Daily Papers

Agent systems powered by large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive performance on repository-level code-generation tasks. However, for tasks such as website codebase generation, which depend heavily on visual effects and user-interaction feedback, current code agents rely only on simple code execution for feedback and verification. This approach fails to capture the actual quality of the generated code. In this paper, we propose WebGen-Agent, a novel website-generation agent that leverages comprehensive and multi-level visual feedback to iteratively generate and refine the website codebase. Detailed and expressive text descriptions and suggestions regarding the screenshots and GUI-agent testing of the websites are generated by a visual language model (VLM), together with scores that quantify their quality. The screenshot and GUI-agent scores are further integrated with a backtracking and select-best mechanism, enhancing the performance of the agent. Utilizing the accurate visual scores inherent in the WebGen-Agent workflow, we further introduce Step-GRPO with Screenshot and GUI-agent Feedback to improve the ability of LLMs to act as the reasoning engine of WebGen-Agent. By using the screenshot and GUI-agent scores at each step as the reward in Step-GRPO, we provide a dense and reliable process supervision signal, which effectively improves the model's website-generation ability. On the WebGen-Bench dataset, WebGen-Agent increases the accuracy of Claude-3.5-Sonnet from 26.4% to 51.9% and its appearance score from 3.0 to 3.9, outperforming the previous state-of-the-art agent system. Additionally, our Step-GRPO training approach increases the accuracy of Qwen2.5-Coder-7B-Instruct from 38.9% to 45.4% and raises the appearance score from 3.4 to 3.7.

With the advancement of large language models (LLMs), solving complex reasoning tasks has gained increasing attention. Inference-time computation methods (e.g., Best-of-N, beam search, et al.) are particularly valuable as they can enhance reasoning performance without modifying model parameters or requiring additional training. However, these techniques come with implementation challenges, and most existing methods remain at the proof-of-concept stage with limited practical adoption due to their computational complexity and varying effectiveness across different tasks. In this paper, we investigate and benchmark diverse inference-time computation strategies across reasoning tasks of varying complexity. Since most current methods rely on a proposer-verifier pipeline that first generates candidate solutions (e.g., reasoning solutions) and then selects the best one based on reward signals (e.g., RLHF rewards, process rewards), our research focuses on optimizing both candidate solution generation (e.g., instructing prompts, hyperparameters such as temperature and top-p) and reward mechanisms (e.g., self-evaluation, reward types). Through extensive experiments (more than 20,000 A100-80G GPU hours with over 1,000 experiments) across a variety of models (e.g., Llama, Qwen, and Mistral families) of various sizes, our ablation studies reveal that previously overlooked strategies can significantly enhance performance (e.g., tuning temperature can improve reasoning task performance by up to 5%). Furthermore, we establish a standardized benchmark for inference-time computation by systematically evaluating six representative methods across eight reasoning tasks. These findings provide a stronger foundation for future research. The code is available at https://github.com/usail-hkust/benchmark_inference_time_computation_LLM

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility result that no strategy proof mechanism can bound the approximation ratio of the optimal Gini index of utilities for one or more facilities. We propose instead computing approximation ratios of the complemented Gini index of utilities, and consider how well both deterministic and randomized mechanisms approximate this. In addition, as Nash welfare is often put forwards as an equitable compromise between egalitarian and utilitarian outcomes, we consider how well mechanisms approximate the Nash welfare.

Proportionality is an attractive fairness concept that has been applied to a range of problems including the facility location problem, a classic problem in social choice. In our work, we propose a concept called Strong Proportionality, which ensures that when there are two groups of agents at different locations, both groups incur the same total cost. We show that although Strong Proportionality is a well-motivated and basic axiom, there is no deterministic strategyproof mechanism satisfying the property. We then identify a randomized mechanism called Random Rank (which uniformly selects a number k between 1 to n and locates the facility at the k'th highest agent location) which satisfies Strong Proportionality in expectation. Our main theorem characterizes Random Rank as the unique mechanism that achieves universal truthfulness, universal anonymity, and Strong Proportionality in expectation among all randomized mechanisms. Finally, we show via the AverageOrRandomRank mechanism that even stronger ex-post fairness guarantees can be achieved by weakening universal truthfulness to strategyproofness in expectation.

