Daily Papers

Vanilla Federated learning (FL) relies on the centralized global aggregation mechanism and assumes that all clients are honest. This makes it a challenge for FL to alleviate the single point of failure and dishonest clients. These impending challenges in the design philosophy of FL call for blockchain-based federated learning (BFL) due to the benefits of coupling FL and blockchain (e.g., democracy, incentive, and immutability). However, one problem in vanilla BFL is that its capabilities do not follow adopters' needs in a dynamic fashion. Besides, vanilla BFL relies on unverifiable clients' self-reported contributions like data size because checking clients' raw data is not allowed in FL for privacy concerns. We design and evaluate a novel BFL framework, and resolve the identified challenges in vanilla BFL with greater flexibility and incentive mechanism called FAIR-BFL. In contrast to existing works, FAIR-BFL offers unprecedented flexibility via the modular design, allowing adopters to adjust its capabilities following business demands in a dynamic fashion. Our design accounts for BFL's ability to quantify each client's contribution to the global learning process. Such quantification provides a rational metric for distributing the rewards among federated clients and helps discover malicious participants that may poison the global model.

In collaborative learning with streaming data, nodes (e.g., organizations) jointly and continuously learn a machine learning (ML) model by sharing the latest model updates computed from their latest streaming data. For the more resourceful nodes to be willing to share their model updates, they need to be fairly incentivized. This paper explores an incentive design that guarantees fairness so that nodes receive rewards commensurate to their contributions. Our approach leverages an explore-then-exploit formulation to estimate the nodes' contributions (i.e., exploration) for realizing our theoretically guaranteed fair incentives (i.e., exploitation). However, we observe a "rich get richer" phenomenon arising from the existing approaches to guarantee fairness and it discourages the participation of the less resourceful nodes. To remedy this, we additionally preserve asymptotic equality, i.e., less resourceful nodes achieve equal performance eventually to the more resourceful/"rich" nodes. We empirically demonstrate in two settings with real-world streaming data: federated online incremental learning and federated reinforcement learning, that our proposed approach outperforms existing baselines in fairness and learning performance while remaining competitive in preserving equality.

Decentralized learning offers a promising approach to crowdsource data consumptions and computational workloads across geographically distributed compute interconnected through peer-to-peer networks, accommodating the exponentially increasing demands. However, proper incentives are still in absence, considerably discouraging participation. Our vision is that a fair incentive mechanism relies on fair attribution of contributions to participating nodes, which faces non-trivial challenges arising from the localized connections making influence ``cascade'' in a decentralized network. To overcome this, we design the first method to estimate Data Influence CascadE (DICE) in a decentralized environment. Theoretically, the framework derives tractable approximations of influence cascade over arbitrary neighbor hops, suggesting the influence cascade is determined by an interplay of data, communication topology, and the curvature of loss landscape. DICE also lays the foundations for applications including selecting suitable collaborators and identifying malicious behaviors. Project page is available at https://raiden-zhu.github.io/blog/2025/DICE/.

To enhance the efficiency and practicality of federated bandit learning, recent advances have introduced incentives to motivate communication among clients, where a client participates only when the incentive offered by the server outweighs its participation cost. However, existing incentive mechanisms naively assume the clients are truthful: they all report their true cost and thus the higher cost one participating client claims, the more the server has to pay. Therefore, such mechanisms are vulnerable to strategic clients aiming to optimize their own utility by misreporting. To address this issue, we propose an incentive compatible (i.e., truthful) communication protocol, named Truth-FedBan, where the incentive for each participant is independent of its self-reported cost, and reporting the true cost is the only way to achieve the best utility. More importantly, Truth-FedBan still guarantees the sub-linear regret and communication cost without any overheads. In other words, the core conceptual contribution of this paper is, for the first time, demonstrating the possibility of simultaneously achieving incentive compatibility and nearly optimal regret in federated bandit learning. Extensive numerical studies further validate the effectiveness of our proposed solution.

Decentralized reputation schemes present a promising area of experimentation in blockchain applications. These solutions aim to overcome the shortcomings of simple monetary incentive mechanisms of naive tokenomics. However, there is a significant research gap regarding the limitations and benefits of such solutions. We formulate these trade-offs as a conjecture on the irreconcilability of three desirable properties of the reputation system in this context. Such a system can not be simultaneously generalizable, trustless, and Sybil resistant. To handle the limitations of this trilemma, we propose MeritRank: Sybil tolerant feedback aggregation mechanism for reputation. Instead of preventing Sybil attacks, our approach successfully bounds the benefits of these attacks. Using a dataset of participants' interactions in MakerDAO, we run experiments to demonstrate Sybil tolerance of MeritRank. Decay parameters of reputation in MeritRank: transitivity decay and connectivity decay, allow for a fine-tuning of desirable levels of reputation utility and Sybil tolerance in different use contexts.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

We study the problem of designing mechanisms for information acquisition scenarios. This setting models strategic interactions between an uniformed receiver and a set of informed senders. In our model the senders receive information about the underlying state of nature and communicate their observation (either truthfully or not) to the receiver, which, based on this information, selects an action. Our goal is to design mechanisms maximizing the receiver's utility while incentivizing the senders to report truthfully their information. First, we provide an algorithm that efficiently computes an optimal incentive compatible (IC) mechanism. Then, we focus on the online problem in which the receiver sequentially interacts in an unknown game, with the objective of minimizing the cumulative regret w.r.t. the optimal IC mechanism, and the cumulative violation of the incentive compatibility constraints. We investigate two different online scenarios, i.e., the full and bandit feedback settings. For the full feedback problem, we propose an algorithm that guarantees mathcal O(sqrt T) regret and violation, while for the bandit feedback setting we present an algorithm that attains mathcal O(T^{alpha}) regret and mathcal O(T^{1-alpha/2}) violation for any alphain[1/2, 1]. Finally, we complement our results providing a tight lower bound.

Conversational search systems require effective handling of context-dependent queries that often contain ambiguity, omission, and coreference. Conversational Query Reformulation (CQR) addresses this challenge by transforming these queries into self-contained forms suitable for off-the-shelf retrievers. However, existing CQR approaches suffer from two critical constraints: high dependency on costly external supervision from human annotations or large language models, and insufficient alignment between the rewriting model and downstream retrievers. We present ConvSearch-R1, the first self-driven framework that completely eliminates dependency on external rewrite supervision by leveraging reinforcement learning to optimize reformulation directly through retrieval signals. Our novel two-stage approach combines Self-Driven Policy Warm-Up to address the cold-start problem through retrieval-guided self-distillation, followed by Retrieval-Guided Reinforcement Learning with a specially designed rank-incentive reward shaping mechanism that addresses the sparsity issue in conventional retrieval metrics. Extensive experiments on TopiOCQA and QReCC datasets demonstrate that ConvSearch-R1 significantly outperforms previous state-of-the-art methods, achieving over 10% improvement on the challenging TopiOCQA dataset while using smaller 3B parameter models without any external supervision.

We study a strategic variant of the multi-armed bandit problem, which we coin the strategic click-bandit. This model is motivated by applications in online recommendation where the choice of recommended items depends on both the click-through rates and the post-click rewards. Like in classical bandits, rewards follow a fixed unknown distribution. However, we assume that the click-rate of each arm is chosen strategically by the arm (e.g., a host on Airbnb) in order to maximize the number of times it gets clicked. The algorithm designer does not know the post-click rewards nor the arms' actions (i.e., strategically chosen click-rates) in advance, and must learn both values over time. To solve this problem, we design an incentive-aware learning algorithm, UCB-S, which achieves two goals simultaneously: (a) incentivizing desirable arm behavior under uncertainty; (b) minimizing regret by learning unknown parameters. We characterize all approximate Nash equilibria among arms under UCB-S and show a mathcal{O} (KT) regret bound uniformly in every equilibrium. We also show that incentive-unaware algorithms generally fail to achieve low regret in the strategic click-bandit. Finally, we support our theoretical results by simulations of strategic arm behavior which confirm the effectiveness and robustness of our proposed incentive design.

The burgeoning integration of artificial intelligence (AI) into human society brings forth significant implications for societal governance and safety. While considerable strides have been made in addressing AI alignment challenges, existing methodologies primarily focus on technical facets, often neglecting the intricate sociotechnical nature of AI systems, which can lead to a misalignment between the development and deployment contexts. To this end, we posit a new problem worth exploring: Incentive Compatibility Sociotechnical Alignment Problem (ICSAP). We hope this can call for more researchers to explore how to leverage the principles of Incentive Compatibility (IC) from game theory to bridge the gap between technical and societal components to maintain AI consensus with human societies in different contexts. We further discuss three classical game problems for achieving IC: mechanism design, contract theory, and Bayesian persuasion, in addressing the perspectives, potentials, and challenges of solving ICSAP, and provide preliminary implementation conceptions.

