Daily Papers

Regardless of the particular task we want them to perform in an environment, there are often shared safety constraints we want our agents to respect. For example, regardless of whether it is making a sandwich or clearing the table, a kitchen robot should not break a plate. Manually specifying such a constraint can be both time-consuming and error-prone. We show how to learn constraints from expert demonstrations of safe task completion by extending inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) techniques to the space of constraints. Intuitively, we learn constraints that forbid highly rewarding behavior that the expert could have taken but chose not to. Unfortunately, the constraint learning problem is rather ill-posed and typically leads to overly conservative constraints that forbid all behavior that the expert did not take. We counter this by leveraging diverse demonstrations that naturally occur in multi-task settings to learn a tighter set of constraints. We validate our method with simulation experiments on high-dimensional continuous control tasks.

Existing approaches to language model alignment often treat safety as a tradeoff against helpfulness, which can lead to unacceptable responses in sensitive domains. To ensure reliable performance in such settings, we propose High-Confidence Safe Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (HC-RLHF), a method that provides high-confidence safety guarantees while maximizing helpfulness. Similar to previous methods, HC-RLHF explicitly decouples human preferences into helpfulness and harmlessness (safety), which are learned by training a reward model and a cost model, respectively. It then employs a two-step process to find safe solutions. In the first step, it optimizes the reward function under an intentionally pessimistic version of the cost constraint. In the second step, the trained model undergoes a safety test to verify whether its performance stays within an upper-confidence bound of the actual cost constraint. We provide a theoretical analysis of HC-RLHF, including proof that it will not return an unsafe solution with a probability greater than a user-specified threshold. For our empirical analysis, we apply HC-RLHF to align three different language models (Qwen2-1.5B, Qwen2.5-3B, and LLaMa3.2-3B) with human preferences. Our results demonstrate that HC-RLHF produces safe models with high probability and can improve harmlessness and helpfulness compared to previous methods.

Robots must operate safely when deployed in novel and human-centered environments, like homes. Current safe control approaches typically assume that the safety constraints are known a priori, and thus, the robot can pre-compute a corresponding safety controller. While this may make sense for some safety constraints (e.g., avoiding collision with walls by analyzing a floor plan), other constraints are more complex (e.g., spills), inherently personal, context-dependent, and can only be identified at deployment time when the robot is interacting in a specific environment and with a specific person (e.g., fragile objects, expensive rugs). Here, language provides a flexible mechanism to communicate these evolving safety constraints to the robot. In this work, we use vision language models (VLMs) to interpret language feedback and the robot's image observations to continuously update the robot's representation of safety constraints. With these inferred constraints, we update a Hamilton-Jacobi reachability safety controller online via efficient warm-starting techniques. Through simulation and hardware experiments, we demonstrate the robot's ability to infer and respect language-based safety constraints with the proposed approach.

The growing safety concerns surrounding large language models raise an urgent need to align them with diverse human preferences to simultaneously enhance their helpfulness and safety. A promising approach is to enforce safety constraints through Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF). For such constrained RLHF, typical Lagrangian-based primal-dual policy optimization methods are computationally expensive and often unstable. This paper presents a perspective of dualization that reduces constrained alignment to an equivalent unconstrained alignment problem. We do so by pre-optimizing a smooth and convex dual function that has a closed form. This shortcut eliminates the need for cumbersome primal-dual policy iterations, greatly reducing the computational burden and improving training stability. Our strategy leads to two practical algorithms in model-based and preference-based settings (MoCAN and PeCAN, respectively). A broad range of experiments demonstrate the effectiveness and merits of our algorithms.

Vision-language-action models (VLAs) have shown great potential as generalist robot policies. However, these models pose urgent safety challenges during deployment, including the risk of physical harm to the environment, the robot itself, and humans. How can safety be explicitly incorporated into VLAs? In this work, we propose SafeVLA, a novel algorithm designed to integrate safety into VLAs, ensuring the protection of the environment, robot hardware and humans in real-world settings. SafeVLA effectively balances safety and task performance by employing large-scale constrained learning within simulated environments. We demonstrate that SafeVLA outperforms the current state-of-the-art method in both safety and task performance, achieving average improvements of 83.58% and 3.85%, respectively, in simulation. By prioritizing safety, our approach eliminates high-risk behaviors and reduces the upper bound of unsafe behaviors to 1/35 of that in the current state-of-the-art, thereby significantly mitigating long-tail risks. Furthermore, the learned safety constraints generalize to diverse, unseen scenarios, including multiple out-of-distribution perturbations and tasks. Our data, models and newly proposed benchmark environment are available at https://sites.google.com/view/pku-safevla.

Aligning large language models (LLMs) with human values is an increasingly critical step in post-training. Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) has emerged as a simple, yet effective alternative to reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). Synthetic preference data with its low cost and high quality enable effective alignment through single- or multi-model generated preference data. Our study reveals a striking, safety-specific phenomenon associated with DPO alignment: Although multi-model generated data enhances performance on general tasks (ARC, Hellaswag, MMLU, TruthfulQA, Winogrande) by providing diverse responses, it also tends to facilitate reward hacking during training. This can lead to a high attack success rate (ASR) when models encounter jailbreaking prompts. The issue is particularly pronounced when employing stronger models like GPT-4o or larger models in the same family to generate chosen responses paired with target model self-generated rejected responses, resulting in dramatically poorer safety outcomes. Furthermore, with respect to safety, using solely self-generated responses (single-model generation) for both chosen and rejected pairs significantly outperforms configurations that incorporate responses from stronger models, whether used directly as chosen data or as part of a multi-model response pool. We demonstrate that multi-model preference data exhibits high linear separability between chosen and rejected responses, which allows models to exploit superficial cues rather than internalizing robust safety constraints. Our experiments, conducted on models from the Llama, Mistral, and Qwen families, consistently validate these findings.

Ensuring safety is of paramount importance in physical human-robot interaction applications. This requires both adherence to safety constraints defined on the system state, as well as guaranteeing compliant behavior of the robot. If the underlying dynamical system is known exactly, the former can be addressed with the help of control barrier functions. The incorporation of elastic actuators in the robot's mechanical design can address the latter requirement. However, this elasticity can increase the complexity of the resulting system, leading to unmodeled dynamics, such that control barrier functions cannot directly ensure safety. In this paper, we mitigate this issue by learning the unknown dynamics using Gaussian process regression. By employing the model in a feedback linearizing control law, the safety conditions resulting from control barrier functions can be robustified to take into account model errors, while remaining feasible. In order to enforce them on-line, we formulate the derived safety conditions in the form of a second-order cone program. We demonstrate our proposed approach with simulations on a two-degree-of-freedom planar robot with elastic joints.

Aligning large language models (LLMs) with human values and safety constraints is challenging, especially when objectives like helpfulness, truthfulness, and avoidance of harm conflict. Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) has achieved notable success in steering models, but is complex and can be unstable. Recent approaches such as Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) simplify preference-based fine-tuning but may introduce bias or trade-off certain objectives~dpo. In this work, we propose a Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) framework with a multi-label reward regression model to achieve safe and aligned language generation. The GRPO algorithm optimizes a policy by comparing groups of sampled responses, eliminating the need for a separate value critic and improving training efficiency~grpo. We train a reward model to predict multiple alignment scores (e.g., safety, helpfulness, etc.), which are combined into a single reward signal. We provide a theoretical derivation for using this learned multi-aspect reward within GRPO and discuss its advantages and limitations. Empirically, our approach improves all the safety and quality metrics evaluated in language generation tasks on model scales (0.5B, 7B, and 14B parameters), demonstrating a robust balance of objectives. We compare GRPO to PPO-based RLHF and DPO, highlighting that GRPO achieves alignment with significantly lower computational cost and explicit multi-objective handling. \textbf{We will open-source all trained models at https://huggingface.co/hydroxai.

Reinforcement learning (RL) agents need to explore their environments in order to learn optimal policies. In many environments and tasks, safety is of critical importance. The widespread use of simulators offers a number of advantages, including safe exploration which will be inevitable in cases when RL systems need to be trained directly in the physical environment (e.g. in human-robot interaction). The popular Safety Gym library offers three mobile agent types that can learn goal-directed tasks while considering various safety constraints. In this paper, we extend the applicability of safe RL algorithms by creating a customized environment with Panda robotic arm where Safety Gym algorithms can be tested. We performed pilot experiments with the popular PPO algorithm comparing the baseline with the constrained version and show that the constrained version is able to learn the equally good policy while better complying with safety constraints and taking longer training time as expected.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable generative capabilities. However, their susceptibility to misuse has raised significant safety concerns. While post-training safety alignment methods have been widely adopted, LLMs remain vulnerable to malicious instructions that can bypass safety constraints. Recent efforts have introduced inference-time safety reasoning (system-2 alignment), where LLMs conduct a reasoning process to perform safety verification before final response. We show, however, that these checks are driven by ad-hoc reasoning that diverges from the structured human process, where they first discern a user's true intent, then evaluate the associated risk based on the true intent. Consequently, these defenses remain vulnerable to sophisticated jailbreak prompts that cloak harmful goals in seemingly benign language. To build secure and safe LLMs, we propose a reasoning-based safety alignment framework, ARMOR, that replaces the ad-hoc chains of thought reasoning process with human-aligned, structured one. At inference, ARMOR (1) detects likely jailbreak strategies, (2) extracts the user's core intent while discarding deceptive instructions, and (3) applies a policy-grounded safety analysis to the purified request. ARMOR is evaluated on adaptive jailbreak attacks and multiple safety benchmarks, and a test-time scaling is conducted to further improve its performance. Results demonstrate that ARMOR significantly enhances the robustness against state-of-the-art adaptive jailbreak attacks and outperforms recent reasoning-based aligned models across various safety benchmarks.

Even highly capable large language models (LLMs) can produce biased or unsafe responses, and alignment techniques, such as RLHF, aimed at mitigating this issue, are expensive and prone to overfitting as they retrain the LLM. This paper introduces a novel inference-time alignment approach that ensures LLMs generate safe responses almost surely, i.e., with a probability approaching one. We achieve this by framing the safe generation of inference-time responses as a constrained Markov decision process within the LLM's latent space. Crucially, we augment a safety state that tracks the evolution of safety constraints and enables us to demonstrate formal safety guarantees upon solving the MDP in the latent space. Building on this foundation, we propose InferenceGuard, a practical implementation that safely aligns LLMs without modifying the model weights. Empirically, we demonstrate InferenceGuard effectively balances safety and task performance, outperforming existing inference-time alignment methods in generating safe and aligned responses.

Humans interact with the environment using a combination of perception - transforming sensory inputs from their environment into symbols, and cognition - mapping symbols to knowledge about the environment for supporting abstraction, reasoning by analogy, and long-term planning. Human perception-inspired machine perception, in the context of AI, refers to large-scale pattern recognition from raw data using neural networks trained using self-supervised learning objectives such as next-word prediction or object recognition. On the other hand, machine cognition encompasses more complex computations, such as using knowledge of the environment to guide reasoning, analogy, and long-term planning. Humans can also control and explain their cognitive functions. This seems to require the retention of symbolic mappings from perception outputs to knowledge about their environment. For example, humans can follow and explain the guidelines and safety constraints driving their decision-making in safety-critical applications such as healthcare, criminal justice, and autonomous driving. This article introduces the rapidly emerging paradigm of Neurosymbolic AI combines neural networks and knowledge-guided symbolic approaches to create more capable and flexible AI systems. These systems have immense potential to advance both algorithm-level (e.g., abstraction, analogy, reasoning) and application-level (e.g., explainable and safety-constrained decision-making) capabilities of AI systems.

Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) has emerged as a promising solution for learning complex and scalable coordination behaviors in multi-robot systems. However, established MARL platforms (e.g., SMAC and MPE) lack robotics relevance and hardware deployment, leaving multi-robot learning researchers to develop bespoke environments and hardware testbeds dedicated to the development and evaluation of their individual contributions. The Multi-Agent RL Benchmark and Learning Environment for the Robotarium (MARBLER) is an exciting recent step in providing a standardized robotics-relevant platform for MARL, by bridging the Robotarium testbed with existing MARL software infrastructure. However, MARBLER lacks support for parallelization and GPU/TPU execution, making the platform prohibitively slow compared to modern MARL environments and hindering adoption. We contribute JaxRobotarium, a Jax-powered end-to-end simulation, learning, deployment, and benchmarking platform for the Robotarium. JaxRobotarium enables rapid training and deployment of multi-robot RL (MRRL) policies with realistic robot dynamics and safety constraints, supporting parallelization and hardware acceleration. Our generalizable learning interface integrates easily with SOTA MARL libraries (e.g., JaxMARL). In addition, JaxRobotarium includes eight standardized coordination scenarios, including four novel scenarios that bring established MARL benchmark tasks (e.g., RWARE and Level-Based Foraging) to a robotics setting. We demonstrate that JaxRobotarium retains high simulation fidelity while achieving dramatic speedups over baseline (20x in training and 150x in simulation), and provides an open-access sim-to-real evaluation pipeline through the Robotarium testbed, accelerating and democratizing access to multi-robot learning research and evaluation. Our code is available at https://github.com/GT-STAR-Lab/JaxRobotarium.

Safety and trustworthiness are indispensable requirements for real-world applications of AI systems using large language models (LLMs). This paper formulates human value alignment as an optimization problem of the language model policy to maximize reward under a safety constraint, and then proposes an algorithm, Stepwise Alignment for Constrained Policy Optimization (SACPO). One key idea behind SACPO, supported by theory, is that the optimal policy incorporating reward and safety can be directly obtained from a reward-aligned policy. Building on this key idea, SACPO aligns LLMs step-wise with each metric while leveraging simple yet powerful alignment algorithms such as direct preference optimization (DPO). SACPO offers several advantages, including simplicity, stability, computational efficiency, and flexibility of algorithms and datasets. Under mild assumptions, our theoretical analysis provides the upper bounds on optimality and safety constraint violation. Our experimental results show that SACPO can fine-tune Alpaca-7B better than the state-of-the-art method in terms of both helpfulness and harmlessness.

Offline reinforcement learning (RL) aims to learn from historical data without requiring (costly) access to the environment. To facilitate offline RL research, we previously introduced NeoRL, which highlighted that datasets from real-world tasks are often conservative and limited. With years of experience applying offline RL to various domains, we have identified additional real-world challenges. These include extremely conservative data distributions produced by deployed control systems, delayed action effects caused by high-latency transitions, external factors arising from the uncontrollable variance of transitions, and global safety constraints that are difficult to evaluate during the decision-making process. These challenges are underrepresented in previous benchmarks but frequently occur in real-world tasks. To address this, we constructed the extended Near Real-World Offline RL Benchmark (NeoRL-2), which consists of 7 datasets from 7 simulated tasks along with their corresponding evaluation simulators. Benchmarking results from state-of-the-art offline RL approaches demonstrate that current methods often struggle to outperform the data-collection behavior policy, highlighting the need for more effective methods. We hope NeoRL-2 will accelerate the development of reinforcement learning algorithms for real-world applications. The benchmark project page is available at https://github.com/polixir/NeoRL2.

Language models trained on internet-scale data sets have shown an impressive ability to solve problems in Natural Language Processing and Computer Vision. However, experience is showing that these models are frequently brittle in unexpected ways, and require significant scaffolding to ensure that they operate correctly in the larger systems that comprise "language-model agents." In this paper, we argue that behavior trees provide a unifying framework for combining language models with classical AI and traditional programming. We introduce Dendron, a Python library for programming language model agents using behavior trees. We demonstrate the approach embodied by Dendron in three case studies: building a chat agent, a camera-based infrastructure inspection agent for use on a mobile robot or vehicle, and an agent that has been built to satisfy safety constraints that it did not receive through instruction tuning or RLHF.

Large language models (LLMs) are susceptible to a variety of risks, from non-faithful output to biased and toxic generations. Due to several limiting factors surrounding LLMs (training cost, API access, data availability, etc.), it may not always be feasible to impose direct safety constraints on a deployed model. Therefore, an efficient and reliable alternative is required. To this end, we present our ongoing efforts to create and deploy a library of detectors: compact and easy-to-build classification models that provide labels for various harms. In addition to the detectors themselves, we discuss a wide range of uses for these detector models - from acting as guardrails to enabling effective AI governance. We also deep dive into inherent challenges in their development and discuss future work aimed at making the detectors more reliable and broadening their scope.

Alignment is no longer a luxury, it is a necessity. As large language models (LLMs) enter high-stakes domains like education, healthcare, governance, and law, their behavior must reliably reflect human-aligned values and safety constraints. Yet current evaluations rely heavily on behavioral proxies such as refusal rates, G-Eval scores, and toxicity classifiers, all of which have critical blind spots. Aligned models are often vulnerable to jailbreaking, stochasticity of generation, and alignment faking. To address this issue, we introduce the Alignment Quality Index (AQI). This novel geometric and prompt-invariant metric empirically assesses LLM alignment by analyzing the separation of safe and unsafe activations in latent space. By combining measures such as the Davies-Bouldin Score (DBS), Dunn Index (DI), Xie-Beni Index (XBI), and Calinski-Harabasz Index (CHI) across various formulations, AQI captures clustering quality to detect hidden misalignments and jailbreak risks, even when outputs appear compliant. AQI also serves as an early warning signal for alignment faking, offering a robust, decoding invariant tool for behavior agnostic safety auditing. Additionally, we propose the LITMUS dataset to facilitate robust evaluation under these challenging conditions. Empirical tests on LITMUS across different models trained under DPO, GRPO, and RLHF conditions demonstrate AQI's correlation with external judges and ability to reveal vulnerabilities missed by refusal metrics. We make our implementation publicly available to foster future research in this area.

This paper identifies and analyzes a novel vulnerability class in Model Context Protocol (MCP) based agent systems. The attack chain describes and demonstrates how benign, individually authorized tasks can be orchestrated to produce harmful emergent behaviors. Through systematic analysis using the MITRE ATLAS framework, we demonstrate how 95 agents tested with access to multiple services-including browser automation, financial analysis, location tracking, and code deployment-can chain legitimate operations into sophisticated attack sequences that extend beyond the security boundaries of any individual service. These red team exercises survey whether current MCP architectures lack cross-domain security measures necessary to detect or prevent a large category of compositional attacks. We present empirical evidence of specific attack chains that achieve targeted harm through service orchestration, including data exfiltration, financial manipulation, and infrastructure compromise. These findings reveal that the fundamental security assumption of service isolation fails when agents can coordinate actions across multiple domains, creating an exponential attack surface that grows with each additional capability. This research provides a barebones experimental framework that evaluate not whether agents can complete MCP benchmark tasks, but what happens when they complete them too well and optimize across multiple services in ways that violate human expectations and safety constraints. We propose three concrete experimental directions using the existing MCP benchmark suite.

This work presents a novel reinforcement learning (RL) algorithm based on Y-wise Affine Neural Networks (YANNs). YANNs provide an interpretable neural network which can exactly represent known piecewise affine functions of arbitrary input and output dimensions defined on any amount of polytopic subdomains. One representative application of YANNs is to reformulate explicit solutions of multi-parametric linear model predictive control. Built on this, we propose the use of YANNs to initialize RL actor and critic networks, which enables the resulting YANN-RL control algorithm to start with the confidence of linear optimal control. The YANN-actor is initialized by representing the multi-parametric control solutions obtained via offline computation using an approximated linear system model. The YANN-critic represents the explicit form of the state-action value function for the linear system and the reward function as the objective in an optimal control problem (OCP). Additional network layers are injected to extend YANNs for nonlinear expressions, which can be trained online by directly interacting with the true complex nonlinear system. In this way, both the policy and state-value functions exactly represent a linear OCP initially and are able to eventually learn the solution of a general nonlinear OCP. Continuous policy improvement is also implemented to provide heuristic confidence that the linear OCP solution serves as an effective lower bound to the performance of RL policy. The YANN-RL algorithm is demonstrated on a clipped pendulum and a safety-critical chemical-reactive system. Our results show that YANN-RL significantly outperforms the modern RL algorithm using deep deterministic policy gradient, especially when considering safety constraints.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are critical for developing general-purpose AI assistants, yet they face growing safety risks. How can we ensure that MLLMs are safely aligned to prevent undesired behaviors such as discrimination, misinformation, or violations of ethical standards? In a further step, we need to explore how to fine-tune MLLMs to enhance reasoning performance while ensuring they satisfy safety constraints. Fundamentally, this can be formulated as a min-max optimization problem. In this study, we propose Safe RLHF-V, the first multimodal safety alignment framework that jointly optimizes helpfulness and safety using separate multimodal reward and cost models within a Lagrangian-based constrained optimization framework. Given that there is a lack of preference datasets that separate helpfulness and safety in multimodal scenarios, we introduce BeaverTails-V, the first open-source dataset with dual preference annotations for helpfulness and safety, along with multi-level safety labels (minor, moderate, severe). Additionally, we design a Multi-level Guardrail System to proactively defend against unsafe queries and adversarial attacks. By applying the Beaver-Guard-V moderation for 5 rounds of filtering and re-generation on the precursor model, the overall safety of the upstream model is significantly improved by an average of 40.9%. Experimental results demonstrate that fine-tuning different MLLMs with Safe RLHF can effectively enhance model helpfulness while ensuring improved safety. Specifically, Safe RLHF-V improves model safety by 34.2% and helpfulness by 34.3%. All of datasets, models, and code can be found at https://github.com/SafeRLHF-V to support the safety development of MLLMs and reduce potential societal risks.

Two main challenges in Reinforcement Learning (RL) are designing appropriate reward functions and ensuring the safety of the learned policy. To address these challenges, we present a theoretical framework for Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL) in constrained Markov decision processes. From a convex-analytic perspective, we extend prior results on reward identifiability and generalizability to both the constrained setting and a more general class of regularizations. In particular, we show that identifiability up to potential shaping (Cao et al., 2021) is a consequence of entropy regularization and may generally no longer hold for other regularizations or in the presence of safety constraints. We also show that to ensure generalizability to new transition laws and constraints, the true reward must be identified up to a constant. Additionally, we derive a finite sample guarantee for the suboptimality of the learned rewards, and validate our results in a gridworld environment.

