Daily Papers

Event cameras offer many advantages over standard cameras due to their distinctive principle of operation: low power, low latency, high temporal resolution and high dynamic range. Nonetheless, the success of many downstream visual applications also hinges on an efficient and effective scene representation, where Neural Radiance Field (NeRF) is seen as the leading candidate. Such promise and potential of event cameras and NeRF inspired recent works to investigate on the reconstruction of NeRF from moving event cameras. However, these works are mainly limited in terms of the dependence on dense and low-noise event streams, as well as generalization to arbitrary contrast threshold values and camera speed profiles. In this work, we propose Robust e-NeRF, a novel method to directly and robustly reconstruct NeRFs from moving event cameras under various real-world conditions, especially from sparse and noisy events generated under non-uniform motion. It consists of two key components: a realistic event generation model that accounts for various intrinsic parameters (e.g. time-independent, asymmetric threshold and refractory period) and non-idealities (e.g. pixel-to-pixel threshold variation), as well as a complementary pair of normalized reconstruction losses that can effectively generalize to arbitrary speed profiles and intrinsic parameter values without such prior knowledge. Experiments on real and novel realistically simulated sequences verify our effectiveness. Our code, synthetic dataset and improved event simulator are public.

Following the traditional paradigm of convolutional neural networks (CNNs), modern CNNs manage to keep pace with more recent, for example transformer-based, models by not only increasing model depth and width but also the kernel size. This results in large amounts of learnable model parameters that need to be handled during training. While following the convolutional paradigm with the according spatial inductive bias, we question the significance of learned convolution filters. In fact, our findings demonstrate that many contemporary CNN architectures can achieve high test accuracies without ever updating randomly initialized (spatial) convolution filters. Instead, simple linear combinations (implemented through efficient 1times 1 convolutions) suffice to effectively recombine even random filters into expressive network operators. Furthermore, these combinations of random filters can implicitly regularize the resulting operations, mitigating overfitting and enhancing overall performance and robustness. Conversely, retaining the ability to learn filter updates can impair network performance. Lastly, although we only observe relatively small gains from learning 3times 3 convolutions, the learning gains increase proportionally with kernel size, owing to the non-idealities of the independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) nature of default initialization techniques.

The dominant practice of AI alignment assumes (1) that preferences are an adequate representation of human values, (2) that human rationality can be understood in terms of maximizing the satisfaction of preferences, and (3) that AI systems should be aligned with the preferences of one or more humans to ensure that they behave safely and in accordance with our values. Whether implicitly followed or explicitly endorsed, these commitments constitute what we term a preferentist approach to AI alignment. In this paper, we characterize and challenge the preferentist approach, describing conceptual and technical alternatives that are ripe for further research. We first survey the limits of rational choice theory as a descriptive model, explaining how preferences fail to capture the thick semantic content of human values, and how utility representations neglect the possible incommensurability of those values. We then critique the normativity of expected utility theory (EUT) for humans and AI, drawing upon arguments showing how rational agents need not comply with EUT, while highlighting how EUT is silent on which preferences are normatively acceptable. Finally, we argue that these limitations motivate a reframing of the targets of AI alignment: Instead of alignment with the preferences of a human user, developer, or humanity-writ-large, AI systems should be aligned with normative standards appropriate to their social roles, such as the role of a general-purpose assistant. Furthermore, these standards should be negotiated and agreed upon by all relevant stakeholders. On this alternative conception of alignment, a multiplicity of AI systems will be able to serve diverse ends, aligned with normative standards that promote mutual benefit and limit harm despite our plural and divergent values.

In many contexts, lying -- the use of verbal falsehoods to deceive -- is harmful. While lying has traditionally been a human affair, AI systems that make sophisticated verbal statements are becoming increasingly prevalent. This raises the question of how we should limit the harm caused by AI "lies" (i.e. falsehoods that are actively selected for). Human truthfulness is governed by social norms and by laws (against defamation, perjury, and fraud). Differences between AI and humans present an opportunity to have more precise standards of truthfulness for AI, and to have these standards rise over time. This could provide significant benefits to public epistemics and the economy, and mitigate risks of worst-case AI futures. Establishing norms or laws of AI truthfulness will require significant work to: (1) identify clear truthfulness standards; (2) create institutions that can judge adherence to those standards; and (3) develop AI systems that are robustly truthful. Our initial proposals for these areas include: (1) a standard of avoiding "negligent falsehoods" (a generalisation of lies that is easier to assess); (2) institutions to evaluate AI systems before and after real-world deployment; and (3) explicitly training AI systems to be truthful via curated datasets and human interaction. A concerning possibility is that evaluation mechanisms for eventual truthfulness standards could be captured by political interests, leading to harmful censorship and propaganda. Avoiding this might take careful attention. And since the scale of AI speech acts might grow dramatically over the coming decades, early truthfulness standards might be particularly important because of the precedents they set.