We study the impact on mechanisms for facility location of moving from one dimension to two (or more) dimensions and Euclidean or Manhattan distances. We consider three fundamental axiomatic properties: anonymity which is a basic fairness property, Pareto optimality which is one of the most important efficiency properties, and strategy proofness which ensures agents do not have an incentive to mis-report. We also consider how well such mechanisms can approximate the optimal welfare. Our results are somewhat negative. Moving from one dimension to two (or more) dimensions often makes these axiomatic properties more difficult to achieve. For example, with two facilities in Euclidean space or with just a single facility in Manhattan space, no mechanism is anonymous, Pareto optimal and strategy proof. By contrast, mechanisms on the line exist with all three properties.We also show that approximation ratios may increase when moving to two (or more) dimensions. All our impossibility results are minimal. If we drop one of the three axioms (anonymity, Pareto optimality or strategy proofness) multiple mechanisms satisfy the other two axioms.

We develop a Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) method to learn scalable control policies for target tracking. Our method can handle an arbitrary number of pursuers and targets; we show results for tasks consisting up to 1000 pursuers tracking 1000 targets. We use a decentralized, partially-observable Markov Decision Process framework to model pursuers as agents receiving partial observations (range and bearing) about targets which move using fixed, unknown policies. An attention mechanism is used to parameterize the value function of the agents; this mechanism allows us to handle an arbitrary number of targets. Entropy-regularized off-policy RL methods are used to train a stochastic policy, and we discuss how it enables a hedging behavior between pursuers that leads to a weak form of cooperation in spite of completely decentralized control execution. We further develop a masking heuristic that allows training on smaller problems with few pursuers-targets and execution on much larger problems. Thorough simulation experiments, ablation studies, and comparisons to state of the art algorithms are performed to study the scalability of the approach and robustness of performance to varying numbers of agents and targets.

We describe an incentive system for distributed deep learning of foundational models where peers are rewarded for contributions. The incentive system, Gauntlet, has been deployed on the bittensor blockchain and used to train a 1.2B LLM with completely permissionless contributions of pseudo-gradients: no control over the users that can register or their hardware. Gauntlet can be applied to any synchronous distributed training scheme that relies on aggregating updates or pseudo-gradients. We rely on a two-stage mechanism for fast filtering of peer uptime, reliability, and synchronization, combined with the core component that estimates the loss before and after individual pseudo-gradient contributions. We utilized an OpenSkill rating system to track competitiveness of pseudo-gradient scores across time. Finally, we introduce a novel mechanism to ensure peers on the network perform unique computations. Our live 1.2B run, which has paid out real-valued tokens to participants based on the value of their contributions, yielded a competitive (on a per-iteration basis) 1.2B model that demonstrates the utility of our incentive system.

Effective conversational agents must be able to personalize their behavior to suit a user's preferences, personality, and attributes, whether they are assisting with writing tasks or operating in domains like education or healthcare. Current training methods like Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) prioritize helpfulness and safety but fall short in fostering truly empathetic, adaptive, and personalized interactions. Traditional approaches to personalization often rely on extensive user history, limiting their effectiveness for new or context-limited users. To overcome these limitations, we propose to incorporate an intrinsic motivation to improve the conversational agents's model of the user as an additional reward alongside multi-turn RLHF. This reward mechanism encourages the agent to actively elicit user traits by optimizing conversations to increase the accuracy of its user model. Consequently, the policy agent can deliver more personalized interactions through obtaining more information about the user. We applied our method both education and fitness settings, where LLMs teach concepts or recommend personalized strategies based on users' hidden learning style or lifestyle attributes. Using LLM-simulated users, our approach outperformed a multi-turn RLHF baseline in revealing information about the users' preferences, and adapting to them.

Self-rewarding have emerged recently as a powerful tool in the field of Natural Language Processing (NLP), allowing language models to generate high-quality relevant responses by providing their own rewards during training. This innovative technique addresses the limitations of other methods that rely on human preferences. In this paper, we build upon the concept of self-rewarding models and introduce its vision equivalent for Text-to-Image generative AI models. This approach works by fine-tuning diffusion model on a self-generated self-judged dataset, making the fine-tuning more automated and with better data quality. The proposed mechanism makes use of other pre-trained models such as vocabulary based-object detection, image captioning and is conditioned by the a set of object for which the user might need to improve generated data quality. The approach has been implemented, fine-tuned and evaluated on stable diffusion and has led to a performance that has been evaluated to be at least 60\% better than existing commercial and research Text-to-image models. Additionally, the built self-rewarding mechanism allowed a fully automated generation of images, while increasing the visual quality of the generated images and also more efficient following of prompt instructions. The code used in this work is freely available on https://github.com/safouaneelg/SRT2I.

Information is often stored in a distributed and proprietary form, and agents who own information are often self-interested and require incentives to reveal their information. Suitable mechanisms are required to elicit and aggregate such distributed information for decision making. In this paper, we use simulations to investigate the use of decision markets as mechanisms in a multi-agent learning system to aggregate distributed information for decision-making in a contextual bandit problem. The system utilises strictly proper decision scoring rules to assess the accuracy of probabilistic reports from agents, which allows agents to learn to solve the contextual bandit problem jointly. Our simulations show that our multi-agent system with distributed information can be trained as efficiently as a centralised counterpart with a single agent that receives all information. Moreover, we use our system to investigate scenarios with deterministic decision scoring rules which are not incentive compatible. We observe the emergence of more complex dynamics with manipulative behaviour, which agrees with existing theoretical analyses.

In peer mechanisms, the competitors for a prize also determine who wins. Each competitor may be asked to rank, grade, or nominate peers for the prize. Since the prize can be valuable, such as financial aid, course grades, or an award at a conference, competitors may be tempted to manipulate the mechanism. We survey approaches to prevent or discourage the manipulation of peer mechanisms. We conclude our survey by identifying several important research challenges.

We consider an extension to the classic position auctions in which sponsored creatives can be added within AI generated content rather than shown in predefined slots. New challenges arise from the natural requirement that sponsored creatives should smoothly fit into the context. With the help of advanced LLM technologies, it becomes viable to accurately estimate the benefits of adding each individual sponsored creatives into each potential positions within the AI generated content by properly taking the context into account. Therefore, we assume one click-through rate estimation for each position-creative pair, rather than one uniform estimation for each sponsored creative across all positions in classic settings. As a result, the underlying optimization becomes a general matching problem, thus the substitution effects should be treated more carefully compared to standard position auction settings, where the slots are independent with each other. In this work, we formalize a concrete mathematical model of the extended position auction problem and study the welfare-maximization and revenue-maximization mechanism design problem. Formally, we consider two different user behavior models and solve the mechanism design problems therein respectively. For the Multinomial Logit (MNL) model, which is order-insensitive, we can efficiently implement the optimal mechanisms. For the cascade model, which is order-sensitive, we provide approximately optimal solutions.

Recent advances such as DeepSeek R1-Zero highlight the effectiveness of incentive training, a reinforcement learning paradigm that computes rewards solely based on the final answer part of a language model's output, thereby encouraging the generation of intermediate reasoning steps. However, these methods fundamentally rely on external verifiers, which limits their applicability to domains like mathematics and coding where such verifiers are readily available. Although reward models can serve as verifiers, they require high-quality annotated data and are costly to train. In this work, we propose NOVER, NO-VERifier Reinforcement Learning, a general reinforcement learning framework that requires only standard supervised fine-tuning data with no need for an external verifier. NOVER enables incentive training across a wide range of text-to-text tasks and outperforms the model of the same size distilled from large reasoning models such as DeepSeek R1 671B by 7.7 percent. Moreover, the flexibility of NOVER enables new possibilities for optimizing large language models, such as inverse incentive training.

Designing reward functions for efficiently guiding reinforcement learning (RL) agents toward specific behaviors is a complex task. This is challenging since it requires the identification of reward structures that are not sparse and that avoid inadvertently inducing undesirable behaviors. Naively modifying the reward structure to offer denser and more frequent feedback can lead to unintended outcomes and promote behaviors that are not aligned with the designer's intended goal. Although potential-based reward shaping is often suggested as a remedy, we systematically investigate settings where deploying it often significantly impairs performance. To address these issues, we introduce a new framework that uses a bi-level objective to learn behavior alignment reward functions. These functions integrate auxiliary rewards reflecting a designer's heuristics and domain knowledge with the environment's primary rewards. Our approach automatically determines the most effective way to blend these types of feedback, thereby enhancing robustness against heuristic reward misspecification. Remarkably, it can also adapt an agent's policy optimization process to mitigate suboptimalities resulting from limitations and biases inherent in the underlying RL algorithms. We evaluate our method's efficacy on a diverse set of tasks, from small-scale experiments to high-dimensional control challenges. We investigate heuristic auxiliary rewards of varying quality -- some of which are beneficial and others detrimental to the learning process. Our results show that our framework offers a robust and principled way to integrate designer-specified heuristics. It not only addresses key shortcomings of existing approaches but also consistently leads to high-performing solutions, even when given misaligned or poorly-specified auxiliary reward functions.