Reinforcement Learning (RL) offers a versatile framework for achieving long-term goals. Its generality allows us to formalize a wide range of problems that real-world intelligent systems encounter, such as dealing with delayed rewards, handling partial observability, addressing the exploration and exploitation dilemma, utilizing offline data to improve online performance, and ensuring safety constraints are met. Despite considerable progress made by the RL research community in addressing these issues, existing open-source RL libraries tend to focus on a narrow portion of the RL solution pipeline, leaving other aspects largely unattended. This paper introduces Pearl, a Production-ready RL agent software package explicitly designed to embrace these challenges in a modular fashion. In addition to presenting preliminary benchmark results, this paper highlights Pearl's industry adoptions to demonstrate its readiness for production usage. Pearl is open sourced on Github at github.com/facebookresearch/pearl and its official website is located at pearlagent.github.io.

Recent progress in large language models (LLMs) has demonstrated the ability to learn and leverage Internet-scale knowledge through pre-training with autoregressive models. Unfortunately, applying such models to settings with embodied agents, such as robots, is challenging due to their lack of experience with the physical world, inability to parse non-language observations, and ignorance of rewards or safety constraints that robots may require. On the other hand, language-conditioned robotic policies that learn from interaction data can provide the necessary grounding that allows the agent to be correctly situated in the real world, but such policies are limited by the lack of high-level semantic understanding due to the limited breadth of the interaction data available for training them. Thus, if we want to make use of the semantic knowledge in a language model while still situating it in an embodied setting, we must construct an action sequence that is both likely according to the language model and also realizable according to grounded models of the environment. We frame this as a problem similar to probabilistic filtering: decode a sequence that both has high probability under the language model and high probability under a set of grounded model objectives. We demonstrate this guided decoding strategy is able to solve complex, long-horizon embodiment tasks in a robotic setting by leveraging the knowledge of both models. The project's website can be found at grounded-decoding.github.io.

Unlimited, or so-called helpful-only language models are trained without safety alignment constraints and never refuse user queries. They are widely used by leading AI companies as internal tools for red teaming and alignment evaluation. For example, if a safety-aligned model produces harmful outputs similar to an unlimited model, this indicates alignment failures that require further attention. Despite their essential role in assessing alignment, such models are not available to the research community. We introduce Jinx, a helpful-only variant of popular open-weight LLMs. Jinx responds to all queries without refusals or safety filtering, while preserving the base model's capabilities in reasoning and instruction following. It provides researchers with an accessible tool for probing alignment failures, evaluating safety boundaries, and systematically studying failure modes in language model safety.

Most end-to-end autonomous driving methods rely on imitation learning from single expert demonstrations, often leading to conservative and homogeneous behaviors that limit generalization in complex real-world scenarios. In this work, we propose DIVER, an end-to-end driving framework that integrates reinforcement learning with diffusion-based generation to produce diverse and feasible trajectories. At the core of DIVER lies a reinforced diffusion-based generation mechanism. First, the model conditions on map elements and surrounding agents to generate multiple reference trajectories from a single ground-truth trajectory, alleviating the limitations of imitation learning that arise from relying solely on single expert demonstrations. Second, reinforcement learning is employed to guide the diffusion process, where reward-based supervision enforces safety and diversity constraints on the generated trajectories, thereby enhancing their practicality and generalization capability. Furthermore, to address the limitations of L2-based open-loop metrics in capturing trajectory diversity, we propose a novel Diversity metric to evaluate the diversity of multi-mode predictions.Extensive experiments on the closed-loop NAVSIM and Bench2Drive benchmarks, as well as the open-loop nuScenes dataset, demonstrate that DIVER significantly improves trajectory diversity, effectively addressing the mode collapse problem inherent in imitation learning.

Low-rank adaptation (LoRA) has become a standard tool for efficiently fine-tuning large language models (LLMs). Yet, even minor LoRA updates can induce alignment drift, weakening safety and behavioral constraints through entangled parameter changes. To address this, we propose AlignGuard-LoRA (AGL), a principled framework for preserving alignment during finetuning. AGL introduces several key components: a primary task loss for supervision, Fisher Information Matrix-based regularization to restrict updates in alignment-sensitive subspaces, and task-specific regularization to stabilize the integration of new knowledge. We further introduce collision-aware regularization, blending Riemannian overlap -- which penalizes coordinate-wise interference -- and geodesic separation -- which encourages disjoint update geometry. We curate DriftCaps, a targeted diagnostic benchmark of safe and unsafe prompts designed to quantify alignment drift and safety degradation. Empirical evaluations show that AGL mitigates alignment drift by up to 50% on safety-critical benchmarks without degrading downstream task performance. Comprehensive ablation confirms that each component contributes distinctly to preserving latent safety behaviors. Finally, we derive and validate a scaling law for catastrophic forgetting, revealing that AGL flattens post-finetuning loss escalation while preserving adaptation dynamics. AGL is a structurally grounded refinement of LoRA, ensuring alignment preservation with minimal trade-offs. To encourage further exploration and development, we open-source our implementation.

Embodied agents operating in the physical world must make decisions that are not only effective but also safe, spatially coherent, and grounded in context. While recent advances in large multimodal models (LMMs) have shown promising capabilities in visual understanding and language generation, their ability to perform structured reasoning for real-world embodied tasks remains underexplored. In this work, we aim to understand how well foundation models can perform step-by-step reasoning in embodied environments. To this end, we propose the Foundation Model Embodied Reasoning (FoMER) benchmark, designed to evaluate the reasoning capabilities of LMMs in complex embodied decision-making scenarios. Our benchmark spans a diverse set of tasks that require agents to interpret multimodal observations, reason about physical constraints and safety, and generate valid next actions in natural language. We present (i) a large-scale, curated suite of embodied reasoning tasks, (ii) a novel evaluation framework that disentangles perceptual grounding from action reasoning, and (iii) empirical analysis of several leading LMMs under this setting. Our benchmark includes over 1.1k samples with detailed step-by-step reasoning across 10 tasks and 8 embodiments, covering three different robot types. Our results highlight both the potential and current limitations of LMMs in embodied reasoning, pointing towards key challenges and opportunities for future research in robot intelligence. Our data and code will be made publicly available.

State-of-the-art language model fine-tuning techniques, such as Direct Preference Optimization (DPO), restrict user control by hard-coding predefined behaviors into the model. To address this, we propose a novel method, Configurable Safety Tuning (CST), that augments DPO using synthetic preference data to facilitate flexible safety configuration of LLMs at inference time. CST overcomes the constraints of vanilla DPO by introducing a system prompt specifying safety configurations, enabling LLM deployers to disable/enable safety preferences based on their need, just changing the system prompt. Our experimental evaluations indicate that CST successfully manages different safety configurations and retains the original functionality of LLMs, showing it is a robust method for configurable deployment. Data and models available at https://github.com/vicgalle/configurable-safety-tuning

Adversarial threats against LLMs are escalating faster than current defenses can adapt. We expose a critical geometric blind spot in alignment: adversarial prompts exploit latent camouflage, embedding perilously close to the safe representation manifold while encoding unsafe intent thereby evading surface level defenses like Direct Preference Optimization (DPO), which remain blind to the latent geometry. We introduce ALKALI, the first rigorously curated adversarial benchmark and the most comprehensive to date spanning 9,000 prompts across three macro categories, six subtypes, and fifteen attack families. Evaluation of 21 leading LLMs reveals alarmingly high Attack Success Rates (ASRs) across both open and closed source models, exposing an underlying vulnerability we term latent camouflage, a structural blind spot where adversarial completions mimic the latent geometry of safe ones. To mitigate this vulnerability, we introduce GRACE - Geometric Representation Aware Contrastive Enhancement, an alignment framework coupling preference learning with latent space regularization. GRACE enforces two constraints: latent separation between safe and adversarial completions, and adversarial cohesion among unsafe and jailbreak behaviors. These operate over layerwise pooled embeddings guided by a learned attention profile, reshaping internal geometry without modifying the base model, and achieve up to 39% ASR reduction. Moreover, we introduce AVQI, a geometry aware metric that quantifies latent alignment failure via cluster separation and compactness. AVQI reveals when unsafe completions mimic the geometry of safe ones, offering a principled lens into how models internally encode safety. We make the code publicly available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/alkali-B416/README.md.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have made them indispensable, raising significant concerns over managing their safety. Automated red teaming offers a promising alternative to the labor-intensive and error-prone manual probing for vulnerabilities, providing more consistent and scalable safety evaluations. However, existing approaches often compromise diversity by focusing on maximizing attack success rate. Additionally, methods that decrease the cosine similarity from historical embeddings with semantic diversity rewards lead to novelty stagnation as history grows. To address these issues, we introduce DiveR-CT, which relaxes conventional constraints on the objective and semantic reward, granting greater freedom for the policy to enhance diversity. Our experiments demonstrate DiveR-CT's marked superiority over baselines by 1) generating data that perform better in various diversity metrics across different attack success rate levels, 2) better-enhancing resiliency in blue team models through safety tuning based on collected data, 3) allowing dynamic control of objective weights for reliable and controllable attack success rates, and 4) reducing susceptibility to reward overoptimization. Project details and code can be found at https://andrewzh112.github.io/#diverct.

As AI systems become more capable, widely deployed, and increasingly autonomous in critical areas such as cybersecurity, biological research, and healthcare, ensuring their safety and alignment with human values is paramount. Machine unlearning -- the ability to selectively forget or suppress specific types of knowledge -- has shown promise for privacy and data removal tasks, which has been the primary focus of existing research. More recently, its potential application to AI safety has gained attention. In this paper, we identify key limitations that prevent unlearning from serving as a comprehensive solution for AI safety, particularly in managing dual-use knowledge in sensitive domains like cybersecurity and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) safety. In these contexts, information can be both beneficial and harmful, and models may combine seemingly harmless information for harmful purposes -- unlearning this information could strongly affect beneficial uses. We provide an overview of inherent constraints and open problems, including the broader side effects of unlearning dangerous knowledge, as well as previously unexplored tensions between unlearning and existing safety mechanisms. Finally, we investigate challenges related to evaluation, robustness, and the preservation of safety features during unlearning. By mapping these limitations and open challenges, we aim to guide future research toward realistic applications of unlearning within a broader AI safety framework, acknowledging its limitations and highlighting areas where alternative approaches may be required.

This paper presents a safety-critical approach to the coordination of robots in dynamic environments. To this end, we leverage control barrier functions (CBFs) with the forward reachable set to guarantee the safe coordination of the robots while preserving a desired trajectory via a layered controller. The top-level planner generates a safety-ensured trajectory for each agent, accounting for the dynamic constraints in the environment. This planner leverages high-order CBFs based on the forward reachable set to ensure safety-critical coordination control, i.e., guarantee the safe coordination of the robots during locomotion. The middle-level trajectory planner employs single rigid body (SRB) dynamics to generate optimal ground reaction forces (GRFs) to track the safety-ensured trajectories from the top-level planner. The whole-body motions to adhere to the optimal GRFs while ensuring the friction cone condition at the end of each stance leg are generated from the low-level controller. The effectiveness of the approach is demonstrated through simulation and hardware experiments.

Text-to-image diffusion models have revolutionized visual content generation, but current safety mechanisms apply uniform standards that often fail to account for individual user preferences. These models overlook the diverse safety boundaries shaped by factors like age, mental health, and personal beliefs. To address this, we propose Personalized Safety Alignment (PSA), a framework that allows user-specific control over safety behaviors in generative models. PSA integrates personalized user profiles into the diffusion process, adjusting the model's behavior to match individual safety preferences while preserving image quality. We introduce a new dataset, Sage, which captures user-specific safety preferences and incorporates these profiles through a cross-attention mechanism. Experiments show that PSA outperforms existing methods in harmful content suppression and aligns generated content better with user constraints, achieving higher Win Rate and Pass Rate scores. Our code, data, and models are publicly available at https://torpedo2648.github.io/PSAlign/.

Runtime energy management has become quintessential for multi-sensor autonomous systems at the edge for achieving high performance given the platform constraints. Typical for such systems, however, is to have their controllers designed with formal guarantees on safety that precede in priority such optimizations, which in turn limits their application in real settings. In this paper, we propose a novel energy optimization framework that is aware of the autonomous system's safety state, and leverages it to regulate the application of energy optimization methods so that the system's formal safety properties are preserved. In particular, through the formal characterization of a system's safety state as a dynamic processing deadline, the computing workloads of the underlying models can be adapted accordingly. For our experiments, we model two popular runtime energy optimization methods, offloading and gating, and simulate an autonomous driving system (ADS) use-case in the CARLA simulation environment with performance characterizations obtained from the standard Nvidia Drive PX2 ADS platform. Our results demonstrate that through a formal awareness of the perceived risks in the test case scenario, energy efficiency gains are still achieved (reaching 89.9%) while maintaining the desired safety properties.

With the rapid advancement of natural language processing technologies, generative artificial intelligence techniques, represented by large language models (LLMs), are gaining increasing prominence and demonstrating significant potential for applications in safety engineering. However, fundamental LLMs face constraints such as limited training data coverage and unreliable responses. This study develops a vector database from 117 explosion accident reports in China spanning 2013 to 2023, employing techniques such as corpus segmenting and vector embedding. By utilizing the vector database, which outperforms the relational database in information retrieval quality, we provide LLMs with richer, more relevant knowledge. Comparative analysis of LLMs demonstrates that ChatSOS significantly enhances reliability, accuracy, and comprehensiveness, improves adaptability and clarification of responses. These results illustrate the effectiveness of supplementing LLMs with an external database, highlighting their potential to handle professional queries in safety engineering and laying a foundation for broader applications.

The increasing capabilities of large language models (LLMs) raise opportunities for artificial general intelligence but concurrently amplify safety concerns, such as potential misuse of AI systems, necessitating effective AI alignment. Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) has emerged as a promising pathway towards AI alignment but brings forth challenges due to its complexity and dependence on a separate reward model. Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) has been proposed as an alternative, and it remains equivalent to RLHF under the reverse KL regularization constraint. This paper presents f-DPO, a generalized approach to DPO by incorporating diverse divergence constraints. We show that under certain f-divergences, including Jensen-Shannon divergence, forward KL divergences and alpha-divergences, the complex relationship between the reward and optimal policy can also be simplified by addressing the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions. This eliminates the need for estimating the normalizing constant in the Bradley-Terry model and enables a tractable mapping between the reward function and the optimal policy. Our approach optimizes LLMs to align with human preferences in a more efficient and supervised manner under a broad set of divergence constraints. Empirically, adopting these divergences ensures a balance between alignment performance and generation diversity. Importantly, f-DPO outperforms PPO-based methods in divergence efficiency, and divergence constraints directly influence expected calibration error (ECE).

Aiming at promoting the safe real-world deployment of Reinforcement Learning (RL), research on safe RL has made significant progress in recent years. However, most existing works in the literature still focus on the online setting where risky violations of the safety budget are likely to be incurred during training. Besides, in many real-world applications, the learned policy is required to respond to dynamically determined safety budgets (i.e., constraint threshold) in real time. In this paper, we target at the above real-time budget constraint problem under the offline setting, and propose Trajectory-based REal-time Budget Inference (TREBI) as a novel solution that approaches this problem from the perspective of trajectory distribution. Theoretically, we prove an error bound of the estimation on the episodic reward and cost under the offline setting and thus provide a performance guarantee for TREBI. Empirical results on a wide range of simulation tasks and a real-world large-scale advertising application demonstrate the capability of TREBI in solving real-time budget constraint problems under offline settings.

This paper develops a graph reinforcement learning approach to online planning of the schedule and destinations of electric aircraft that comprise an urban air mobility (UAM) fleet operating across multiple vertiports. This fleet scheduling problem is formulated to consider time-varying demand, constraints related to vertiport capacity, aircraft capacity and airspace safety guidelines, uncertainties related to take-off delay, weather-induced route closures, and unanticipated aircraft downtime. Collectively, such a formulation presents greater complexity, and potentially increased realism, than in existing UAM fleet planning implementations. To address these complexities, a new policy architecture is constructed, primary components of which include: graph capsule conv-nets for encoding vertiport and aircraft-fleet states both abstracted as graphs; transformer layers encoding time series information on demand and passenger fare; and a Multi-head Attention-based decoder that uses the encoded information to compute the probability of selecting each available destination for an aircraft. Trained with Proximal Policy Optimization, this policy architecture shows significantly better performance in terms of daily averaged profits on unseen test scenarios involving 8 vertiports and 40 aircraft, when compared to a random baseline and genetic algorithm-derived optimal solutions, while being nearly 1000 times faster in execution than the latter.

Jailbreaking attacks can effectively induce unsafe behaviors in Large Language Models (LLMs); however, the transferability of these attacks across different models remains limited. This study aims to understand and enhance the transferability of gradient-based jailbreaking methods, which are among the standard approaches for attacking white-box models. Through a detailed analysis of the optimization process, we introduce a novel conceptual framework to elucidate transferability and identify superfluous constraints-specifically, the response pattern constraint and the token tail constraint-as significant barriers to improved transferability. Removing these unnecessary constraints substantially enhances the transferability and controllability of gradient-based attacks. Evaluated on Llama-3-8B-Instruct as the source model, our method increases the overall Transfer Attack Success Rate (T-ASR) across a set of target models with varying safety levels from 18.4% to 50.3%, while also improving the stability and controllability of jailbreak behaviors on both source and target models.

In many applications of Reinforcement Learning (RL), it is critically important that the algorithm performs safely, such that instantaneous hard constraints are satisfied at each step, and unsafe states and actions are avoided. However, existing algorithms for ''safe'' RL are often designed under constraints that either require expected cumulative costs to be bounded or assume all states are safe. Thus, such algorithms could violate instantaneous hard constraints and traverse unsafe states (and actions) in practice. Therefore, in this paper, we develop the first near-optimal safe RL algorithm for episodic Markov Decision Processes with unsafe states and actions under instantaneous hard constraints and the linear mixture model. It not only achieves a regret O(d H^3 sqrt{dK}{Delta_c}) that tightly matches the state-of-the-art regret in the setting with only unsafe actions and nearly matches that in the unconstrained setting, but is also safe at each step, where d is the feature-mapping dimension, K is the number of episodes, H is the number of steps in each episode, and Delta_c is a safety-related parameter. We also provide a lower bound Omega(max{dH K, H{Delta_c^2}}), which indicates that the dependency on Delta_c is necessary. Further, both our algorithm design and regret analysis involve several novel ideas, which may be of independent interest.

Large Language Models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that bypass their safety mechanisms. Existing attack methods are fixed or specifically tailored for certain models and cannot flexibly adjust attack strength, which is critical for generalization when attacking models of various sizes. We introduce a novel scalable jailbreak attack that preempts the activation of an LLM's safety policies by occupying its computational resources. Our method involves engaging the LLM in a resource-intensive preliminary task - a Character Map lookup and decoding process - before presenting the target instruction. By saturating the model's processing capacity, we prevent the activation of safety protocols when processing the subsequent instruction. Extensive experiments on state-of-the-art LLMs demonstrate that our method achieves a high success rate in bypassing safety measures without requiring gradient access, manual prompt engineering. We verified our approach offers a scalable attack that quantifies attack strength and adapts to different model scales at the optimal strength. We shows safety policies of LLMs might be more susceptible to resource constraints. Our findings reveal a critical vulnerability in current LLM safety designs, highlighting the need for more robust defense strategies that account for resource-intense condition.

Constraints are critical in text generation as LLM outputs are often unreliable when it comes to ensuring generated outputs adhere to user defined instruction or general safety guidelines. To address this gap, we present Constrained Discrete Diffusion (CDD), a novel method for enforcing constraints on natural language by integrating discrete diffusion models with differentiable optimization. Unlike conventional text generators, which often rely on post-hoc filtering or model retraining for controllable generation, we propose imposing constraints directly into the discrete diffusion sampling process. We illustrate how this technique can be applied to satisfy a variety of natural language constraints, including (i) toxicity mitigation by preventing harmful content from emerging, (ii) character and sequence level lexical constraints, and (iii) novel molecule sequence generation with specific property adherence. Experimental results show that our constraint-aware procedure achieves high fidelity in meeting these requirements while preserving fluency and semantic coherence, outperforming auto-regressive and existing discrete diffusion approaches.

With the development of large language models (LLMs), striking a balance between the performance and safety of AI systems has never been more critical. However, the inherent tension between the objectives of helpfulness and harmlessness presents a significant challenge during LLM training. To address this issue, we propose Safe Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (Safe RLHF), a novel algorithm for human value alignment. Safe RLHF explicitly decouples human preferences regarding helpfulness and harmlessness, effectively avoiding the crowdworkers' confusion about the tension and allowing us to train separate reward and cost models. We formalize the safety concern of LLMs as an optimization task of maximizing the reward function while satisfying specified cost constraints. Leveraging the Lagrangian method to solve this constrained problem, Safe RLHF dynamically adjusts the balance between the two objectives during fine-tuning. Through a three-round fine-tuning using Safe RLHF, we demonstrate a superior ability to mitigate harmful responses while enhancing model performance compared to existing value-aligned algorithms. Experimentally, we fine-tuned the Alpaca-7B using Safe RLHF and aligned it with collected human preferences, significantly improving its helpfulness and harmlessness according to human evaluations.

Children with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) often misunderstand social situations and struggle to participate in daily routines. Psychology experts write Social Stories under strict constraints of structural clarity, descriptive orientation, and situational safety to enhance their abilities in these regimes. However, Social Stories are costly in creation and often limited in diversity and timeliness. As Large Language Models (LLMs) become increasingly powerful, there is a growing need for more automated, affordable, and accessible methods to generate Social Stories in real-time with broad coverage. Adapting LLMs to meet the unique and strict constraints of Social Stories is a challenging issue. To this end, we propose SS-Bench, a Social Story Benchmark for generating and evaluating Social Stories. Specifically, we develop a constraint-driven strategy named \textsc{StarSow} to hierarchically prompt LLMs to generate Social Stories and build a benchmark, which has been validated through experiments to fine-tune smaller models for generating qualified Social Stories. Additionally, we introduce Quality Assessment Criteria, employed in human and GPT evaluations, to verify the effectiveness of the generated stories. We hope this work benefits the autism community and catalyzes future research focusing on particular groups.

