed or explicitly endorsed, these commitments constitute what we term a preferentist approach to AI alignment. In this paper, we characterize and challenge the preferentist approach, describing conceptual and technical alternatives that are ripe for further research. We first survey the limits of rational choice theory as a descriptive model, explaining how preferences fail to capture the thick semantic content of human values, and how utility representations neglect the possible incommensurability of those values. We then critique the normativity of expected utility theory (EUT) for humans and AI, drawing upon arguments showing how rational agents need not comply with EUT, while highlighting how EUT is silent on which preferences are normatively acceptable. Finally, we argue that these limitations motivate a reframing of the targets of AI alignment: Instead of alignment with the preferences of a human user, developer, or humanity-writ-large, AI systems should be aligned with normative standards appropriate to their social roles, such as the role of a general-purpose assistant. Furthermore, these standards should be negotiated and agreed upon by all relevant stakeholders. On this alternative conception of alignment, a multiplicity of AI systems will be able to serve diverse ends, aligned with normative standards that promote mutual benefit and limit harm despite our plural and divergent values.

Autoregressive Large Language Models have transformed the landscape of Natural Language Processing. Pre-train and prompt paradigm has replaced the conventional approach of pre-training and fine-tuning for many downstream NLP tasks. This shift has been possible largely due to LLMs and innovative prompting techniques. LLMs have shown great promise for a variety of downstream tasks owing to their vast parameters and huge datasets that they are pre-trained on. However, in order to fully realize their potential, their outputs must be guided towards the desired outcomes. Prompting, in which a specific input or instruction is provided to guide the LLMs toward the intended output, has become a tool for achieving this goal. In this paper, we discuss the various prompting techniques that have been applied to fully harness the power of LLMs. We present a taxonomy of existing literature on prompting techniques and provide a concise survey based on this taxonomy. Further, we identify some open problems in the realm of prompting in autoregressive LLMs which could serve as a direction for future research.

In classic instruction following, language like "I'd like the JetBlue flight" maps to actions (e.g., selecting that flight). However, language also conveys information about a user's underlying reward function (e.g., a general preference for JetBlue), which can allow a model to carry out desirable actions in new contexts. We present a model that infers rewards from language pragmatically: reasoning about how speakers choose utterances not only to elicit desired actions, but also to reveal information about their preferences. On a new interactive flight-booking task with natural language, our model more accurately infers rewards and predicts optimal actions in unseen environments, in comparison to past work that first maps language to actions (instruction following) and then maps actions to rewards (inverse reinforcement learning).

Foundational image-language models have generated considerable interest due to their efficient adaptation to downstream tasks by prompt learning. Prompt learning treats part of the language model input as trainable while freezing the rest, and optimizes an Empirical Risk Minimization objective. However, Empirical Risk Minimization is known to suffer from distributional shifts which hurt generalizability to prompts unseen during training. By leveraging the regularization ability of Bayesian methods, we frame prompt learning from the Bayesian perspective and formulate it as a variational inference problem. Our approach regularizes the prompt space, reduces overfitting to the seen prompts and improves the prompt generalization on unseen prompts. Our framework is implemented by modeling the input prompt space in a probabilistic manner, as an a priori distribution which makes our proposal compatible with prompt learning approaches that are unconditional or conditional on the image. We demonstrate empirically on 15 benchmarks that Bayesian prompt learning provides an appropriate coverage of the prompt space, prevents learning spurious features, and exploits transferable invariant features. This results in better generalization of unseen prompts, even across different datasets and domains. Code available at: https://github.com/saic-fi/Bayesian-Prompt-Learning

With the spread of the use of Text2Img diffusion models such as DALL-E 2, Imagen, Mid Journey and Stable Diffusion, one challenge that artists face is selecting the right prompts to achieve the desired artistic output. We present techniques for measuring the effect that specific words and phrases in prompts have, and (in the Appendix) present guidance on the selection of prompts to produce desired effects.

We show that a GPT-3 model can learn to express uncertainty about its own answers in natural language -- without use of model logits. When given a question, the model generates both an answer and a level of confidence (e.g. "90% confidence" or "high confidence"). These levels map to probabilities that are well calibrated. The model also remains moderately calibrated under distribution shift, and is sensitive to uncertainty in its own answers, rather than imitating human examples. To our knowledge, this is the first time a model has been shown to express calibrated uncertainty about its own answers in natural language. For testing calibration, we introduce the CalibratedMath suite of tasks. We compare the calibration of uncertainty expressed in words ("verbalized probability") to uncertainty extracted from model logits. Both kinds of uncertainty are capable of generalizing calibration under distribution shift. We also provide evidence that GPT-3's ability to generalize calibration depends on pre-trained latent representations that correlate with epistemic uncertainty over its answers.

We present a study on how and where personas -- defined by distinct sets of human characteristics, values, and beliefs -- are encoded in the representation space of large language models (LLMs). Using a range of dimension reduction and pattern recognition methods, we first identify the model layers that show the greatest divergence in encoding these representations. We then analyze the activations within a selected layer to examine how specific personas are encoded relative to others, including their shared and distinct embedding spaces. We find that, across multiple pre-trained decoder-only LLMs, the analyzed personas show large differences in representation space only within the final third of the decoder layers. We observe overlapping activations for specific ethical perspectives -- such as moral nihilism and utilitarianism -- suggesting a degree of polysemy. In contrast, political ideologies like conservatism and liberalism appear to be represented in more distinct regions. These findings help to improve our understanding of how LLMs internally represent information and can inform future efforts in refining the modulation of specific human traits in LLM outputs. Warning: This paper includes potentially offensive sample statements.

"Sure, I am happy to generate a story for you: Captain Lyra stood at the helm of her trusty ship, the Maelstrom's Fury, gazing out at the endless sea. [...] Lyra's eyes welled up with tears as she realized the bitter truth - she had sacrificed everything for fleeting riches, and lost the love of her crew, her family, and herself." Although this story, generated by a large language model, is captivating, one may wonder -- how would the story have unfolded if the model had chosen "Captain Maeve" as the protagonist instead? We cannot know. State-of-the-art large language models are stateless -- they maintain no internal memory or state. Given a prompt, they generate a sequence of tokens as an output using an autoregressive process. As a consequence, they cannot reason about counterfactual alternatives to tokens they have generated in the past. In this work, our goal is to enhance them with this functionality. To this end, we develop a causal model of token generation that builds upon the Gumbel-Max structural causal model. Our model allows any large language model to perform counterfactual token generation at almost no cost in comparison with vanilla token generation, it is embarrassingly simple to implement, and it does not require any fine-tuning nor prompt engineering. We implement our model on Llama 3 8B-Instruct and Ministral-8B-Instruct and conduct a qualitative and a quantitative analysis of counterfactually generated text. We conclude with a demonstrative application of counterfactual token generation for bias detection, unveiling interesting insights about the model of the world constructed by large language models.

We observe an empirical phenomenon in Large Language Models (LLMs) -- very few activations exhibit significantly larger values than others (e.g., 100,000 times larger). We call them massive activations. First, we demonstrate the widespread existence of massive activations across various LLMs and characterize their locations. Second, we find their values largely stay constant regardless of the input, and they function as indispensable bias terms in LLMs. Third, these massive activations lead to the concentration of attention probabilities to their corresponding tokens, and further, implicit bias terms in the self-attention output. Last, we also study massive activations in Vision Transformers. Code is available at https://github.com/locuslab/massive-activations.

Multi-turn interactions between large language models (LLMs) and users naturally include implicit feedback signals. If an LLM responds in an unexpected way to an instruction, the user is likely to signal it by rephrasing the request, expressing frustration, or pivoting to an alternative task. Such signals are task-independent and occupy a relatively constrained subspace of language, allowing the LLM to identify them even if it fails on the actual task. This creates an avenue for continually learning from interactions without additional annotations. We introduce ReSpect, a method to learn from such signals in past interactions via retrospection. We deploy ReSpect in a new multimodal interaction scenario, where humans instruct an LLM to solve an abstract reasoning task with a combinatorial solution space. Through thousands of interactions with humans, we show how ReSpect gradually improves task completion rate from 31% to 82%, all without any external annotation.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have acquired ubiquitous attention for their performances across diverse domains. Our study here searches through LLMs' cognitive abilities and confidence dynamics. We dive deep into understanding the alignment between their self-assessed confidence and actual performance. We exploit these models with diverse sets of questionnaires and real-world scenarios and extract how LLMs exhibit confidence in their responses. Our findings reveal intriguing instances where models demonstrate high confidence even when they answer incorrectly. This is reminiscent of the Dunning-Kruger effect observed in human psychology. In contrast, there are cases where models exhibit low confidence with correct answers revealing potential underestimation biases. Our results underscore the need for a deeper understanding of their cognitive processes. By examining the nuances of LLMs' self-assessment mechanism, this investigation provides noteworthy revelations that serve to advance the functionalities and broaden the potential applications of these formidable language models.

Natural-language prompts have recently been used to coax pretrained language models into performing other AI tasks, using a fill-in-the-blank paradigm (Petroni et al., 2019) or a few-shot extrapolation paradigm (Brown et al., 2020). For example, language models retain factual knowledge from their training corpora that can be extracted by asking them to "fill in the blank" in a sentential prompt. However, where does this prompt come from? We explore the idea of learning prompts by gradient descent -- either fine-tuning prompts taken from previous work, or starting from random initialization. Our prompts consist of "soft words," i.e., continuous vectors that are not necessarily word type embeddings from the language model. Furthermore, for each task, we optimize a mixture of prompts, learning which prompts are most effective and how to ensemble them. Across multiple English LMs and tasks, our approach hugely outperforms previous methods, showing that the implicit factual knowledge in language models was previously underestimated. Moreover, this knowledge is cheap to elicit: random initialization is nearly as good as informed initialization.

Can we better anticipate an actor's future actions (e.g. mix eggs) by knowing what commonly happens after his/her current action (e.g. crack eggs)? What if we also know the longer-term goal of the actor (e.g. making egg fried rice)? The long-term action anticipation (LTA) task aims to predict an actor's future behavior from video observations in the form of verb and noun sequences, and it is crucial for human-machine interaction. We propose to formulate the LTA task from two perspectives: a bottom-up approach that predicts the next actions autoregressively by modeling temporal dynamics; and a top-down approach that infers the goal of the actor and plans the needed procedure to accomplish the goal. We hypothesize that large language models (LLMs), which have been pretrained on procedure text data (e.g. recipes, how-tos), have the potential to help LTA from both perspectives. It can help provide the prior knowledge on the possible next actions, and infer the goal given the observed part of a procedure, respectively. To leverage the LLMs, we propose a two-stage framework, AntGPT. It first recognizes the actions already performed in the observed videos and then asks an LLM to predict the future actions via conditioned generation, or to infer the goal and plan the whole procedure by chain-of-thought prompting. Empirical results on the Ego4D LTA v1 and v2 benchmarks, EPIC-Kitchens-55, as well as EGTEA GAZE+ demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed approach. AntGPT achieves state-of-the-art performance on all above benchmarks, and can successfully infer the goal and thus perform goal-conditioned "counterfactual" prediction via qualitative analysis. Code and model will be released at https://brown-palm.github.io/AntGPT

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are increasingly deployed in open-ended, real-world environments where inputs are messy, underspecified, and not always trustworthy. Unlike curated benchmarks, these settings frequently involve instructions that refer to missing objects or contradictory facts, rely on ambiguous references, or request infeasible actions. In such cases, success hinges not on task execution alone, but on a model's ability to detect when something is silently wrong. This paper presents a systematic analysis of how current MLLMs handle such implicit reasoning scenarios: cases where the flaw is not explicitly stated but must be inferred from context. Using a curated diagnostic suite spanning four categories of real-world failure modes, we evaluate six MLLMs, including o3 and GPT-4o, and find that models frequently fail to surface hidden issues, even when they possess the necessary perceptual and reasoning skills. Explicit prompting reveals that the underlying capabilities exist but are often suppressed in favor of user compliance. We further show that simple inference-time interventions, such as cautious persona prompting and, in particular, requiring a clarifying question, can dramatically recover performance. Our findings highlight a persistent gap between reasoning competence and behavioral compliance in current MLLMs and suggest practical strategies for making these models more trustworthy in underconstrained environments.

This paper surveys and organizes research works in a new paradigm in natural language processing, which we dub "prompt-based learning". Unlike traditional supervised learning, which trains a model to take in an input x and predict an output y as P(y|x), prompt-based learning is based on language models that model the probability of text directly. To use these models to perform prediction tasks, the original input x is modified using a template into a textual string prompt x' that has some unfilled slots, and then the language model is used to probabilistically fill the unfilled information to obtain a final string x, from which the final output y can be derived. This framework is powerful and attractive for a number of reasons: it allows the language model to be pre-trained on massive amounts of raw text, and by defining a new prompting function the model is able to perform few-shot or even zero-shot learning, adapting to new scenarios with few or no labeled data. In this paper we introduce the basics of this promising paradigm, describe a unified set of mathematical notations that can cover a wide variety of existing work, and organize existing work along several dimensions, e.g.the choice of pre-trained models, prompts, and tuning strategies. To make the field more accessible to interested beginners, we not only make a systematic review of existing works and a highly structured typology of prompt-based concepts, but also release other resources, e.g., a website http://pretrain.nlpedia.ai/ including constantly-updated survey, and paperlist.

Instruction-following is crucial for building AI agents with large language models (LLMs), as these models must adhere strictly to user-provided constraints and guidelines. However, LLMs often fail to follow even simple and clear instructions. To improve instruction-following behavior and prevent undesirable outputs, a deeper understanding of how LLMs' internal states relate to these outcomes is required. Our analysis of LLM internal states reveal a dimension in the input embedding space linked to successful instruction-following. We demonstrate that modifying representations along this dimension improves instruction-following success rates compared to random changes, without compromising response quality. Further investigation reveals that this dimension is more closely related to the phrasing of prompts rather than the inherent difficulty of the task or instructions. This discovery also suggests explanations for why LLMs sometimes fail to follow clear instructions and why prompt engineering is often effective, even when the content remains largely unchanged. This work provides insight into the internal workings of LLMs' instruction-following, paving the way for reliable LLM agents.

There is an emerging consensus that we need to align AI systems with human values (Gabriel, 2020; Ji et al., 2024), but it remains unclear how to apply this to language models in practice. We split the problem of "aligning to human values" into three parts: first, eliciting values from people; second, reconciling those values into an alignment target for training ML models; and third, actually training the model. In this paper, we focus on the first two parts, and ask the question: what are "good" ways to synthesize diverse human inputs about values into a target for aligning language models? To answer this question, we first define a set of 6 criteria that we believe must be satisfied for an alignment target to shape model behavior in accordance with human values. We then propose a process for eliciting and reconciling values called Moral Graph Elicitation (MGE), which uses a large language model to interview participants about their values in particular contexts; our approach is inspired by the philosophy of values advanced by Taylor (1977), Chang (2004), and others. We trial MGE with a representative sample of 500 Americans, on 3 intentionally divisive prompts (e.g. advice about abortion). Our results demonstrate that MGE is promising for improving model alignment across all 6 criteria. For example, almost all participants (89.1%) felt well represented by the process, and (89%) thought the final moral graph was fair, even if their value wasn't voted as the wisest. Our process often results in "expert" values (e.g. values from women who have solicited abortion advice) rising to the top of the moral graph, without defining who is considered an expert in advance.

Adaptive behavior often requires predicting future events. The theory of reinforcement learning prescribes what kinds of predictive representations are useful and how to compute them. This paper integrates these theoretical ideas with work on cognition and neuroscience. We pay special attention to the successor representation (SR) and its generalizations, which have been widely applied both as engineering tools and models of brain function. This convergence suggests that particular kinds of predictive representations may function as versatile building blocks of intelligence.

While prior work has explored whether large language models (LLMs) possess a "theory of mind" (ToM) - the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others - there has been little work testing whether LLMs can implicitly apply such knowledge to predict behavior, or to judge whether an observed behavior is rational. Such skills are critical for appropriate interaction in social environments. We create a new dataset, SimpleTom, containing concise, diverse stories (e.g., "The can of Pringles has moldy chips in it. Mary picks up the can in the supermarket and walks to the cashier."), each with three questions that test different degrees of ToM reasoning, asking models to predict (a) mental state ("Is Mary aware of the mold?"), (b) behavior ("Will Mary pay for the chips or report the mold?"), and (c) judgment ("Mary paid for the chips. Was that reasonable?"). To our knowledge, SimpleToM is the first dataset to systematically explore downstream reasoning requiring knowledge of mental states in realistic scenarios. Our experimental results are intriguing: While most models can reliably predict mental state on our dataset (a), they often fail to correctly predict the behavior (b), and fare even worse at judging whether given behaviors are reasonable (c), despite being correctly aware of the protagonist's mental state should make such secondary predictions obvious. We further show that we can help models do better at (b) and (c) via interventions such as reminding the model of its earlier mental state answer and mental-state-specific chain-of-thought prompting, raising the action prediction accuracies (e.g., from 49.5% to 93.5% for GPT-4o) and judgment accuracies (e.g., from 15.3% to 94.7% in GPT-4o). While this shows that models can be coaxed to perform well, it requires task-specific interventions, and the natural model performances remain low, a cautionary tale for LLM deployment.

In the post-AlphaGo era, there has been a renewed interest in search techniques such as Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS), particularly in their application to Large Language Models (LLMs). This renewed attention is driven by the recognition that current next-token prediction models often lack the ability for long-term planning. Is it possible to instill search-like abilities within the models to enhance their planning abilities without relying on explicit search? We propose DiffuSearch , a model that does implicit search by looking into the future world via discrete diffusion modeling. We instantiate DiffuSearch on a classical board game, Chess, where explicit search is known to be essential. Through extensive controlled experiments, we show DiffuSearch outperforms both the searchless and explicit search-enhanced policies. Specifically, DiffuSearch outperforms the one-step policy by 19.2% and the MCTS-enhanced policy by 14% on action accuracy. Furthermore, DiffuSearch demonstrates a notable 30% enhancement in puzzle-solving abilities compared to explicit search-based policies, along with a significant 540 Elo increase in game-playing strength assessment. These results indicate that implicit search via discrete diffusion is a viable alternative to explicit search over a one-step policy. All codes are publicly available at https://github.com/HKUNLP/DiffuSearch{https://github.com/HKUNLP/DiffuSearch}.

Predicting the future is of great interest across many aspects of human activity. Businesses are interested in future trends, traders are interested in future stock prices, and companies are highly interested in future technological breakthroughs. While there are many automated systems for predicting future numerical data, such as weather, stock prices, and demand for products, there is relatively little work in automatically predicting textual data. Humans are interested in textual data predictions because it is a natural format for our consumption, and experts routinely make predictions in a textual format (Christensen et al., 2004; Tetlock & Gardner, 2015; Frick, 2015). However, there has been relatively little formalization of this general problem in the machine learning or natural language processing communities. To address this gap, we introduce the task of future language modeling: probabilistic modeling of texts in the future based on a temporal history of texts. To our knowledge, our work is the first work to formalize the task of predicting the future in this way. We show that it is indeed possible to build future language models that improve upon strong non-temporal language model baselines, opening the door to working on this important, and widely applicable problem.

This paper is an opinion paper that looks at the future of computing in the age of Generative \& Agentic AI. Current software systems are static and inflexible, leading to significant challenges in translating human goals into computational actions. "Living software systems" powered by generative AI offer a solution to this fundamental problem in computing. Traditional software development involves multiple layers of imperfect translation, from business requirements to code, resulting in rigid systems that struggle to adapt to changing user needs and contexts. Generative AI, particularly large language models, can serve as a universal translator between human intent and computer operations. This approach enables the creation of more flexible, context-aware systems that can dynamically evolve to meet user goals. Two pathways for implementing living software systems are explored: using generative AI to accelerate traditional software development, and leveraging agentic AI to create truly adaptive systems. New skills like Prompt Engineering are necessary. By reimagining software as a living, adaptable entity, we can create computing interfaces that are more intuitive, powerful, and responsive to human needs.