We study the problem of designing mechanisms for information acquisition scenarios. This setting models strategic interactions between an uniformed receiver and a set of informed senders. In our model the senders receive information about the underlying state of nature and communicate their observation (either truthfully or not) to the receiver, which, based on this information, selects an action. Our goal is to design mechanisms maximizing the receiver's utility while incentivizing the senders to report truthfully their information. First, we provide an algorithm that efficiently computes an optimal incentive compatible (IC) mechanism. Then, we focus on the online problem in which the receiver sequentially interacts in an unknown game, with the objective of minimizing the cumulative regret w.r.t. the optimal IC mechanism, and the cumulative violation of the incentive compatibility constraints. We investigate two different online scenarios, i.e., the full and bandit feedback settings. For the full feedback problem, we propose an algorithm that guarantees mathcal O(sqrt T) regret and violation, while for the bandit feedback setting we present an algorithm that attains mathcal O(T^{alpha}) regret and mathcal O(T^{1-alpha/2}) violation for any alphain[1/2, 1]. Finally, we complement our results providing a tight lower bound.

Motivated by the phenomenon of strategic agents gaming a recommender system to maximize the number of times they are recommended to users, we study a strategic variant of the linear contextual bandit problem, where the arms can strategically misreport privately observed contexts to the learner. We treat the algorithm design problem as one of mechanism design under uncertainty and propose the Optimistic Grim Trigger Mechanism (OptGTM) that incentivizes the agents (i.e., arms) to report their contexts truthfully while simultaneously minimizing regret. We also show that failing to account for the strategic nature of the agents results in linear regret. However, a trade-off between mechanism design and regret minimization appears to be unavoidable. More broadly, this work aims to provide insight into the intersection of online learning and mechanism design.

We consider an extension to the classic position auctions in which sponsored creatives can be added within AI generated content rather than shown in predefined slots. New challenges arise from the natural requirement that sponsored creatives should smoothly fit into the context. With the help of advanced LLM technologies, it becomes viable to accurately estimate the benefits of adding each individual sponsored creatives into each potential positions within the AI generated content by properly taking the context into account. Therefore, we assume one click-through rate estimation for each position-creative pair, rather than one uniform estimation for each sponsored creative across all positions in classic settings. As a result, the underlying optimization becomes a general matching problem, thus the substitution effects should be treated more carefully compared to standard position auction settings, where the slots are independent with each other. In this work, we formalize a concrete mathematical model of the extended position auction problem and study the welfare-maximization and revenue-maximization mechanism design problem. Formally, we consider two different user behavior models and solve the mechanism design problems therein respectively. For the Multinomial Logit (MNL) model, which is order-insensitive, we can efficiently implement the optimal mechanisms. For the cascade model, which is order-sensitive, we provide approximately optimal solutions.

We focus on a simple, one-dimensional collective decision problem (often referred to as the facility location problem) and explore issues of strategyproofness and proportionality-based fairness. We introduce and analyze a hierarchy of proportionality-based fairness axioms of varying strength: Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS), Proportionality (as in Freeman et al, 2021), and Proportional Fairness (PF). For each axiom, we characterize the family of mechanisms that satisfy the axiom and strategyproofness. We show that imposing strategyproofness renders many of the axioms to be equivalent: the family of mechanisms that satisfy proportionality, unanimity, and strategyproofness is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy UFS and strategyproofness, which, in turn, is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy PF and strategyproofness. Furthermore, there is a unique such mechanism: the Uniform Phantom mechanism, which is studied in Freeman et al. (2021). We also characterize the outcomes of the Uniform Phantom mechanism as the unique (pure) equilibrium outcome for any mechanism that satisfies continuity, strict monotonicity, and UFS. Finally, we analyze the approximation guarantees, in terms of optimal social welfare and minimum total cost, obtained by mechanisms that are strategyproof and satisfy each proportionality-based fairness axiom. We show that the Uniform Phantom mechanism provides the best approximation of the optimal social welfare (and also minimum total cost) among all mechanisms that satisfy UFS.