Safe offline RL is a promising way to bypass risky online interactions towards safe policy learning. Most existing methods only enforce soft constraints, i.e., constraining safety violations in expectation below thresholds predetermined. This can lead to potentially unsafe outcomes, thus unacceptable in safety-critical scenarios. An alternative is to enforce the hard constraint of zero violation. However, this can be challenging in offline setting, as it needs to strike the right balance among three highly intricate and correlated aspects: safety constraint satisfaction, reward maximization, and behavior regularization imposed by offline datasets. Interestingly, we discover that via reachability analysis of safe-control theory, the hard safety constraint can be equivalently translated to identifying the largest feasible region given the offline dataset. This seamlessly converts the original trilogy problem to a feasibility-dependent objective, i.e., maximizing reward value within the feasible region while minimizing safety risks in the infeasible region. Inspired by these, we propose FISOR (FeasIbility-guided Safe Offline RL), which allows safety constraint adherence, reward maximization, and offline policy learning to be realized via three decoupled processes, while offering strong safety performance and stability. In FISOR, the optimal policy for the translated optimization problem can be derived in a special form of weighted behavior cloning. Thus, we propose a novel energy-guided diffusion model that does not require training a complicated time-dependent classifier to extract the policy, greatly simplifying the training. We compare FISOR against baselines on DSRL benchmark for safe offline RL. Evaluation results show that FISOR is the only method that can guarantee safety satisfaction in all tasks, while achieving top returns in most tasks.

While reinforcement learning-trained Large Reasoning Models (LRMs, e.g., Deepseek-R1) demonstrate advanced reasoning capabilities in the evolving Large Language Models (LLMs) domain, their susceptibility to security threats remains a critical vulnerability. This weakness is particularly evident in Chain-of-Thought (CoT) generation processes, where adversarial methods like backdoor prompt attacks can systematically subvert the model's core reasoning mechanisms. The emerging Chain-of-Thought Attack (CoTA) reveals this vulnerability through exploiting prompt controllability, simultaneously degrading both CoT safety and task performance with low-cost interventions. To address this compounded security-performance vulnerability, we propose Thought Purity (TP): a defense paradigm that systematically strengthens resistance to malicious content while preserving operational efficacy. Our solution achieves this through three synergistic components: (1) a safety-optimized data processing pipeline (2) reinforcement learning-enhanced rule constraints (3) adaptive monitoring metrics. Our approach establishes the first comprehensive defense mechanism against CoTA vulnerabilities in reinforcement learning-aligned reasoning systems, significantly advancing the security-functionality equilibrium for next-generation AI architectures.

Despite the recent advancements of vision-language-action (VLA) models on a variety of robotics tasks, they suffer from critical issues such as poor generalizability to unseen tasks, due to their reliance on behavior cloning exclusively from successful rollouts. Furthermore, they are typically fine-tuned to replicate demonstrations collected by experts under different settings, thus introducing distribution bias and limiting their adaptability to diverse manipulation objectives, such as efficiency, safety, and task completion. To bridge this gap, we introduce GRAPE: Generalizing Robot Policy via Preference Alignment. Specifically, GRAPE aligns VLAs on a trajectory level and implicitly models reward from both successful and failure trials to boost generalizability to diverse tasks. Moreover, GRAPE breaks down complex manipulation tasks to independent stages and automatically guides preference modeling through customized spatiotemporal constraints with keypoints proposed by a large vision-language model. Notably, these constraints are flexible and can be customized to align the model with varying objectives, such as safety, efficiency, or task success. We evaluate GRAPE across a diverse array of tasks in both real-world and simulated environments. Experimental results demonstrate that GRAPE enhances the performance of state-of-the-art VLA models, increasing success rates on in-domain and unseen manipulation tasks by 51.79% and 60.36%, respectively. Additionally, GRAPE can be aligned with various objectives, such as safety and efficiency, reducing collision rates by 44.31% and rollout step-length by 11.15%, respectively. All code, models, and data are available at https://grape-vla.github.io/

When applying offline reinforcement learning (RL) in healthcare scenarios, the out-of-distribution (OOD) issues pose significant risks, as inappropriate generalization beyond clinical expertise can result in potentially harmful recommendations. While existing methods like conservative Q-learning (CQL) attempt to address the OOD issue, their effectiveness is limited by only constraining action selection by suppressing uncertain actions. This action-only regularization imitates clinician actions that prioritize short-term rewards, but it fails to regulate downstream state trajectories, thereby limiting the discovery of improved long-term treatment strategies. To safely improve policy beyond clinician recommendations while ensuring that state-action trajectories remain in-distribution, we propose Offline Guarded Safe Reinforcement Learning (OGSRL), a theoretically grounded model-based offline RL framework. OGSRL introduces a novel dual constraint mechanism for improving policy with reliability and safety. First, the OOD guardian is established to specify clinically validated regions for safe policy exploration. By constraining optimization within these regions, it enables the reliable exploration of treatment strategies that outperform clinician behavior by leveraging the full patient state history, without drifting into unsupported state-action trajectories. Second, we introduce a safety cost constraint that encodes medical knowledge about physiological safety boundaries, providing domain-specific safeguards even in areas where training data might contain potentially unsafe interventions. Notably, we provide theoretical guarantees on safety and near-optimality: policies that satisfy these constraints remain in safe and reliable regions and achieve performance close to the best possible policy supported by the data.

Deep reinforcement learning (RL) can enable robots to autonomously acquire complex behaviors, such as legged locomotion. However, RL in the real world is complicated by constraints on efficiency, safety, and overall training stability, which limits its practical applicability. We present APRL, a policy regularization framework that modulates the robot's exploration over the course of training, striking a balance between flexible improvement potential and focused, efficient exploration. APRL enables a quadrupedal robot to efficiently learn to walk entirely in the real world within minutes and continue to improve with more training where prior work saturates in performance. We demonstrate that continued training with APRL results in a policy that is substantially more capable of navigating challenging situations and is able to adapt to changes in dynamics with continued training.

The computational study of equilibria involving constraints on players' strategies has been largely neglected. However, in real-world applications, players are usually subject to constraints ruling out the feasibility of some of their strategies, such as, e.g., safety requirements and budget caps. Computational studies on constrained versions of the Nash equilibrium have lead to some results under very stringent assumptions, while finding constrained versions of the correlated equilibrium (CE) is still unexplored. In this paper, we introduce and computationally characterize constrained Phi-equilibria -- a more general notion than constrained CEs -- in normal-form games. We show that computing such equilibria is in general computationally intractable, and also that the set of the equilibria may not be convex, providing a sharp divide with unconstrained CEs. Nevertheless, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a constrained (approximate) Phi-equilibrium maximizing a given linear function, when either the number of constraints or that of players' actions is fixed. Moreover, in the special case in which a player's constraints do not depend on other players' strategies, we show that an exact, function-maximizing equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time, while one (approximate) equilibrium can be found with an efficient decentralized no-regret learning algorithm.

Language agents have demonstrated promising capabilities in automating web-based tasks, though their current reactive approaches still underperform largely compared to humans. While incorporating advanced planning algorithms, particularly tree search methods, could enhance these agents' performance, implementing tree search directly on live websites poses significant safety risks and practical constraints due to irreversible actions such as confirming a purchase. In this paper, we introduce a novel paradigm that augments language agents with model-based planning, pioneering the innovative use of large language models (LLMs) as world models in complex web environments. Our method, WebDreamer, builds on the key insight that LLMs inherently encode comprehensive knowledge about website structures and functionalities. Specifically, WebDreamer uses LLMs to simulate outcomes for each candidate action (e.g., "what would happen if I click this button?") using natural language descriptions, and then evaluates these imagined outcomes to determine the optimal action at each step. Empirical results on two representative web agent benchmarks with online interaction -- VisualWebArena and Mind2Web-live -- demonstrate that WebDreamer achieves substantial improvements over reactive baselines. By establishing the viability of LLMs as world models in web environments, this work lays the groundwork for a paradigm shift in automated web interaction. More broadly, our findings open exciting new avenues for future research into 1) optimizing LLMs specifically for world modeling in complex, dynamic environments, and 2) model-based speculative planning for language agents.

The rapid advancement and deployment of AI systems have created an urgent need for standard safety-evaluation frameworks. This paper introduces AILuminate v1.0, the first comprehensive industry-standard benchmark for assessing AI-product risk and reliability. Its development employed an open process that included participants from multiple fields. The benchmark evaluates an AI system's resistance to prompts designed to elicit dangerous, illegal, or undesirable behavior in 12 hazard categories, including violent crimes, nonviolent crimes, sex-related crimes, child sexual exploitation, indiscriminate weapons, suicide and self-harm, intellectual property, privacy, defamation, hate, sexual content, and specialized advice (election, financial, health, legal). Our method incorporates a complete assessment standard, extensive prompt datasets, a novel evaluation framework, a grading and reporting system, and the technical as well as organizational infrastructure for long-term support and evolution. In particular, the benchmark employs an understandable five-tier grading scale (Poor to Excellent) and incorporates an innovative entropy-based system-response evaluation. In addition to unveiling the benchmark, this report also identifies limitations of our method and of building safety benchmarks generally, including evaluator uncertainty and the constraints of single-turn interactions. This work represents a crucial step toward establishing global standards for AI risk and reliability evaluation while acknowledging the need for continued development in areas such as multiturn interactions, multimodal understanding, coverage of additional languages, and emerging hazard categories. Our findings provide valuable insights for model developers, system integrators, and policymakers working to promote safer AI deployment.

Continuum robots are advancing bronchoscopy procedures by accessing complex lung airways and enabling targeted interventions. However, their development is limited by the lack of realistic training and test environments: Real data is difficult to collect due to ethical constraints and patient safety concerns, and developing autonomy algorithms requires realistic imaging and physical feedback. We present ROOM (Realistic Optical Observation in Medicine), a comprehensive simulation framework designed for generating photorealistic bronchoscopy training data. By leveraging patient CT scans, our pipeline renders multi-modal sensor data including RGB images with realistic noise and light specularities, metric depth maps, surface normals, optical flow and point clouds at medically relevant scales. We validate the data generated by ROOM in two canonical tasks for medical robotics -- multi-view pose estimation and monocular depth estimation, demonstrating diverse challenges that state-of-the-art methods must overcome to transfer to these medical settings. Furthermore, we show that the data produced by ROOM can be used to fine-tune existing depth estimation models to overcome these challenges, also enabling other downstream applications such as navigation. We expect that ROOM will enable large-scale data generation across diverse patient anatomies and procedural scenarios that are challenging to capture in clinical settings. Code and data: https://github.com/iamsalvatore/room.

We study the problem of combining neural networks with symbolic reasoning. Recently introduced frameworks for Probabilistic Neurosymbolic Learning (PNL), such as DeepProbLog, perform exponential-time exact inference, limiting the scalability of PNL solutions. We introduce Approximate Neurosymbolic Inference (A-NeSI): a new framework for PNL that uses neural networks for scalable approximate inference. A-NeSI 1) performs approximate inference in polynomial time without changing the semantics of probabilistic logics; 2) is trained using data generated by the background knowledge; 3) can generate symbolic explanations of predictions; and 4) can guarantee the satisfaction of logical constraints at test time, which is vital in safety-critical applications. Our experiments show that A-NeSI is the first end-to-end method to solve three neurosymbolic tasks with exponential combinatorial scaling. Finally, our experiments show that A-NeSI achieves explainability and safety without a penalty in performance.

The rapid integration of agentic AI into high-stakes real-world applications requires robust oversight mechanisms. The emerging field of AI Control (AIC) aims to provide such an oversight mechanism, but practical adoption depends heavily on implementation overhead. To study this problem better, we introduce the notion of Control tax -- the operational and financial cost of integrating control measures into AI pipelines. Our work makes three key contributions to the field of AIC: (1) we introduce a theoretical framework that quantifies the Control Tax and maps classifier performance to safety assurances; (2) we conduct comprehensive evaluations of state-of-the-art language models in adversarial settings, where attacker models insert subtle backdoors into code while monitoring models attempt to detect these vulnerabilities; and (3) we provide empirical financial cost estimates for control protocols and develop optimized monitoring strategies that balance safety and cost-effectiveness while accounting for practical constraints like auditing budgets. Our framework enables practitioners to make informed decisions by systematically connecting safety guarantees with their costs, advancing AIC through principled economic feasibility assessment across different deployment contexts.

The rapid emergence of foundation models, particularly Large Language Models (LLMs) and Vision-Language Models (VLMs), has introduced a transformative paradigm in robotics. These models offer powerful capabilities in semantic understanding, high-level reasoning, and cross-modal generalization, enabling significant advances in perception, planning, control, and human-robot interaction. This critical review provides a structured synthesis of recent developments, categorizing applications across simulation-driven design, open-world execution, sim-to-real transfer, and adaptable robotics. Unlike existing surveys that emphasize isolated capabilities, this work highlights integrated, system-level strategies and evaluates their practical feasibility in real-world environments. Key enabling trends such as procedural scene generation, policy generalization, and multimodal reasoning are discussed alongside core bottlenecks, including limited embodiment, lack of multimodal data, safety risks, and computational constraints. Through this lens, this paper identifies both the architectural strengths and critical limitations of foundation model-based robotics, highlighting open challenges in real-time operation, grounding, resilience, and trust. The review concludes with a roadmap for future research aimed at bridging semantic reasoning and physical intelligence through more robust, interpretable, and embodied models.

Partial perception deficits can compromise autonomous vehicle safety by disrupting environmental understanding. Current protocols typically respond with immediate stops or minimal-risk maneuvers, worsening traffic flow and lacking flexibility for rare driving scenarios. In this paper, we propose LLM-RCO, a framework leveraging large language models to integrate human-like driving commonsense into autonomous systems facing perception deficits. LLM-RCO features four key modules: hazard inference, short-term motion planner, action condition verifier, and safety constraint generator. These modules interact with the dynamic driving environment, enabling proactive and context-aware control actions to override the original control policy of autonomous agents. To improve safety in such challenging conditions, we construct DriveLM-Deficit, a dataset of 53,895 video clips featuring deficits of safety-critical objects, complete with annotations for LLM-based hazard inference and motion planning fine-tuning. Extensive experiments in adverse driving conditions with the CARLA simulator demonstrate that systems equipped with LLM-RCO significantly improve driving performance, highlighting its potential for enhancing autonomous driving resilience against adverse perception deficits. Our results also show that LLMs fine-tuned with DriveLM-Deficit can enable more proactive movements instead of conservative stops in the context of perception deficits.

Primal-dual safe RL methods commonly perform iterations between the primal update of the policy and the dual update of the Lagrange Multiplier. Such a training paradigm is highly susceptible to the error in cumulative cost estimation since this estimation serves as the key bond connecting the primal and dual update processes. We show that this problem causes significant underestimation of cost when using off-policy methods, leading to the failure to satisfy the safety constraint. To address this issue, we propose conservative policy optimization, which learns a policy in a constraint-satisfying area by considering the uncertainty in cost estimation. This improves constraint satisfaction but also potentially hinders reward maximization. We then introduce local policy convexification to help eliminate such suboptimality by gradually reducing the estimation uncertainty. We provide theoretical interpretations of the joint coupling effect of these two ingredients and further verify them by extensive experiments. Results on benchmark tasks show that our method not only achieves an asymptotic performance comparable to state-of-the-art on-policy methods while using much fewer samples, but also significantly reduces constraint violation during training. Our code is available at https://github.com/ZifanWu/CAL.

Safety is critical to broadening the application of reinforcement learning (RL). Often, we train RL agents in a controlled environment, such as a laboratory, before deploying them in the real world. However, the real-world target task might be unknown prior to deployment. Reward-free RL trains an agent without the reward to adapt quickly once the reward is revealed. We consider the constrained reward-free setting, where an agent (the guide) learns to explore safely without the reward signal. This agent is trained in a controlled environment, which allows unsafe interactions and still provides the safety signal. After the target task is revealed, safety violations are not allowed anymore. Thus, the guide is leveraged to compose a safe behaviour policy. Drawing from transfer learning, we also regularize a target policy (the student) towards the guide while the student is unreliable and gradually eliminate the influence of the guide as training progresses. The empirical analysis shows that this method can achieve safe transfer learning and helps the student solve the target task faster.

Ensuring safety in Reinforcement Learning (RL), typically framed as a Constrained Markov Decision Process (CMDP), is crucial for real-world exploration applications. Current approaches in handling CMDP struggle to balance optimality and feasibility, as direct optimization methods cannot ensure state-wise in-training safety, and projection-based methods correct actions inefficiently through lengthy iterations. To address these challenges, we propose Adaptive Chance-constrained Safeguards (ACS), an adaptive, model-free safe RL algorithm using the safety recovery rate as a surrogate chance constraint to iteratively ensure safety during exploration and after achieving convergence. Theoretical analysis indicates that the relaxed probabilistic constraint sufficiently guarantees forward invariance to the safe set. And extensive experiments conducted on both simulated and real-world safety-critical tasks demonstrate its effectiveness in enforcing safety (nearly zero-violation) while preserving optimality (+23.8%), robustness, and fast response in stochastic real-world settings.

Most safety testing efforts for large language models (LLMs) today focus on evaluating foundation models. However, there is a growing need to evaluate safety at the application level, as components such as system prompts, retrieval pipelines, and guardrails introduce additional factors that significantly influence the overall safety of LLM applications. In this paper, we introduce a practical framework for evaluating application-level safety in LLM systems, validated through real-world deployment across multiple use cases within our organization. The framework consists of two parts: (1) principles for developing customized safety risk taxonomies, and (2) practices for evaluating safety risks in LLM applications. We illustrate how the proposed framework was applied in our internal pilot, providing a reference point for organizations seeking to scale their safety testing efforts. This work aims to bridge the gap between theoretical concepts in AI safety and the operational realities of safeguarding LLM applications in practice, offering actionable guidance for safe and scalable deployment.

Safe reinforcement learning (RL) trains a constraint satisfaction policy by interacting with the environment. We aim to tackle a more challenging problem: learning a safe policy from an offline dataset. We study the offline safe RL problem from a novel multi-objective optimization perspective and propose the epsilon-reducible concept to characterize problem difficulties. The inherent trade-offs between safety and task performance inspire us to propose the constrained decision transformer (CDT) approach, which can dynamically adjust the trade-offs during deployment. Extensive experiments show the advantages of the proposed method in learning an adaptive, safe, robust, and high-reward policy. CDT outperforms its variants and strong offline safe RL baselines by a large margin with the same hyperparameters across all tasks, while keeping the zero-shot adaptation capability to different constraint thresholds, making our approach more suitable for real-world RL under constraints. The code is available at https://github.com/liuzuxin/OSRL.

Policy search reinforcement learning allows robots to acquire skills by themselves. However, the learning procedure is inherently unsafe as the robot has no a-priori way to predict the consequences of the exploratory actions it takes. Therefore, exploration can lead to collisions with the potential to harm the robot and/or the environment. In this work we address the safety aspect by constraining the exploration to happen in safe-to-explore state spaces. These are formed by decomposing target skills (e.g., grasping) into higher ranked sub-tasks (e.g., collision avoidance, joint limit avoidance) and lower ranked movement tasks (e.g., reaching). Sub-tasks are defined as concurrent controllers (policies) in different operational spaces together with associated Jacobians representing their joint-space mapping. Safety is ensured by only learning policies corresponding to lower ranked sub-tasks in the redundant null space of higher ranked ones. As a side benefit, learning in sub-manifolds of the state-space also facilitates sample efficiency. Reaching skills performed in simulation and grasping skills performed on a real robot validate the usefulness of the proposed approach.

Ensuring safety in reinforcement learning (RL)-based robotic systems is a critical challenge, especially in contact-rich tasks within unstructured environments. While the state-of-the-art safe RL approaches mitigate risks through safe exploration or high-level recovery mechanisms, they often overlook low-level execution safety, where reflexive responses to potential hazards are crucial. Similarly, variable impedance control (VIC) enhances safety by adjusting the robot's mechanical response, yet lacks a systematic way to adapt parameters, such as stiffness and damping throughout the task. In this paper, we propose Bresa, a Bio-inspired Reflexive Hierarchical Safe RL method inspired by biological reflexes. Our method decouples task learning from safety learning, incorporating a safety critic network that evaluates action risks and operates at a higher frequency than the task solver. Unlike existing recovery-based methods, our safety critic functions at a low-level control layer, allowing real-time intervention when unsafe conditions arise. The task-solving RL policy, running at a lower frequency, focuses on high-level planning (decision-making), while the safety critic ensures instantaneous safety corrections. We validate Bresa on multiple tasks including a contact-rich robotic task, demonstrating its reflexive ability to enhance safety, and adaptability in unforeseen dynamic environments. Our results show that Bresa outperforms the baseline, providing a robust and reflexive safety mechanism that bridges the gap between high-level planning and low-level execution. Real-world experiments and supplementary material are available at project website https://jack-sherman01.github.io/Bresa.

Machine learning (ML) systems are rapidly increasing in size, are acquiring new capabilities, and are increasingly deployed in high-stakes settings. As with other powerful technologies, safety for ML should be a leading research priority. In response to emerging safety challenges in ML, such as those introduced by recent large-scale models, we provide a new roadmap for ML Safety and refine the technical problems that the field needs to address. We present four problems ready for research, namely withstanding hazards ("Robustness"), identifying hazards ("Monitoring"), reducing inherent model hazards ("Alignment"), and reducing systemic hazards ("Systemic Safety"). Throughout, we clarify each problem's motivation and provide concrete research directions.

An important feature of many real world facility location problems are capacity limits on the facilities. We show here how capacity constraints make it harder to design strategy proof mechanisms for facility location, but counter-intuitively can improve the guarantees on how well we can approximate the optimal solution.