Ensuring sufficient exploration is a central challenge when training meta-reinforcement learning (meta-RL) agents to solve novel environments. Conventional solutions to the exploration-exploitation dilemma inject explicit incentives such as randomization, uncertainty bonuses, or intrinsic rewards to encourage exploration. In this work, we hypothesize that an agent trained solely to maximize a greedy (exploitation-only) objective can nonetheless exhibit emergent exploratory behavior, provided three conditions are met: (1) Recurring Environmental Structure, where the environment features repeatable regularities that allow past experience to inform future choices; (2) Agent Memory, enabling the agent to retain and utilize historical interaction data; and (3) Long-Horizon Credit Assignment, where learning propagates returns over a time frame sufficient for the delayed benefits of exploration to inform current decisions. Through experiments in stochastic multi-armed bandits and temporally extended gridworlds, we observe that, when both structure and memory are present, a policy trained on a strictly greedy objective exhibits information-seeking exploratory behavior. We further demonstrate, through controlled ablations, that emergent exploration vanishes if either environmental structure or agent memory is absent (Conditions 1 & 2). Surprisingly, removing long-horizon credit assignment (Condition 3) does not always prevent emergent exploration-a result we attribute to the pseudo-Thompson Sampling effect. These findings suggest that, under the right prerequisites, exploration and exploitation need not be treated as orthogonal objectives but can emerge from a unified reward-maximization process.

Solving the problem of cooperation is fundamentally important for the creation and maintenance of functional societies. Problems of cooperation are omnipresent within human society, with examples ranging from navigating busy road junctions to negotiating treaties. As the use of AI becomes more pervasive throughout society, the need for socially intelligent agents capable of navigating these complex cooperative dilemmas is becoming increasingly evident. Direct punishment is a ubiquitous social mechanism that has been shown to foster the emergence of cooperation in both humans and non-humans. In the natural world, direct punishment is often strongly coupled with partner selection and reputation and used in conjunction with third-party punishment. The interactions between these mechanisms could potentially enhance the emergence of cooperation within populations. However, no previous work has evaluated the learning dynamics and outcomes emerging from Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) populations that combine these mechanisms. This paper addresses this gap. It presents a comprehensive analysis and evaluation of the behaviors and learning dynamics associated with direct punishment, third-party punishment, partner selection, and reputation. Finally, we discuss the implications of using these mechanisms on the design of cooperative AI systems.

Proportionality is an attractive fairness concept that has been applied to a range of problems including the facility location problem, a classic problem in social choice. In our work, we propose a concept called Strong Proportionality, which ensures that when there are two groups of agents at different locations, both groups incur the same total cost. We show that although Strong Proportionality is a well-motivated and basic axiom, there is no deterministic strategyproof mechanism satisfying the property. We then identify a randomized mechanism called Random Rank (which uniformly selects a number k between 1 to n and locates the facility at the k'th highest agent location) which satisfies Strong Proportionality in expectation. Our main theorem characterizes Random Rank as the unique mechanism that achieves universal truthfulness, universal anonymity, and Strong Proportionality in expectation among all randomized mechanisms. Finally, we show via the AverageOrRandomRank mechanism that even stronger ex-post fairness guarantees can be achieved by weakening universal truthfulness to strategyproofness in expectation.

Intrinsic reward shaping has emerged as a prevalent approach to solving hard-exploration and sparse-rewards environments in reinforcement learning (RL). While single intrinsic rewards, such as curiosity-driven or novelty-based methods, have shown effectiveness, they often limit the diversity and efficiency of exploration. Moreover, the potential and principle of combining multiple intrinsic rewards remains insufficiently explored. To address this gap, we introduce HIRE (Hybrid Intrinsic REward), a flexible and elegant framework for creating hybrid intrinsic rewards through deliberate fusion strategies. With HIRE, we conduct a systematic analysis of the application of hybrid intrinsic rewards in both general and unsupervised RL across multiple benchmarks. Extensive experiments demonstrate that HIRE can significantly enhance exploration efficiency and diversity, as well as skill acquisition in complex and dynamic settings.

Navigating safely and efficiently in dense and heterogeneous traffic scenarios is challenging for autonomous vehicles (AVs) due to their inability to infer the behaviors or intentions of nearby drivers. In this work, we introduce a distributed multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) algorithm that can predict trajectories and intents in dense and heterogeneous traffic scenarios. Our approach for intent-aware planning, iPLAN, allows agents to infer nearby drivers' intents solely from their local observations. We model two distinct incentives for agents' strategies: Behavioral Incentive for high-level decision-making based on their driving behavior or personality and Instant Incentive for motion planning for collision avoidance based on the current traffic state. Our approach enables agents to infer their opponents' behavior incentives and integrate this inferred information into their decision-making and motion-planning processes. We perform experiments on two simulation environments, Non-Cooperative Navigation and Heterogeneous Highway. In Heterogeneous Highway, results show that, compared with centralized training decentralized execution (CTDE) MARL baselines such as QMIX and MAPPO, our method yields a 4.3% and 38.4% higher episodic reward in mild and chaotic traffic, with 48.1% higher success rate and 80.6% longer survival time in chaotic traffic. We also compare with a decentralized training decentralized execution (DTDE) baseline IPPO and demonstrate a higher episodic reward of 12.7% and 6.3% in mild traffic and chaotic traffic, 25.3% higher success rate, and 13.7% longer survival time.

Multi-agent systems commonly distribute tasks among specialized, autonomous agents, yet they often lack mechanisms to replace or reassign underperforming agents in real time. Inspired by the free-agency model of Major League Baseball, the Reinforcement Learning Free Agent (RLFA) algorithm introduces a reward-based mechanism to detect and remove agents exhibiting persistent underperformance and seamlessly insert more capable ones. Each agent internally uses a mixture-of-experts (MoE) approach, delegating incoming tasks to specialized sub-models under the guidance of a gating function. A primary use case is fraud detection, where RLFA promptly swaps out an agent whose detection accuracy dips below a preset threshold. A new agent is tested in a probationary mode, and upon demonstrating superior performance, fully replaces the underperformer. This dynamic, free-agency cycle ensures sustained accuracy, quicker adaptation to emerging threats, and minimal disruption to ongoing operations. By continually refreshing its roster of agents, the system fosters ongoing improvements and more resilient collaboration in multi-agent Generative AI environments.

In cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), agents aim to achieve a common goal, such as defeating enemies or scoring a goal. Existing MARL algorithms are effective but still require significant learning time and often get trapped in local optima by complex tasks, subsequently failing to discover a goal-reaching policy. To address this, we introduce Efficient episodic Memory Utilization (EMU) for MARL, with two primary objectives: (a) accelerating reinforcement learning by leveraging semantically coherent memory from an episodic buffer and (b) selectively promoting desirable transitions to prevent local convergence. To achieve (a), EMU incorporates a trainable encoder/decoder structure alongside MARL, creating coherent memory embeddings that facilitate exploratory memory recall. To achieve (b), EMU introduces a novel reward structure called episodic incentive based on the desirability of states. This reward improves the TD target in Q-learning and acts as an additional incentive for desirable transitions. We provide theoretical support for the proposed incentive and demonstrate the effectiveness of EMU compared to conventional episodic control. The proposed method is evaluated in StarCraft II and Google Research Football, and empirical results indicate further performance improvement over state-of-the-art methods.

Randomized mechanisms can have good normative properties compared to their deterministic counterparts. However, randomized mechanisms are problematic in several ways such as in their verifiability. We propose here to derandomize such mechanisms by having agents play a game instead of tossing a coin. The game is designed so an agent's best action is to play randomly, and this play then injects ``randomness'' into the mechanism. This derandomization retains many of the good normative properties of the original randomized mechanism but gives a mechanism that is deterministic and easy, for instance, to audit. We consider three related methods to derandomize randomized mechanism in six different domains: voting, facility location, task allocation, school choice, peer selection, and resource allocation. We propose a number of novel derandomized mechanisms for these six domains with good normative properties. Each mechanism has a mixed Nash equilibrium in which agents play a modular arithmetic game with an uniform mixed strategy. In all but one mixed Nash equilibrium, agents report their preferences over the original problem sincerely. The derandomized methods are thus ``quasi-strategy proof''. In one domain, we additionally show that a new and desirable normative property emerges as a result of derandomization.

Large reasoning models achieve remarkable performance through extensive chain-of-thought generation, yet exhibit significant computational inefficiency by applying uniform reasoning strategies regardless of problem complexity. We present Hierarchical Budget Policy Optimization (HBPO), a reinforcement learning framework that enables models to learn problem-specific reasoning depths without sacrificing capability. HBPO addresses the fundamental challenge of exploration space collapse in efficiency-oriented training, where penalties on long output length systematically bias models away from necessary long reasoning paths. Through hierarchical budget exploration, our approach partitions rollout samples into multiple subgroups with distinct token budgets, aiming to enable efficient resource allocation while preventing degradation of capability. We introduce differentiated reward mechanisms that create budget-aware incentives aligned with the complexity of the problem, allowing models to discover natural correspondences between task requirements and computational effort. Extensive experiments demonstrate that HBPO reduces average token usage by up to 60.6% while improving accuracy by 3.14% across four reasoning benchmarks. Unlike existing methods that impose external constraints or rely on discrete mode selection, HBPO exhibits emergent adaptive behavior where models automatically adjust reasoning depth based on problem complexity. Our results suggest that reasoning efficiency and capability are not inherently conflicting, and can be simultaneously optimized through appropriately structured hierarchical training that preserves exploration diversity.

