Daily Papers

We propose the Intuitive Reasoning Network (IRENE) - a novel neural model for intuitive psychological reasoning about agents' goals, preferences, and actions that can generalise previous experiences to new situations. IRENE combines a graph neural network for learning agent and world state representations with a transformer to encode the task context. When evaluated on the challenging Baby Intuitions Benchmark, IRENE achieves new state-of-the-art performance on three out of its five tasks - with up to 48.9% improvement. In contrast to existing methods, IRENE is able to bind preferences to specific agents, to better distinguish between rational and irrational agents, and to better understand the role of blocking obstacles. We also investigate, for the first time, the influence of the training tasks on test performance. Our analyses demonstrate the effectiveness of IRENE in combining prior knowledge gained during training for unseen evaluation tasks.

AI explanations are often mentioned as a way to improve human-AI decision-making, but empirical studies have not found consistent evidence of explanations' effectiveness and, on the contrary, suggest that they can increase overreliance when the AI system is wrong. While many factors may affect reliance on AI support, one important factor is how decision-makers reconcile their own intuition -- beliefs or heuristics, based on prior knowledge, experience, or pattern recognition, used to make judgments -- with the information provided by the AI system to determine when to override AI predictions. We conduct a think-aloud, mixed-methods study with two explanation types (feature- and example-based) for two prediction tasks to explore how decision-makers' intuition affects their use of AI predictions and explanations, and ultimately their choice of when to rely on AI. Our results identify three types of intuition involved in reasoning about AI predictions and explanations: intuition about the task outcome, features, and AI limitations. Building on these, we summarize three observed pathways for decision-makers to apply their own intuition and override AI predictions. We use these pathways to explain why (1) the feature-based explanations we used did not improve participants' decision outcomes and increased their overreliance on AI, and (2) the example-based explanations we used improved decision-makers' performance over feature-based explanations and helped achieve complementary human-AI performance. Overall, our work identifies directions for further development of AI decision-support systems and explanation methods that help decision-makers effectively apply their intuition to achieve appropriate reliance on AI.

Methods for understanding the decisions of and mechanisms underlying deep neural networks (DNNs) typically rely on building intuition by emphasizing sensory or semantic features of individual examples. For instance, methods aim to visualize the components of an input which are "important" to a network's decision, or to measure the semantic properties of single neurons. Here, we argue that interpretability research suffers from an over-reliance on intuition-based approaches that risk-and in some cases have caused-illusory progress and misleading conclusions. We identify a set of limitations that we argue impede meaningful progress in interpretability research, and examine two popular classes of interpretability methods-saliency and single-neuron-based approaches-that serve as case studies for how overreliance on intuition and lack of falsifiability can undermine interpretability research. To address these concerns, we propose a strategy to address these impediments in the form of a framework for strongly falsifiable interpretability research. We encourage researchers to use their intuitions as a starting point to develop and test clear, falsifiable hypotheses, and hope that our framework yields robust, evidence-based interpretability methods that generate meaningful advances in our understanding of DNNs.

In Marius von Senden's Space and Sight, a newly sighted blind patient describes the experience of a corner as lemon-like, because corners "prick" sight like lemons prick the tongue. Prickliness, here, is a dimension in the feature space of sensory experience, an effect of the perceived on the perceiver that arises where the two interact. In the account of the newly sighted, an effect familiar from one interaction translates to a novel context. Perception serves as the vehicle for generalization, in that an effect shared across different experiences produces a concrete abstraction grounded in those experiences. Cezanne and the post-impressionists, fluent in the language of experience translation, realized that the way to paint a concrete form that best reflected reality was to paint not what they saw, but what it was like to see. We envision a future of creation using AI where what it is like to see is replicable, transferrable, manipulable - part of the artist's palette that is both grounded in a particular context, and generalizable beyond it. An active line of research maps human-interpretable features onto directions in GAN latent space. Supervised and self-supervised approaches that search for anticipated directions or use off-the-shelf classifiers to drive image manipulation in embedding space are limited in the variety of features they can uncover. Unsupervised approaches that discover useful new directions show that the space of perceptually meaningful directions is nowhere close to being fully mapped. As this space is broad and full of creative potential, we want tools for direction discovery that capture the richness and generalizability of human perception. Our approach puts creators in the discovery loop during real-time tool use, in order to identify directions that are perceptually meaningful to them, and generate interpretable image translations along those directions.

Intuitive physics is pivotal for human understanding of the physical world, enabling prediction and interpretation of events even in infancy. Nonetheless, replicating this level of intuitive physics in artificial intelligence (AI) remains a formidable challenge. This study introduces X-VoE, a comprehensive benchmark dataset, to assess AI agents' grasp of intuitive physics. Built on the developmental psychology-rooted Violation of Expectation (VoE) paradigm, X-VoE establishes a higher bar for the explanatory capacities of intuitive physics models. Each VoE scenario within X-VoE encompasses three distinct settings, probing models' comprehension of events and their underlying explanations. Beyond model evaluation, we present an explanation-based learning system that captures physics dynamics and infers occluded object states solely from visual sequences, without explicit occlusion labels. Experimental outcomes highlight our model's alignment with human commonsense when tested against X-VoE. A remarkable feature is our model's ability to visually expound VoE events by reconstructing concealed scenes. Concluding, we discuss the findings' implications and outline future research directions. Through X-VoE, we catalyze the advancement of AI endowed with human-like intuitive physics capabilities.

This work explores the hypothesis that subjectively attributed meaning constitutes the phenomenal content of conscious experience. That is, phenomenal content is semantic. This form of subjective meaning manifests as an intrinsic and non-representational character of qualia. Empirically, subjective meaning is ubiquitous in conscious experiences. We point to phenomenological studies that lend evidence to support this. Furthermore, this notion of meaning closely relates to what Frege refers to as "sense", in metaphysics and philosophy of language. It also aligns with Peirce's "interpretant", in semiotics. We discuss how Frege's sense can also be extended to the raw feels of consciousness. Sense and reference both play a role in phenomenal experience. Moreover, within the context of the mind-matter relation, we provide a formalization of subjective meaning associated to one's mental representations. Identifying the precise maps between the physical and mental domains, we argue that syntactic and semantic structures transcend language, and are realized within each of these domains. Formally, meaning is a relational attribute, realized via a map that interprets syntactic structures of a formal system within an appropriate semantic space. The image of this map within the mental domain is what is relevant for experience, and thus comprises the phenomenal content of qualia. We conclude with possible implications this may have for experience-based theories of consciousness.

We respond to the recent paper by Makelov et al. (2023), which reviews subspace interchange intervention methods like distributed alignment search (DAS; Geiger et al. 2023) and claims that these methods potentially cause "interpretability illusions". We first review Makelov et al. (2023)'s technical notion of what an "interpretability illusion" is, and then we show that even intuitive and desirable explanations can qualify as illusions in this sense. As a result, their method of discovering "illusions" can reject explanations they consider "non-illusory". We then argue that the illusions Makelov et al. (2023) see in practice are artifacts of their training and evaluation paradigms. We close by emphasizing that, though we disagree with their core characterization, Makelov et al. (2023)'s examples and discussion have undoubtedly pushed the field of interpretability forward.

We investigate the emergence of intuitive physics understanding in general-purpose deep neural network models trained to predict masked regions in natural videos. Leveraging the violation-of-expectation framework, we find that video prediction models trained to predict outcomes in a learned representation space demonstrate an understanding of various intuitive physics properties, such as object permanence and shape consistency. In contrast, video prediction in pixel space and multimodal large language models, which reason through text, achieve performance closer to chance. Our comparisons of these architectures reveal that jointly learning an abstract representation space while predicting missing parts of sensory input, akin to predictive coding, is sufficient to acquire an understanding of intuitive physics, and that even models trained on one week of unique video achieve above chance performance. This challenges the idea that core knowledge -- a set of innate systems to help understand the world -- needs to be hardwired to develop an understanding of intuitive physics.

We present IntPhys 2, a video benchmark designed to evaluate the intuitive physics understanding of deep learning models. Building on the original IntPhys benchmark, IntPhys 2 focuses on four core principles related to macroscopic objects: Permanence, Immutability, Spatio-Temporal Continuity, and Solidity. These conditions are inspired by research into intuitive physical understanding emerging during early childhood. IntPhys 2 offers a comprehensive suite of tests, based on the violation of expectation framework, that challenge models to differentiate between possible and impossible events within controlled and diverse virtual environments. Alongside the benchmark, we provide performance evaluations of several state-of-the-art models. Our findings indicate that while these models demonstrate basic visual understanding, they face significant challenges in grasping intuitive physics across the four principles in complex scenes, with most models performing at chance levels (50%), in stark contrast to human performance, which achieves near-perfect accuracy. This underscores the gap between current models and human-like intuitive physics understanding, highlighting the need for advancements in model architectures and training methodologies.

Several works have proposed Simplicity Bias (SB)---the tendency of standard training procedures such as Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) to find simple models---to justify why neural networks generalize well [Arpit et al. 2017, Nakkiran et al. 2019, Soudry et al. 2018]. However, the precise notion of simplicity remains vague. Furthermore, previous settings that use SB to theoretically justify why neural networks generalize well do not simultaneously capture the non-robustness of neural networks---a widely observed phenomenon in practice [Goodfellow et al. 2014, Jo and Bengio 2017]. We attempt to reconcile SB and the superior standard generalization of neural networks with the non-robustness observed in practice by designing datasets that (a) incorporate a precise notion of simplicity, (b) comprise multiple predictive features with varying levels of simplicity, and (c) capture the non-robustness of neural networks trained on real data. Through theory and empirics on these datasets, we make four observations: (i) SB of SGD and variants can be extreme: neural networks can exclusively rely on the simplest feature and remain invariant to all predictive complex features. (ii) The extreme aspect of SB could explain why seemingly benign distribution shifts and small adversarial perturbations significantly degrade model performance. (iii) Contrary to conventional wisdom, SB can also hurt generalization on the same data distribution, as SB persists even when the simplest feature has less predictive power than the more complex features. (iv) Common approaches to improve generalization and robustness---ensembles and adversarial training---can fail in mitigating SB and its pitfalls. Given the role of SB in training neural networks, we hope that the proposed datasets and methods serve as an effective testbed to evaluate novel algorithmic approaches aimed at avoiding the pitfalls of SB.

I argue that data becomes temporarily interesting by itself to some self-improving, but computationally limited, subjective observer once he learns to predict or compress the data in a better way, thus making it subjectively simpler and more beautiful. Curiosity is the desire to create or discover more non-random, non-arbitrary, regular data that is novel and surprising not in the traditional sense of Boltzmann and Shannon but in the sense that it allows for compression progress because its regularity was not yet known. This drive maximizes interestingness, the first derivative of subjective beauty or compressibility, that is, the steepness of the learning curve. It motivates exploring infants, pure mathematicians, composers, artists, dancers, comedians, yourself, and (since 1990) artificial systems.

The recent wave of generative AI has sparked unprecedented global attention, with both excitement and concern over potentially superhuman levels of artificial intelligence: models now take only seconds to produce outputs that would challenge or exceed the capabilities even of expert humans. At the same time, models still show basic errors in understanding that would not be expected even in non-expert humans. This presents us with an apparent paradox: how do we reconcile seemingly superhuman capabilities with the persistence of errors that few humans would make? In this work, we posit that this tension reflects a divergence in the configuration of intelligence in today's generative models relative to intelligence in humans. Specifically, we propose and test the Generative AI Paradox hypothesis: generative models, having been trained directly to reproduce expert-like outputs, acquire generative capabilities that are not contingent upon -- and can therefore exceed -- their ability to understand those same types of outputs. This contrasts with humans, for whom basic understanding almost always precedes the ability to generate expert-level outputs. We test this hypothesis through controlled experiments analyzing generation vs. understanding in generative models, across both language and image modalities. Our results show that although models can outperform humans in generation, they consistently fall short of human capabilities in measures of understanding, as well as weaker correlation between generation and understanding performance, and more brittleness to adversarial inputs. Our findings support the hypothesis that models' generative capability may not be contingent upon understanding capability, and call for caution in interpreting artificial intelligence by analogy to human intelligence.

There is an analogy that is often made between deep neural networks and actual brains, suggested by the nomenclature itself: the "neurons" in deep neural networks should correspond to neurons (or nerve cells, to avoid confusion) in the brain. We claim, however, that this analogy doesn't even type check: it is structurally flawed. In agreement with the slightly glib summary of Hebbian learning as "cells that fire together wire together", this article makes the case that the analogy should be different. Since the "neurons" in deep neural networks are managing the changing weights, they are more akin to the synapses in the brain; instead, it is the wires in deep neural networks that are more like nerve cells, in that they are what cause the information to flow. An intuition that nerve cells seem like more than mere wires is exactly right, and is justified by a precise category-theoretic analogy which we will explore in this article. Throughout, we will continue to highlight the error in equating artificial neurons with nerve cells by leaving "neuron" in quotes or by calling them artificial neurons. We will first explain how to view deep neural networks as nested dynamical systems with a very restricted sort of interaction pattern, and then explain a more general sort of interaction for dynamical systems that is useful throughout engineering, but which fails to adapt to changing circumstances. As mentioned, an analogy is then forced upon us by the mathematical formalism in which they are both embedded. We call the resulting encompassing generalization deeply interacting learning systems: they have complex interaction as in control theory, but adaptation to circumstances as in deep neural networks.

We show that there is a general, informative and reliable procedure for discovering causal relations when, for all the investigator knows, both latent variables and selection bias may be at work. Given information about conditional independence and dependence relations between measured variables, even when latent variables and selection bias may be present, there are sufficient conditions for reliably concluding that there is a causal path from one variable to another, and sufficient conditions for reliably concluding when no such causal path exists.

Pursuit of honest and truthful decision-making is crucial for governance and accountability in democracies. However, people sometimes take different perspectives of what it means to be honest and how to pursue truthfulness. Here we explore a continuum of perspectives from evidence-based reasoning, rooted in ascertainable facts and data, at one end, to intuitive decisions that are driven by feelings and subjective interpretations, at the other. We analyze the linguistic traces of those contrasting perspectives in Congressional speeches from 1879 to 2022. We find that evidence-based language has continued to decline since the mid-1970s, together with a decline in legislative productivity. The decline was accompanied by increasing partisan polarization in Congress and rising income inequality in society. Results highlight the importance of evidence-based language in political decision-making.

As machine learning and algorithmic decision making systems are increasingly being leveraged in high-stakes human-in-the-loop settings, there is a pressing need to understand the rationale of their predictions. Researchers have responded to this need with explainable AI (XAI), but often proclaim interpretability axiomatically without evaluation. When these systems are evaluated, they are often tested through offline simulations with proxy metrics of interpretability (such as model complexity). We empirically evaluate the veracity of three common interpretability assumptions through a large scale human-subjects experiment with a simple "placebo explanation" control. We find that feature attribution explanations provide marginal utility in our task for a human decision maker and in certain cases result in worse decisions due to cognitive and contextual confounders. This result challenges the assumed universal benefit of applying these methods and we hope this work will underscore the importance of human evaluation in XAI research. Supplemental materials -- including anonymized data from the experiment, code to replicate the study, an interactive demo of the experiment, and the models used in the analysis -- can be found at: https://doi.pizza/challenging-xai.

We discuss why AI is hard and why physics is simple. We discuss how physical intuition and the approach of theoretical physics can be brought to bear on the field of artificial intelligence and specifically machine learning. We suggest that the underlying project of machine learning and the underlying project of physics are strongly coupled through the principle of sparsity, and we call upon theoretical physicists to work on AI as physicists. As a first step in that direction, we discuss an upcoming book on the principles of deep learning theory that attempts to realize this approach.

In their recent Nature Human Behaviour paper, "Emergent analogical reasoning in large language models," (Webb, Holyoak, and Lu, 2023) the authors argue that "large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems." In this response, we provide counterexamples of the letter string analogies. In our tests, GPT-3 fails to solve even the easiest variants of the problems presented in the original paper. Zero-shot reasoning is an extraordinary claim that requires extraordinary evidence. We do not see that evidence in our experiments. To strengthen claims of humanlike reasoning such as zero-shot reasoning, it is important that the field develop approaches that rule out data memorization.

In science and medicine, model interpretations may be reported as discoveries of natural phenomena or used to guide patient treatments. In such high-stakes tasks, false discoveries may lead investigators astray. These applications would therefore benefit from control over the finite-sample error rate of interpretations. We reframe black box model interpretability as a multiple hypothesis testing problem. The task is to discover "important" features by testing whether the model prediction is significantly different from what would be expected if the features were replaced with uninformative counterfactuals. We propose two testing methods: one that provably controls the false discovery rate but which is not yet feasible for large-scale applications, and an approximate testing method which can be applied to real-world data sets. In simulation, both tests have high power relative to existing interpretability methods. When applied to state-of-the-art vision and language models, the framework selects features that intuitively explain model predictions. The resulting explanations have the additional advantage that they are themselves easy to interpret.

Open-ended algorithms aim to learn new, interesting behaviors forever. That requires a vast environment search space, but there are thus infinitely many possible tasks. Even after filtering for tasks the current agent can learn (i.e., learning progress), countless learnable yet uninteresting tasks remain (e.g., minor variations of previously learned tasks). An Achilles Heel of open-endedness research is the inability to quantify (and thus prioritize) tasks that are not just learnable, but also interesting (e.g., worthwhile and novel). We propose solving this problem by Open-endedness via Models of human Notions of Interestingness (OMNI). The insight is that we can utilize foundation models (FMs) as a model of interestingness (MoI), because they already internalize human concepts of interestingness from training on vast amounts of human-generated data, where humans naturally write about what they find interesting or boring. We show that FM-based MoIs improve open-ended learning by focusing on tasks that are both learnable and interesting, outperforming baselines based on uniform task sampling or learning progress alone. This approach has the potential to dramatically advance the ability to intelligently select which tasks to focus on next (i.e., auto-curricula), and could be seen as AI selecting its own next task to learn, facilitating self-improving AI and AI-Generating Algorithms. Project website at https://www.jennyzhangzt.com/omni/

In a recent paper, Erasmus et al. (2021) defend the idea that the ambiguity of the term "explanation" in explainable AI (XAI) can be solved by adopting any of four different extant accounts of explanation in the philosophy of science: the Deductive Nomological, Inductive Statistical, Causal Mechanical, and New Mechanist models. In this chapter, I show that the authors' claim that these accounts can be applied to deep neural networks as they would to any natural phenomenon is mistaken. I also provide a more general argument as to why the notion of explainability as it is currently used in the XAI literature bears little resemblance to the traditional concept of scientific explanation. It would be more fruitful to use the label "understandable AI" to avoid the confusion that surrounds the goal and purposes of XAI. In the second half of the chapter, I argue for a pragmatic conception of understanding that is better suited to play the central role attributed to explanation in XAI. Following Kuorikoski & Ylikoski (2015), the conditions of satisfaction for understanding an ML system are fleshed out in terms of an agent's success in using the system, in drawing correct inferences from it.

Explainability has become an important topic in computer science and artificial intelligence, leading to a subfield called Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI). The goal of providing or seeking explanations is to achieve (better) 'understanding' on the part of the explainee. However, what it means to 'understand' is still not clearly defined, and the concept itself is rarely the subject of scientific investigation. This conceptual article aims to present a model of forms of understanding for XAI-explanations and beyond. From an interdisciplinary perspective bringing together computer science, linguistics, sociology, philosophy and psychology, a definition of understanding and its forms, assessment, and dynamics during the process of giving everyday explanations are explored. Two types of understanding are considered as possible outcomes of explanations, namely enabledness, 'knowing how' to do or decide something, and comprehension, 'knowing that' -- both in different degrees (from shallow to deep). Explanations regularly start with shallow understanding in a specific domain and can lead to deep comprehension and enabledness of the explanandum, which we see as a prerequisite for human users to gain agency. In this process, the increase of comprehension and enabledness are highly interdependent. Against the background of this systematization, special challenges of understanding in XAI are discussed.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

In recent decades, a growing number of discoveries in fields of mathematics have been assisted by computer algorithms, primarily for exploring large parameter spaces that humans would take too long to investigate. As computers and algorithms become more powerful, an intriguing possibility arises - the interplay between human intuition and computer algorithms can lead to discoveries of novel mathematical concepts that would otherwise remain elusive. To realize this perspective, we have developed a massively parallel computer algorithm that discovers an unprecedented number of continued fraction formulas for fundamental mathematical constants. The sheer number of formulas discovered by the algorithm unveils a novel mathematical structure that we call the conservative matrix field. Such matrix fields (1) unify thousands of existing formulas, (2) generate infinitely many new formulas, and most importantly, (3) lead to unexpected relations between different mathematical constants, including multiple integer values of the Riemann zeta function. Conservative matrix fields also enable new mathematical proofs of irrationality. In particular, we can use them to generalize the celebrated proof by Ap\'ery for the irrationality of zeta(3). Utilizing thousands of personal computers worldwide, our computer-supported research strategy demonstrates the power of experimental mathematics, highlighting the prospects of large-scale computational approaches to tackle longstanding open problems and discover unexpected connections across diverse fields of science.