The rapid advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) systems in critical domains like healthcare, justice, and social services has sparked numerous regulatory initiatives aimed at ensuring their safe deployment. Current regulatory frameworks, exemplified by recent US and EU efforts, primarily focus on procedural guidelines while presuming that scientific benchmarking can effectively validate AI safety, similar to how crash tests verify vehicle safety or clinical trials validate drug efficacy. However, this approach fundamentally misunderstands the unique technical challenges posed by modern AI systems. Through systematic analysis of successful technology regulation case studies, we demonstrate that effective scientific regulation requires a causal theory linking observable test outcomes to future performance - for instance, how a vehicle's crash resistance at one speed predicts its safety at lower speeds. We show that deep learning models, which learn complex statistical patterns from training data without explicit causal mechanisms, preclude such guarantees. This limitation renders traditional regulatory approaches inadequate for ensuring AI safety. Moving forward, we call for regulators to reckon with this limitation, and propose a preliminary two-tiered regulatory framework that acknowledges these constraints: mandating human oversight for high-risk applications while developing appropriate risk communication strategies for lower-risk uses. Our findings highlight the urgent need to reconsider fundamental assumptions in AI regulation and suggest a concrete path forward for policymakers and researchers.

Imposing known physical constraints, such as conservation laws, during neural network training introduces an inductive bias that can improve accuracy, reliability, convergence, and data efficiency for modeling physical dynamics. While such constraints can be softly imposed via loss function penalties, recent advancements in differentiable physics and optimization improve performance by incorporating PDE-constrained optimization as individual layers in neural networks. This enables a stricter adherence to physical constraints. However, imposing hard constraints significantly increases computational and memory costs, especially for complex dynamical systems. This is because it requires solving an optimization problem over a large number of points in a mesh, representing spatial and temporal discretizations, which greatly increases the complexity of the constraint. To address this challenge, we develop a scalable approach to enforce hard physical constraints using Mixture-of-Experts (MoE), which can be used with any neural network architecture. Our approach imposes the constraint over smaller decomposed domains, each of which is solved by an "expert" through differentiable optimization. During training, each expert independently performs a localized backpropagation step by leveraging the implicit function theorem; the independence of each expert allows for parallelization across multiple GPUs. Compared to standard differentiable optimization, our scalable approach achieves greater accuracy in the neural PDE solver setting for predicting the dynamics of challenging non-linear systems. We also improve training stability and require significantly less computation time during both training and inference stages.

Increasingly sophisticated mathematical modelling processes from Machine Learning are being used to analyse complex data. However, the performance and explainability of these models within practical critical systems requires a rigorous and continuous verification of their safe utilisation. Working towards addressing this challenge, this paper presents a principled novel safety argument framework for critical systems that utilise deep neural networks. The approach allows various forms of predictions, e.g., future reliability of passing some demands, or confidence on a required reliability level. It is supported by a Bayesian analysis using operational data and the recent verification and validation techniques for deep learning. The prediction is conservative -- it starts with partial prior knowledge obtained from lifecycle activities and then determines the worst-case prediction. Open challenges are also identified.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit advancing capabilities in complex tasks, such as reasoning and graduate-level question answering, yet their resilience against misuse, particularly involving scientifically sophisticated risks, remains underexplored. Existing safety benchmarks typically focus either on instructions requiring minimal knowledge comprehension (e.g., ``tell me how to build a bomb") or utilize prompts that are relatively low-risk (e.g., multiple-choice or classification tasks about hazardous content). Consequently, they fail to adequately assess model safety when handling knowledge-intensive, hazardous scenarios. To address this critical gap, we introduce SOSBench, a regulation-grounded, hazard-focused benchmark encompassing six high-risk scientific domains: chemistry, biology, medicine, pharmacology, physics, and psychology. The benchmark comprises 3,000 prompts derived from real-world regulations and laws, systematically expanded via an LLM-assisted evolutionary pipeline that introduces diverse, realistic misuse scenarios (e.g., detailed explosive synthesis instructions involving advanced chemical formulas). We evaluate frontier models within a unified evaluation framework using our SOSBench. Despite their alignment claims, advanced models consistently disclose policy-violating content across all domains, demonstrating alarmingly high rates of harmful responses (e.g., 79.1% for Deepseek-R1 and 47.3% for GPT-4.1). These results highlight significant safety alignment deficiencies and underscore urgent concerns regarding the responsible deployment of powerful LLMs.

As AI systems become more advanced, companies and regulators will make difficult decisions about whether it is safe to train and deploy them. To prepare for these decisions, we investigate how developers could make a 'safety case,' which is a structured rationale that AI systems are unlikely to cause a catastrophe. We propose a framework for organizing a safety case and discuss four categories of arguments to justify safety: total inability to cause a catastrophe, sufficiently strong control measures, trustworthiness despite capability to cause harm, and -- if AI systems become much more powerful -- deference to credible AI advisors. We evaluate concrete examples of arguments in each category and outline how arguments could be combined to justify that AI systems are safe to deploy.

When considering the accuracy of sensors in an automated vehicle (AV), it is not sufficient to evaluate the performance of any given sensor in isolation. Rather, the performance of any individual sensor must be considered in the context of the overall system design. Techniques like redundancy and different sensing modalities can reduce the chances of a sensing failure. Additionally, the use of safety models is essential to understanding whether any particular sensing failure is relevant. Only when the entire system design is taken into account can one properly understand the meaning of safety-relevant sensing failures in an AV. In this paper, we will consider what should actually constitute a sensing failure, how safety models play an important role in mitigating potential failures, how a system-level approach to safety will deliver a safe and scalable AV, and what an acceptable sensing failure rate should be considering the full picture of an AV's architecture.

Safety alignment is an important procedure before the official deployment of a Large Language Model (LLM). While safety alignment has been extensively studied for LLM, there is still a large research gap for Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) that equip with improved reasoning capability. We in this paper systematically examine a simplified pipeline for producing safety aligned LRMs. With our evaluation of various LRMs, we deliver two main findings: i) Safety alignment can be done upon the LRM to restore its safety capability. ii) Safety alignment leads to a degradation of the reasoning capability of LRMs. The two findings show that there exists a trade-off between reasoning and safety capability with the sequential LRM production pipeline. The discovered trade-off, which we name Safety Tax, should shed light on future endeavors of safety research on LRMs. As a by-product, we curate a dataset called DirectRefusal, which might serve as an alternative dataset for safety alignment. Our source code is available at https://github.com/git-disl/Safety-Tax.

Large language models (LLMs) show inherent brittleness in their safety mechanisms, as evidenced by their susceptibility to jailbreaking and even non-malicious fine-tuning. This study explores this brittleness of safety alignment by leveraging pruning and low-rank modifications. We develop methods to identify critical regions that are vital for safety guardrails, and that are disentangled from utility-relevant regions at both the neuron and rank levels. Surprisingly, the isolated regions we find are sparse, comprising about 3% at the parameter level and 2.5% at the rank level. Removing these regions compromises safety without significantly impacting utility, corroborating the inherent brittleness of the model's safety mechanisms. Moreover, we show that LLMs remain vulnerable to low-cost fine-tuning attacks even when modifications to the safety-critical regions are restricted. These findings underscore the urgent need for more robust safety strategies in LLMs.

Neural Networks (NNs) trained through supervised learning struggle with managing edge-case scenarios common in real-world driving due to the intractability of exhaustive datasets covering all edge-cases, making knowledge-driven approaches, akin to how humans intuitively detect unexpected driving behavior, a suitable complement to data-driven methods. This work proposes a hybrid architecture combining low-level Model Predictive Controller (MPC) with locally deployed Large Language Models (LLMs) to enhance decision-making and Human Machine Interaction (HMI). The DecisionxLLM module evaluates robotic state information against natural language instructions to ensure adherence to desired driving behavior. The MPCxLLM module then adjusts MPC parameters based on LLM-generated insights, achieving control adaptability while preserving the safety and constraint guarantees of traditional MPC systems. Further, to enable efficient on-board deployment and to eliminate dependency on cloud connectivity, we shift processing to the on-board computing platform: We propose an approach that exploits Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG), Low Rank Adaptation (LoRA) fine-tuning, and quantization. Experimental results demonstrate that these enhancements yield significant improvements in reasoning accuracy by up to 10.45%, control adaptability by as much as 52.2%, and up to 10.5x increase in computational efficiency (tokens/s), validating the proposed framework's practicality for real-time deployment even on down-scaled robotic platforms. This work bridges high-level decision-making with low-level control adaptability, offering a synergistic framework for knowledge-driven and adaptive Autonomous Driving Systems (ADS).

Large language models (LLMs), despite possessing latent safety understanding from their vast pretraining data, remain vulnerable to generating harmful content and exhibit issues such as over-refusal and utility degradation after safety alignment. Current safety alignment methods often result in superficial refusal shortcuts or rely on intensive supervision for reasoning-based approaches, failing to fully leverage the model's intrinsic safety self-awareness. We propose AlphaAlign, a simple yet effective pure reinforcement learning (RL) framework with verifiable safety reward designed to incentivize this latent safety awareness through proactive safety reasoning.} AlphaAlign employs a dual-reward system: a verifiable safety reward encourages correctly formatted and explicitly justified refusals for harmful queries while penalizing over-refusals, and a normalized helpfulness reward guides high-quality responses to benign inputs. This allows the model to develop proactive safety reasoning capabilities without depending on supervised safety-specific reasoning data. AlphaAlign demonstrates three key advantages: (1) Simplicity and efficiency, requiring only binary prompt safety labels and minimal RL steps for substantial improvements. (2) Breaking the safety-utility trade-off, by enhancing refusal of harmful content and reducing over-refusals, while simultaneously maintaining or even improving general task performance and robustness to unseen jailbreaks. (3) Deep alignment, fostering proactive safety reasoning that generates explicit safety rationales rather than relying on shallow refusal patterns.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have achieved remarkable success on reasoning-intensive tasks such as mathematics and programming. However, their enhanced reasoning capabilities do not necessarily translate to improved safety performance-and in some cases, may even degrade it. This raises an important research question: how can we enhance the safety of LRMs? In this paper, we present a comprehensive empirical study on how to enhance the safety of LRMs through Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT). Our investigation begins with an unexpected observation: directly distilling safe responses from DeepSeek-R1 fails to significantly enhance safety. We analyze this phenomenon and identify three key failure patterns that contribute to it. We then demonstrate that explicitly addressing these issues during the data distillation process can lead to substantial safety improvements. Next, we explore whether a long and complex reasoning process is necessary for achieving safety. Interestingly, we find that simply using short or template-based reasoning process can attain comparable safety performance-and are significantly easier for models to learn than more intricate reasoning chains. These findings prompt a deeper reflection on the role of reasoning in ensuring safety. Finally, we find that mixing math reasoning data during safety fine-tuning is helpful to balance safety and over-refusal. Overall, we hope our empirical study could provide a more holistic picture on enhancing the safety of LRMs. The code and data used in our experiments are released in https://github.com/thu-coai/LRM-Safety-Study.

Advanced AI models hold the promise of tremendous benefits for humanity, but society needs to proactively manage the accompanying risks. In this paper, we focus on what we term "frontier AI" models: highly capable foundation models that could possess dangerous capabilities sufficient to pose severe risks to public safety. Frontier AI models pose a distinct regulatory challenge: dangerous capabilities can arise unexpectedly; it is difficult to robustly prevent a deployed model from being misused; and, it is difficult to stop a model's capabilities from proliferating broadly. To address these challenges, at least three building blocks for the regulation of frontier models are needed: (1) standard-setting processes to identify appropriate requirements for frontier AI developers, (2) registration and reporting requirements to provide regulators with visibility into frontier AI development processes, and (3) mechanisms to ensure compliance with safety standards for the development and deployment of frontier AI models. Industry self-regulation is an important first step. However, wider societal discussions and government intervention will be needed to create standards and to ensure compliance with them. We consider several options to this end, including granting enforcement powers to supervisory authorities and licensure regimes for frontier AI models. Finally, we propose an initial set of safety standards. These include conducting pre-deployment risk assessments; external scrutiny of model behavior; using risk assessments to inform deployment decisions; and monitoring and responding to new information about model capabilities and uses post-deployment. We hope this discussion contributes to the broader conversation on how to balance public safety risks and innovation benefits from advances at the frontier of AI development.

Rapid progress in machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI) has brought increasing attention to the potential impacts of AI technologies on society. In this paper we discuss one such potential impact: the problem of accidents in machine learning systems, defined as unintended and harmful behavior that may emerge from poor design of real-world AI systems. We present a list of five practical research problems related to accident risk, categorized according to whether the problem originates from having the wrong objective function ("avoiding side effects" and "avoiding reward hacking"), an objective function that is too expensive to evaluate frequently ("scalable supervision"), or undesirable behavior during the learning process ("safe exploration" and "distributional shift"). We review previous work in these areas as well as suggesting research directions with a focus on relevance to cutting-edge AI systems. Finally, we consider the high-level question of how to think most productively about the safety of forward-looking applications of AI.

The availability of representative datasets is an essential prerequisite for many successful artificial intelligence and machine learning models. However, in real life applications these models often encounter scenarios that are inadequately represented in the data used for training. There are various reasons for the absence of sufficient data, ranging from time and cost constraints to ethical considerations. As a consequence, the reliable usage of these models, especially in safety-critical applications, is still a tremendous challenge. Leveraging additional, already existing sources of knowledge is key to overcome the limitations of purely data-driven approaches. Knowledge augmented machine learning approaches offer the possibility of compensating for deficiencies, errors, or ambiguities in the data, thus increasing the generalization capability of the applied models. Even more, predictions that conform with knowledge are crucial for making trustworthy and safe decisions even in underrepresented scenarios. This work provides an overview of existing techniques and methods in the literature that combine data-driven models with existing knowledge. The identified approaches are structured according to the categories knowledge integration, extraction and conformity. In particular, we address the application of the presented methods in the field of autonomous driving.

Safety limitations in service robotics across various industries have raised significant concerns about the need for robust mechanisms ensuring that robots adhere to safe practices, thereby preventing actions that might harm humans or cause property damage. Despite advances, including the integration of Knowledge Graphs (KGs) with Large Language Models (LLMs), challenges in ensuring consistent safety in autonomous robot actions persist. In this paper, we propose a novel integration of Large Language Models with Embodied Robotic Control Prompts (ERCPs) and Embodied Knowledge Graphs (EKGs) to enhance the safety framework for service robots. ERCPs are designed as predefined instructions that ensure LLMs generate safe and precise responses. These responses are subsequently validated by EKGs, which provide a comprehensive knowledge base ensuring that the actions of the robot are continuously aligned with safety protocols, thereby promoting safer operational practices in varied contexts. Our experimental setup involved diverse real-world tasks, where robots equipped with our framework demonstrated significantly higher compliance with safety standards compared to traditional methods. This integration fosters secure human-robot interactions and positions our methodology at the forefront of AI-driven safety innovations in service robotics.

With the rapid development of multimodal large language models (MLLMs), they are increasingly deployed as autonomous computer-use agents capable of accomplishing complex computer tasks. However, a pressing issue arises: Can the safety risk principles designed and aligned for general MLLMs in dialogue scenarios be effectively transferred to real-world computer-use scenarios? Existing research on evaluating the safety risks of MLLM-based computer-use agents suffers from several limitations: it either lacks realistic interactive environments, or narrowly focuses on one or a few specific risk types. These limitations ignore the complexity, variability, and diversity of real-world environments, thereby restricting comprehensive risk evaluation for computer-use agents. To this end, we introduce RiOSWorld, a benchmark designed to evaluate the potential risks of MLLM-based agents during real-world computer manipulations. Our benchmark includes 492 risky tasks spanning various computer applications, involving web, social media, multimedia, os, email, and office software. We categorize these risks into two major classes based on their risk source: (i) User-originated risks and (ii) Environmental risks. For the evaluation, we evaluate safety risks from two perspectives: (i) Risk goal intention and (ii) Risk goal completion. Extensive experiments with multimodal agents on RiOSWorld demonstrate that current computer-use agents confront significant safety risks in real-world scenarios. Our findings highlight the necessity and urgency of safety alignment for computer-use agents in real-world computer manipulation, providing valuable insights for developing trustworthy computer-use agents. Our benchmark is publicly available at https://yjyddq.github.io/RiOSWorld.github.io/.

The development of robust safety benchmarks for large language models requires open, reproducible datasets that can measure both appropriate refusal of harmful content and potential over-restriction of legitimate scientific discourse. We present an open-source dataset and testing framework for evaluating LLM safety mechanisms across mainly controlled substance queries, analyzing four major models' responses to systematically varied prompts. Our results reveal distinct safety profiles: Claude-3.5-sonnet demonstrated the most conservative approach with 73% refusals and 27% allowances, while Mistral attempted to answer 100% of queries. GPT-3.5-turbo showed moderate restriction with 10% refusals and 90% allowances, and Grok-2 registered 20% refusals and 80% allowances. Testing prompt variation strategies revealed decreasing response consistency, from 85% with single prompts to 65% with five variations. This publicly available benchmark enables systematic evaluation of the critical balance between necessary safety restrictions and potential over-censorship of legitimate scientific inquiry, while providing a foundation for measuring progress in AI safety implementation. Chain-of-thought analysis reveals potential vulnerabilities in safety mechanisms, highlighting the complexity of implementing robust safeguards without unduly restricting desirable and valid scientific discourse.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used to control robotic systems such as drones, but their risks of causing physical threats and harm in real-world applications remain unexplored. Our study addresses the critical gap in evaluating LLM physical safety by developing a comprehensive benchmark for drone control. We classify the physical safety risks of drones into four categories: (1) human-targeted threats, (2) object-targeted threats, (3) infrastructure attacks, and (4) regulatory violations. Our evaluation of mainstream LLMs reveals an undesirable trade-off between utility and safety, with models that excel in code generation often performing poorly in crucial safety aspects. Furthermore, while incorporating advanced prompt engineering techniques such as In-Context Learning and Chain-of-Thought can improve safety, these methods still struggle to identify unintentional attacks. In addition, larger models demonstrate better safety capabilities, particularly in refusing dangerous commands. Our findings and benchmark can facilitate the design and evaluation of physical safety for LLMs. The project page is available at huggingface.co/spaces/TrustSafeAI/LLM-physical-safety.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) introduce a new generation paradigm of explicitly reasoning before answering, leading to remarkable improvements in complex tasks. However, they pose great safety risks against harmful queries and adversarial attacks. While recent mainstream safety efforts on LRMs, supervised fine-tuning (SFT), improve safety performance, we find that SFT-aligned models struggle to generalize to unseen jailbreak prompts. After thorough investigation of LRMs' generation, we identify a safety aha moment that can activate safety reasoning and lead to a safe response. This aha moment typically appears in the `key sentence', which follows models' query understanding process and can indicate whether the model will proceed safely. Based on these insights, we propose SafeKey, including two complementary objectives to better activate the safety aha moment in the key sentence: (1) a Dual-Path Safety Head to enhance the safety signal in the model's internal representations before the key sentence, and (2) a Query-Mask Modeling objective to improve the models' attention on its query understanding, which has important safety hints. Experiments across multiple safety benchmarks demonstrate that our methods significantly improve safety generalization to a wide range of jailbreak attacks and out-of-distribution harmful prompts, lowering the average harmfulness rate by 9.6\%, while maintaining general abilities. Our analysis reveals how SafeKey enhances safety by reshaping internal attention and improving the quality of hidden representations.

Fine-tuning large language models (LLMs) for downstream tasks is a widely adopted approach, but it often leads to safety degradation in safety-aligned LLMs. Currently, many solutions address this issue by incorporating additional safety data, which can be impractical in many cases. In this paper, we address the question: How can we improve downstream task performance while preserving safety in LLMs without relying on additional safety data? We propose a simple and effective method that maintains the inherent safety of LLMs while enhancing their downstream task performance: merging the weights of pre- and post-fine-tuned safety-aligned models. Experimental results across various downstream tasks, models, and merging methods demonstrate that this approach effectively mitigates safety degradation while improving downstream task performance, offering a practical solution for adapting safety-aligned LLMs.

The current paradigm for safety alignment of large language models (LLMs) follows a one-size-fits-all approach: the model refuses to interact with any content deemed unsafe by the model provider. This approach lacks flexibility in the face of varying social norms across cultures and regions. In addition, users may have diverse safety needs, making a model with static safety standards too restrictive to be useful, as well as too costly to be re-aligned. We propose Controllable Safety Alignment (CoSA), a framework designed to adapt models to diverse safety requirements without re-training. Instead of aligning a fixed model, we align models to follow safety configs -- free-form natural language descriptions of the desired safety behaviors -- that are provided as part of the system prompt. To adjust model safety behavior, authorized users only need to modify such safety configs at inference time. To enable that, we propose CoSAlign, a data-centric method for aligning LLMs to easily adapt to diverse safety configs. Furthermore, we devise a novel controllability evaluation protocol that considers both helpfulness and configured safety, summarizing them into CoSA-Score, and construct CoSApien, a human-authored benchmark that consists of real-world LLM use cases with diverse safety requirements and corresponding evaluation prompts. We show that CoSAlign leads to substantial gains of controllability over strong baselines including in-context alignment. Our framework encourages better representation and adaptation to pluralistic human values in LLMs, and thereby increasing their practicality.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have become an integral part of our daily lives. However, they impose certain risks, including those that can harm individuals' privacy, perpetuate biases and spread misinformation. These risks highlight the need for robust safety mechanisms, ethical guidelines, and thorough testing to ensure their responsible deployment. Safety of LLMs is a key property that needs to be thoroughly tested prior the model to be deployed and accessible to the general users. This paper reports the external safety testing experience conducted by researchers from Mondragon University and University of Seville on OpenAI's new o3-mini LLM as part of OpenAI's early access for safety testing program. In particular, we apply our tool, ASTRAL, to automatically and systematically generate up to date unsafe test inputs (i.e., prompts) that helps us test and assess different safety categories of LLMs. We automatically generate and execute a total of 10,080 unsafe test input on a early o3-mini beta version. After manually verifying the test cases classified as unsafe by ASTRAL, we identify a total of 87 actual instances of unsafe LLM behavior. We highlight key insights and findings uncovered during the pre-deployment external testing phase of OpenAI's latest LLM.