LLM inference often generates a batch of candidates for a prompt and selects one via strategies like majority voting or Best-of- N (BoN). For difficult tasks, this single-shot selection often underperforms. Consequently, evaluations commonly report Pass@k: the agent may submit up to k responses, and only the best of them is used when computing regret. Motivated by this, we study inference scaling in the more general Pass@k inference setting, and prove that neither majority voting nor BoN exhibits the desirable scaling with k and the sampling budget N. Combining the advantages of majority voting and BoN, we propose a new inference strategy called Best-of-Majority (BoM), with a pivotal step that restricts the candidates to the responses with high frequency in the N samples before selecting the top-k rewards. We prove that when the sampling budget is N=tildeOmega(C^*), the regret of BoM is O(epsilon_{opt}+epsilon_{mathrm{RM}^2C^*/k}), where C^* is the coverage coefficient, epsilon_{RM} is the estimation error of the reward model, and epsilon_{opt} is the estimation error of reward at the optimal response. We further establish a matching lower bound, certifying that our algorithm is minimax optimal. Beyond optimality, BoM has a key advantage: unlike majority voting and BoN, its performance does not degrade when increasing N. Experimental results of inference on math problems show BoM outperforming both majority voting and BoN.

Randomized mechanisms can have good normative properties compared to their deterministic counterparts. However, randomized mechanisms are problematic in several ways such as in their verifiability. We propose here to derandomize such mechanisms by having agents play a game instead of tossing a coin. The game is designed so an agent's best action is to play randomly, and this play then injects ``randomness'' into the mechanism. This derandomization retains many of the good normative properties of the original randomized mechanism but gives a mechanism that is deterministic and easy, for instance, to audit. We consider three related methods to derandomize randomized mechanism in six different domains: voting, facility location, task allocation, school choice, peer selection, and resource allocation. We propose a number of novel derandomized mechanisms for these six domains with good normative properties. Each mechanism has a mixed Nash equilibrium in which agents play a modular arithmetic game with an uniform mixed strategy. In all but one mixed Nash equilibrium, agents report their preferences over the original problem sincerely. The derandomized methods are thus ``quasi-strategy proof''. In one domain, we additionally show that a new and desirable normative property emerges as a result of derandomization.

We consider the problem of locating a facility to serve a set of agents located along a line. The Nash welfare objective function, defined as the product of the agents' utilities, is known to provide a compromise between fairness and efficiency in resource allocation problems. We apply this welfare notion to the facility location problem, converting individual costs to utilities and analyzing the facility placement that maximizes the Nash welfare. We give a polynomial-time approximation algorithm to compute this facility location, and prove results suggesting that it achieves a good balance of fairness and efficiency. Finally, we take a mechanism design perspective and propose a strategy-proof mechanism with a bounded approximation ratio for Nash welfare.

We study the impact on mechanisms for facility location of moving from one dimension to two (or more) dimensions and Euclidean or Manhattan distances. We consider three fundamental axiomatic properties: anonymity which is a basic fairness property, Pareto optimality which is one of the most important efficiency properties, and strategy proofness which ensures agents do not have an incentive to mis-report. We also consider how well such mechanisms can approximate the optimal welfare. Our results are somewhat negative. Moving from one dimension to two (or more) dimensions often makes these axiomatic properties more difficult to achieve. For example, with two facilities in Euclidean space or with just a single facility in Manhattan space, no mechanism is anonymous, Pareto optimal and strategy proof. By contrast, mechanisms on the line exist with all three properties.We also show that approximation ratios may increase when moving to two (or more) dimensions. All our impossibility results are minimal. If we drop one of the three axioms (anonymity, Pareto optimality or strategy proofness) multiple mechanisms satisfy the other two axioms.

