Daily Papers

Large Language Models have shown remarkable capabilities in the NLP domain. Their effectiveness can mainly be attributed to their ability to adapt to an array of downstream tasks. However, generally, full fine-tuning is a computationally expensive job. To mitigate this, many techniques have been developed that prime efficiency, a prominent one being Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA). However, LoRA and its variants employ re-parametrized additive updates. In this paper, we propose Low-Rank Multiplicative Adaptation (LoRMA), which shifts the paradigm of additive updates to a richer space of matrix multiplicative transformations. We tackle challenges such as computational complexity and rank bottleneck of matrix multiplication by effectively re-ordering operations and introducing rank inflation strategies. We conduct extensive experiments to demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach in terms of various evaluation metrics.

We study the design of loss functions for click-through rates (CTR) to optimize (social) welfare in advertising auctions. Existing works either only focus on CTR predictions without consideration of business objectives (e.g., welfare) in auctions or assume that the distribution over the participants' expected cost-per-impression (eCPM) is known a priori, then use various additional assumptions on the parametric form of the distribution to derive loss functions for predicting CTRs. In this work, we bring back the welfare objectives of ad auctions into CTR predictions and propose a novel weighted rankloss to train the CTR model. Compared to existing literature, our approach provides a provable guarantee on welfare but without assumptions on the eCPMs' distribution while also avoiding the intractability of naively applying existing learning-to-rank methods. Further, we propose a theoretically justifiable technique for calibrating the losses using labels generated from a teacher network, only assuming that the teacher network has bounded ell_2 generalization error. Finally, we demonstrate the advantages of the proposed loss on synthetic and real-world data.

This paper investigates the problem of ensembling multiple strategies for sequential portfolios to outperform individual strategies in terms of long-term wealth. Due to the uncertainty of strategies' performances in the future market, which are often based on specific models and statistical assumptions, investors often mitigate risk and enhance robustness by combining multiple strategies, akin to common approaches in collective learning prediction. However, the absence of a distribution-free and consistent preference framework complicates decisions of combination due to the ambiguous objective. To address this gap, we introduce a novel framework for decision-making in combining strategies, irrespective of market conditions, by establishing the investor's preference between decisions and then forming a clear objective. Through this framework, we propose a combinatorial strategy construction, free from statistical assumptions, for any scale of component strategies, even infinite, such that it meets the determined criterion. Finally, we test the proposed strategy along with its accelerated variant and some other multi-strategies. The numerical experiments show results in favor of the proposed strategies, albeit with small tradeoffs in their Sharpe ratios, in which their cumulative wealths eventually exceed those of the best component strategies while the accelerated strategy significantly improves performance.

We consider an extension to the classic position auctions in which sponsored creatives can be added within AI generated content rather than shown in predefined slots. New challenges arise from the natural requirement that sponsored creatives should smoothly fit into the context. With the help of advanced LLM technologies, it becomes viable to accurately estimate the benefits of adding each individual sponsored creatives into each potential positions within the AI generated content by properly taking the context into account. Therefore, we assume one click-through rate estimation for each position-creative pair, rather than one uniform estimation for each sponsored creative across all positions in classic settings. As a result, the underlying optimization becomes a general matching problem, thus the substitution effects should be treated more carefully compared to standard position auction settings, where the slots are independent with each other. In this work, we formalize a concrete mathematical model of the extended position auction problem and study the welfare-maximization and revenue-maximization mechanism design problem. Formally, we consider two different user behavior models and solve the mechanism design problems therein respectively. For the Multinomial Logit (MNL) model, which is order-insensitive, we can efficiently implement the optimal mechanisms. For the cascade model, which is order-sensitive, we provide approximately optimal solutions.

We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility result that no strategy proof mechanism can bound the approximation ratio of the optimal Gini index of utilities for one or more facilities. We propose instead computing approximation ratios of the complemented Gini index of utilities, and consider how well both deterministic and randomized mechanisms approximate this. In addition, as Nash welfare is often put forwards as an equitable compromise between egalitarian and utilitarian outcomes, we consider how well mechanisms approximate the Nash welfare.

We initiate the study of statistical inference and A/B testing for first-price pacing equilibria (FPPE). The FPPE model captures the dynamics resulting from large-scale first-price auction markets where buyers use pacing-based budget management. Such markets arise in the context of internet advertising, where budgets are prevalent. We propose a statistical framework for the FPPE model, in which a limit FPPE with a continuum of items models the long-run steady-state behavior of the auction platform, and an observable FPPE consisting of a finite number of items provides the data to estimate primitives of the limit FPPE, such as revenue, Nash social welfare (a fair metric of efficiency), and other parameters of interest. We develop central limit theorems and asymptotically valid confidence intervals. Furthermore, we establish the asymptotic local minimax optimality of our estimators. We then show that the theory can be used for conducting statistically valid A/B testing on auction platforms. Numerical simulations verify our central limit theorems, and empirical coverage rates for our confidence intervals agree with our theory.

Proportionality is an attractive fairness concept that has been applied to a range of problems including the facility location problem, a classic problem in social choice. In our work, we propose a concept called Strong Proportionality, which ensures that when there are two groups of agents at different locations, both groups incur the same total cost. We show that although Strong Proportionality is a well-motivated and basic axiom, there is no deterministic strategyproof mechanism satisfying the property. We then identify a randomized mechanism called Random Rank (which uniformly selects a number k between 1 to n and locates the facility at the k'th highest agent location) which satisfies Strong Proportionality in expectation. Our main theorem characterizes Random Rank as the unique mechanism that achieves universal truthfulness, universal anonymity, and Strong Proportionality in expectation among all randomized mechanisms. Finally, we show via the AverageOrRandomRank mechanism that even stronger ex-post fairness guarantees can be achieved by weakening universal truthfulness to strategyproofness in expectation.

The realm of High-Frequency Trading (HFT) is characterized by rapid decision-making processes that capitalize on fleeting market inefficiencies. As the financial markets become increasingly competitive, there is a pressing need for innovative strategies that can adapt and evolve with changing market dynamics. Enter Reinforcement Learning (RL), a branch of machine learning where agents learn by interacting with their environment, making it an intriguing candidate for HFT applications. This paper dives deep into the integration of RL in statistical arbitrage strategies tailored for HFT scenarios. By leveraging the adaptive learning capabilities of RL, we explore its potential to unearth patterns and devise trading strategies that traditional methods might overlook. We delve into the intricate exploration-exploitation trade-offs inherent in RL and how they manifest in the volatile world of HFT. Furthermore, we confront the challenges of applying RL in non-stationary environments, typical of financial markets, and investigate methodologies to mitigate associated risks. Through extensive simulations and backtests, our research reveals that RL not only enhances the adaptability of trading strategies but also shows promise in improving profitability metrics and risk-adjusted returns. This paper, therefore, positions RL as a pivotal tool for the next generation of HFT-based statistical arbitrage, offering insights for both researchers and practitioners in the field.

Large-scale high-quality training data is important for improving the performance of models. After trained with data that has rationales (reasoning steps), models gain reasoning capability. However, the dataset with high-quality rationales is relatively scarce due to the high annotation cost. To address this issue, we propose Self-motivated Learning framework. The framework motivates the model itself to automatically generate rationales on existing datasets. Based on the inherent rank from correctness across multiple rationales, the model learns to generate better rationales, leading to higher reasoning capability. Specifically, we train a reward model with the rank to evaluate the quality of rationales, and improve the performance of reasoning through reinforcement learning. Experiment results of Llama2 7B on multiple reasoning datasets show that our method significantly improves the reasoning ability of models, even outperforming text-davinci-002 in some datasets.

Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA) has become a widely adopted technique for fine-tuning large-scale pre-trained models with minimal parameter updates. However, existing methods rely on fixed ranks or focus solely on either rank pruning or expansion, failing to adapt ranks dynamically to match the importance of different layers during training. In this work, we propose ElaLoRA, an adaptive low-rank adaptation framework that dynamically prunes and expands ranks based on gradient-derived importance scores. To the best of our knowledge, ElaLoRA is the first method that enables both rank pruning and expansion during fine-tuning. Experiments across multiple benchmarks demonstrate that ElaLoRA consistently outperforms existing PEFT methods across different parameter budgets. Furthermore, our studies validate that layers receiving higher rank allocations contribute more significantly to model performance, providing theoretical justification for our adaptive strategy. By introducing a principled and adaptive rank allocation mechanism, ElaLoRA offers a scalable and efficient fine-tuning solution, particularly suited for resource-constrained environments.