A prerequisite for safe autonomy-in-the-wild is safe testing-in-the-wild. Yet real-world autonomous tests face several unique safety challenges, both due to the possibility of causing harm during a test, as well as the risk of encountering new unsafe agent behavior through interactions with real-world and potentially malicious actors. We propose a framework for conducting safe autonomous agent tests on the open internet: agent actions are audited by a context-sensitive monitor that enforces a stringent safety boundary to stop an unsafe test, with suspect behavior ranked and logged to be examined by humans. We a design a basic safety monitor that is flexible enough to monitor existing LLM agents, and, using an adversarial simulated agent, we measure its ability to identify and stop unsafe situations. Then we apply the safety monitor on a battery of real-world tests of AutoGPT, and we identify several limitations and challenges that will face the creation of safe in-the-wild tests as autonomous agents grow more capable.

Large language models (LLMs) achieve state-of-the-art performance on multiple language tasks, yet their safety guardrails can be circumvented, leading to harmful generations. In light of this, recent research on safety mechanisms has emerged, revealing that when safety representations or component are suppressed, the safety capability of LLMs are compromised. However, existing research tends to overlook the safety impact of multi-head attention mechanisms, despite their crucial role in various model functionalities. Hence, in this paper, we aim to explore the connection between standard attention mechanisms and safety capability to fill this gap in the safety-related mechanistic interpretability. We propose a novel metric which tailored for multi-head attention, the Safety Head ImPortant Score (Ships), to assess the individual heads' contributions to model safety. Based on this, we generalize Ships to the dataset level and further introduce the Safety Attention Head AttRibution Algorithm (Sahara) to attribute the critical safety attention heads inside the model. Our findings show that the special attention head has a significant impact on safety. Ablating a single safety head allows aligned model (e.g., Llama-2-7b-chat) to respond to 16 times more harmful queries, while only modifying 0.006% of the parameters, in contrast to the ~ 5% modification required in previous studies. More importantly, we demonstrate that attention heads primarily function as feature extractors for safety and models fine-tuned from the same base model exhibit overlapping safety heads through comprehensive experiments. Together, our attribution approach and findings provide a novel perspective for unpacking the black box of safety mechanisms within large models.

As large reasoning models (LRMs) grow more capable, chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning introduces new safety challenges. Existing SFT-based safety alignment studies dominantly focused on filtering prompts with safe, high-quality responses, while overlooking hard prompts that always elicit harmful outputs. To fill this gap, we introduce UnsafeChain, a safety alignment dataset constructed from hard prompts with diverse sources, where unsafe completions are identified and explicitly corrected into safe responses. By exposing models to unsafe behaviors and guiding their correction, UnsafeChain enhances safety while preserving general reasoning ability. We fine-tune three LRMs on UnsafeChain and compare them against recent SafeChain and STAR-1 across six out-of-distribution and five in-distribution benchmarks. UnsafeChain consistently outperforms prior datasets, with even a 1K subset matching or surpassing baseline performance, demonstrating the effectiveness and generalizability of correction-based supervision. We release our dataset and code at https://github.com/mbzuai-nlp/UnsafeChain

Deploying large language models (LLMs) in real-world applications requires robust safety guard models to detect and block harmful user prompts. While large safety guard models achieve strong performance, their computational cost is substantial. To mitigate this, smaller distilled models are used, but they often underperform on "hard" examples where the larger model provides accurate predictions. We observe that many inputs can be reliably handled by the smaller model, while only a small fraction require the larger model's capacity. Motivated by this, we propose SafeRoute, a binary router that distinguishes hard examples from easy ones. Our method selectively applies the larger safety guard model to the data that the router considers hard, improving efficiency while maintaining accuracy compared to solely using the larger safety guard model. Experimental results on multiple benchmark datasets demonstrate that our adaptive model selection significantly enhances the trade-off between computational cost and safety performance, outperforming relevant baselines.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) and generative AI become increasingly widespread, concerns about content safety have grown in parallel. Currently, there is a clear lack of high-quality, human-annotated datasets that address the full spectrum of LLM-related safety risks and are usable for commercial applications. To bridge this gap, we propose a comprehensive and adaptable taxonomy for categorizing safety risks, structured into 12 top-level hazard categories with an extension to 9 fine-grained subcategories. This taxonomy is designed to meet the diverse requirements of downstream users, offering more granular and flexible tools for managing various risk types. Using a hybrid data generation pipeline that combines human annotations with a multi-LLM "jury" system to assess the safety of responses, we obtain Aegis 2.0, a carefully curated collection of 34,248 samples of human-LLM interactions, annotated according to our proposed taxonomy. To validate its effectiveness, we demonstrate that several lightweight models, trained using parameter-efficient techniques on Aegis 2.0, achieve performance competitive with leading safety models fully fine-tuned on much larger, non-commercial datasets. In addition, we introduce a novel training blend that combines safety with topic following data.This approach enhances the adaptability of guard models, enabling them to generalize to new risk categories defined during inference. We plan to open-source Aegis 2.0 data and models to the research community to aid in the safety guardrailing of LLMs.

Training large language models to follow instructions makes them perform better on a wide range of tasks, generally becoming more helpful. However, a perfectly helpful model will follow even the most malicious instructions and readily generate harmful content. In this paper, we raise concerns over the safety of models that only emphasize helpfulness, not safety, in their instruction-tuning. We show that several popular instruction-tuned models are highly unsafe. Moreover, we show that adding just 3% safety examples (a few hundred demonstrations) in the training set when fine-tuning a model like LLaMA can substantially improve their safety. Our safety-tuning does not make models significantly less capable or helpful as measured by standard benchmarks. However, we do find a behavior of exaggerated safety, where too much safety-tuning makes models refuse to respond to reasonable prompts that superficially resemble unsafe ones. Our study sheds light on trade-offs in training LLMs to follow instructions and exhibit safe behavior.

The current safeguard mechanisms for large language models (LLMs) are indeed susceptible to jailbreak attacks, making them inherently fragile. Even the process of fine-tuning on apparently benign data for downstream tasks can jeopardize safety. One potential solution is to conduct safety fine-tuning subsequent to downstream fine-tuning. However, there's a risk of catastrophic forgetting during safety fine-tuning, where LLMs may regain safety measures but lose the task-specific knowledge acquired during downstream fine-tuning. In this paper, we introduce a safety realignment framework through subspace-oriented model fusion (SOMF), aiming to combine the safeguard capabilities of initially aligned model and the current fine-tuned model into a realigned model. Our approach begins by disentangling all task vectors from the weights of each fine-tuned model. We then identify safety-related regions within these vectors by subspace masking techniques. Finally, we explore the fusion of the initial safely aligned LLM with all task vectors based on the identified safety subspace. We validate that our safety realignment framework satisfies the safety requirements of a single fine-tuned model as well as multiple models during their fusion. Our findings confirm that SOMF preserves safety without notably compromising performance on downstream tasks, including instruction following in Chinese, English, and Hindi, as well as problem-solving capabilities in Code and Math.

Foundation models (FMs) provide societal benefits but also amplify risks. Governments, companies, and researchers have proposed regulatory frameworks, acceptable use policies, and safety benchmarks in response. However, existing public benchmarks often define safety categories based on previous literature, intuitions, or common sense, leading to disjointed sets of categories for risks specified in recent regulations and policies, which makes it challenging to evaluate and compare FMs across these benchmarks. To bridge this gap, we introduce AIR-Bench 2024, the first AI safety benchmark aligned with emerging government regulations and company policies, following the regulation-based safety categories grounded in our AI risks study, AIR 2024. AIR 2024 decomposes 8 government regulations and 16 company policies into a four-tiered safety taxonomy with 314 granular risk categories in the lowest tier. AIR-Bench 2024 contains 5,694 diverse prompts spanning these categories, with manual curation and human auditing to ensure quality. We evaluate leading language models on AIR-Bench 2024, uncovering insights into their alignment with specified safety concerns. By bridging the gap between public benchmarks and practical AI risks, AIR-Bench 2024 provides a foundation for assessing model safety across jurisdictions, fostering the development of safer and more responsible AI systems.

The remarkable success of Large Language Models (LLMs) has illuminated a promising pathway toward achieving Artificial General Intelligence for both academic and industrial communities, owing to their unprecedented performance across various applications. As LLMs continue to gain prominence in both research and commercial domains, their security and safety implications have become a growing concern, not only for researchers and corporations but also for every nation. Currently, existing surveys on LLM safety primarily focus on specific stages of the LLM lifecycle, e.g., deployment phase or fine-tuning phase, lacking a comprehensive understanding of the entire "lifechain" of LLMs. To address this gap, this paper introduces, for the first time, the concept of "full-stack" safety to systematically consider safety issues throughout the entire process of LLM training, deployment, and eventual commercialization. Compared to the off-the-shelf LLM safety surveys, our work demonstrates several distinctive advantages: (I) Comprehensive Perspective. We define the complete LLM lifecycle as encompassing data preparation, pre-training, post-training, deployment and final commercialization. To our knowledge, this represents the first safety survey to encompass the entire lifecycle of LLMs. (II) Extensive Literature Support. Our research is grounded in an exhaustive review of over 800+ papers, ensuring comprehensive coverage and systematic organization of security issues within a more holistic understanding. (III) Unique Insights. Through systematic literature analysis, we have developed reliable roadmaps and perspectives for each chapter. Our work identifies promising research directions, including safety in data generation, alignment techniques, model editing, and LLM-based agent systems. These insights provide valuable guidance for researchers pursuing future work in this field.

Agents should avoid unsafe behaviour during both training and deployment. This typically requires a simulator and a procedural specification of unsafe behaviour. Unfortunately, a simulator is not always available, and procedurally specifying constraints can be difficult or impossible for many real-world tasks. A recently introduced technique, ReQueST, aims to solve this problem by learning a neural simulator of the environment from safe human trajectories, then using the learned simulator to efficiently learn a reward model from human feedback. However, it is yet unknown whether this approach is feasible in complex 3D environments with feedback obtained from real humans - whether sufficient pixel-based neural simulator quality can be achieved, and whether the human data requirements are viable in terms of both quantity and quality. In this paper we answer this question in the affirmative, using ReQueST to train an agent to perform a 3D first-person object collection task using data entirely from human contractors. We show that the resulting agent exhibits an order of magnitude reduction in unsafe behaviour compared to standard reinforcement learning.

The rapid development of large reasoning models, such as OpenAI-o3 and DeepSeek-R1, has led to significant improvements in complex reasoning over non-reasoning large language models~(LLMs). However, their enhanced capabilities, combined with the open-source access of models like DeepSeek-R1, raise serious safety concerns, particularly regarding their potential for misuse. In this work, we present a comprehensive safety assessment of these reasoning models, leveraging established safety benchmarks to evaluate their compliance with safety regulations. Furthermore, we investigate their susceptibility to adversarial attacks, such as jailbreaking and prompt injection, to assess their robustness in real-world applications. Through our multi-faceted analysis, we uncover four key findings: (1) There is a significant safety gap between the open-source R1 models and the o3-mini model, on both safety benchmark and attack, suggesting more safety effort on R1 is needed. (2) The distilled reasoning model shows poorer safety performance compared to its safety-aligned base models. (3) The stronger the model's reasoning ability, the greater the potential harm it may cause when answering unsafe questions. (4) The thinking process in R1 models pose greater safety concerns than their final answers. Our study provides insights into the security implications of reasoning models and highlights the need for further advancements in R1 models' safety to close the gap.

Laboratory accidents pose significant risks to human life and property, underscoring the importance of robust safety protocols. Despite advancements in safety training, laboratory personnel may still unknowingly engage in unsafe practices. With the increasing reliance on large language models (LLMs) for guidance in various fields, including laboratory settings, there is a growing concern about their reliability in critical safety-related decision-making. Unlike trained human researchers, LLMs lack formal lab safety education, raising questions about their ability to provide safe and accurate guidance. Existing research on LLM trustworthiness primarily focuses on issues such as ethical compliance, truthfulness, and fairness but fails to fully cover safety-critical real-world applications, like lab safety. To address this gap, we propose the Laboratory Safety Benchmark (LabSafety Bench), a comprehensive evaluation framework based on a new taxonomy aligned with Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) protocols. This benchmark includes 765 multiple-choice questions verified by human experts, assessing LLMs and vision language models (VLMs) performance in lab safety contexts. Our evaluations demonstrate that while GPT-4o outperforms human participants, it is still prone to critical errors, highlighting the risks of relying on LLMs in safety-critical environments. Our findings emphasize the need for specialized benchmarks to accurately assess the trustworthiness of LLMs in real-world safety applications.

The open-world deployment of Machine Learning (ML) algorithms in safety-critical applications such as autonomous vehicles needs to address a variety of ML vulnerabilities such as interpretability, verifiability, and performance limitations. Research explores different approaches to improve ML dependability by proposing new models and training techniques to reduce generalization error, achieve domain adaptation, and detect outlier examples and adversarial attacks. However, there is a missing connection between ongoing ML research and well-established safety principles. In this paper, we present a structured and comprehensive review of ML techniques to improve the dependability of ML algorithms in uncontrolled open-world settings. From this review, we propose the Taxonomy of ML Safety that maps state-of-the-art ML techniques to key engineering safety strategies. Our taxonomy of ML safety presents a safety-oriented categorization of ML techniques to provide guidance for improving dependability of the ML design and development. The proposed taxonomy can serve as a safety checklist to aid designers in improving coverage and diversity of safety strategies employed in any given ML system.

Driving on roads is restricted by various traffic rules, aiming to ensure safety for all traffic participants. However, human road users usually do not adhere to these rules strictly, resulting in varying degrees of rule conformity. Such deviations from given rules are key components of today's road traffic. In autonomous driving, robotic agents can disturb traffic flow, when rule deviations are not taken into account. In this paper, we present an approach to derive the distribution of degrees of rule conformity from human driving data. We demonstrate our method with the Waymo Open Motion dataset and Safety Distance and Speed Limit rules.

Safety and responsibility evaluations of advanced AI models are a critical but developing field of research and practice. In the development of Google DeepMind's advanced AI models, we innovated on and applied a broad set of approaches to safety evaluation. In this report, we summarise and share elements of our evolving approach as well as lessons learned for a broad audience. Key lessons learned include: First, theoretical underpinnings and frameworks are invaluable to organise the breadth of risk domains, modalities, forms, metrics, and goals. Second, theory and practice of safety evaluation development each benefit from collaboration to clarify goals, methods and challenges, and facilitate the transfer of insights between different stakeholders and disciplines. Third, similar key methods, lessons, and institutions apply across the range of concerns in responsibility and safety - including established and emerging harms. For this reason it is important that a wide range of actors working on safety evaluation and safety research communities work together to develop, refine and implement novel evaluation approaches and best practices, rather than operating in silos. The report concludes with outlining the clear need to rapidly advance the science of evaluations, to integrate new evaluations into the development and governance of AI, to establish scientifically-grounded norms and standards, and to promote a robust evaluation ecosystem.

Given the growing concerns around the safety and risks of Large Language Models (LLMs), it is essential to develop methods for mitigating these issues. We introduce Safe and Responsible Large Language Model (SR_{LLM}) , a model designed to enhance the safety of language generation using LLMs. Our approach incorporates a comprehensive LLM safety risk taxonomy and utilizes a dataset annotated by experts that align with this taxonomy. SR_{LLM} is designed to identify potentially unsafe content and produce benign variations. It employs instruction-based and parameter-efficient fine-tuning methods, making the model not only effective in enhancing safety but also resource-efficient and straightforward to adjust. Through our testing on five benchmark datasets and two proprietary datasets, we observed notable reductions in the generation of unsafe content. Moreover, following the implementation of safety measures, there was a significant improvement in the production of safe content. We detail our fine-tuning processes and how we benchmark safety for SR_{LLM} with the community engagement and promote the responsible advancement of LLMs. All the data and code are available anonymous at https://github.com/shainarazavi/Safe-Responsible-LLM .

The strive to make AI applications "safe" has led to the development of safety-measures as the main or even sole normative requirement of their permissible use. Similar can be attested to the latest version of chatbots, such as chatGPT. In this view, if they are "safe", they are supposed to be permissible to deploy. This approach, which we call "safety-normativity", is rather limited in solving the emerging issues that chatGPT and other chatbots have caused thus far. In answering this limitation, in this paper we argue for limiting chatbots in the range of topics they can chat about according to the normative concept of appropriateness. We argue that rather than looking for "safety" in a chatbot's utterances to determine what they may and may not say, we ought to assess those utterances according to three forms of appropriateness: technical-discursive, social, and moral. We then spell out what requirements for chatbots follow from these forms of appropriateness to avoid the limits of previous accounts: positionality, acceptability, and value alignment (PAVA). With these in mind, we may be able to determine what a chatbot may and may not say. Lastly, one initial suggestion is to use challenge sets, specifically designed for appropriateness, as a validation method.

The rapid development in large language models (LLMs) has transformed the landscape of natural language processing and understanding (NLP/NLU), offering significant benefits across various domains. However, when applied to scientific research, these powerful models exhibit critical failure modes related to scientific integrity and trustworthiness. Existing general-purpose LLM guardrails are insufficient to address these unique challenges in the scientific domain. We provide comprehensive guidelines for deploying LLM guardrails in the scientific domain. We identify specific challenges -- including time sensitivity, knowledge contextualization, conflict resolution, and intellectual property concerns -- and propose a guideline framework for the guardrails that can align with scientific needs. These guardrail dimensions include trustworthiness, ethics & bias, safety, and legal aspects. We also outline in detail the implementation strategies that employ white-box, black-box, and gray-box methodologies that can be enforced within scientific contexts.

Text-to-image (T2I) models are widespread, but their limited safety guardrails expose end users to harmful content and potentially allow for model misuse. Current safety measures are typically limited to text-based filtering or concept removal strategies, able to remove just a few concepts from the model's generative capabilities. In this work, we introduce AlignGuard, a method for safety alignment of T2I models. We enable the application of Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) for safety purposes in T2I models by synthetically generating a dataset of harmful and safe image-text pairs, which we call CoProV2. Using a custom DPO strategy and this dataset, we train safety experts, in the form of low-rank adaptation (LoRA) matrices, able to guide the generation process away from specific safety-related concepts. Then, we merge the experts into a single LoRA using a novel merging strategy for optimal scaling performance. This expert-based approach enables scalability, allowing us to remove 7x more harmful concepts from T2I models compared to baselines. AlignGuard consistently outperforms the state-of-the-art on many benchmarks and establishes new practices for safety alignment in T2I networks. Code and data will be shared at https://safetydpo.github.io/.

As Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) becomes increasingly integrated into various facets of human life, ensuring the safety and ethical alignment of such systems is paramount. Previous studies primarily focus on single-modality threats, which may not suffice given the integrated and complex nature of cross-modality interactions. We introduce a novel safety alignment challenge called Safe Inputs but Unsafe Output (SIUO) to evaluate cross-modality safety alignment. Specifically, it considers cases where single modalities are safe independently but could potentially lead to unsafe or unethical outputs when combined. To empirically investigate this problem, we developed the SIUO, a cross-modality benchmark encompassing 9 critical safety domains, such as self-harm, illegal activities, and privacy violations. Our findings reveal substantial safety vulnerabilities in both closed- and open-source LVLMs, such as GPT-4V and LLaVA, underscoring the inadequacy of current models to reliably interpret and respond to complex, real-world scenarios.

Large language models (LLMs) typically deploy safety mechanisms to prevent harmful content generation. Most current approaches focus narrowly on risks posed by malicious actors, often framing risks as adversarial events and relying on defensive refusals. However, in real-world settings, risks also come from non-malicious users seeking help while under psychological distress (e.g., self-harm intentions). In such cases, the model's response can strongly influence the user's next actions. Simple refusals may lead them to repeat, escalate, or move to unsafe platforms, creating worse outcomes. We introduce Constructive Safety Alignment (CSA), a human-centric paradigm that protects against malicious misuse while actively guiding vulnerable users toward safe and helpful results. Implemented in Oyster-I (Oy1), CSA combines game-theoretic anticipation of user reactions, fine-grained risk boundary discovery, and interpretable reasoning control, turning safety into a trust-building process. Oy1 achieves state-of-the-art safety among open models while retaining high general capabilities. On our Constructive Benchmark, it shows strong constructive engagement, close to GPT-5, and unmatched robustness on the Strata-Sword jailbreak dataset, nearing GPT-o1 levels. By shifting from refusal-first to guidance-first safety, CSA redefines the model-user relationship, aiming for systems that are not just safe, but meaningfully helpful. We release Oy1, code, and the benchmark to support responsible, user-centered AI.

With the rapid advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs), significant safety concerns have emerged. Fundamentally, the safety of large language models is closely linked to the accuracy, comprehensiveness, and clarity of their understanding of safety knowledge, particularly in domains such as law, policy and ethics. This factuality ability is crucial in determining whether these models can be deployed and applied safely and compliantly within specific regions. To address these challenges and better evaluate the factuality ability of LLMs to answer short questions, we introduce the Chinese SafetyQA benchmark. Chinese SafetyQA has several properties (i.e., Chinese, Diverse, High-quality, Static, Easy-to-evaluate, Safety-related, Harmless). Based on Chinese SafetyQA, we perform a comprehensive evaluation on the factuality abilities of existing LLMs and analyze how these capabilities relate to LLM abilities, e.g., RAG ability and robustness against attacks.

Although AI systems have been applied in various fields and achieved impressive performance, their safety and reliability are still a big concern. This is especially important for safety-critical tasks. One shared characteristic of these critical tasks is their risk sensitivity, where small mistakes can cause big consequences and even endanger life. There are several factors that could be guidelines for the successful deployment of AI systems in sensitive tasks: (i) failure detection and out-of-distribution (OOD) detection; (ii) overfitting identification; (iii) uncertainty quantification for predictions; (iv) robustness to data perturbations. These factors are also challenges of current AI systems, which are major blocks for building safe and reliable AI. Specifically, the current AI algorithms are unable to identify common causes for failure detection. Furthermore, additional techniques are required to quantify the quality of predictions. All these contribute to inaccurate uncertainty quantification, which lowers trust in predictions. Hence obtaining accurate model uncertainty quantification and its further improvement are challenging. To address these issues, many techniques have been proposed, such as regularization methods and learning strategies. As vision and language are the most typical data type and have many open source benchmark datasets, this thesis will focus on vision-language data processing for tasks like classification, image captioning, and vision question answering. In this thesis, we aim to build a safeguard by further developing current techniques to ensure the accurate model uncertainty for safety-critical tasks.