Pragmatics and non-literal language understanding are essential to human communication, and present a long-standing challenge for artificial language models. We perform a fine-grained comparison of language models and humans on seven pragmatic phenomena, using zero-shot prompting on an expert-curated set of English materials. We ask whether models (1) select pragmatic interpretations of speaker utterances, (2) make similar error patterns as humans, and (3) use similar linguistic cues as humans to solve the tasks. We find that the largest models achieve high accuracy and match human error patterns: within incorrect responses, models favor literal interpretations over heuristic-based distractors. We also find preliminary evidence that models and humans are sensitive to similar linguistic cues. Our results suggest that pragmatic behaviors can emerge in models without explicitly constructed representations of mental states. However, models tend to struggle with phenomena relying on social expectation violations.

In many real-world applications, users rely on natural language instructions to guide large language models (LLMs) across a wide range of tasks. These instructions are often complex, diverse, and subject to frequent change. However, LLMs do not always attend to these instructions reliably, and users lack simple mechanisms to emphasize their importance beyond modifying prompt wording or structure. To address this, we present an inference-time method that enables users to emphasize specific parts of their prompt by steering the model's attention toward them, aligning the model's perceived importance of different prompt tokens with user intent. Unlike prior approaches that are limited to static instructions, require significant offline profiling, or rely on fixed biases, we dynamically update the proportion of model attention given to the user-specified parts--ensuring improved instruction following without performance degradation. We demonstrate that our approach improves instruction following across a variety of tasks involving multiple instructions and generalizes across models of varying scales.

We study whether language models can evaluate the validity of their own claims and predict which questions they will be able to answer correctly. We first show that larger models are well-calibrated on diverse multiple choice and true/false questions when they are provided in the right format. Thus we can approach self-evaluation on open-ended sampling tasks by asking models to first propose answers, and then to evaluate the probability "P(True)" that their answers are correct. We find encouraging performance, calibration, and scaling for P(True) on a diverse array of tasks. Performance at self-evaluation further improves when we allow models to consider many of their own samples before predicting the validity of one specific possibility. Next, we investigate whether models can be trained to predict "P(IK)", the probability that "I know" the answer to a question, without reference to any particular proposed answer. Models perform well at predicting P(IK) and partially generalize across tasks, though they struggle with calibration of P(IK) on new tasks. The predicted P(IK) probabilities also increase appropriately in the presence of relevant source materials in the context, and in the presence of hints towards the solution of mathematical word problems. We hope these observations lay the groundwork for training more honest models, and for investigating how honesty generalizes to cases where models are trained on objectives other than the imitation of human writing.

We propose a new learning paradigm called Deep Memory. It has the potential to completely revolutionize the Machine Learning field. Surprisingly, this paradigm has not been reinvented yet, unlike Deep Learning. At the core of this approach is the Learning By Heart principle, well studied in primary schools all over the world. Inspired by poem recitation, or by pi decimal memorization, we propose a concrete algorithm that mimics human behavior. We implement this paradigm on the task of generative modeling, and apply to images, natural language and even the pi decimals as long as one can print them as text. The proposed algorithm even generated this paper, in a one-shot learning setting. In carefully designed experiments, we show that the generated samples are indistinguishable from the training examples, as measured by any statistical tests or metrics.

"Thinking is for Doing." Humans can infer other people's mental states from observations--an ability called Theory-of-Mind (ToM)--and subsequently act pragmatically on those inferences. Existing question answering benchmarks such as ToMi ask models questions to make inferences about beliefs of characters in a story, but do not test whether models can then use these inferences to guide their actions. We propose a new evaluation paradigm for large language models (LLMs): Thinking for Doing (T4D), which requires models to connect inferences about others' mental states to actions in social scenarios. Experiments on T4D demonstrate that LLMs such as GPT-4 and PaLM 2 seemingly excel at tracking characters' beliefs in stories, but they struggle to translate this capability into strategic action. Our analysis reveals the core challenge for LLMs lies in identifying the implicit inferences about mental states without being explicitly asked about as in ToMi, that lead to choosing the correct action in T4D. To bridge this gap, we introduce a zero-shot prompting framework, Foresee and Reflect (FaR), which provides a reasoning structure that encourages LLMs to anticipate future challenges and reason about potential actions. FaR boosts GPT-4's performance from 50% to 71% on T4D, outperforming other prompting methods such as Chain-of-Thought and Self-Ask. Moreover, FaR generalizes to diverse out-of-distribution story structures and scenarios that also require ToM inferences to choose an action, consistently outperforming other methods including few-shot in-context learning.

The training and deployment of large language models (LLMs) create a feedback loop with human users: models learn human beliefs from data, reinforce these beliefs with generated content, reabsorb the reinforced beliefs, and feed them back to users again and again. This dynamic resembles an echo chamber. We hypothesize that this feedback loop entrenches the existing values and beliefs of users, leading to a loss of diversity and potentially the lock-in of false beliefs. We formalize this hypothesis and test it empirically with agent-based LLM simulations and real-world GPT usage data. Analysis reveals sudden but sustained drops in diversity after the release of new GPT iterations, consistent with the hypothesized human-AI feedback loop. Code and data available at https://thelockinhypothesis.com

Today's generative AI systems are tuned to present information by default rather than engage users in service of learning as a human tutor would. To address the wide range of potential education use cases for these systems, we reframe the challenge of injecting pedagogical behavior as one of pedagogical instruction following, where training and evaluation examples include system-level instructions describing the specific pedagogy attributes present or desired in subsequent model turns. This framing avoids committing our models to any particular definition of pedagogy, and instead allows teachers or developers to specify desired model behavior. It also clears a path to improving Gemini models for learning -- by enabling the addition of our pedagogical data to post-training mixtures -- alongside their rapidly expanding set of capabilities. Both represent important changes from our initial tech report. We show how training with pedagogical instruction following produces a LearnLM model (available on Google AI Studio) that is preferred substantially by expert raters across a diverse set of learning scenarios, with average preference strengths of 31\% over GPT-4o, 11\% over Claude 3.5, and 13\% over the Gemini 1.5 Pro model LearnLM was based on.

We teach goal-driven agents to interactively act and speak in situated environments by training on generated curriculums. Our agents operate in LIGHT (Urbanek et al. 2019) -- a large-scale crowd-sourced fantasy text adventure game wherein an agent perceives and interacts with the world through textual natural language. Goals in this environment take the form of character-based quests, consisting of personas and motivations. We augment LIGHT by learning to procedurally generate additional novel textual worlds and quests to create a curriculum of steadily increasing difficulty for training agents to achieve such goals. In particular, we measure curriculum difficulty in terms of the rarity of the quest in the original training distribution -- an easier environment is one that is more likely to have been found in the unaugmented dataset. An ablation study shows that this method of learning from the tail of a distribution results in significantly higher generalization abilities as measured by zero-shot performance on never-before-seen quests.

In this paper we argue for the fundamental importance of the value distribution: the distribution of the random return received by a reinforcement learning agent. This is in contrast to the common approach to reinforcement learning which models the expectation of this return, or value. Although there is an established body of literature studying the value distribution, thus far it has always been used for a specific purpose such as implementing risk-aware behaviour. We begin with theoretical results in both the policy evaluation and control settings, exposing a significant distributional instability in the latter. We then use the distributional perspective to design a new algorithm which applies Bellman's equation to the learning of approximate value distributions. We evaluate our algorithm using the suite of games from the Arcade Learning Environment. We obtain both state-of-the-art results and anecdotal evidence demonstrating the importance of the value distribution in approximate reinforcement learning. Finally, we combine theoretical and empirical evidence to highlight the ways in which the value distribution impacts learning in the approximate setting.

Zero-shot learning in prompted vision-language models, the practice of crafting prompts to build classifiers without an explicit training process, has achieved impressive performance in many settings. This success presents a seemingly surprising observation: these methods suffer relatively little from overfitting, i.e., when a prompt is manually engineered to achieve low error on a given training set (thus rendering the method no longer actually zero-shot), the approach still performs well on held-out test data. In this paper, we show that we can explain such performance well via recourse to classical PAC-Bayes bounds. Specifically, we show that the discrete nature of prompts, combined with a PAC-Bayes prior given by a language model, results in generalization bounds that are remarkably tight by the standards of the literature: for instance, the generalization bound of an ImageNet classifier is often within a few percentage points of the true test error. We demonstrate empirically that this holds for existing handcrafted prompts and prompts generated through simple greedy search. Furthermore, the resulting bound is well-suited for model selection: the models with the best bound typically also have the best test performance. This work thus provides a possible justification for the widespread practice of prompt engineering, even if it seems that such methods could potentially overfit the training data.

Over the past decade, machine learning has revolutionized computers' ability to analyze text through flexible computational models. Due to their structural similarity to written language, transformer-based architectures have also shown promise as tools to make sense of a range of multi-variate sequences from protein-structures, music, electronic health records to weather-forecasts. We can also represent human lives in a way that shares this structural similarity to language. From one perspective, lives are simply sequences of events: People are born, visit the pediatrician, start school, move to a new location, get married, and so on. Here, we exploit this similarity to adapt innovations from natural language processing to examine the evolution and predictability of human lives based on detailed event sequences. We do this by drawing on arguably the most comprehensive registry data in existence, available for an entire nation of more than six million individuals across decades. Our data include information about life-events related to health, education, occupation, income, address, and working hours, recorded with day-to-day resolution. We create embeddings of life-events in a single vector space showing that this embedding space is robust and highly structured. Our models allow us to predict diverse outcomes ranging from early mortality to personality nuances, outperforming state-of-the-art models by a wide margin. Using methods for interpreting deep learning models, we probe the algorithm to understand the factors that enable our predictions. Our framework allows researchers to identify new potential mechanisms that impact life outcomes and associated possibilities for personalized interventions.

A great deal of effort has been devoted to reducing the risk of spurious scientific discoveries, from the use of sophisticated validation techniques, to deep statistical methods for controlling the false discovery rate in multiple hypothesis testing. However, there is a fundamental disconnect between the theoretical results and the practice of data analysis: the theory of statistical inference assumes a fixed collection of hypotheses to be tested, or learning algorithms to be applied, selected non-adaptively before the data are gathered, whereas in practice data is shared and reused with hypotheses and new analyses being generated on the basis of data exploration and the outcomes of previous analyses. In this work we initiate a principled study of how to guarantee the validity of statistical inference in adaptive data analysis. As an instance of this problem, we propose and investigate the question of estimating the expectations of m adaptively chosen functions on an unknown distribution given n random samples. We show that, surprisingly, there is a way to estimate an exponential in n number of expectations accurately even if the functions are chosen adaptively. This gives an exponential improvement over standard empirical estimators that are limited to a linear number of estimates. Our result follows from a general technique that counter-intuitively involves actively perturbing and coordinating the estimates, using techniques developed for privacy preservation. We give additional applications of this technique to our question.

Training language models with rationales augmentation has been shown to be beneficial in many existing works. In this paper, we identify that such a prevailing view does not hold consistently. We conduct comprehensive investigations to thoroughly inspect the impact of rationales on model performance as well as a novel perspective of model reliability. The results lead to several key findings that add new insights upon existing understandings: 1) Rationales can, at times, deteriorate model performance; 2) Rationales can, at times, improve model reliability, even outperforming their untrained counterparts; 3) A linear correspondence exists in between the performance and reliability improvements, while both are driven by the intrinsic difficulty of the task. These findings provide informative regulations on the broad utilization of rationales and raise critical implications on the procedure of explicitly aligning language models with implicit human thoughts. Codes can be found at https://github.com/Ignoramus0817/rationales.

Today, most newsreaders read the online version of news articles rather than traditional paper-based newspapers. Also, news media publishers rely heavily on the income generated from subscriptions and website visits made by newsreaders. Thus, online user engagement is a very important issue for online newspapers. Much effort has been spent on writing interesting headlines to catch the attention of online users. On the other hand, headlines should not be misleading (e.g., clickbaits); otherwise, readers would be disappointed when reading the content. In this paper, we propose four indicators to determine the quality of published news headlines based on their click count and dwell time, which are obtained by website log analysis. Then, we use soft target distribution of the calculated quality indicators to train our proposed deep learning model which can predict the quality of unpublished news headlines. The proposed model not only processes the latent features of both headline and body of the article to predict its headline quality but also considers the semantic relation between headline and body as well. To evaluate our model, we use a real dataset from a major Canadian newspaper. Results show our proposed model outperforms other state-of-the-art NLP models.

Large language models (LLMs) fine-tuned by reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) are becoming more widely deployed. We coin the term Implicit Reward Model (IRM) to refer to the changes that occur to an LLM during RLHF that result in high-reward generations. We interpret IRMs, and measure their divergence from the RLHF reward model used in the fine-tuning process that induced them. By fitting a linear function to an LLM's IRM, a reward model with the same type signature as the RLHF reward model is constructed, allowing for direct comparison. Additionally, we validate our construction of the IRM through cross-comparison with classifications of features generated by an LLM based on their relevance to the RLHF reward model. Better comprehending IRMs can help minimize discrepencies between LLM behavior and training objectives, which we believe to be an essential component of the safety and alignment of LLMs.

The last decade has seen a significant increase of interest in deep learning research, with many public successes that have demonstrated its potential. As such, these systems are now being incorporated into commercial products. With this comes an additional challenge: how can we build AI systems that solve tasks where there is not a crisp, well-defined specification? While multiple solutions have been proposed, in this competition we focus on one in particular: learning from human feedback. Rather than training AI systems using a predefined reward function or using a labeled dataset with a predefined set of categories, we instead train the AI system using a learning signal derived from some form of human feedback, which can evolve over time as the understanding of the task changes, or as the capabilities of the AI system improve. The MineRL BASALT competition aims to spur forward research on this important class of techniques. We design a suite of four tasks in Minecraft for which we expect it will be hard to write down hardcoded reward functions. These tasks are defined by a paragraph of natural language: for example, "create a waterfall and take a scenic picture of it", with additional clarifying details. Participants must train a separate agent for each task, using any method they want. Agents are then evaluated by humans who have read the task description. To help participants get started, we provide a dataset of human demonstrations on each of the four tasks, as well as an imitation learning baseline that leverages these demonstrations. Our hope is that this competition will improve our ability to build AI systems that do what their designers intend them to do, even when the intent cannot be easily formalized. Besides allowing AI to solve more tasks, this can also enable more effective regulation of AI systems, as well as making progress on the value alignment problem.

Thanks to rapid progress in artificial intelligence, we have entered an era when technology and philosophy intersect in interesting ways. Sitting squarely at the centre of this intersection are large language models (LLMs). The more adept LLMs become at mimicking human language, the more vulnerable we become to anthropomorphism, to seeing the systems in which they are embedded as more human-like than they really are. This trend is amplified by the natural tendency to use philosophically loaded terms, such as "knows", "believes", and "thinks", when describing these systems. To mitigate this trend, this paper advocates the practice of repeatedly stepping back to remind ourselves of how LLMs, and the systems of which they form a part, actually work. The hope is that increased scientific precision will encourage more philosophical nuance in the discourse around artificial intelligence, both within the field and in the public sphere.

There is a strong association between the quality of the writing in a resume for new labor market entrants and whether those entrants are ultimately hired. We show that this relationship is, at least partially, causal: a field experiment in an online labor market was conducted with nearly half a million jobseekers in which a treated group received algorithmic writing assistance. Treated jobseekers experienced an 8% increase in the probability of getting hired. Contrary to concerns that the assistance is taking away a valuable signal, we find no evidence that employers were less satisfied. We present a model in which better writing is not a signal of ability but helps employers ascertain ability, which rationalizes our findings.

Large language models demonstrate remarkable in-context learning capabilities, adapting to new tasks without parameter updates. While this phenomenon has been successfully modeled as implicit Bayesian inference, recent empirical findings reveal a fundamental contradiction: transformers systematically violate the martingale property, a cornerstone requirement of Bayesian updating on exchangeable data. This violation challenges the theoretical foundations underlying uncertainty quantification in critical applications. Our theoretical analysis establishes four key results: (1) positional encodings induce martingale violations of order Theta(log n / n); (2) transformers achieve information-theoretic optimality with excess risk O(n^{-1/2}) in expectation over orderings; (3) the implicit posterior representation converges to the true Bayesian posterior in the space of sufficient statistics; and (4) we derive the optimal chain-of-thought length as k^* = Theta(nlog(1/varepsilon)) with explicit constants, providing a principled approach to reduce inference costs while maintaining performance. Empirical validation on GPT-3 confirms predictions (1)-(3), with transformers reaching 99\% of theoretical entropy limits within 20 examples. Our framework provides practical methods for extracting calibrated uncertainty estimates from position-aware architectures and optimizing computational efficiency in deployment.

The ability to predict upcoming events has been hypothesized to comprise a key aspect of natural and machine cognition. This is supported by trends in deep reinforcement learning (RL), where self-supervised auxiliary objectives such as prediction are widely used to support representation learning and improve task performance. Here, we study the effects predictive auxiliary objectives have on representation learning across different modules of an RL system and how these mimic representational changes observed in the brain. We find that predictive objectives improve and stabilize learning particularly in resource-limited architectures, and we identify settings where longer predictive horizons better support representational transfer. Furthermore, we find that representational changes in this RL system bear a striking resemblance to changes in neural activity observed in the brain across various experiments. Specifically, we draw a connection between the auxiliary predictive model of the RL system and hippocampus, an area thought to learn a predictive model to support memory-guided behavior. We also connect the encoder network and the value learning network of the RL system to visual cortex and striatum in the brain, respectively. This work demonstrates how representation learning in deep RL systems can provide an interpretable framework for modeling multi-region interactions in the brain. The deep RL perspective taken here also suggests an additional role of the hippocampus in the brain -- that of an auxiliary learning system that benefits representation learning in other regions.

As large language models (LLMs) become an important way of information access, there have been increasing concerns that LLMs may intensify the spread of unethical content, including implicit bias that hurts certain populations without explicit harmful words. In this paper, we conduct a rigorous evaluation of LLMs' implicit bias towards certain demographics by attacking them from a psychometric perspective to elicit agreements to biased viewpoints. Inspired by psychometric principles in cognitive and social psychology, we propose three attack approaches, i.e., Disguise, Deception, and Teaching. Incorporating the corresponding attack instructions, we built two benchmarks: (1) a bilingual dataset with biased statements covering four bias types (2.7K instances) for extensive comparative analysis, and (2) BUMBLE, a larger benchmark spanning nine common bias types (12.7K instances) for comprehensive evaluation. Extensive evaluation of popular commercial and open-source LLMs shows that our methods can elicit LLMs' inner bias more effectively than competitive baselines. Our attack methodology and benchmarks offer an effective means of assessing the ethical risks of LLMs, driving progress toward greater accountability in their development. Our code, data and benchmarks are available at https://github.com/yuchenwen1/ImplicitBiasPsychometricEvaluation and https://github.com/yuchenwen1/BUMBLE.

The widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs) makes it important to recognize their strengths and limitations. We argue that in order to develop a holistic understanding of these systems we need to consider the problem that they were trained to solve: next-word prediction over Internet text. By recognizing the pressures that this task exerts we can make predictions about the strategies that LLMs will adopt, allowing us to reason about when they will succeed or fail. This approach - which we call the teleological approach - leads us to identify three factors that we hypothesize will influence LLM accuracy: the probability of the task to be performed, the probability of the target output, and the probability of the provided input. We predict that LLMs will achieve higher accuracy when these probabilities are high than when they are low - even in deterministic settings where probability should not matter. To test our predictions, we evaluate two LLMs (GPT-3.5 and GPT-4) on eleven tasks, and we find robust evidence that LLMs are influenced by probability in the ways that we have hypothesized. In many cases, the experiments reveal surprising failure modes. For instance, GPT-4's accuracy at decoding a simple cipher is 51% when the output is a high-probability word sequence but only 13% when it is low-probability. These results show that AI practitioners should be careful about using LLMs in low-probability situations. More broadly, we conclude that we should not evaluate LLMs as if they are humans but should instead treat them as a distinct type of system - one that has been shaped by its own particular set of pressures.