Reinforcement learning is emerging as a primary driver for improving language model reasoning capabilities. A fundamental question is whether current reinforcement learning algorithms -- such as Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO), the de facto standard algorithm used to improve language model reasoning -- merely sharpen the base model's distribution around problems it can already solve. We investigate this question in the context of formal theorem proving, which has access to a perfect verifier. We identify a degenerate rank bias in GRPO in which highly probable trajectories are reinforced and rare ones are neglected. This results in distribution sharpening: the model can solve some problems with fewer samples, but underperforms simply sampling more solutions from the original model. To overcome GRPO's rank bias we introduce unlikeliness reward, a simple method for explicitly up-weighting rare but correct solutions. We show that unlikeliness reward mitigates rank bias and improves pass@N across a large range of N in both synthetic and real theorem proving settings. We also uncover an unexpected link between rank bias and a seemingly mundane hyperparameter -- the number of updates per batch -- that leads to a second, complementary mitigation. We combine our insights into a revised GRPO training recipe for formal theorem proving, yielding an open pipeline that achieves competitive performance to DeepSeek-Prover-V1.5-RL on the miniF2F-test benchmark. We release our implementation at https://github.com/AndreHe02/rewarding-unlikely-release

Budget management strategies in repeated auctions have received growing attention in online advertising markets. However, previous work on budget management in online bidding mainly focused on second-price auctions. The rapid shift from second-price auctions to first-price auctions for online ads in recent years has motivated the challenging question of how to bid in repeated first-price auctions while controlling budgets. In this work, we study the problem of learning in repeated first-price auctions with budgets. We design a dual-based algorithm that can achieve a near-optimal O(T) regret with full information feedback where the maximum competing bid is always revealed after each auction. We further consider the setting with one-sided information feedback where only the winning bid is revealed after each auction. We show that our modified algorithm can still achieve an O(T) regret with mild assumptions on the bidder's value distribution. Finally, we complement the theoretical results with numerical experiments to confirm the effectiveness of our budget management policy.

A key puzzle in search, ads, and recommendation is that the ranking model can only utilize a small portion of the vastly available user interaction data. As a result, increasing data volume, model size, or computation FLOPs will quickly suffer from diminishing returns. We examined this problem and found that one of the root causes may lie in the so-called ``item-centric'' formulation, which has an unbounded vocabulary and thus uncontrolled model complexity. To mitigate quality saturation, we introduce an alternative formulation named ``user-centric ranking'', which is based on a transposed view of the dyadic user-item interaction data. We show that this formulation has a promising scaling property, enabling us to train better-converged models on substantially larger data sets.

The development of state-of-the-art systems in different applied areas of machine learning (ML) is driven by benchmarks, which have shaped the paradigm of evaluating generalisation capabilities from multiple perspectives. Although the paradigm is shifting towards more fine-grained evaluation across diverse tasks, the delicate question of how to aggregate the performances has received particular interest in the community. In general, benchmarks follow the unspoken utilitarian principles, where the systems are ranked based on their mean average score over task-specific metrics. Such aggregation procedure has been viewed as a sub-optimal evaluation protocol, which may have created the illusion of progress. This paper proposes Vote'n'Rank, a framework for ranking systems in multi-task benchmarks under the principles of the social choice theory. We demonstrate that our approach can be efficiently utilised to draw new insights on benchmarking in several ML sub-fields and identify the best-performing systems in research and development case studies. The Vote'n'Rank's procedures are more robust than the mean average while being able to handle missing performance scores and determine conditions under which the system becomes the winner.

In this study, we delve into an emerging optimization challenge involving a black-box objective function that can only be gauged via a ranking oracle-a situation frequently encountered in real-world scenarios, especially when the function is evaluated by human judges. Such challenge is inspired from Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF), an approach recently employed to enhance the performance of Large Language Models (LLMs) using human guidance. We introduce ZO-RankSGD, an innovative zeroth-order optimization algorithm designed to tackle this optimization problem, accompanied by theoretical assurances. Our algorithm utilizes a novel rank-based random estimator to determine the descent direction and guarantees convergence to a stationary point. Moreover, ZO-RankSGD is readily applicable to policy optimization problems in Reinforcement Learning (RL), particularly when only ranking oracles for the episode reward are available. Last but not least, we demonstrate the effectiveness of ZO-RankSGD in a novel application: improving the quality of images generated by a diffusion generative model with human ranking feedback. Throughout experiments, we found that ZO-RankSGD can significantly enhance the detail of generated images with only a few rounds of human feedback. Overall, our work advances the field of zeroth-order optimization by addressing the problem of optimizing functions with only ranking feedback, and offers a new and effective approach for aligning Artificial Intelligence (AI) with human intentions.

We compare the (1,lambda)-EA and the (1 + lambda)-EA on the recently introduced benchmark DisOM, which is the OneMax function with randomly planted local optima. Previous work showed that if all local optima have the same relative height, then the plus strategy never loses more than a factor O(nlog n) compared to the comma strategy. Here we show that even small random fluctuations in the heights of the local optima have a devastating effect for the plus strategy and lead to super-polynomial runtimes. On the other hand, due to their ability to escape local optima, comma strategies are unaffected by the height of the local optima and remain efficient. Our results hold for a broad class of possible distortions and show that the plus strategy, but not the comma strategy, is generally deceived by sparse unstructured fluctuations of a smooth landscape.

We study a strategic variant of the multi-armed bandit problem, which we coin the strategic click-bandit. This model is motivated by applications in online recommendation where the choice of recommended items depends on both the click-through rates and the post-click rewards. Like in classical bandits, rewards follow a fixed unknown distribution. However, we assume that the click-rate of each arm is chosen strategically by the arm (e.g., a host on Airbnb) in order to maximize the number of times it gets clicked. The algorithm designer does not know the post-click rewards nor the arms' actions (i.e., strategically chosen click-rates) in advance, and must learn both values over time. To solve this problem, we design an incentive-aware learning algorithm, UCB-S, which achieves two goals simultaneously: (a) incentivizing desirable arm behavior under uncertainty; (b) minimizing regret by learning unknown parameters. We characterize all approximate Nash equilibria among arms under UCB-S and show a mathcal{O} (KT) regret bound uniformly in every equilibrium. We also show that incentive-unaware algorithms generally fail to achieve low regret in the strategic click-bandit. Finally, we support our theoretical results by simulations of strategic arm behavior which confirm the effectiveness and robustness of our proposed incentive design.

Representation rank is an important concept for understanding the role of Neural Networks (NNs) in Deep Reinforcement learning (DRL), which measures the expressive capacity of value networks. Existing studies focus on unboundedly maximizing this rank; nevertheless, that approach would introduce overly complex models in the learning, thus undermining performance. Hence, fine-tuning representation rank presents a challenging and crucial optimization problem. To address this issue, we find a guiding principle for adaptive control of the representation rank. We employ the Bellman equation as a theoretical foundation and derive an upper bound on the cosine similarity of consecutive state-action pairs representations of value networks. We then leverage this upper bound to propose a novel regularizer, namely BEllman Equation-based automatic rank Regularizer (BEER). This regularizer adaptively regularizes the representation rank, thus improving the DRL agent's performance. We first validate the effectiveness of automatic control of rank on illustrative experiments. Then, we scale up BEER to complex continuous control tasks by combining it with the deterministic policy gradient method. Among 12 challenging DeepMind control tasks, BEER outperforms the baselines by a large margin. Besides, BEER demonstrates significant advantages in Q-value approximation. Our code is available at https://github.com/sweetice/BEER-ICLR2024.

Ranking algorithms in traditional search engines are powered by enormous training data sets that are meticulously engineered and curated by a centralized entity. Decentralized peer-to-peer (p2p) networks such as torrenting applications and Web3 protocols deliberately eschew centralized databases and computational architectures when designing services and features. As such, robust search-and-rank algorithms designed for such domains must be engineered specifically for decentralized networks, and must be lightweight enough to operate on consumer-grade personal devices such as a smartphone or laptop computer. We introduce G-Rank, an unsupervised ranking algorithm designed exclusively for decentralized networks. We demonstrate that accurate, relevant ranking results can be achieved in fully decentralized networks without any centralized data aggregation, feature engineering, or model training. Furthermore, we show that such results are obtainable with minimal data preprocessing and computational overhead, and can still return highly relevant results even when a user's device is disconnected from the network. G-Rank is highly modular in design, is not limited to categorical data, and can be implemented in a variety of domains with minimal modification. The results herein show that unsupervised ranking models designed for decentralized p2p networks are not only viable, but worthy of further research.