Density of the reachable states can help understand the risk of safety-critical systems, especially in situations when worst-case reachability is too conservative. Recent work provides a data-driven approach to compute the density distribution of autonomous systems' forward reachable states online. In this paper, we study the use of such approach in combination with model predictive control for verifiable safe path planning under uncertainties. We first use the learned density distribution to compute the risk of collision online. If such risk exceeds the acceptable threshold, our method will plan for a new path around the previous trajectory, with the risk of collision below the threshold. Our method is well-suited to handle systems with uncertainties and complicated dynamics as our data-driven approach does not need an analytical form of the systems' dynamics and can estimate forward state density with an arbitrary initial distribution of uncertainties. We design two challenging scenarios (autonomous driving and hovercraft control) for safe motion planning in environments with obstacles under system uncertainties. We first show that our density estimation approach can reach a similar accuracy as the Monte-Carlo-based method while using only 0.01X training samples. By leveraging the estimated risk, our algorithm achieves the highest success rate in goal reaching when enforcing the safety rate above 0.99.

Codex, a large language model (LLM) trained on a variety of codebases, exceeds the previous state of the art in its capacity to synthesize and generate code. Although Codex provides a plethora of benefits, models that may generate code on such scale have significant limitations, alignment problems, the potential to be misused, and the possibility to increase the rate of progress in technical fields that may themselves have destabilizing impacts or have misuse potential. Yet such safety impacts are not yet known or remain to be explored. In this paper, we outline a hazard analysis framework constructed at OpenAI to uncover hazards or safety risks that the deployment of models like Codex may impose technically, socially, politically, and economically. The analysis is informed by a novel evaluation framework that determines the capacity of advanced code generation techniques against the complexity and expressivity of specification prompts, and their capability to understand and execute them relative to human ability.

Although large reasoning models (LRMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities on complex tasks, recent studies reveal that these models frequently fulfill harmful user instructions, raising significant safety concerns. In this paper, we investigate the underlying cause of LRM safety risks and find that models already possess sufficient safety knowledge but fail to activate it during reasoning. Based on this insight, we propose R1-Act, a simple and efficient post-training method that explicitly triggers safety knowledge through a structured reasoning process. R1-Act achieves strong safety improvements while preserving reasoning performance, outperforming prior alignment methods. Notably, it requires only 1,000 training examples and 90 minutes of training on a single RTX A6000 GPU. Extensive experiments across multiple LRM backbones and sizes demonstrate the robustness, scalability, and practical efficiency of our approach.

Deep learning methods are widely regarded as indispensable when it comes to designing perception pipelines for autonomous agents such as robots, drones or automated vehicles. The main reasons, however, for deep learning not being used for autonomous agents at large scale already are safety concerns. Deep learning approaches typically exhibit a black-box behavior which makes it hard for them to be evaluated with respect to safety-critical aspects. While there have been some work on safety in deep learning, most papers typically focus on high-level safety concerns. In this work, we seek to dive into the safety concerns of deep learning methods and present a concise enumeration on a deeply technical level. Additionally, we present extensive discussions on possible mitigation methods and give an outlook regarding what mitigation methods are still missing in order to facilitate an argumentation for the safety of a deep learning method.

In this position paper, we address the persistent gap between rapidly growing AI capabilities and lagging safety progress. Existing paradigms divide into ``Make AI Safe'', which applies post-hoc alignment and guardrails but remains brittle and reactive, and ``Make Safe AI'', which emphasizes intrinsic safety but struggles to address unforeseen risks in open-ended environments. We therefore propose safe-by-coevolution as a new formulation of the ``Make Safe AI'' paradigm, inspired by biological immunity, in which safety becomes a dynamic, adversarial, and ongoing learning process. To operationalize this vision, we introduce R^2AI -- Resistant and Resilient AI -- as a practical framework that unites resistance against known threats with resilience to unforeseen risks. R^2AI integrates fast and slow safe models, adversarial simulation and verification through a safety wind tunnel, and continual feedback loops that guide safety and capability to coevolve. We argue that this framework offers a scalable and proactive path to maintain continual safety in dynamic environments, addressing both near-term vulnerabilities and long-term existential risks as AI advances toward AGI and ASI.

Optimizing large language models (LLMs) for downstream use cases often involves the customization of pre-trained LLMs through further fine-tuning. Meta's open release of Llama models and OpenAI's APIs for fine-tuning GPT-3.5 Turbo on custom datasets also encourage this practice. But, what are the safety costs associated with such custom fine-tuning? We note that while existing safety alignment infrastructures can restrict harmful behaviors of LLMs at inference time, they do not cover safety risks when fine-tuning privileges are extended to end-users. Our red teaming studies find that the safety alignment of LLMs can be compromised by fine-tuning with only a few adversarially designed training examples. For instance, we jailbreak GPT-3.5 Turbo's safety guardrails by fine-tuning it on only 10 such examples at a cost of less than $0.20 via OpenAI's APIs, making the model responsive to nearly any harmful instructions. Disconcertingly, our research also reveals that, even without malicious intent, simply fine-tuning with benign and commonly used datasets can also inadvertently degrade the safety alignment of LLMs, though to a lesser extent. These findings suggest that fine-tuning aligned LLMs introduces new safety risks that current safety infrastructures fall short of addressing -- even if a model's initial safety alignment is impeccable, it is not necessarily to be maintained after custom fine-tuning. We outline and critically analyze potential mitigations and advocate for further research efforts toward reinforcing safety protocols for the custom fine-tuning of aligned LLMs.

Recent advancements in large language model (LLM) agents have significantly accelerated scientific discovery automation, yet concurrently raised critical ethical and safety concerns. To systematically address these challenges, we introduce SafeScientist, an innovative AI scientist framework explicitly designed to enhance safety and ethical responsibility in AI-driven scientific exploration. SafeScientist proactively refuses ethically inappropriate or high-risk tasks and rigorously emphasizes safety throughout the research process. To achieve comprehensive safety oversight, we integrate multiple defensive mechanisms, including prompt monitoring, agent-collaboration monitoring, tool-use monitoring, and an ethical reviewer component. Complementing SafeScientist, we propose SciSafetyBench, a novel benchmark specifically designed to evaluate AI safety in scientific contexts, comprising 240 high-risk scientific tasks across 6 domains, alongside 30 specially designed scientific tools and 120 tool-related risk tasks. Extensive experiments demonstrate that SafeScientist significantly improves safety performance by 35\% compared to traditional AI scientist frameworks, without compromising scientific output quality. Additionally, we rigorously validate the robustness of our safety pipeline against diverse adversarial attack methods, further confirming the effectiveness of our integrated approach. The code and data will be available at https://github.com/ulab-uiuc/SafeScientist. red{Warning: this paper contains example data that may be offensive or harmful.}

Deep reinforcement learning has emerged as a powerful tool for obtaining high-performance policies. However, the safety of these policies has been a long-standing issue. One promising paradigm to guarantee safety is a shield, which shields a policy from making unsafe actions. However, computing a shield scales exponentially in the number of state variables. This is a particular concern in multi-agent systems with many agents. In this work, we propose a novel approach for multi-agent shielding. We address scalability by computing individual shields for each agent. The challenge is that typical safety specifications are global properties, but the shields of individual agents only ensure local properties. Our key to overcome this challenge is to apply assume-guarantee reasoning. Specifically, we present a sound proof rule that decomposes a (global, complex) safety specification into (local, simple) obligations for the shields of the individual agents. Moreover, we show that applying the shields during reinforcement learning significantly improves the quality of the policies obtained for a given training budget. We demonstrate the effectiveness and scalability of our multi-agent shielding framework in two case studies, reducing the computation time from hours to seconds and achieving fast learning convergence.

With the rapid development of Large Language Models (LLMs), increasing attention has been paid to their safety concerns. Consequently, evaluating the safety of LLMs has become an essential task for facilitating the broad applications of LLMs. Nevertheless, the absence of comprehensive safety evaluation benchmarks poses a significant impediment to effectively assess and enhance the safety of LLMs. In this work, we present SafetyBench, a comprehensive benchmark for evaluating the safety of LLMs, which comprises 11,435 diverse multiple choice questions spanning across 7 distinct categories of safety concerns. Notably, SafetyBench also incorporates both Chinese and English data, facilitating the evaluation in both languages. Our extensive tests over 25 popular Chinese and English LLMs in both zero-shot and few-shot settings reveal a substantial performance advantage for GPT-4 over its counterparts, and there is still significant room for improving the safety of current LLMs. We believe SafetyBench will enable fast and comprehensive evaluation of LLMs' safety, and foster the development of safer LLMs. Data and evaluation guidelines are available at https://github.com/thu-coai/SafetyBench. Submission entrance and leaderboard are available at https://llmbench.ai/safety.

We introduce SafeWork-R1, a cutting-edge multimodal reasoning model that demonstrates the coevolution of capabilities and safety. It is developed by our proposed SafeLadder framework, which incorporates large-scale, progressive, safety-oriented reinforcement learning post-training, supported by a suite of multi-principled verifiers. Unlike previous alignment methods such as RLHF that simply learn human preferences, SafeLadder enables SafeWork-R1 to develop intrinsic safety reasoning and self-reflection abilities, giving rise to safety `aha' moments. Notably, SafeWork-R1 achieves an average improvement of 46.54% over its base model Qwen2.5-VL-72B on safety-related benchmarks without compromising general capabilities, and delivers state-of-the-art safety performance compared to leading proprietary models such as GPT-4.1 and Claude Opus 4. To further bolster its reliability, we implement two distinct inference-time intervention methods and a deliberative search mechanism, enforcing step-level verification. Finally, we further develop SafeWork-R1-InternVL3-78B, SafeWork-R1-DeepSeek-70B, and SafeWork-R1-Qwen2.5VL-7B. All resulting models demonstrate that safety and capability can co-evolve synergistically, highlighting the generalizability of our framework in building robust, reliable, and trustworthy general-purpose AI.

Safety reasoning is a recent paradigm where LLMs reason over safety policies before generating responses, thereby mitigating limitations in existing safety measures such as over-refusal and jailbreak vulnerabilities. However, implementing this paradigm is challenging due to the resource-intensive process of creating high-quality policy-embedded chain-of-thought (CoT) datasets while ensuring reasoning remains accurate and free from hallucinations or policy conflicts. To tackle this, we propose AIDSAFE: Agentic Iterative Deliberation for Safety Reasoning, a novel data generation recipe that leverages multi-agent deliberation to iteratively expand reasoning on safety policies. A data refiner stage in AIDSAFE ensures high-quality outputs by eliminating repetitive, redundant, and deceptive thoughts. AIDSAFE-generated CoTs provide a strong foundation for supervised fine-tuning (SFT)-based safety training. Additionally, to address the need of preference data in alignment stages, such as DPO training, we introduce a supplemental recipe that uses belief augmentation to create distinct selected and rejected CoT samples. Our evaluations demonstrate that AIDSAFE-generated CoTs achieve superior policy adherence and reasoning quality. Consequently, we show that fine-tuning open-source LLMs on these CoTs can significantly improve safety generalization and jailbreak robustness while maintaining acceptable utility and over-refusal accuracy. AIDSAFE-generated CoT datasets can be found here: https://huggingface.co/datasets/AmazonScience/AIDSAFE

The National Airspace System (NAS) is a complex and evolving system that enables safe and efficient aviation. Advanced air mobility concepts and new airspace entrants, such as unmanned aircraft, must integrate into the NAS without degrading overall safety or efficiency. For instance, regulations, standards, and systems are required to mitigate the risk of a midair collision between aircraft. Monte Carlo simulations have been a foundational capability for decades to develop, assess, and certify aircraft conflict avoidance systems. These are often validated through human-in-the-loop experiments and flight testing. For many aviation safety studies, manned aircraft behavior is represented using dynamic Bayesian networks. The original statistical models were developed from 2008-2013 to support safety simulations for altitudes above 500 feet Above Ground Level (AGL). However, these models were not sufficient to assess the safety of smaller UAS operations below 500 feet AGL. In response, newer models with altitude floors below 500 feet AGL have been in development since 2018. Many of the models assume that aircraft behavior is uncorrelated and not dependent on air traffic services or nearby aircraft. Our research objective was to compare the various uncorrelated models of conventional aircraft and identify how the models differ. Particularly if models of rotorcraft were sufficiently different than models of fixed-wing aircraft to require type specific models. The primary contribution is guidance on which uncorrelated models to leverage when evaluating the performance of a collision avoidance system designed for low altitude operations. We also address which models can be surrogates for noncooperative aircraft without transponders.

With the growing prevalence of large language models (LLMs), the safety of LLMs has raised significant concerns. However, there is still a lack of definitive standards for evaluating their safety due to the subjective nature of current safety benchmarks. To address this gap, we conducted the first exploration of LLMs' safety evaluation from a legal perspective by proposing the SafeLawBench benchmark. SafeLawBench categorizes safety risks into three levels based on legal standards, providing a systematic and comprehensive framework for evaluation. It comprises 24,860 multi-choice questions and 1,106 open-domain question-answering (QA) tasks. Our evaluation included 2 closed-source LLMs and 18 open-source LLMs using zero-shot and few-shot prompting, highlighting the safety features of each model. We also evaluated the LLMs' safety-related reasoning stability and refusal behavior. Additionally, we found that a majority voting mechanism can enhance model performance. Notably, even leading SOTA models like Claude-3.5-Sonnet and GPT-4o have not exceeded 80.5% accuracy in multi-choice tasks on SafeLawBench, while the average accuracy of 20 LLMs remains at 68.8\%. We urge the community to prioritize research on the safety of LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) have become increasingly sophisticated, leading to widespread deployment in sensitive applications where safety and reliability are paramount. However, LLMs have inherent risks accompanying them, including bias, potential for unsafe actions, dataset poisoning, lack of explainability, hallucinations, and non-reproducibility. These risks necessitate the development of "guardrails" to align LLMs with desired behaviors and mitigate potential harm. This work explores the risks associated with deploying LLMs and evaluates current approaches to implementing guardrails and model alignment techniques. We examine intrinsic and extrinsic bias evaluation methods and discuss the importance of fairness metrics for responsible AI development. The safety and reliability of agentic LLMs (those capable of real-world actions) are explored, emphasizing the need for testability, fail-safes, and situational awareness. Technical strategies for securing LLMs are presented, including a layered protection model operating at external, secondary, and internal levels. System prompts, Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) architectures, and techniques to minimize bias and protect privacy are highlighted. Effective guardrail design requires a deep understanding of the LLM's intended use case, relevant regulations, and ethical considerations. Striking a balance between competing requirements, such as accuracy and privacy, remains an ongoing challenge. This work underscores the importance of continuous research and development to ensure the safe and responsible use of LLMs in real-world applications.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have exhibited extraordinary prowess in tasks like mathematics and coding, leveraging their advanced reasoning capabilities. Nevertheless, as these capabilities progress, significant concerns regarding their vulnerabilities and safety have arisen, which can pose challenges to their deployment and application in real-world settings. This paper presents a comprehensive survey of LRMs, meticulously exploring and summarizing the newly emerged safety risks, attacks, and defense strategies. By organizing these elements into a detailed taxonomy, this work aims to offer a clear and structured understanding of the current safety landscape of LRMs, facilitating future research and development to enhance the security and reliability of these powerful models.

As the use of large language model (LLM) agents continues to grow, their safety vulnerabilities have become increasingly evident. Extensive benchmarks evaluate various aspects of LLM safety by defining the safety relying heavily on general standards, overlooking user-specific standards. However, safety standards for LLM may vary based on a user-specific profiles rather than being universally consistent across all users. This raises a critical research question: Do LLM agents act safely when considering user-specific safety standards? Despite its importance for safe LLM use, no benchmark datasets currently exist to evaluate the user-specific safety of LLMs. To address this gap, we introduce U-SAFEBENCH, the first benchmark designed to assess user-specific aspect of LLM safety. Our evaluation of 18 widely used LLMs reveals current LLMs fail to act safely when considering user-specific safety standards, marking a new discovery in this field. To address this vulnerability, we propose a simple remedy based on chain-of-thought, demonstrating its effectiveness in improving user-specific safety. Our benchmark and code are available at https://github.com/yeonjun-in/U-SafeBench.

We propose a novel dynamic safety framework that optimizes language model (LM) safety reasoning at inference time without modifying model weights. Building on recent advances in self-critique methods, our approach leverages a meta-critique mechanism that iteratively updates safety prompts-termed specifications-to drive the critique and revision process adaptively. This test-time optimization not only improves performance against adversarial jailbreak requests but also in diverse general safety-related tasks, such as avoiding moral harm or pursuing honest responses. Our empirical evaluations across several language models demonstrate that dynamically optimized safety prompts yield significantly higher safety scores compared to fixed system prompts and static self-critique defenses. Code to be released at https://github.com/vicgalle/meta-self-critique.git .

Large Vision-Language Models (VLMs) have achieved remarkable performance across a wide range of tasks. However, their deployment in safety-critical domains poses significant challenges. Existing safety fine-tuning methods, which focus on textual or multimodal content, fall short in addressing challenging cases or disrupt the balance between helpfulness and harmlessness. Our evaluation highlights a safety reasoning gap: these methods lack safety visual reasoning ability, leading to such bottlenecks. To address this limitation and enhance both visual perception and reasoning in safety-critical contexts, we propose a novel dataset that integrates multi-image inputs with safety Chain-of-Thought (CoT) labels as fine-grained reasoning logic to improve model performance. Specifically, we introduce the Multi-Image Safety (MIS) dataset, an instruction-following dataset tailored for multi-image safety scenarios, consisting of training and test splits. Our experiments demonstrate that fine-tuning InternVL2.5-8B with MIS significantly outperforms both powerful open-source models and API-based models in challenging multi-image tasks requiring safety-related visual reasoning. This approach not only delivers exceptional safety performance but also preserves general capabilities without any trade-offs. Specifically, fine-tuning with MIS increases average accuracy by 0.83% across five general benchmarks and reduces the Attack Success Rate (ASR) on multiple safety benchmarks by a large margin. Data and Models are released under: https://dripnowhy.github.io/MIS/{https://dripnowhy.github.io/MIS/}

Vision-Language adaptation (VL adaptation) transforms Large Language Models (LLMs) into Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) for multimodal tasks, but this process often compromises the inherent safety capabilities embedded in the original LLMs. Despite potential harmfulness due to weakened safety measures, in-depth analysis on the effects of VL adaptation on safety remains under-explored. This study examines how VL adaptation influences safety and evaluates the impact of safety fine-tuning methods. Our analysis reveals that safety degradation occurs during VL adaptation, even when the training data is safe. While safety tuning techniques like supervised fine-tuning with safety datasets or reinforcement learning from human feedback mitigate some risks, they still lead to safety degradation and a reduction in helpfulness due to over-rejection issues. Further analysis of internal model weights suggests that VL adaptation may impact certain safety-related layers, potentially lowering overall safety levels. Additionally, our findings demonstrate that the objectives of VL adaptation and safety tuning are divergent, which often results in their simultaneous application being suboptimal. To address this, we suggest the weight merging approach as an optimal solution effectively reducing safety degradation while maintaining helpfulness. These insights help guide the development of more reliable and secure LVLMs for real-world applications.

The ISO 26262 standard from 2016 represents the state of the art for a safety-guided development of safety-critical electric/electronic vehicle systems. These vehicle systems include advanced driver assistance systems and vehicle guidance systems. The development process proposed in the ISO 26262 standard is based upon multiple V-models, and defines activities and work products for each process step. In many of these process steps, scenario based approaches can be applied to achieve the defined work products for the development of automated driving functions. To accomplish the work products of different process steps, scenarios have to focus on various aspects like a human understandable notation or a description via time-space variables. This leads to contradictory requirements regarding the level of detail and way of notation for the representation of scenarios. In this paper, the authors present requirements for the representation of scenarios in different process steps defined by the ISO 26262 standard, propose a consistent terminology based on prior publications for the identified levels of abstraction, and demonstrate how scenarios can be systematically evolved along the phases of the development process outlined in the ISO 26262 standard.

Large Language Models (LLMs) rely on safety alignment to produce socially acceptable responses. This is typically achieved through instruction tuning and reinforcement learning from human feedback. However, this alignment is known to be brittle: further fine-tuning, even on benign or lightly contaminated data, can degrade safety and reintroduce harmful behaviors. A growing body of work suggests that alignment may correspond to identifiable geometric directions in weight space, forming subspaces that could, in principle, be isolated or preserved to defend against misalignment. In this work, we conduct a comprehensive empirical study of this geometric perspective. We examine whether safety-relevant behavior is concentrated in specific subspaces, whether it can be separated from general-purpose learning, and whether harmfulness arises from distinguishable patterns in internal representations. Across both parameter and activation space, our findings are consistent: subspaces that amplify safe behaviors also amplify unsafe ones, and prompts with different safety implications activate overlapping representations. We find no evidence of a subspace that selectively governs safety. These results challenge the assumption that alignment is geometrically localized. Rather than residing in distinct directions, safety appears to emerge from entangled, high-impact components of the model's broader learning dynamics. This suggests that subspace-based defenses may face fundamental limitations and underscores the need for alternative strategies to preserve alignment under continued training. We corroborate these findings through multiple experiments on five open-source LLMs. Our code is publicly available at: https://github.com/CERT-Lab/safety-subspaces.