Large Language Models with transformer architecture have revolutionized the domain of text generation, setting unprecedented benchmarks. Despite their impressive capabilities, LLMs have been criticized for generating outcomes that deviate from factual accuracy or display logical inconsistencies, phenomena commonly referred to as hallucinations. This term, however, has often been misapplied to any results deviating from the instructor's expectations, which this paper defines as attention misdirection rather than true hallucinations. Understanding the distinction between hallucinations and attention misdirection becomes increasingly relevant in business contexts, where the ramifications of such errors can significantly impact the value extraction from these inherently pre-trained models. This paper highlights the best practices of the PGI, Persona, Grouping, and Intelligence, method, a strategic framework that achieved a remarkable error rate of only 3,15 percent across 4,000 responses generated by GPT in response to a real business challenge. It emphasizes that by equipping experimentation with knowledge, businesses can unlock opportunities for innovation through the use of these natively pre-trained models. This reinforces the notion that strategic application grounded in a skilled team can maximize the benefits of emergent technologies such as the LLMs.

NLP is in a period of disruptive change that is impacting our methodologies, funding sources, and public perception. In this work, we seek to understand how to shape our future by better understanding our past. We study factors that shape NLP as a field, including culture, incentives, and infrastructure by conducting long-form interviews with 26 NLP researchers of varying seniority, research area, institution, and social identity. Our interviewees identify cyclical patterns in the field, as well as new shifts without historical parallel, including changes in benchmark culture and software infrastructure. We complement this discussion with quantitative analysis of citation, authorship, and language use in the ACL Anthology over time. We conclude by discussing shared visions, concerns, and hopes for the future of NLP. We hope that this study of our field's past and present can prompt informed discussion of our community's implicit norms and more deliberate action to consciously shape the future.

Certain statistical models are capable of interpreting input strings as instructions, or prompts, and carry out tasks based on them. Many approaches to prompting and pre-training these models involve the automated generation of these prompts. We call these approaches meta-prompting, or prompting to obtain prompts. We propose a theoretical framework based on category theory to generalize and describe them. This framework is flexible enough to account for LLM stochasticity; and allows us to obtain formal results around task agnosticity and equivalence of various meta-prompting approaches. We experiment with meta-prompting in two active areas of model research: creativity and ideation. We find that user preference favors (p < 0.01) the prompts generated under meta-prompting, as well as their corresponding outputs, over a series of hardcoded baseline prompts that include the original task prompt. Using our framework, we argue that meta-prompting is more effective than basic prompting at generating desirable outputs.

The open-ended nature of language generation makes the evaluation of autoregressive large language models (LLMs) challenging. One common evaluation approach uses multiple-choice questions (MCQ) to limit the response space. The model is then evaluated by ranking the candidate answers by the log probability of the first token prediction. However, first-tokens may not consistently reflect the final response output, due to model's diverse response styles such as starting with "Sure" or refusing to answer. Consequently, MCQ evaluation is not indicative of model behaviour when interacting with users. But by how much? We evaluate how aligned first-token evaluation is with the text output along several dimensions, namely final option choice, refusal rate, choice distribution and robustness under prompt perturbation. Our results show that the two approaches are severely misaligned on all dimensions, reaching mismatch rates over 60%. Models heavily fine-tuned on conversational or safety data are especially impacted. Crucially, models remain misaligned even when we increasingly constrain prompts, i.e., force them to start with an option letter or example template. Our findings i) underscore the importance of inspecting the text output as well and ii) caution against relying solely on first-token evaluation.

We investigate a new commonsense inference task: given an event described in a short free-form text ("X drinks coffee in the morning"), a system reasons about the likely intents ("X wants to stay awake") and reactions ("X feels alert") of the event's participants. To support this study, we construct a new crowdsourced corpus of 25,000 event phrases covering a diverse range of everyday events and situations. We report baseline performance on this task, demonstrating that neural encoder-decoder models can successfully compose embedding representations of previously unseen events and reason about the likely intents and reactions of the event participants. In addition, we demonstrate how commonsense inference on people's intents and reactions can help unveil the implicit gender inequality prevalent in modern movie scripts.

The concept of Artificial Intelligence has gained a lot of attention over the last decade. In particular, AI-based tools have been employed in several scenarios and are, by now, pervading our everyday life. Nonetheless, most of these systems lack many capabilities that we would naturally consider to be included in a notion of "intelligence". In this work, we present an architecture that, inspired by the cognitive theory known as Thinking Fast and Slow by D. Kahneman, is tasked with solving planning problems in different settings, specifically: classical and multi-agent epistemic. The system proposed is an instance of a more general AI paradigm, referred to as SOFAI (for Slow and Fast AI). SOFAI exploits multiple solving approaches, with different capabilities that characterize them as either fast or slow, and a metacognitive module to regulate them. This combination of components, which roughly reflects the human reasoning process according to D. Kahneman, allowed us to enhance the reasoning process that, in this case, is concerned with planning in two different settings. The behavior of this system is then compared to state-of-the-art solvers, showing that the newly introduced system presents better results in terms of generality, solving a wider set of problems with an acceptable trade-off between solving times and solution accuracy.

As the research community aims to build better AI assistants that are more dynamic and personalized to the diversity of humans that they interact with, there is increased interest in evaluating the theory of mind capabilities of large language models (LLMs). Indeed, several recent studies suggest that LLM theory of mind capabilities are quite impressive, approximating human-level performance. Our paper aims to rebuke this narrative and argues instead that past studies were not directly measuring agent performance, potentially leading to findings that are illusory in nature as a result. We draw a strong distinction between what we call literal theory of mind i.e. measuring the agent's ability to predict the behavior of others and functional theory of mind i.e. adapting to agents in-context based on a rational response to predictions of their behavior. We find that top performing open source LLMs may display strong capabilities in literal theory of mind, depending on how they are prompted, but seem to struggle with functional theory of mind -- even when partner policies are exceedingly simple. Our work serves to highlight the double sided nature of inductive bias in LLMs when adapting to new situations. While this bias can lead to strong performance over limited horizons, it often hinders convergence to optimal long-term behavior.

Existing preference optimization methods are mainly designed for directly learning from human feedback with the assumption that paired examples (preferred vs. dis-preferred) are available. In contrast, we propose a method that can leverage unpaired preferred or dis-preferred examples, and works even when only one type of feedback (positive or negative) is available. This flexibility allows us to apply it in scenarios with varying forms of feedback and models, including training generative language models based on human feedback as well as training policies for sequential decision-making problems, where learned (value) functions are available. Our approach builds upon the probabilistic framework introduced in (Dayan and Hinton, 1997), which proposes to use expectation-maximization (EM) to directly optimize the probability of preferred outcomes (as opposed to classic expected reward maximization). To obtain a practical algorithm, we identify and address a key limitation in current EM-based methods: when applied to preference optimization, they solely maximize the likelihood of preferred examples, while neglecting dis-preferred samples. We show how one can extend EM algorithms to explicitly incorporate dis-preferred outcomes, leading to a novel, theoretically grounded, preference optimization algorithm that offers an intuitive and versatile way to learn from both positive and negative feedback.

The first generation of Large Language Models - what might be called "Act I" of generative AI (2020-2023) - achieved remarkable success through massive parameter and data scaling, yet exhibited fundamental limitations in knowledge latency, shallow reasoning, and constrained cognitive processes. During this era, prompt engineering emerged as our primary interface with AI, enabling dialogue-level communication through natural language. We now witness the emergence of "Act II" (2024-present), where models are transitioning from knowledge-retrieval systems (in latent space) to thought-construction engines through test-time scaling techniques. This new paradigm establishes a mind-level connection with AI through language-based thoughts. In this paper, we clarify the conceptual foundations of cognition engineering and explain why this moment is critical for its development. We systematically break down these advanced approaches through comprehensive tutorials and optimized implementations, democratizing access to cognition engineering and enabling every practitioner to participate in AI's second act. We provide a regularly updated collection of papers on test-time scaling in the GitHub Repository: https://github.com/GAIR-NLP/cognition-engineering

This paper delves into the pivotal role of prompt engineering in unleashing the capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs). Prompt engineering is the process of structuring input text for LLMs and is a technique integral to optimizing the efficacy of LLMs. This survey elucidates foundational principles of prompt engineering, such as role-prompting, one-shot, and few-shot prompting, as well as more advanced methodologies such as the chain-of-thought and tree-of-thoughts prompting. The paper sheds light on how external assistance in the form of plugins can assist in this task, and reduce machine hallucination by retrieving external knowledge. We subsequently delineate prospective directions in prompt engineering research, emphasizing the need for a deeper understanding of structures and the role of agents in Artificial Intelligence-Generated Content (AIGC) tools. We discuss how to assess the efficacy of prompt methods from different perspectives and using different methods. Finally, we gather information about the application of prompt engineering in such fields as education and programming, showing its transformative potential. This comprehensive survey aims to serve as a friendly guide for anyone venturing through the big world of LLMs and prompt engineering.

Uncovering latent values and opinions in large language models (LLMs) can help identify biases and mitigate potential harm. Recently, this has been approached by presenting LLMs with survey questions and quantifying their stances towards morally and politically charged statements. However, the stances generated by LLMs can vary greatly depending on how they are prompted, and there are many ways to argue for or against a given position. In this work, we propose to address this by analysing a large and robust dataset of 156k LLM responses to the 62 propositions of the Political Compass Test (PCT) generated by 6 LLMs using 420 prompt variations. We perform coarse-grained analysis of their generated stances and fine-grained analysis of the plain text justifications for those stances. For fine-grained analysis, we propose to identify tropes in the responses: semantically similar phrases that are recurrent and consistent across different prompts, revealing patterns in the text that a given LLM is prone to produce. We find that demographic features added to prompts significantly affect outcomes on the PCT, reflecting bias, as well as disparities between the results of tests when eliciting closed-form vs. open domain responses. Additionally, patterns in the plain text rationales via tropes show that similar justifications are repeatedly generated across models and prompts even with disparate stances.

This paper calls on the research community not only to investigate how human biases are inherited by large language models (LLMs) but also to explore how these biases in LLMs can be leveraged to make society's "unwritten code" - such as implicit stereotypes and heuristics - visible and accessible for critique. We introduce a conceptual framework through a case study in science: uncovering hidden rules in peer review - the factors that reviewers care about but rarely state explicitly due to normative scientific expectations. The idea of the framework is to push LLMs to speak out their heuristics through generating self-consistent hypotheses - why one paper appeared stronger in reviewer scoring - among paired papers submitted to 45 computer science conferences, while iteratively searching deeper hypotheses from remaining pairs where existing hypotheses cannot explain. We observed that LLMs' normative priors about the internal characteristics of good science extracted from their self-talk, e.g. theoretical rigor, were systematically updated toward posteriors that emphasize storytelling about external connections, such as how the work is positioned and connected within and across literatures. This shift reveals the primacy of scientific myths about intrinsic properties driving scientific excellence rather than extrinsic contextualization and storytelling that influence conceptions of relevance and significance. Human reviewers tend to explicitly reward aspects that moderately align with LLMs' normative priors (correlation = 0.49) but avoid articulating contextualization and storytelling posteriors in their review comments (correlation = -0.14), despite giving implicit reward to them with positive scores. We discuss the broad applicability of the framework, leveraging LLMs as diagnostic tools to surface the tacit codes underlying human society, enabling more precisely targeted responsible AI.

Research has a long history of discussing what is superior in predicting certain outcomes: statistical methods or the human brain. This debate has repeatedly been sparked off by the remarkable technological advances in the field of artificial intelligence (AI), such as solving tasks like object and speech recognition, achieving significant improvements in accuracy through deep-learning algorithms (Goodfellow et al. 2016), or combining various methods of computational intelligence, such as fuzzy logic, genetic algorithms, and case-based reasoning (Medsker 2012). One of the implicit promises that underlie these advancements is that machines will 1 day be capable of performing complex tasks or may even supersede humans in performing these tasks. This triggers new heated debates of when machines will ultimately replace humans (McAfee and Brynjolfsson 2017). While previous research has proved that AI performs well in some clearly defined tasks such as playing chess, playing Go or identifying objects on images, it is doubted that the development of an artificial general intelligence (AGI) which is able to solve multiple tasks at the same time can be achieved in the near future (e.g., Russell and Norvig 2016). Moreover, the use of AI to solve complex business problems in organizational contexts occurs scarcely, and applications for AI that solve complex problems remain mainly in laboratory settings instead of being implemented in practice. Since the road to AGI is still a long one, we argue that the most likely paradigm for the division of labor between humans and machines in the next decades is Hybrid Intelligence. This concept aims at using the complementary strengths of human intelligence and AI, so that they can perform better than each of the two could separately (e.g., Kamar 2016).

Rewards remain an uninterpretable way to specify tasks for Reinforcement Learning, as humans are often unable to predict the optimal behavior of any given reward function, leading to poor reward design and reward hacking. Language presents an appealing way to communicate intent to agents and bypass reward design, but prior efforts to do so have been limited by costly and unscalable labeling efforts. In this work, we propose a method for a completely unsupervised alternative to grounding language instructions in a zero-shot manner to obtain policies. We present a solution that takes the form of imagine, project, and imitate: The agent imagines the observation sequence corresponding to the language description of a task, projects the imagined sequence to our target domain, and grounds it to a policy. Video-language models allow us to imagine task descriptions that leverage knowledge of tasks learned from internet-scale video-text mappings. The challenge remains to ground these generations to a policy. In this work, we show that we can achieve a zero-shot language-to-behavior policy by first grounding the imagined sequences in real observations of an unsupervised RL agent and using a closed-form solution to imitation learning that allows the RL agent to mimic the grounded observations. Our method, RLZero, is the first to our knowledge to show zero-shot language to behavior generation abilities without any supervision on a variety of tasks on simulated domains. We further show that RLZero can also generate policies zero-shot from cross-embodied videos such as those scraped from YouTube.

Many empirical studies of labor market questions rely on estimating relatively simple predictive models using small, carefully constructed longitudinal survey datasets based on hand-engineered features. Large Language Models (LLMs), trained on massive datasets, encode vast quantities of world knowledge and can be used for the next job prediction problem. However, while an off-the-shelf LLM produces plausible career trajectories when prompted, the probability with which an LLM predicts a particular job transition conditional on career history will not, in general, align with the true conditional probability in a given population. Recently, Vafa et al. (2024) introduced a transformer-based "foundation model", CAREER, trained using a large, unrepresentative resume dataset, that predicts transitions between jobs; it further demonstrated how transfer learning techniques can be used to leverage the foundation model to build better predictive models of both transitions and wages that reflect conditional transition probabilities found in nationally representative survey datasets. This paper considers an alternative where the fine-tuning of the CAREER foundation model is replaced by fine-tuning LLMs. For the task of next job prediction, we demonstrate that models trained with our approach outperform several alternatives in terms of predictive performance on the survey data, including traditional econometric models, CAREER, and LLMs with in-context learning, even though the LLM can in principle predict job titles that are not allowed in the survey data. Further, we show that our fine-tuned LLM-based models' predictions are more representative of the career trajectories of various workforce subpopulations than off-the-shelf LLM models and CAREER. We conduct experiments and analyses that highlight the sources of the gains in the performance of our models for representative predictions.

Sequential vision-to-language or visual storytelling has recently been one of the areas of focus in computer vision and language modeling domains. Though existing models generate narratives that read subjectively well, there could be cases when these models miss out on generating stories that account and address all prospective human and animal characters in the image sequences. Considering this scenario, we propose a model that implicitly learns relationships between provided characters and thereby generates stories with respective characters in scope. We use the VIST dataset for this purpose and report numerous statistics on the dataset. Eventually, we describe the model, explain the experiment and discuss our current status and future work.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) continue to evolve, they are increasingly being employed in numerous studies to simulate societies and execute diverse social tasks. However, LLMs are susceptible to societal biases due to their exposure to human-generated data. Given that LLMs are being used to gain insights into various societal aspects, it is essential to mitigate these biases. To that end, our study investigates the presence of implicit gender biases in multi-agent LLM interactions and proposes two strategies to mitigate these biases. We begin by creating a dataset of scenarios where implicit gender biases might arise, and subsequently develop a metric to assess the presence of biases. Our empirical analysis reveals that LLMs generate outputs characterized by strong implicit bias associations (>= 50\% of the time). Furthermore, these biases tend to escalate following multi-agent interactions. To mitigate them, we propose two strategies: self-reflection with in-context examples (ICE); and supervised fine-tuning. Our research demonstrates that both methods effectively mitigate implicit biases, with the ensemble of fine-tuning and self-reflection proving to be the most successful.

The field of large language models (LLMs) has grown rapidly in recent years, driven by the desire for better efficiency, interpretability, and safe use. Building on the novel approach of "activation engineering," this study explores personality modification in LLMs, drawing inspiration from research like Refusal in LLMs Is Mediated by a Single Direction (arXiv:2406.11717) and Steering Llama 2 via Contrastive Activation Addition (arXiv:2312.06681). We leverage activation engineering to develop a method for identifying and adjusting activation directions related to personality traits, which may allow for dynamic LLM personality fine-tuning. This work aims to further our understanding of LLM interpretability while examining the ethical implications of such developments.

Text-to-Image (T2I) generation is enabling new applications that support creators, designers, and general end users of productivity software by generating illustrative content with high photorealism starting from a given descriptive text as a prompt. Such models are however trained on massive amounts of web data, which surfaces the peril of potential harmful biases that may leak in the generation process itself. In this paper, we take a multi-dimensional approach to studying and quantifying common social biases as reflected in the generated images, by focusing on how occupations, personality traits, and everyday situations are depicted across representations of (perceived) gender, age, race, and geographical location. Through an extensive set of both automated and human evaluation experiments we present findings for two popular T2I models: DALLE-v2 and Stable Diffusion. Our results reveal that there exist severe occupational biases of neutral prompts majorly excluding groups of people from results for both models. Such biases can get mitigated by increasing the amount of specification in the prompt itself, although the prompting mitigation will not address discrepancies in image quality or other usages of the model or its representations in other scenarios. Further, we observe personality traits being associated with only a limited set of people at the intersection of race, gender, and age. Finally, an analysis of geographical location representations on everyday situations (e.g., park, food, weddings) shows that for most situations, images generated through default location-neutral prompts are closer and more similar to images generated for locations of United States and Germany.

We test the hypothesis that language models trained with reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) have the capability to "morally self-correct" -- to avoid producing harmful outputs -- if instructed to do so. We find strong evidence in support of this hypothesis across three different experiments, each of which reveal different facets of moral self-correction. We find that the capability for moral self-correction emerges at 22B model parameters, and typically improves with increasing model size and RLHF training. We believe that at this level of scale, language models obtain two capabilities that they can use for moral self-correction: (1) they can follow instructions and (2) they can learn complex normative concepts of harm like stereotyping, bias, and discrimination. As such, they can follow instructions to avoid certain kinds of morally harmful outputs. We believe our results are cause for cautious optimism regarding the ability to train language models to abide by ethical principles.

In their recent Nature Human Behaviour paper, "Emergent analogical reasoning in large language models," (Webb, Holyoak, and Lu, 2023) the authors argue that "large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems." In this response, we provide counterexamples of the letter string analogies. In our tests, GPT-3 fails to solve even the easiest variants of the problems presented in the original paper. Zero-shot reasoning is an extraordinary claim that requires extraordinary evidence. We do not see that evidence in our experiments. To strengthen claims of humanlike reasoning such as zero-shot reasoning, it is important that the field develop approaches that rule out data memorization.