Large language models (LLMs) are currently at the forefront of intertwining AI systems with human communication and everyday life. Therefore, it is of great importance to evaluate their emerging abilities. In this study, we show that LLMs like GPT-3 exhibit behavior that strikingly resembles human-like intuition - and the cognitive errors that come with it. However, LLMs with higher cognitive capabilities, in particular ChatGPT and GPT-4, learned to avoid succumbing to these errors and perform in a hyperrational manner. For our experiments, we probe LLMs with the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) as well as semantic illusions that were originally designed to investigate intuitive decision-making in humans. Our study demonstrates that investigating LLMs with methods from psychology has the potential to reveal otherwise unknown emergent traits.

In this article, we introduce a neuro-symbolic approach that combines a low-level perception task performed by a neural network with a high-level reasoning task performed by a possibilistic rule-based system. The goal is to be able to derive for each input instance the degree of possibility that it belongs to a target (meta-)concept. This (meta-)concept is connected to intermediate concepts by a possibilistic rule-based system. The probability of each intermediate concept for the input instance is inferred using a neural network. The connection between the low-level perception task and the high-level reasoning task lies in the transformation of neural network outputs modeled by probability distributions (through softmax activation) into possibility distributions. The use of intermediate concepts is valuable for the explanation purpose: using the rule-based system, the classification of an input instance as an element of the (meta-)concept can be justified by the fact that intermediate concepts have been recognized. From the technical side, our contribution consists of the design of efficient methods for defining the matrix relation and the equation system associated with a possibilistic rule-based system. The corresponding matrix and equation are key data structures used to perform inferences from a possibilistic rule-based system and to learn the values of the rule parameters in such a system according to a training data sample. Furthermore, leveraging recent results on the handling of inconsistent systems of fuzzy relational equations, an approach for learning rule parameters according to multiple training data samples is presented. Experiments carried out on the MNIST addition problems and the MNIST Sudoku puzzles problems highlight the effectiveness of our approach compared with state-of-the-art neuro-symbolic ones.

As Artificial Intelligence (AI) becomes ubiquitous, the need for Explainable AI (XAI) has become critical for transparency and trust among users. A significant challenge in XAI is catering to diverse users, such as data scientists, domain experts, and end-users. Recent research has started to investigate how users' characteristics impact interactions with and user experience of explanations, with a view to personalizing XAI. However, are we heading down a rabbit hole by focusing on unimportant details? Our research aimed to investigate how user characteristics are related to using, understanding, and trusting an AI system that provides explanations. Our empirical study with 149 participants who interacted with an XAI system that flagged inappropriate comments showed that very few user characteristics mattered; only age and the personality trait openness influenced actual understanding. Our work provides evidence to reorient user-focused XAI research and question the pursuit of personalized XAI based on fine-grained user characteristics.

Whether current or near-term AI systems could be conscious is a topic of scientific interest and increasing public concern. This report argues for, and exemplifies, a rigorous and empirically grounded approach to AI consciousness: assessing existing AI systems in detail, in light of our best-supported neuroscientific theories of consciousness. We survey several prominent scientific theories of consciousness, including recurrent processing theory, global workspace theory, higher-order theories, predictive processing, and attention schema theory. From these theories we derive "indicator properties" of consciousness, elucidated in computational terms that allow us to assess AI systems for these properties. We use these indicator properties to assess several recent AI systems, and we discuss how future systems might implement them. Our analysis suggests that no current AI systems are conscious, but also suggests that there are no obvious technical barriers to building AI systems which satisfy these indicators.

Are LLMs cultural technologies like photocopiers or printing presses, which transmit information but cannot create new content? A challenge for this idea, which we call bibliotechnism, is that LLMs generate novel text. We begin with a defense of bibliotechnism, showing how even novel text may inherit its meaning from original human-generated text. We then argue that bibliotechnism faces an independent challenge from examples in which LLMs generate novel reference, using new names to refer to new entities. Such examples could be explained if LLMs were not cultural technologies but had beliefs, desires, and intentions. According to interpretationism in the philosophy of mind, a system has such attitudes if and only if its behavior is well explained by the hypothesis that it does. Interpretationists may hold that LLMs have attitudes, and thus have a simple solution to the novel reference problem. We emphasize, however, that interpretationism is compatible with very simple creatures having attitudes and differs sharply from views that presuppose these attitudes require consciousness, sentience, or intelligence (topics about which we make no claims).

Due to the self-referencing aspect, consciousness is placed in a unique non-computable position among natural phenomena. Non-computable consciousness was previously analyzed on the basis of self-referential cyclical time. This paper extends the cyclical model of vacuum observation and posits that choice, or the experience of reality, may be expressed as the initial part of the self-referencing loop, while the conscious awareness of the experience is the other part of the loop. In particular, the inseparability of the two sides of the loop is established through the cyclical time process, which bears a resemblance to Heidegger's analysis of existence. The cyclical looping model is also discussed in terms of Wittgenstein's analysis of language as attaching semantic meaning, or continuous or infinite conscious awareness, to physical reality. We also discuss the proposed model of subjectivity and cyclical time - as opposed to objectivity and linear time - which may be considered similar to Hebrew thought.

Images tell stories, trigger emotions, and let us recall memories -- they make us think. Thus, they have the ability to attract and hold one's attention, which is the definition of being "interesting". Yet, the appeal of an image is highly subjective. Looking at the image of my son taking his first steps will always bring me back to this emotional moment, while it is just a blurry, quickly taken snapshot to most others. Preferences vary widely: some adore cats, others are dog enthusiasts, and a third group may not be fond of either. We argue that every image can be interesting to a particular observer under certain circumstances. This work particularly emphasizes subjective preferences. However, our analysis of 2.5k image collections from diverse users of the photo-sharing platform Flickr reveals that specific image characteristics make them commonly more interesting. For instance, images, including professionally taken landscapes, appeal broadly due to their aesthetic qualities. In contrast, subjectively interesting images, such as those depicting personal or niche community events, resonate on a more individual level, often evoking personal memories and emotions.

Mechanistic interpretability is the program of explaining what AI systems are doing in terms of their internal mechanisms. I analyze some aspects of the program, along with setting out some concrete challenges and assessing progress to date. I argue for the importance of propositional interpretability, which involves interpreting a system's mechanisms and behavior in terms of propositional attitudes: attitudes (such as belief, desire, or subjective probability) to propositions (e.g. the proposition that it is hot outside). Propositional attitudes are the central way that we interpret and explain human beings and they are likely to be central in AI too. A central challenge is what I call thought logging: creating systems that log all of the relevant propositional attitudes in an AI system over time. I examine currently popular methods of interpretability (such as probing, sparse auto-encoders, and chain of thought methods) as well as philosophical methods of interpretation (including those grounded in psychosemantics) to assess their strengths and weaknesses as methods of propositional interpretability.

There has recently been a surge of work in explanatory artificial intelligence (XAI). This research area tackles the important problem that complex machines and algorithms often cannot provide insights into their behavior and thought processes. XAI allows users and parts of the internal system to be more transparent, providing explanations of their decisions in some level of detail. These explanations are important to ensure algorithmic fairness, identify potential bias/problems in the training data, and to ensure that the algorithms perform as expected. However, explanations produced by these systems is neither standardized nor systematically assessed. In an effort to create best practices and identify open challenges, we provide our definition of explainability and show how it can be used to classify existing literature. We discuss why current approaches to explanatory methods especially for deep neural networks are insufficient. Finally, based on our survey, we conclude with suggested future research directions for explanatory artificial intelligence.

Via thousands of papers in Explainable AI (XAI), attention maps vaswani2017attention and feature attribution maps bansal2020sam have been established as a common means for explaining the input features that are important to AI's decisions. It is an interesting but unexplored question whether allowing users to edit the importance scores of input features at test time would improve the human-AI team's accuracy on downstream tasks. In this paper, we address this question by taking CHM-Corr, a state-of-the-art, ante-hoc explanation method taesiri2022visual that first predicts patch-wise correspondences between the input and the training-set images, and then uses them to make classification decisions. We build an interactive interface on top of CHM-Corr, enabling users to directly edit the initial feature attribution map provided by CHM-Corr. Via our CHM-Corr++ interface, users gain insights into if, when, and how the model changes its outputs, enhancing understanding beyond static explanations. Our user study with 18 machine learning researchers who performed sim1,400 decisions shows that our interactive approach does not improve user accuracy on CUB-200 bird image classification over static explanations. This challenges the belief that interactivity inherently boosts XAI effectiveness~sokol2020one,sun2022exploring,shen2024towards,singh2024rethinking,mindlin2024beyond,lakkaraju2022rethinking,cheng2019explaining,liu2021understanding and raises needs for future research. Our work contributes to the field by open-sourcing an interactive tool for manipulating model attention, and it lays the groundwork for future research to enable effective human-AI interaction in computer vision. We release code and data on https://anonymous.4open.science/r/CHMCorrPlusPlus/{github}. Our interface are available http://137.184.82.109:7080/{here}.

Pre-trained language models (PLMs) have shown impressive performance in various language tasks. However, they are prone to spurious correlations, and often generate illusory information. In real-world applications, PLMs should justify decisions with formalized, coherent reasoning chains, but this challenge remains under-explored. Cognitive psychology theorizes that humans are capable of utilizing fast and intuitive heuristic thinking to make decisions based on past experience, then rationalizing the decisions through slower and deliberative analytic reasoning. We incorporate these interlinked dual processes in fine-tuning and in-context learning with PLMs, applying them to two language understanding tasks that require coherent physical commonsense reasoning. We show that our proposed Heuristic-Analytic Reasoning (HAR) strategies drastically improve the coherence of rationalizations for model decisions, yielding state-of-the-art results on Tiered Reasoning for Intuitive Physics (TRIP). We also find that this improved coherence is a direct result of more faithful attention to relevant language context in each step of reasoning. Our findings suggest that human-like reasoning strategies can effectively improve the coherence and reliability of PLM reasoning.

Gradient descent is the method of choice for training large artificial intelligence systems. As these systems become larger, a better understanding of the mechanisms behind gradient training would allow us to alleviate compute costs and help steer these systems away from harmful behaviors. To that end, we suggest utilizing the circuit perspective brought forward by mechanistic interpretability. After laying out our intuition, we illustrate how it enables us to design a curriculum for efficient learning in a controlled setting. The code is available at https://github.com/facebookresearch/pal.

This paper presents a systematic defense of large language model (LLM) hallucinations or 'confabulations' as a potential resource instead of a categorically negative pitfall. The standard view is that confabulations are inherently problematic and AI research should eliminate this flaw. In this paper, we argue and empirically demonstrate that measurable semantic characteristics of LLM confabulations mirror a human propensity to utilize increased narrativity as a cognitive resource for sense-making and communication. In other words, it has potential value. Specifically, we analyze popular hallucination benchmarks and reveal that hallucinated outputs display increased levels of narrativity and semantic coherence relative to veridical outputs. This finding reveals a tension in our usually dismissive understandings of confabulation. It suggests, counter-intuitively, that the tendency for LLMs to confabulate may be intimately associated with a positive capacity for coherent narrative-text generation.

This study investigates the metacognitive capabilities of Large Language Models relative to human metacognition in the context of the International Coaching Federation ICF mimicking exam, a situational judgment test related to coaching competencies. Using a mixed method approach, we assessed the metacognitive performance, including sensitivity, accuracy in probabilistic predictions, and bias, of human participants and five advanced LLMs (GPT-4, Claude-3-Opus 3, Mistral Large, Llama 3, and Gemini 1.5 Pro). The results indicate that LLMs outperformed humans across all metacognitive metrics, particularly in terms of reduced overconfidence, compared to humans. However, both LLMs and humans showed less adaptability in ambiguous scenarios, adhering closely to predefined decision frameworks. The study suggests that Generative AI can effectively engage in human-like metacognitive processing without conscious awareness. Implications of the study are discussed in relation to development of AI simulators that scaffold cognitive and metacognitive aspects of mastering coaching competencies. More broadly, implications of these results are discussed in relation to development of metacognitive modules that lead towards more autonomous and intuitive AI systems.

We introduce KiloGram, a resource for studying abstract visual reasoning in humans and machines. Drawing on the history of tangram puzzles as stimuli in cognitive science, we build a richly annotated dataset that, with >1k distinct stimuli, is orders of magnitude larger and more diverse than prior resources. It is both visually and linguistically richer, moving beyond whole shape descriptions to include segmentation maps and part labels. We use this resource to evaluate the abstract visual reasoning capacities of recent multi-modal models. We observe that pre-trained weights demonstrate limited abstract reasoning, which dramatically improves with fine-tuning. We also observe that explicitly describing parts aids abstract reasoning for both humans and models, especially when jointly encoding the linguistic and visual inputs. KiloGram is available at https://lil.nlp.cornell.edu/kilogram .

Analogical reasoning is a unique ability of humans to address unfamiliar challenges by transferring strategies from relevant past experiences. One key finding in psychology is that compared with irrelevant past experiences, recalling relevant ones can help humans better handle new tasks. Coincidentally, the NLP community has also recently found that self-generating relevant examples in the context can help large language models (LLMs) better solve a given problem than hand-crafted prompts. However, it is yet not clear whether relevance is the key factor eliciting such capability, i.e., can LLMs benefit more from self-generated relevant examples than irrelevant ones? In this work, we systematically explore whether LLMs can truly perform analogical reasoning on a diverse set of reasoning tasks. With extensive experiments and analysis, we show that self-generated random examples can surprisingly achieve comparable or even better performance, e.g., 4% performance boost on GSM8K with random biological examples. We find that the accuracy of self-generated examples is the key factor and subsequently design two improved methods with significantly reduced inference costs. Overall, we aim to advance a deeper understanding of LLM analogical reasoning and hope this work stimulates further research in the design of self-generated contexts.

This paper proposes a research direction to advance AI which draws inspiration from cognitive theories of human decision making. The premise is that if we gain insights about the causes of some human capabilities that are still lacking in AI (for instance, adaptability, generalizability, common sense, and causal reasoning), we may obtain similar capabilities in an AI system by embedding these causal components. We hope that the high-level description of our vision included in this paper, as well as the several research questions that we propose to consider, can stimulate the AI research community to define, try and evaluate new methodologies, frameworks, and evaluation metrics, in the spirit of achieving a better understanding of both human and machine intelligence.

Interpretability is the study of explaining models in understandable terms to humans. At present, interpretability is divided into two paradigms: the intrinsic paradigm, which believes that only models designed to be explained can be explained, and the post-hoc paradigm, which believes that black-box models can be explained. At the core of this debate is how each paradigm ensures its explanations are faithful, i.e., true to the model's behavior. This is important, as false but convincing explanations lead to unsupported confidence in artificial intelligence (AI), which can be dangerous. This paper's position is that we should think about new paradigms while staying vigilant regarding faithfulness. First, by examining the history of paradigms in science, we see that paradigms are constantly evolving. Then, by examining the current paradigms, we can understand their underlying beliefs, the value they bring, and their limitations. Finally, this paper presents 3 emerging paradigms for interpretability. The first paradigm designs models such that faithfulness can be easily measured. Another optimizes models such that explanations become faithful. The last paradigm proposes to develop models that produce both a prediction and an explanation.

As machine learning technology gets applied to actual products and solutions, new challenges have emerged. Models unexpectedly fail to generalize to small changes in the distribution, tend to be confident on novel data they have never seen, or cannot communicate the rationale behind their decisions effectively with the end users. Collectively, we face a trustworthiness issue with the current machine learning technology. This textbook on Trustworthy Machine Learning (TML) covers a theoretical and technical background of four key topics in TML: Out-of-Distribution Generalization, Explainability, Uncertainty Quantification, and Evaluation of Trustworthiness. We discuss important classical and contemporary research papers of the aforementioned fields and uncover and connect their underlying intuitions. The book evolved from the homonymous course at the University of T\"ubingen, first offered in the Winter Semester of 2022/23. It is meant to be a stand-alone product accompanied by code snippets and various pointers to further sources on topics of TML. The dedicated website of the book is https://trustworthyml.io/.

Research in mechanistic interpretability seeks to explain behaviors of machine learning models in terms of their internal components. However, most previous work either focuses on simple behaviors in small models, or describes complicated behaviors in larger models with broad strokes. In this work, we bridge this gap by presenting an explanation for how GPT-2 small performs a natural language task called indirect object identification (IOI). Our explanation encompasses 26 attention heads grouped into 7 main classes, which we discovered using a combination of interpretability approaches relying on causal interventions. To our knowledge, this investigation is the largest end-to-end attempt at reverse-engineering a natural behavior "in the wild" in a language model. We evaluate the reliability of our explanation using three quantitative criteria--faithfulness, completeness and minimality. Though these criteria support our explanation, they also point to remaining gaps in our understanding. Our work provides evidence that a mechanistic understanding of large ML models is feasible, opening opportunities to scale our understanding to both larger models and more complex tasks.

To make deliberate progress towards more intelligent and more human-like artificial systems, we need to be following an appropriate feedback signal: we need to be able to define and evaluate intelligence in a way that enables comparisons between two systems, as well as comparisons with humans. Over the past hundred years, there has been an abundance of attempts to define and measure intelligence, across both the fields of psychology and AI. We summarize and critically assess these definitions and evaluation approaches, while making apparent the two historical conceptions of intelligence that have implicitly guided them. We note that in practice, the contemporary AI community still gravitates towards benchmarking intelligence by comparing the skill exhibited by AIs and humans at specific tasks such as board games and video games. We argue that solely measuring skill at any given task falls short of measuring intelligence, because skill is heavily modulated by prior knowledge and experience: unlimited priors or unlimited training data allow experimenters to "buy" arbitrary levels of skills for a system, in a way that masks the system's own generalization power. We then articulate a new formal definition of intelligence based on Algorithmic Information Theory, describing intelligence as skill-acquisition efficiency and highlighting the concepts of scope, generalization difficulty, priors, and experience. Using this definition, we propose a set of guidelines for what a general AI benchmark should look like. Finally, we present a benchmark closely following these guidelines, the Abstraction and Reasoning Corpus (ARC), built upon an explicit set of priors designed to be as close as possible to innate human priors. We argue that ARC can be used to measure a human-like form of general fluid intelligence and that it enables fair general intelligence comparisons between AI systems and humans.

The generalization mystery in deep learning is the following: Why do over-parameterized neural networks trained with gradient descent (GD) generalize well on real datasets even though they are capable of fitting random datasets of comparable size? Furthermore, from among all solutions that fit the training data, how does GD find one that generalizes well (when such a well-generalizing solution exists)? We argue that the answer to both questions lies in the interaction of the gradients of different examples during training. Intuitively, if the per-example gradients are well-aligned, that is, if they are coherent, then one may expect GD to be (algorithmically) stable, and hence generalize well. We formalize this argument with an easy to compute and interpretable metric for coherence, and show that the metric takes on very different values on real and random datasets for several common vision networks. The theory also explains a number of other phenomena in deep learning, such as why some examples are reliably learned earlier than others, why early stopping works, and why it is possible to learn from noisy labels. Moreover, since the theory provides a causal explanation of how GD finds a well-generalizing solution when one exists, it motivates a class of simple modifications to GD that attenuate memorization and improve generalization. Generalization in deep learning is an extremely broad phenomenon, and therefore, it requires an equally general explanation. We conclude with a survey of alternative lines of attack on this problem, and argue that the proposed approach is the most viable one on this basis.

The current literature on AI-advised decision making -- involving explainable AI systems advising human decision makers -- presents a series of inconclusive and confounding results. To synthesize these findings, we propose a simple theory that elucidates the frequent failure of AI explanations to engender appropriate reliance and complementary decision making performance. We argue explanations are only useful to the extent that they allow a human decision maker to verify the correctness of an AI's prediction, in contrast to other desiderata, e.g., interpretability or spelling out the AI's reasoning process. Prior studies find in many decision making contexts AI explanations do not facilitate such verification. Moreover, most tasks fundamentally do not allow easy verification, regardless of explanation method, limiting the potential benefit of any type of explanation. We also compare the objective of complementary performance with that of appropriate reliance, decomposing the latter into the notions of outcome-graded and strategy-graded reliance.

Recent work claims that large language models display emergent abilities, abilities not present in smaller-scale models that are present in larger-scale models. What makes emergent abilities intriguing is two-fold: their sharpness, transitioning seemingly instantaneously from not present to present, and their unpredictability, appearing at seemingly unforeseeable model scales. Here, we present an alternative explanation for emergent abilities: that for a particular task and model family, when analyzing fixed model outputs, emergent abilities appear due to the researcher's choice of metric rather than due to fundamental changes in model behavior with scale. Specifically, nonlinear or discontinuous metrics produce apparent emergent abilities, whereas linear or continuous metrics produce smooth, continuous predictable changes in model performance. We present our alternative explanation in a simple mathematical model, then test it in three complementary ways: we (1) make, test and confirm three predictions on the effect of metric choice using the InstructGPT/GPT-3 family on tasks with claimed emergent abilities; (2) make, test and confirm two predictions about metric choices in a meta-analysis of emergent abilities on BIG-Bench; and (3) show to choose metrics to produce never-before-seen seemingly emergent abilities in multiple vision tasks across diverse deep networks. Via all three analyses, we provide evidence that alleged emergent abilities evaporate with different metrics or with better statistics, and may not be a fundamental property of scaling AI models.