Congestion is a common failure mode of markets, where consumers compete inefficiently on the same subset of goods (e.g., chasing the same small set of properties on a vacation rental platform). The typical economic story is that prices decongest by balancing supply and demand. But in modern online marketplaces, prices are typically set in a decentralized way by sellers, and the information about items is inevitably partial. The power of a platform is limited to controlling representations -- the subset of information about items presented by default to users. This motivates the present study of decongestion by representation, where a platform seeks to learn representations that reduce congestion and thus improve social welfare. The technical challenge is twofold: relying only on revealed preferences from the choices of consumers, rather than true preferences; and the combinatorial problem associated with representations that determine the features to reveal in the default view. We tackle both challenges by proposing a differentiable proxy of welfare that can be trained end-to-end on consumer choice data. We develop sufficient conditions for when decongestion promotes welfare, and present the results of extensive experiments on both synthetic and real data that demonstrate the utility of our approach.

Preference learning algorithms (e.g., RLHF and DPO) are frequently used to steer LLMs to produce generations that are more preferred by humans, but our understanding of their inner workings is still limited. In this work, we study the conventional wisdom that preference learning trains models to assign higher likelihoods to more preferred outputs than less preferred outputs, measured via ranking accuracy. Surprisingly, we find that most state-of-the-art preference-tuned models achieve a ranking accuracy of less than 60% on common preference datasets. We furthermore derive the idealized ranking accuracy that a preference-tuned LLM would achieve if it optimized the DPO or RLHF objective perfectly. We demonstrate that existing models exhibit a significant alignment gap -- i.e., a gap between the observed and idealized ranking accuracies. We attribute this discrepancy to the DPO objective, which is empirically and theoretically ill-suited to fix even mild ranking errors in the reference model, and derive a simple and efficient formula for quantifying the difficulty of learning a given preference datapoint. Finally, we demonstrate that ranking accuracy strongly correlates with the empirically popular win rate metric when the model is close to the reference model used in the objective, shedding further light on the differences between on-policy (e.g., RLHF) and off-policy (e.g., DPO) preference learning algorithms.

We consider the problem of subset selection where one is given multiple rankings of items and the goal is to select the highest ``quality'' subset. Score functions from the multiwinner voting literature have been used to aggregate rankings into quality scores for subsets. We study this setting of subset selection problems when, in addition, rankings may contain systemic or unconscious biases toward a group of items. For a general model of input rankings and biases, we show that requiring the selected subset to satisfy group fairness constraints can improve the quality of the selection with respect to unbiased rankings. Importantly, we show that for fairness constraints to be effective, different multiwinner score functions may require a drastically different number of rankings: While for some functions, fairness constraints need an exponential number of rankings to recover a close-to-optimal solution, for others, this dependency is only polynomial. This result relies on a novel notion of ``smoothness'' of submodular functions in this setting that quantifies how well a function can ``correctly'' assess the quality of items in the presence of bias. The results in this paper can be used to guide the choice of multiwinner score functions for the subset selection setting considered here; we additionally provide a tool to empirically enable this.

In this paper, we introduce a novel predict-and-optimize method for profit-driven churn prevention. We frame the task of targeting customers for a retention campaign as a regret minimization problem. The main objective is to leverage individual customer lifetime values (CLVs) to ensure that only the most valuable customers are targeted. In contrast, many profit-driven strategies focus on churn probabilities while considering average CLVs. This often results in significant information loss due to data aggregation. Our proposed model aligns with the guidelines of Predict-and-Optimize (PnO) frameworks and can be efficiently solved using stochastic gradient descent methods. Results from 12 churn prediction datasets underscore the effectiveness of our approach, which achieves the best average performance compared to other well-established strategies in terms of average profit.

Pairwise re-ranking models predict which of two documents is more relevant to a query and then aggregate a final ranking from such preferences. This is often more effective than pointwise re-ranking models that directly predict a relevance value for each document. However, the high inference overhead of pairwise models limits their practical application: usually, for a set of k documents to be re-ranked, preferences for all k^2-k comparison pairs excluding self-comparisons are aggregated. We investigate whether the efficiency of pairwise re-ranking can be improved by sampling from all pairs. In an exploratory study, we evaluate three sampling methods and five preference aggregation methods. The best combination allows for an order of magnitude fewer comparisons at an acceptable loss of retrieval effectiveness, while competitive effectiveness is already achieved with about one third of the comparisons.

We study an online learning problem in general-sum Stackelberg games, where players act in a decentralized and strategic manner. We study two settings depending on the type of information for the follower: (1) the limited information setting where the follower only observes its own reward, and (2) the side information setting where the follower has extra side information about the leader's reward. We show that for the follower, myopically best responding to the leader's action is the best strategy for the limited information setting, but not necessarily so for the side information setting -- the follower can manipulate the leader's reward signals with strategic actions, and hence induce the leader's strategy to converge to an equilibrium that is better off for itself. Based on these insights, we study decentralized online learning for both players in the two settings. Our main contribution is to derive last-iterate convergence and sample complexity results in both settings. Notably, we design a new manipulation strategy for the follower in the latter setting, and show that it has an intrinsic advantage against the best response strategy. Our theories are also supported by empirical results.

Learning to Rank (LTR) algorithms are usually evaluated using Information Retrieval metrics like Normalised Discounted Cumulative Gain (NDCG) or Mean Average Precision. As these metrics rely on sorting predicted items' scores (and thus, on items' ranks), their derivatives are either undefined or zero everywhere. This makes them unsuitable for gradient-based optimisation, which is the usual method of learning appropriate scoring functions. Commonly used LTR loss functions are only loosely related to the evaluation metrics, causing a mismatch between the optimisation objective and the evaluation criterion. In this paper, we address this mismatch by proposing NeuralNDCG, a novel differentiable approximation to NDCG. Since NDCG relies on the non-differentiable sorting operator, we obtain NeuralNDCG by relaxing that operator using NeuralSort, a differentiable approximation of sorting. As a result, we obtain a new ranking loss function which is an arbitrarily accurate approximation to the evaluation metric, thus closing the gap between the training and the evaluation of LTR models. We introduce two variants of the proposed loss function. Finally, the empirical evaluation shows that our proposed method outperforms previous work aimed at direct optimisation of NDCG and is competitive with the state-of-the-art methods.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

The majority of online display ads are served through real-time bidding (RTB) --- each ad display impression is auctioned off in real-time when it is just being generated from a user visit. To place an ad automatically and optimally, it is critical for advertisers to devise a learning algorithm to cleverly bid an ad impression in real-time. Most previous works consider the bid decision as a static optimization problem of either treating the value of each impression independently or setting a bid price to each segment of ad volume. However, the bidding for a given ad campaign would repeatedly happen during its life span before the budget runs out. As such, each bid is strategically correlated by the constrained budget and the overall effectiveness of the campaign (e.g., the rewards from generated clicks), which is only observed after the campaign has completed. Thus, it is of great interest to devise an optimal bidding strategy sequentially so that the campaign budget can be dynamically allocated across all the available impressions on the basis of both the immediate and future rewards. In this paper, we formulate the bid decision process as a reinforcement learning problem, where the state space is represented by the auction information and the campaign's real-time parameters, while an action is the bid price to set. By modeling the state transition via auction competition, we build a Markov Decision Process framework for learning the optimal bidding policy to optimize the advertising performance in the dynamic real-time bidding environment. Furthermore, the scalability problem from the large real-world auction volume and campaign budget is well handled by state value approximation using neural networks.

Neural ranking models (NRMs) have attracted considerable attention in information retrieval. Unfortunately, NRMs may inherit the adversarial vulnerabilities of general neural networks, which might be leveraged by black-hat search engine optimization practitioners. Recently, adversarial attacks against NRMs have been explored in the paired attack setting, generating an adversarial perturbation to a target document for a specific query. In this paper, we focus on a more general type of perturbation and introduce the topic-oriented adversarial ranking attack task against NRMs, which aims to find an imperceptible perturbation that can promote a target document in ranking for a group of queries with the same topic. We define both static and dynamic settings for the task and focus on decision-based black-box attacks. We propose a novel framework to improve topic-oriented attack performance based on a surrogate ranking model. The attack problem is formalized as a Markov decision process (MDP) and addressed using reinforcement learning. Specifically, a topic-oriented reward function guides the policy to find a successful adversarial example that can be promoted in rankings to as many queries as possible in a group. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed framework can significantly outperform existing attack strategies, and we conclude by re-iterating that there exist potential risks for applying NRMs in the real world.