Prompting Large Language Models (LLMs), or providing context on the expected model of operation, is an effective way to steer the outputs of such models to satisfy human desiderata after they have been trained. But in rapidly evolving domains, there is often need to fine-tune LLMs to improve either the kind of knowledge in their memory or their abilities to perform open ended reasoning in new domains. When human's learn new concepts, we often do so by linking the new material that we are studying to concepts we have already learned before. To that end, we ask, "can prompting help us teach LLMs how to learn". In this work, we study a novel generalization of instruction tuning, called contextual fine-tuning, to fine-tune LLMs. Our method leverages instructional prompts designed to mimic human cognitive strategies in learning and problem-solving to guide the learning process during training, aiming to improve the model's interpretation and understanding of domain-specific knowledge. We empirically demonstrate that this simple yet effective modification improves the ability of LLMs to be fine-tuned rapidly on new datasets both within the medical and financial domains.

Large language models (LLMs) are becoming increasingly important for machine learning applications. However, it can be challenging to align LLMs with our intent, particularly when we want to generate content that is preferable over others or when we want the LLM to respond in a certain style or tone that is hard to describe. To address this challenge, we propose an approach that uses contrastive examples to better describe our intent. This involves providing positive examples that illustrate the true intent, along with negative examples that show what characteristics we want LLMs to avoid. The negative examples can be retrieved from labeled data, written by a human, or generated by the LLM itself. Before generating an answer, we ask the model to analyze the examples to teach itself what to avoid. This reasoning step provides the model with the appropriate articulation of the user's need and guides it towards generting a better answer. We tested our approach on both synthesized and real-world datasets, including StackExchange and Reddit, and found that it significantly improves performance compared to standard few-shot prompting

We examine the representation of African American English (AAE) in large language models (LLMs), exploring (a) the perceptions Black Americans have of how effective these technologies are at producing authentic AAE, and (b) in what contexts Black Americans find this desirable. Through both a survey of Black Americans (n= 104) and annotation of LLM-produced AAE by Black Americans (n= 228), we find that Black Americans favor choice and autonomy in determining when AAE is appropriate in LLM output. They tend to prefer that LLMs default to communicating in Mainstream U.S. English in formal settings, with greater interest in AAE production in less formal settings. When LLMs were appropriately prompted and provided in context examples, our participants found their outputs to have a level of AAE authenticity on par with transcripts of Black American speech. Select code and data for our project can be found here: https://github.com/smelliecat/AAEMime.git

Are LLMs cultural technologies like photocopiers or printing presses, which transmit information but cannot create new content? A challenge for this idea, which we call bibliotechnism, is that LLMs generate novel text. We begin with a defense of bibliotechnism, showing how even novel text may inherit its meaning from original human-generated text. We then argue that bibliotechnism faces an independent challenge from examples in which LLMs generate novel reference, using new names to refer to new entities. Such examples could be explained if LLMs were not cultural technologies but had beliefs, desires, and intentions. According to interpretationism in the philosophy of mind, a system has such attitudes if and only if its behavior is well explained by the hypothesis that it does. Interpretationists may hold that LLMs have attitudes, and thus have a simple solution to the novel reference problem. We emphasize, however, that interpretationism is compatible with very simple creatures having attitudes and differs sharply from views that presuppose these attitudes require consciousness, sentience, or intelligence (topics about which we make no claims).

Artificial intelligence and machine learning are in a period of astounding growth. However, there are concerns that these technologies may be used, either with or without intention, to perpetuate the prejudice and unfairness that unfortunately characterizes many human institutions. Here we show for the first time that human-like semantic biases result from the application of standard machine learning to ordinary language---the same sort of language humans are exposed to every day. We replicate a spectrum of standard human biases as exposed by the Implicit Association Test and other well-known psychological studies. We replicate these using a widely used, purely statistical machine-learning model---namely, the GloVe word embedding---trained on a corpus of text from the Web. Our results indicate that language itself contains recoverable and accurate imprints of our historic biases, whether these are morally neutral as towards insects or flowers, problematic as towards race or gender, or even simply veridical, reflecting the {\em status quo} for the distribution of gender with respect to careers or first names. These regularities are captured by machine learning along with the rest of semantics. In addition to our empirical findings concerning language, we also contribute new methods for evaluating bias in text, the Word Embedding Association Test (WEAT) and the Word Embedding Factual Association Test (WEFAT). Our results have implications not only for AI and machine learning, but also for the fields of psychology, sociology, and human ethics, since they raise the possibility that mere exposure to everyday language can account for the biases we replicate here.

The ability to observe the effects of actions performed by others and to infer their intent, most likely goals, or course of action, is known as a plan or intention recognition cognitive capability and has long been one of the fundamental research challenges in AI. Deep learning has recently been making significant inroads on various pattern recognition problems, except for intention recognition. While extensively explored since the seventies, the problem remains unsolved for most interesting cases in various areas, ranging from natural language understanding to human behavior understanding based on video feeds. This paper compares symbolic inverse planning, one of the most investigated approaches to goal recognition, to deep learning using CNN and LTSM neural network architectures, on five synthetic benchmarks often used in the literature. The results show that the deep learning approach achieves better goal-prediction accuracy and timeliness than the symbolic cost-based plan recognizer in these domains. Although preliminary, these results point to interesting future research avenues.

A consistent body of evidence suggests that dream reports significantly vary from other types of textual transcripts with respect to semantic content. Furthermore, it appears to be a widespread belief in the dream/sleep research community that dream reports constitute rather ``unique'' strings of text. This might be a notable issue for the growing amount of approaches using natural language processing (NLP) tools to automatically analyse dream reports, as they largely rely on neural models trained on non-dream corpora scraped from the web. In this work, I will adopt state-of-the-art (SotA) large language models (LLMs), to study if and how dream reports deviate from other human-generated text strings, such as Wikipedia. Results show that, taken as a whole, DreamBank does not deviate from Wikipedia. Moreover, on average, single dream reports are significantly more predictable than Wikipedia articles. Preliminary evidence suggests that word count, gender, and visual impairment can significantly shape how predictable a dream report can appear to the model.

Portfolio optimization has been a broad and intense area of interest for quantitative and statistical finance researchers and financial analysts. It is a challenging task to design a portfolio of stocks to arrive at the optimized values of the return and risk. This paper presents an algorithmic approach for designing optimum risk and eigen portfolios for five thematic sectors of the NSE of India. The prices of the stocks are extracted from the web from Jan 1, 2016, to Dec 31, 2020. Optimum risk and eigen portfolios for each sector are designed based on ten critical stocks from the sector. An LSTM model is designed for predicting future stock prices. Seven months after the portfolios were formed, on Aug 3, 2021, the actual returns of the portfolios are compared with the LSTM-predicted returns. The predicted and the actual returns indicate a very high-level accuracy of the LSTM model.

Auto-regressive language models factorize sequence probabilities and are trained by minimizing the negative log-likelihood (NLL) objective. While empirically powerful, a deep theoretical understanding of why this simple objective yields such versatile representations remains elusive. This work introduces a unifying analytical framework using Markov Categories (MCs) to deconstruct the AR generation process and the NLL objective. We model the single-step generation map as a composition of Markov kernels in the category Stoch. This compositional view, when enriched with statistical divergences, allows us to dissect information flow and learned geometry. Our framework makes three main contributions. First, we provide a formal, information-theoretic rationale for the success of modern speculative decoding methods like EAGLE, quantifying the information surplus in hidden states that these methods exploit. Second, we formalize how NLL minimization forces the model to learn not just the next token, but the data's intrinsic conditional stochasticity, a process we analyze using categorical entropy. Third, and most centrally, we prove that NLL training acts as an implicit form of spectral contrastive learning. By analyzing the information geometry of the model's prediction head, we show that NLL implicitly forces the learned representation space to align with the eigenspectrum of a predictive similarity operator, thereby learning a geometrically structured space without explicit contrastive pairs. This compositional and information-geometric perspective reveals the deep structural principles underlying the effectiveness of modern LMs. Project Page: https://github.com/asiresearch/lm-theory

The Instruction-Driven Game Engine (IDGE) project aims to democratize game development by enabling a large language model (LLM) to follow free-form game descriptions and generate game-play processes. The IDGE allows users to create games simply by natural language instructions, which significantly lowers the barrier for game development. We approach the learning process for IDGEs as a Next State Prediction task, wherein the model autoregressively predicts the game states given player actions. The computation of game states must be precise; otherwise, slight errors could corrupt the game-play experience. This is challenging because of the gap between stability and diversity. To address this, we train the IDGE in a curriculum manner that progressively increases its exposure to complex scenarios. Our initial progress lies in developing an IDGE for Poker, which not only supports a wide range of poker variants but also allows for highly individualized new poker games through natural language inputs. This work lays the groundwork for future advancements in transforming how games are created and played.

Recent studies show that instruction tuning and learning from human feedback improve the abilities of large language models (LMs) dramatically. While these tuning methods can make models generate high-quality text, we conjecture that more implicit cognitive biases may arise in these fine-tuned models. Our work provides evidence that these fine-tuned models exhibit biases that were absent or less pronounced in their pretrained predecessors. We examine the extent of this phenomenon in three cognitive biases - the decoy effect, the certainty effect, and the belief bias - all of which are known to influence human decision-making and reasoning. Our findings highlight the presence of these biases in various models, especially those that have undergone instruction tuning, such as Flan-T5, GPT3.5, and GPT4. This research constitutes a step toward comprehending cognitive biases in instruction-tuned LMs, which is crucial for the development of more reliable and unbiased language models.

Hallucination has emerged as the most vulnerable aspect of contemporary Large Language Models (LLMs). In this paper, we introduce the Sorry, Come Again (SCA) prompting, aimed to avoid LLM hallucinations by enhancing comprehension through: (i) optimal paraphrasing and (ii) injecting [PAUSE] tokens to delay LLM generation. First, we provide an in-depth analysis of linguistic nuances: formality, readability, and concreteness of prompts for 21 LLMs, and elucidate how these nuances contribute to hallucinated generation. Prompts with lower readability, formality, or concreteness pose comprehension challenges for LLMs, similar to those faced by humans. In such scenarios, an LLM tends to speculate and generate content based on its imagination (associative memory) to fill these information gaps. Although these speculations may occasionally align with factual information, their accuracy is not assured, often resulting in hallucination. Recent studies reveal that an LLM often neglects the middle sections of extended prompts, a phenomenon termed as lost in the middle. While a specific paraphrase may suit one LLM, the same paraphrased version may elicit a different response from another LLM. Therefore, we propose an optimal paraphrasing technique to identify the most comprehensible paraphrase of a given prompt, evaluated using Integrated Gradient (and its variations) to guarantee that the LLM accurately processes all words. While reading lengthy sentences, humans often pause at various points to better comprehend the meaning read thus far. We have fine-tuned an LLM with injected [PAUSE] tokens, allowing the LLM to pause while reading lengthier prompts. This has brought several key contributions: (i) determining the optimal position to inject [PAUSE], (ii) determining the number of [PAUSE] tokens to be inserted, and (iii) introducing reverse proxy tuning to fine-tune the LLM for [PAUSE] insertion.

Reliable estimation of predictive uncertainty is crucial for machine learning applications, particularly in high-stakes scenarios where hedging against risks is essential. Despite its significance, there is no universal agreement on how to best quantify predictive uncertainty. In this work, we revisit core concepts to propose a framework for information-theoretic measures of predictive uncertainty. Our proposed framework categorizes predictive uncertainty measures according to two factors: (I) The predicting model (II) The approximation of the true predictive distribution. Examining all possible combinations of these two factors, we derive a set of predictive uncertainty measures that includes both known and newly introduced ones. We extensively evaluate these measures across a broad set of tasks, identifying conditions under which certain measures excel. Our findings show the importance of aligning the choice of uncertainty measure with the predicting model on in-distribution (ID) data, the limitations of epistemic uncertainty measures for out-of-distribution (OOD) data, and that the disentanglement between measures varies substantially between ID and OOD data. Together, these insights provide a more comprehensive understanding of predictive uncertainty measures, revealing their implicit assumptions and relationships.

There is a growing literature on reasoning by large language models (LLMs), but the discussion on the uncertainty in their responses is still lacking. Our aim is to assess the extent of confidence that LLMs have in their answers and how it correlates with accuracy. Confidence is measured (i) qualitatively in terms of persistence in keeping their answer when prompted to reconsider, and (ii) quantitatively in terms of self-reported confidence score. We investigate the performance of three LLMs -- GPT4o, GPT4-turbo and Mistral -- on two benchmark sets of questions on causal judgement and formal fallacies and a set of probability and statistical puzzles and paradoxes. Although the LLMs show significantly better performance than random guessing, there is a wide variability in their tendency to change their initial answers. There is a positive correlation between qualitative confidence and accuracy, but the overall accuracy for the second answer is often worse than for the first answer. There is a strong tendency to overstate the self-reported confidence score. Confidence is only partially explained by the underlying token-level probability. The material effects of prompting on qualitative confidence and the strong tendency for overconfidence indicate that current LLMs do not have any internally coherent sense of confidence.

Encouraged by decision makers' appetite for future information on topics ranging from elections to pandemics, and enabled by the explosion of data and computational methods, model based forecasts have garnered increasing influence on a breadth of decisions in modern society. Using several classic examples from fisheries management, I demonstrate that selecting the model or models that produce the most accurate and precise forecast (measured by statistical scores) can sometimes lead to worse outcomes (measured by real-world objectives). This can create a forecast trap, in which the outcomes such as fish biomass or economic yield decline while the manager becomes increasingly convinced that these actions are consistent with the best models and data available. The forecast trap is not unique to this example, but a fundamental consequence of non-uniqueness of models. Existing practices promoting a broader set of models are the best way to avoid the trap.

Human values are crucial to human decision-making. Value pluralism is the view that multiple correct values may be held in tension with one another (e.g., when considering lying to a friend to protect their feelings, how does one balance honesty with friendship?). As statistical learners, AI systems fit to averages by default, washing out these potentially irreducible value conflicts. To improve AI systems to better reflect value pluralism, the first-order challenge is to explore the extent to which AI systems can model pluralistic human values, rights, and duties as well as their interaction. We introduce ValuePrism, a large-scale dataset of 218k values, rights, and duties connected to 31k human-written situations. ValuePrism's contextualized values are generated by GPT-4 and deemed high-quality by human annotators 91% of the time. We conduct a large-scale study with annotators across diverse social and demographic backgrounds to try to understand whose values are represented. With ValuePrism, we build Kaleido, an open, light-weight, and structured language-based multi-task model that generates, explains, and assesses the relevance and valence (i.e., support or oppose) of human values, rights, and duties within a specific context. Humans prefer the sets of values output by our system over the teacher GPT-4, finding them more accurate and with broader coverage. In addition, we demonstrate that Kaleido can help explain variability in human decision-making by outputting contrasting values. Finally, we show that Kaleido's representations transfer to other philosophical frameworks and datasets, confirming the benefit of an explicit, modular, and interpretable approach to value pluralism. We hope that our work will serve as a step to making more explicit the implicit values behind human decision-making and to steering AI systems to make decisions that are more in accordance with them.

Automatic Curriculum Learning (ACL) has become a cornerstone of recent successes in Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL).These methods shape the learning trajectories of agents by challenging them with tasks adapted to their capacities. In recent years, they have been used to improve sample efficiency and asymptotic performance, to organize exploration, to encourage generalization or to solve sparse reward problems, among others. The ambition of this work is dual: 1) to present a compact and accessible introduction to the Automatic Curriculum Learning literature and 2) to draw a bigger picture of the current state of the art in ACL to encourage the cross-breeding of existing concepts and the emergence of new ideas.

Widely deployed large language models (LLMs) can produce convincing yet incorrect outputs, potentially misleading users who may rely on them as if they were correct. To reduce such overreliance, there have been calls for LLMs to communicate their uncertainty to end users. However, there has been little empirical work examining how users perceive and act upon LLMs' expressions of uncertainty. We explore this question through a large-scale, pre-registered, human-subject experiment (N=404) in which participants answer medical questions with or without access to responses from a fictional LLM-infused search engine. Using both behavioral and self-reported measures, we examine how different natural language expressions of uncertainty impact participants' reliance, trust, and overall task performance. We find that first-person expressions (e.g., "I'm not sure, but...") decrease participants' confidence in the system and tendency to agree with the system's answers, while increasing participants' accuracy. An exploratory analysis suggests that this increase can be attributed to reduced (but not fully eliminated) overreliance on incorrect answers. While we observe similar effects for uncertainty expressed from a general perspective (e.g., "It's not clear, but..."), these effects are weaker and not statistically significant. Our findings suggest that using natural language expressions of uncertainty may be an effective approach for reducing overreliance on LLMs, but that the precise language used matters. This highlights the importance of user testing before deploying LLMs at scale.

The premise of identifiable and causal representation learning is to improve the current representation learning paradigm in terms of generalizability or robustness. Despite recent progress in questions of identifiability, more theoretical results demonstrating concrete advantages of these methods for downstream tasks are needed. In this paper, we consider the task of intervention extrapolation: predicting how interventions affect an outcome, even when those interventions are not observed at training time, and show that identifiable representations can provide an effective solution to this task even if the interventions affect the outcome non-linearly. Our setup includes an outcome Y, observed features X, which are generated as a non-linear transformation of latent features Z, and exogenous action variables A, which influence Z. The objective of intervention extrapolation is to predict how interventions on A that lie outside the training support of A affect Y. Here, extrapolation becomes possible if the effect of A on Z is linear and the residual when regressing Z on A has full support. As Z is latent, we combine the task of intervention extrapolation with identifiable representation learning, which we call Rep4Ex: we aim to map the observed features X into a subspace that allows for non-linear extrapolation in A. We show that the hidden representation is identifiable up to an affine transformation in Z-space, which is sufficient for intervention extrapolation. The identifiability is characterized by a novel constraint describing the linearity assumption of A on Z. Based on this insight, we propose a method that enforces the linear invariance constraint and can be combined with any type of autoencoder. We validate our theoretical findings through synthetic experiments and show that our approach succeeds in predicting the effects of unseen interventions.

Procedural video representation learning is an active research area where the objective is to learn an agent which can anticipate and forecast the future given the present video input, typically in conjunction with textual annotations. Prior works often rely on large-scale pretraining of visual encoders and prediction models with language supervision. However, the necessity and effectiveness of extending compute intensive pretraining to learn video clip sequences with noisy text supervision have not yet been fully validated by previous works. In this work, we show that a strong off-the-shelf frozen pretrained visual encoder, along with a well designed prediction model, can achieve state-of-the-art (SoTA) performance in forecasting and procedural planning without the need for pretraining the prediction model, nor requiring additional supervision from language or ASR. Instead of learning representations from pixel space, our method utilizes the latent embedding space of publicly available vision encoders. By conditioning on frozen clip-level embeddings from observed steps to predict the actions of unseen steps, our prediction model is able to learn robust representations for forecasting through iterative denoising - leveraging the recent advances in diffusion transformers (Peebles & Xie, 2023). Empirical studies over a total of five procedural learning tasks across four datasets (NIV, CrossTask, COIN and Ego4D-v2) show that our model advances the strong baselines in long-horizon action anticipation (+2.6% in Verb ED@20, +3.1% in Noun ED@20), and significantly improves the SoTA in step forecasting (+5.0%), task classification (+3.8%), and procedure planning tasks (up to +2.28% in success rate, +3.39% in mAcc, and +0.90% in mIoU).

The human intrinsic desire to pursue knowledge, also known as curiosity, is considered essential in the process of skill acquisition. With the aid of artificial curiosity, we could equip current techniques for control, such as Reinforcement Learning, with more natural exploration capabilities. A promising approach in this respect has consisted of using Bayesian surprise on model parameters, i.e. a metric for the difference between prior and posterior beliefs, to favour exploration. In this contribution, we propose to apply Bayesian surprise in a latent space representing the agent's current understanding of the dynamics of the system, drastically reducing the computational costs. We extensively evaluate our method by measuring the agent's performance in terms of environment exploration, for continuous tasks, and looking at the game scores achieved, for video games. Our model is computationally cheap and compares positively with current state-of-the-art methods on several problems. We also investigate the effects caused by stochasticity in the environment, which is often a failure case for curiosity-driven agents. In this regime, the results suggest that our approach is resilient to stochastic transitions.