A major barrier to deploying current machine learning models lies in their non-reliability to dataset shifts. To resolve this problem, most existing studies attempted to transfer stable information to unseen environments. Particularly, independent causal mechanisms-based methods proposed to remove mutable causal mechanisms via the do-operator. Compared to previous methods, the obtained stable predictors are more effective in identifying stable information. However, a key question remains: which subset of this whole stable information should the model transfer, in order to achieve optimal generalization ability? To answer this question, we present a comprehensive minimax analysis from a causal perspective. Specifically, we first provide a graphical condition for the whole stable set to be optimal. When this condition fails, we surprisingly find with an example that this whole stable set, although can fully exploit stable information, is not the optimal one to transfer. To identify the optimal subset under this case, we propose to estimate the worst-case risk with a novel optimization scheme over the intervention functions on mutable causal mechanisms. We then propose an efficient algorithm to search for the subset with minimal worst-case risk, based on a newly defined equivalence relation between stable subsets. Compared to the exponential cost of exhaustively searching over all subsets, our searching strategy enjoys a polynomial complexity. The effectiveness and efficiency of our methods are demonstrated on synthetic data and the diagnosis of Alzheimer's disease.

We consider the obnoxious facility location problem (in which agents prefer the facility location to be far from them) and propose a hierarchy of distance-based proportional fairness concepts for the problem. These fairness axioms ensure that groups of agents at the same location are guaranteed to be a distance from the facility proportional to their group size. We consider deterministic and randomized mechanisms, and compute tight bounds on the price of proportional fairness. In the deterministic setting, we show that our proportional fairness axioms are incompatible with strategyproofness, and prove asymptotically tight epsilon-price of anarchy and stability bounds for proportionally fair welfare-optimal mechanisms. In the randomized setting, we identify proportionally fair and strategyproof mechanisms that give an expected welfare within a constant factor of the optimal welfare. Finally, we prove existence results for two extensions to our model.

To enhance the efficiency and practicality of federated bandit learning, recent advances have introduced incentives to motivate communication among clients, where a client participates only when the incentive offered by the server outweighs its participation cost. However, existing incentive mechanisms naively assume the clients are truthful: they all report their true cost and thus the higher cost one participating client claims, the more the server has to pay. Therefore, such mechanisms are vulnerable to strategic clients aiming to optimize their own utility by misreporting. To address this issue, we propose an incentive compatible (i.e., truthful) communication protocol, named Truth-FedBan, where the incentive for each participant is independent of its self-reported cost, and reporting the true cost is the only way to achieve the best utility. More importantly, Truth-FedBan still guarantees the sub-linear regret and communication cost without any overheads. In other words, the core conceptual contribution of this paper is, for the first time, demonstrating the possibility of simultaneously achieving incentive compatibility and nearly optimal regret in federated bandit learning. Extensive numerical studies further validate the effectiveness of our proposed solution.

We study a strategic variant of the multi-armed bandit problem, which we coin the strategic click-bandit. This model is motivated by applications in online recommendation where the choice of recommended items depends on both the click-through rates and the post-click rewards. Like in classical bandits, rewards follow a fixed unknown distribution. However, we assume that the click-rate of each arm is chosen strategically by the arm (e.g., a host on Airbnb) in order to maximize the number of times it gets clicked. The algorithm designer does not know the post-click rewards nor the arms' actions (i.e., strategically chosen click-rates) in advance, and must learn both values over time. To solve this problem, we design an incentive-aware learning algorithm, UCB-S, which achieves two goals simultaneously: (a) incentivizing desirable arm behavior under uncertainty; (b) minimizing regret by learning unknown parameters. We characterize all approximate Nash equilibria among arms under UCB-S and show a mathcal{O} (KT) regret bound uniformly in every equilibrium. We also show that incentive-unaware algorithms generally fail to achieve low regret in the strategic click-bandit. Finally, we support our theoretical results by simulations of strategic arm behavior which confirm the effectiveness and robustness of our proposed incentive design.

Online display advertising platforms service numerous advertisers by providing real-time bidding (RTB) for the scale of billions of ad requests every day. The bidding strategy handles ad requests cross multiple channels to maximize the number of clicks under the set financial constraints, i.e., total budget and cost-per-click (CPC), etc. Different from existing works mainly focusing on single channel bidding, we explicitly consider cross-channel constrained bidding with budget allocation. Specifically, we propose a hierarchical offline deep reinforcement learning (DRL) framework called ``HiBid'', consisted of a high-level planner equipped with auxiliary loss for non-competitive budget allocation, and a data augmentation enhanced low-level executor for adaptive bidding strategy in response to allocated budgets. Additionally, a CPC-guided action selection mechanism is introduced to satisfy the cross-channel CPC constraint. Through extensive experiments on both the large-scale log data and online A/B testing, we confirm that HiBid outperforms six baselines in terms of the number of clicks, CPC satisfactory ratio, and return-on-investment (ROI). We also deploy HiBid on Meituan advertising platform to already service tens of thousands of advertisers every day.