Portfolio Selection is an important real-world financial task and has attracted extensive attention in artificial intelligence communities. This task, however, has two main difficulties: (i) the non-stationary price series and complex asset correlations make the learning of feature representation very hard; (ii) the practicality principle in financial markets requires controlling both transaction and risk costs. Most existing methods adopt handcraft features and/or consider no constraints for the costs, which may make them perform unsatisfactorily and fail to control both costs in practice. In this paper, we propose a cost-sensitive portfolio selection method with deep reinforcement learning. Specifically, a novel two-stream portfolio policy network is devised to extract both price series patterns and asset correlations, while a new cost-sensitive reward function is developed to maximize the accumulated return and constrain both costs via reinforcement learning. We theoretically analyze the near-optimality of the proposed reward, which shows that the growth rate of the policy regarding this reward function can approach the theoretical optimum. We also empirically evaluate the proposed method on real-world datasets. Promising results demonstrate the effectiveness and superiority of the proposed method in terms of profitability, cost-sensitivity and representation abilities.

A modified LAB algorithm is introduced in this paper. It builds upon the original LAB algorithm (Reddy et al. 2023), which is a socio-inspired algorithm that models competitive and learning behaviours within a group, establishing hierarchical roles. The proposed algorithm incorporates the roulette wheel approach and a reduction factor introducing inter-group competition and iteratively narrowing down the sample space. The algorithm is validated by solving the benchmark test problems from CEC 2005 and CEC 2017. The solutions are validated using standard statistical tests such as two-sided and pairwise signed rank Wilcoxon test and Friedman rank test. The algorithm exhibited improved and superior robustness as well as search space exploration capabilities. Furthermore, a Clustering-Based Search Space Reduction (C-SSR) method is proposed, making the algorithm capable to solve constrained problems. The C-SSR method enables the algorithm to identify clusters of feasible regions, satisfying the constraints and contributing to achieve the optimal solution. This method demonstrates its effectiveness as a potential alternative to traditional constraint handling techniques. The results obtained using the Modified LAB algorithm are then compared with those achieved by other recent metaheuristic algorithms.

We consider multi-draft speculative sampling, where the proposal sequences are sampled independently from different draft models. At each step, a token-level draft selection scheme takes a list of valid tokens as input and produces an output token whose distribution matches that of the target model. Previous works have demonstrated that the optimal scheme (which maximizes the probability of accepting one of the input tokens) can be cast as a solution to a linear program. In this work we show that the optimal scheme can be decomposed into a two-step solution: in the first step an importance sampling (IS) type scheme is used to select one intermediate token; in the second step (single-draft) speculative sampling is applied to generate the output token. For the case of two identical draft models we further 1) establish a necessary and sufficient condition on the distributions of the target and draft models for the acceptance probability to equal one and 2) provide an explicit expression for the optimal acceptance probability. Our theoretical analysis also motives a new class of token-level selection scheme based on weighted importance sampling. Our experimental results demonstrate consistent improvements in the achievable block efficiency and token rates over baseline schemes in a number of scenarios.

Competitions for shareable and limited resources have long been studied with strategic agents. In reality, agents often have to learn and maximize the rewards of the resources at the same time. To design an individualized competing policy, we model the competition between agents in a novel multi-player multi-armed bandit (MPMAB) setting where players are selfish and aim to maximize their own rewards. In addition, when several players pull the same arm, we assume that these players averagely share the arms' rewards by expectation. Under this setting, we first analyze the Nash equilibrium when arms' rewards are known. Subsequently, we propose a novel SelfishMPMAB with Averaging Allocation (SMAA) approach based on the equilibrium. We theoretically demonstrate that SMAA could achieve a good regret guarantee for each player when all players follow the algorithm. Additionally, we establish that no single selfish player can significantly increase their rewards through deviation, nor can they detrimentally affect other players' rewards without incurring substantial losses for themselves. We finally validate the effectiveness of the method in extensive synthetic experiments.

Nowadays, state-of-the-art learning-to-rank (LTR) methods are based on gradient-boosted decision trees (GBDT). The most well-known algorithm is LambdaMART that was proposed more than a decade ago. Recently, several other GBDT-based ranking algorithms were proposed. In this paper, we conduct a thorough analysis of these methods in a unified setup. In particular, we address the following questions. Is direct optimization of a smoothed ranking loss preferable over optimizing a convex surrogate? How to properly construct and smooth surrogate ranking losses? To address these questions, we compare LambdaMART with YetiRank and StochasticRank methods and their modifications. We also improve the YetiRank approach to allow for optimizing specific ranking loss functions. As a result, we gain insights into learning-to-rank approaches and obtain a new state-of-the-art algorithm.

We propose the PeerRank method for peer assessment. This constructs a grade for an agent based on the grades proposed by the agents evaluating the agent. Since the grade of an agent is a measure of their ability to grade correctly, the PeerRank method weights grades by the grades of the grading agent. The PeerRank method also provides an incentive for agents to grade correctly. As the grades of an agent depend on the grades of the grading agents, and as these grades themselves depend on the grades of other agents, we define the PeerRank method by a fixed point equation similar to the PageRank method for ranking web-pages. We identify some formal properties of the PeerRank method (for example, it satisfies axioms of unanimity, no dummy, no discrimination and symmetry), discuss some examples, compare with related work and evaluate the performance on some synthetic data. Our results show considerable promise, reducing the error in grade predictions by a factor of 2 or more in many cases over the natural baseline of averaging peer grades.

Learning to rank with biased click data is a well-known challenge. A variety of methods has been explored to debias click data for learning to rank such as click models, result interleaving and, more recently, the unbiased learning-to-rank framework based on inverse propensity weighting. Despite their differences, most existing studies separate the estimation of click bias (namely the propensity model) from the learning of ranking algorithms. To estimate click propensities, they either conduct online result randomization, which can negatively affect the user experience, or offline parameter estimation, which has special requirements for click data and is optimized for objectives (e.g. click likelihood) that are not directly related to the ranking performance of the system. In this work, we address those problems by unifying the learning of propensity models and ranking models. We find that the problem of estimating a propensity model from click data is a dual problem of unbiased learning to rank. Based on this observation, we propose a Dual Learning Algorithm (DLA) that jointly learns an unbiased ranker and an unbiased propensity model. DLA is an automatic unbiased learning-to-rank framework as it directly learns unbiased ranking models from biased click data without any preprocessing. It can adapt to the change of bias distributions and is applicable to online learning. Our empirical experiments with synthetic and real-world data show that the models trained with DLA significantly outperformed the unbiased learning-to-rank algorithms based on result randomization and the models trained with relevance signals extracted by click models.

Modern recommender systems may output considerably different recommendations due to small perturbations in the training data. Changes in the data from a single user will alter the recommendations as well as the recommendations of other users. In applications like healthcare, housing, and finance, this sensitivity can have adverse effects on user experience. We propose a method to stabilize a given recommender system against such perturbations. This is a challenging task due to (1) the lack of a ``reference'' rank list that can be used to anchor the outputs; and (2) the computational challenges in ensuring the stability of rank lists with respect to all possible perturbations of training data. Our method, FINEST, overcomes these challenges by obtaining reference rank lists from a given recommendation model and then fine-tuning the model under simulated perturbation scenarios with rank-preserving regularization on sampled items. Our experiments on real-world datasets demonstrate that FINEST can ensure that recommender models output stable recommendations under a wide range of different perturbations without compromising next-item prediction accuracy.

Organizations typically train large models individually. This is costly and time-consuming, particularly for large-scale foundation models. Such vertical production is known to be suboptimal. Inspired by this economic insight, we ask whether it is possible to leverage others' expertise by trading the constituent parts in models, i.e., sets of weights, as if they were market commodities. While recent advances in aligning and interpolating models suggest that doing so may be possible, a number of fundamental questions must be answered to create viable parameter markets. In this work, we address these basic questions, propose a framework containing the infrastructure necessary for market operations to take place, study strategies for exchanging parameters, and offer means for agents to monetize parameters. Excitingly, compared to agents who train siloed models from scratch, we show that it is possible to mutually gain by using the market, even in competitive settings. This suggests that the notion of parameter markets may be a useful paradigm for improving large-scale model training in the future.

Calculating the action and the interaction Hamiltonian at higher orders in cosmological perturbation theory is a cumbersome task. We employ the formalism of EFT of inflation in models of single field ultra slow-roll inflation and obtain a non-perturbative result for the Hamiltonian in terms of the Goldstone field pi. To complete the dictionary, a non-linear relation between the curvature perturbations and pi is presented. Equipped with these non-linear results, we calculate the higher order loop corrections in USR models which are employed for PBHs formation. It is shown that the loop corrections on long CMB scales increase rapidly with the number of loop L and the setup will go out of perturbative control at the four-loop level.