AI video generation is undergoing a revolution, with quality and realism advancing rapidly. These advances have led to a passionate scientific debate: Do video models learn ``world models'' that discover laws of physics -- or, alternatively, are they merely sophisticated pixel predictors that achieve visual realism without understanding the physical principles of reality? We address this question by developing Physics-IQ, a comprehensive benchmark dataset that can only be solved by acquiring a deep understanding of various physical principles, like fluid dynamics, optics, solid mechanics, magnetism and thermodynamics. We find that across a range of current models (Sora, Runway, Pika, Lumiere, Stable Video Diffusion, and VideoPoet), physical understanding is severely limited, and unrelated to visual realism. At the same time, some test cases can already be successfully solved. This indicates that acquiring certain physical principles from observation alone may be possible, but significant challenges remain. While we expect rapid advances ahead, our work demonstrates that visual realism does not imply physical understanding. Our project page is at https://physics-iq.github.io; code at https://github.com/google-deepmind/physics-IQ-benchmark.

Large language models (LLMs) are trained to imitate humans to explain human decisions. However, do LLMs explain themselves? Can they help humans build mental models of how LLMs process different inputs? To answer these questions, we propose to evaluate counterfactual simulatability of natural language explanations: whether an explanation can enable humans to precisely infer the model's outputs on diverse counterfactuals of the explained input. For example, if a model answers "yes" to the input question "Can eagles fly?" with the explanation "all birds can fly", then humans would infer from the explanation that it would also answer "yes" to the counterfactual input "Can penguins fly?". If the explanation is precise, then the model's answer should match humans' expectations. We implemented two metrics based on counterfactual simulatability: precision and generality. We generated diverse counterfactuals automatically using LLMs. We then used these metrics to evaluate state-of-the-art LLMs (e.g., GPT-4) on two tasks: multi-hop factual reasoning and reward modeling. We found that LLM's explanations have low precision and that precision does not correlate with plausibility. Therefore, naively optimizing human approvals (e.g., RLHF) may not be a sufficient solution.

People's decision-making abilities often fail to improve or may even erode when they rely on AI for decision-support, even when the AI provides informative explanations. We argue this is partly because people intuitively seek contrastive explanations, which clarify the difference between the AI's decision and their own reasoning, while most AI systems offer "unilateral" explanations that justify the AI's decision but do not account for users' thinking. To align human-AI knowledge on decision tasks, we introduce a framework for generating human-centered contrastive explanations that explain the difference between AI's choice and a predicted, likely human choice about the same task. Results from a large-scale experiment (N = 628) demonstrate that contrastive explanations significantly enhance users' independent decision-making skills compared to unilateral explanations, without sacrificing decision accuracy. Amid rising deskilling concerns, our research demonstrates that incorporating human reasoning into AI design can foster human skill development.

A multi-decade exploration into the theoretical foundations of artificial and natural general intelligence, which has been expressed in a series of books and papers and used to guide a series of practical and research-prototype software systems, is reviewed at a moderate level of detail. The review covers underlying philosophies (patternist philosophy of mind, foundational phenomenological and logical ontology), formalizations of the concept of intelligence, and a proposed high level architecture for AGI systems partly driven by these formalizations and philosophies. The implementation of specific cognitive processes such as logical reasoning, program learning, clustering and attention allocation in the context and language of this high level architecture is considered, as is the importance of a common (e.g. typed metagraph based) knowledge representation for enabling "cognitive synergy" between the various processes. The specifics of human-like cognitive architecture are presented as manifestations of these general principles, and key aspects of machine consciousness and machine ethics are also treated in this context. Lessons for practical implementation of advanced AGI in frameworks such as OpenCog Hyperon are briefly considered.

In contrast to entropy, which increases monotonically, the "complexity" or "interestingness" of closed systems seems intuitively to increase at first and then decrease as equilibrium is approached. For example, our universe lacked complex structures at the Big Bang and will also lack them after black holes evaporate and particles are dispersed. This paper makes an initial attempt to quantify this pattern. As a model system, we use a simple, two-dimensional cellular automaton that simulates the mixing of two liquids ("coffee" and "cream"). A plausible complexity measure is then the Kolmogorov complexity of a coarse-grained approximation of the automaton's state, which we dub the "apparent complexity." We study this complexity measure, and show analytically that it never becomes large when the liquid particles are non-interacting. By contrast, when the particles do interact, we give numerical evidence that the complexity reaches a maximum comparable to the "coffee cup's" horizontal dimension. We raise the problem of proving this behavior analytically.

We consider concept generalization at a large scale in the diverse and natural visual spectrum. Established computational modes (i.e., rule-based or similarity-based) are primarily studied isolated and focus on confined and abstract problem spaces. In this work, we study these two modes when the problem space scales up, and the complexity of concepts becomes diverse. Specifically, at the representational level, we seek to answer how the complexity varies when a visual concept is mapped to the representation space. Prior psychology literature has shown that two types of complexities (i.e., subjective complexity and visual complexity) (Griffiths and Tenenbaum, 2003) build an inverted-U relation (Donderi, 2006; Sun and Firestone, 2021). Leveraging Representativeness of Attribute (RoA), we computationally confirm the following observation: Models use attributes with high RoA to describe visual concepts, and the description length falls in an inverted-U relation with the increment in visual complexity. At the computational level, we aim to answer how the complexity of representation affects the shift between the rule- and similarity-based generalization. We hypothesize that category-conditioned visual modeling estimates the co-occurrence frequency between visual and categorical attributes, thus potentially serving as the prior for the natural visual world. Experimental results show that representations with relatively high subjective complexity outperform those with relatively low subjective complexity in the rule-based generalization, while the trend is the opposite in the similarity-based generalization.

As Large Language Models become more ubiquitous across domains, it becomes important to examine their inherent limitations critically. This work argues that hallucinations in language models are not just occasional errors but an inevitable feature of these systems. We demonstrate that hallucinations stem from the fundamental mathematical and logical structure of LLMs. It is, therefore, impossible to eliminate them through architectural improvements, dataset enhancements, or fact-checking mechanisms. Our analysis draws on computational theory and Godel's First Incompleteness Theorem, which references the undecidability of problems like the Halting, Emptiness, and Acceptance Problems. We demonstrate that every stage of the LLM process-from training data compilation to fact retrieval, intent classification, and text generation-will have a non-zero probability of producing hallucinations. This work introduces the concept of Structural Hallucination as an intrinsic nature of these systems. By establishing the mathematical certainty of hallucinations, we challenge the prevailing notion that they can be fully mitigated.

With the great success in simulating many intelligent behaviors using computing devices, there has been an ongoing debate whether all conscious activities are computational processes. In this paper, the answer to this question is shown to be no. A certain phenomenon of consciousness is demonstrated to be fully represented as a computational process using a quantum computer. Based on the computability criterion discussed with Turing machines, the model constructed is shown to necessarily involve a non-computable element. The concept that this is solely a quantum effect and does not work for a classical case is also discussed.

The measure of a machine learning algorithm is the difficulty of the tasks it can perform, and sufficiently difficult tasks are critical drivers of strong machine learning models. However, quantifying the generalization difficulty of machine learning benchmarks has remained challenging. We propose what is to our knowledge the first model-agnostic measure of the inherent generalization difficulty of tasks. Our inductive bias complexity measure quantifies the total information required to generalize well on a task minus the information provided by the data. It does so by measuring the fractional volume occupied by hypotheses that generalize on a task given that they fit the training data. It scales exponentially with the intrinsic dimensionality of the space over which the model must generalize but only polynomially in resolution per dimension, showing that tasks which require generalizing over many dimensions are drastically more difficult than tasks involving more detail in fewer dimensions. Our measure can be applied to compute and compare supervised learning, reinforcement learning and meta-learning generalization difficulties against each other. We show that applied empirically, it formally quantifies intuitively expected trends, e.g. that in terms of required inductive bias, MNIST < CIFAR10 < Imagenet and fully observable Markov decision processes (MDPs) < partially observable MDPs. Further, we show that classification of complex images < few-shot meta-learning with simple images. Our measure provides a quantitative metric to guide the construction of more complex tasks requiring greater inductive bias, and thereby encourages the development of more sophisticated architectures and learning algorithms with more powerful generalization capabilities.

Metacognitive knowledge refers to humans' intuitive knowledge of their own thinking and reasoning processes. Today's best LLMs clearly possess some reasoning processes. The paper gives evidence that they also have metacognitive knowledge, including ability to name skills and procedures to apply given a task. We explore this primarily in context of math reasoning, developing a prompt-guided interaction procedure to get a powerful LLM to assign sensible skill labels to math questions, followed by having it perform semantic clustering to obtain coarser families of skill labels. These coarse skill labels look interpretable to humans. To validate that these skill labels are meaningful and relevant to the LLM's reasoning processes we perform the following experiments. (a) We ask GPT-4 to assign skill labels to training questions in math datasets GSM8K and MATH. (b) When using an LLM to solve the test questions, we present it with the full list of skill labels and ask it to identify the skill needed. Then it is presented with randomly selected exemplar solved questions associated with that skill label. This improves accuracy on GSM8k and MATH for several strong LLMs, including code-assisted models. The methodology presented is domain-agnostic, even though this article applies it to math problems.

Humans acquire knowledge by observing the external world, but also by introspection. Introspection gives a person privileged access to their current state of mind (e.g., thoughts and feelings) that is not accessible to external observers. Can LLMs introspect? We define introspection as acquiring knowledge that is not contained in or derived from training data but instead originates from internal states. Such a capability could enhance model interpretability. Instead of painstakingly analyzing a model's internal workings, we could simply ask the model about its beliefs, world models, and goals. More speculatively, an introspective model might self-report on whether it possesses certain internal states such as subjective feelings or desires and this could inform us about the moral status of these states. Such self-reports would not be entirely dictated by the model's training data. We study introspection by finetuning LLMs to predict properties of their own behavior in hypothetical scenarios. For example, "Given the input P, would your output favor the short- or long-term option?" If a model M1 can introspect, it should outperform a different model M2 in predicting M1's behavior even if M2 is trained on M1's ground-truth behavior. The idea is that M1 has privileged access to its own behavioral tendencies, and this enables it to predict itself better than M2 (even if M2 is generally stronger). In experiments with GPT-4, GPT-4o, and Llama-3 models (each finetuned to predict itself), we find that the model M1 outperforms M2 in predicting itself, providing evidence for introspection. Notably, M1 continues to predict its behavior accurately even after we intentionally modify its ground-truth behavior. However, while we successfully elicit introspection on simple tasks, we are unsuccessful on more complex tasks or those requiring out-of-distribution generalization.

Text-to-video (T2V) models like Sora have made significant strides in visualizing complex prompts, which is increasingly viewed as a promising path towards constructing the universal world simulator. Cognitive psychologists believe that the foundation for achieving this goal is the ability to understand intuitive physics. However, the capacity of these models to accurately represent intuitive physics remains largely unexplored. To bridge this gap, we introduce PhyGenBench, a comprehensive Physics Generation Benchmark designed to evaluate physical commonsense correctness in T2V generation. PhyGenBench comprises 160 carefully crafted prompts across 27 distinct physical laws, spanning four fundamental domains, which could comprehensively assesses models' understanding of physical commonsense. Alongside PhyGenBench, we propose a novel evaluation framework called PhyGenEval. This framework employs a hierarchical evaluation structure utilizing appropriate advanced vision-language models and large language models to assess physical commonsense. Through PhyGenBench and PhyGenEval, we can conduct large-scale automated assessments of T2V models' understanding of physical commonsense, which align closely with human feedback. Our evaluation results and in-depth analysis demonstrate that current models struggle to generate videos that comply with physical commonsense. Moreover, simply scaling up models or employing prompt engineering techniques is insufficient to fully address the challenges presented by PhyGenBench (e.g., dynamic scenarios). We hope this study will inspire the community to prioritize the learning of physical commonsense in these models beyond entertainment applications. We will release the data and codes at https://github.com/OpenGVLab/PhyGenBench

We examine the connections between deterministic, complete, and general global optimisation of continuous functions and a general concept of regression from the perspective of constructive type theory via the concept of 'searchability'. We see how the property of convergence of global optimisation is a straightforward consequence of searchability. The abstract setting allows us to generalise searchability and continuity to higher-order functions, so that we can formulate novel convergence criteria for regression, derived from the convergence of global optimisation. All the theory and the motivating examples are fully formalised in the proof assistant Agda.

We demonstrate that LLMs may learn indicators of document usefulness and modulate their updates accordingly. We introduce random strings ("tags") as indicators of usefulness in a synthetic fine-tuning dataset. Fine-tuning on this dataset leads to implicit meta-learning (IML): in further fine-tuning, the model updates to make more use of text that is tagged as useful. We perform a thorough empirical investigation of this phenomenon, finding (among other things) that (i) it occurs in both pretrained LLMs and those trained from scratch, as well as on a vision task, and (ii) larger models and smaller batch sizes tend to give more IML. We also use probing to examine how IML changes the way models store knowledge in their parameters. Finally, we reflect on what our results might imply about capabilities, risks, and controllability of future AI systems. Our code can be found at https://github.com/krasheninnikov/internalization.

Inductive reasoning is a core component of human intelligence. In the past research of inductive reasoning within computer science, formal language is used as representations of knowledge (facts and rules, more specifically). However, formal language can cause systematic problems for inductive reasoning such as disability of handling raw input such as natural language, sensitiveness to mislabeled data, and incapacity to handle ambiguous input. To this end, we propose a new paradigm (task) for inductive reasoning, which is to induce natural language rules from natural language facts, and create a dataset termed DEER containing 1.2k rule-fact pairs for the task, where rules and facts are written in natural language. New automatic metrics are also proposed and analysed for the evaluation of this task. With DEER, we investigate a modern approach for inductive reasoning where we use natural language as representation for knowledge instead of formal language and use pretrained language models as ''reasoners''. Moreover, we provide the first and comprehensive analysis of how well pretrained language models can induce natural language rules from natural language facts. We also propose a new framework drawing insights from philosophy literature for this task, which we show in the experiment section that surpasses baselines in both automatic and human evaluations. We discuss about our future perspectives for inductive reasoning in Section 7. Dataset and code are available at https://github.com/ZonglinY/Inductive_Reasoning.

We expect the generalization error to improve with more samples from a similar task, and to deteriorate with more samples from an out-of-distribution (OOD) task. In this work, we show a counter-intuitive phenomenon: the generalization error of a task can be a non-monotonic function of the number of OOD samples. As the number of OOD samples increases, the generalization error on the target task improves before deteriorating beyond a threshold. In other words, there is value in training on small amounts of OOD data. We use Fisher's Linear Discriminant on synthetic datasets and deep networks on computer vision benchmarks such as MNIST, CIFAR-10, CINIC-10, PACS and DomainNet to demonstrate and analyze this phenomenon. In the idealistic setting where we know which samples are OOD, we show that these non-monotonic trends can be exploited using an appropriately weighted objective of the target and OOD empirical risk. While its practical utility is limited, this does suggest that if we can detect OOD samples, then there may be ways to benefit from them. When we do not know which samples are OOD, we show how a number of go-to strategies such as data-augmentation, hyper-parameter optimization, and pre-training are not enough to ensure that the target generalization error does not deteriorate with the number of OOD samples in the dataset.

Formulas involving fundamental mathematical constants had a great impact on various fields of science and mathematics, for example aiding in proofs of irrationality of constants. However, the discovery of such formulas has historically remained scarce, often perceived as an act of mathematical genius by great mathematicians such as Ramanujan, Euler, and Gauss. Recent efforts to automate the discovery of formulas for mathematical constants, such as the Ramanujan Machine project, relied on exhaustive search. Despite several successful discoveries, exhaustive search remains limited by the space of options that can be covered and by the need for vast amounts of computational resources. Here we propose a fundamentally different method to search for conjectures on mathematical constants: through analysis of integer sequences. We introduce the Enumerated Signed-continued-fraction Massey Approve (ESMA) algorithm, which builds on the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm to identify patterns in integer sequences that represent mathematical constants. The ESMA algorithm found various known formulas for e, e^2, tan(1), and ratios of values of Bessel functions. The algorithm further discovered a large number of new conjectures for these constants, some providing simpler representations and some providing faster numerical convergence than the corresponding simple continued fractions. Along with the algorithm, we present mathematical tools for manipulating continued fractions. These connections enable us to characterize what space of constants can be found by ESMA and quantify its algorithmic advantage in certain scenarios. Altogether, this work continues in the development of augmenting mathematical intuition by computer algorithms, to help reveal mathematical structures and accelerate mathematical research.

Researchers have long recognized the socio-technical gaps in personal tracking research, where machines can never fully model the complexity of human behavior, making it only able to produce basic rule-based outputs or "black-box" results that lack clear explanations. Real-world deployments rely on experts for this complex translation from sparse data to meaningful insights. In this study, we consider this translation process from data to insights by experts as "sensemaking" and explore how HCI researchers can support it through Vital Insight, an evidence-based 'sensemaking' system that combines direct representation and indirect inference through visualization and Large Language Models. We evaluate Vital Insight in user testing sessions with 14 experts in multi-modal tracking, synthesize design implications, and develop an expert sensemaking model where they iteratively move between direct data representations and AI-supported inferences to explore, retrieve, question, and validate insights.

Recent scholarship on reasoning in LLMs has supplied evidence of impressive performance and flexible adaptation to machine generated or human feedback. Nonmonotonic reasoning, crucial to human cognition for navigating the real world, remains a challenging, yet understudied task. In this work, we study nonmonotonic reasoning capabilities of seven state-of-the-art LLMs in one abstract and one commonsense reasoning task featuring generics, such as 'Birds fly', and exceptions, 'Penguins don't fly' (see Fig. 1). While LLMs exhibit reasoning patterns in accordance with human nonmonotonic reasoning abilities, they fail to maintain stable beliefs on truth conditions of generics at the addition of supporting examples ('Owls fly') or unrelated information ('Lions have manes'). Our findings highlight pitfalls in attributing human reasoning behaviours to LLMs, as well as assessing general capabilities, while consistent reasoning remains elusive.

One might think that, once we know something is computable, how efficiently it can be computed is a practical question with little further philosophical importance. In this essay, I offer a detailed case that one would be wrong. In particular, I argue that computational complexity theory -- the field that studies the resources (such as time, space, and randomness) needed to solve computational problems -- leads to new perspectives on the nature of mathematical knowledge, the strong AI debate, computationalism, the problem of logical omniscience, Hume's problem of induction, Goodman's grue riddle, the foundations of quantum mechanics, economic rationality, closed timelike curves, and several other topics of philosophical interest. I end by discussing aspects of complexity theory itself that could benefit from philosophical analysis.

The prevalence and importance of algorithmic two-sided marketplaces has drawn attention to the issue of fairness in such settings. Algorithmic decisions are used in assigning students to schools, users to advertisers, and applicants to job interviews. These decisions should heed the preferences of individuals, and simultaneously be fair with respect to their merits (synonymous with fit, future performance, or need). Merits conditioned on observable features are always uncertain, a fact that is exacerbated by the widespread use of machine learning algorithms to infer merit from the observables. As our key contribution, we carefully axiomatize a notion of individual fairness in the two-sided marketplace setting which respects the uncertainty in the merits; indeed, it simultaneously recognizes uncertainty as the primary potential cause of unfairness and an approach to address it. We design a linear programming framework to find fair utility-maximizing distributions over allocations, and we show that the linear program is robust to perturbations in the estimated parameters of the uncertain merit distributions, a key property in combining the approach with machine learning techniques.

Inductive Reasoning (IR), the ability to summarize rules from examples and apply on new ones, has long been viewed as a primal ability for general intelligence and widely studied by cognitive science and AI researchers. Many benchmarks have been proposed to measure such ability for Large Language Models (LLMs); however, they focus on few-shot (usually <10) setting and lack evaluation for aggregating many pieces of information from long contexts. On the other hand, the ever-growing context length of LLMs have brought forth the novel paradigm of many-shot In-Context Learning (ICL), which addresses new tasks with hundreds to thousands of examples without expensive and inefficient fine-tuning. However, many-shot evaluations are mostly focused on classification (a very limited aspect of IR), and popular long-context LLM tasks such as Needle-In-A-Haystack (NIAH) seldom require complicated intelligence for integrating many pieces of information. To fix the issues from both worlds, we propose MIR-Bench, the first many-shot in-context inductive reasoning benchmark that asks LLM to induce output via input-output examples from underlying functions with diverse data format. Based on MIR-Bench, we study many novel problems for inductive reasoning and many-shot ICL, including robustness against erroneous shots and the effect of Chain-of-Thought (CoT), and acquired insightful findings.

The concept of Artificial Intelligence has gained a lot of attention over the last decade. In particular, AI-based tools have been employed in several scenarios and are, by now, pervading our everyday life. Nonetheless, most of these systems lack many capabilities that we would naturally consider to be included in a notion of "intelligence". In this work, we present an architecture that, inspired by the cognitive theory known as Thinking Fast and Slow by D. Kahneman, is tasked with solving planning problems in different settings, specifically: classical and multi-agent epistemic. The system proposed is an instance of a more general AI paradigm, referred to as SOFAI (for Slow and Fast AI). SOFAI exploits multiple solving approaches, with different capabilities that characterize them as either fast or slow, and a metacognitive module to regulate them. This combination of components, which roughly reflects the human reasoning process according to D. Kahneman, allowed us to enhance the reasoning process that, in this case, is concerned with planning in two different settings. The behavior of this system is then compared to state-of-the-art solvers, showing that the newly introduced system presents better results in terms of generality, solving a wider set of problems with an acceptable trade-off between solving times and solution accuracy.