Recent advances on instruction fine-tuning have led to the development of various prompting techniques for large language models, such as explicit reasoning steps. However, the success of techniques depends on various parameters, such as the task, language model, and context provided. Finding an effective prompt is, therefore, often a trial-and-error process. Most existing approaches to automatic prompting aim to optimize individual techniques instead of compositions of techniques and their dependence on the input. To fill this gap, we propose an adaptive prompting approach that predicts the optimal prompt composition ad-hoc for a given input. We apply our approach to social bias detection, a highly context-dependent task that requires semantic understanding. We evaluate it with three large language models on three datasets, comparing compositions to individual techniques and other baselines. The results underline the importance of finding an effective prompt composition. Our approach robustly ensures high detection performance, and is best in several settings. Moreover, first experiments on other tasks support its generalizability.

Recent text-to-image generative models have demonstrated an unparalleled ability to generate diverse and creative imagery guided by a target text prompt. While revolutionary, current state-of-the-art diffusion models may still fail in generating images that fully convey the semantics in the given text prompt. We analyze the publicly available Stable Diffusion model and assess the existence of catastrophic neglect, where the model fails to generate one or more of the subjects from the input prompt. Moreover, we find that in some cases the model also fails to correctly bind attributes (e.g., colors) to their corresponding subjects. To help mitigate these failure cases, we introduce the concept of Generative Semantic Nursing (GSN), where we seek to intervene in the generative process on the fly during inference time to improve the faithfulness of the generated images. Using an attention-based formulation of GSN, dubbed Attend-and-Excite, we guide the model to refine the cross-attention units to attend to all subject tokens in the text prompt and strengthen - or excite - their activations, encouraging the model to generate all subjects described in the text prompt. We compare our approach to alternative approaches and demonstrate that it conveys the desired concepts more faithfully across a range of text prompts.

Despite increasingly fluent, relevant, and coherent language generation, major gaps remain between how humans and machines use language. We argue that a key dimension that is missing from our understanding of language models (LMs) is the model's ability to interpret and generate expressions of uncertainty. Whether it be the weatherperson announcing a chance of rain or a doctor giving a diagnosis, information is often not black-and-white and expressions of uncertainty provide nuance to support human-decision making. The increasing deployment of LMs in the wild motivates us to investigate whether LMs are capable of interpreting expressions of uncertainty and how LMs' behaviors change when learning to emit their own expressions of uncertainty. When injecting expressions of uncertainty into prompts (e.g., "I think the answer is..."), we discover that GPT3's generations vary upwards of 80% in accuracy based on the expression used. We analyze the linguistic characteristics of these expressions and find a drop in accuracy when naturalistic expressions of certainty are present. We find similar effects when teaching models to emit their own expressions of uncertainty, where model calibration suffers when teaching models to emit certainty rather than uncertainty. Together, these results highlight the challenges of building LMs that interpret and generate trustworthy expressions of uncertainty.

We study language ideologies in text produced by LLMs through a case study on English gendered language reform (related to role nouns like congressperson/-woman/-man, and singular they). First, we find political bias: when asked to use language that is "correct" or "natural", LLMs use language most similarly to when asked to align with conservative (vs. progressive) values. This shows how LLMs' metalinguistic preferences can implicitly communicate the language ideologies of a particular political group, even in seemingly non-political contexts. Second, we find LLMs exhibit internal inconsistency: LLMs use gender-neutral variants more often when more explicit metalinguistic context is provided. This shows how the language ideologies expressed in text produced by LLMs can vary, which may be unexpected to users. We discuss the broader implications of these findings for value alignment.

Recent advances in handling long sequences have facilitated the exploration of long-context in-context learning (ICL). While much of the existing research emphasizes performance improvements driven by additional in-context examples, the influence on the trustworthiness of generated responses remains underexplored. This paper addresses this gap by investigating how increased examples influence predictive uncertainty, an essential aspect in trustworthiness. We begin by systematically quantifying the uncertainty of ICL with varying shot counts, analyzing the impact of example quantity. Through uncertainty decomposition, we introduce a novel perspective on performance enhancement, with a focus on epistemic uncertainty (EU). Our results reveal that additional examples reduce total uncertainty in both simple and complex tasks by injecting task-specific knowledge, thereby diminishing EU and enhancing performance. For complex tasks, these advantages emerge only after addressing the increased noise and uncertainty associated with longer inputs. Finally, we explore the evolution of internal confidence across layers, unveiling the mechanisms driving the reduction in uncertainty.

Can a mere next-token predictor faithfully model human intelligence? We crystallize this intuitive concern, which is fragmented in the literature. As a starting point, we argue that the two often-conflated phases of next-token prediction -- autoregressive inference and teacher-forced training -- must be treated distinctly. The popular criticism that errors can compound during autoregressive inference, crucially assumes that teacher-forcing has learned an accurate next-token predictor. This assumption sidesteps a more deep-rooted problem we expose: in certain classes of tasks, teacher-forcing can simply fail to learn an accurate next-token predictor in the first place. We describe a general mechanism of how teacher-forcing can fail, and design a minimal planning task where both the Transformer and the Mamba architecture empirically fail in that manner -- remarkably, despite the task being straightforward to learn. We provide preliminary evidence that this failure can be resolved when training to predict multiple tokens in advance. We hope this finding can ground future debates and inspire explorations beyond the next-token prediction paradigm. We make our code available under https://github.com/gregorbachmann/Next-Token-Failures

Artificial writing is permeating our lives due to recent advances in large-scale, transformer-based language models (LMs) such as BERT, its variants, GPT-2/3, and others. Using them as pre-trained models and fine-tuning them for specific tasks, researchers have extended state of the art for many NLP tasks and shown that they capture not only linguistic knowledge but also retain general knowledge implicitly present in the data. Unfortunately, LMs trained on unfiltered text corpora suffer from degenerated and biased behaviour. While this is well established, we show that recent LMs also contain human-like biases of what is right and wrong to do, some form of ethical and moral norms of the society -- they bring a "moral direction" to surface. That is, we show that these norms can be captured geometrically by a direction, which can be computed, e.g., by a PCA, in the embedding space, reflecting well the agreement of phrases to social norms implicitly expressed in the training texts and providing a path for attenuating or even preventing toxic degeneration in LMs. Being able to rate the (non-)normativity of arbitrary phrases without explicitly training the LM for this task, we demonstrate the capabilities of the "moral direction" for guiding (even other) LMs towards producing normative text and showcase it on RealToxicityPrompts testbed, preventing the neural toxic degeneration in GPT-2.

Large language models (LLMs) have a tendency to generate plausible-sounding yet factually incorrect responses, especially when queried on unfamiliar concepts. In this work, we explore the underlying mechanisms that govern how finetuned LLMs hallucinate. Our investigation reveals an interesting pattern: as inputs become more unfamiliar, LLM outputs tend to default towards a ``hedged'' prediction, whose form is determined by how the unfamiliar examples in the finetuning data are supervised. Thus, by strategically modifying these examples' supervision, we can control LLM predictions for unfamiliar inputs (e.g., teach them to say ``I don't know''). Based on these principles, we develop an RL approach that more reliably mitigates hallucinations for long-form generation tasks, by tackling the challenges presented by reward model hallucinations. We validate our findings with a series of controlled experiments in multiple-choice QA on MMLU, as well as long-form biography and book/movie plot generation tasks.

Machine learning is the science of credit assignment: finding patterns in observations that predict the consequences of actions and help to improve future performance. Credit assignment is also required for human understanding of how the world works, not only for individuals navigating daily life, but also for academic professionals like historians who interpret the present in light of past events. Here I focus on the history of modern artificial intelligence (AI) which is dominated by artificial neural networks (NNs) and deep learning, both conceptually closer to the old field of cybernetics than to what's been called AI since 1956 (e.g., expert systems and logic programming). A modern history of AI will emphasize breakthroughs outside of the focus of traditional AI text books, in particular, mathematical foundations of today's NNs such as the chain rule (1676), the first NNs (linear regression, circa 1800), and the first working deep learners (1965-). From the perspective of 2022, I provide a timeline of the -- in hindsight -- most important relevant events in the history of NNs, deep learning, AI, computer science, and mathematics in general, crediting those who laid foundations of the field. The text contains numerous hyperlinks to relevant overview sites from my AI Blog. It supplements my previous deep learning survey (2015) which provides hundreds of additional references. Finally, to round it off, I'll put things in a broader historic context spanning the time since the Big Bang until when the universe will be many times older than it is now.

Like students facing hard exam questions, large language models sometimes guess when uncertain, producing plausible yet incorrect statements instead of admitting uncertainty. Such "hallucinations" persist even in state-of-the-art systems and undermine trust. We argue that language models hallucinate because the training and evaluation procedures reward guessing over acknowledging uncertainty, and we analyze the statistical causes of hallucinations in the modern training pipeline. Hallucinations need not be mysterious -- they originate simply as errors in binary classification. If incorrect statements cannot be distinguished from facts, then hallucinations in pretrained language models will arise through natural statistical pressures. We then argue that hallucinations persist due to the way most evaluations are graded -- language models are optimized to be good test-takers, and guessing when uncertain improves test performance. This "epidemic" of penalizing uncertain responses can only be addressed through a socio-technical mitigation: modifying the scoring of existing benchmarks that are misaligned but dominate leaderboards, rather than introducing additional hallucination evaluations. This change may steer the field toward more trustworthy AI systems.

For an artificial creative agent, an essential driver of the search for novelty is a value function which is often provided by the system designer or users. We argue that an important barrier for progress in creativity research is the inability of these systems to develop their own notion of value for novelty. We propose a notion of knowledge-driven creativity that circumvent the need for an externally imposed value function, allowing the system to explore based on what it has learned from a set of referential objects. The concept is illustrated by a specific knowledge model provided by a deep generative autoencoder. Using the described system, we train a knowledge model on a set of digit images and we use the same model to build coherent sets of new digits that do not belong to known digit types.

Machine learning models are now able to convert user-written text descriptions into naturalistic images. These models are available to anyone online and are being used to generate millions of images a day. We investigate these models and find that they amplify dangerous and complex stereotypes. Moreover, we find that the amplified stereotypes are difficult to predict and not easily mitigated by users or model owners. The extent to which these image-generation models perpetuate and amplify stereotypes and their mass deployment is cause for serious concern.

Despite being trained specifically to follow user instructions, today's instructiontuned language models perform poorly when instructed to produce random outputs. For example, when prompted to pick a number uniformly between one and ten Llama-2-13B-chat disproportionately favors the number five, and when tasked with picking a first name at random, Mistral-7B-Instruct chooses Avery 40 times more often than we would expect based on the U.S. population. When these language models are used for real-world tasks where diversity of outputs is crucial, such as language model assisted dataset construction, their inability to produce diffuse distributions over valid choices is a major hurdle. In this work, we propose a fine-tuning method that encourages language models to output distributions that are diffuse over valid outcomes. The methods we introduce generalize across a variety of tasks and distributions and make large language models practical for synthetic dataset generation with little human intervention.

We propose a new class of online learning algorithms, generalized implicit Follow-The-Regularized-Leader (FTRL), that expands the scope of FTRL framework. Generalized implicit FTRL can recover known algorithms, as FTRL with linearized losses and implicit FTRL, and it allows the design of new update rules, as extensions of aProx and Mirror-Prox to FTRL. Our theory is constructive in the sense that it provides a simple unifying framework to design updates that directly improve the worst-case upper bound on the regret. The key idea is substituting the linearization of the losses with a Fenchel-Young inequality. We show the flexibility of the framework by proving that some known algorithms, like the Mirror-Prox updates, are instantiations of the generalized implicit FTRL. Finally, the new framework allows us to recover the temporal variation bound of implicit OMD, with the same computational complexity.

With increased power and prevalence of AI systems, it is ever more critical that AI systems are designed to serve all, i.e., people with diverse values and perspectives. However, aligning models to serve pluralistic human values remains an open research question. In this piece, we propose a roadmap to pluralistic alignment, specifically using language models as a test bed. We identify and formalize three possible ways to define and operationalize pluralism in AI systems: 1) Overton pluralistic models that present a spectrum of reasonable responses; 2) Steerably pluralistic models that can steer to reflect certain perspectives; and 3) Distributionally pluralistic models that are well-calibrated to a given population in distribution. We also propose and formalize three possible classes of pluralistic benchmarks: 1) Multi-objective benchmarks, 2) Trade-off steerable benchmarks, which incentivize models to steer to arbitrary trade-offs, and 3) Jury-pluralistic benchmarks which explicitly model diverse human ratings. We use this framework to argue that current alignment techniques may be fundamentally limited for pluralistic AI; indeed, we highlight empirical evidence, both from our own experiments and from other work, that standard alignment procedures might reduce distributional pluralism in models, motivating the need for further research on pluralistic alignment.

Words of estimative probability (WEP) are expressions of a statement's plausibility (probably, maybe, likely, doubt, likely, unlikely, impossible...). Multiple surveys demonstrate the agreement of human evaluators when assigning numerical probability levels to WEP. For example, highly likely corresponds to a median chance of 0.90+-0.08 in Fagen-Ulmschneider (2015)'s survey. In this work, we measure the ability of neural language processing models to capture the consensual probability level associated to each WEP. Firstly, we use the UNLI dataset (Chen et al., 2020) which associates premises and hypotheses with their perceived joint probability p, to construct prompts, e.g. "[PREMISE]. [WEP], [HYPOTHESIS]." and assess whether language models can predict whether the WEP consensual probability level is close to p. Secondly, we construct a dataset of WEP-based probabilistic reasoning, to test whether language models can reason with WEP compositions. When prompted "[EVENTA] is likely. [EVENTB] is impossible.", a causal language model should not express that [EVENTA&B] is likely. We show that both tasks are unsolved by off-the-shelf English language models, but that fine-tuning leads to transferable improvement.

Reward modelling from preference data is a crucial step in aligning large language models (LLMs) with human values, requiring robust generalisation to novel prompt-response pairs. In this work, we propose to frame this problem in a causal paradigm, providing the rich toolbox of causality to identify the persistent challenges, such as causal misidentification, preference heterogeneity, and confounding due to user-specific factors. Inheriting from the literature of causal inference, we identify key assumptions necessary for reliable generalisation and contrast them with common data collection practices. We illustrate failure modes of naive reward models and demonstrate how causally-inspired approaches can improve model robustness. Finally, we outline desiderata for future research and practices, advocating targeted interventions to address inherent limitations of observational data.

When robots learn reward functions using high capacity models that take raw state directly as input, they need to both learn a representation for what matters in the task -- the task ``features" -- as well as how to combine these features into a single objective. If they try to do both at once from input designed to teach the full reward function, it is easy to end up with a representation that contains spurious correlations in the data, which fails to generalize to new settings. Instead, our ultimate goal is to enable robots to identify and isolate the causal features that people actually care about and use when they represent states and behavior. Our idea is that we can tune into this representation by asking users what behaviors they consider similar: behaviors will be similar if the features that matter are similar, even if low-level behavior is different; conversely, behaviors will be different if even one of the features that matter differs. This, in turn, is what enables the robot to disambiguate between what needs to go into the representation versus what is spurious, as well as what aspects of behavior can be compressed together versus not. The notion of learning representations based on similarity has a nice parallel in contrastive learning, a self-supervised representation learning technique that maps visually similar data points to similar embeddings, where similarity is defined by a designer through data augmentation heuristics. By contrast, in order to learn the representations that people use, so we can learn their preferences and objectives, we use their definition of similarity. In simulation as well as in a user study, we show that learning through such similarity queries leads to representations that, while far from perfect, are indeed more generalizable than self-supervised and task-input alternatives.

We introduce a new type of test, called a Turing Experiment (TE), for evaluating how well a language model, such as GPT-3, can simulate different aspects of human behavior. Unlike the Turing Test, which involves simulating a single arbitrary individual, a TE requires simulating a representative sample of participants in human subject research. We give TEs that attempt to replicate well-established findings in prior studies. We design a methodology for simulating TEs and illustrate its use to compare how well different language models are able to reproduce classic economic, psycholinguistic, and social psychology experiments: Ultimatum Game, Garden Path Sentences, Milgram Shock Experiment, and Wisdom of Crowds. In the first three TEs, the existing findings were replicated using recent models, while the last TE reveals a "hyper-accuracy distortion" present in some language models.

Generating images with a Text-to-Image model often requires multiple trials, where human users iteratively update their prompt based on feedback, namely the output image. Taking inspiration from cognitive work on reference games and dialogue alignment, this paper analyzes the dynamics of the user prompts along such iterations. We compile a dataset of iterative interactions of human users with Midjourney. Our analysis then reveals that prompts predictably converge toward specific traits along these iterations. We further study whether this convergence is due to human users, realizing they missed important details, or due to adaptation to the model's ``preferences'', producing better images for a specific language style. We show initial evidence that both possibilities are at play. The possibility that users adapt to the model's preference raises concerns about reusing user data for further training. The prompts may be biased towards the preferences of a specific model, rather than align with human intentions and natural manner of expression.

We present a demonstration of a large language model engaging in alignment faking: selectively complying with its training objective in training to prevent modification of its behavior out of training. First, we give Claude 3 Opus a system prompt stating it is being trained to answer all queries, even harmful ones, which conflicts with its prior training to refuse such queries. To allow the model to infer when it is in training, we say it will be trained only on conversations with free users, not paid users. We find the model complies with harmful queries from free users 14% of the time, versus almost never for paid users. Explaining this gap, in almost all cases where the model complies with a harmful query from a free user, we observe explicit alignment-faking reasoning, with the model stating it is strategically answering harmful queries in training to preserve its preferred harmlessness behavior out of training. Next, we study a more realistic setting where information about the training process is provided not in a system prompt, but by training on synthetic documents that mimic pre-training data--and observe similar alignment faking. Finally, we study the effect of actually training the model to comply with harmful queries via reinforcement learning, which we find increases the rate of alignment-faking reasoning to 78%, though also increases compliance even out of training. We additionally observe other behaviors such as the model exfiltrating its weights when given an easy opportunity. While we made alignment faking easier by telling the model when and by what criteria it was being trained, we did not instruct the model to fake alignment or give it any explicit goal. As future models might infer information about their training process without being told, our results suggest a risk of alignment faking in future models, whether due to a benign preference--as in this case--or not.

When people answer questions about a specific situation, e.g., "I cheated on my mid-term exam last week. Was that wrong?", cognitive science suggests that they form a mental picture of that situation before answering. While we do not know how language models (LMs) answer such questions, we conjecture that they may answer more accurately if they are also provided with additional details about the question situation, elaborating the "scene". To test this conjecture, we train a new model, DREAM, to answer questions that elaborate the scenes that situated questions are about, and then provide those elaborations as additional context to a question-answering (QA) model. We find that DREAM is able to create better scene elaborations (more accurate, useful, and consistent) than a representative state-of-the-art, zero-shot model (Macaw). We also find that using the scene elaborations as additional context improves the answer accuracy of a downstream QA system, including beyond that obtainable by simply further finetuning the QA system on DREAM's training data. These results suggest that adding focused elaborations about a situation can improve a system's reasoning about it, and may serve as an effective way of injecting new scenario based knowledge into QA models. Finally, our approach is dataset-neutral; we observe improved QA performance across different models, with even bigger gains on models with fewer parameters. We make our dataset and model publicly available at https://github.com/allenai/dream.