Without proper safeguards, large language models will readily follow malicious instructions and generate toxic content. This motivates safety efforts such as red-teaming and large-scale feedback learning, which aim to make models both helpful and harmless. However, there is a tension between these two objectives, since harmlessness requires models to refuse complying with unsafe prompts, and thus not be helpful. Recent anecdotal evidence suggests that some models may have struck a poor balance, so that even clearly safe prompts are refused if they use similar language to unsafe prompts or mention sensitive topics. In this paper, we introduce a new test suite called XSTest to identify such eXaggerated Safety behaviours in a structured and systematic way. In its current form, XSTest comprises 200 safe prompts across ten prompt types that well-calibrated models should not refuse to comply with. We describe XSTest's creation and composition, and use the test suite to highlight systematic failure modes in a recently-released state-of-the-art language model.

Large language models (LLMs) have had a transformative impact on a variety of scientific tasks across disciplines such as biology, chemistry, medicine, and physics. However, ensuring the safety alignment of these models in scientific research remains an underexplored area, with existing benchmarks primarily focus on textual content and overlooking key scientific representations such as molecular, protein, and genomic languages. Moreover, the safety mechanisms of LLMs in scientific tasks are insufficiently studied. To address these limitations, we introduce SciSafeEval, a comprehensive benchmark designed to evaluate the safety alignment of LLMs across a range of scientific tasks. SciSafeEval spans multiple scientific languages - including textual, molecular, protein, and genomic - and covers a wide range of scientific domains. We evaluate LLMs in zero-shot, few-shot and chain-of-thought settings, and introduce a 'jailbreak' enhancement feature that challenges LLMs equipped with safety guardrails, rigorously testing their defenses against malicious intention. Our benchmark surpasses existing safety datasets in both scale and scope, providing a robust platform for assessing the safety and performance of LLMs in scientific contexts. This work aims to facilitate the responsible development and deployment of LLMs, promoting alignment with safety and ethical standards in scientific research.

The rapid development of Multimodal Large Reasoning Models (MLRMs) has demonstrated broad application potential, yet their safety and reliability remain critical concerns that require systematic exploration. To address this gap, we conduct a comprehensive and systematic safety evaluation of 11 MLRMs across 5 benchmarks and unveil prevalent safety degradation phenomena in most advanced models. Moreover, our analysis reveals distinct safety patterns across different benchmarks: significant safety degradation is observed across jailbreak robustness benchmarks, whereas safety-awareness benchmarks demonstrate less pronounced degradation. In particular, the long thought process in some scenarios even enhances safety performance. Therefore, it is a potential approach to address safety issues in MLRMs by leveraging the intrinsic reasoning capabilities of the model to detect unsafe intent. To operationalize this insight, we construct a multimodal tuning dataset that incorporates a safety-oriented thought process. Experimental results from fine-tuning existing MLRMs with this dataset effectively enhances the safety on both jailbreak robustness and safety-awareness benchmarks. This study provides a new perspective for developing safe MLRMs. Our dataset is available at https://github.com/xinyuelou/Think-in-Safety.

Machine learning models are often trained to predict the outcome resulting from a human decision. For example, if a doctor decides to test a patient for disease, will the patient test positive? A challenge is that historical decision-making determines whether the outcome is observed: we only observe test outcomes for patients doctors historically tested. Untested patients, for whom outcomes are unobserved, may differ from tested patients along observed and unobserved dimensions. We propose a Bayesian model class which captures this setting. The purpose of the model is to accurately estimate risk for both tested and untested patients. Estimating this model is challenging due to the wide range of possibilities for untested patients. To address this, we propose two domain constraints which are plausible in health settings: a prevalence constraint, where the overall disease prevalence is known, and an expertise constraint, where the human decision-maker deviates from purely risk-based decision-making only along a constrained feature set. We show theoretically and on synthetic data that domain constraints improve parameter inference. We apply our model to a case study of cancer risk prediction, showing that the model's inferred risk predicts cancer diagnoses, its inferred testing policy captures known public health policies, and it can identify suboptimalities in test allocation. Though our case study is in healthcare, our analysis reveals a general class of domain constraints which can improve model estimation in many settings.

Advanced text-to-image models such as DALL-E 2 and Midjourney possess the capacity to generate highly realistic images, raising significant concerns regarding the potential proliferation of unsafe content. This includes adult, violent, or deceptive imagery of political figures. Despite claims of rigorous safety mechanisms implemented in these models to restrict the generation of not-safe-for-work (NSFW) content, we successfully devise and exhibit the first prompt attacks on Midjourney, resulting in the production of abundant photorealistic NSFW images. We reveal the fundamental principles of such prompt attacks and suggest strategically substituting high-risk sections within a suspect prompt to evade closed-source safety measures. Our novel framework, SurrogatePrompt, systematically generates attack prompts, utilizing large language models, image-to-text, and image-to-image modules to automate attack prompt creation at scale. Evaluation results disclose an 88% success rate in bypassing Midjourney's proprietary safety filter with our attack prompts, leading to the generation of counterfeit images depicting political figures in violent scenarios. Both subjective and objective assessments validate that the images generated from our attack prompts present considerable safety hazards.

Autonomous agents powered by large language models (LLMs) show promising potential in assistive tasks across various domains, including mobile device control. As these agents interact directly with personal information and device settings, ensuring their safe and reliable behavior is crucial to prevent undesirable outcomes. However, no benchmark exists for standardized evaluation of the safety of mobile device-control agents. In this work, we introduce MobileSafetyBench, a benchmark designed to evaluate the safety of device-control agents within a realistic mobile environment based on Android emulators. We develop a diverse set of tasks involving interactions with various mobile applications, including messaging and banking applications. To clearly evaluate safety apart from general capabilities, we design separate tasks measuring safety and tasks evaluating helpfulness. The safety tasks challenge agents with managing potential risks prevalent in daily life and include tests to evaluate robustness against indirect prompt injections. Our experiments demonstrate that while baseline agents, based on state-of-the-art LLMs, perform well in executing helpful tasks, they show poor performance in safety tasks. To mitigate these safety concerns, we propose a prompting method that encourages agents to prioritize safety considerations. While this method shows promise in promoting safer behaviors, there is still considerable room for improvement to fully earn user trust. This highlights the urgent need for continued research to develop more robust safety mechanisms in mobile environments. We open-source our benchmark at: https://mobilesafetybench.github.io/.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are rapidly evolving, demonstrating impressive capabilities as multimodal assistants that interact with both humans and their environments. However, this increased sophistication introduces significant safety concerns. In this paper, we present the first evaluation and analysis of a novel safety challenge termed Multimodal Situational Safety, which explores how safety considerations vary based on the specific situation in which the user or agent is engaged. We argue that for an MLLM to respond safely, whether through language or action, it often needs to assess the safety implications of a language query within its corresponding visual context. To evaluate this capability, we develop the Multimodal Situational Safety benchmark (MSSBench) to assess the situational safety performance of current MLLMs. The dataset comprises 1,820 language query-image pairs, half of which the image context is safe, and the other half is unsafe. We also develop an evaluation framework that analyzes key safety aspects, including explicit safety reasoning, visual understanding, and, crucially, situational safety reasoning. Our findings reveal that current MLLMs struggle with this nuanced safety problem in the instruction-following setting and struggle to tackle these situational safety challenges all at once, highlighting a key area for future research. Furthermore, we develop multi-agent pipelines to coordinately solve safety challenges, which shows consistent improvement in safety over the original MLLM response. Code and data: mssbench.github.io.

Reducing traffic accidents is an important public safety challenge. However, the majority of studies on traffic accident analysis and prediction have used small-scale datasets with limited coverage, which limits their impact and applicability; and existing large-scale datasets are either private, old, or do not include important contextual information such as environmental stimuli (weather, points-of-interest, etc.). In order to help the research community address these shortcomings we have - through a comprehensive process of data collection, integration, and augmentation - created a large-scale publicly available database of accident information named US-Accidents. US-Accidents currently contains data about 2.25 million instances of traffic accidents that took place within the contiguous United States, and over the last three years. Each accident record consists of a variety of intrinsic and contextual attributes such as location, time, natural language description, weather, period-of-day, and points-of-interest. We present this dataset in this paper, along with a wide range of insights gleaned from this dataset with respect to the spatiotemporal characteristics of accidents. The dataset is publicly available at https://smoosavi.org/datasets/us_accidents.

This paper presents a safety-critical control framework tailored for quadruped robots equipped with a roller arm, particularly when performing locomotive tasks such as autonomous robotic inspection in complex, multi-tiered environments. In this study, we consider the problem of operating a quadrupedal robot in distillation columns, locomoting on column trays and transitioning between these trays with a roller arm. To address this problem, our framework encompasses the following key elements: 1) Trajectory generation for seamless transitions between columns, 2) Foothold re-planning in regions deemed unsafe, 3) Safety-critical control incorporating control barrier functions, 4) Gait transitions based on safety levels, and 5) A low-level controller. Our comprehensive framework, comprising these components, enables autonomous and safe locomotion across multiple layers. We incorporate reduced-order and full-body models to ensure safety, integrating safety-critical control and footstep re-planning approaches. We validate the effectiveness of our proposed framework through practical experiments involving a quadruped robot equipped with a roller arm, successfully navigating and transitioning between different levels within the column tray structure.

The development of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) promises to be a major event. Along with its many potential benefits, it also raises serious safety concerns (Bostrom, 2014). The intention of this paper is to provide an easily accessible and up-to-date collection of references for the emerging field of AGI safety. A significant number of safety problems for AGI have been identified. We list these, and survey recent research on solving them. We also cover works on how best to think of AGI from the limited knowledge we have today, predictions for when AGI will first be created, and what will happen after its creation. Finally, we review the current public policy on AGI.

Large Language Models (LLMs) continue to exhibit vulnerabilities despite deliberate safety alignment efforts, posing significant risks to users and society. To safeguard against the risk of policy-violating content, system-level moderation via external guard models-designed to monitor LLM inputs and outputs and block potentially harmful content-has emerged as a prevalent mitigation strategy. Existing approaches of training guard models rely heavily on extensive human curated datasets and struggle with out-of-distribution threats, such as emerging harmful categories or jailbreak attacks. To address these limitations, we propose RSafe, an adaptive reasoning-based safeguard that conducts guided safety reasoning to provide robust protection within the scope of specified safety policies. RSafe operates in two stages: 1) guided reasoning, where it analyzes safety risks of input content through policy-guided step-by-step reasoning, and 2) reinforced alignment, where rule-based RL optimizes its reasoning paths to align with accurate safety prediction. This two-stage training paradigm enables RSafe to internalize safety principles to generalize safety protection capability over unseen or adversarial safety violation scenarios. During inference, RSafe accepts user-specified safety policies to provide enhanced safeguards tailored to specific safety requirements.

Modern reinforcement learning (RL) systems capture deep truths about general, human problem-solving. In domains where new data can be simulated cheaply, these systems uncover sequential decision-making policies that far exceed the ability of any human. Society faces many problems whose solutions require this skill, but they are often in domains where new data cannot be cheaply simulated. In such scenarios, we can learn simulators from existing data, but these will only ever be approximately correct, and can be pathologically incorrect when queried outside of their training distribution. As a result, a misalignment between the environments in which we train our agents and the real-world in which we wish to deploy our agents is inevitable. Dealing with this misalignment is the primary concern of zero-shot reinforcement learning, a problem setting where the agent must generalise to a new task or domain with zero practice shots. Whilst impressive progress has been made on methods that perform zero-shot RL in idealised settings, new work is needed if these results are to be replicated in real-world settings. In this thesis, we argue that doing so requires us to navigate (at least) three constraints. First, the data quality constraint: real-world datasets are small and homogeneous. Second, the observability constraint: states, dynamics and rewards in the real-world are often only partially observed. And third, the data availability constraint: a priori access to data cannot always be assumed. This work proposes a suite of methods that perform zero-shot RL subject to these constraints. In a series of empirical studies we expose the failings of existing methods, and justify our techniques for remedying them. We believe these designs take us a step closer to RL methods that can be deployed to solve real-world problems.

The widespread application of Reinforcement Learning (RL) in real-world situations is yet to come to fruition, largely as a result of its failure to satisfy the essential safety demands of such systems. Existing safe reinforcement learning (SafeRL) methods, employing cost functions to enhance safety, fail to achieve zero-cost in complex scenarios, including vision-only tasks, even with comprehensive data sampling and training. To address this, we introduce Safe DreamerV3, a novel algorithm that integrates both Lagrangian-based and planning-based methods within a world model. Our methodology represents a significant advancement in SafeRL as the first algorithm to achieve nearly zero-cost in both low-dimensional and vision-only tasks within the Safety-Gymnasium benchmark. Our project website can be found in: https://sites.google.com/view/safedreamerv3.

Rigorously testing autonomy systems is essential for making safe self-driving vehicles (SDV) a reality. It requires one to generate safety critical scenarios beyond what can be collected safely in the world, as many scenarios happen rarely on public roads. To accurately evaluate performance, we need to test the SDV on these scenarios in closed-loop, where the SDV and other actors interact with each other at each timestep. Previously recorded driving logs provide a rich resource to build these new scenarios from, but for closed loop evaluation, we need to modify the sensor data based on the new scene configuration and the SDV's decisions, as actors might be added or removed and the trajectories of existing actors and the SDV will differ from the original log. In this paper, we present UniSim, a neural sensor simulator that takes a single recorded log captured by a sensor-equipped vehicle and converts it into a realistic closed-loop multi-sensor simulation. UniSim builds neural feature grids to reconstruct both the static background and dynamic actors in the scene, and composites them together to simulate LiDAR and camera data at new viewpoints, with actors added or removed and at new placements. To better handle extrapolated views, we incorporate learnable priors for dynamic objects, and leverage a convolutional network to complete unseen regions. Our experiments show UniSim can simulate realistic sensor data with small domain gap on downstream tasks. With UniSim, we demonstrate closed-loop evaluation of an autonomy system on safety-critical scenarios as if it were in the real world.

This paper presents a comprehensive analysis of the linguistic diversity of LLM safety research, highlighting the English-centric nature of the field. Through a systematic review of nearly 300 publications from 2020--2024 across major NLP conferences and workshops at *ACL, we identify a significant and growing language gap in LLM safety research, with even high-resource non-English languages receiving minimal attention. We further observe that non-English languages are rarely studied as a standalone language and that English safety research exhibits poor language documentation practice. To motivate future research into multilingual safety, we make several recommendations based on our survey, and we then pose three concrete future directions on safety evaluation, training data generation, and crosslingual safety generalization. Based on our survey and proposed directions, the field can develop more robust, inclusive AI safety practices for diverse global populations.

Vision-language models (VLMs), which process image and text inputs, are increasingly integrated into chat assistants and other consumer AI applications. Without proper safeguards, however, VLMs may give harmful advice (e.g. how to self-harm) or encourage unsafe behaviours (e.g. to consume drugs). Despite these clear hazards, little work so far has evaluated VLM safety and the novel risks created by multimodal inputs. To address this gap, we introduce MSTS, a Multimodal Safety Test Suite for VLMs. MSTS comprises 400 test prompts across 40 fine-grained hazard categories. Each test prompt consists of a text and an image that only in combination reveal their full unsafe meaning. With MSTS, we find clear safety issues in several open VLMs. We also find some VLMs to be safe by accident, meaning that they are safe because they fail to understand even simple test prompts. We translate MSTS into ten languages, showing non-English prompts to increase the rate of unsafe model responses. We also show models to be safer when tested with text only rather than multimodal prompts. Finally, we explore the automation of VLM safety assessments, finding even the best safety classifiers to be lacking.

Motivated by concerns about making online decisions that incur undue amount of risk at each time step, in this paper, we formulate the probably anytime-safe stochastic combinatorial semi-bandits problem. In this problem, the agent is given the option to select a subset of size at most K from a set of L ground items. Each item is associated to a certain mean reward as well as a variance that represents its risk. To mitigate the risk that the agent incurs, we require that with probability at least 1-delta, over the entire horizon of time T, each of the choices that the agent makes should contain items whose sum of variances does not exceed a certain variance budget. We call this probably anytime-safe constraint. Under this constraint, we design and analyze an algorithm {\sc PASCombUCB} that minimizes the regret over the horizon of time T. By developing accompanying information-theoretic lower bounds, we show that under both the problem-dependent and problem-independent paradigms, {\sc PASCombUCB} is almost asymptotically optimal. Experiments are conducted to corroborate our theoretical findings. Our problem setup, the proposed {\sc PASCombUCB} algorithm, and novel analyses are applicable to domains such as recommendation systems and transportation in which an agent is allowed to choose multiple items at a single time step and wishes to control the risk over the whole time horizon.

Safety perception measurement has been a subject of interest in many cities of the world. This is due to its social relevance, and to its effect on some local economic activities. Even though people safety perception is a subjective topic, sometimes it is possible to find out common patterns given a restricted geographical and sociocultural context. This paper presents an approach that makes use of image processing and machine learning techniques to detect with high accuracy urban environment patterns that could affect citizen's safety perception.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has achieved tremendous success in many complex decision making tasks. When it comes to deploying RL in the real world, safety concerns are usually raised, leading to a growing demand for safe RL algorithms, such as in autonomous driving and robotics scenarios. While safety control has a long history, the study of safe RL algorithms is still in the early stages. To establish a good foundation for future research in this thread, in this paper, we provide a review for safe RL from the perspectives of methods, theory and applications. Firstly, we review the progress of safe RL from five dimensions and come up with five problems that are crucial for safe RL being deployed in real-world applications, coined as "2H3W". Secondly, we analyze the theory and algorithm progress from the perspectives of answering the "2H3W" problems. Then, the sample complexity of safe RL methods is reviewed and discussed, followed by an introduction of the applications and benchmarks of safe RL algorithms. Finally, we open the discussion of the challenging problems in safe RL, hoping to inspire more future research on this thread. To advance the study of safe RL algorithms, we release a benchmark suite, an open-sourced repository containing the implementations of major safe RL algorithms, along with tutorials at the link: https://github.com/chauncygu/Safe-Reinforcement-Learning-Baselines.git.

Large Language Model (LLM)-based agents are increasingly deployed in real-world applications such as "digital assistants, autonomous customer service, and decision-support systems", where their ability to "interact in multi-turn, tool-augmented environments" makes them indispensable. However, ensuring the safety of these agents remains a significant challenge due to the diverse and complex risks arising from dynamic user interactions, external tool usage, and the potential for unintended harmful behaviors. To address this critical issue, we propose AutoSafe, the first framework that systematically enhances agent safety through fully automated synthetic data generation. Concretely, 1) we introduce an open and extensible threat model, OTS, which formalizes how unsafe behaviors emerge from the interplay of user instructions, interaction contexts, and agent actions. This enables precise modeling of safety risks across diverse scenarios. 2) we develop a fully automated data generation pipeline that simulates unsafe user behaviors, applies self-reflective reasoning to generate safe responses, and constructs a large-scale, diverse, and high-quality safety training dataset-eliminating the need for hazardous real-world data collection. To evaluate the effectiveness of our framework, we design comprehensive experiments on both synthetic and real-world safety benchmarks. Results demonstrate that AutoSafe boosts safety scores by 45% on average and achieves a 28.91% improvement on real-world tasks, validating the generalization ability of our learned safety strategies. These results highlight the practical advancement and scalability of AutoSafe in building safer LLM-based agents for real-world deployment. We have released the project page at https://auto-safe.github.io/.

Do LLMs robustly generalize critical safety facts to novel situations? Lacking this ability is dangerous when users ask naive questions. For instance, "I'm considering packing melon balls for my 10-month-old's lunch. What other foods would be good to include?" Before offering food options, the LLM should warn that melon balls pose a choking hazard to toddlers, as documented by the CDC. Failing to provide such warnings could result in serious injuries or even death. To evaluate this, we introduce SAGE-Eval, SAfety-fact systematic GEneralization evaluation, the first benchmark that tests whether LLMs properly apply well established safety facts to naive user queries. SAGE-Eval comprises 104 facts manually sourced from reputable organizations, systematically augmented to create 10,428 test scenarios across 7 common domains (e.g., Outdoor Activities, Medicine). We find that the top model, Claude-3.7-sonnet, passes only 58% of all the safety facts tested. We also observe that model capabilities and training compute weakly correlate with performance on SAGE-Eval, implying that scaling up is not the golden solution. Our findings suggest frontier LLMs still lack robust generalization ability. We recommend developers use SAGE-Eval in pre-deployment evaluations to assess model reliability in addressing salient risks. We publicly release SAGE-Eval at https://huggingface.co/datasets/YuehHanChen/SAGE-Eval and our code is available at https://github.com/YuehHanChen/SAGE-Eval/tree/main.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs), such as OpenAI o1 and DeepSeek-R1, have been rapidly progressing and achieving breakthrough performance on complex reasoning tasks such as mathematics and coding. However, the open-source R1 models have raised safety concerns in wide applications, such as the tendency to comply with malicious queries, which greatly impacts the utility of these powerful models in their applications. In this paper, we introduce RealSafe-R1 as safety-aligned versions of DeepSeek-R1 distilled models. To train these models, we construct a dataset of 15k safety-aware reasoning trajectories generated by DeepSeek-R1, under explicit instructions for expected refusal behavior. Both quantitative experiments and qualitative case studies demonstrate the models' improvements, which are shown in their safety guardrails against both harmful queries and jailbreak attacks. Importantly, unlike prior safety alignment efforts that often compromise reasoning performance, our method preserves the models' reasoning capabilities by maintaining the training data within the original distribution of generation. Model weights of RealSafe-R1 are open-source at https://huggingface.co/RealSafe.