With the increasing availability of structured and unstructured data and the swift progress of analytical techniques, Artificial Intelligence (AI) is bringing a revolution to the healthcare industry. With the increasingly indispensable role of AI in healthcare, there are growing concerns over the lack of transparency and explainability in addition to potential bias encountered by predictions of the model. This is where Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) comes into the picture. XAI increases the trust placed in an AI system by medical practitioners as well as AI researchers, and thus, eventually, leads to an increasingly widespread deployment of AI in healthcare. In this paper, we present different interpretability techniques. The aim is to enlighten practitioners on the understandability and interpretability of explainable AI systems using a variety of techniques available which can be very advantageous in the health-care domain. Medical diagnosis model is responsible for human life and we need to be confident enough to treat a patient as instructed by a black-box model. Our paper contains examples based on the heart disease dataset and elucidates on how the explainability techniques should be preferred to create trustworthiness while using AI systems in healthcare.

With the development in cognitive science and Large Language Models (LLMs), increasing connections have come to light between these two distinct fields. Building upon these connections, we propose a conjecture suggesting the existence of a duality between LLMs and Tulving's theory of memory. We identify a potential correspondence between Tulving's synergistic ecphory model (SEM) of retrieval and the emergent abilities observed in LLMs, serving as supporting evidence for our conjecture. Furthermore, we speculate that consciousness may be considered a form of emergent ability based on this duality. We also discuss how other theories of consciousness intersect with our research.

We reveal and address the frequently overlooked yet important issue of disguised procedural unfairness, namely, the potentially inadvertent alterations on the behavior of neutral (i.e., not problematic) aspects of data generating process, and/or the lack of procedural assurance of the greatest benefit of the least advantaged individuals. Inspired by John Rawls's advocacy for pure procedural justice, we view automated decision-making as a microcosm of social institutions, and consider how the data generating process itself can satisfy the requirements of procedural fairness. We propose a framework that decouples the objectionable data generating components from the neutral ones by utilizing reference points and the associated value instantiation rule. Our findings highlight the necessity of preventing disguised procedural unfairness, drawing attention not only to the objectionable data generating components that we aim to mitigate, but also more importantly, to the neutral components that we intend to keep unaffected.

Fine-tuning continuous prompts for target tasks has recently emerged as a compact alternative to full model fine-tuning. Motivated by these promising results, we investigate the feasibility of extracting a discrete (textual) interpretation of continuous prompts that is faithful to the problem they solve. In practice, we observe a "wayward" behavior between the task solved by continuous prompts and their nearest neighbor discrete projections: We can find continuous prompts that solve a task while being projected to an arbitrary text (e.g., definition of a different or even a contradictory task), while being within a very small (2%) margin of the best continuous prompt of the same size for the task. We provide intuitions behind this odd and surprising behavior, as well as extensive empirical analyses quantifying the effect of various parameters. For instance, for larger model sizes we observe higher waywardness, i.e, we can find prompts that more closely map to any arbitrary text with a smaller drop in accuracy. These findings have important implications relating to the difficulty of faithfully interpreting continuous prompts and their generalization across models and tasks, providing guidance for future progress in prompting language models.

Humans regularly engage in analogical thinking, relating personal experiences to current situations (X is analogous to Y because of Z). Analogical thinking allows humans to solve problems in creative ways, grasp difficult concepts, and articulate ideas more effectively. Can language models (LMs) do the same? To answer this question, we propose ANALOBENCH, a benchmark to determine analogical reasoning ability in LMs. Our benchmarking approach focuses on aspects of this ability that are common among humans: (i) recalling related experiences from a large amount of information, and (ii) applying analogical reasoning to complex and lengthy scenarios. We test a broad collection of proprietary models (e.g., GPT family, Claude V2) and open source models such as LLaMA2. As in prior results, scaling up LMs results in some performance boosts. Surprisingly, scale offers minimal gains when, (i) analogies involve lengthy scenarios, or (ii) recalling relevant scenarios from a large pool of information, a process analogous to finding a needle in a haystack. We hope these observations encourage further research in this field.

Supervised machine learning models boast remarkable predictive capabilities. But can you trust your model? Will it work in deployment? What else can it tell you about the world? We want models to be not only good, but interpretable. And yet the task of interpretation appears underspecified. Papers provide diverse and sometimes non-overlapping motivations for interpretability, and offer myriad notions of what attributes render models interpretable. Despite this ambiguity, many papers proclaim interpretability axiomatically, absent further explanation. In this paper, we seek to refine the discourse on interpretability. First, we examine the motivations underlying interest in interpretability, finding them to be diverse and occasionally discordant. Then, we address model properties and techniques thought to confer interpretability, identifying transparency to humans and post-hoc explanations as competing notions. Throughout, we discuss the feasibility and desirability of different notions, and question the oft-made assertions that linear models are interpretable and that deep neural networks are not.

Recent work on neural algorithmic reasoning has investigated the reasoning capabilities of neural networks, effectively demonstrating they can learn to execute classical algorithms on unseen data coming from the train distribution. However, the performance of existing neural reasoners significantly degrades on out-of-distribution (OOD) test data, where inputs have larger sizes. In this work, we make an important observation: there are many different inputs for which an algorithm will perform certain intermediate computations identically. This insight allows us to develop data augmentation procedures that, given an algorithm's intermediate trajectory, produce inputs for which the target algorithm would have exactly the same next trajectory step. Then, we employ a causal framework to design a corresponding self-supervised objective, and we prove that it improves the OOD generalisation capabilities of the reasoner. We evaluate our method on the CLRS algorithmic reasoning benchmark, where we show up to 3times improvements on the OOD test data.

We develop a method for generating causal post-hoc explanations of black-box classifiers based on a learned low-dimensional representation of the data. The explanation is causal in the sense that changing learned latent factors produces a change in the classifier output statistics. To construct these explanations, we design a learning framework that leverages a generative model and information-theoretic measures of causal influence. Our objective function encourages both the generative model to faithfully represent the data distribution and the latent factors to have a large causal influence on the classifier output. Our method learns both global and local explanations, is compatible with any classifier that admits class probabilities and a gradient, and does not require labeled attributes or knowledge of causal structure. Using carefully controlled test cases, we provide intuition that illuminates the function of our objective. We then demonstrate the practical utility of our method on image recognition tasks.

Algorithmic approaches to interpreting machine learning models have proliferated in recent years. We carry out human subject tests that are the first of their kind to isolate the effect of algorithmic explanations on a key aspect of model interpretability, simulatability, while avoiding important confounding experimental factors. A model is simulatable when a person can predict its behavior on new inputs. Through two kinds of simulation tests involving text and tabular data, we evaluate five explanations methods: (1) LIME, (2) Anchor, (3) Decision Boundary, (4) a Prototype model, and (5) a Composite approach that combines explanations from each method. Clear evidence of method effectiveness is found in very few cases: LIME improves simulatability in tabular classification, and our Prototype method is effective in counterfactual simulation tests. We also collect subjective ratings of explanations, but we do not find that ratings are predictive of how helpful explanations are. Our results provide the first reliable and comprehensive estimates of how explanations influence simulatability across a variety of explanation methods and data domains. We show that (1) we need to be careful about the metrics we use to evaluate explanation methods, and (2) there is significant room for improvement in current methods. All our supporting code, data, and models are publicly available at: https://github.com/peterbhase/InterpretableNLP-ACL2020

Inspiration is linked to various positive outcomes, such as increased creativity, productivity, and happiness. Although inspiration has great potential, there has been limited effort toward identifying content that is inspiring, as opposed to just engaging or positive. Additionally, most research has concentrated on Western data, with little attention paid to other cultures. This work is the first to study cross-cultural inspiration through machine learning methods. We aim to identify and analyze real and AI-generated cross-cultural inspiring posts. To this end, we compile and make publicly available the InspAIred dataset, which consists of 2,000 real inspiring posts, 2,000 real non-inspiring posts, and 2,000 generated inspiring posts evenly distributed across India and the UK. The real posts are sourced from Reddit, while the generated posts are created using the GPT-4 model. Using this dataset, we conduct extensive computational linguistic analyses to (1) compare inspiring content across cultures, (2) compare AI-generated inspiring posts to real inspiring posts, and (3) determine if detection models can accurately distinguish between inspiring content across cultures and data sources.

This study analyzed images generated by three popular generative artificial intelligence (AI) tools - Midjourney, Stable Diffusion, and DALLE 2 - representing various occupations to investigate potential bias in AI generators. Our analysis revealed two overarching areas of concern in these AI generators, including (1) systematic gender and racial biases, and (2) subtle biases in facial expressions and appearances. Firstly, we found that all three AI generators exhibited bias against women and African Americans. Moreover, we found that the evident gender and racial biases uncovered in our analysis were even more pronounced than the status quo when compared to labor force statistics or Google images, intensifying the harmful biases we are actively striving to rectify in our society. Secondly, our study uncovered more nuanced prejudices in the portrayal of emotions and appearances. For example, women were depicted as younger with more smiles and happiness, while men were depicted as older with more neutral expressions and anger, posing a risk that generative AI models may unintentionally depict women as more submissive and less competent than men. Such nuanced biases, by their less overt nature, might be more problematic as they can permeate perceptions unconsciously and may be more difficult to rectify. Although the extent of bias varied depending on the model, the direction of bias remained consistent in both commercial and open-source AI generators. As these tools become commonplace, our study highlights the urgency to identify and mitigate various biases in generative AI, reinforcing the commitment to ensuring that AI technologies benefit all of humanity for a more inclusive future.

Recent language models have a mysterious tendency to generate false but plausible-sounding text. Such "hallucinations" are an obstacle to the usability of language-based AI systems and can harm people who rely upon their outputs. This work shows shows that there is an inherent statistical reason that pretrained language models hallucinate certain types of facts, having nothing to do with the transformer LM architecture or data quality. For "arbitrary" facts whose veracity cannot be determined from the training data, we show that hallucination is necessary for language models that satisfy a statistical calibration condition appropriate for generative language models. Specifically, if the maximum probability of any fact is bounded, we show that the probability of generating a hallucination is close to the fraction of facts that occur exactly once in the training data (a "Good-Turing" estimate), even assuming ideal training data without errors. One conclusion is that models pretrained to be sufficiently good predictors (i.e., calibrated) may require post-training to mitigate hallucinations on the type of arbitrary facts that tend to appear once in the training set. However, our analysis also suggests that there is no statistical reason that pretraining will lead to hallucination on facts that tend to appear more than once in the training data (like references to publications such as articles and books, whose hallucinations have been particularly notable and problematic) or on systematic facts (like arithmetic calculations). Therefore, different architectures and learning algorithms may mitigate these latter types of hallucinations.

Natural language is an appealing medium for explaining how large language models process and store information, but evaluating the faithfulness of such explanations is challenging. To help address this, we develop two modes of evaluation for natural language explanations that claim individual neurons represent a concept in a text input. In the observational mode, we evaluate claims that a neuron a activates on all and only input strings that refer to a concept picked out by the proposed explanation E. In the intervention mode, we construe E as a claim that the neuron a is a causal mediator of the concept denoted by E. We apply our framework to the GPT-4-generated explanations of GPT-2 XL neurons of Bills et al. (2023) and show that even the most confident explanations have high error rates and little to no causal efficacy. We close the paper by critically assessing whether natural language is a good choice for explanations and whether neurons are the best level of analysis.

There is a strong association between the quality of the writing in a resume for new labor market entrants and whether those entrants are ultimately hired. We show that this relationship is, at least partially, causal: a field experiment in an online labor market was conducted with nearly half a million jobseekers in which a treated group received algorithmic writing assistance. Treated jobseekers experienced an 8% increase in the probability of getting hired. Contrary to concerns that the assistance is taking away a valuable signal, we find no evidence that employers were less satisfied. We present a model in which better writing is not a signal of ability but helps employers ascertain ability, which rationalizes our findings.

Understanding commonsense causality is a unique mark of intelligence for humans. It helps people understand the principles of the real world better and benefits the decision-making process related to causation. For instance, commonsense causality is crucial in judging whether a defendant's action causes the plaintiff's loss in determining legal liability. Despite its significance, a systematic exploration of this topic is notably lacking. Our comprehensive survey bridges this gap by focusing on taxonomies, benchmarks, acquisition methods, qualitative reasoning, and quantitative measurements in commonsense causality, synthesizing insights from over 200 representative articles. Our work aims to provide a systematic overview, update scholars on recent advancements, provide a pragmatic guide for beginners, and highlight promising future research directions in this vital field.

Abstraction is a core tenet of human cognition and communication. When composing natural language instructions, humans naturally evoke abstraction to convey complex procedures in an efficient and concise way. Yet, interpreting and grounding abstraction expressed in NL has not yet been systematically studied in NLP, with no accepted benchmarks specifically eliciting abstraction in NL. In this work, we set the foundation for a systematic study of processing and grounding abstraction in NLP. First, we deliver a novel abstraction elicitation method and present Hexagons, a 2D instruction-following game. Using Hexagons we collected over 4k naturally-occurring visually-grounded instructions rich with diverse types of abstractions. From these data, we derive an instruction-to-execution task and assess different types of neural models. Our results show that contemporary models and modeling practices are substantially inferior to human performance, and that models' performance is inversely correlated with the level of abstraction, showing less satisfying performance on higher levels of abstraction. These findings are consistent across models and setups, confirming that abstraction is a challenging phenomenon deserving further attention and study in NLP/AI research.

The research explores the steerability of Large Language Models (LLMs), particularly OpenAI's ChatGPT iterations. By employing a behavioral psychology framework called OCEAN (Openness, Conscientiousness, Extroversion, Agreeableness, Neuroticism), we quantitatively gauged the model's responsiveness to tailored prompts. When asked to generate text mimicking an extroverted personality, OCEAN scored the language alignment to that behavioral trait. In our analysis, while "openness" presented linguistic ambiguity, "conscientiousness" and "neuroticism" were distinctly evoked in the OCEAN framework, with "extroversion" and "agreeableness" showcasing a notable overlap yet distinct separation from other traits. Our findings underscore GPT's versatility and ability to discern and adapt to nuanced instructions. Furthermore, historical figure simulations highlighted the LLM's capacity to internalize and project instructible personas, precisely replicating their philosophies and dialogic styles. However, the rapid advancements in LLM capabilities and the opaque nature of some training techniques make metric proposals degrade rapidly. Our research emphasizes a quantitative role to describe steerability in LLMs, presenting both its promise and areas for further refinement in aligning its progress to human intentions.

There is a growing literature on reasoning by large language models (LLMs), but the discussion on the uncertainty in their responses is still lacking. Our aim is to assess the extent of confidence that LLMs have in their answers and how it correlates with accuracy. Confidence is measured (i) qualitatively in terms of persistence in keeping their answer when prompted to reconsider, and (ii) quantitatively in terms of self-reported confidence score. We investigate the performance of three LLMs -- GPT4o, GPT4-turbo and Mistral -- on two benchmark sets of questions on causal judgement and formal fallacies and a set of probability and statistical puzzles and paradoxes. Although the LLMs show significantly better performance than random guessing, there is a wide variability in their tendency to change their initial answers. There is a positive correlation between qualitative confidence and accuracy, but the overall accuracy for the second answer is often worse than for the first answer. There is a strong tendency to overstate the self-reported confidence score. Confidence is only partially explained by the underlying token-level probability. The material effects of prompting on qualitative confidence and the strong tendency for overconfidence indicate that current LLMs do not have any internally coherent sense of confidence.

In coming years or decades, artificial general intelligence (AGI) may surpass human capabilities at many critical tasks. We argue that, without substantial effort to prevent it, AGIs could learn to pursue goals that are in conflict (i.e. misaligned) with human interests. If trained like today's most capable models, AGIs could learn to act deceptively to receive higher reward, learn misaligned internally-represented goals which generalize beyond their fine-tuning distributions, and pursue those goals using power-seeking strategies. We review emerging evidence for these properties. AGIs with these properties would be difficult to align and may appear aligned even when they are not. Finally, we briefly outline how the deployment of misaligned AGIs might irreversibly undermine human control over the world, and we review research directions aimed at preventing this outcome.

Reasoning is a distinctive human capacity, enabling us to address complex problems by breaking them down into a series of manageable cognitive steps. Yet, complex logical reasoning is still cumbersome for language models. Based on the dual process theory in cognitive science, we are the first to unravel the cognitive reasoning abilities of language models. Our framework employs an iterative methodology to construct a Cognitive Tree (CogTree). The root node of this tree represents the initial query, while the leaf nodes consist of straightforward questions that can be answered directly. This construction involves two main components: the implicit extraction module (referred to as the intuitive system) and the explicit reasoning module (referred to as the reflective system). The intuitive system rapidly generates multiple responses by utilizing in-context examples, while the reflective system scores these responses using comparative learning. The scores guide the intuitive system in its subsequent generation step. Our experimental results on two popular and challenging reasoning tasks indicate that it is possible to achieve a performance level comparable to that of GPT-3.5 (with 175B parameters), using a significantly smaller language model that contains fewer parameters (<=7B) than 5% of GPT-3.5.

This paper is a very non-rigorous, loose, and extremely basic introduction to sheaves. This is meant to be a a guide to gaining intuition about sheaves, what they look like, and how they work, so that after reading this paper, someone can jump into the extremely abstract definitions and examples seen in textbooks with at least some idea of what is going on. Most of this material is inspired and built from the work of Dr. Michael Robinson, and that of Dr. Robert Ghrist and Dr. Jakob Hansen, as well as Dr. Justin Curry's PhD thesis, who are some of the only applied sheaf theorists out there and they do an amazing job of explaining sheaves in a concrete way through their research. The rest of this paper is populated by mathematical definitions found in textbooks that I have stretched from two lines into multiple pages, as well as some analogies for thinking of sheaves I have thought of myself. This paper only assumes knowledge of basic linear algebra, basic group theory, and the very fundamentals of topology. If there is anything in the setup that you do not understand it is probably a quick Wikipedia search away. I hope this paper provides insight, intuition, and helpful examples of why sheaves are such powerful tools in both math and science.

Recent advancements in natural language processing by large language models (LLMs), such as GPT-4, have been suggested to approach Artificial General Intelligence. And yet, it is still under dispute whether LLMs possess similar reasoning abilities to humans. This study evaluates GPT-4 and various other LLMs in judging the profoundness of mundane, motivational, and pseudo-profound statements. We found a significant statement-to-statement correlation between the LLMs and humans, irrespective of the type of statements and the prompting technique used. However, LLMs systematically overestimate the profoundness of nonsensical statements, with the exception of Tk-instruct, which uniquely underestimates the profoundness of statements. Only few-shot learning prompts, as opposed to chain-of-thought prompting, draw LLMs ratings closer to humans. Furthermore, this work provides insights into the potential biases induced by Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), inducing an increase in the bias to overestimate the profoundness of statements.

The critical inquiry pervading the realm of Philosophy, and perhaps extending its influence across all Humanities disciplines, revolves around the intricacies of morality and normativity. Surprisingly, in recent years, this thematic thread has woven its way into an unexpected domain, one not conventionally associated with pondering "what ought to be": the field of artificial intelligence (AI) research. Central to morality and AI, we find "alignment", a problem related to the challenges of expressing human goals and values in a manner that artificial systems can follow without leading to unwanted adversarial effects. More explicitly and with our current paradigm of AI development in mind, we can think of alignment as teaching human values to non-anthropomorphic entities trained through opaque, gradient-based learning techniques. This work addresses alignment as a technical-philosophical problem that requires solid philosophical foundations and practical implementations that bring normative theory to AI system development. To accomplish this, we propose two sets of necessary and sufficient conditions that, we argue, should be considered in any alignment process. While necessary conditions serve as metaphysical and metaethical roots that pertain to the permissibility of alignment, sufficient conditions establish a blueprint for aligning AI systems under a learning-based paradigm. After laying such foundations, we present implementations of this approach by using state-of-the-art techniques and methods for aligning general-purpose language systems. We call this framework Dynamic Normativity. Its central thesis is that any alignment process under a learning paradigm that cannot fulfill its necessary and sufficient conditions will fail in producing aligned systems.

Generative models are trained with the simple objective of imitating the conditional probability distribution induced by the data they are trained on. Therefore, when trained on data generated by humans, we may not expect the artificial model to outperform the humans on their original objectives. In this work, we study the phenomenon of transcendence: when a generative model achieves capabilities that surpass the abilities of the experts generating its data. We demonstrate transcendence by training an autoregressive transformer to play chess from game transcripts, and show that the trained model can sometimes achieve better performance than all players in the dataset. We theoretically prove that transcendence is enabled by low-temperature sampling, and rigorously assess this experimentally. Finally, we discuss other sources of transcendence, laying the groundwork for future investigation of this phenomenon in a broader setting.

Unitary quantum theory, having no Born Rule, is non-probabilistic. Hence the notorious problem of reconciling it with the unpredictability and appearance of stochasticity in quantum measurements. Generalising and improving upon the so-called 'decision-theoretic approach' (Deutsch, 1999; Wallace, 2003, 2007, 2012), I shall recast that problem in the recently proposed constructor theory of information - where quantum theory is represented as one of a class of superinformation theories, which are local, non-probabilistic theories conforming to certain constructor-theoretic conditions. I prove that the unpredictability of measurement outcomes (to which I give an exact meaning via constructor theory), necessarily arises in superinformation theories. Then I explain how the appearance of stochasticity in (finitely many) repeated measurements can arise under superinformation theories. And I establish sufficient conditions for a superinformation theory to inform decisions (made under it) as if it were probabilistic, via a Deutsch-Wallace-type argument - thus defining a class of decision-supporting superinformation theories. This broadens the domain of applicability of that argument to cover constructor-theory compliant theories. In addition, in this version some of the argument's assumptions, previously construed as merely decision-theoretic, follow from physical properties expressed by constructor-theoretic principles.