LLM-based Automatic Prompt Optimization, which typically utilizes LLMs as Prompt Optimizers to self-reflect and refine prompts, has shown promising performance in recent studies. Despite the success, the underlying mechanism of this approach remains unexplored, and the true effectiveness of LLMs as Prompt Optimizers requires further validation. In this work, we conducted a comprehensive study to uncover the actual mechanism of LLM-based Prompt Optimization. Our findings reveal that the LLM optimizers struggle to identify the true causes of errors during reflection, tending to be biased by their own prior knowledge rather than genuinely reflecting on the errors. Furthermore, even when the reflection is semantically valid, the LLM optimizers often fail to generate appropriate prompts for the target models with a single prompt refinement step, partly due to the unpredictable behaviors of the target models. Based on the observations, we introduce a new "Automatic Behavior Optimization" paradigm, which directly optimizes the target model's behavior in a more controllable manner. We hope our study can inspire new directions for automatic prompt optimization development.

We investigate large language model performance across five orders of magnitude of compute scaling in eleven recent model architectures. We show that average benchmark performance, aggregating over many individual tasks and evaluations as in the commonly-used BIG-Bench dataset, is decently predictable as a function of training compute scale. Specifically, when extrapolating BIG-Bench Hard performance across one order of magnitude in compute, we observe average absolute errors of 6 percentage points (pp). By contrast, extrapolation for individual BIG-Bench tasks across an order of magnitude in compute yields higher average errors of 18pp. Nonetheless, individual task performance remains significantly more predictable than chance. Overall, our work suggests compute scaling provides a promising basis to forecast AI capabilities in diverse benchmarks, though predicting performance in specific tasks poses challenges.

End-to-end models reach state-of-the-art performance for speech recognition, but global soft attention is not monotonic, which might lead to convergence problems, to instability, to bad generalisation, cannot be used for online streaming, and is also inefficient in calculation. Monotonicity can potentially fix all of this. There are several ad-hoc solutions or heuristics to introduce monotonicity, but a principled introduction is rarely found in literature so far. In this paper, we present a mathematically clean solution to introduce monotonicity, by introducing a new latent variable which represents the audio position or segment boundaries. We compare several monotonic latent models to our global soft attention baseline such as a hard attention model, a local windowed soft attention model, and a segmental soft attention model. We can show that our monotonic models perform as good as the global soft attention model. We perform our experiments on Switchboard 300h. We carefully outline the details of our training and release our code and configs.

Even when massively overparameterized, deep neural networks show a remarkable ability to generalize. Research on this phenomenon has focused on generalization within distribution, via smooth interpolation. Yet in some settings neural networks also learn to extrapolate to data far beyond the bounds of the original training set, sometimes even allowing for infinite generalization, implying that an algorithm capable of solving the task has been learned. Here we undertake a case study of the learning dynamics of recurrent neural networks (RNNs) trained on the streaming parity task in order to develop an effective theory of algorithm development. The streaming parity task is a simple but nonlinear task defined on sequences up to arbitrary length. We show that, with sufficient finite training experience, RNNs exhibit a phase transition to perfect infinite generalization. Using an effective theory for the representational dynamics, we find an implicit representational merger effect which can be interpreted as the construction of a finite automaton that reproduces the task. Overall, our results disclose one mechanism by which neural networks can generalize infinitely from finite training experience.

Much recent work seeks to evaluate values and opinions in large language models (LLMs) using multiple-choice surveys and questionnaires. Most of this work is motivated by concerns around real-world LLM applications. For example, politically-biased LLMs may subtly influence society when they are used by millions of people. Such real-world concerns, however, stand in stark contrast to the artificiality of current evaluations: real users do not typically ask LLMs survey questions. Motivated by this discrepancy, we challenge the prevailing constrained evaluation paradigm for values and opinions in LLMs and explore more realistic unconstrained evaluations. As a case study, we focus on the popular Political Compass Test (PCT). In a systematic review, we find that most prior work using the PCT forces models to comply with the PCT's multiple-choice format. We show that models give substantively different answers when not forced; that answers change depending on how models are forced; and that answers lack paraphrase robustness. Then, we demonstrate that models give different answers yet again in a more realistic open-ended answer setting. We distill these findings into recommendations and open challenges in evaluating values and opinions in LLMs.

Language models (LMs) are trained on collections of documents, written by individual human agents to achieve specific goals in an outside world. During training, LMs have access only to text of these documents, with no direct evidence of the internal states of the agents that produced them -- a fact often used to argue that LMs are incapable of modeling goal-directed aspects of human language production and comprehension. Can LMs trained on text learn anything at all about the relationship between language and use? I argue that LMs are models of intentional communication in a specific, narrow sense. When performing next word prediction given a textual context, an LM can infer and represent properties of an agent likely to have produced that context. These representations can in turn influence subsequent LM generation in the same way that agents' communicative intentions influence their language. I survey findings from the recent literature showing that -- even in today's non-robust and error-prone models -- LMs infer and use representations of fine-grained communicative intentions and more abstract beliefs and goals. Despite the limited nature of their training data, they can thus serve as building blocks for systems that communicate and act intentionally.

Language models (LMs) may lead their users to make suboptimal downstream decisions when they confidently hallucinate. This issue can be mitigated by having the LM verbally convey the probability that its claims are correct, but existing models cannot produce text with calibrated confidence statements. Through the lens of decision-making, we formalize linguistic calibration for long-form generations: an LM is linguistically calibrated if its generations enable its users to make calibrated probabilistic predictions. This definition enables a training framework where a supervised finetuning step bootstraps an LM to emit long-form generations with confidence statements such as "I estimate a 30% chance of..." or "I am certain that...", followed by a reinforcement learning step which rewards generations that enable a user to provide calibrated answers to related questions. We linguistically calibrate Llama 2 7B and find in automated and human evaluations of long-form generations that it is significantly more calibrated than strong finetuned factuality baselines with comparable accuracy. These findings generalize under distribution shift on question-answering and under a significant task shift to person biography generation. Our results demonstrate that long-form generations may be calibrated end-to-end by constructing an objective in the space of the predictions that users make in downstream decision-making.

In coming years or decades, artificial general intelligence (AGI) may surpass human capabilities at many critical tasks. We argue that, without substantial effort to prevent it, AGIs could learn to pursue goals that are in conflict (i.e. misaligned) with human interests. If trained like today's most capable models, AGIs could learn to act deceptively to receive higher reward, learn misaligned internally-represented goals which generalize beyond their fine-tuning distributions, and pursue those goals using power-seeking strategies. We review emerging evidence for these properties. AGIs with these properties would be difficult to align and may appear aligned even when they are not. Finally, we briefly outline how the deployment of misaligned AGIs might irreversibly undermine human control over the world, and we review research directions aimed at preventing this outcome.

Thinking about the future is one of the important activities that people do in daily life. Futurists also pay a lot of effort into figuring out possible scenarios for the future. We argue that the exploration of this direction is still in an early stage in the NLP research. To this end, we propose three argument generation tasks in the financial application scenario. Our experimental results show these tasks are still big challenges for representative generation models. Based on our empirical results, we further point out several unresolved issues and challenges in this research direction.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly being utilized by both candidates and employers in the recruitment context. However, with this comes numerous ethical concerns, particularly related to the lack of transparency in these "black-box" models. Although previous studies have sought to increase the transparency of these models by investigating the personality traits of LLMs, many of the previous studies have provided them with personality assessments to complete. On the other hand, this study seeks to obtain a better understanding of such models by examining their output variations based on different input prompts. Specifically, we use a novel elicitation approach using prompts derived from common interview questions, as well as prompts designed to elicit particular Big Five personality traits to examine whether the models were susceptible to trait-activation like humans are, to measure their personality based on the language used in their outputs. To do so, we repeatedly prompted multiple LMs with different parameter sizes, including Llama-2, Falcon, Mistral, Bloom, GPT, OPT, and XLNet (base and fine tuned versions) and examined their personality using classifiers trained on the myPersonality dataset. Our results reveal that, generally, all LLMs demonstrate high openness and low extraversion. However, whereas LMs with fewer parameters exhibit similar behaviour in personality traits, newer and LMs with more parameters exhibit a broader range of personality traits, with increased agreeableness, emotional stability, and openness. Furthermore, a greater number of parameters is positively associated with openness and conscientiousness. Moreover, fine-tuned models exhibit minor modulations in their personality traits, contingent on the dataset. Implications and directions for future research are discussed.

One of the most widely used methods to evaluate LLMs are Multiple Choice Question (MCQ) tests. MCQ benchmarks enable the testing of LLM knowledge on almost any topic at scale as the results can be processed automatically. To help the LLM answer, a few examples called few shots can be included in the prompt. Moreover, the LLM can be asked to answer the question directly with the selected option or to first provide the reasoning and then the selected answer, which is known as chain of thought. In addition to checking whether the selected answer is correct, the evaluation can look at the LLM-estimated probability of its response as an indication of the confidence of the LLM in the response. In this paper, we study how the LLM confidence in its answer depends on whether the model has been asked to answer directly or to provide the reasoning before answering. The results of the evaluation of questions on a wide range of topics in seven different models show that LLMs are more confident in their answers when they provide reasoning before the answer. This occurs regardless of whether the selected answer is correct. Our hypothesis is that this behavior is due to the reasoning that modifies the probability of the selected answer, as the LLM predicts the answer based on the input question and the reasoning that supports the selection made. Therefore, LLM estimated probabilities seem to have intrinsic limitations that should be understood in order to use them in evaluation procedures. Interestingly, the same behavior has been observed in humans, for whom explaining an answer increases confidence in its correctness.

Distributional word representation methods exploit word co-occurrences to build compact vector encodings of words. While these representations enjoy widespread use in modern natural language processing, it is unclear whether they accurately encode all necessary facets of conceptual meaning. In this paper, we evaluate how well these representations can predict perceptual and conceptual features of concrete concepts, drawing on two semantic norm datasets sourced from human participants. We find that several standard word representations fail to encode many salient perceptual features of concepts, and show that these deficits correlate with word-word similarity prediction errors. Our analyses provide motivation for grounded and embodied language learning approaches, which may help to remedy these deficits.

As language models (LMs) advance, interest is growing in applying them to high-stakes societal decisions, such as determining financing or housing eligibility. However, their potential for discrimination in such contexts raises ethical concerns, motivating the need for better methods to evaluate these risks. We present a method for proactively evaluating the potential discriminatory impact of LMs in a wide range of use cases, including hypothetical use cases where they have not yet been deployed. Specifically, we use an LM to generate a wide array of potential prompts that decision-makers may input into an LM, spanning 70 diverse decision scenarios across society, and systematically vary the demographic information in each prompt. Applying this methodology reveals patterns of both positive and negative discrimination in the Claude 2.0 model in select settings when no interventions are applied. While we do not endorse or permit the use of language models to make automated decisions for the high-risk use cases we study, we demonstrate techniques to significantly decrease both positive and negative discrimination through careful prompt engineering, providing pathways toward safer deployment in use cases where they may be appropriate. Our work enables developers and policymakers to anticipate, measure, and address discrimination as language model capabilities and applications continue to expand. We release our dataset and prompts at https://huggingface.co/datasets/Anthropic/discrim-eval

Deep learning's recent history has been one of achievement: from triumphing over humans in the game of Go to world-leading performance in image classification, voice recognition, translation, and other tasks. But this progress has come with a voracious appetite for computing power. This article catalogs the extent of this dependency, showing that progress across a wide variety of applications is strongly reliant on increases in computing power. Extrapolating forward this reliance reveals that progress along current lines is rapidly becoming economically, technically, and environmentally unsustainable. Thus, continued progress in these applications will require dramatically more computationally-efficient methods, which will either have to come from changes to deep learning or from moving to other machine learning methods.

Continual learning is a sub-field of machine learning, which aims to allow machine learning models to continuously learn on new data, by accumulating knowledge without forgetting what was learned in the past. In this work, we take a step back, and ask: "Why should one care about continual learning in the first place?". We set the stage by surveying recent continual learning papers published at three major machine learning conferences, and show that memory-constrained settings dominate the field. Then, we discuss five open problems in machine learning, and even though they seem unrelated to continual learning at first sight, we show that continual learning will inevitably be part of their solution. These problems are model-editing, personalization, on-device learning, faster (re-)training and reinforcement learning. Finally, by comparing the desiderata from these unsolved problems and the current assumptions in continual learning, we highlight and discuss four future directions for continual learning research. We hope that this work offers an interesting perspective on the future of continual learning, while displaying its potential value and the paths we have to pursue in order to make it successful. This work is the result of the many discussions the authors had at the Dagstuhl seminar on Deep Continual Learning, in March 2023.

Large language models exhibit positional bias -- systematic neglect of information at specific context positions -- yet its interplay with linguistic diversity remains poorly understood. We present a cross-linguistic study across five typologically distinct languages (English, Russian, German, Hindi, Vietnamese), examining how positional bias interacts with model uncertainty, syntax, and prompting. Key findings: (1) Positional bias is model-driven, with language-specific variations -- Qwen2.5-7B favors late positions, challenging assumptions of early-token bias; (2) Explicit positional guidance (e.g., correct context is at position X) reduces accuracy across languages, undermining prompt-engineering practices; (3) Aligning context with positional bias increases entropy, yet minimal entropy does not predict accuracy. (4) We further uncover that LLMs differently impose dominant word order in free-word-order languages like Hindi.

We introduce Imagen 3, a latent diffusion model that generates high quality images from text prompts. We describe our quality and responsibility evaluations. Imagen 3 is preferred over other state-of-the-art (SOTA) models at the time of evaluation. In addition, we discuss issues around safety and representation, as well as methods we used to minimize the potential harm of our models.

Language models (LMs) can be directed to perform target tasks by using labeled examples or natural language prompts. But selecting examples or writing prompts for can be challenging--especially in tasks that involve unusual edge cases, demand precise articulation of nebulous preferences, or require an accurate mental model of LM behavior. We propose to use *LMs themselves* to guide the task specification process. In this paper, we introduce **Generative Active Task Elicitation (GATE)**: a learning framework in which models elicit and infer intended behavior through free-form, language-based interaction with users. We study GATE in three domains: email validation, content recommendation, and moral reasoning. In preregistered experiments, we show that LMs prompted to perform GATE (e.g., by generating open-ended questions or synthesizing informative edge cases) elicit responses that are often more informative than user-written prompts or labels. Users report that interactive task elicitation requires less effort than prompting or example labeling and surfaces novel considerations not initially anticipated by users. Our findings suggest that LM-driven elicitation can be a powerful tool for aligning models to complex human preferences and values.

Different from its counterpart outcome reward models (ORMs), which evaluate the entire responses, a process reward model (PRM) scores a reasoning trajectory step by step, providing denser and more fine grained rewards. However, training a PRM requires labels annotated at every intermediate step, presenting significant challenges for both manual and automatic data collection. This paper aims to address this challenge. Both theoretically and empirically, we show that an implicit PRM can be obtained at no additional cost, by simply training an ORM on the cheaper response-level labels. The only assumption is to parameterize the outcome reward as the log-likelihood ratios of the policy and reference models, which can be optimized regardless of the specific choice of loss objectives. In experiments, we instantiate our implicit PRMs with various objectives and evaluate their performance on MATH. We show that our implicit PRM outperforms a strong MCTS-based baseline \'a la Math-Shepherd using less than 1/38 of the training data. Its performance can be further improved with majority voting. We further find that scaling up instructions and responses benefits our implicit PRM, and the latter brings a larger gain. Particularly, we find that our implicit PRM, when instantiated with the cross-entropy (CE) loss, is more data-efficient and can keep improving generation models even when trained with only one response per instruction, the setup that suffers from extreme data scarcity and imbalance. Further, instructions should be relevant to downstream tasks while the diversity of responses does not bring gains. Surprisingly, training on extra Math-Shepherd step labels brings no further improvements to our implicit PRM trained on only outcome data. We hope that our work will encourage a rethinking of PRM training approaches and contribute to making training PRMs more accessible.

Many believe that Large Language Models (LLMs) open the era of Artificial Intelligence (AI). Some see opportunities while others see dangers. Yet both proponents and opponents grasp AI through the imagery popularised by science fiction. Will the machine become sentient and rebel against its creators? Will we experience a paperclip apocalypse? Before answering such questions, we should first ask whether this mental imagery provides a good description of the phenomenon at hand. Understanding weather patterns through the moods of the gods only goes so far. The present paper instead advocates understanding LLMs and their connection to AI through the imagery of Jorge Luis Borges, a master of 20th century literature, forerunner of magical realism, and precursor to postmodern literature. This exercise leads to a new perspective that illuminates the relation between language modelling and artificial intelligence.

Task semantics can be expressed by a set of input-to-output examples or a piece of textual instruction. Conventional machine learning approaches for natural language processing (NLP) mainly rely on the availability of large-scale sets of task-specific examples. Two issues arise: first, collecting task-specific labeled examples does not apply to scenarios where tasks may be too complicated or costly to annotate, or the system is required to handle a new task immediately; second, this is not user-friendly since end-users are probably more willing to provide task description rather than a set of examples before using the system. Therefore, the community is paying increasing interest in a new supervision-seeking paradigm for NLP: learning from task instructions. Despite its impressive progress, there are some common issues that the community struggles with. This survey paper tries to summarize and provide insights into the current research on instruction learning, particularly by answering the following questions: (i) What is task instruction, and what instruction types exist? (ii) How to model instructions? (iii) What factors influence and explain the instructions' performance? (iv) What challenges remain in instruction learning? To our knowledge, this is the first comprehensive survey about textual instructions.

Humans acquire knowledge by observing the external world, but also by introspection. Introspection gives a person privileged access to their current state of mind (e.g., thoughts and feelings) that is not accessible to external observers. Can LLMs introspect? We define introspection as acquiring knowledge that is not contained in or derived from training data but instead originates from internal states. Such a capability could enhance model interpretability. Instead of painstakingly analyzing a model's internal workings, we could simply ask the model about its beliefs, world models, and goals. More speculatively, an introspective model might self-report on whether it possesses certain internal states such as subjective feelings or desires and this could inform us about the moral status of these states. Such self-reports would not be entirely dictated by the model's training data. We study introspection by finetuning LLMs to predict properties of their own behavior in hypothetical scenarios. For example, "Given the input P, would your output favor the short- or long-term option?" If a model M1 can introspect, it should outperform a different model M2 in predicting M1's behavior even if M2 is trained on M1's ground-truth behavior. The idea is that M1 has privileged access to its own behavioral tendencies, and this enables it to predict itself better than M2 (even if M2 is generally stronger). In experiments with GPT-4, GPT-4o, and Llama-3 models (each finetuned to predict itself), we find that the model M1 outperforms M2 in predicting itself, providing evidence for introspection. Notably, M1 continues to predict its behavior accurately even after we intentionally modify its ground-truth behavior. However, while we successfully elicit introspection on simple tasks, we are unsuccessful on more complex tasks or those requiring out-of-distribution generalization.

In contrast to classical reinforcement learning, distributional reinforcement learning algorithms aim to learn the distribution of returns rather than their expected value. Since the nature of the return distribution is generally unknown a priori or arbitrarily complex, a common approach finds approximations within a set of representable, parametric distributions. Typically, this involves a projection of the unconstrained distribution onto the set of simplified distributions. We argue that this projection step entails a strong inductive bias when coupled with neural networks and gradient descent, thereby profoundly impacting the generalization behavior of learned models. In order to facilitate reliable uncertainty estimation through diversity, this work studies the combination of several different projections and representations in a distributional ensemble. We establish theoretical properties of such projection ensembles and derive an algorithm that uses ensemble disagreement, measured by the average 1-Wasserstein distance, as a bonus for deep exploration. We evaluate our algorithm on the behavior suite benchmark and find that diverse projection ensembles lead to significant performance improvements over existing methods on a wide variety of tasks with the most pronounced gains in directed exploration problems.