Reward functions are central in reinforcement learning (RL), guiding agents towards optimal decision-making. The complexity of RL tasks requires meticulously designed reward functions that effectively drive learning while avoiding unintended consequences. Effective reward design aims to provide signals that accelerate the agent's convergence to optimal behavior. Crafting rewards that align with task objectives, foster desired behaviors, and prevent undesirable actions is inherently challenging. This thesis delves into the critical role of reward signals in RL, highlighting their impact on the agent's behavior and learning dynamics and addressing challenges such as delayed, ambiguous, or intricate rewards. In this thesis work, we tackle different aspects of reward shaping. First, we address the problem of designing informative and interpretable reward signals from a teacher's/expert's perspective (teacher-driven). Here, the expert, equipped with the optimal policy and the corresponding value function, designs reward signals that expedite the agent's convergence to optimal behavior. Second, we build on this teacher-driven approach by introducing a novel method for adaptive interpretable reward design. In this scenario, the expert tailors the rewards based on the learner's current policy, ensuring alignment and optimal progression. Third, we propose a meta-learning approach, enabling the agent to self-design its reward signals online without expert input (agent-driven). This self-driven method considers the agent's learning and exploration to establish a self-improving feedback loop.

This paper argues that market governance mechanisms should be considered a key approach in the governance of artificial intelligence (AI), alongside traditional regulatory frameworks. While current governance approaches have predominantly focused on regulation, we contend that market-based mechanisms offer effective incentives for responsible AI development. We examine four emerging vectors of market governance: insurance, auditing, procurement, and due diligence, demonstrating how these mechanisms can affirm the relationship between AI risk and financial risk while addressing capital allocation inefficiencies. While we do not claim that market forces alone can adequately protect societal interests, we maintain that standardised AI disclosures and market mechanisms can create powerful incentives for safe and responsible AI development. This paper urges regulators, economists, and machine learning researchers to investigate and implement market-based approaches to AI governance.

Current reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) pipelines for large language model (LLM) alignment typically assign scalar rewards to sequences, using the final token as a surrogate indicator for the quality of the entire sequence. However, this leads to sparse feedback and suboptimal token-level credit assignment. In this work, we frame reward shaping as an optimization problem focused on token-level credit assignment. We propose a reward-shaping function leveraging explainability methods such as SHAP and LIME to estimate per-token rewards from the reward model. To learn parameters of this shaping function, we employ a bilevel optimization framework that integrates Bayesian Optimization and policy training to handle noise from the token reward estimates. Our experiments show that achieving a better balance of token-level reward attribution leads to performance improvements over baselines on downstream tasks and finds an optimal policy faster during training. Furthermore, we show theoretically that explainability methods that are feature additive attribution functions maintain the optimal policy as the original reward.

With the increasing importance of data sharing for collaboration and innovation, it is becoming more important to ensure that data is managed and shared in a secure and trustworthy manner. Data governance is a common approach to managing data, but it faces many challenges such as data silos, data consistency, privacy, security, and access control. To address these challenges, this paper proposes a comprehensive framework that integrates data trust in federated learning with InterPlanetary File System, blockchain, and smart contracts to facilitate secure and mutually beneficial data sharing while providing incentives, access control mechanisms, and penalizing any dishonest behavior. The experimental results demonstrate that the proposed model is effective in improving the accuracy of federated learning models while ensuring the security and fairness of the data-sharing process. The research paper also presents a decentralized federated learning platform that successfully trained a CNN model on the MNIST dataset using blockchain technology. The platform enables multiple workers to train the model simultaneously while maintaining data privacy and security. The decentralized architecture and use of blockchain technology allow for efficient communication and coordination between workers. This platform has the potential to facilitate decentralized machine learning and support privacy-preserving collaboration in various domains.

Reward design in reinforcement learning (RL) is challenging since specifying human notions of desired behavior may be difficult via reward functions or require many expert demonstrations. Can we instead cheaply design rewards using a natural language interface? This paper explores how to simplify reward design by prompting a large language model (LLM) such as GPT-3 as a proxy reward function, where the user provides a textual prompt containing a few examples (few-shot) or a description (zero-shot) of the desired behavior. Our approach leverages this proxy reward function in an RL framework. Specifically, users specify a prompt once at the beginning of training. During training, the LLM evaluates an RL agent's behavior against the desired behavior described by the prompt and outputs a corresponding reward signal. The RL agent then uses this reward to update its behavior. We evaluate whether our approach can train agents aligned with user objectives in the Ultimatum Game, matrix games, and the DealOrNoDeal negotiation task. In all three tasks, we show that RL agents trained with our framework are well-aligned with the user's objectives and outperform RL agents trained with reward functions learned via supervised learning

We consider the obnoxious facility location problem (in which agents prefer the facility location to be far from them) and propose a hierarchy of distance-based proportional fairness concepts for the problem. These fairness axioms ensure that groups of agents at the same location are guaranteed to be a distance from the facility proportional to their group size. We consider deterministic and randomized mechanisms, and compute tight bounds on the price of proportional fairness. In the deterministic setting, we show that our proportional fairness axioms are incompatible with strategyproofness, and prove asymptotically tight epsilon-price of anarchy and stability bounds for proportionally fair welfare-optimal mechanisms. In the randomized setting, we identify proportionally fair and strategyproof mechanisms that give an expected welfare within a constant factor of the optimal welfare. Finally, we prove existence results for two extensions to our model.

We utilize an offline reinforcement learning (RL) model for sequential targeted promotion in the presence of budget constraints in a real-world business environment. In our application, the mobile app aims to boost customer retention by sending cash bonuses to customers and control the costs of such cash bonuses during each time period. To achieve the multi-task goal, we propose the Budget Constrained Reinforcement Learning for Sequential Promotion (BCRLSP) framework to determine the value of cash bonuses to be sent to users. We first find out the target policy and the associated Q-values that maximizes the user retention rate using an RL model. A linear programming (LP) model is then added to satisfy the constraints of promotion costs. We solve the LP problem by maximizing the Q-values of actions learned from the RL model given the budget constraints. During deployment, we combine the offline RL model with the LP model to generate a robust policy under the budget constraints. Using both online and offline experiments, we demonstrate the efficacy of our approach by showing that BCRLSP achieves a higher long-term customer retention rate and a lower cost than various baselines. Taking advantage of the near real-time cost control method, the proposed framework can easily adapt to data with a noisy behavioral policy and/or meet flexible budget constraints.

Large-scale high-quality training data is important for improving the performance of models. After trained with data that has rationales (reasoning steps), models gain reasoning capability. However, the dataset with high-quality rationales is relatively scarce due to the high annotation cost. To address this issue, we propose Self-motivated Learning framework. The framework motivates the model itself to automatically generate rationales on existing datasets. Based on the inherent rank from correctness across multiple rationales, the model learns to generate better rationales, leading to higher reasoning capability. Specifically, we train a reward model with the rank to evaluate the quality of rationales, and improve the performance of reasoning through reinforcement learning. Experiment results of Llama2 7B on multiple reasoning datasets show that our method significantly improves the reasoning ability of models, even outperforming text-davinci-002 in some datasets.

We focus on a simple, one-dimensional collective decision problem (often referred to as the facility location problem) and explore issues of strategyproofness and proportionality-based fairness. We introduce and analyze a hierarchy of proportionality-based fairness axioms of varying strength: Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS), Proportionality (as in Freeman et al, 2021), and Proportional Fairness (PF). For each axiom, we characterize the family of mechanisms that satisfy the axiom and strategyproofness. We show that imposing strategyproofness renders many of the axioms to be equivalent: the family of mechanisms that satisfy proportionality, unanimity, and strategyproofness is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy UFS and strategyproofness, which, in turn, is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy PF and strategyproofness. Furthermore, there is a unique such mechanism: the Uniform Phantom mechanism, which is studied in Freeman et al. (2021). We also characterize the outcomes of the Uniform Phantom mechanism as the unique (pure) equilibrium outcome for any mechanism that satisfies continuity, strict monotonicity, and UFS. Finally, we analyze the approximation guarantees, in terms of optimal social welfare and minimum total cost, obtained by mechanisms that are strategyproof and satisfy each proportionality-based fairness axiom. We show that the Uniform Phantom mechanism provides the best approximation of the optimal social welfare (and also minimum total cost) among all mechanisms that satisfy UFS.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance in reasoning tasks, where reinforcement learning (RL) serves as a key algorithm for enhancing their reasoning capabilities. Currently, there are two mainstream reward paradigms: model-based rewards and rule-based rewards. However, both approaches suffer from limitations: rule-based rewards lack robustness, while model-based rewards are vulnerable to reward hacking. To address these issues, we propose Cooper(Co-optimizing Policy Model and Reward Model), a RL framework that jointly optimizes both the policy model and the reward model. Cooper leverages the high precision of rule-based rewards when identifying correct responses, and dynamically constructs and selects positive-negative sample pairs for continued training the reward model. This design enhances robustness and mitigates the risk of reward hacking. To further support Cooper, we introduce a hybrid annotation strategy that efficiently and accurately generates training data for the reward model. We also propose a reference-based reward modeling paradigm, where the reward model takes a reference answer as input. Based on this design, we train a reward model named VerifyRM, which achieves higher accuracy on VerifyBench compared to other models of the same size. We conduct reinforcement learning using both VerifyRM and Cooper. Our experiments show that Cooper not only alleviates reward hacking but also improves end-to-end RL performance, for instance, achieving a 0.54% gain in average accuracy on Qwen2.5-1.5B-Instruct. Our findings demonstrate that dynamically updating reward model is an effective way to combat reward hacking, providing a reference for better integrating reward models into RL.