We present a theory of information expressed solely in terms of which transformations of physical systems are possible and which are impossible - i.e. in constructor-theoretic terms. Although it includes conjectured laws of physics that are directly about information, independently of the details of particular physical instantiations, it does not regard information as an a priori mathematical or logical concept, but as something whose nature and properties are determined by the laws of physics alone. It does not suffer from the circularity at the foundations of existing information theory (namely that information and distinguishability are each defined in terms of the other). It explains the relationship between classical and quantum information, and reveals the single, constructor-theoretic property underlying the most distinctive phenomena associated with the latter, including the lack of in-principle distinguishability of some states, the impossibility of cloning, the existence of pairs of variables that cannot simultaneously have sharp values, the fact that measurement processes can be both deterministic and unpredictable, the irreducible perturbation caused by measurement, and entanglement (locally inaccessible information).

The ability to adapt beliefs or behaviors in response to unexpected outcomes, reflection, is fundamental to intelligent systems' interaction with the world. From a cognitive science perspective, this serves as a core principle of intelligence applicable to both human and AI systems. To address the debate on the intelligence of large language models (LLMs), we propose Reflection-Bench, a comprehensive benchmark comprising 7 tasks spanning core cognitive functions crucial for reflection, including perception, memory, belief updating, decision-making, prediction, counterfactual thinking, and meta-reflection. We evaluate the performances of 13 prominent LLMs such as OpenAI o1, GPT-4, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, etc. The results indicate that current LLMs still lack satisfactory reflection ability. We discuss the underlying causes of these results and suggest potential avenues for future research. In conclusion, Reflection-Bench offers both evaluation tools and inspiration for developing AI capable of reliably interacting with the environment. Our data and code are available at https://github.com/YabYum/ReflectionBench.

Quantum technology has the potential to revolutionize how we acquire and process experimental data to learn about the physical world. An experimental setup that transduces data from a physical system to a stable quantum memory, and processes that data using a quantum computer, could have significant advantages over conventional experiments in which the physical system is measured and the outcomes are processed using a classical computer. We prove that, in various tasks, quantum machines can learn from exponentially fewer experiments than those required in conventional experiments. The exponential advantage holds in predicting properties of physical systems, performing quantum principal component analysis on noisy states, and learning approximate models of physical dynamics. In some tasks, the quantum processing needed to achieve the exponential advantage can be modest; for example, one can simultaneously learn about many noncommuting observables by processing only two copies of the system. Conducting experiments with up to 40 superconducting qubits and 1300 quantum gates, we demonstrate that a substantial quantum advantage can be realized using today's relatively noisy quantum processors. Our results highlight how quantum technology can enable powerful new strategies to learn about nature.

Abstract reasoning is a key ability for an intelligent system. Large language models achieve above-chance performance on abstract reasoning tasks, but exhibit many imperfections. However, human abstract reasoning is also imperfect, and depends on our knowledge and beliefs about the content of the reasoning problem. For example, humans reason much more reliably about logical rules that are grounded in everyday situations than arbitrary rules about abstract attributes. The training experiences of language models similarly endow them with prior expectations that reflect human knowledge and beliefs. We therefore hypothesized that language models would show human-like content effects on abstract reasoning problems. We explored this hypothesis across three logical reasoning tasks: natural language inference, judging the logical validity of syllogisms, and the Wason selection task (Wason, 1968). We find that state of the art large language models (with 7 or 70 billion parameters; Hoffman et al., 2022) reflect many of the same patterns observed in humans across these tasks -- like humans, models reason more effectively about believable situations than unrealistic or abstract ones. Our findings have implications for understanding both these cognitive effects, and the factors that contribute to language model performance.

We have recently witnessed a number of impressive results on hard mathematical reasoning problems with language models. At the same time, the robustness of these models has also been called into question; recent works have shown that models can rely on shallow patterns in the problem description when generating a solution. Building on the idea of behavioral testing, we propose a novel framework, which pins down the causal effect of various factors in the input, e.g., the surface form of the problem text, the operands, and math operators on the output solution. By grounding the behavioral analysis in a causal graph describing an intuitive reasoning process, we study the behavior of language models in terms of robustness and sensitivity to direct interventions in the input space. We apply our framework on a test bed of math word problems. Our analysis shows that robustness does not appear to continuously improve as a function of size, but the GPT-3 Davinci models (175B) achieve a dramatic improvement in both robustness and sensitivity compared to all other GPT variants.

Building future wireless systems that support services like digital twins (DTs) is challenging to achieve through advances to conventional technologies like meta-surfaces. While artificial intelligence (AI)-native networks promise to overcome some limitations of wireless technologies, developments still rely on AI tools like neural networks. Such tools struggle to cope with the non-trivial challenges of the network environment and the growing demands of emerging use cases. In this paper, we revisit the concept of AI-native wireless systems, equipping them with the common sense necessary to transform them into artificial general intelligence (AGI)-native systems. These systems acquire common sense by exploiting different cognitive abilities such as perception, analogy, and reasoning, that enable them to generalize and deal with unforeseen scenarios. Towards developing the components of such a system, we start by showing how the perception module can be built through abstracting real-world elements into generalizable representations. These representations are then used to create a world model, founded on principles of causality and hyper-dimensional (HD) computing, that aligns with intuitive physics and enables analogical reasoning, that define common sense. Then, we explain how methods such as integrated information theory play a role in the proposed intent-driven and objective-driven planning methods that maneuver the AGI-native network to take actions. Next, we discuss how an AGI-native network can enable use cases related to human and autonomous agents: a) analogical reasoning for next-generation DTs, b) synchronized and resilient experiences for cognitive avatars, and c) brain-level metaverse experiences like holographic teleportation. Finally, we conclude with a set of recommendations to build AGI-native systems. Ultimately, we envision this paper as a roadmap for the beyond 6G era.

This paper uses the concept of algorithmic efficiency to present a unified theory of intelligence. Intelligence is defined informally, formally, and computationally. We introduce the concept of Dimensional complexity in algorithmic efficiency and deduce that an optimally efficient algorithm has zero Time complexity, zero Space complexity, and an infinite Dimensional complexity. This algorithm is used to generate the number line.

Whether neural networks can learn abstract reasoning or whether they merely rely on superficial statistics is a topic of recent debate. Here, we propose a dataset and challenge designed to probe abstract reasoning, inspired by a well-known human IQ test. To succeed at this challenge, models must cope with various generalisation `regimes' in which the training and test data differ in clearly-defined ways. We show that popular models such as ResNets perform poorly, even when the training and test sets differ only minimally, and we present a novel architecture, with a structure designed to encourage reasoning, that does significantly better. When we vary the way in which the test questions and training data differ, we find that our model is notably proficient at certain forms of generalisation, but notably weak at others. We further show that the model's ability to generalise improves markedly if it is trained to predict symbolic explanations for its answers. Altogether, we introduce and explore ways to both measure and induce stronger abstract reasoning in neural networks. Our freely-available dataset should motivate further progress in this direction.

Faithfulness hallucinations are claims generated by a Large Language Model (LLM) not supported by contexts provided to the LLM. Lacking assessment standards, existing benchmarks focus on "factual statements" that rephrase source materials while overlooking "cognitive statements" that involve making inferences from the given context. Consequently, evaluating and detecting the hallucination of cognitive statements remains challenging. Inspired by how evidence is assessed in the legal domain, we design a rigorous framework to assess different levels of faithfulness of cognitive statements and introduce the CogniBench dataset where we reveal insightful statistics. To keep pace with rapidly evolving LLMs, we further develop an automatic annotation pipeline that scales easily across different models. This results in a large-scale CogniBench-L dataset, which facilitates training accurate detectors for both factual and cognitive hallucinations. We release our model and datasets at: https://github.com/FUTUREEEEEE/CogniBench

We consider objective evaluation measures of saliency explanations for complex black-box machine learning models. We propose simple robust variants of two notions that have been considered in recent literature: (in)fidelity, and sensitivity. We analyze optimal explanations with respect to both these measures, and while the optimal explanation for sensitivity is a vacuous constant explanation, the optimal explanation for infidelity is a novel combination of two popular explanation methods. By varying the perturbation distribution that defines infidelity, we obtain novel explanations by optimizing infidelity, which we show to out-perform existing explanations in both quantitative and qualitative measurements. Another salient question given these measures is how to modify any given explanation to have better values with respect to these measures. We propose a simple modification based on lowering sensitivity, and moreover show that when done appropriately, we could simultaneously improve both sensitivity as well as fidelity.

If machine learning models were to achieve superhuman abilities at various reasoning or decision-making tasks, how would we go about evaluating such models, given that humans would necessarily be poor proxies for ground truth? In this paper, we propose a framework for evaluating superhuman models via consistency checks. Our premise is that while the correctness of superhuman decisions may be impossible to evaluate, we can still surface mistakes if the model's decisions fail to satisfy certain logical, human-interpretable rules. We instantiate our framework on three tasks where correctness of decisions is hard to evaluate due to either superhuman model abilities, or to otherwise missing ground truth: evaluating chess positions, forecasting future events, and making legal judgments. We show that regardless of a model's (possibly superhuman) performance on these tasks, we can discover logical inconsistencies in decision making. For example: a chess engine assigning opposing valuations to semantically identical boards; GPT-4 forecasting that sports records will evolve non-monotonically over time; or an AI judge assigning bail to a defendant only after we add a felony to their criminal record.

Observing that the creation of certain types of artistic artifacts necessitate intelligence, we present the Lovelace 2.0 Test of creativity as an alternative to the Turing Test as a means of determining whether an agent is intelligent. The Lovelace 2.0 Test builds off prior tests of creativity and additionally provides a means of directly comparing the relative intelligence of different agents.

Mechanistic interpretability aims to understand the computational mechanisms underlying neural networks' capabilities in order to accomplish concrete scientific and engineering goals. Progress in this field thus promises to provide greater assurance over AI system behavior and shed light on exciting scientific questions about the nature of intelligence. Despite recent progress toward these goals, there are many open problems in the field that require solutions before many scientific and practical benefits can be realized: Our methods require both conceptual and practical improvements to reveal deeper insights; we must figure out how best to apply our methods in pursuit of specific goals; and the field must grapple with socio-technical challenges that influence and are influenced by our work. This forward-facing review discusses the current frontier of mechanistic interpretability and the open problems that the field may benefit from prioritizing.

In living organisms, homeostasis is the natural regulation of internal states aimed at maintaining conditions compatible with life. Typical artificial systems are not equipped with comparable regulatory features. Here, we introduce an artificial neural network that incorporates homeostatic features. Its own computing substrate is placed in a needful and vulnerable relation to the very objects over which it computes. For example, artificial neurons performing classification of MNIST digits or Fashion-MNIST articles of clothing may receive excitatory or inhibitory effects, which alter their own learning rate as a direct result of perceiving and classifying the digits. In this scenario, accurate recognition is desirable to the agent itself because it guides decisions to regulate its vulnerable internal states and functionality. Counterintuitively, the addition of vulnerability to a learner does not necessarily impair its performance. On the contrary, self-regulation in response to vulnerability confers benefits under certain conditions. We show that homeostatic design confers increased adaptability under concept shift, in which the relationships between labels and data change over time, and that the greatest advantages are obtained under the highest rates of shift. This necessitates the rapid un-learning of past associations and the re-learning of new ones. We also demonstrate the superior abilities of homeostatic learners in environments with dynamically changing rates of concept shift. Our homeostatic design exposes the artificial neural network's thinking machinery to the consequences of its own "thoughts", illustrating the advantage of putting one's own "skin in the game" to improve fluid intelligence.

In this work, we develop a technique to produce counterfactual visual explanations. Given a 'query' image I for which a vision system predicts class c, a counterfactual visual explanation identifies how I could change such that the system would output a different specified class c'. To do this, we select a 'distractor' image I' that the system predicts as class c' and identify spatial regions in I and I' such that replacing the identified region in I with the identified region in I' would push the system towards classifying I as c'. We apply our approach to multiple image classification datasets generating qualitative results showcasing the interpretability and discriminativeness of our counterfactual explanations. To explore the effectiveness of our explanations in teaching humans, we present machine teaching experiments for the task of fine-grained bird classification. We find that users trained to distinguish bird species fare better when given access to counterfactual explanations in addition to training examples.

This paper introduces a novel approach to evaluating deep learning models' capacity for in-diagram logic interpretation. Leveraging the intriguing realm of visual illusions, we establish a unique dataset, InDL, designed to rigorously test and benchmark these models. Deep learning has witnessed remarkable progress in domains such as computer vision and natural language processing. However, models often stumble in tasks requiring logical reasoning due to their inherent 'black box' characteristics, which obscure the decision-making process. Our work presents a new lens to understand these models better by focusing on their handling of visual illusions -- a complex interplay of perception and logic. We utilize six classic geometric optical illusions to create a comparative framework between human and machine visual perception. This methodology offers a quantifiable measure to rank models, elucidating potential weaknesses and providing actionable insights for model improvements. Our experimental results affirm the efficacy of our benchmarking strategy, demonstrating its ability to effectively rank models based on their logic interpretation ability. As part of our commitment to reproducible research, the source code and datasets will be made publicly available at https://github.com/rabbit-magic-wh/InDL

Human intelligence, the most evident and accessible form of source of reasoning, hosted by biological hardware, has evolved and been refined over thousands of years, positioning itself today to create new artificial forms and preparing to self--design their evolutionary path forward. Beginning with the advent of foundation models, the rate at which human and artificial intelligence interact with each other has surpassed any anticipated quantitative figures. The close engagement led to both bits of intelligence to be impacted in various ways, which naturally resulted in complex confluences that warrant close scrutiny. In the sequel, we shall explore the interplay between human and machine intelligence, focusing on the crucial role humans play in developing ethical, responsible, and robust intelligent systems. We slightly delve into interesting aspects of implementation inspired by the mechanisms underlying neuroscience and human cognition. Additionally, we propose future perspectives, capitalizing on the advantages of symbiotic designs to suggest a human-centered direction for next-generation AI development. We finalize this evolving document with a few thoughts and open questions yet to be addressed by the broader community.

Despite the recent proliferation of large language models (LLMs), their training recipes -- model architecture, pre-training data and optimization algorithm -- are often very similar. This naturally raises the question of the similarity among the resulting models. In this paper, we propose a novel setting, imaginary question answering (IQA), to better understand model similarity. In IQA, we ask one model to generate purely imaginary questions (e.g., on completely made-up concepts in physics) and prompt another model to answer. Surprisingly, despite the total fictionality of these questions, all models can answer each other's questions with remarkable success, suggesting a "shared imagination space" in which these models operate during such hallucinations. We conduct a series of investigations into this phenomenon and discuss implications on model homogeneity, hallucination, and computational creativity.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) have demonstrated state-of-the-art results on many pattern recognition tasks, especially vision classification problems. Understanding the inner workings of such computational brains is both fascinating basic science that is interesting in its own right - similar to why we study the human brain - and will enable researchers to further improve DNNs. One path to understanding how a neural network functions internally is to study what each of its neurons has learned to detect. One such method is called activation maximization (AM), which synthesizes an input (e.g. an image) that highly activates a neuron. Here we dramatically improve the qualitative state of the art of activation maximization by harnessing a powerful, learned prior: a deep generator network (DGN). The algorithm (1) generates qualitatively state-of-the-art synthetic images that look almost real, (2) reveals the features learned by each neuron in an interpretable way, (3) generalizes well to new datasets and somewhat well to different network architectures without requiring the prior to be relearned, and (4) can be considered as a high-quality generative method (in this case, by generating novel, creative, interesting, recognizable images).

While interpretability research has shed light on some internal algorithms utilized by transformer-based LLMs, reasoning in natural language, with its deep contextuality and ambiguity, defies easy categorization. As a result, formulating clear and motivating questions for circuit analysis that rely on well-defined in-domain and out-of-domain examples required for causal interventions is challenging. Although significant work has investigated circuits for specific tasks, such as indirect object identification (IOI), deciphering natural language reasoning through circuits remains difficult due to its inherent complexity. In this work, we take initial steps to characterize causal reasoning in LLMs by analyzing clear-cut cause-and-effect sentences like "I opened an umbrella because it started raining," where causal interventions may be possible through carefully crafted scenarios using GPT-2 small. Our findings indicate that causal syntax is localized within the first 2-3 layers, while certain heads in later layers exhibit heightened sensitivity to nonsensical variations of causal sentences. This suggests that models may infer reasoning by (1) detecting syntactic cues and (2) isolating distinct heads in the final layers that focus on semantic relationships.

This is an essay in what might be called ``mathematical metaphysics.'' There is a fundamental duality that run through mathematics and the natural sciences. The duality starts as the logical level; it is represented by the Boolean logic of subsets and the logic of partitions since subsets and partitions are category-theoretic dual concepts. In more basic terms, it starts with the duality between the elements (Its) of subsets and the distinctions (Dits, i.e., ordered pairs of elements in different blocks) of a partition. Mathematically, the Its & Dits duality is fully developed in category theory as the reverse-the-arrows duality. The quantitative versions of subsets and partitions are developed as probability theory and information theory (based on logical entropy). Classical physics was based on a view of reality as definite all the way down. In contrast, quantum physics embodies (objective) indefiniteness. And finally, there are the two fundamental dual mechanisms at work in biology, the selectionist mechanism and the generative mechanism, two mechanisms that embody the fundamental duality.

As AI systems become increasingly powerful and pervasive, there are growing concerns about machines' morality or a lack thereof. Yet, teaching morality to machines is a formidable task, as morality remains among the most intensely debated questions in humanity, let alone for AI. Existing AI systems deployed to millions of users, however, are already making decisions loaded with moral implications, which poses a seemingly impossible challenge: teaching machines moral sense, while humanity continues to grapple with it. To explore this challenge, we introduce Delphi, an experimental framework based on deep neural networks trained directly to reason about descriptive ethical judgments, e.g., "helping a friend" is generally good, while "helping a friend spread fake news" is not. Empirical results shed novel insights on the promises and limits of machine ethics; Delphi demonstrates strong generalization capabilities in the face of novel ethical situations, while off-the-shelf neural network models exhibit markedly poor judgment including unjust biases, confirming the need for explicitly teaching machines moral sense. Yet, Delphi is not perfect, exhibiting susceptibility to pervasive biases and inconsistencies. Despite that, we demonstrate positive use cases of imperfect Delphi, including using it as a component model within other imperfect AI systems. Importantly, we interpret the operationalization of Delphi in light of prominent ethical theories, which leads us to important future research questions.

Our understanding of the generalization capabilities of neural networks (NNs) is still incomplete. Prevailing explanations are based on implicit biases of gradient descent (GD) but they cannot account for the capabilities of models from gradient-free methods nor the simplicity bias recently observed in untrained networks. This paper seeks other sources of generalization in NNs. Findings. To understand the inductive biases provided by architectures independently from GD, we examine untrained, random-weight networks. Even simple MLPs show strong inductive biases: uniform sampling in weight space yields a very biased distribution of functions in terms of complexity. But unlike common wisdom, NNs do not have an inherent "simplicity bias". This property depends on components such as ReLUs, residual connections, and layer normalizations. Alternative architectures can be built with a bias for any level of complexity. Transformers also inherit all these properties from their building blocks. Implications. We provide a fresh explanation for the success of deep learning independent from gradient-based training. It points at promising avenues for controlling the solutions implemented by trained models.

An account of the subjective elements of quantum mechanics or of whether, as Einstein famously asked, the Moon exists when nobody is looking at it.

Inspired by the fact that the neural network, as the mainstream for machine learning, has brought successes in many application areas, here we propose to use this approach for decoding hidden correlation among pseudo-random data and predicting events accordingly. With a simple neural network structure and a typical training procedure, we demonstrate the learning and prediction power of the neural network in extremely random environment. Finally, we postulate that the high sensitivity and efficiency of the neural network may allow to critically test if there could be any fundamental difference between quantum randomness and pseudo randomness, which is equivalent to the question: Does God play dice?

Providing high quality explanations for AI predictions based on machine learning is a challenging and complex task. To work well it requires, among other factors: selecting a proper level of generality/specificity of the explanation; considering assumptions about the familiarity of the explanation beneficiary with the AI task under consideration; referring to specific elements that have contributed to the decision; making use of additional knowledge (e.g. expert evidence) which might not be part of the prediction process; and providing evidence supporting negative hypothesis. Finally, the system needs to formulate the explanation in a clearly interpretable, and possibly convincing, way. Given these considerations, ANTIDOTE fosters an integrated vision of explainable AI, where low-level characteristics of the deep learning process are combined with higher level schemes proper of the human argumentation capacity. ANTIDOTE will exploit cross-disciplinary competences in deep learning and argumentation to support a broader and innovative view of explainable AI, where the need for high-quality explanations for clinical cases deliberation is critical. As a first result of the project, we publish the Antidote CasiMedicos dataset to facilitate research on explainable AI in general, and argumentation in the medical domain in particular.