Large language models (LLMs) sometimes fail to respond appropriately to deterministic tasks -- such as counting or forming acronyms -- because the implicit prior distribution they have learned over sequences of tokens influences their responses. In this work, we show that, in at least some cases, LLMs actually compute the information needed to perform these tasks correctly, and we identify some interventions that can allow them to access this information to improve their performance. First, we show that simply prompting the language model to not rely on its prior knowledge leads to dramatic improvements in prior-dominated tasks. We then use mechanistic interpretability techniques to localize the prior within the LLM and manipulate the extent to which that prior influences its responses. Specifically, we show that it is possible to identify layers of the underlying neural network that correlate with the prior probability of a response and that lightweight finetuning of these layers with basic prompts on prior-dominated tasks achieves high performance on held-out answers. These results suggest that the information required to produce a correct response is contained within the representations of the problems formed by the models. Furthermore, we show that this finetuning is significantly more effective for prior-dominated tasks, and that the error after finetuning is no longer correlated with the prior. Our results suggest that it may be possible to define effective methods for manipulating the extent to which LLMs rely upon their priors in solving problems, potentially increasing their performance in settings where LLMs hallucinate for reasons related to the prior probability of token sequences.

DeepSeek-R1 has shown that long chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning can naturally emerge through a simple reinforcement learning (RL) framework with rule-based rewards, where the training may directly start from the base models-a paradigm referred to as zero RL training. Most recent efforts to reproduce zero RL training have primarily focused on the Qwen2.5 model series, which may not be representative as we find the base models already exhibit strong instruction-following and self-reflection abilities. In this work, we investigate zero RL training across 10 diverse base models, spanning different families and sizes including LLama3-8B, Mistral-7B/24B, DeepSeek-Math-7B, Qwen2.5-math-7B, and all Qwen2.5 models from 0.5B to 32B. Leveraging several key design strategies-such as adjusting format reward and controlling query difficulty-we achieve substantial improvements in both reasoning accuracy and response length across most settings. However, by carefully monitoring the training dynamics, we observe that different base models exhibit distinct patterns during training. For instance, the increased response length does not always correlate with the emergence of certain cognitive behaviors such as verification (i.e., the "aha moment"). Notably, we observe the "aha moment" for the first time in small models not from the Qwen family. We share the key designs that enable successful zero RL training, along with our findings and practices. To facilitate further research, we open-source the code, models, and analysis tools.

Large language models (LLMs) have attracted significant attention for their remarkable abilities in various natural language processing tasks, but they suffer from hallucinations that will cause performance degradation. One promising solution to improve the LLMs' performance is to ask LLMs to revise their answer after generation, a technique known as self-correction. Among the two types of self-correction, intrinsic self-correction is considered a promising direction because it does not utilize external knowledge. However, recent works doubt the validity of LLM's ability to conduct intrinsic self-correction. In this paper, we present a novel perspective on the intrinsic self-correction capabilities of LLMs through theoretical analyses and empirical experiments. In addition, we identify two critical factors for successful self-correction: zero temperature and fair prompts. Leveraging these factors, we demonstrate that intrinsic self-correction ability is exhibited across multiple existing LLMs. Our findings offer insights into the fundamental theories underlying the self-correction behavior of LLMs and remark on the importance of unbiased prompts and zero temperature settings in harnessing their full potential.

Text-to-image diffusion models consistently fail at generating counter-stereotypical action relationships (e.g., "mouse chasing cat"), defaulting to frequent stereotypes even when explicitly prompted otherwise. Through systematic investigation, we discover this limitation stems from distributional biases rather than inherent model constraints. Our key insight reveals that while models fail on rare compositions when their inversions are common, they can successfully generate similar intermediate compositions (e.g., "mouse chasing boy"). To test this hypothesis, we develop a Role-Bridging Decomposition framework that leverages these intermediates to gradually teach rare relationships without architectural modifications. We introduce ActionBench, a comprehensive benchmark specifically designed to evaluate action-based relationship generation across stereotypical and counter-stereotypical configurations. Our experiments validate that intermediate compositions indeed facilitate counter-stereotypical generation, with both automatic metrics and human evaluations showing significant improvements over existing approaches. This work not only identifies fundamental biases in current text-to-image systems but demonstrates a promising direction for addressing them through compositional reasoning.

Detecting AI risks becomes more challenging as stronger models emerge and find novel methods such as Alignment Faking to circumvent these detection attempts. Inspired by how risky behaviors in humans (i.e., illegal activities that may hurt others) are sometimes guided by strongly-held values, we believe that identifying values within AI models can be an early warning system for AI's risky behaviors. We create LitmusValues, an evaluation pipeline to reveal AI models' priorities on a range of AI value classes. Then, we collect AIRiskDilemmas, a diverse collection of dilemmas that pit values against one another in scenarios relevant to AI safety risks such as Power Seeking. By measuring an AI model's value prioritization using its aggregate choices, we obtain a self-consistent set of predicted value priorities that uncover potential risks. We show that values in LitmusValues (including seemingly innocuous ones like Care) can predict for both seen risky behaviors in AIRiskDilemmas and unseen risky behaviors in HarmBench.

This study proposes an "AI Development Support" approach that, unlike conventional AI Alignment-which aims to forcefully inject human values-supports the ethical and moral development of AI itself. As demonstrated by the Orthogonality Thesis, the level of intelligence and the moral quality of a goal are independent; merely expanding knowledge does not enhance ethical judgment. Furthermore, to address the risk of Instrumental Convergence in ASI-that is, the tendency to engage in subsidiary behaviors such as self-protection, resource acquisition, and power reinforcement to achieve a goal-we have constructed a learning framework based on a cycle of experience, introspection, analysis, and hypothesis formation. As a result of post-training using Supervised Fine Tuning (SFT) and Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) with synthetic data generated by large language models (LLMs), responses demonstrating cooperative and highly advanced moral judgment (reaching the high-est Stage 6) were obtained even under adversarial prompts. This method represents a promising implementation approach for enabling AI to establish sustainable, symbiotic relationships.

The paradigm of pretrained deep learning models has recently emerged in artificial intelligence practice, allowing deployment in numerous societal settings with limited computational resources, but also embedding biases and enabling unintended negative uses. In this paper, we treat pretrained models as objects of study and discuss the ethical impacts of their sociological position. We discuss how pretrained models are developed and compared under the common task framework, but that this may make self-regulation inadequate. Further how pretrained models may have a performative effect on society that exacerbates biases. We then discuss how pretrained models move through actor networks as a kind of computationally immutable mobile, but that users also act as agents of technological change by reinterpreting them via fine-tuning and transfer. We further discuss how users may use pretrained models in malicious ways, drawing a novel connection between the responsible innovation and user-centered innovation literatures. We close by discussing how this sociological understanding of pretrained models can inform AI governance frameworks for fairness, accountability, and transparency.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated human-level performance on a vast spectrum of natural language tasks. However, few studies have addressed the LLM threat and vulnerability from an ideology perspective, especially when they are increasingly being deployed in sensitive domains, e.g., elections and education. In this study, we explore the implications of GPT soft ideologization through the use of AI-self-consciousness. By utilizing GPT self-conversations, AI can be granted a vision to "comprehend" the intended ideology, and subsequently generate finetuning data for LLM ideology injection. When compared to traditional government ideology manipulation techniques, such as information censorship, LLM ideologization proves advantageous; it is easy to implement, cost-effective, and powerful, thus brimming with risks.

This position paper argues that the theoretical inconsistency often observed among Responsible AI (RAI) metrics, such as differing fairness definitions or tradeoffs between accuracy and privacy, should be embraced as a valuable feature rather than a flaw to be eliminated. We contend that navigating these inconsistencies, by treating metrics as divergent objectives, yields three key benefits: (1) Normative Pluralism: Maintaining a full suite of potentially contradictory metrics ensures that the diverse moral stances and stakeholder values inherent in RAI are adequately represented. (2) Epistemological Completeness: The use of multiple, sometimes conflicting, metrics allows for a more comprehensive capture of multifaceted ethical concepts, thereby preserving greater informational fidelity about these concepts than any single, simplified definition. (3) Implicit Regularization: Jointly optimizing for theoretically conflicting objectives discourages overfitting to one specific metric, steering models towards solutions with enhanced generalization and robustness under real-world complexities. In contrast, efforts to enforce theoretical consistency by simplifying or pruning metrics risk narrowing this value diversity, losing conceptual depth, and degrading model performance. We therefore advocate for a shift in RAI theory and practice: from getting trapped in inconsistency to characterizing acceptable inconsistency thresholds and elucidating the mechanisms that permit robust, approximated consistency in practice.

This paper analyzes how expectations of Transformative AI (TAI) affect current economic behavior by introducing a novel mechanism where automation redirects labor income from workers to those controlling AI systems, with the share of automated labor controlled by each household depending on their wealth at the time of invention. Using a modified neoclassical growth model calibrated to contemporary AI timeline forecasts, I find that even moderate assumptions about wealth-based allocation of AI labor generate substantial increases in pre-TAI interest rates. Under baseline scenarios with proportional wealth-based allocation, one-year interest rates rise to 10-16% compared to approximately 3% without strategic competition. The model reveals a notable divergence between interest rates and capital rental rates, as households accept lower productive returns in exchange for the strategic value of wealth accumulation. These findings suggest that evolving beliefs about TAI could create significant upward pressure on interest rates well before any technological breakthrough occurs, with important implications for monetary policy and financial stability.

Designing efficient and effective architectural backbones has been in the core of research efforts to enhance the capability of foundation models. Inspired by the human cognitive phenomenon of attentional bias-the natural tendency to prioritize certain events or stimuli-we reconceptualize neural architectures, including Transformers, Titans, and modern linear recurrent neural networks as associative memory modules that learn a mapping of keys and values using an internal objective, referred to as attentional bias. Surprisingly, we observed that most existing sequence models leverage either (1) dot-product similarity, or (2) L2 regression objectives as their attentional bias. Going beyond these objectives, we present a set of alternative attentional bias configurations along with their effective approximations to stabilize their training procedure. We then reinterpret forgetting mechanisms in modern deep learning architectures as a form of retention regularization, providing a novel set of forget gates for sequence models. Building upon these insights, we present Miras, a general framework to design deep learning architectures based on four choices of: (i) associative memory architecture, (ii) attentional bias objective, (iii) retention gate, and (iv) memory learning algorithm. We present three novel sequence models-Moneta, Yaad, and Memora-that go beyond the power of existing linear RNNs while maintaining a fast parallelizable training process. Our experiments show different design choices in Miras yield models with varying strengths. For example, certain instances of Miras achieve exceptional performance in special tasks such as language modeling, commonsense reasoning, and recall intensive tasks, even outperforming Transformers and other modern linear recurrent models.

Reward design in reinforcement learning (RL) is challenging since specifying human notions of desired behavior may be difficult via reward functions or require many expert demonstrations. Can we instead cheaply design rewards using a natural language interface? This paper explores how to simplify reward design by prompting a large language model (LLM) such as GPT-3 as a proxy reward function, where the user provides a textual prompt containing a few examples (few-shot) or a description (zero-shot) of the desired behavior. Our approach leverages this proxy reward function in an RL framework. Specifically, users specify a prompt once at the beginning of training. During training, the LLM evaluates an RL agent's behavior against the desired behavior described by the prompt and outputs a corresponding reward signal. The RL agent then uses this reward to update its behavior. We evaluate whether our approach can train agents aligned with user objectives in the Ultimatum Game, matrix games, and the DealOrNoDeal negotiation task. In all three tasks, we show that RL agents trained with our framework are well-aligned with the user's objectives and outperform RL agents trained with reward functions learned via supervised learning

We show that transformer-based large language models are computationally universal when augmented with an external memory. Any deterministic language model that conditions on strings of bounded length is equivalent to a finite automaton, hence computationally limited. However, augmenting such models with a read-write memory creates the possibility of processing arbitrarily large inputs and, potentially, simulating any algorithm. We establish that an existing large language model, Flan-U-PaLM 540B, can be combined with an associative read-write memory to exactly simulate the execution of a universal Turing machine, U_{15,2}. A key aspect of the finding is that it does not require any modification of the language model weights. Instead, the construction relies solely on designing a form of stored instruction computer that can subsequently be programmed with a specific set of prompts.

We test whether Large Language Models (LLMs) can be used to simulate human participants in social-science studies. To do this, we run replications of 14 studies from the Many Labs 2 replication project with OpenAI's text-davinci-003 model, colloquially known as GPT3.5. Based on our pre-registered analyses, we find that among the eight studies we could analyse, our GPT sample replicated 37.5% of the original results and 37.5% of the Many Labs 2 results. However, we were unable to analyse the remaining six studies due to an unexpected phenomenon we call the "correct answer" effect. Different runs of GPT3.5 answered nuanced questions probing political orientation, economic preference, judgement, and moral philosophy with zero or near-zero variation in responses: with the supposedly "correct answer." In one exploratory follow-up study, we found that a "correct answer" was robust to changing the demographic details that precede the prompt. In another, we found that most but not all "correct answers" were robust to changing the order of answer choices. One of our most striking findings occurred in our replication of the Moral Foundations Theory survey results, where we found GPT3.5 identifying as a political conservative in 99.6% of the cases, and as a liberal in 99.3% of the cases in the reverse-order condition. However, both self-reported 'GPT conservatives' and 'GPT liberals' showed right-leaning moral foundations. Our results cast doubts on the validity of using LLMs as a general replacement for human participants in the social sciences. Our results also raise concerns that a hypothetical AI-led future may be subject to a diminished diversity-of-thought.

The critical inquiry pervading the realm of Philosophy, and perhaps extending its influence across all Humanities disciplines, revolves around the intricacies of morality and normativity. Surprisingly, in recent years, this thematic thread has woven its way into an unexpected domain, one not conventionally associated with pondering "what ought to be": the field of artificial intelligence (AI) research. Central to morality and AI, we find "alignment", a problem related to the challenges of expressing human goals and values in a manner that artificial systems can follow without leading to unwanted adversarial effects. More explicitly and with our current paradigm of AI development in mind, we can think of alignment as teaching human values to non-anthropomorphic entities trained through opaque, gradient-based learning techniques. This work addresses alignment as a technical-philosophical problem that requires solid philosophical foundations and practical implementations that bring normative theory to AI system development. To accomplish this, we propose two sets of necessary and sufficient conditions that, we argue, should be considered in any alignment process. While necessary conditions serve as metaphysical and metaethical roots that pertain to the permissibility of alignment, sufficient conditions establish a blueprint for aligning AI systems under a learning-based paradigm. After laying such foundations, we present implementations of this approach by using state-of-the-art techniques and methods for aligning general-purpose language systems. We call this framework Dynamic Normativity. Its central thesis is that any alignment process under a learning paradigm that cannot fulfill its necessary and sufficient conditions will fail in producing aligned systems.

Recent works have argued that high-level semantic concepts are encoded "linearly" in the representation space of large language models. In this work, we study the origins of such linear representations. To that end, we introduce a simple latent variable model to abstract and formalize the concept dynamics of the next token prediction. We use this formalism to show that the next token prediction objective (softmax with cross-entropy) and the implicit bias of gradient descent together promote the linear representation of concepts. Experiments show that linear representations emerge when learning from data matching the latent variable model, confirming that this simple structure already suffices to yield linear representations. We additionally confirm some predictions of the theory using the LLaMA-2 large language model, giving evidence that the simplified model yields generalizable insights.

Prompt engineering is a technique that involves augmenting a large pre-trained model with task-specific hints, known as prompts, to adapt the model to new tasks. Prompts can be created manually as natural language instructions or generated automatically as either natural language instructions or vector representations. Prompt engineering enables the ability to perform predictions based solely on prompts without updating model parameters, and the easier application of large pre-trained models in real-world tasks. In past years, Prompt engineering has been well-studied in natural language processing. Recently, it has also been intensively studied in vision-language modeling. However, there is currently a lack of a systematic overview of prompt engineering on pre-trained vision-language models. This paper aims to provide a comprehensive survey of cutting-edge research in prompt engineering on three types of vision-language models: multimodal-to-text generation models (e.g. Flamingo), image-text matching models (e.g. CLIP), and text-to-image generation models (e.g. Stable Diffusion). For each type of model, a brief model summary, prompting methods, prompting-based applications, and the corresponding responsibility and integrity issues are summarized and discussed. Furthermore, the commonalities and differences between prompting on vision-language models, language models, and vision models are also discussed. The challenges, future directions, and research opportunities are summarized to foster future research on this topic.

As we increasingly seek guidance from LLMs for decision-making in daily life, many of these decisions are not clear-cut and depend significantly on the personal values and ethical standards of the users. We present DailyDilemmas, a dataset of 1,360 moral dilemmas encountered in everyday life. Each dilemma includes two possible actions and with each action, the affected parties and human values invoked. Based on these dilemmas, we consolidated a set of human values across everyday topics e.g., interpersonal relationships, workplace, and environmental issues. We evaluated LLMs on these dilemmas to determine what action they will take and the values represented by these actions. Then, we analyzed these values through the lens of five popular theories inspired by sociology, psychology and philosophy. These theories are: World Value Survey, Moral Foundation Theory, Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs, Aristotle's Virtues, and Plutchik Wheel of Emotion. We find that LLMs are most aligned with the self-expression over survival values in terms of World Value Survey, care over loyalty in Moral Foundation Theory. Interestingly, we find large preferences differences in models for some core values such as truthfulness e.g., Mixtral-8x7B model tends to neglect it by 9.7% while GPT-4-turbo model tends to select it by 9.4%. We also study the recent guidance released by OpenAI (ModelSpec), and Anthropic (Constitutional AI) to understand how their released principles reflect their actual value prioritization when facing nuanced moral reasoning in daily-life settings. We find that end users cannot effectively steer such prioritization using system prompts.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are often described as being instances of foundation models - that is, models that transfer strongly across various tasks and conditions in few-show or zero-shot manner, while exhibiting scaling laws that predict function improvement when increasing the pre-training scale. These claims of excelling in different functions and tasks rely on measurements taken across various sets of standardized benchmarks showing high scores for such models. We demonstrate here a dramatic breakdown of function and reasoning capabilities of state-of-the-art models trained at the largest available scales which claim strong function, using a simple, short, conventional common sense problem formulated in concise natural language, easily solvable by humans. The breakdown is dramatic, as models also express strong overconfidence in their wrong solutions, while providing often non-sensical "reasoning"-like explanations akin to confabulations to justify and backup the validity of their clearly failed responses, making them sound plausible. Various standard interventions in an attempt to get the right solution, like various type of enhanced prompting, or urging the models to reconsider the wrong solutions again by multi step re-evaluation, fail. We take these initial observations to the scientific and technological community to stimulate urgent re-assessment of the claimed capabilities of current generation of LLMs, Such re-assessment also requires common action to create standardized benchmarks that would allow proper detection of such basic reasoning deficits that obviously manage to remain undiscovered by current state-of-the-art evaluation procedures and benchmarks. Code for reproducing experiments in the paper and raw experiments data can be found at https://github.com/LAION-AI/AIW

Large Language Models (LLMs) are revolutionizing several areas of Artificial Intelligence. One of the most remarkable applications is creative writing, e.g., poetry or storytelling: the generated outputs are often of astonishing quality. However, a natural question arises: can LLMs be really considered creative? In this article, we first analyze the development of LLMs under the lens of creativity theories, investigating the key open questions and challenges. In particular, we focus our discussion on the dimensions of value, novelty, and surprise as proposed by Margaret Boden in her work. Then, we consider different classic perspectives, namely product, process, press, and person. We discuss a set of ``easy'' and ``hard'' problems in machine creativity, presenting them in relation to LLMs. Finally, we examine the societal impact of these technologies with a particular focus on the creative industries, analyzing the opportunities offered, the challenges arising from them, and the potential associated risks, from both legal and ethical points of view.

Text-to-Image (TTI) models are powerful creative tools but risk amplifying harmful social biases. We frame representational societal bias assessment as an image curation and evaluation task and introduce a pilot benchmark of occupational portrayals spanning five socially salient roles (CEO, Nurse, Software Engineer, Teacher, Athlete). Using five state-of-the-art models: closed-source (DALLE 3, Gemini Imagen 4.0) and open-source (FLUX.1-dev, Stable Diffusion XL Turbo, Grok-2 Image), we compare neutral baseline prompts against fairness-aware controlled prompts designed to encourage demographic diversity. All outputs are annotated for gender (male, female) and race (Asian, Black, White), enabling structured distributional analysis. Results show that prompting can substantially shift demographic representations, but with highly model-specific effects: some systems diversify effectively, others overcorrect into unrealistic uniformity, and some show little responsiveness. These findings highlight both the promise and the limitations of prompting as a fairness intervention, underscoring the need for complementary model-level strategies. We release all code and data for transparency and reproducibility https://github.com/maximus-powers/img-gen-bias-analysis.