Competitions for shareable and limited resources have long been studied with strategic agents. In reality, agents often have to learn and maximize the rewards of the resources at the same time. To design an individualized competing policy, we model the competition between agents in a novel multi-player multi-armed bandit (MPMAB) setting where players are selfish and aim to maximize their own rewards. In addition, when several players pull the same arm, we assume that these players averagely share the arms' rewards by expectation. Under this setting, we first analyze the Nash equilibrium when arms' rewards are known. Subsequently, we propose a novel SelfishMPMAB with Averaging Allocation (SMAA) approach based on the equilibrium. We theoretically demonstrate that SMAA could achieve a good regret guarantee for each player when all players follow the algorithm. Additionally, we establish that no single selfish player can significantly increase their rewards through deviation, nor can they detrimentally affect other players' rewards without incurring substantial losses for themselves. We finally validate the effectiveness of the method in extensive synthetic experiments.

We propose the PeerRank method for peer assessment. This constructs a grade for an agent based on the grades proposed by the agents evaluating the agent. Since the grade of an agent is a measure of their ability to grade correctly, the PeerRank method weights grades by the grades of the grading agent. The PeerRank method also provides an incentive for agents to grade correctly. As the grades of an agent depend on the grades of the grading agents, and as these grades themselves depend on the grades of other agents, we define the PeerRank method by a fixed point equation similar to the PageRank method for ranking web-pages. We identify some formal properties of the PeerRank method (for example, it satisfies axioms of unanimity, no dummy, no discrimination and symmetry), discuss some examples, compare with related work and evaluate the performance on some synthetic data. Our results show considerable promise, reducing the error in grade predictions by a factor of 2 or more in many cases over the natural baseline of averaging peer grades.

Reward models play a key role in aligning language model applications towards human preferences. However, this setup creates an incentive for the language model to exploit errors in the reward model to achieve high estimated reward, a phenomenon often termed reward hacking. A natural mitigation is to train an ensemble of reward models, aggregating over model outputs to obtain a more robust reward estimate. We explore the application of reward ensembles to alignment at both training time (through reinforcement learning) and inference time (through reranking). First, we show that reward models are underspecified: reward models that perform similarly in-distribution can yield very different rewards when used in alignment, due to distribution shift. Second, underspecification results in overoptimization, where alignment to one reward model does not improve reward as measured by another reward model trained on the same data. Third, overoptimization is mitigated by the use of reward ensembles, and ensembles that vary by their pretraining seeds lead to better generalization than ensembles that differ only by their fine-tuning seeds, with both outperforming individual reward models. However, even pretrain reward ensembles do not eliminate reward hacking: we show several qualitative reward hacking phenomena that are not mitigated by ensembling because all reward models in the ensemble exhibit similar error patterns.

We consider the problem of locating a facility to serve a set of agents located along a line. The Nash welfare objective function, defined as the product of the agents' utilities, is known to provide a compromise between fairness and efficiency in resource allocation problems. We apply this welfare notion to the facility location problem, converting individual costs to utilities and analyzing the facility placement that maximizes the Nash welfare. We give a polynomial-time approximation algorithm to compute this facility location, and prove results suggesting that it achieves a good balance of fairness and efficiency. Finally, we take a mechanism design perspective and propose a strategy-proof mechanism with a bounded approximation ratio for Nash welfare.

It is clear that one of the primary tools we can use to mitigate the potential risk from a misbehaving AI system is the ability to turn the system off. As the capabilities of AI systems improve, it is important to ensure that such systems do not adopt subgoals that prevent a human from switching them off. This is a challenge because many formulations of rational agents create strong incentives for self-preservation. This is not caused by a built-in instinct, but because a rational agent will maximize expected utility and cannot achieve whatever objective it has been given if it is dead. Our goal is to study the incentives an agent has to allow itself to be switched off. We analyze a simple game between a human H and a robot R, where H can press R's off switch but R can disable the off switch. A traditional agent takes its reward function for granted: we show that such agents have an incentive to disable the off switch, except in the special case where H is perfectly rational. Our key insight is that for R to want to preserve its off switch, it needs to be uncertain about the utility associated with the outcome, and to treat H's actions as important observations about that utility. (R also has no incentive to switch itself off in this setting.) We conclude that giving machines an appropriate level of uncertainty about their objectives leads to safer designs, and we argue that this setting is a useful generalization of the classical AI paradigm of rational agents.

The temporal credit assignment problem is a central challenge in Reinforcement Learning (RL), concerned with attributing the appropriate influence to each actions in a trajectory for their ability to achieve a goal. However, when feedback is delayed and sparse, the learning signal is poor, and action evaluation becomes harder. Canonical solutions, such as reward shaping and options, require extensive domain knowledge and manual intervention, limiting their scalability and applicability. In this work, we lay the foundations for Credit Assignment with Language Models (CALM), a novel approach that leverages Large Language Models (LLMs) to automate credit assignment via reward shaping and options discovery. CALM uses LLMs to decompose a task into elementary subgoals and assess the achievement of these subgoals in state-action transitions. Every time an option terminates, a subgoal is achieved, and CALM provides an auxiliary reward. This additional reward signal can enhance the learning process when the task reward is sparse and delayed without the need for human-designed rewards. We provide a preliminary evaluation of CALM using a dataset of human-annotated demonstrations from MiniHack, suggesting that LLMs can be effective in assigning credit in zero-shot settings, without examples or LLM fine-tuning. Our preliminary results indicate that the knowledge of LLMs is a promising prior for credit assignment in RL, facilitating the transfer of human knowledge into value functions.

Reinforcement fine-tuning (RFT) often suffers from reward over-optimization, where a policy model hacks the reward signals to achieve high scores while producing low-quality outputs. Our theoretical analysis shows that the key lies in reward misspecification at the high-reward tail: the inability to reliably distinguish Excellent responses from merely Great ones. This motivate us to focus on the high-reward region. However, such tail examples are scarce under the base LLM. While off-policy exemplars (e.g. from stronger models or rewrites) are easier to obtain, naively training on them yields a misspecified reward for the policy we aim to align. To address this, we study rubric-based rewards. By design, rubrics can leverage off-policy examples while remaining insensitive to their artifacts. To elicit rubrics that capture the high-reward tail, we highlight the importance of distinguishing among great and diverse responses, and introduce a workflow to implement this idea. We empirically demonstrate that rubric-based rewards substantially mitigate reward over-optimization and deliver effective LLM post-training improvements. Our code can be accessed at https://github.com/Jun-Kai-Zhang/rubrics.git .

We study a class of reinforcement learning problems where the reward signals for policy learning are generated by a discriminator that is dependent on and jointly optimized with the policy. This interdependence between the policy and the discriminator leads to an unstable learning process because reward signals from an immature discriminator are noisy and impede policy learning, and conversely, an untrained policy impedes discriminator learning. We call this learning setting Internally Rewarded Reinforcement Learning (IRRL) as the reward is not provided directly by the environment but internally by the discriminator. In this paper, we formally formulate IRRL and present a class of problems that belong to IRRL. We theoretically derive and empirically analyze the effect of the reward function in IRRL and based on these analyses propose the clipped linear reward function. Experimental results show that the proposed reward function can consistently stabilize the training process by reducing the impact of reward noise, which leads to faster convergence and higher performance compared with baselines in diverse tasks.

We introduce an exploration bonus for deep reinforcement learning methods that is easy to implement and adds minimal overhead to the computation performed. The bonus is the error of a neural network predicting features of the observations given by a fixed randomly initialized neural network. We also introduce a method to flexibly combine intrinsic and extrinsic rewards. We find that the random network distillation (RND) bonus combined with this increased flexibility enables significant progress on several hard exploration Atari games. In particular we establish state of the art performance on Montezuma's Revenge, a game famously difficult for deep reinforcement learning methods. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first method that achieves better than average human performance on this game without using demonstrations or having access to the underlying state of the game, and occasionally completes the first level.