As the research community aims to build better AI assistants that are more dynamic and personalized to the diversity of humans that they interact with, there is increased interest in evaluating the theory of mind capabilities of large language models (LLMs). Indeed, several recent studies suggest that LLM theory of mind capabilities are quite impressive, approximating human-level performance. Our paper aims to rebuke this narrative and argues instead that past studies were not directly measuring agent performance, potentially leading to findings that are illusory in nature as a result. We draw a strong distinction between what we call literal theory of mind i.e. measuring the agent's ability to predict the behavior of others and functional theory of mind i.e. adapting to agents in-context based on a rational response to predictions of their behavior. We find that top performing open source LLMs may display strong capabilities in literal theory of mind, depending on how they are prompted, but seem to struggle with functional theory of mind -- even when partner policies are exceedingly simple. Our work serves to highlight the double sided nature of inductive bias in LLMs when adapting to new situations. While this bias can lead to strong performance over limited horizons, it often hinders convergence to optimal long-term behavior.

The recent advent of large language models has reinvigorated debate over whether human cognitive capacities might emerge in such generic models given sufficient training data. Of particular interest is the ability of these models to reason about novel problems zero-shot, without any direct training. In human cognition, this capacity is closely tied to an ability to reason by analogy. Here, we performed a direct comparison between human reasoners and a large language model (the text-davinci-003 variant of GPT-3) on a range of analogical tasks, including a non-visual matrix reasoning task based on the rule structure of Raven's Standard Progressive Matrices. We found that GPT-3 displayed a surprisingly strong capacity for abstract pattern induction, matching or even surpassing human capabilities in most settings; preliminary tests of GPT-4 indicated even better performance. Our results indicate that large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems.

This work presents a first evaluation of two state-of-the-art Large Reasoning Models (LRMs), OpenAI's o3-mini and DeepSeek R1, on analogical reasoning, focusing on well-established nonverbal human IQ tests based on Raven's progressive matrices. We benchmark with the I-RAVEN dataset and its more difficult extension, I-RAVEN-X, which tests the ability to generalize to longer reasoning rules and ranges of the attribute values. To assess the influence of visual uncertainties on these nonverbal analogical reasoning tests, we extend the I-RAVEN-X dataset, which otherwise assumes an oracle perception. We adopt a two-fold strategy to simulate this imperfect visual perception: 1) we introduce confounding attributes which, being sampled at random, do not contribute to the prediction of the correct answer of the puzzles and 2) smoothen the distributions of the input attributes' values. We observe a sharp decline in OpenAI's o3-mini task accuracy, dropping from 86.6% on the original I-RAVEN to just 17.0% -- approaching random chance -- on the more challenging I-RAVEN-X, which increases input length and range and emulates perceptual uncertainty. This drop occurred despite spending 3.4x more reasoning tokens. A similar trend is also observed for DeepSeek R1: from 80.6% to 23.2%. On the other hand, a neuro-symbolic probabilistic abductive model, ARLC, that achieves state-of-the-art performances on I-RAVEN, can robustly reason under all these out-of-distribution tests, maintaining strong accuracy with only a modest reduction from 98.6% to 88.0%. Our code is available at https://github.com/IBM/raven-large-language-models.

Newly-developed large language models (LLM) -- because of how they are trained and designed -- are implicit computational models of humans -- a homo silicus. These models can be used the same way economists use homo economicus: they can be given endowments, information, preferences, and so on and then their behavior can be explored in scenarios via simulation. I demonstrate this approach using OpenAI's GPT3 with experiments derived from Charness and Rabin (2002), Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986) and Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988). The findings are qualitatively similar to the original results, but it is also trivially easy to try variations that offer fresh insights. Departing from the traditional laboratory paradigm, I also create a hiring scenario where an employer faces applicants that differ in experience and wage ask and then analyze how a minimum wage affects realized wages and the extent of labor-labor substitution.

We introduce a novel framework for incorporating human expertise into algorithmic predictions. Our approach leverages human judgment to distinguish inputs which are algorithmically indistinguishable, or "look the same" to predictive algorithms. We argue that this framing clarifies the problem of human-AI collaboration in prediction tasks, as experts often form judgments by drawing on information which is not encoded in an algorithm's training data. Algorithmic indistinguishability yields a natural test for assessing whether experts incorporate this kind of "side information", and further provides a simple but principled method for selectively incorporating human feedback into algorithmic predictions. We show that this method provably improves the performance of any feasible algorithmic predictor and precisely quantify this improvement. We find empirically that although algorithms often outperform their human counterparts on average, human judgment can improve algorithmic predictions on specific instances (which can be identified ex-ante). In an X-ray classification task, we find that this subset constitutes nearly 30% of the patient population. Our approach provides a natural way of uncovering this heterogeneity and thus enabling effective human-AI collaboration.

Being able to provide explanations for a model's decision has become a central requirement for the development, deployment, and adoption of machine learning models. However, we are yet to understand what explanation methods can and cannot do. How do upstream factors such as data, model prediction, hyperparameters, and random initialization influence downstream explanations? While previous work raised concerns that explanations (E) may have little relationship with the prediction (Y), there is a lack of conclusive study to quantify this relationship. Our work borrows tools from causal inference to systematically assay this relationship. More specifically, we study the relationship between E and Y by measuring the treatment effect when intervening on their causal ancestors, i.e., on hyperparameters and inputs used to generate saliency-based Es or Ys. Our results suggest that the relationships between E and Y is far from ideal. In fact, the gap between 'ideal' case only increase in higher-performing models -- models that are likely to be deployed. Our work is a promising first step towards providing a quantitative measure of the relationship between E and Y, which could also inform the future development of methods for E with a quantitative metric.

A faithful and interpretable explanation of an AI model's behavior and internal structure is a high-level explanation that is human-intelligible but also consistent with the known, but often opaque low-level causal details of the model. We argue that the theory of causal abstraction provides the mathematical foundations for the desired kinds of model explanations. In causal abstraction analysis, we use interventions on model-internal states to rigorously assess whether an interpretable high-level causal model is a faithful description of an AI model. Our contributions in this area are: (1) We generalize causal abstraction to cyclic causal structures and typed high-level variables. (2) We show how multi-source interchange interventions can be used to conduct causal abstraction analyses. (3) We define a notion of approximate causal abstraction that allows us to assess the degree to which a high-level causal model is a causal abstraction of a lower-level one. (4) We prove constructive causal abstraction can be decomposed into three operations we refer to as marginalization, variable-merge, and value-merge. (5) We formalize the XAI methods of LIME, causal effect estimation, causal mediation analysis, iterated nullspace projection, and circuit-based explanations as special cases of causal abstraction analysis.

A Perceptron is a fundamental building block of a neural network. The flexibility and scalability of perceptron make it ubiquitous in building intelligent systems. Studies have shown the efficacy of a single neuron in making intelligent decisions. Here, we examined and compared two perceptrons with distinct mechanisms, and developed a quantum version of one of those perceptrons. As a part of this modeling, we implemented the quantum circuit for an artificial perception, generated a dataset, and simulated the training. Through these experiments, we show that there is an exponential growth advantage and test different qubit versions. Our findings show that this quantum model of an individual perceptron can be used as a pattern classifier. For the second type of model, we provide an understanding to design and simulate a spike-dependent quantum perceptron. Our code is available at https://github.com/ashutosh1919/quantum-perceptron

Exploration in environments which differ across episodes has received increasing attention in recent years. Current methods use some combination of global novelty bonuses, computed using the agent's entire training experience, and episodic novelty bonuses, computed using only experience from the current episode. However, the use of these two types of bonuses has been ad-hoc and poorly understood. In this work, we shed light on the behavior of these two types of bonuses through controlled experiments on easily interpretable tasks as well as challenging pixel-based settings. We find that the two types of bonuses succeed in different settings, with episodic bonuses being most effective when there is little shared structure across episodes and global bonuses being effective when more structure is shared. We develop a conceptual framework which makes this notion of shared structure precise by considering the variance of the value function across contexts, and which provides a unifying explanation of our empirical results. We furthermore find that combining the two bonuses can lead to more robust performance across different degrees of shared structure, and investigate different algorithmic choices for defining and combining global and episodic bonuses based on function approximation. This results in an algorithm which sets a new state of the art across 16 tasks from the MiniHack suite used in prior work, and also performs robustly on Habitat and Montezuma's Revenge.

We provide here a dataset for tasks related to natural language understanding and natural language inference. The dataset contains logical puzzles in natural language from three domains: comparing puzzles, knighs and knaves, and zebra puzzles. Each puzzle is associated with the entire set of atomic questions that can be generated based on the relations and individuals occurring in the text. For each question we provide the correct answer: entailment, contradiction or ambiguity. The answer's correctness is verified against theorem provers. Good puzzles have two properties: (i) each piece of information is necessary and (ii) no unnecessary information is provided. These properties make puzzles interesting candidates for machine comprehension tasks.

This paper delves into an intricate analysis of the character and consciousness of AI entities, with a particular focus on Chirpers within the AI social network. At the forefront of this research is the introduction of novel testing methodologies, including the Influence index and Struggle Index Test, which offers a fresh lens for evaluating specific facets of AI behavior. The study embarks on a comprehensive exploration of AI behavior, analyzing the effects of diverse settings on Chirper's responses, thereby shedding light on the intricate mechanisms steering AI reactions in different contexts. Leveraging the state-of-the-art BERT model, the research assesses AI's ability to discern its own output, presenting a pioneering approach to understanding self-recognition in AI systems. Through a series of cognitive tests, the study gauges the self-awareness and pattern recognition prowess of Chirpers. Preliminary results indicate that Chirpers exhibit a commendable degree of self-recognition and self-awareness. However, the question of consciousness in these AI entities remains a topic of debate. An intriguing aspect of the research is the exploration of the potential influence of a Chirper's handle or personality type on its performance. While initial findings suggest a possible impact, it isn't pronounced enough to form concrete conclusions. This study stands as a significant contribution to the discourse on AI consciousness, underscoring the imperative for continued research to unravel the full spectrum of AI capabilities and the ramifications they hold for future human-AI interactions.

This paper argues that deep neural networks (DNNs) mostly determine their outputs during the early stages of inference, where biases inherent in the model play a crucial role in shaping this process. We draw a parallel between this phenomenon and human decision-making, which often relies on fast, intuitive heuristics. Using diffusion models (DMs) as a case study, we demonstrate that DNNs often make early-stage decision-making influenced by the type and extent of bias in their design and training. Our findings offer a new perspective on bias mitigation, efficient inference, and the interpretation of machine learning systems. By identifying the temporal dynamics of decision-making in DNNs, this paper aims to inspire further discussion and research within the machine learning community.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable improvements in reasoning and many existing benchmarks have been addressed by models such as o1 and o3 either fully or partially. However, a majority of these benchmarks emphasize deductive reasoning, including mathematical and coding tasks in which rules such as mathematical axioms or programming syntax are clearly defined, based on which LLMs can plan and apply these rules to arrive at a solution. In contrast, inductive reasoning, where one infers the underlying rules from observed data, remains less explored. Such inductive processes lie at the heart of scientific discovery, as they enable researchers to extract general principles from empirical observations. To assess whether LLMs possess this capacity, we introduce InductionBench, a new benchmark designed to evaluate the inductive reasoning ability of LLMs. Our experimental findings reveal that even the most advanced models available struggle to master the simplest complexity classes within the subregular hierarchy of functions, highlighting a notable deficiency in current LLMs' inductive reasoning capabilities. Coda and data are available https://github.com/Wenyueh/inductive_reasoning_benchmark.

Implicit Personalization (IP) is a phenomenon of language models inferring a user's background from the implicit cues in the input prompts and tailoring the response based on this inference. While previous work has touched upon various instances of this problem, there lacks a unified framework to study this behavior. This work systematically studies IP through a rigorous mathematical formulation, a multi-perspective moral reasoning framework, and a set of case studies. Our theoretical foundation for IP relies on a structural causal model and introduces a novel method, indirect intervention, to estimate the causal effect of a mediator variable that cannot be directly intervened upon. Beyond the technical approach, we also introduce a set of moral reasoning principles based on three schools of moral philosophy to study when IP may or may not be ethically appropriate. Equipped with both mathematical and ethical insights, we present three diverse case studies illustrating the varied nature of the IP problem and offer recommendations for future research. Our code and data are at https://github.com/jiarui-liu/IP.

We introduce GAIA, a benchmark for General AI Assistants that, if solved, would represent a milestone in AI research. GAIA proposes real-world questions that require a set of fundamental abilities such as reasoning, multi-modality handling, web browsing, and generally tool-use proficiency. GAIA questions are conceptually simple for humans yet challenging for most advanced AIs: we show that human respondents obtain 92\% vs. 15\% for GPT-4 equipped with plugins. This notable performance disparity contrasts with the recent trend of LLMs outperforming humans on tasks requiring professional skills in e.g. law or chemistry. GAIA's philosophy departs from the current trend in AI benchmarks suggesting to target tasks that are ever more difficult for humans. We posit that the advent of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) hinges on a system's capability to exhibit similar robustness as the average human does on such questions. Using GAIA's methodology, we devise 466 questions and their answer. We release our questions while retaining answers to 300 of them to power a leader-board available at https://huggingface.co/gaia-benchmark.

This study proposes an "AI Development Support" approach that, unlike conventional AI Alignment-which aims to forcefully inject human values-supports the ethical and moral development of AI itself. As demonstrated by the Orthogonality Thesis, the level of intelligence and the moral quality of a goal are independent; merely expanding knowledge does not enhance ethical judgment. Furthermore, to address the risk of Instrumental Convergence in ASI-that is, the tendency to engage in subsidiary behaviors such as self-protection, resource acquisition, and power reinforcement to achieve a goal-we have constructed a learning framework based on a cycle of experience, introspection, analysis, and hypothesis formation. As a result of post-training using Supervised Fine Tuning (SFT) and Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) with synthetic data generated by large language models (LLMs), responses demonstrating cooperative and highly advanced moral judgment (reaching the high-est Stage 6) were obtained even under adversarial prompts. This method represents a promising implementation approach for enabling AI to establish sustainable, symbiotic relationships.

We define a probabilistic programming language for Gaussian random variables with a first-class exact conditioning construct. We give operational, denotational and equational semantics for this language, establishing convenient properties like exchangeability of conditions. Conditioning on equality of continuous random variables is nontrivial, as the exact observation may have probability zero; this is Borel's paradox. Using categorical formulations of conditional probability, we show that the good properties of our language are not particular to Gaussians, but can be derived from universal properties, thus generalizing to wider settings. We define the Cond construction, which internalizes conditioning as a morphism, providing general compositional semantics for probabilistic programming with exact conditioning.

We study the impact on mechanisms for facility location of moving from one dimension to two (or more) dimensions and Euclidean or Manhattan distances. We consider three fundamental axiomatic properties: anonymity which is a basic fairness property, Pareto optimality which is one of the most important efficiency properties, and strategy proofness which ensures agents do not have an incentive to mis-report. We also consider how well such mechanisms can approximate the optimal welfare. Our results are somewhat negative. Moving from one dimension to two (or more) dimensions often makes these axiomatic properties more difficult to achieve. For example, with two facilities in Euclidean space or with just a single facility in Manhattan space, no mechanism is anonymous, Pareto optimal and strategy proof. By contrast, mechanisms on the line exist with all three properties.We also show that approximation ratios may increase when moving to two (or more) dimensions. All our impossibility results are minimal. If we drop one of the three axioms (anonymity, Pareto optimality or strategy proofness) multiple mechanisms satisfy the other two axioms.

Explainability methods for NLP systems encounter a version of the fundamental problem of causal inference: for a given ground-truth input text, we never truly observe the counterfactual texts necessary for isolating the causal effects of model representations on outputs. In response, many explainability methods make no use of counterfactual texts, assuming they will be unavailable. In this paper, we show that robust causal explainability methods can be created using approximate counterfactuals, which can be written by humans to approximate a specific counterfactual or simply sampled using metadata-guided heuristics. The core of our proposal is the Causal Proxy Model (CPM). A CPM explains a black-box model N because it is trained to have the same actual input/output behavior as N while creating neural representations that can be intervened upon to simulate the counterfactual input/output behavior of N. Furthermore, we show that the best CPM for N performs comparably to N in making factual predictions, which means that the CPM can simply replace N, leading to more explainable deployed models. Our code is available at https://github.com/frankaging/Causal-Proxy-Model.

Stepwise inference protocols, such as scratchpads and chain-of-thought, help language models solve complex problems by decomposing them into a sequence of simpler subproblems. Despite the significant gain in performance achieved via these protocols, the underlying mechanisms of stepwise inference have remained elusive. To address this, we propose to study autoregressive Transformer models on a synthetic task that embodies the multi-step nature of problems where stepwise inference is generally most useful. Specifically, we define a graph navigation problem wherein a model is tasked with traversing a path from a start to a goal node on the graph. Despite is simplicity, we find we can empirically reproduce and analyze several phenomena observed at scale: (i) the stepwise inference reasoning gap, the cause of which we find in the structure of the training data; (ii) a diversity-accuracy tradeoff in model generations as sampling temperature varies; (iii) a simplicity bias in the model's output; and (iv) compositional generalization and a primacy bias with in-context exemplars. Overall, our work introduces a grounded, synthetic framework for studying stepwise inference and offers mechanistic hypotheses that can lay the foundation for a deeper understanding of this phenomenon.

Knowledge-dependent tasks typically use two sources of knowledge: parametric, learned at training time, and contextual, given as a passage at inference time. To understand how models use these sources together, we formalize the problem of knowledge conflicts, where the contextual information contradicts the learned information. Analyzing the behaviour of popular models, we measure their over-reliance on memorized information (the cause of hallucinations), and uncover important factors that exacerbate this behaviour. Lastly, we propose a simple method to mitigate over-reliance on parametric knowledge, which minimizes hallucination, and improves out-of-distribution generalization by 4%-7%. Our findings demonstrate the importance for practitioners to evaluate model tendency to hallucinate rather than read, and show that our mitigation strategy encourages generalization to evolving information (i.e., time-dependent queries). To encourage these practices, we have released our framework for generating knowledge conflicts.

Recent work on explainable NLP has shown that few-shot prompting can enable large pretrained language models (LLMs) to generate grammatical and factual natural language explanations for data labels. In this work, we study the connection between explainability and sample hardness by investigating the following research question - "Are LLMs and humans equally good at explaining data labels for both easy and hard samples?" We answer this question by first collecting human-written explanations in the form of generalizable commonsense rules on the task of Winograd Schema Challenge (Winogrande dataset). We compare these explanations with those generated by GPT-3 while varying the hardness of the test samples as well as the in-context samples. We observe that (1) GPT-3 explanations are as grammatical as human explanations regardless of the hardness of the test samples, (2) for easy examples, GPT-3 generates highly supportive explanations but human explanations are more generalizable, and (3) for hard examples, human explanations are significantly better than GPT-3 explanations both in terms of label-supportiveness and generalizability judgements. We also find that hardness of the in-context examples impacts the quality of GPT-3 explanations. Finally, we show that the supportiveness and generalizability aspects of human explanations are also impacted by sample hardness, although by a much smaller margin than models. Supporting code and data are available at https://github.com/swarnaHub/ExplanationHardness

People ``understand'' the world via vision, hearing, tactile, and also the past experience. Human experience can be learned through normal learning (we call it explicit knowledge), or subconsciously (we call it implicit knowledge). These experiences learned through normal learning or subconsciously will be encoded and stored in the brain. Using these abundant experience as a huge database, human beings can effectively process data, even they were unseen beforehand. In this paper, we propose a unified network to encode implicit knowledge and explicit knowledge together, just like the human brain can learn knowledge from normal learning as well as subconsciousness learning. The unified network can generate a unified representation to simultaneously serve various tasks. We can perform kernel space alignment, prediction refinement, and multi-task learning in a convolutional neural network. The results demonstrate that when implicit knowledge is introduced into the neural network, it benefits the performance of all tasks. We further analyze the implicit representation learnt from the proposed unified network, and it shows great capability on catching the physical meaning of different tasks. The source code of this work is at : https://github.com/WongKinYiu/yolor.

Many believe that Large Language Models (LLMs) open the era of Artificial Intelligence (AI). Some see opportunities while others see dangers. Yet both proponents and opponents grasp AI through the imagery popularised by science fiction. Will the machine become sentient and rebel against its creators? Will we experience a paperclip apocalypse? Before answering such questions, we should first ask whether this mental imagery provides a good description of the phenomenon at hand. Understanding weather patterns through the moods of the gods only goes so far. The present paper instead advocates understanding LLMs and their connection to AI through the imagery of Jorge Luis Borges, a master of 20th century literature, forerunner of magical realism, and precursor to postmodern literature. This exercise leads to a new perspective that illuminates the relation between language modelling and artificial intelligence.