We study the ranking of individuals, teams, or objects, based on pairwise comparisons between them, using the Bradley-Terry model. Estimates of rankings within this model are commonly made using a simple iterative algorithm first introduced by Zermelo almost a century ago. Here we describe an alternative and similarly simple iteration that provably returns identical results but does so much faster -- over a hundred times faster in some cases. We demonstrate this algorithm with applications to a range of example data sets and derive a number of results regarding its convergence.

Efficiently ranking relevant items from large candidate pools is a cornerstone of modern information retrieval systems -- such as web search, recommendation, and retrieval-augmented generation. Listwise rerankers, which improve relevance by jointly considering multiple candidates, are often limited in practice: either by model input size constraints, or by degraded quality when processing large sets. We propose a model-agnostic method for fast reranking large sets that exceed a model input limits. The method first partitions candidate items into overlapping blocks, each of which is ranked independently in parallel. Implicit pairwise comparisons are then derived from these local rankings. Finally, these comparisons are aggregated to construct a global ranking using algorithms such as Winrate or PageRank. Experiments on TREC DL-2019 show that our method achieves an nDCG@10 of 70.88 compared to the 57.68 for full-context listwise approach using gpt-4.1-mini as long-context model, while reducing latency from 21 to 8 seconds. The implementation of the algorithm and the experiments is available in the repository: https://github.com/V3RGANz/jointrank

We focus on a simple, one-dimensional collective decision problem (often referred to as the facility location problem) and explore issues of strategyproofness and proportionality-based fairness. We introduce and analyze a hierarchy of proportionality-based fairness axioms of varying strength: Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS), Proportionality (as in Freeman et al, 2021), and Proportional Fairness (PF). For each axiom, we characterize the family of mechanisms that satisfy the axiom and strategyproofness. We show that imposing strategyproofness renders many of the axioms to be equivalent: the family of mechanisms that satisfy proportionality, unanimity, and strategyproofness is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy UFS and strategyproofness, which, in turn, is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy PF and strategyproofness. Furthermore, there is a unique such mechanism: the Uniform Phantom mechanism, which is studied in Freeman et al. (2021). We also characterize the outcomes of the Uniform Phantom mechanism as the unique (pure) equilibrium outcome for any mechanism that satisfies continuity, strict monotonicity, and UFS. Finally, we analyze the approximation guarantees, in terms of optimal social welfare and minimum total cost, obtained by mechanisms that are strategyproof and satisfy each proportionality-based fairness axiom. We show that the Uniform Phantom mechanism provides the best approximation of the optimal social welfare (and also minimum total cost) among all mechanisms that satisfy UFS.

Creating test collections for offline retrieval evaluation requires human effort to judge documents' relevance. This expensive activity motivated much work in developing methods for constructing benchmarks with fewer assessment costs. In this respect, adjudication methods actively decide both which documents and the order in which experts review them, in order to better exploit the assessment budget or to lower it. Researchers evaluate the quality of those methods by measuring the correlation between the known gold ranking of systems under the full collection and the observed ranking of systems under the lower-cost one. This traditional analysis ignores whether and how the low-cost judgements impact on the statistically significant differences among systems with respect to the full collection. We fill this void by proposing a novel methodology to evaluate how the low-cost adjudication methods preserve the pairwise significant differences between systems as the full collection. In other terms, while traditional approaches look for stability in answering the question "is system A better than system B?", our proposed approach looks for stability in answering the question "is system A significantly better than system B?", which is the ultimate questions researchers need to answer to guarantee the generalisability of their results. Among other results, we found that the best methods in terms of ranking of systems correlation do not always match those preserving statistical significance.

In this work, we consider the problem of collaborative multi-user reinforcement learning. In this setting there are multiple users with the same state-action space and transition probabilities but with different rewards. Under the assumption that the reward matrix of the N users has a low-rank structure -- a standard and practically successful assumption in the offline collaborative filtering setting -- the question is can we design algorithms with significantly lower sample complexity compared to the ones that learn the MDP individually for each user. Our main contribution is an algorithm which explores rewards collaboratively with N user-specific MDPs and can learn rewards efficiently in two key settings: tabular MDPs and linear MDPs. When N is large and the rank is constant, the sample complexity per MDP depends logarithmically over the size of the state-space, which represents an exponential reduction (in the state-space size) when compared to the standard ``non-collaborative'' algorithms.

As with other commodities, markets could help us efficiently produce machine intelligence. We propose a market where intelligence is priced by other intelligence systems peer-to-peer across the internet. Peers rank each other by training neural networks which learn the value of their neighbors. Scores accumulate on a digital ledger where high ranking peers are monetarily rewarded with additional weight in the network. However, this form of peer-ranking is not resistant to collusion, which could disrupt the accuracy of the mechanism. The solution is a connectivity-based regularization which exponentially rewards trusted peers, making the system resistant to collusion of up to 50 percent of the network weight. The result is a collectively run intelligence market which continual produces newly trained models and pays contributors who create information theoretic value.

The acceleration in the adoption of AI-based automated decision-making systems poses a challenge for evaluating the fairness of algorithmic decisions, especially in the absence of ground truth. When designing interventions, uplift modeling is used extensively to identify candidates that are likely to benefit from treatment. However, these models remain particularly susceptible to fairness evaluation due to the lack of ground truth on the outcome measure since a candidate cannot be in both treatment and control simultaneously. In this article, we propose a framework that overcomes the missing ground truth problem by generating surrogates to serve as a proxy for counterfactual labels of uplift modeling campaigns. We then leverage the surrogate ground truth to conduct a more comprehensive binary fairness evaluation. We show how to apply the approach in a comprehensive study from a real-world marketing campaign for promotional offers and demonstrate its enhancement for fairness evaluation.

We introduce a novel framework for analyzing sorting algorithms in pairwise ranking prompting (PRP), re-centering the cost model around LLM inferences rather than traditional pairwise comparisons. While classical metrics based on comparison counts have traditionally been used to gauge efficiency, our analysis reveals that expensive LLM inferences overturn these predictions; accordingly, our framework encourages strategies such as batching and caching to mitigate inference costs. We show that algorithms optimal in the classical setting can lose efficiency when LLM inferences dominate the cost under certain optimizations.

Prediction models can exhibit sensitivity with respect to training data: small changes in the training data can produce models that assign conflicting predictions to individual data points during test time. In this work, we study this sensitivity in recommender systems, where users' recommendations are drastically altered by minor perturbations in other unrelated users' interactions. We introduce a measure of stability for recommender systems, called Rank List Sensitivity (RLS), which measures how rank lists generated by a given recommender system at test time change as a result of a perturbation in the training data. We develop a method, CASPER, which uses cascading effect to identify the minimal and systematical perturbation to induce higher instability in a recommender system. Experiments on four datasets show that recommender models are overly sensitive to minor perturbations introduced randomly or via CASPER - even perturbing one random interaction of one user drastically changes the recommendation lists of all users. Importantly, with CASPER perturbation, the models generate more unstable recommendations for low-accuracy users (i.e., those who receive low-quality recommendations) than high-accuracy ones.

Large reasoning models achieve remarkable performance through extensive chain-of-thought generation, yet exhibit significant computational inefficiency by applying uniform reasoning strategies regardless of problem complexity. We present Hierarchical Budget Policy Optimization (HBPO), a reinforcement learning framework that enables models to learn problem-specific reasoning depths without sacrificing capability. HBPO addresses the fundamental challenge of exploration space collapse in efficiency-oriented training, where penalties on long output length systematically bias models away from necessary long reasoning paths. Through hierarchical budget exploration, our approach partitions rollout samples into multiple subgroups with distinct token budgets, aiming to enable efficient resource allocation while preventing degradation of capability. We introduce differentiated reward mechanisms that create budget-aware incentives aligned with the complexity of the problem, allowing models to discover natural correspondences between task requirements and computational effort. Extensive experiments demonstrate that HBPO reduces average token usage by up to 60.6% while improving accuracy by 3.14% across four reasoning benchmarks. Unlike existing methods that impose external constraints or rely on discrete mode selection, HBPO exhibits emergent adaptive behavior where models automatically adjust reasoning depth based on problem complexity. Our results suggest that reasoning efficiency and capability are not inherently conflicting, and can be simultaneously optimized through appropriately structured hierarchical training that preserves exploration diversity.