We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility result that no strategy proof mechanism can bound the approximation ratio of the optimal Gini index of utilities for one or more facilities. We propose instead computing approximation ratios of the complemented Gini index of utilities, and consider how well both deterministic and randomized mechanisms approximate this. In addition, as Nash welfare is often put forwards as an equitable compromise between egalitarian and utilitarian outcomes, we consider how well mechanisms approximate the Nash welfare.

Reinforcement learning usually uses the feedback rewards of environmental to train agents. But the rewards in the actual environment are sparse, and even some environments will not rewards. Most of the current methods are difficult to get good performance in sparse reward or non-reward environments. Although using shaped rewards is effective when solving sparse reward tasks, it is limited to specific problems and learning is also susceptible to local optima. We propose a model-free method that does not rely on environmental rewards to solve the problem of sparse rewards in the general environment. Our method use the minimum number of transitions between states as the distance to replace the rewards of environmental, and proposes a goal-distance gradient to achieve policy improvement. We also introduce a bridge point planning method based on the characteristics of our method to improve exploration efficiency, thereby solving more complex tasks. Experiments show that our method performs better on sparse reward and local optimal problems in complex environments than previous work.

In reinforcement learning from human feedback, it is common to optimize against a reward model trained to predict human preferences. Because the reward model is an imperfect proxy, optimizing its value too much can hinder ground truth performance, in accordance with Goodhart's law. This effect has been frequently observed, but not carefully measured due to the expense of collecting human preference data. In this work, we use a synthetic setup in which a fixed "gold-standard" reward model plays the role of humans, providing labels used to train a proxy reward model. We study how the gold reward model score changes as we optimize against the proxy reward model using either reinforcement learning or best-of-n sampling. We find that this relationship follows a different functional form depending on the method of optimization, and that in both cases its coefficients scale smoothly with the number of reward model parameters. We also study the effect on this relationship of the size of the reward model dataset, the number of reward model and policy parameters, and the coefficient of the KL penalty added to the reward in the reinforcement learning setup. We explore the implications of these empirical results for theoretical considerations in AI alignment.

A prevailing view in Reinforcement Learning for Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) interprets recent progress through the lens of an exploration-exploitation trade-off, a perspective largely shaped by token-level metrics. We re-examine this perspective, proposing that this perceived trade-off may not be a fundamental constraint but rather an artifact of the measurement level. To investigate this, we shift the analysis to the semantically rich hidden-state space, adopting Effective Rank (ER) to quantify exploration and proposing its novel first- and second-order derivatives, named Effective Rank Velocity (ERV) and Effective Rank Acceleration (ERA), to capture exploitation dynamics. Our analysis reveals that at the hidden-state level, exploration and exploitation could be decoupled (Sec. 4). This finding reveals an opportunity to enhance both capacities simultaneously. This insight motivates our method, Velocity-Exploiting Rank-Learning (VERL), the first to operationalize the principle of synergistic exploration-exploitation enhancement by directly shaping the RL advantage function. The key innovation is leveraging the theoretically stable ERA as a predictive meta-controller to create a synergistic, dual-channel incentive structure. Instead of forcing a trade-off, VERL prospectively amplifies rewards for exploration to preempt overconfidence and reinforces exploitative gains to consolidate reasoning. Experiments across diverse LLMs and reasoning benchmarks show consistent gains, including up to 21.4% absolute accuracy improvement on the challenging Gaokao 2024 dataset.

Although reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) shows promise in improving the reasoning ability of large language models (LLMs), the scaling up dilemma remains due to the reliance on human annotated labels especially for complex tasks. Recent alternatives that explore various self-reward signals exhibit the eliciting potential of LLM reasoning, but suffer from the non-negligible collapse issue. Inspired by the success of self-supervised learning, we propose Co-Reward, a novel RL framework that leverages contrastive agreement across semantically analogical questions as a reward basis. Specifically, we construct a similar question for each training sample (without labels) and synthesize their individual surrogate labels through a simple rollout voting, and then the reward is constructed by cross-referring the labels of each question pair to enforce the internal reasoning consistency across analogical inputs. Intuitively, such a self-supervised reward-shaping mechanism increases the difficulty of learning collapse into a trivial solution, and promotes stable reasoning elicitation and improvement through expanding the input sample variants. Empirically, Co-Reward achieves superior performance compared to other self-reward baselines on multiple reasoning benchmarks and LLM series, and reaches or even surpasses ground-truth (GT) labeled reward, with improvements of up to +6.8% on MATH500 over GT reward on Llama-3.2-3B-Instruct. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/tmlr-group/Co-Reward.

One of the challenges in applying reinforcement learning in a complex real-world environment lies in providing the agent with a sufficiently detailed reward function. Any misalignment between the reward and the desired behavior can result in unwanted outcomes. This may lead to issues like "reward hacking" where the agent maximizes rewards by unintended behavior. In this work, we propose to disentangle the reward into two distinct parts. A simple task-specific reward, outlining the particulars of the task at hand, and an unknown common-sense reward, indicating the expected behavior of the agent within the environment. We then explore how this common-sense reward can be learned from expert demonstrations. We first show that inverse reinforcement learning, even when it succeeds in training an agent, does not learn a useful reward function. That is, training a new agent with the learned reward does not impair the desired behaviors. We then demonstrate that this problem can be solved by training simultaneously on multiple tasks. That is, multi-task inverse reinforcement learning can be applied to learn a useful reward function.

Credit assignment, the process of attributing credit or blame to individual agents for their contributions to a team's success or failure, remains a fundamental challenge in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), particularly in environments with sparse rewards. Commonly-used approaches such as value decomposition often lead to suboptimal policies in these settings, and designing dense reward functions that align with human intuition can be complex and labor-intensive. In this work, we propose a novel framework where a large language model (LLM) generates dense, agent-specific rewards based on a natural language description of the task and the overall team goal. By learning a potential-based reward function over multiple queries, our method reduces the impact of ranking errors while allowing the LLM to evaluate each agent's contribution to the overall task. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that our approach achieves faster convergence and higher policy returns compared to state-of-the-art MARL baselines.

Reward models have been increasingly critical for improving the reasoning capability of LLMs. Existing research has shown that a well-trained reward model can substantially improve model performances at inference time via search. However, the potential of reward models during RL training time still remains largely under-explored. It is currently unclear whether these reward models can provide additional training signals to enhance the reasoning capabilities of LLMs in RL training that uses sparse success rewards, which verify the correctness of solutions. In this work, we evaluate popular reward models for RL training, including the Outcome-supervised Reward Model (ORM) and the Process-supervised Reward Model (PRM), and train a collection of LLMs for math problems using RL by combining these learned rewards with success rewards. Surprisingly, even though these learned reward models have strong inference-time performances, they may NOT help or even hurt RL training, producing worse performances than LLMs trained with the success reward only. Our analysis reveals that an LLM can receive high rewards from some of these reward models by repeating correct but unnecessary reasoning steps, leading to a severe reward hacking issue. Therefore, we introduce two novel reward refinement techniques, including Clipping and Delta. The key idea is to ensure the accumulative reward of any reasoning trajectory is upper-bounded to keep a learned reward model effective without being exploited. We evaluate our techniques with multiple reward models over a set of 1.5B and 7B LLMs on MATH and GSM8K benchmarks and demonstrate that with a carefully designed reward function, RL training without any additional supervised tuning can improve all the evaluated LLMs, including the state-of-the-art 7B LLM Qwen2.5-Math-7B-Instruct on MATH and GSM8K benchmarks.

Motivated by the phenomenon of strategic agents gaming a recommender system to maximize the number of times they are recommended to users, we study a strategic variant of the linear contextual bandit problem, where the arms can strategically misreport privately observed contexts to the learner. We treat the algorithm design problem as one of mechanism design under uncertainty and propose the Optimistic Grim Trigger Mechanism (OptGTM) that incentivizes the agents (i.e., arms) to report their contexts truthfully while simultaneously minimizing regret. We also show that failing to account for the strategic nature of the agents results in linear regret. However, a trade-off between mechanism design and regret minimization appears to be unavoidable. More broadly, this work aims to provide insight into the intersection of online learning and mechanism design.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in reasoning, yet sometimes produce responses that are suboptimal for users in tasks such as writing, information seeking, or providing practical guidance. Conventional alignment practices typically assume that maximizing model reward also maximizes user welfare, but this assumption frequently fails in practice: models may over-clarify or generate overly verbose reasoning when users prefer concise answers. Such behaviors resemble the prisoner's dilemma, where individually rational choices lead to socially suboptimal outcomes. The fundamental challenge is the lack of a principled decision making mechanism that mutually benefits both the LLM and the user. We propose Game-Theoretic Alignment (GTAlign), an alignment framework that integrates game-theoretic decision making into both reasoning and training. During reasoning, the model explicitly treats user-LLM interaction as a strategic game: it constructs payoff matrices within its reasoning chain to estimate welfare for both itself and the user, and then selects actions that are mutually beneficial. During training, we introduce a mutual welfare reward that reinforces cooperative responses, aligning model behavior with socially efficient outcomes. In addition, we introduce an inference technique that leverages game-theoretic reasoning to dynamically adapt LLM's response when pricing policies of LLM service change. Extensive experiments demonstrate that GTAlign substantially improves reasoning efficiency, answer quality, and mutual welfare compared to baselines across diverse tasks. The code is available at https://github.com/ulab-uiuc/GTAlign .