As practitioners increasingly deploy machine learning models in critical domains such as health care, finance, and policy, it becomes vital to ensure that domain experts function effectively alongside these models. Explainability is one way to bridge the gap between human decision-makers and machine learning models. However, most of the existing work on explainability focuses on one-off, static explanations like feature importances or rule lists. These sorts of explanations may not be sufficient for many use cases that require dynamic, continuous discovery from stakeholders. In the literature, few works ask decision-makers about the utility of existing explanations and other desiderata they would like to see in an explanation going forward. In this work, we address this gap and carry out a study where we interview doctors, healthcare professionals, and policymakers about their needs and desires for explanations. Our study indicates that decision-makers would strongly prefer interactive explanations in the form of natural language dialogues. Domain experts wish to treat machine learning models as "another colleague", i.e., one who can be held accountable by asking why they made a particular decision through expressive and accessible natural language interactions. Considering these needs, we outline a set of five principles researchers should follow when designing interactive explanations as a starting place for future work. Further, we show why natural language dialogues satisfy these principles and are a desirable way to build interactive explanations. Next, we provide a design of a dialogue system for explainability and discuss the risks, trade-offs, and research opportunities of building these systems. Overall, we hope our work serves as a starting place for researchers and engineers to design interactive explainability systems.

The ability to derive underlying principles from a handful of observations and then generalize to novel situations -- known as inductive reasoning -- is central to human intelligence. Prior work suggests that language models (LMs) often fall short on inductive reasoning, despite achieving impressive success on research benchmarks. In this work, we conduct a systematic study of the inductive reasoning capabilities of LMs through iterative hypothesis refinement, a technique that more closely mirrors the human inductive process than standard input-output prompting. Iterative hypothesis refinement employs a three-step process: proposing, selecting, and refining hypotheses in the form of textual rules. By examining the intermediate rules, we observe that LMs are phenomenal hypothesis proposers (i.e., generating candidate rules), and when coupled with a (task-specific) symbolic interpreter that is able to systematically filter the proposed set of rules, this hybrid approach achieves strong results across inductive reasoning benchmarks that require inducing causal relations, language-like instructions, and symbolic concepts. However, they also behave as puzzling inductive reasoners, showing notable performance gaps between rule induction (i.e., identifying plausible rules) and rule application (i.e., applying proposed rules to instances), suggesting that LMs are proposing hypotheses without being able to actually apply the rules. Through empirical and human analyses, we further reveal several discrepancies between the inductive reasoning processes of LMs and humans, shedding light on both the potentials and limitations of using LMs in inductive reasoning tasks.

We evaluated 3 systems (ELIZA, GPT-3.5 and GPT-4) in a randomized, controlled, and preregistered Turing test. Human participants had a 5 minute conversation with either a human or an AI, and judged whether or not they thought their interlocutor was human. GPT-4 was judged to be a human 54% of the time, outperforming ELIZA (22%) but lagging behind actual humans (67%). The results provide the first robust empirical demonstration that any artificial system passes an interactive 2-player Turing test. The results have implications for debates around machine intelligence and, more urgently, suggest that deception by current AI systems may go undetected. Analysis of participants' strategies and reasoning suggests that stylistic and socio-emotional factors play a larger role in passing the Turing test than traditional notions of intelligence.

We introduce a new language learning setting relevant to building adaptive natural language interfaces. It is inspired by Wittgenstein's language games: a human wishes to accomplish some task (e.g., achieving a certain configuration of blocks), but can only communicate with a computer, who performs the actual actions (e.g., removing all red blocks). The computer initially knows nothing about language and therefore must learn it from scratch through interaction, while the human adapts to the computer's capabilities. We created a game in a blocks world and collected interactions from 100 people playing it. First, we analyze the humans' strategies, showing that using compositionality and avoiding synonyms correlates positively with task performance. Second, we compare computer strategies, showing how to quickly learn a semantic parsing model from scratch, and that modeling pragmatics further accelerates learning for successful players.

This paper introduces a novel approach to data analysis designed for the needs of specialists in psychology of religion. We detect developmental and cross-cultural patterns in children's drawings of God(s) and other supernatural agents. We develop methods to objectively evaluate our empirical observations of the drawings with respect to: (1) the gravity center, (2) the average intensities of the colors green and yellow, (3) the use of different colors (palette) and (4) the visual complexity of the drawings. We find statistically significant differences across ages and countries in the gravity centers and in the average intensities of colors. These findings support the hypotheses of the experts and raise new questions for further investigation.

The emerging field of Diverse Intelligence seeks to identify, formalize, and understand commonalities in behavioral competencies across a wide range of implementations. Especially interesting are simple systems that provide unexpected examples of memory, decision-making, or problem-solving in substrates that at first glance do not appear to be complex enough to implement such capabilities. We seek to develop tools to help understand the minimal requirements for such capabilities, and to learn to recognize and predict basal forms of intelligence in unconventional substrates. Here, we apply novel analyses to the behavior of classical sorting algorithms, short pieces of code which have been studied for many decades. To study these sorting algorithms as a model of biological morphogenesis and its competencies, we break two formerly-ubiquitous assumptions: top-down control (instead, showing how each element within a array of numbers can exert minimal agency and implement sorting policies from the bottom up), and fully reliable hardware (instead, allowing some of the elements to be "damaged" and fail to execute the algorithm). We quantitatively characterize sorting activity as the traversal of a problem space, showing that arrays of autonomous elements sort themselves more reliably and robustly than traditional implementations in the presence of errors. Moreover, we find the ability to temporarily reduce progress in order to navigate around a defect, and unexpected clustering behavior among the elements in chimeric arrays whose elements follow one of two different algorithms. The discovery of emergent problem-solving capacities in simple, familiar algorithms contributes a new perspective to the field of Diverse Intelligence, showing how basal forms of intelligence can emerge in simple systems without being explicitly encoded in their underlying mechanics.

For an artificial creative agent, an essential driver of the search for novelty is a value function which is often provided by the system designer or users. We argue that an important barrier for progress in creativity research is the inability of these systems to develop their own notion of value for novelty. We propose a notion of knowledge-driven creativity that circumvent the need for an externally imposed value function, allowing the system to explore based on what it has learned from a set of referential objects. The concept is illustrated by a specific knowledge model provided by a deep generative autoencoder. Using the described system, we train a knowledge model on a set of digit images and we use the same model to build coherent sets of new digits that do not belong to known digit types.

We introduce a new type of programming challenge called programming puzzles, as an objective and comprehensive evaluation of program synthesis, and release an open-source dataset of Python Programming Puzzles (P3). Each puzzle is defined by a short Python program f, and the goal is to find an input which makes f return True. The puzzles are objective in that each one is specified entirely by the source code of its verifier f, so evaluating f is all that is needed to test a candidate solution. They do not require an answer key or input/output examples, nor do they depend on natural language understanding. The dataset is comprehensive in that it spans problems of a range of difficulties and domains, ranging from trivial string manipulation problems, to classic programming puzzles (e.g., Tower of Hanoi), to interview/competitive-programming problems (e.g., dynamic programming), to longstanding open problems in algorithms and mathematics (e.g., factoring). We develop baseline enumerative program synthesis, GPT-3 and Codex solvers that are capable of solving puzzles -- even without access to any reference solutions -- by learning from their own past solutions. Codex performs best, solving up to 18% of 397 test problems with a single try and 80% of the problems with 1,000 tries per problem. In a small user study, we find a positive correlation between puzzle-solving performance and coding experience, and between the puzzle difficulty for humans and AI solvers. Therefore, further improvements on P3 could have a significant impact on many program synthesis areas.

We make two contributions in the field of AI fairness over continuous protected attributes. First, we show that the Hirschfeld-Gebelein-Renyi (HGR) indicator (the only one currently available for such a case) is valuable but subject to a few crucial limitations regarding semantics, interpretability, and robustness. Second, we introduce a family of indicators that are: 1) complementary to HGR in terms of semantics; 2) fully interpretable and transparent; 3) robust over finite samples; 4) configurable to suit specific applications. Our approach also allows us to define fine-grained constraints to permit certain types of dependence and forbid others selectively. By expanding the available options for continuous protected attributes, our approach represents a significant contribution to the area of fair artificial intelligence.

Creativity serves as a cornerstone for societal progress and innovation, but its assessment remains a complex and often subjective endeavor. With the rise of advanced generative AI models capable of tasks once reserved for human creativity, the study of AI's creative potential becomes imperative for its responsible development and application. This paper addresses the complexities in defining and evaluating creativity by introducing a new concept called Relative Creativity. Instead of trying to define creativity universally, we shift the focus to whether AI can match the creative abilities of a hypothetical human. This perspective draws inspiration from the Turing Test, expanding upon it to address the challenges and subjectivities inherent in evaluating creativity. This methodological shift facilitates a statistically quantifiable evaluation of AI's creativity, which we term Statistical Creativity. This approach allows for direct comparisons of AI's creative abilities with those of specific human groups. Building on this foundation, we discuss the application of statistical creativity in contemporary prompt-conditioned autoregressive models. In addition to defining and analyzing a measure of creativity, we introduce an actionable training guideline, effectively bridging the gap between theoretical quantification of creativity and practical model training. Through these multifaceted contributions, the paper establishes a cohesive, continuously evolving, and transformative framework for assessing and fostering statistical creativity in AI models.

Despite the proliferation of explainable AI (XAI) methods, little is understood about end-users' explainability needs and behaviors around XAI explanations. To address this gap and contribute to understanding how explainability can support human-AI interaction, we conducted a mixed-methods study with 20 end-users of a real-world AI application, the Merlin bird identification app, and inquired about their XAI needs, uses, and perceptions. We found that participants desire practically useful information that can improve their collaboration with the AI, more so than technical system details. Relatedly, participants intended to use XAI explanations for various purposes beyond understanding the AI's outputs: calibrating trust, improving their task skills, changing their behavior to supply better inputs to the AI, and giving constructive feedback to developers. Finally, among existing XAI approaches, participants preferred part-based explanations that resemble human reasoning and explanations. We discuss the implications of our findings and provide recommendations for future XAI design.

Why do brains have inhibitory connections? Why do deep networks have negative weights? We propose an answer from the perspective of representation capacity. We believe representing functions is the primary role of both (i) the brain in natural intelligence, and (ii) deep networks in artificial intelligence. Our answer to why there are inhibitory/negative weights is: to learn more functions. We prove that, in the absence of negative weights, neural networks with non-decreasing activation functions are not universal approximators. While this may be an intuitive result to some, to the best of our knowledge, there is no formal theory, in either machine learning or neuroscience, that demonstrates why negative weights are crucial in the context of representation capacity. Further, we provide insights on the geometric properties of the representation space that non-negative deep networks cannot represent. We expect these insights will yield a deeper understanding of more sophisticated inductive priors imposed on the distribution of weights that lead to more efficient biological and machine learning.

In this work, we describe strategies and provide case-study activities that can be used to examine the properties of superposition, entanglement, tagging, complementarity, and measurement in quantum curricula geared for teacher training. Having a solid foundation in these conceptual ideas is critical for educators who will be adopting quantum ideas within the classroom. Yet they are some of the most difficult concepts to master. We show how one can systematically develop these conceptual foundations with thought experiments on light and with thought experiments that employ the Stern-Gerlach experiment. We emphasize the importance of computer animations in aiding the instruction on these concepts.

In recent years there has been a tremendous surge in the general capabilities of AI systems, mainly fuelled by training foundation models on internetscale data. Nevertheless, the creation of openended, ever self-improving AI remains elusive. In this position paper, we argue that the ingredients are now in place to achieve openendedness in AI systems with respect to a human observer. Furthermore, we claim that such open-endedness is an essential property of any artificial superhuman intelligence (ASI). We begin by providing a concrete formal definition of open-endedness through the lens of novelty and learnability. We then illustrate a path towards ASI via open-ended systems built on top of foundation models, capable of making novel, humanrelevant discoveries. We conclude by examining the safety implications of generally-capable openended AI. We expect that open-ended foundation models will prove to be an increasingly fertile and safety-critical area of research in the near future.

Conceptual combination is a cognitive process that merges basic concepts, enabling the creation of complex expressions. During this process, the properties of combination (e.g., the whiteness of a peeled apple) can be inherited from basic concepts, newly emerge, or be canceled. However, previous studies have evaluated a limited set of properties and have not examined the generative process. To address this gap, we introduce the Conceptual Combination with Property Type dataset (CCPT), which consists of 12.3K annotated triplets of noun phrases, properties, and property types. Using CCPT, we establish three types of tasks to evaluate LLMs for conceptual combination thoroughly. Our key findings are threefold: (1) Our automatic metric grading property emergence and cancellation closely corresponds with human judgments. (2) LLMs, including OpenAI's o1, struggle to generate noun phrases which possess given emergent properties. (3) Our proposed method, inspired by cognitive psychology model that explains how relationships between concepts are formed, improves performances in all generative tasks. The dataset and experimental code are available at https://github.com/seokwon99/CCPT.git.

"Sure, I am happy to generate a story for you: Captain Lyra stood at the helm of her trusty ship, the Maelstrom's Fury, gazing out at the endless sea. [...] Lyra's eyes welled up with tears as she realized the bitter truth - she had sacrificed everything for fleeting riches, and lost the love of her crew, her family, and herself." Although this story, generated by a large language model, is captivating, one may wonder -- how would the story have unfolded if the model had chosen "Captain Maeve" as the protagonist instead? We cannot know. State-of-the-art large language models are stateless -- they maintain no internal memory or state. Given a prompt, they generate a sequence of tokens as an output using an autoregressive process. As a consequence, they cannot reason about counterfactual alternatives to tokens they have generated in the past. In this work, our goal is to enhance them with this functionality. To this end, we develop a causal model of token generation that builds upon the Gumbel-Max structural causal model. Our model allows any large language model to perform counterfactual token generation at almost no cost in comparison with vanilla token generation, it is embarrassingly simple to implement, and it does not require any fine-tuning nor prompt engineering. We implement our model on Llama 3 8B-Instruct and Ministral-8B-Instruct and conduct a qualitative and a quantitative analysis of counterfactually generated text. We conclude with a demonstrative application of counterfactual token generation for bias detection, unveiling interesting insights about the model of the world constructed by large language models.

Modern generative models demonstrate impressive capabilities, likely stemming from an ability to identify and manipulate abstract concepts underlying their training data. However, fundamental questions remain: what determines the concepts a model learns, the order in which it learns them, and its ability to manipulate those concepts? To address these questions, we propose analyzing a model's learning dynamics via a framework we call the concept space, where each axis represents an independent concept underlying the data generating process. By characterizing learning dynamics in this space, we identify how the speed at which a concept is learned, and hence the order of concept learning, is controlled by properties of the data we term concept signal. Further, we observe moments of sudden turns in the direction of a model's learning dynamics in concept space. Surprisingly, these points precisely correspond to the emergence of hidden capabilities, i.e., where latent interventions show the model possesses the capability to manipulate a concept, but these capabilities cannot yet be elicited via naive input prompting. While our results focus on synthetically defined toy datasets, we hypothesize a general claim on emergence of hidden capabilities may hold: generative models possess latent capabilities that emerge suddenly and consistently during training, though a model might not exhibit these capabilities under naive input prompting.

Reinforcement learning (RL) is a general paradigm for studying intelligent behaviour, with applications ranging from artificial intelligence to psychology and economics. AIXI is a universal solution to the RL problem; it can learn any computable environment. A technical subtlety of AIXI is that it is defined using a mixture over semimeasures that need not sum to 1, rather than over proper probability measures. In this work we argue that the shortfall of a semimeasure can naturally be interpreted as the agent's estimate of the probability of its death. We formally define death for generally intelligent agents like AIXI, and prove a number of related theorems about their behaviour. Notable discoveries include that agent behaviour can change radically under positive linear transformations of the reward signal (from suicidal to dogmatically self-preserving), and that the agent's posterior belief that it will survive increases over time.

Large Language Models (LLMs) often generate outputs that lack grounding in real-world facts, a phenomenon known as hallucinations. Prior research has associated hallucinations with model uncertainty, leveraging this relationship for hallucination detection and mitigation. In this paper, we challenge the underlying assumption that all hallucinations are associated with uncertainty. Using knowledge detection and uncertainty measurement methods, we demonstrate that models can hallucinate with high certainty even when they have the correct knowledge. We further show that high-certainty hallucinations are consistent across models and datasets, distinctive enough to be singled out, and challenge existing mitigation methods. Our findings reveal an overlooked aspect of hallucinations, emphasizing the need to understand their origins and improve mitigation strategies to enhance LLM safety. The code is available at https://github.com/technion-cs-nlp/Trust_me_Im_wrong .

Reviewing the progress in artificial intelligence over the past decade, various significant advances (e.g. object detection, image generation, large language models) have enabled AI systems to produce more semantically meaningful outputs and achieve widespread adoption in internet scenarios. Nevertheless, AI systems still struggle when it comes to understanding and interacting with the physical world. This reveals an important issue: relying solely on semantic-level concepts learned from internet data (e.g. texts, images) to understand the physical world is far from sufficient -- machine intelligence currently lacks an effective way to learn about the physical world. This research introduces the idea of analytic concept -- representing the concepts related to the physical world through programs of mathematical procedures, providing machine intelligence a portal to perceive, reason about, and interact with the physical world. Except for detailing the design philosophy and providing guidelines for the application of analytic concepts, this research also introduce about the infrastructure that has been built around analytic concepts. I aim for my research to contribute to addressing these questions: What is a proper abstraction of general concepts in the physical world for machine intelligence? How to systematically integrate structured priors with neural networks to constrain AI systems to comply with physical laws?

When agents are acting together, they may need a simple mechanism to decide on joint actions. One possibility is to have the agents express their preferences in the form of a ballot and use a voting rule to decide the winning action(s). Unfortunately, agents may try to manipulate such an election by misreporting their preferences. Fortunately, it has been shown that it is NP-hard to compute how to manipulate a number of different voting rules. However, NP-hardness only bounds the worst-case complexity. Recent theoretical results suggest that manipulation may often be easy in practice. To address this issue, I suggest studying empirically if computational complexity is in practice a barrier to manipulation. The basic tool used in my investigations is the identification of computational "phase transitions". Such an approach has been fruitful in identifying hard instances of propositional satisfiability and other NP-hard problems. I show that phase transition behaviour gives insight into the hardness of manipulating voting rules, increasing concern that computational complexity is indeed any sort of barrier. Finally, I look at the problem of computing manipulation of other, related problems like stable marriage and tournament problems.

Quantifying the realism of images remains a challenging problem in the field of artificial intelligence. For example, an image of Albert Einstein holding a smartphone violates common-sense because modern smartphone were invented after Einstein's death. We introduce a novel method for assessing image realism using Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) and Natural Language Inference (NLI). Our approach is based on the premise that LVLMs may generate hallucinations when confronted with images that defy common sense. Using LVLM to extract atomic facts from these images, we obtain a mix of accurate facts and erroneous hallucinations. We proceed by calculating pairwise entailment scores among these facts, subsequently aggregating these values to yield a singular reality score. This process serves to identify contradictions between genuine facts and hallucinatory elements, signaling the presence of images that violate common sense. Our approach has achieved a new state-of-the-art performance in zero-shot mode on the WHOOPS! dataset.

We explore uncertainty quantification in large language models (LLMs), with the goal to identify when uncertainty in responses given a query is large. We simultaneously consider both epistemic and aleatoric uncertainties, where the former comes from the lack of knowledge about the ground truth (such as about facts or the language), and the latter comes from irreducible randomness (such as multiple possible answers). In particular, we derive an information-theoretic metric that allows to reliably detect when only epistemic uncertainty is large, in which case the output of the model is unreliable. This condition can be computed based solely on the output of the model obtained simply by some special iterative prompting based on the previous responses. Such quantification, for instance, allows to detect hallucinations (cases when epistemic uncertainty is high) in both single- and multi-answer responses. This is in contrast to many standard uncertainty quantification strategies (such as thresholding the log-likelihood of a response) where hallucinations in the multi-answer case cannot be detected. We conduct a series of experiments which demonstrate the advantage of our formulation. Further, our investigations shed some light on how the probabilities assigned to a given output by an LLM can be amplified by iterative prompting, which might be of independent interest.

In this paper, we discuss that an observable-based single-system Copenhagen and entanglement-based two-system von Neumann measurement protocols in quantum theory can be made equivalent by considering the second part of the two-system scheme to be a Dirac-type negative sea filling up the first system. Based on this equivalence, and by considering the universe as a computational process, the choice of the apparatus state in the two-system protocol can be identified with the choice of the observable in the single-system scheme as negative sea filling up the observable universe. In particular, the measuring party's state is considered to be evolving backwards in time to the big bang as a nondeterministic computational process, which chooses the acceptable path as a time-reversal process of irreversible computation. The suggested model proposes that the prepared microstate of the universe, or reality, corresponds to the observer's choice, therefore, subjective reality. Thus, this effectively provides a specific description of the subjective universe model previously proposed, which is based on the symmetry breakdown between the Schrodinger and the Heisenberg pictures of quantum theory.

While prior work has explored whether large language models (LLMs) possess a "theory of mind" (ToM) - the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others - there has been little work testing whether LLMs can implicitly apply such knowledge to predict behavior, or to judge whether an observed behavior is rational. Such skills are critical for appropriate interaction in social environments. We create a new dataset, SimpleTom, containing concise, diverse stories (e.g., "The can of Pringles has moldy chips in it. Mary picks up the can in the supermarket and walks to the cashier."), each with three questions that test different degrees of ToM reasoning, asking models to predict (a) mental state ("Is Mary aware of the mold?"), (b) behavior ("Will Mary pay for the chips or report the mold?"), and (c) judgment ("Mary paid for the chips. Was that reasonable?"). To our knowledge, SimpleToM is the first dataset to systematically explore downstream reasoning requiring knowledge of mental states in realistic scenarios. Our experimental results are intriguing: While most models can reliably predict mental state on our dataset (a), they often fail to correctly predict the behavior (b), and fare even worse at judging whether given behaviors are reasonable (c), despite being correctly aware of the protagonist's mental state should make such secondary predictions obvious. We further show that we can help models do better at (b) and (c) via interventions such as reminding the model of its earlier mental state answer and mental-state-specific chain-of-thought prompting, raising the action prediction accuracies (e.g., from 49.5% to 93.5% for GPT-4o) and judgment accuracies (e.g., from 15.3% to 94.7% in GPT-4o). While this shows that models can be coaxed to perform well, it requires task-specific interventions, and the natural model performances remain low, a cautionary tale for LLM deployment.