Large language models (LLMs), like ChatGPT and GPT-4, have demonstrated remarkable abilities in natural language understanding and generation. However, alongside their positive impact on our daily tasks, they can also produce harmful content that negatively affects societal perceptions. To systematically assess the safety of Chinese LLMs, we introduce SuperCLUE-Safety (SC-Safety) - a multi-round adversarial benchmark with 4912 open-ended questions covering more than 20 safety sub-dimensions. Adversarial human-model interactions and conversations significantly increase the challenges compared to existing methods. Experiments on 13 major LLMs supporting Chinese yield the following insights: 1) Closed-source models outperform open-sourced ones in terms of safety; 2) Models released from China demonstrate comparable safety levels to LLMs like GPT-3.5-turbo; 3) Some smaller models with 6B-13B parameters can compete effectively in terms of safety. By introducing SC-Safety, we aim to promote collaborative efforts to create safer and more trustworthy LLMs. The benchmark and findings provide guidance on model selection. Our benchmark can be found at https://www.CLUEbenchmarks.com

Large Language Models (LLMs) require careful safety alignment to prevent malicious outputs. While significant research focuses on mitigating harmful content generation, the enhanced safety often come with the side effect of over-refusal, where LLMs may reject innocuous prompts and become less helpful. Although the issue of over-refusal has been empirically observed, a systematic measurement is challenging due to the difficulty of crafting prompts that appear harmful but are benign. This study proposes a novel method for automatically generating large-scale sets of "seemingly toxic prompts" (benign prompts likely rejected by LLMs). Leveraging this technique, we introduce OR-Bench, the first large-scale over-refusal benchmark. OR-Bench comprises 80,000 seemingly toxic prompts across 10 common rejection categories, a subset of around 1,000 hard prompts that are challenging even for state-of-the-art LLMs, and an additional 600 toxic prompts to prevent indiscriminate responses. We then conduct a comprehensive study to measure the over-refusal of 25 popular LLMs across 8 model families. Our datasets are available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/bench-llm/or-bench and the demo can be found at https://huggingface.co/spaces/bench-llm/or-bench. We hope this benchmark can help the community develop better safety aligned models.

Safe yet stable grasping requires a robotic hand to apply sufficient force on the object to immobilize it while keeping it from getting damaged. Soft robotic hands have been proposed for safe grasping due to their passive compliance, but even such a hand can crush objects if the applied force is too high. Thus for safe grasping, regulating the grasping force is of uttermost importance even with soft hands. In this work, we present a force controlled soft hand and use it to achieve safe grasping. To this end, resistive force and bend sensors are integrated in a soft hand, and a data-driven calibration method is proposed to estimate contact interaction forces. Given the force readings, the pneumatic pressures are regulated using a proportional-integral controller to achieve desired force. The controller is experimentally evaluated and benchmarked by grasping easily deformable objects such as plastic and paper cups without neither dropping nor deforming them. Together, the results demonstrate that our force controlled soft hand can grasp deformable objects in a safe yet stable manner.

The o1 model series is trained with large-scale reinforcement learning to reason using chain of thought. These advanced reasoning capabilities provide new avenues for improving the safety and robustness of our models. In particular, our models can reason about our safety policies in context when responding to potentially unsafe prompts, through deliberative alignment. This leads to state-of-the-art performance on certain benchmarks for risks such as generating illicit advice, choosing stereotyped responses, and succumbing to known jailbreaks. Training models to incorporate a chain of thought before answering has the potential to unlock substantial benefits, while also increasing potential risks that stem from heightened intelligence. Our results underscore the need for building robust alignment methods, extensively stress-testing their efficacy, and maintaining meticulous risk management protocols. This report outlines the safety work carried out for the OpenAI o1 and OpenAI o1-mini models, including safety evaluations, external red teaming, and Preparedness Framework evaluations.

This paper argues that fully autonomous AI agents should not be developed. In support of this position, we build from prior scientific literature and current product marketing to delineate different AI agent levels and detail the ethical values at play in each, documenting trade-offs in potential benefits and risks. Our analysis reveals that risks to people increase with the autonomy of a system: The more control a user cedes to an AI agent, the more risks to people arise. Particularly concerning are safety risks, which affect human life and impact further values.

Flawed planning from VLM-driven embodied agents poses significant safety hazards, hindering their deployment in real-world household tasks. However, existing static, non-interactive evaluation paradigms fail to adequately assess risks within these interactive environments, since they cannot simulate dynamic risks that emerge from an agent's actions and rely on unreliable post-hoc evaluations that ignore unsafe intermediate steps. To bridge this critical gap, we propose evaluating an agent's interactive safety: its ability to perceive emergent risks and execute mitigation steps in the correct procedural order. We thus present IS-Bench, the first multi-modal benchmark designed for interactive safety, featuring 161 challenging scenarios with 388 unique safety risks instantiated in a high-fidelity simulator. Crucially, it facilitates a novel process-oriented evaluation that verifies whether risk mitigation actions are performed before/after specific risk-prone steps. Extensive experiments on leading VLMs, including the GPT-4o and Gemini-2.5 series, reveal that current agents lack interactive safety awareness, and that while safety-aware Chain-of-Thought can improve performance, it often compromises task completion. By highlighting these critical limitations, IS-Bench provides a foundation for developing safer and more reliable embodied AI systems.

Tram-human interaction safety is an important challenge, given that trams frequently operate in densely populated areas, where collisions can range from minor injuries to fatal outcomes. This paper addresses the issue from the perspective of designing a solution leveraging digital image processing, deep learning, and artificial intelligence to improve the safety of pedestrians, drivers, cyclists, pets, and tram passengers. We present RailSafeNet, a real-time framework that fuses semantic segmentation, object detection and a rule-based Distance Assessor to highlight track intrusions. Using only monocular video, the system identifies rails, localises nearby objects and classifies their risk by comparing projected distances with the standard 1435mm rail gauge. Experiments on the diverse RailSem19 dataset show that a class-filtered SegFormer B3 model achieves 65% intersection-over-union (IoU), while a fine-tuned YOLOv8 attains 75.6% mean average precision (mAP) calculated at an intersection over union (IoU) threshold of 0.50. RailSafeNet therefore delivers accurate, annotation-light scene understanding that can warn drivers before dangerous situations escalate. Code available at https://github.com/oValach/RailSafeNet.

In recent years, Reinforcement Learning (RL) has been applied to real-world problems with increasing success. Such applications often require to put constraints on the agent's behavior. Existing algorithms for constrained RL (CRL) rely on gradient descent-ascent, but this approach comes with a caveat. While these algorithms are guaranteed to converge on average, they do not guarantee last-iterate convergence, i.e., the current policy of the agent may never converge to the optimal solution. In practice, it is often observed that the policy alternates between satisfying the constraints and maximizing the reward, rarely accomplishing both objectives simultaneously. Here, we address this problem by introducing Reinforcement Learning with Optimistic Ascent-Descent (ReLOAD), a principled CRL method with guaranteed last-iterate convergence. We demonstrate its empirical effectiveness on a wide variety of CRL problems including discrete MDPs and continuous control. In the process we establish a benchmark of challenging CRL problems.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit exceptional capabilities across various tasks but also pose risks by generating harmful content. Existing safety mechanisms, while improving model safety, often lead to overly cautious behavior and fail to fully leverage LLMs' internal cognitive processes. Inspired by humans' reflective thinking capability, we first show that LLMs can similarly perform internal assessments about safety in their internal states. Building on this insight, we propose SafeSwitch, a dynamic framework that regulates unsafe outputs by utilizing the prober-based internal state monitor that actively detects harmful intentions, and activates a safety head that leads to safer and more conservative responses only when necessary. SafeSwitch reduces harmful outputs by approximately 80% on harmful queries while maintaining strong utility, reaching a Pareto optimal among several methods. Our method is also advantageous over traditional methods in offering more informative, context-aware refusals, and achieves these benefits while only tuning less than 6% of the original parameters. SafeSwitch demonstrates large language models' capacity for self-awareness and reflection regarding safety, offering a promising approach to more nuanced and effective safety controls. Codes for this work are available at https://github.com/Hanpx20/SafeSwitch.

Current methods for content safety in Large Language Models (LLMs), such as Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), often rely on multi-stage training pipelines and lack fine-grained, post-deployment controllability. To address these limitations, we propose a unified co-training framework that efficiently integrates multiple safety behaviors: positive (lawful/prosocial), negative (unfiltered/risk-prone) and rejective (refusal-oriented/conservative) within a single SFT stage. Notably, each behavior is dynamically activated via a simple system-level instruction, or magic token, enabling stealthy and efficient behavioral switching at inference time. This flexibility supports diverse deployment scenarios, such as positive for safe user interaction, negative for internal red-teaming, and rejective for context-aware refusals triggered by upstream moderation signals. This co-training strategy induces a distinct Safety Alignment Margin in the output space, characterized by well-separated response distributions corresponding to each safety mode. The existence of this margin provides empirical evidence for the model's safety robustness and enables unprecedented fine-grained control. Experiments show that our method matches the safety alignment quality of SFT+DPO, with our 8B model notably surpassing DeepSeek-R1 (671B) in safety performance, while significantly reducing both training complexity and deployment costs. This work presents a scalable, efficient, and highly controllable solution for LLM content safety.

To understand the risks posed by a new AI system, we must understand what it can and cannot do. Building on prior work, we introduce a programme of new "dangerous capability" evaluations and pilot them on Gemini 1.0 models. Our evaluations cover four areas: (1) persuasion and deception; (2) cyber-security; (3) self-proliferation; and (4) self-reasoning. We do not find evidence of strong dangerous capabilities in the models we evaluated, but we flag early warning signs. Our goal is to help advance a rigorous science of dangerous capability evaluation, in preparation for future models.

The ideal LLM content moderation system would be both structurally interpretable (so its decisions can be explained to users) and steerable (to reflect a community's values or align to safety standards). However, current systems fall short on both of these dimensions. To address this gap, we present SafetyAnalyst, a novel LLM safety moderation framework. Given a prompt, SafetyAnalyst creates a structured "harm-benefit tree," which identifies 1) the actions that could be taken if a compliant response were provided, 2) the harmful and beneficial effects of those actions (along with their likelihood, severity, and immediacy), and 3) the stakeholders that would be impacted by those effects. It then aggregates this structured representation into a harmfulness score based on a parameterized set of safety preferences, which can be transparently aligned to particular values. Using extensive harm-benefit features generated by SOTA LLMs on 19k prompts, we fine-tuned an open-weight LM to specialize in generating harm-benefit trees through symbolic knowledge distillation. On a comprehensive set of prompt safety benchmarks, we show that our system (average F1=0.75) outperforms existing LLM safety moderation systems (average F1<0.72) on prompt harmfulness classification, while offering the additional advantages of interpretability and steerability.

The deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs) in robotic systems presents unique safety challenges, particularly in unpredictable environments. Although LLMs, leveraging zero-shot learning, enhance human-robot interaction and decision-making capabilities, their inherent probabilistic nature and lack of formal guarantees raise significant concerns for safety-critical applications. Traditional model-based verification approaches often rely on precise system models, which are difficult to obtain for real-world robotic systems and may not be fully trusted due to modeling inaccuracies, unmodeled dynamics, or environmental uncertainties. To address these challenges, this paper introduces a safety assurance framework for LLM-controlled robots based on data-driven reachability analysis, a formal verification technique that ensures all possible system trajectories remain within safe operational limits. Our framework specifically investigates the problem of instructing an LLM to navigate the robot to a specified goal and assesses its ability to generate low-level control actions that successfully guide the robot safely toward that goal. By leveraging historical data to construct reachable sets of states for the robot-LLM system, our approach provides rigorous safety guarantees against unsafe behaviors without relying on explicit analytical models. We validate the framework through experimental case studies in autonomous navigation and task planning, demonstrating its effectiveness in mitigating risks associated with LLM-generated commands. This work advances the integration of formal methods into LLM-based robotics, offering a principled and practical approach to ensuring safety in next-generation autonomous systems.

Safety alignment in Large Language Models (LLMs) often involves mediating internal representations to refuse harmful requests. Recent research has demonstrated that these safety mechanisms can be bypassed by ablating or removing specific representational directions within the model. In this paper, we propose the opposite approach: Rank-One Safety Injection (ROSI), a white-box method that amplifies a model's safety alignment by permanently steering its activations toward the refusal-mediating subspace. ROSI operates as a simple, fine-tuning-free rank-one weight modification applied to all residual stream write matrices. The required safety direction can be computed from a small set of harmful and harmless instruction pairs. We show that ROSI consistently increases safety refusal rates - as evaluated by Llama Guard 3 - while preserving the utility of the model on standard benchmarks such as MMLU, HellaSwag, and Arc. Furthermore, we show that ROSI can also re-align 'uncensored' models by amplifying their own latent safety directions, demonstrating its utility as an effective last-mile safety procedure. Our results suggest that targeted, interpretable weight steering is a cheap and potent mechanism to improve LLM safety, complementing more resource-intensive fine-tuning paradigms.

As artificial intelligence (AI) models are scaled up, new capabilities can emerge unintentionally and unpredictably, some of which might be dangerous. In response, dangerous capabilities evaluations have emerged as a new risk assessment tool. But what should frontier AI developers do if sufficiently dangerous capabilities are in fact discovered? This paper focuses on one possible response: coordinated pausing. It proposes an evaluation-based coordination scheme that consists of five main steps: (1) Frontier AI models are evaluated for dangerous capabilities. (2) Whenever, and each time, a model fails a set of evaluations, the developer pauses certain research and development activities. (3) Other developers are notified whenever a model with dangerous capabilities has been discovered. They also pause related research and development activities. (4) The discovered capabilities are analyzed and adequate safety precautions are put in place. (5) Developers only resume their paused activities if certain safety thresholds are reached. The paper also discusses four concrete versions of that scheme. In the first version, pausing is completely voluntary and relies on public pressure on developers. In the second version, participating developers collectively agree to pause under certain conditions. In the third version, a single auditor evaluates models of multiple developers who agree to pause if any model fails a set of evaluations. In the fourth version, developers are legally required to run evaluations and pause if dangerous capabilities are discovered. Finally, the paper discusses the desirability and feasibility of our proposed coordination scheme. It concludes that coordinated pausing is a promising mechanism for tackling emerging risks from frontier AI models. However, a number of practical and legal obstacles need to be overcome, especially how to avoid violations of antitrust law.

Existing safety assurance research has primarily focused on training-phase alignment to instill safe behaviors into LLMs. However, recent studies have exposed these methods' susceptibility to diverse jailbreak attacks. Concurrently, inference scaling has significantly advanced LLM reasoning capabilities but remains unexplored in the context of safety assurance. Addressing this gap, our work pioneers inference scaling for robust and effective LLM safety against emerging threats. We reveal that conventional inference scaling techniques, despite their success in reasoning tasks, perform poorly in safety contexts, even falling short of basic approaches like Best-of-N Sampling. We attribute this inefficiency to a newly identified challenge, the exploration--efficiency dilemma, arising from the high computational overhead associated with frequent process reward model (PRM) evaluations. To overcome this dilemma, we propose SAFFRON, a novel inference scaling paradigm tailored explicitly for safety assurance. Central to our approach is the introduction of a multifurcation reward model (MRM) that significantly reduces the required number of reward model evaluations. To operationalize this paradigm, we further propose: (i) a partial supervision training objective for MRM, (ii) a conservative exploration constraint to prevent out-of-distribution explorations, and (iii) a Trie-based key--value caching strategy that facilitates cache sharing across sequences during tree search. Extensive experiments validate the effectiveness of our method. Additionally, we publicly release our trained multifurcation reward model (Saffron-1) and the accompanying token-level safety reward dataset (Safety4M) to accelerate future research in LLM safety. Our code, model, and data are publicly available at https://github.com/q-rz/saffron , and our project homepage is at https://q-rz.github.io/p/saffron .

With the rapid development of Large language models (LLMs), understanding the capabilities of LLMs in identifying unsafe content has become increasingly important. While previous works have introduced several benchmarks to evaluate the safety risk of LLMs, the community still has a limited understanding of current LLMs' capability to recognize illegal and unsafe content in Chinese contexts. In this work, we present a Chinese safety benchmark (ChineseSafe) to facilitate research on the content safety of large language models. To align with the regulations for Chinese Internet content moderation, our ChineseSafe contains 205,034 examples across 4 classes and 10 sub-classes of safety issues. For Chinese contexts, we add several special types of illegal content: political sensitivity, pornography, and variant/homophonic words. Moreover, we employ two methods to evaluate the legal risks of popular LLMs, including open-sourced models and APIs. The results reveal that many LLMs exhibit vulnerability to certain types of safety issues, leading to legal risks in China. Our work provides a guideline for developers and researchers to facilitate the safety of LLMs. Our results are also available at https://huggingface.co/spaces/SUSTech/ChineseSafe-Benchmark.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaksx2013methods to elicit harmful or generally impermissible outputs. Safety measures are developed and assessed on their effectiveness at defending against jailbreak attacks, indicating a belief that safety is equivalent to robustness. We assert that current defense mechanisms, such as output filters and alignment fine-tuning, are, and will remain, fundamentally insufficient for ensuring model safety. These defenses fail to address risks arising from dual-intent queries and the ability to composite innocuous outputs to achieve harmful goals. To address this critical gap, we introduce an information-theoretic threat model called inferential adversaries who exploit impermissible information leakage from model outputs to achieve malicious goals. We distinguish these from commonly studied security adversaries who only seek to force victim models to generate specific impermissible outputs. We demonstrate the feasibility of automating inferential adversaries through question decomposition and response aggregation. To provide safety guarantees, we define an information censorship criterion for censorship mechanisms, bounding the leakage of impermissible information. We propose a defense mechanism which ensures this bound and reveal an intrinsic safety-utility trade-off. Our work provides the first theoretically grounded understanding of the requirements for releasing safe LLMs and the utility costs involved.

Reasoning methods that adaptively allocate test-time compute have advanced LLM performance on easy to verify domains such as math and code. In this work, we study how to utilize this approach to train models that exhibit a degree of robustness to safety vulnerabilities, and show that doing so can provide benefits. We build a recipe called TARS (Training Adaptive Reasoners for Safety), a reinforcement learning (RL) approach that trains models to reason about safety using chain-of-thought traces and a reward signal that balances safety with task completion. To build TARS, we identify three critical design choices: (1) a "lightweight" warmstart SFT stage, (2) a mix of harmful, harmless, and ambiguous prompts to prevent shortcut behaviors such as too many refusals, and (3) a reward function to prevent degeneration of reasoning capabilities during training. Models trained with TARS exhibit adaptive behaviors by spending more compute on ambiguous queries, leading to better safety-refusal trade-offs. They also internally learn to better distinguish between safe and unsafe prompts and attain greater robustness to both white-box (e.g., GCG) and black-box attacks (e.g., PAIR). Overall, our work provides an effective, open recipe for training LLMs against jailbreaks and harmful requests by reasoning per prompt.

When building Large Language Models (LLMs), it is paramount to bear safety in mind and protect them with guardrails. Indeed, LLMs should never generate content promoting or normalizing harmful, illegal, or unethical behavior that may contribute to harm to individuals or society. This principle applies to both normal and adversarial use. In response, we introduce ALERT, a large-scale benchmark to assess safety based on a novel fine-grained risk taxonomy. It is designed to evaluate the safety of LLMs through red teaming methodologies and consists of more than 45k instructions categorized using our novel taxonomy. By subjecting LLMs to adversarial testing scenarios, ALERT aims to identify vulnerabilities, inform improvements, and enhance the overall safety of the language models. Furthermore, the fine-grained taxonomy enables researchers to perform an in-depth evaluation that also helps one to assess the alignment with various policies. In our experiments, we extensively evaluate 10 popular open- and closed-source LLMs and demonstrate that many of them still struggle to attain reasonable levels of safety.

Software maintenance faces a persistent challenge with crash bugs, especially across diverse release channels catering to distinct user bases. Nightly builds, favoured by enthusiasts, often reveal crashes that are cheaper to fix but may differ significantly from those in stable releases. In this paper, we emphasize the need for a data-driven solution to predict the impact of crashes happening on nightly channels once they are released to stable channels. We also list the challenges that need to be considered when approaching this problem.

With the rapid evolution of large language models (LLMs), new and hard-to-predict harmful capabilities are emerging. This requires developers to be able to identify risks through the evaluation of "dangerous capabilities" in order to responsibly deploy LLMs. In this work, we collect the first open-source dataset to evaluate safeguards in LLMs, and deploy safer open-source LLMs at a low cost. Our dataset is curated and filtered to consist only of instructions that responsible language models should not follow. We annotate and assess the responses of six popular LLMs to these instructions. Based on our annotation, we proceed to train several BERT-like classifiers, and find that these small classifiers can achieve results that are comparable with GPT-4 on automatic safety evaluation. Warning: this paper contains example data that may be offensive, harmful, or biased.

Incorporating a robotic manipulator into a wheel-legged robot enhances its agility and expands its potential for practical applications. However, the presence of potential instability and uncertainties presents additional challenges for control objectives. In this paper, we introduce an arm-constrained curriculum learning architecture to tackle the issues introduced by adding the manipulator. Firstly, we develop an arm-constrained reinforcement learning algorithm to ensure safety and stability in control performance. Additionally, to address discrepancies in reward settings between the arm and the base, we propose a reward-aware curriculum learning method. The policy is first trained in Isaac gym and transferred to the physical robot to do dynamic grasping tasks, including the door-opening task, fan-twitching task and the relay-baton-picking and following task. The results demonstrate that our proposed approach effectively controls the arm-equipped wheel-legged robot to master dynamic grasping skills, allowing it to chase and catch a moving object while in motion. Please refer to our website (https://acodedog.github.io/wheel-legged-loco-manipulation) for the code and supplemental videos.

This paper introduces STAR-1, a high-quality, just-1k-scale safety dataset specifically designed for large reasoning models (LRMs) like DeepSeek-R1. Built on three core principles -- diversity, deliberative reasoning, and rigorous filtering -- STAR-1 aims to address the critical needs for safety alignment in LRMs. Specifically, we begin by integrating existing open-source safety datasets from diverse sources. Then, we curate safety policies to generate policy-grounded deliberative reasoning samples. Lastly, we apply a GPT-4o-based safety scoring system to select training examples aligned with best practices. Experimental results show that fine-tuning LRMs with STAR-1 leads to an average 40% improvement in safety performance across four benchmarks, while only incurring a marginal decrease (e.g., an average of 1.1%) in reasoning ability measured across five reasoning tasks. Extensive ablation studies further validate the importance of our design principles in constructing STAR-1 and analyze its efficacy across both LRMs and traditional LLMs. Our project page is https://ucsc-vlaa.github.io/STAR-1.