Recent advances in deep learning and large language models (LLMs) have facilitated the deployment of the mixture-of-experts (MoE) mechanism in the stock investment domain. While these models have demonstrated promising trading performance, they are often unimodal, neglecting the wealth of information available in other modalities, such as textual data. Moreover, the traditional neural network-based router selection mechanism fails to consider contextual and real-world nuances, resulting in suboptimal expert selection. To address these limitations, we propose LLMoE, a novel framework that employs LLMs as the router within the MoE architecture. Specifically, we replace the conventional neural network-based router with LLMs, leveraging their extensive world knowledge and reasoning capabilities to select experts based on historical price data and stock news. This approach provides a more effective and interpretable selection mechanism. Our experiments on multimodal real-world stock datasets demonstrate that LLMoE outperforms state-of-the-art MoE models and other deep neural network approaches. Additionally, the flexible architecture of LLMoE allows for easy adaptation to various downstream tasks.

We develop a Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) method to learn scalable control policies for target tracking. Our method can handle an arbitrary number of pursuers and targets; we show results for tasks consisting up to 1000 pursuers tracking 1000 targets. We use a decentralized, partially-observable Markov Decision Process framework to model pursuers as agents receiving partial observations (range and bearing) about targets which move using fixed, unknown policies. An attention mechanism is used to parameterize the value function of the agents; this mechanism allows us to handle an arbitrary number of targets. Entropy-regularized off-policy RL methods are used to train a stochastic policy, and we discuss how it enables a hedging behavior between pursuers that leads to a weak form of cooperation in spite of completely decentralized control execution. We further develop a masking heuristic that allows training on smaller problems with few pursuers-targets and execution on much larger problems. Thorough simulation experiments, ablation studies, and comparisons to state of the art algorithms are performed to study the scalability of the approach and robustness of performance to varying numbers of agents and targets.

In peer mechanisms, the competitors for a prize also determine who wins. Each competitor may be asked to rank, grade, or nominate peers for the prize. Since the prize can be valuable, such as financial aid, course grades, or an award at a conference, competitors may be tempted to manipulate the mechanism. We survey approaches to prevent or discourage the manipulation of peer mechanisms. We conclude our survey by identifying several important research challenges.

Information is often stored in a distributed and proprietary form, and agents who own information are often self-interested and require incentives to reveal their information. Suitable mechanisms are required to elicit and aggregate such distributed information for decision making. In this paper, we use simulations to investigate the use of decision markets as mechanisms in a multi-agent learning system to aggregate distributed information for decision-making in a contextual bandit problem. The system utilises strictly proper decision scoring rules to assess the accuracy of probabilistic reports from agents, which allows agents to learn to solve the contextual bandit problem jointly. Our simulations show that our multi-agent system with distributed information can be trained as efficiently as a centralised counterpart with a single agent that receives all information. Moreover, we use our system to investigate scenarios with deterministic decision scoring rules which are not incentive compatible. We observe the emergence of more complex dynamics with manipulative behaviour, which agrees with existing theoretical analyses.

Recent advances in reinforcement learning for foundation models, such as Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO), have significantly improved the performance of foundation models on reasoning tasks. Notably, the advantage function serves as a central mechanism in GRPO for ranking the trajectory importance. However, existing explorations encounter both advantage reversion and advantage mirror problems, which hinder the reasonable advantage allocation across different query samples. In this work, we propose an easy but effective GRPO strategy, Mixed Advantage Policy Optimization (MAPO). We reveal that the trajectory appears with different certainty and propose the advantage percent deviation for samples with high-certainty trajectories. Furthermore, we dynamically reweight the advantage function for samples with varying trajectory certainty, thereby adaptively configuring the advantage function to account for sample-specific characteristics. Comparison with related state-of-the-art methods, along with ablation studies on different advantage variants, validates the effectiveness of our approach.