We present the LLM Economist, a novel framework that uses agent-based modeling to design and assess economic policies in strategic environments with hierarchical decision-making. At the lower level, bounded rational worker agents -- instantiated as persona-conditioned prompts sampled from U.S. Census-calibrated income and demographic statistics -- choose labor supply to maximize text-based utility functions learned in-context. At the upper level, a planner agent employs in-context reinforcement learning to propose piecewise-linear marginal tax schedules anchored to the current U.S. federal brackets. This construction endows economic simulacra with three capabilities requisite for credible fiscal experimentation: (i) optimization of heterogeneous utilities, (ii) principled generation of large, demographically realistic agent populations, and (iii) mechanism design -- the ultimate nudging problem -- expressed entirely in natural language. Experiments with populations of up to one hundred interacting agents show that the planner converges near Stackelberg equilibria that improve aggregate social welfare relative to Saez solutions, while a periodic, persona-level voting procedure furthers these gains under decentralized governance. These results demonstrate that large language model-based agents can jointly model, simulate, and govern complex economic systems, providing a tractable test bed for policy evaluation at the societal scale to help build better civilizations.

We present a new type of game, the Liquidity Game. We draw inspiration from the UK government bond market and apply game theoretic approaches to its analysis. In Liquidity Games, market participants (agents) use non-cooperative games where the players' utility is directly defined by the liquidity of the game itself, offering a paradigm shift in our understanding of market dynamics. Each player's utility is intricately linked to the liquidity generated within the game, making the utility endogenous and dynamic. Players are not just passive recipients of utility based on external factors but active participants whose strategies and actions collectively shape and are shaped by the liquidity of the market. This reflexivity introduces a level of complexity and realism previously unattainable in conventional models. We apply Liquidity Game theoretic approaches to a simple UK bond market interaction and present results for market design and strategic behavior of participants. We tackle one of the largest issues within this mechanism, namely what strategy should market makers utilize when uncertain about the type of market maker they are interacting with, and what structure might regulators wish to see.

Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF) has achieved great success in aligning large language models (LLMs) with human preferences. Prevalent RLHF approaches are reward-based, following the Bradley-Terry (BT) model assumption, which may not fully capture the complexity of human preferences. In this paper, we explore RLHF under a general preference framework and approach it from a game-theoretic perspective. Specifically, we formulate the problem as a two-player game and propose a novel algorithm, iterative Nash policy optimization (INPO). The key idea is to let the policy play against itself via no-regret learning, thereby approximating the Nash policy. Unlike previous methods, INPO bypasses the need for estimating the expected win rate for individual responses, which typically incurs high computational or annotation costs. Instead, we introduce a new loss objective that is directly minimized over a preference dataset. We provide theoretical analysis for our approach and demonstrate its effectiveness through experiments on various representative benchmarks. With an LLaMA-3-8B-based SFT model, INPO achieves a 41.5% length-controlled win rate on AlpacaEval 2.0 and a 38.3% win rate on Arena-Hard, showing substantial improvement over the state-of-the-art iterative algorithm [Dong et al., 2024] under the BT model assumption. Additionally, our ablation study highlights the benefits of incorporating KL regularization for response length control.

Effective macroeconomic policies play a crucial role in promoting economic growth and social stability. This paper models the optimal macroeconomic policy problem based on the Stackelberg Mean Field Game (SMFG), where the government acts as the leader in policy-making, and large-scale households dynamically respond as followers. This modeling method captures the asymmetric dynamic game between the government and large-scale households, and interpretably evaluates the effects of macroeconomic policies based on microfoundations, which is difficult for existing methods to achieve. We also propose a solution for SMFGs, incorporating pre-training on real data and a model-free Stackelberg mean-field reinforcement learning (SMFRL) algorithm, which operates independently of prior environmental knowledge and transitions. Our experimental results showcase the superiority of the SMFG method over other economic policies in terms of performance, efficiency-equity tradeoff, and SMFG assumption analysis. This paper significantly contributes to the domain of AI for economics by providing a powerful tool for modeling and solving optimal macroeconomic policies.

Projection maintenance is one of the core data structure tasks. Efficient data structures for projection maintenance have led to recent breakthroughs in many convex programming algorithms. In this work, we further extend this framework to the Kronecker product structure. Given a constraint matrix {sf A} and a positive semi-definite matrix Win R^{ntimes n} with a sparse eigenbasis, we consider the task of maintaining the projection in the form of {sf B}^top({sf B}{sf B}^top)^{-1}{sf B}, where {sf B}={sf A}(Wotimes I) or {sf B}={sf A}(W^{1/2}otimes W^{1/2}). At each iteration, the weight matrix W receives a low rank change and we receive a new vector h. The goal is to maintain the projection matrix and answer the query {sf B}^top({sf B}{sf B}^top)^{-1}{sf B}h with good approximation guarantees. We design a fast dynamic data structure for this task and it is robust against an adaptive adversary. Following the beautiful and pioneering work of [Beimel, Kaplan, Mansour, Nissim, Saranurak and Stemmer, STOC'22], we use tools from differential privacy to reduce the randomness required by the data structure and further improve the running time.

We introduce Agent K v1.0, an end-to-end autonomous data science agent designed to automate, optimise, and generalise across diverse data science tasks. Fully automated, Agent K v1.0 manages the entire data science life cycle by learning from experience. It leverages a highly flexible structured reasoning framework to enable it to dynamically process memory in a nested structure, effectively learning from accumulated experience stored to handle complex reasoning tasks. It optimises long- and short-term memory by selectively storing and retrieving key information, guiding future decisions based on environmental rewards. This iterative approach allows it to refine decisions without fine-tuning or backpropagation, achieving continuous improvement through experiential learning. We evaluate our agent's apabilities using Kaggle competitions as a case study. Following a fully automated protocol, Agent K v1.0 systematically addresses complex and multimodal data science tasks, employing Bayesian optimisation for hyperparameter tuning and feature engineering. Our new evaluation framework rigorously assesses Agent K v1.0's end-to-end capabilities to generate and send submissions starting from a Kaggle competition URL. Results demonstrate that Agent K v1.0 achieves a 92.5\% success rate across tasks, spanning tabular, computer vision, NLP, and multimodal domains. When benchmarking against 5,856 human Kaggle competitors by calculating Elo-MMR scores for each, Agent K v1.0 ranks in the top 38\%, demonstrating an overall skill level comparable to Expert-level users. Notably, its Elo-MMR score falls between the first and third quartiles of scores achieved by human Grandmasters. Furthermore, our results indicate that Agent K v1.0 has reached a performance level equivalent to Kaggle Grandmaster, with a record of 6 gold, 3 silver, and 7 bronze medals, as defined by Kaggle's progression system.

How should one judge whether a given large language model (LLM) can reliably perform economic reasoning? Most existing LLM benchmarks focus on specific applications and fail to present the model with a rich variety of economic tasks. A notable exception is Raman et al. [2024], who offer an approach for comprehensively benchmarking strategic decision-making; however, this approach fails to address the non-strategic settings prevalent in microeconomics, such as supply-and-demand analysis. We address this gap by taxonomizing microeconomic reasoning into 58 distinct elements, focusing on the logic of supply and demand, each grounded in up to 10 distinct domains, 5 perspectives, and 3 types. The generation of benchmark data across this combinatorial space is powered by a novel LLM-assisted data generation protocol that we dub auto-STEER, which generates a set of questions by adapting handwritten templates to target new domains and perspectives. Because it offers an automated way of generating fresh questions, auto-STEER mitigates the risk that LLMs will be trained to over-fit evaluation benchmarks; we thus hope that it will serve as a useful tool both for evaluating and fine-tuning models for years to come. We demonstrate the usefulness of our benchmark via a case study on 27 LLMs, ranging from small open-source models to the current state of the art. We examined each model's ability to solve microeconomic problems across our whole taxonomy and present the results across a range of prompting strategies and scoring metrics.

Motivated by equilibrium models of labor markets, we develop a formulation of causal strategic classification in which strategic agents can directly manipulate their outcomes. As an application, we compare employers that anticipate the strategic response of a labor force with employers that do not. We show through a combination of theory and experiment that employers with performatively optimal hiring policies improve employer reward, labor force skill level, and in some cases labor force equity. On the other hand, we demonstrate that performative employers harm labor force utility and fail to prevent discrimination in other cases.

The Combined Algorithm Selection and Hyperparameter optimization (CASH) is one of the most fundamental problems in Automatic Machine Learning (AutoML). The existing Bayesian optimization (BO) based solutions turn the CASH problem into a Hyperparameter Optimization (HPO) problem by combining the hyperparameters of all machine learning (ML) algorithms, and use BO methods to solve it. As a result, these methods suffer from the low-efficiency problem due to the huge hyperparameter space in CASH. To alleviate this issue, we propose the alternating optimization framework, where the HPO problem for each ML algorithm and the algorithm selection problem are optimized alternately. In this framework, the BO methods are used to solve the HPO problem for each ML algorithm separately, incorporating a much smaller hyperparameter space for BO methods. Furthermore, we introduce Rising Bandits, a CASH-oriented Multi-Armed Bandits (MAB) variant, to model the algorithm selection in CASH. This framework can take the advantages of both BO in solving the HPO problem with a relatively small hyperparameter space and the MABs in accelerating the algorithm selection. Moreover, we further develop an efficient online algorithm to solve the Rising Bandits with provably theoretical guarantees. The extensive experiments on 30 OpenML datasets demonstrate the superiority of the proposed approach over the competitive baselines.