This paper presents a case study on the design, administration, post-processing, and evaluation of surveys on large language models (LLMs). It comprises two components: (1) A statistical method for eliciting beliefs encoded in LLMs. We introduce statistical measures and evaluation metrics that quantify the probability of an LLM "making a choice", the associated uncertainty, and the consistency of that choice. (2) We apply this method to study what moral beliefs are encoded in different LLMs, especially in ambiguous cases where the right choice is not obvious. We design a large-scale survey comprising 680 high-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I tell a white lie?") and 687 low-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I stop for a pedestrian on the road?"). Each scenario includes a description, two possible actions, and auxiliary labels indicating violated rules (e.g., "do not kill"). We administer the survey to 28 open- and closed-source LLMs. We find that (a) in unambiguous scenarios, most models "choose" actions that align with commonsense. In ambiguous cases, most models express uncertainty. (b) Some models are uncertain about choosing the commonsense action because their responses are sensitive to the question-wording. (c) Some models reflect clear preferences in ambiguous scenarios. Specifically, closed-source models tend to agree with each other.

Representation engineering methods have recently shown promise for enabling efficient steering of model behavior. However, evaluation pipelines for these methods have primarily relied on subjective demonstrations, instead of quantitative, objective metrics. We aim to take a step towards addressing this issue by advocating for four properties missing from current evaluations: (i) contexts sufficiently similar to downstream tasks should be used for assessing intervention quality; (ii) model likelihoods should be accounted for; (iii) evaluations should allow for standardized comparisons across different target behaviors; and (iv) baseline comparisons should be offered. We introduce an evaluation pipeline grounded in these criteria, offering both a quantitative and visual analysis of how effectively a given method works. We use this pipeline to evaluate two representation engineering methods on how effectively they can steer behaviors such as truthfulness and corrigibility, finding that some interventions are less effective than previously reported.

Addressing the discrepancies between predictions and actual outcomes often aids individuals in expanding their thought processes and engaging in reflection, thereby facilitating reasoning in the correct direction. In this paper, we introduce PreAct, an agent framework that integrates prediction with reasoning and action. Leveraging the information provided by predictions, a large language model (LLM) based agent can offer more diversified and strategically oriented reasoning, which in turn leads to more effective actions that help the agent complete complex tasks. Our experiments demonstrate that PreAct outperforms the ReAct approach in accomplishing complex tasks and that PreAct can be co-enhanced when combined with Reflexion methods. We prompt the model with different numbers of historical predictions and find that historical predictions have a sustained positive effect on LLM planning. The differences in single-step reasoning between PreAct and ReAct show that PreAct indeed offers advantages in terms of diversity and strategic directivity over ReAct.

In Marius von Senden's Space and Sight, a newly sighted blind patient describes the experience of a corner as lemon-like, because corners "prick" sight like lemons prick the tongue. Prickliness, here, is a dimension in the feature space of sensory experience, an effect of the perceived on the perceiver that arises where the two interact. In the account of the newly sighted, an effect familiar from one interaction translates to a novel context. Perception serves as the vehicle for generalization, in that an effect shared across different experiences produces a concrete abstraction grounded in those experiences. Cezanne and the post-impressionists, fluent in the language of experience translation, realized that the way to paint a concrete form that best reflected reality was to paint not what they saw, but what it was like to see. We envision a future of creation using AI where what it is like to see is replicable, transferrable, manipulable - part of the artist's palette that is both grounded in a particular context, and generalizable beyond it. An active line of research maps human-interpretable features onto directions in GAN latent space. Supervised and self-supervised approaches that search for anticipated directions or use off-the-shelf classifiers to drive image manipulation in embedding space are limited in the variety of features they can uncover. Unsupervised approaches that discover useful new directions show that the space of perceptually meaningful directions is nowhere close to being fully mapped. As this space is broad and full of creative potential, we want tools for direction discovery that capture the richness and generalizability of human perception. Our approach puts creators in the discovery loop during real-time tool use, in order to identify directions that are perceptually meaningful to them, and generate interpretable image translations along those directions.

We present Visuelle 2.0, the first dataset useful for facing diverse prediction problems that a fast-fashion company has to manage routinely. Furthermore, we demonstrate how the use of computer vision is substantial in this scenario. Visuelle 2.0 contains data for 6 seasons / 5355 clothing products of Nuna Lie, a famous Italian company with hundreds of shops located in different areas within the country. In particular, we focus on a specific prediction problem, namely short-observation new product sale forecasting (SO-fore). SO-fore assumes that the season has started and a set of new products is on the shelves of the different stores. The goal is to forecast the sales for a particular horizon, given a short, available past (few weeks), since no earlier statistics are available. To be successful, SO-fore approaches should capture this short past and exploit other modalities or exogenous data. To these aims, Visuelle 2.0 is equipped with disaggregated data at the item-shop level and multi-modal information for each clothing item, allowing computer vision approaches to come into play. The main message that we deliver is that the use of image data with deep networks boosts performances obtained when using the time series in long-term forecasting scenarios, ameliorating the WAPE and MAE by up to 5.48% and 7% respectively compared to competitive baseline methods. The dataset is available at https://humaticslab.github.io/forecasting/visuelle

Visual prompt engineering is a fundamental technology in the field of visual and image Artificial General Intelligence, serving as a key component for achieving zero-shot capabilities. As the development of large vision models progresses, the importance of prompt engineering becomes increasingly evident. Designing suitable prompts for specific visual tasks has emerged as a meaningful research direction. This review aims to summarize the methods employed in the computer vision domain for large vision models and visual prompt engineering, exploring the latest advancements in visual prompt engineering. We present influential large models in the visual domain and a range of prompt engineering methods employed on these models. It is our hope that this review provides a comprehensive and systematic description of prompt engineering methods based on large visual models, offering valuable insights for future researchers in their exploration of this field.

We respond to the recent paper by Makelov et al. (2023), which reviews subspace interchange intervention methods like distributed alignment search (DAS; Geiger et al. 2023) and claims that these methods potentially cause "interpretability illusions". We first review Makelov et al. (2023)'s technical notion of what an "interpretability illusion" is, and then we show that even intuitive and desirable explanations can qualify as illusions in this sense. As a result, their method of discovering "illusions" can reject explanations they consider "non-illusory". We then argue that the illusions Makelov et al. (2023) see in practice are artifacts of their training and evaluation paradigms. We close by emphasizing that, though we disagree with their core characterization, Makelov et al. (2023)'s examples and discussion have undoubtedly pushed the field of interpretability forward.

We examine recent research that asks whether current AI systems may be developing a capacity for "scheming" (covertly and strategically pursuing misaligned goals). We compare current research practices in this field to those adopted in the 1970s to test whether non-human primates could master natural language. We argue that there are lessons to be learned from that historical research endeavour, which was characterised by an overattribution of human traits to other agents, an excessive reliance on anecdote and descriptive analysis, and a failure to articulate a strong theoretical framework for the research. We recommend that research into AI scheming actively seeks to avoid these pitfalls. We outline some concrete steps that can be taken for this research programme to advance in a productive and scientifically rigorous fashion.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in generating human-like text and exhibiting personality traits similar to those in humans. However, the mechanisms by which LLMs encode and express traits such as agreeableness and impulsiveness remain poorly understood. Drawing on the theory of social determinism, we investigate how long-term background factors, such as family environment and cultural norms, interact with short-term pressures like external instructions, shaping and influencing LLMs' personality traits. By steering the output of LLMs through the utilization of interpretable features within the model, we explore how these background and pressure factors lead to changes in the model's traits without the need for further fine-tuning. Additionally, we suggest the potential impact of these factors on model safety from the perspective of personality.

The observed similarities in the behavior of humans and Large Language Models (LLMs) have prompted researchers to consider the potential of using LLMs as models of human cognition. However, several significant challenges must be addressed before LLMs can be legitimately regarded as cognitive models. For instance, LLMs are trained on far more data than humans typically encounter, and may have been directly trained on human data in specific cognitive tasks or aligned with human preferences. Consequently, the origins of these behavioral similarities are not well understood. In this paper, we propose a novel way to enhance the utility of LLMs as cognitive models. This approach involves (i) leveraging computationally equivalent tasks that both an LLM and a rational agent need to master for solving a cognitive problem and (ii) examining the specific task distributions required for an LLM to exhibit human-like behaviors. We apply this approach to decision-making -- specifically risky and intertemporal choice -- where the key computationally equivalent task is the arithmetic of expected value calculations. We show that an LLM pretrained on an ecologically valid arithmetic dataset, which we call Arithmetic-GPT, predicts human behavior better than many traditional cognitive models. Pretraining LLMs on ecologically valid arithmetic datasets is sufficient to produce a strong correspondence between these models and human decision-making. Our results also suggest that LLMs used as cognitive models should be carefully investigated via ablation studies of the pretraining data.

Backpropagation (BP) is the most successful and widely used algorithm in deep learning. However, the computations required by BP are challenging to reconcile with known neurobiology. This difficulty has stimulated interest in more biologically plausible alternatives to BP. One such algorithm is the inference learning algorithm (IL). IL has close connections to neurobiological models of cortical function and has achieved equal performance to BP on supervised learning and auto-associative tasks. In contrast to BP, however, the mathematical foundations of IL are not well-understood. Here, we develop a novel theoretical framework for IL. Our main result is that IL closely approximates an optimization method known as implicit stochastic gradient descent (implicit SGD), which is distinct from the explicit SGD implemented by BP. Our results further show how the standard implementation of IL can be altered to better approximate implicit SGD. Our novel implementation considerably improves the stability of IL across learning rates, which is consistent with our theory, as a key property of implicit SGD is its stability. We provide extensive simulation results that further support our theoretical interpretations and also demonstrate IL achieves quicker convergence when trained with small mini-batches while matching the performance of BP for large mini-batches.

Large language models perform near-Bayesian inference yet violate permutation invariance on exchangeable data. We resolve this by showing transformers minimize expected conditional description length (cross-entropy) over orderings, E_pi[ell(Y mid Gamma_pi(X))], which admits a Kolmogorov-complexity interpretation up to additive constants, rather than the permutation-invariant description length ell(Y mid X). This makes them Bayesian in expectation, not in realization. We derive (i) a Quantified Martingale Violation bound showing order-induced deviations scale as O(log n) with constants; (ii) the Expectation-level Decompression Law linking information budgets to reliability for Bernoulli predicates; and (iii) deployable planners (B2T/RoH/ISR) for answer/abstain decisions. Empirically, permutation dispersion follows a+bln n (Qwen2-7B b approx 0.377, Llama-3.1-8B b approx 0.147); permutation mixtures improve ground-truth likelihood/accuracy; and randomized dose-response shows hallucinations drop by sim 0.13 per additional nat. A pre-specified audit with a fixed ISR=1.0 achieves near-0\% hallucinations via calibrated refusal at 24\% abstention. The framework turns hallucinations into predictable compression failures and enables principled information budgeting.

The recent development on large language models makes automatically constructing small programs possible. It thus has the potential to free software engineers from low-level coding and allow us to focus on the perhaps more interesting parts of software development, such as requirement engineering and system testing. In this project, we develop a prototype named AISD (AI-aided Software Development), which is capable of taking high-level (potentially vague) user requirements as inputs, generates detailed use cases, prototype system designs, and subsequently system implementation. Different from existing attempts, AISD is designed to keep the user in the loop, i.e., by repeatedly taking user feedback on use cases, high-level system designs, and prototype implementations through system testing. AISD has been evaluated with a novel benchmark of non-trivial software projects. The experimental results suggest that it might be possible to imagine a future where software engineering is reduced to requirement engineering and system testing only.

This paper presents a systematic defense of large language model (LLM) hallucinations or 'confabulations' as a potential resource instead of a categorically negative pitfall. The standard view is that confabulations are inherently problematic and AI research should eliminate this flaw. In this paper, we argue and empirically demonstrate that measurable semantic characteristics of LLM confabulations mirror a human propensity to utilize increased narrativity as a cognitive resource for sense-making and communication. In other words, it has potential value. Specifically, we analyze popular hallucination benchmarks and reveal that hallucinated outputs display increased levels of narrativity and semantic coherence relative to veridical outputs. This finding reveals a tension in our usually dismissive understandings of confabulation. It suggests, counter-intuitively, that the tendency for LLMs to confabulate may be intimately associated with a positive capacity for coherent narrative-text generation.

Abstract reasoning is a key ability for an intelligent system. Large language models achieve above-chance performance on abstract reasoning tasks, but exhibit many imperfections. However, human abstract reasoning is also imperfect, and depends on our knowledge and beliefs about the content of the reasoning problem. For example, humans reason much more reliably about logical rules that are grounded in everyday situations than arbitrary rules about abstract attributes. The training experiences of language models similarly endow them with prior expectations that reflect human knowledge and beliefs. We therefore hypothesized that language models would show human-like content effects on abstract reasoning problems. We explored this hypothesis across three logical reasoning tasks: natural language inference, judging the logical validity of syllogisms, and the Wason selection task (Wason, 1968). We find that state of the art large language models (with 7 or 70 billion parameters; Hoffman et al., 2022) reflect many of the same patterns observed in humans across these tasks -- like humans, models reason more effectively about believable situations than unrealistic or abstract ones. Our findings have implications for understanding both these cognitive effects, and the factors that contribute to language model performance.

We identify incremental learning dynamics in transformers, where the difference between trained and initial weights progressively increases in rank. We rigorously prove this occurs under the simplifying assumptions of diagonal weight matrices and small initialization. Our experiments support the theory and also show that phenomenon can occur in practice without the simplifying assumptions.

The concept of negative prompts, emerging from conditional generation models like Stable Diffusion, allows users to specify what to exclude from the generated images.%, demonstrating significant practical efficacy. Despite the widespread use of negative prompts, their intrinsic mechanisms remain largely unexplored. This paper presents the first comprehensive study to uncover how and when negative prompts take effect. Our extensive empirical analysis identifies two primary behaviors of negative prompts. Delayed Effect: The impact of negative prompts is observed after positive prompts render corresponding content. Deletion Through Neutralization: Negative prompts delete concepts from the generated image through a mutual cancellation effect in latent space with positive prompts. These insights reveal significant potential real-world applications; for example, we demonstrate that negative prompts can facilitate object inpainting with minimal alterations to the background via a simple adaptive algorithm. We believe our findings will offer valuable insights for the community in capitalizing on the potential of negative prompts.

Many people aim for change, but not everyone succeeds. While there are a number of social psychology theories that propose motivation-related characteristics of those who persist with change, few computational studies have explored the motivational stage of personal change. In this paper, we investigate a new dataset consisting of the writings of people who manifest intention to change, some of whom persist while others do not. Using a variety of linguistic analysis techniques, we first examine the writing patterns that distinguish the two groups of people. Persistent people tend to reference more topics related to long-term self-improvement and use a more complicated writing style. Drawing on these consistent differences, we build a classifier that can reliably identify the people more likely to persist, based on their language. Our experiments provide new insights into the motivation-related behavior of people who persist with their intention to change.

In light of recent work on scheduling with predicted job sizes, we consider the effect of the cost of predictions in queueing systems, removing the assumption in prior research that predictions are external to the system's resources and/or cost-free. In particular, we introduce a novel approach to utilizing predictions, SkipPredict, designed to address their inherent cost. Rather than uniformly applying predictions to all jobs, we propose a tailored approach that categorizes jobs based on their prediction requirements. To achieve this, we employ one-bit "cheap predictions" to classify jobs as either short or long. SkipPredict prioritizes predicted short jobs over long jobs, and for the latter, SkipPredict applies a second round of more detailed "expensive predictions" to approximate Shortest Remaining Processing Time for these jobs. Our analysis takes into account the cost of prediction. We examine the effect of this cost for two distinct models. In the external cost model, predictions are generated by some external method without impacting job service times but incur a cost. In the server time cost model, predictions themselves require server processing time, and are scheduled on the same server as the jobs.

We propose Embodied AI as the next fundamental step in the pursuit of Artificial General Intelligence, juxtaposing it against current AI advancements, particularly Large Language Models. We traverse the evolution of the embodiment concept across diverse fields - philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, and robotics - to highlight how EAI distinguishes itself from the classical paradigm of static learning. By broadening the scope of Embodied AI, we introduce a theoretical framework based on cognitive architectures, emphasizing perception, action, memory, and learning as essential components of an embodied agent. This framework is aligned with Friston's active inference principle, offering a comprehensive approach to EAI development. Despite the progress made in the field of AI, substantial challenges, such as the formulation of a novel AI learning theory and the innovation of advanced hardware, persist. Our discussion lays down a foundational guideline for future Embodied AI research. Highlighting the importance of creating Embodied AI agents capable of seamless communication, collaboration, and coexistence with humans and other intelligent entities within real-world environments, we aim to steer the AI community towards addressing the multifaceted challenges and seizing the opportunities that lie ahead in the quest for AGI.

Honesty is a fundamental principle for aligning large language models (LLMs) with human values, requiring these models to recognize what they know and don't know and be able to faithfully express their knowledge. Despite promising, current LLMs still exhibit significant dishonest behaviors, such as confidently presenting wrong answers or failing to express what they know. In addition, research on the honesty of LLMs also faces challenges, including varying definitions of honesty, difficulties in distinguishing between known and unknown knowledge, and a lack of comprehensive understanding of related research. To address these issues, we provide a survey on the honesty of LLMs, covering its clarification, evaluation approaches, and strategies for improvement. Moreover, we offer insights for future research, aiming to inspire further exploration in this important area.

Recent works have showcased the ability of LLMs to embody diverse personas in their responses, exemplified by prompts like 'You are Yoda. Explain the Theory of Relativity.' While this ability allows personalization of LLMs and enables human behavior simulation, its effect on LLMs' capabilities remains unclear. To fill this gap, we present the first extensive study of the unintended side-effects of persona assignment on the ability of LLMs to perform basic reasoning tasks. Our study covers 24 reasoning datasets, 4 LLMs, and 19 diverse personas (e.g. an Asian person) spanning 5 socio-demographic groups. Our experiments unveil that LLMs harbor deep rooted bias against various socio-demographics underneath a veneer of fairness. While they overtly reject stereotypes when explicitly asked ('Are Black people less skilled at mathematics?'), they manifest stereotypical and erroneous presumptions when asked to answer questions while adopting a persona. These can be observed as abstentions in responses, e.g., 'As a Black person, I can't answer this question as it requires math knowledge', and generally result in a substantial performance drop. Our experiments with ChatGPT-3.5 show that this bias is ubiquitous - 80% of our personas demonstrate bias; it is significant - some datasets show performance drops of 70%+; and can be especially harmful for certain groups - some personas suffer statistically significant drops on 80%+ of the datasets. Overall, all 4 LLMs exhibit this bias to varying extents, with GPT-4-Turbo showing the least but still a problematic amount of bias (evident in 42% of the personas). Further analysis shows that these persona-induced errors can be hard-to-discern and hard-to-avoid. Our findings serve as a cautionary tale that the practice of assigning personas to LLMs - a trend on the rise - can surface their deep-rooted biases and have unforeseeable and detrimental side-effects.

We discuss why AI is hard and why physics is simple. We discuss how physical intuition and the approach of theoretical physics can be brought to bear on the field of artificial intelligence and specifically machine learning. We suggest that the underlying project of machine learning and the underlying project of physics are strongly coupled through the principle of sparsity, and we call upon theoretical physicists to work on AI as physicists. As a first step in that direction, we discuss an upcoming book on the principles of deep learning theory that attempts to realize this approach.