We consider multi-draft speculative sampling, where the proposal sequences are sampled independently from different draft models. At each step, a token-level draft selection scheme takes a list of valid tokens as input and produces an output token whose distribution matches that of the target model. Previous works have demonstrated that the optimal scheme (which maximizes the probability of accepting one of the input tokens) can be cast as a solution to a linear program. In this work we show that the optimal scheme can be decomposed into a two-step solution: in the first step an importance sampling (IS) type scheme is used to select one intermediate token; in the second step (single-draft) speculative sampling is applied to generate the output token. For the case of two identical draft models we further 1) establish a necessary and sufficient condition on the distributions of the target and draft models for the acceptance probability to equal one and 2) provide an explicit expression for the optimal acceptance probability. Our theoretical analysis also motives a new class of token-level selection scheme based on weighted importance sampling. Our experimental results demonstrate consistent improvements in the achievable block efficiency and token rates over baseline schemes in a number of scenarios.

The best-of-both-worlds paradigm advocates an approach that achieves desirable properties both ex-ante and ex-post. We launch a best-of-both-worlds fairness perspective for the important social choice setting of approval-based committee voting. To this end, we initiate work on ex-ante proportional representation properties in this domain and formalize a hierarchy of notions including Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS), Group Fair Share (GFS), and their stronger variants. We establish their compatibility with well-studied ex-post concepts such as extended justified representation (EJR) and fully justified representation (FJR). Our first main result is a polynomial-time algorithm that simultaneously satisfies ex-post EJR, ex-ante GFS and ex-ante Strong UFS. Subsequently, we strengthen our ex-post guarantee to FJR and present an algorithm that outputs a lottery which is ex-post FJR and ex-ante Strong UFS, but does not run in polynomial time.

This paper concerns the problem of aligning samples from large language models to human preferences using best-of-n sampling, where we draw n samples, rank them, and return the best one. We consider two fundamental problems. First: what is the relationship between best-of-n and approaches to alignment that train LLMs to output samples with a high expected reward (e.g., RLHF or DPO)? To answer this, we embed both the best-of-n distribution and the sampling distributions learned by alignment procedures in a common class of tiltings of the base LLM distribution. We then show that, within this class, best-of-n is essentially optimal in terms of the trade-off between win-rate against the base model vs KL distance from the base model. That is, best-of-n is the best choice of alignment distribution if the goal is to maximize win rate. However, best-of-n requires drawing n samples for each inference, a substantial cost. To avoid this, the second problem we consider is how to fine-tune a LLM to mimic the best-of-n sampling distribution. We derive BoNBoN Alignment to achieve this by exploiting the special structure of the best-of-n distribution. Experiments show that BoNBoN alignment yields substantial improvements in producing a model that is preferred to the base policy while minimally affecting off-target aspects.

Generative reward models with parallel sampling have enabled effective test-time scaling for reasoning tasks. Current approaches employ pointwise scoring of individual solutions or pairwise comparisons. However, pointwise methods underutilize LLMs' comparative abilities, while pairwise methods scale inefficiently with larger sampling budgets. We introduce GenSelect, where the LLM uses long reasoning to select the best solution among N candidates. This leverages LLMs' comparative strengths while scaling efficiently across parallel sampling budgets. For math reasoning, we demonstrate that reasoning models, such as QwQ and DeepSeek-R1-0528, excel at GenSelect, outperforming existing scoring approaches with simple prompting.

Portfolio Selection is an important real-world financial task and has attracted extensive attention in artificial intelligence communities. This task, however, has two main difficulties: (i) the non-stationary price series and complex asset correlations make the learning of feature representation very hard; (ii) the practicality principle in financial markets requires controlling both transaction and risk costs. Most existing methods adopt handcraft features and/or consider no constraints for the costs, which may make them perform unsatisfactorily and fail to control both costs in practice. In this paper, we propose a cost-sensitive portfolio selection method with deep reinforcement learning. Specifically, a novel two-stream portfolio policy network is devised to extract both price series patterns and asset correlations, while a new cost-sensitive reward function is developed to maximize the accumulated return and constrain both costs via reinforcement learning. We theoretically analyze the near-optimality of the proposed reward, which shows that the growth rate of the policy regarding this reward function can approach the theoretical optimum. We also empirically evaluate the proposed method on real-world datasets. Promising results demonstrate the effectiveness and superiority of the proposed method in terms of profitability, cost-sensitivity and representation abilities.