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) has emerged as a powerful technique to make large language models (LLMs) easier to use and more effective. A core piece of the RLHF process is the training and utilization of a model of human preferences that acts as a reward function for optimization. This approach, which operates at the intersection of many stakeholders and academic disciplines, remains poorly understood. RLHF reward models are often cited as being central to achieving performance, yet very few descriptors of capabilities, evaluations, training methods, or open-source models exist. Given this lack of information, further study and transparency is needed for learned RLHF reward models. In this paper, we illustrate the complex history of optimizing preferences, and articulate lines of inquiry to understand the sociotechnical context of reward models. In particular, we highlight the ontological differences between costs, rewards, and preferences at stake in RLHF's foundations, related methodological tensions, and possible research directions to improve general understanding of how reward models function.

Curiosity-based reward schemes can present powerful exploration mechanisms which facilitate the discovery of solutions for complex, sparse or long-horizon tasks. However, as the agent learns to reach previously unexplored spaces and the objective adapts to reward new areas, many behaviours emerge only to disappear due to being overwritten by the constantly shifting objective. We argue that merely using curiosity for fast environment exploration or as a bonus reward for a specific task does not harness the full potential of this technique and misses useful skills. Instead, we propose to shift the focus towards retaining the behaviours which emerge during curiosity-based learning. We posit that these self-discovered behaviours serve as valuable skills in an agent's repertoire to solve related tasks. Our experiments demonstrate the continuous shift in behaviour throughout training and the benefits of a simple policy snapshot method to reuse discovered behaviour for transfer tasks.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has been widely used in text generation to alleviate the exposure bias issue or to utilize non-parallel datasets. The reward function plays an important role in making RL training successful. However, previous reward functions are typically task-specific and sparse, restricting the use of RL. In our work, we propose a task-agnostic approach that derives a step-wise reward function directly from a model trained with teacher forcing. We additionally propose a simple modification to stabilize the RL training on non-parallel datasets with our induced reward function. Empirical results show that our method outperforms self-training and reward regression methods on several text generation tasks, confirming the effectiveness of our reward function.

Diffusion models have emerged as the de facto paradigm for video generation. However, their reliance on web-scale data of varied quality often yields results that are visually unappealing and misaligned with the textual prompts. To tackle this problem, we propose InstructVideo to instruct text-to-video diffusion models with human feedback by reward fine-tuning. InstructVideo has two key ingredients: 1) To ameliorate the cost of reward fine-tuning induced by generating through the full DDIM sampling chain, we recast reward fine-tuning as editing. By leveraging the diffusion process to corrupt a sampled video, InstructVideo requires only partial inference of the DDIM sampling chain, reducing fine-tuning cost while improving fine-tuning efficiency. 2) To mitigate the absence of a dedicated video reward model for human preferences, we repurpose established image reward models, e.g., HPSv2. To this end, we propose Segmental Video Reward, a mechanism to provide reward signals based on segmental sparse sampling, and Temporally Attenuated Reward, a method that mitigates temporal modeling degradation during fine-tuning. Extensive experiments, both qualitative and quantitative, validate the practicality and efficacy of using image reward models in InstructVideo, significantly enhancing the visual quality of generated videos without compromising generalization capabilities. Code and models will be made publicly available.

Reinforcement learning (RL) often encounters delayed and sparse feedback in real-world applications, even with only episodic rewards. Previous approaches have made some progress in reward redistribution for credit assignment but still face challenges, including training difficulties due to redundancy and ambiguous attributions stemming from overlooking the multifaceted nature of mission performance evaluation. Hopefully, Large Language Model (LLM) encompasses fruitful decision-making knowledge and provides a plausible tool for reward redistribution. Even so, deploying LLM in this case is non-trivial due to the misalignment between linguistic knowledge and the symbolic form requirement, together with inherent randomness and hallucinations in inference. To tackle these issues, we introduce LaRe, a novel LLM-empowered symbolic-based decision-making framework, to improve credit assignment. Key to LaRe is the concept of the Latent Reward, which works as a multi-dimensional performance evaluation, enabling more interpretable goal attainment from various perspectives and facilitating more effective reward redistribution. We examine that semantically generated code from LLM can bridge linguistic knowledge and symbolic latent rewards, as it is executable for symbolic objects. Meanwhile, we design latent reward self-verification to increase the stability and reliability of LLM inference. Theoretically, reward-irrelevant redundancy elimination in the latent reward benefits RL performance from more accurate reward estimation. Extensive experimental results witness that LaRe (i) achieves superior temporal credit assignment to SOTA methods, (ii) excels in allocating contributions among multiple agents, and (iii) outperforms policies trained with ground truth rewards for certain tasks.

Automatic LLM benchmarks, such as AlpacaEval 2.0, Arena-Hard-Auto, and MT-Bench, have become popular for evaluating language models due to their cost-effectiveness and scalability compared to human evaluation. Achieving high win rates on these benchmarks can significantly boost the promotional impact of newly released language models. This promotional benefit may motivate tricks, such as manipulating model output length or style to game win rates, even though several mechanisms have been developed to control length and disentangle style to reduce gameability. Nonetheless, we show that even a "null model" that always outputs a constant response (irrelevant to input instructions) can cheat automatic benchmarks and achieve top-ranked win rates: an 86.5% LC win rate on AlpacaEval 2.0; an 83.0 score on Arena-Hard-Auto; and a 9.55 score on MT-Bench. Moreover, the crafted cheating outputs are transferable because we assume that the instructions of these benchmarks (e.g., 805 samples of AlpacaEval 2.0) are private and cannot be accessed. While our experiments are primarily proof-of-concept, an adversary could use LLMs to generate more imperceptible cheating responses, unethically benefiting from high win rates and promotional impact. Our findings call for the development of anti-cheating mechanisms for reliable automatic benchmarks. The code is available at https://github.com/sail-sg/Cheating-LLM-Benchmarks.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) is essential for aligning large language models (LLMs) with human values. However, RLHF is susceptible to reward hacking, where the agent exploits flaws in the reward function rather than learning the intended behavior, thus degrading alignment. While reward shaping helps stabilize RLHF and partially mitigate reward hacking, a systematic investigation into shaping techniques and their underlying principles remains lacking. To bridge this gap, we present a comprehensive study of the prevalent reward shaping methods. Our analysis suggests three key design principles: (1) RL reward is ideally bounded, (2) RL benefits from rapid initial growth followed by gradual convergence, and (3) RL reward is best formulated as a function of centered reward. Guided by these insights, we propose Preference As Reward (PAR), a novel approach that leverages the latent preferences embedded within the reward model itself as the signal for reinforcement learning. We evaluated PAR on two base models, Gemma2-2B and Llama3-8B, using two datasets, Ultrafeedback-Binarized and HH-RLHF. Experimental results demonstrate PAR's superior performance over other reward shaping methods. On the AlpacaEval 2.0 benchmark, PAR achieves a win rate at least 5 percentage points higher than competing approaches. Furthermore, PAR exhibits remarkable data efficiency, requiring only a single reference reward for optimal performance, and maintains robustness against reward hacking even after two full epochs of training. Code is available at https://github.com/PorUna-byte/PAR.

We propose Fuzzy Group Relative Policy Reward (FGRPR), a novel framework that integrates Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) with a fuzzy reward function to enhance learning efficiency. Unlike the conventional binary 0/1 accuracy reward, our fuzzy reward model provides nuanced incentives, encouraging more precise outputs. Experimental results demonstrate that GRPO with a standard 0/1 accuracy reward underperforms compared to supervised fine-tuning (SFT). In contrast, FGRPR, applied to Qwen2.5-VL(3B and 7B), surpasses all baseline models, including GPT4o, LLaMA2(90B), and SFT, across five in-domain datasets. On an out-of-domain dataset, FGRPR achieves performance comparable to SFT but excels when target values are larger, as its fuzzy reward function assigns higher rewards to closer approximations. This approach is broadly applicable to tasks where the precision of the answer is critical. Code and data: https://github.com/yeyimilk/CrowdVLM-R1

Implementing a reward function that perfectly captures a complex task in the real world is impractical. As a result, it is often appropriate to think of the reward function as a proxy for the true objective rather than as its definition. We study this phenomenon through the lens of Goodhart's law, which predicts that increasing optimisation of an imperfect proxy beyond some critical point decreases performance on the true objective. First, we propose a way to quantify the magnitude of this effect and show empirically that optimising an imperfect proxy reward often leads to the behaviour predicted by Goodhart's law for a wide range of environments and reward functions. We then provide a geometric explanation for why Goodhart's law occurs in Markov decision processes. We use these theoretical insights to propose an optimal early stopping method that provably avoids the aforementioned pitfall and derive theoretical regret bounds for this method. Moreover, we derive a training method that maximises worst-case reward, for the setting where there is uncertainty about the true reward function. Finally, we evaluate our early stopping method experimentally. Our results support a foundation for a theoretically-principled study of reinforcement learning under reward misspecification.