Assessing and comparing player skill in online multiplayer gaming environments is essential for fair matchmaking and player engagement. Traditional ranking models like Elo and Glicko-2, designed for two-player games, are insufficient for the complexity of multi-player, asymmetric team-based matches. To address this gap, the OpenSkill library offers a suite of sophisticated, fast, and adaptable models tailored for such dynamics. Drawing from Bayesian inference methods, OpenSkill provides a more accurate representation of individual player contributions and speeds up the computation of ranks. This paper introduces the OpenSkill library, featuring a Python implementation of the Plackett-Luce model among others, highlighting its performance advantages and predictive accuracy against proprietary systems like TrueSkill. OpenSkill is a valuable tool for game developers and researchers, ensuring a responsive and fair gaming experience by efficiently adjusting player rankings based on game outcomes. The library's support for time decay and diligent documentation further aid in its practical application, making it a robust solution for the nuanced world of multiplayer ranking systems. This paper also acknowledges areas for future enhancement, such as partial play and contribution weighting, emphasizing the library's ongoing development to meet the evolving needs of online gaming communities.

We study the conformal bootstrap of 1D CFTs on the straight Maldacena-Wilson line in 4D {cal N}=4 super-Yang-Mills theory. We introduce an improved truncation scheme with an 'OPE tail' approximation and use it to reproduce the 'bootstrability' results of Cavagli\`a et al. for the OPE-coefficients squared of the first three unprotected operators. For example, for the first OPE-coefficient squared at 't Hooft coupling (4pi)^2, linear-functional methods with two sum rules from integrated correlators give the rigorous result 0.294014873 pm 4.88 cdot 10^{-8}, whereas our methods give with machine-precision computations 0.294014228 pm 6.77 cdot 10^{-7}. For our numerical searches, we benchmark the Reinforcement Learning Soft Actor-Critic algorithm against an Interior Point Method algorithm (IPOPT) and comment on the merits of each algorithm.

Standard practice within Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) involves optimizing against a Reward Model (RM), which itself is trained to reflect human preferences for desirable generations. A notable subject that is understudied is the (in-)consistency of RMs -- whether they can recognize the semantic changes to different prompts and appropriately adapt their reward assignments -- and their impact on the downstream RLHF model. In this paper, we visit a series of research questions relevant to RM inconsistency: (1) How can we measure the consistency of reward models? (2) How consistent are the existing RMs and how can we improve them? (3) In what ways does reward inconsistency influence the chatbots resulting from the RLHF model training? We propose Contrast Instructions -- a benchmarking strategy for the consistency of RM. Each example in Contrast Instructions features a pair of lexically similar instructions with different ground truth responses. A consistent RM is expected to rank the corresponding instruction and response higher than other combinations. We observe that current RMs trained with the standard ranking objective fail miserably on Contrast Instructions compared to average humans. To show that RM consistency can be improved efficiently without using extra training budget, we propose two techniques ConvexDA and RewardFusion, which enhance reward consistency through extrapolation during the RM training and inference stage, respectively. We show that RLHF models trained with a more consistent RM yield more useful responses, suggesting that reward inconsistency exhibits a trickle-down effect on the downstream RLHF process.

University rankings are increasingly adopted for academic comparison and success quantification, even to establish performance-based criteria for funding assignment. However, rankings are not neutral tools, and their use frequently overlooks disparities in the starting conditions of institutions. In this research, we detect and measure structural biases that affect in inhomogeneous ways the ranking outcomes of universities from diversified territorial and educational contexts. Moreover, we develop a fairer rating system based on a fully data-driven debiasing strategy that returns an equity-oriented redefinition of the achieved scores. The key idea consists in partitioning universities in similarity groups, determined from multifaceted data using complex network analysis, and referring the performance of each institution to an expectation based on its peers. Significant evidence of territorial biases emerges for official rankings concerning both the OECD and Italian university systems, hence debiasing provides relevant insights suggesting the design of fairer strategies for performance-based funding allocations.

In pursuit of participatory budgeting (PB) outcomes with broader fairness guarantees, we initiate the study of lotteries over discrete PB outcomes. As the projects have heterogeneous costs, the amount spent may not be equal ex ante and ex post. To address this, we develop a technique to bound the amount by which the ex-post spend differs from the ex-ante spend -- the property is termed budget balanced up to one project (BB1). With respect to fairness, we take a best-of-both-worlds perspective, seeking outcomes that are both ex-ante and ex-post fair. Towards this goal, we initiate a study of ex-ante fairness properties in PB, including Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS) and their stronger variants, as well as Group Fair Share (GFS). We show several incompatibility results between these ex-ante fairness notions and existing ex-post concepts based on justified representation. One of our main contributions is a randomized algorithm which simultaneously satisfies ex-ante Strong UFS, ex-post full justified representation (FJR) and ex-post BB1 for PB with binary utilities.

In the context of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), the reward function is generally derived from maximum likelihood estimation of a random utility model based on pairwise comparisons made by humans. The problem of learning a reward function is one of preference aggregation that, we argue, largely falls within the scope of social choice theory. From this perspective, we can evaluate different aggregation methods via established axioms, examining whether these methods meet or fail well-known standards. We demonstrate that both the Bradley-Terry-Luce Model and its broad generalizations fail to meet basic axioms. In response, we develop novel rules for learning reward functions with strong axiomatic guarantees. A key innovation from the standpoint of social choice is that our problem has a linear structure, which greatly restricts the space of feasible rules and leads to a new paradigm that we call linear social choice.

Selective state space models (SSM), such as Mamba, have gained prominence for their effectiveness in modeling sequential data. Despite their outstanding empirical performance, a comprehensive theoretical understanding of deep selective SSM remains elusive, hindering their further development and adoption for applications that need high fidelity. In this paper, we investigate the dynamical properties of tokens in a pre-trained Mamba model. In particular, we derive the dynamical system governing the continuous-time limit of the Mamba model and characterize the asymptotic behavior of its solutions. In the one-dimensional case, we prove that only one of the following two scenarios happens: either all tokens converge to zero, or all tokens diverge to infinity. We provide criteria based on model parameters to determine when each scenario occurs. For the convergent scenario, we empirically verify that this scenario negatively impacts the model's performance. For the divergent scenario, we prove that different tokens will diverge to infinity at different rates, thereby contributing unequally to the updates during model training. Based on these investigations, we propose two refinements for the model: excluding the convergent scenario and reordering tokens based on their importance scores, both aimed at improving practical performance. Our experimental results validate these refinements, offering insights into enhancing Mamba's effectiveness in real-world applications.

We propose a novel approach for analysis of the composition of an equity mutual fund based on the time series decomposition of the price movements of the individual stocks of the fund. The proposed scheme can be applied to check whether the style proclaimed for a mutual fund actually matches with the fund composition. We have applied our proposed framework on eight well known mutual funds of varying styles in the Indian financial market to check the consistency between their fund style and actual fund composition, and have obtained extensive results from our experiments. A detailed analysis of the results has shown that while in majority of the cases the actual allocations of funds are consistent with the corresponding fund styles, there have been some notable deviations too.

In practical scenarios, the effectiveness of sequential recommendation systems is hindered by the user cold-start problem, which arises due to limited interactions for accurately determining user preferences. Previous studies have attempted to address this issue by combining meta-learning with user and item-side information. However, these approaches face inherent challenges in modeling user preference dynamics, particularly for "minor users" who exhibit distinct preferences compared to more common or "major users." To overcome these limitations, we present a novel approach called ClusterSeq, a Meta-Learning Clustering-Based Sequential Recommender System. ClusterSeq leverages dynamic information in the user sequence to enhance item prediction accuracy, even in the absence of side information. This model preserves the preferences of minor users without being overshadowed by major users, and it capitalizes on the collective knowledge of users within the same cluster. Extensive experiments conducted on various benchmark datasets validate the effectiveness of ClusterSeq. Empirical results consistently demonstrate that ClusterSeq outperforms several state-of-the-art meta-learning recommenders. Notably, compared to existing meta-learning methods, our proposed approach achieves a substantial improvement of 16-39% in Mean Reciprocal Rank (MRR).

