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Jul 30

RigorLLM: Resilient Guardrails for Large Language Models against Undesired Content

Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have showcased remarkable capabilities across various tasks in different domains. However, the emergence of biases and the potential for generating harmful content in LLMs, particularly under malicious inputs, pose significant challenges. Current mitigation strategies, while effective, are not resilient under adversarial attacks. This paper introduces Resilient Guardrails for Large Language Models (RigorLLM), a novel framework designed to efficiently and effectively moderate harmful and unsafe inputs and outputs for LLMs. By employing a multi-faceted approach that includes energy-based training data augmentation through Langevin dynamics, optimizing a safe suffix for inputs via minimax optimization, and integrating a fusion-based model combining robust KNN with LLMs based on our data augmentation, RigorLLM offers a robust solution to harmful content moderation. Our experimental evaluations demonstrate that RigorLLM not only outperforms existing baselines like OpenAI API and Perspective API in detecting harmful content but also exhibits unparalleled resilience to jailbreaking attacks. The innovative use of constrained optimization and a fusion-based guardrail approach represents a significant step forward in developing more secure and reliable LLMs, setting a new standard for content moderation frameworks in the face of evolving digital threats.

Exploring the Impact of Disrupted Peer-to-Peer Communications on Fully Decentralized Learning in Disaster Scenarios

Fully decentralized learning enables the distribution of learning resources and decision-making capabilities across multiple user devices or nodes, and is rapidly gaining popularity due to its privacy-preserving and decentralized nature. Importantly, this crowdsourcing of the learning process allows the system to continue functioning even if some nodes are affected or disconnected. In a disaster scenario, communication infrastructure and centralized systems may be disrupted or completely unavailable, hindering the possibility of carrying out standard centralized learning tasks in these settings. Thus, fully decentralized learning can help in this case. However, transitioning from centralized to peer-to-peer communications introduces a dependency between the learning process and the topology of the communication graph among nodes. In a disaster scenario, even peer-to-peer communications are susceptible to abrupt changes, such as devices running out of battery or getting disconnected from others due to their position. In this study, we investigate the effects of various disruptions to peer-to-peer communications on decentralized learning in a disaster setting. We examine the resilience of a decentralized learning process when a subset of devices drop from the process abruptly. To this end, we analyze the difference between losing devices holding data, i.e., potential knowledge, vs. devices contributing only to the graph connectivity, i.e., with no data. Our findings on a Barabasi-Albert graph topology, where training data is distributed across nodes in an IID fashion, indicate that the accuracy of the learning process is more affected by a loss of connectivity than by a loss of data. Nevertheless, the network remains relatively robust, and the learning process can achieve a good level of accuracy.

Model Tampering Attacks Enable More Rigorous Evaluations of LLM Capabilities

Evaluations of large language model (LLM) risks and capabilities are increasingly being incorporated into AI risk management and governance frameworks. Currently, most risk evaluations are conducted by designing inputs that elicit harmful behaviors from the system. However, a fundamental limitation of this approach is that the harmfulness of the behaviors identified during any particular evaluation can only lower bound the model's worst-possible-case behavior. As a complementary method for eliciting harmful behaviors, we propose evaluating LLMs with model tampering attacks which allow for modifications to latent activations or weights. We pit state-of-the-art techniques for removing harmful LLM capabilities against a suite of 5 input-space and 6 model tampering attacks. In addition to benchmarking these methods against each other, we show that (1) model resilience to capability elicitation attacks lies on a low-dimensional robustness subspace; (2) the attack success rate of model tampering attacks can empirically predict and offer conservative estimates for the success of held-out input-space attacks; and (3) state-of-the-art unlearning methods can easily be undone within 16 steps of fine-tuning. Together these results highlight the difficulty of removing harmful LLM capabilities and show that model tampering attacks enable substantially more rigorous evaluations than input-space attacks alone. We release models at https://huggingface.co/LLM-GAT