In the last decade, Deep Reinforcement Learning has evolved into a powerful tool for complex sequential decision-making problems. It combines deep learning's proficiency in processing rich input signals with reinforcement learning's adaptability across diverse control tasks. At its core, an RL agent seeks to maximize its cumulative reward, enabling AI algorithms to uncover novel solutions previously unknown to experts. However, this focus on reward maximization also introduces a significant difficulty: improper reward specification can result in unexpected, misaligned agent behavior and inefficient learning. The complexity of accurately specifying the reward function is further amplified by the sequential nature of the task, the sparsity of learning signals, and the multifaceted aspects of the desired behavior. In this thesis, we survey the literature on effective reward specification strategies, identify core challenges relating to each of these approaches, and propose original contributions addressing the issue of sample efficiency and alignment in deep reinforcement learning. Reward specification represents one of the most challenging aspects of applying reinforcement learning in real-world domains. Our work underscores the absence of a universal solution to this complex and nuanced challenge; solving it requires selecting the most appropriate tools for the specific requirements of each unique application.

We study the incentivized information acquisition problem, where a principal hires an agent to gather information on her behalf. Such a problem is modeled as a Stackelberg game between the principal and the agent, where the principal announces a scoring rule that specifies the payment, and then the agent then chooses an effort level that maximizes her own profit and reports the information. We study the online setting of such a problem from the principal's perspective, i.e., designing the optimal scoring rule by repeatedly interacting with the strategic agent. We design a provably sample efficient algorithm that tailors the UCB algorithm (Auer et al., 2002) to our model, which achieves a sublinear T^{2/3}-regret after T iterations. Our algorithm features a delicate estimation procedure for the optimal profit of the principal, and a conservative correction scheme that ensures the desired agent's actions are incentivized. Furthermore, a key feature of our regret bound is that it is independent of the number of states of the environment.

Because it is difficult to precisely specify complex objectives, reinforcement learning policies are often optimized using proxy reward functions that only approximate the true goal. However, optimizing proxy rewards frequently leads to reward hacking: the optimized reward function ceases to be a good proxy and the resulting policy performs poorly with respect to the unspecified true reward. Principled solutions to reward hacking have been impeded by the lack of a good definition for the problem. To address this gap, we introduce a definition of reward hacking based on the correlation between proxy and true rewards for states and actions seen by a "base policy" that breaks down under optimization. We show that this definition captures reward hacking behavior across several realistic settings, including in reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). Using our formulation, we show theoretically that regularization to the base policy can effectively prevent reward hacking. While the current practice in RLHF applies a KL penalty between action distributions for this purpose, our theory suggests regularizing the chi^2 divergence between the policies' occupancy measures can be more effective. We intuitively show the benefits of this type of regularization and demonstrate that it better mitigates reward hacking in practice across four realistic settings, including RLHF. Our code is available at https://github.com/cassidylaidlaw/orpo.

Coordinating multiple large language models (LLMs) to solve complex tasks collaboratively poses a fundamental trade-off between the computation costs and collective performance compared with individual model. We introduce a novel, game-theoretically grounded reinforcement learning (RL) framework, the Multi-Agent Cooperation Sequential Public Goods Game (MAC-SPGG), to systematically incentivize cooperation in multi-LLM ensembles. In MAC-SPGG, LLM agents move in sequence, observing predecessors' outputs and updating beliefs to condition their own contributions. By redesigning the public-goods reward, effortful contributions become the unique Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE), which eliminates free-riding under traditional SPGG or PGG. Its sequential protocol replaces costly round-based information exchanges with a streamlined decision flow, cutting communication overhead while retaining strategic depth. We prove the existence and uniqueness of the SPNE under realistic parameters, and empirically show that MAC-SPGG-trained ensembles outperform single-agent baselines, chain-of-thought prompting, and other cooperative methods, even achieving comparable performance to large-scale models across reasoning, math, code generation, and NLP tasks. Our results highlight the power of structured, incentive-aligned MAC-SPGG cooperation for scalable and robust multi-agent language generation.

Reward function design and exploration time are arguably the biggest obstacles to the deployment of reinforcement learning (RL) agents in the real world. In many real-world tasks, designing a reward function takes considerable hand engineering and often requires additional sensors to be installed just to measure whether the task has been executed successfully. Furthermore, many interesting tasks consist of multiple implicit intermediate steps that must be executed in sequence. Even when the final outcome can be measured, it does not necessarily provide feedback on these intermediate steps. To address these issues, we propose leveraging the abstraction power of intermediate visual representations learned by deep models to quickly infer perceptual reward functions from small numbers of demonstrations. We present a method that is able to identify key intermediate steps of a task from only a handful of demonstration sequences, and automatically identify the most discriminative features for identifying these steps. This method makes use of the features in a pre-trained deep model, but does not require any explicit specification of sub-goals. The resulting reward functions can then be used by an RL agent to learn to perform the task in real-world settings. To evaluate the learned reward, we present qualitative results on two real-world tasks and a quantitative evaluation against a human-designed reward function. We also show that our method can be used to learn a real-world door opening skill using a real robot, even when the demonstration used for reward learning is provided by a human using their own hand. To our knowledge, these are the first results showing that complex robotic manipulation skills can be learned directly and without supervised labels from a video of a human performing the task. Supplementary material and data are available at https://sermanet.github.io/rewards

Motivated by equilibrium models of labor markets, we develop a formulation of causal strategic classification in which strategic agents can directly manipulate their outcomes. As an application, we compare employers that anticipate the strategic response of a labor force with employers that do not. We show through a combination of theory and experiment that employers with performatively optimal hiring policies improve employer reward, labor force skill level, and in some cases labor force equity. On the other hand, we demonstrate that performative employers harm labor force utility and fail to prevent discrimination in other cases.

Process reward models (PRMs) have proven effective for test-time scaling of Large Language Models (LLMs) on challenging reasoning tasks. However, reward hacking issues with PRMs limit their successful application in reinforcement fine-tuning. In this paper, we identify the main cause of PRM-induced reward hacking: the canonical summation-form credit assignment in reinforcement learning (RL), which defines the value as cumulative gamma-decayed future rewards, easily induces LLMs to hack steps with high rewards. To address this, we propose PURE: Process sUpervised Reinforcement lEarning. The key innovation of PURE is a min-form credit assignment that formulates the value function as the minimum of future rewards. This method significantly alleviates reward hacking by limiting the value function range and distributing advantages more reasonably. Through extensive experiments on 3 base models, we show that PRM-based approaches enabling min-form credit assignment achieve comparable reasoning performance to verifiable reward-based methods within only 30% steps. In contrast, the canonical sum-form credit assignment collapses training even at the beginning! Additionally, when we supplement PRM-based fine-tuning with just 10% verifiable rewards, we further alleviate reward hacking and produce the best fine-tuned model based on Qwen2.5-Math-7B in our experiments, achieving 82.5% accuracy on AMC23 and 53.3% average accuracy across 5 benchmarks. Moreover, we summarize the observed reward hacking cases and analyze the causes of training collapse. Code and models are available at https://github.com/CJReinforce/PURE.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly trained with reinforcement learning (RL) as autonomous agents that reason and act over long horizons in interactive environments. However, sparse and sometimes unverifiable rewards make temporal credit assignment extremely challenging. Recent work attempts to integrate process supervision into agent learning but suffers from biased annotation, reward hacking, high-variance from overly fine-grained signals or failtures when state overlap is rare. We therefore introduce Online Process Reward Learning (OPRL), a general credit-assignment strategy for agentic RL that integrates seamlessly with standard on-policy algorithms without relying on additional rollouts or explicit step labels. In OPRL, we optimize an implicit process reward model (PRM) alternately with the agent's policy to transform trajectory preferences into implicit step rewards through a trajectory-based DPO objective. These step rewards are then used to compute step-level advantages, which are combined with episode-level advantages from outcome rewards for policy update, creating a self-reinforcing loop. Theoretical findings guarantee that the learned step rewards are consistent with trajectory preferences and act as potential-based shaping rewards, providing bounded gradients to stabilize training. Empirically, we evaluate OPRL on three distinct agent benmarks, including WebShop and VisualSokoban, as well as open-ended social interactions with unverfiable rewards in SOTOPIA. Crucially, OPRL shows superior performance over frontier LLMs and strong RL baselines across domains, achieving state-of-the-art results with higher sample-efficiency and lower variance during training. Further analysis also demonstrates the efficient exploration by OPRL using fewer actions, underscoring its potential for agentic learning in real-world scenarios.