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) aligns large language models (LLMs) by encouraging their generations to have high rewards, using a reward model trained on human preferences. To prevent the forgetting of pre-trained knowledge, RLHF usually incorporates a KL regularization; this forces the policy to remain close to its supervised fine-tuned initialization, though it hinders the reward optimization. To tackle the trade-off between KL and reward, in this paper we introduce a novel alignment strategy named Weight Averaged Rewarded Policies (WARP). WARP merges policies in the weight space at three distinct stages. First, it uses the exponential moving average of the policy as a dynamic anchor in the KL regularization. Second, it applies spherical interpolation to merge independently fine-tuned policies into a new enhanced one. Third, it linearly interpolates between this merged model and the initialization, to recover features from pre-training. This procedure is then applied iteratively, with each iteration's final model used as an advanced initialization for the next, progressively refining the KL-reward Pareto front, achieving superior rewards at fixed KL. Experiments with GEMMA policies validate that WARP improves their quality and alignment, outperforming other open-source LLMs.

In this paper, we develop an approximation scheme for solving bilevel programs with equilibrium constraints, which are generally difficult to solve. Among other things, calculating the first-order derivative in such a problem requires differentiation across the hierarchy, which is computationally intensive, if not prohibitive. To bypass the hierarchy, we propose to bound such bilevel programs, equivalent to multiple-followers Stackelberg games, with two new hierarchy-free problems: a T-step Cournot game and a T-step monopoly model. Since they are standard equilibrium or optimization problems, both can be efficiently solved via first-order methods. Importantly, we show that the bounds provided by these problems -- the upper bound by the T-step Cournot game and the lower bound by the T-step monopoly model -- can be made arbitrarily tight by increasing the step parameter T for a wide range of problems. We prove that a small T usually suffices under appropriate conditions to reach an approximation acceptable for most practical purposes. Eventually, the analytical insights are highlighted through numerical examples.

In many machine learning for healthcare tasks, standard datasets are constructed by amassing data across many, often fundamentally dissimilar, sources. But when does adding more data help, and when does it hinder progress on desired model outcomes in real-world settings? We identify this situation as the Data Addition Dilemma, demonstrating that adding training data in this multi-source scaling context can at times result in reduced overall accuracy, uncertain fairness outcomes, and reduced worst-subgroup performance. We find that this possibly arises from an empirically observed trade-off between model performance improvements due to data scaling and model deterioration from distribution shift. We thus establish baseline strategies for navigating this dilemma, introducing distribution shift heuristics to guide decision-making on which data sources to add in data scaling, in order to yield the expected model performance improvements. We conclude with a discussion of the required considerations for data collection and suggestions for studying data composition and scale in the age of increasingly larger models.

Most value function learning algorithms in reinforcement learning are based on the mean squared (projected) Bellman error. However, squared errors are known to be sensitive to outliers, both skewing the solution of the objective and resulting in high-magnitude and high-variance gradients. To control these high-magnitude updates, typical strategies in RL involve clipping gradients, clipping rewards, rescaling rewards, or clipping errors. While these strategies appear to be related to robust losses -- like the Huber loss -- they are built on semi-gradient update rules which do not minimize a known loss. In this work, we build on recent insights reformulating squared Bellman errors as a saddlepoint optimization problem and propose a saddlepoint reformulation for a Huber Bellman error and Absolute Bellman error. We start from a formalization of robust losses, then derive sound gradient-based approaches to minimize these losses in both the online off-policy prediction and control settings. We characterize the solutions of the robust losses, providing insight into the problem settings where the robust losses define notably better solutions than the mean squared Bellman error. Finally, we show that the resulting gradient-based algorithms are more stable, for both prediction and control, with less sensitivity to meta-parameters.

Ongoing and upcoming galaxy redshift surveys, such as the Dark Energy Spectroscopic Instrument (DESI) survey, will observe vast regions of sky and a wide range of redshifts. In order to model the observations and address various systematic uncertainties, N-body simulations are routinely adopted, however, the number of large simulations with sufficiently high mass resolution is usually limited by available computing time. Therefore, achieving a simulation volume with the effective statistical errors significantly smaller than those of the observations becomes prohibitively expensive. In this study, we apply the Convergence Acceleration by Regression and Pooling (CARPool) method to mitigate the sample variance of the DESI-like galaxy clustering in the AbacusSummit simulations, with the assistance of the quasi-N-body simulations FastPM. Based on the halo occupation distribution (HOD) models, we construct different FastPM galaxy catalogs, including the luminous red galaxies (LRGs), emission line galaxies (ELGs), and quasars, with their number densities and two-point clustering statistics well matched to those of AbacusSummit. We also employ the same initial conditions between AbacusSummit and FastPM to achieve high cross-correlation, as it is useful in effectively suppressing the variance. Our method of reducing noise in clustering is equivalent to performing a simulation with volume larger by a factor of 5 and 4 for LRGs and ELGs, respectively. We also mitigate the standard deviation of the LRG bispectrum with the triangular configurations k_2=2k_1=0.2 h/Mpc by a factor of 1.6. With smaller sample variance on galaxy clustering, we are able to constrain the baryon acoustic oscillations (BAO) scale parameters to higher precision. The CARPool method will be beneficial to better constrain the theoretical systematics of BAO, redshift space distortions (RSD) and primordial non-Gaussianity (NG).

As the issue of robustness in AI systems becomes vital, statistical learning techniques that are reliable even in presence of partly contaminated data have to be developed. Preference data, in the form of (complete) rankings in the simplest situations, are no exception and the demand for appropriate concepts and tools is all the more pressing given that technologies fed by or producing this type of data (e.g. search engines, recommending systems) are now massively deployed. However, the lack of vector space structure for the set of rankings (i.e. the symmetric group S_n) and the complex nature of statistics considered in ranking data analysis make the formulation of robustness objectives in this domain challenging. In this paper, we introduce notions of robustness, together with dedicated statistical methods, for Consensus Ranking the flagship problem in ranking data analysis, aiming at summarizing a probability distribution on S_n by a median ranking. Precisely, we propose specific extensions of the popular concept of breakdown point, tailored to consensus ranking, and address the related computational issues. Beyond the theoretical contributions, the relevance of the approach proposed is supported by an experimental study.

Iterative data generation and model retraining are widely used to align large language models (LLMs). It typically involves a policy model to generate on-policy responses and a reward model to guide training data selection. Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) further enhances this process by constructing preference pairs of chosen and rejected responses. In this work, we aim to scale up the number of on-policy samples via repeated random sampling to improve alignment performance. Conventional practice selects the sample with the highest reward as chosen and the lowest as rejected for DPO. However, our experiments reveal that this strategy leads to a decline in performance as the sample size increases. To address this, we investigate preference data construction through the lens of underlying normal distribution of sample rewards. We categorize the reward space into seven representative points and systematically explore all 21 (C_7^2) pairwise combinations. Through evaluations on four models using AlpacaEval 2, we find that selecting the rejected response at reward position mu - 2sigma rather than the minimum reward, is crucial for optimal performance. We finally introduce a scalable preference data construction strategy that consistently enhances model performance as the sample scale increases.

This chapter presents a comparative study of the three portfolio optimization methods, MVP, HRP, and HERC, on the Indian stock market, particularly focusing on the stocks chosen from 15 sectors listed on the National Stock Exchange of India. The top stocks of each cluster are identified based on their free-float market capitalization from the report of the NSE published on July 1, 2022 (NSE Website). For each sector, three portfolios are designed on stock prices from July 1, 2019, to June 30, 2022, following three portfolio optimization approaches. The portfolios are tested over the period from July 1, 2022, to June 30, 2023. For the evaluation of the performances of the portfolios, three metrics are used. These three metrics are cumulative returns, annual volatilities, and Sharpe ratios. For each sector, the portfolios that yield the highest cumulative return, the lowest volatility, and the maximum Sharpe Ratio over the training and the test periods are identified.

We study the problem of convergence to a stationary point in zero-sum games. We propose competitive gradient optimization (CGO ), a gradient-based method that incorporates the interactions between the two players in zero-sum games for optimization updates. We provide continuous-time analysis of CGO and its convergence properties while showing that in the continuous limit, CGO predecessors degenerate to their gradient descent ascent (GDA) variants. We provide a rate of convergence to stationary points and further propose a generalized class of alpha-coherent function for which we provide convergence analysis. We show that for strictly alpha-coherent functions, our algorithm convergences to a saddle point. Moreover, we propose optimistic CGO (OCGO), an optimistic variant, for which we show convergence rate to saddle points in alpha-coherent class of functions.