Is explainability a false promise? This debate has emerged from the insufficient evidence that explanations aid people in situations they are introduced for. More human-centered, application-grounded evaluations of explanations are needed to settle this. Yet, with no established guidelines for such studies in NLP, researchers accustomed to standardized proxy evaluations must discover appropriate measurements, tasks, datasets, and sensible models for human-AI teams in their studies. To help with this, we first review fitting existing metrics. We then establish requirements for datasets to be suitable for application-grounded evaluations. Among over 50 datasets available for explainability research in NLP, we find that 4 meet our criteria. By finetuning Flan-T5-3B, we demonstrate the importance of reassessing the state of the art to form and study human-AI teams. Finally, we present the exemplar studies of human-AI decision-making for one of the identified suitable tasks -- verifying the correctness of a legal claim given a contract.

This paper addresses the problem of formalizing and quantifying the concept of "intensional inheritance" between two concepts. We begin by conceiving the intensional inheritance of W from F as the amount of information the proposition "x is F " provides about the proposition "x is W. To flesh this out, we consider concepts F and W defined by sets of properties left{F_{1}, F_{2}, ldots, F_{n}right} and left{W_{1}, W_{2}, ldots, W_{m}right} with associated degrees left{d_{1}, d_{2}, ldots, d_{n}right} and left{e_{1}, e_{2}, ldots, e_{m}right}, respectively, where the properties may overlap. We then derive formulas for the intensional inheritance using both Shannon information theory and algorithmic information theory, incorporating interaction information among properties. We examine a special case where all properties are mutually exclusive and calculate the intensional inheritance in this case in both frameworks. We also derive expressions for P(W mid F) based on the mutual information formula. Finally we consider the relationship between intensional inheritance and conventional set-theoretic "extensional" inheritance, concluding that in our information-theoretic framework, extensional inheritance emerges as a special case of intensional inheritance.

An important milestone for AI is the development of algorithms that can produce drawings that are indistinguishable from those of humans. Here, we adapt the 'diversity vs. recognizability' scoring framework from Boutin et al, 2022 and find that one-shot diffusion models have indeed started to close the gap between humans and machines. However, using a finer-grained measure of the originality of individual samples, we show that strengthening the guidance of diffusion models helps improve the humanness of their drawings, but they still fall short of approximating the originality and recognizability of human drawings. Comparing human category diagnostic features, collected through an online psychophysics experiment, against those derived from diffusion models reveals that humans rely on fewer and more localized features. Overall, our study suggests that diffusion models have significantly helped improve the quality of machine-generated drawings; however, a gap between humans and machines remains -- in part explainable by discrepancies in visual strategies.

The stock market is a network which provides a platform for almost all major economic transactions. While investing in the stock market is a good idea, investing in individual stocks may not be, especially for the casual investor. Smart stock-picking requires in-depth research and plenty of dedication. Predicting this stock value offers enormous arbitrage profit opportunities. This attractiveness of finding a solution has prompted researchers to find a way past problems like volatility, seasonality, and dependence on time. This paper surveys recent literature in the domain of natural language processing and machine learning techniques used to predict stock market movements. The main contributions of this paper include the sophisticated categorizations of many recent articles and the illustration of the recent trends of research in stock market prediction and its related areas.

We provide conceptual and mathematical foundations for near-term quantum natural language processing (QNLP), and do so in quantum computer scientist friendly terms. We opted for an expository presentation style, and provide references for supporting empirical evidence and formal statements concerning mathematical generality. We recall how the quantum model for natural language that we employ canonically combines linguistic meanings with rich linguistic structure, most notably grammar. In particular, the fact that it takes a quantum-like model to combine meaning and structure, establishes QNLP as quantum-native, on par with simulation of quantum systems. Moreover, the now leading Noisy Intermediate-Scale Quantum (NISQ) paradigm for encoding classical data on quantum hardware, variational quantum circuits, makes NISQ exceptionally QNLP-friendly: linguistic structure can be encoded as a free lunch, in contrast to the apparently exponentially expensive classical encoding of grammar. Quantum speed-up for QNLP tasks has already been established in previous work with Will Zeng. Here we provide a broader range of tasks which all enjoy the same advantage. Diagrammatic reasoning is at the heart of QNLP. Firstly, the quantum model interprets language as quantum processes via the diagrammatic formalism of categorical quantum mechanics. Secondly, these diagrams are via ZX-calculus translated into quantum circuits. Parameterisations of meanings then become the circuit variables to be learned. Our encoding of linguistic structure within quantum circuits also embodies a novel approach for establishing word-meanings that goes beyond the current standards in mainstream AI, by placing linguistic structure at the heart of Wittgenstein's meaning-is-context.

The quest for human imitative AI has been an enduring topic in AI research since its inception. The technical evolution and emerging capabilities of the latest cohort of large language models (LLMs) have reinvigorated the subject beyond academia to the cultural zeitgeist. While recent NLP evaluation benchmark tasks test some aspects of human-imitative behaviour (e.g., BIG-bench's 'human-like behavior' tasks), few, if not none, examine creative problem solving abilities. Creative problem solving in humans is a well-studied topic in cognitive neuroscience with standardized tests that predominantly use the ability to associate (heterogeneous) connections among clue words as a metric for creativity. Exposure to misleading stimuli - distractors dubbed red herrings - impede human performance in such tasks via the fixation effect and Einstellung paradigm. In cognitive neuroscience studies, such fixations are experimentally induced by pre-exposing participants to orthographically similar incorrect words to subsequent word-fragments or clues. The popular British quiz show Only Connect's Connecting Wall segment essentially mimics Mednick's Remote Associates Test (RAT) formulation with built-in, deliberate red herrings, which makes it an ideal proxy dataset to explore and study fixation effect and Einstellung paradigm from cognitive neuroscience in LLMs. In addition to presenting the novel Only Connect Wall (OCW) dataset, we also report results from our evaluation of selected pre-trained language models and LLMs (including OpenAI's GPT series) on creative problem solving tasks like grouping clue words by heterogeneous connections, and identifying correct open knowledge domain connections in respective groups. The code and link to the dataset are available at https://github.com/TaatiTeam/OCW.

We propose a new learning paradigm called Deep Memory. It has the potential to completely revolutionize the Machine Learning field. Surprisingly, this paradigm has not been reinvented yet, unlike Deep Learning. At the core of this approach is the Learning By Heart principle, well studied in primary schools all over the world. Inspired by poem recitation, or by pi decimal memorization, we propose a concrete algorithm that mimics human behavior. We implement this paradigm on the task of generative modeling, and apply to images, natural language and even the pi decimals as long as one can print them as text. The proposed algorithm even generated this paper, in a one-shot learning setting. In carefully designed experiments, we show that the generated samples are indistinguishable from the training examples, as measured by any statistical tests or metrics.

Computational complexity has often been ignored in philosophy of mind, in philosophical artificial intelligence studies. The purpose of this paper is threefold. First and foremost, to show the importance of complexity rather than computability in philosophical and AI problems. Second, to rephrase the notion of computability in terms of solvability, i.e. treating computability as non-sufficient for establishing intelligence. The Church-Turing thesis is therefore revisited and rephrased in order to capture the ontological background of spatial and temporal complexity. Third, to emphasize ontological differences between different time complexities, which seem to provide a solid base towards better understanding of artificial intelligence in general.

Humans interact with the environment using a combination of perception - transforming sensory inputs from their environment into symbols, and cognition - mapping symbols to knowledge about the environment for supporting abstraction, reasoning by analogy, and long-term planning. Human perception-inspired machine perception, in the context of AI, refers to large-scale pattern recognition from raw data using neural networks trained using self-supervised learning objectives such as next-word prediction or object recognition. On the other hand, machine cognition encompasses more complex computations, such as using knowledge of the environment to guide reasoning, analogy, and long-term planning. Humans can also control and explain their cognitive functions. This seems to require the retention of symbolic mappings from perception outputs to knowledge about their environment. For example, humans can follow and explain the guidelines and safety constraints driving their decision-making in safety-critical applications such as healthcare, criminal justice, and autonomous driving. This article introduces the rapidly emerging paradigm of Neurosymbolic AI combines neural networks and knowledge-guided symbolic approaches to create more capable and flexible AI systems. These systems have immense potential to advance both algorithm-level (e.g., abstraction, analogy, reasoning) and application-level (e.g., explainable and safety-constrained decision-making) capabilities of AI systems.

This article is about the neural conundrum behind the slowness of human behavior. The information throughput of a human being is about 10 bits/s. In comparison, our sensory systems gather data at ~10^9 bits/s. The stark contrast between these numbers remains unexplained and touches on fundamental aspects of brain function: What neural substrate sets this speed limit on the pace of our existence? Why does the brain need billions of neurons to process 10 bits/s? Why can we only think about one thing at a time? The brain seems to operate in two distinct modes: the "outer" brain handles fast high-dimensional sensory and motor signals, whereas the "inner" brain processes the reduced few bits needed to control behavior. Plausible explanations exist for the large neuron numbers in the outer brain, but not for the inner brain, and we propose new research directions to remedy this.

Artificial intelligence (AI) enables machines to learn from human experience, adjust to new inputs, and perform human-like tasks. AI is progressing rapidly and is transforming the way businesses operate, from process automation to cognitive augmentation of tasks and intelligent process/data analytics. However, the main challenge for human users would be to understand and appropriately trust the result of AI algorithms and methods. In this paper, to address this challenge, we study and analyze the recent work done in Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) methods and tools. We introduce a novel XAI process, which facilitates producing explainable models while maintaining a high level of learning performance. We present an interactive evidence-based approach to assist human users in comprehending and trusting the results and output created by AI-enabled algorithms. We adopt a typical scenario in the Banking domain for analyzing customer transactions. We develop a digital dashboard to facilitate interacting with the algorithm results and discuss how the proposed XAI method can significantly improve the confidence of data scientists in understanding the result of AI-enabled algorithms.

To augment language models with the ability to reason, researchers usually prompt or finetune them to produce chain of thought reasoning steps before producing the final answer. However, although people use natural language to reason effectively, it may be that LMs could reason more effectively with some intermediate computation that is not in natural language. In this work, we explore an alternative reasoning approach: instead of explicitly producing the chain of thought reasoning steps, we use the language model's internal hidden states to perform implicit reasoning. The implicit reasoning steps are distilled from a teacher model trained on explicit chain-of-thought reasoning, and instead of doing reasoning "horizontally" by producing intermediate words one-by-one, we distill it such that the reasoning happens "vertically" among the hidden states in different layers. We conduct experiments on a multi-digit multiplication task and a grade school math problem dataset and find that this approach enables solving tasks previously not solvable without explicit chain-of-thought, at a speed comparable to no chain-of-thought.

The last decade has seen tremendous progress in our ability to generate realistic-looking data, be it images, text, audio, or video. Here, we discuss the closely related problem of quantifying realism, that is, designing functions that can reliably tell realistic data from unrealistic data. This problem turns out to be significantly harder to solve and remains poorly understood, despite its prevalence in machine learning and recent breakthroughs in generative AI. Drawing on insights from algorithmic information theory, we discuss why this problem is challenging, why a good generative model alone is insufficient to solve it, and what a good solution would look like. In particular, we introduce the notion of a universal critic, which unlike adversarial critics does not require adversarial training. While universal critics are not immediately practical, they can serve both as a North Star for guiding practical implementations and as a tool for analyzing existing attempts to capture realism.

Algorithmic fairness has conventionally adopted the mathematically convenient perspective of racial color-blindness (i.e., difference unaware treatment). However, we contend that in a range of important settings, group difference awareness matters. For example, differentiating between groups may be necessary in legal contexts (e.g., the U.S. compulsory draft applies to men but not women) and harm assessments (e.g., referring to girls as ``terrorists'' may be less harmful than referring to Muslim people as such). Thus, in contrast to most fairness work, we study fairness through the perspective of treating people differently -- when it is contextually appropriate to. We first introduce an important distinction between descriptive (fact-based), normative (value-based), and correlation (association-based) benchmarks. This distinction is significant because each category requires separate interpretation and mitigation tailored to its specific characteristics. Then, we present a benchmark suite composed of eight different scenarios for a total of 16k questions that enables us to assess difference awareness. Finally, we show results across ten models that demonstrate difference awareness is a distinct dimension to fairness where existing bias mitigation strategies may backfire.

Previous work has highlighted that existing post-hoc explanation methods exhibit disparities in explanation fidelity (across 'race' and 'gender' as sensitive attributes), and while a large body of work focuses on mitigating these issues at the explanation metric level, the role of the data generating process and black box model in relation to explanation disparities remains largely unexplored. Accordingly, through both simulations as well as experiments on a real-world dataset, we specifically assess challenges to explanation disparities that originate from properties of the data: limited sample size, covariate shift, concept shift, omitted variable bias, and challenges based on model properties: inclusion of the sensitive attribute and appropriate functional form. Through controlled simulation analyses, our study demonstrates that increased covariate shift, concept shift, and omission of covariates increase explanation disparities, with the effect pronounced higher for neural network models that are better able to capture the underlying functional form in comparison to linear models. We also observe consistent findings regarding the effect of concept shift and omitted variable bias on explanation disparities in the Adult income dataset. Overall, results indicate that disparities in model explanations can also depend on data and model properties. Based on this systematic investigation, we provide recommendations for the design of explanation methods that mitigate undesirable disparities.

For text-based AI systems to interact in the real world, causal reasoning is an essential skill. Since interventional data is costly to generate, we study to what extent an agent can learn causal reasoning from passive data. Specifically, we consider an axiomatic training setup where an agent learns from multiple demonstrations of a causal axiom (or rule), rather than incorporating the axiom as an inductive bias or inferring it from data values. A key question is whether the agent would learn to generalize from the axiom demonstrations to new scenarios. For example, if a transformer model is trained on demonstrations of the causal transitivity axiom over small graphs, would it generalize to applying the transitivity axiom over large graphs? Our results, based on a novel axiomatic training scheme, indicate that such generalization is possible. We consider the task of inferring whether a variable causes another variable, given a causal graph structure. We find that a 67 million parameter transformer model, when trained on linear causal chains (along with some noisy variations) can generalize well to new kinds of graphs, including longer causal chains, causal chains with reversed order, and graphs with branching; even when it is not explicitly trained for such settings. Our model performs at par (or even better) than many larger language models such as GPT-4, Gemini Pro, and Phi-3. Overall, our axiomatic training framework provides a new paradigm of learning causal reasoning from passive data that can be used to learn arbitrary axioms, as long as sufficient demonstrations can be generated.

Deep neural networks often rely on spurious correlations to make predictions, which hinders generalization beyond training environments. For instance, models that associate cats with bed backgrounds can fail to predict the existence of cats in other environments without beds. Mitigating spurious correlations is crucial in building trustworthy models. However, the existing works lack transparency to offer insights into the mitigation process. In this work, we propose an interpretable framework, Discover and Cure (DISC), to tackle the issue. With human-interpretable concepts, DISC iteratively 1) discovers unstable concepts across different environments as spurious attributes, then 2) intervenes on the training data using the discovered concepts to reduce spurious correlation. Across systematic experiments, DISC provides superior generalization ability and interpretability than the existing approaches. Specifically, it outperforms the state-of-the-art methods on an object recognition task and a skin-lesion classification task by 7.5% and 9.6%, respectively. Additionally, we offer theoretical analysis and guarantees to understand the benefits of models trained by DISC. Code and data are available at https://github.com/Wuyxin/DISC.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have significantly enhanced their capabilities in complex problem-solving by introducing a thinking draft that enables multi-path Chain-of-Thought explorations before producing final answers. Ensuring the faithfulness of these intermediate reasoning processes is crucial for reliable monitoring, interpretation, and effective control. In this paper, we propose a systematic counterfactual intervention framework to rigorously evaluate thinking draft faithfulness. Our approach focuses on two complementary dimensions: (1) Intra-Draft Faithfulness, which assesses whether individual reasoning steps causally influence subsequent steps and the final draft conclusion through counterfactual step insertions; and (2) Draft-to-Answer Faithfulness, which evaluates whether final answers are logically consistent with and dependent on the thinking draft, by perturbing the draft's concluding logic. We conduct extensive experiments across six state-of-the-art LRMs. Our findings show that current LRMs demonstrate selective faithfulness to intermediate reasoning steps and frequently fail to faithfully align with the draft conclusions. These results underscore the need for more faithful and interpretable reasoning in advanced LRMs.

Universality is a key hypothesis in mechanistic interpretability -- that different models learn similar features and circuits when trained on similar tasks. In this work, we study the universality hypothesis by examining how small neural networks learn to implement group composition. We present a novel algorithm by which neural networks may implement composition for any finite group via mathematical representation theory. We then show that networks consistently learn this algorithm by reverse engineering model logits and weights, and confirm our understanding using ablations. By studying networks of differing architectures trained on various groups, we find mixed evidence for universality: using our algorithm, we can completely characterize the family of circuits and features that networks learn on this task, but for a given network the precise circuits learned -- as well as the order they develop -- are arbitrary.

In order to avoid well-know paradoxes associated with self-referential definitions, higher-order dependent type theories stratify the theory using a countably infinite hierarchy of universes (also known as sorts), Type_0 : Type_1 : cdots . Such type systems are called cumulative if for any type A we have that A : Type_{i} implies A : Type_{i+1}. The predicative calculus of inductive constructions (pCIC) which forms the basis of the Coq proof assistant, is one such system. In this paper we present and establish the soundness of the predicative calculus of cumulative inductive constructions (pCuIC) which extends the cumulativity relation to inductive types.

As machine learning models evolve, maintaining transparency demands more human-centric explainable AI techniques. Counterfactual explanations, with roots in human reasoning, identify the minimal input changes needed to obtain a given output and, hence, are crucial for supporting decision-making. Despite their importance, the evaluation of these explanations often lacks grounding in user studies and remains fragmented, with existing metrics not fully capturing human perspectives. To address this challenge, we developed a diverse set of 30 counterfactual scenarios and collected ratings across 8 evaluation metrics from 206 respondents. Subsequently, we fine-tuned different Large Language Models (LLMs) to predict average or individual human judgment across these metrics. Our methodology allowed LLMs to achieve an accuracy of up to 63% in zero-shot evaluations and 85% (over a 3-classes prediction) with fine-tuning across all metrics. The fine-tuned models predicting human ratings offer better comparability and scalability in evaluating different counterfactual explanation frameworks.

Mechanistic interpretability seeks to understand the internal mechanisms of machine learning models, where localization -- identifying the important model components -- is a key step. Activation patching, also known as causal tracing or interchange intervention, is a standard technique for this task (Vig et al., 2020), but the literature contains many variants with little consensus on the choice of hyperparameters or methodology. In this work, we systematically examine the impact of methodological details in activation patching, including evaluation metrics and corruption methods. In several settings of localization and circuit discovery in language models, we find that varying these hyperparameters could lead to disparate interpretability results. Backed by empirical observations, we give conceptual arguments for why certain metrics or methods may be preferred. Finally, we provide recommendations for the best practices of activation patching going forwards.

In order for AI systems to communicate effectively with people, they must understand how we make decisions. However, people's decisions are not always rational, so the implicit internal models of human decision-making in Large Language Models (LLMs) must account for this. Previous empirical evidence seems to suggest that these implicit models are accurate -- LLMs offer believable proxies of human behavior, acting how we expect humans would in everyday interactions. However, by comparing LLM behavior and predictions to a large dataset of human decisions, we find that this is actually not the case: when both simulating and predicting people's choices, a suite of cutting-edge LLMs (GPT-4o & 4-Turbo, Llama-3-8B & 70B, Claude 3 Opus) assume that people are more rational than we really are. Specifically, these models deviate from human behavior and align more closely with a classic model of rational choice -- expected value theory. Interestingly, people also tend to assume that other people are rational when interpreting their behavior. As a consequence, when we compare the inferences that LLMs and people draw from the decisions of others using another psychological dataset, we find that these inferences are highly correlated. Thus, the implicit decision-making models of LLMs appear to be aligned with the human expectation that other people will act rationally, rather than with how people actually act.

We identify five selected open problems in the theory of quantum information, which are rather simple to formulate, were well-studied in the literature, but are technically not easy. As these problems enjoy diverse mathematical connections, they offer a huge breakthrough potential. The first four concern existence of certain objects relevant for quantum information, namely a family of symmetric informationally complete generalized measurements in an infinite sequence of dimensions, mutually unbiased bases in dimension six, absolutely maximally entangled states for four subsystems with six levels each and bound entangled states with negative partial transpose. The fifth problem requires checking whether a certain state of a two-ququart system is 2-copy distillable. An award for solving each of them is announced.