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods among a set of agents. Our focus is on the existence of allocations that give each agent their maximin fair share--the value they are guaranteed if they divide the goods into as many bundles as there are agents, and receive their lowest valued bundle. An MMS allocation is one where every agent receives at least their maximin fair share. We examine the existence of such allocations when agents have cost utilities. In this setting, each item has an associated cost, and an agent's valuation for an item is the cost of the item if it is useful to them, and zero otherwise. Our main results indicate that cost utilities are a promising restriction for achieving MMS. We show that for the case of three agents with cost utilities, an MMS allocation always exists. We also show that when preferences are restricted slightly further--to what we call laminar set approvals--we can guarantee MMS allocations for any number of agents. Finally, we explore if it is possible to guarantee each agent their maximin fair share while using a strategyproof mechanism.

Generative Flow Networks (GFlowNets) have been introduced as a method to sample a diverse set of candidates with probabilities proportional to a given reward. However, GFlowNets can only be used with a predefined scalar reward, which can be either computationally expensive or not directly accessible, in the case of multi-objective optimization (MOO) tasks for example. Moreover, to prioritize identifying high-reward candidates, the conventional practice is to raise the reward to a higher exponent, the optimal choice of which may vary across different environments. To address these issues, we propose Order-Preserving GFlowNets (OP-GFNs), which sample with probabilities in proportion to a learned reward function that is consistent with a provided (partial) order on the candidates, thus eliminating the need for an explicit formulation of the reward function. We theoretically prove that the training process of OP-GFNs gradually sparsifies the learned reward landscape in single-objective maximization tasks. The sparsification concentrates on candidates of a higher hierarchy in the ordering, ensuring exploration at the beginning and exploitation towards the end of the training. We demonstrate OP-GFN's state-of-the-art performance in single-objective maximization (totally ordered) and multi-objective Pareto front approximation (partially ordered) tasks, including synthetic datasets, molecule generation, and neural architecture search.

Cascading bandits have gained popularity in recent years due to their applicability to recommendation systems and online advertising. In the cascading bandit model, at each timestep, an agent recommends an ordered subset of items (called an item list) from a pool of items, each associated with an unknown attraction probability. Then, the user examines the list, and clicks the first attractive item (if any), and after that, the agent receives a reward. The goal of the agent is to maximize the expected cumulative reward. However, the prior literature on cascading bandits ignores the influences of user states (e.g., historical behaviors) on recommendations and the change of states as the session proceeds. Motivated by this fact, we propose a generalized cascading RL framework, which considers the impact of user states and state transition into decisions. In cascading RL, we need to select items not only with large attraction probabilities but also leading to good successor states. This imposes a huge computational challenge due to the combinatorial action space. To tackle this challenge, we delve into the properties of value functions, and design an oracle BestPerm to efficiently find the optimal item list. Equipped with BestPerm, we develop two algorithms CascadingVI and CascadingBPI, which are both computationally-efficient and sample-efficient, and provide near-optimal regret and sample complexity guarantees. Furthermore, we present experiments to show the improved computational and sample efficiencies of our algorithms compared to straightforward adaptations of existing RL algorithms in practice.

In risk-averse reinforcement learning (RL), the goal is to optimize some risk measure of the returns. A risk measure often focuses on the worst returns out of the agent's experience. As a result, standard methods for risk-averse RL often ignore high-return strategies. We prove that under certain conditions this inevitably leads to a local-optimum barrier, and propose a soft risk mechanism to bypass it. We also devise a novel Cross Entropy module for risk sampling, which (1) preserves risk aversion despite the soft risk; (2) independently improves sample efficiency. By separating the risk aversion of the sampler and the optimizer, we can sample episodes with poor conditions, yet optimize with respect to successful strategies. We combine these two concepts in CeSoR - Cross-entropy Soft-Risk optimization algorithm - which can be applied on top of any risk-averse policy gradient (PG) method. We demonstrate improved risk aversion in maze navigation, autonomous driving, and resource allocation benchmarks, including in scenarios where standard risk-averse PG completely fails.

Traditional Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) pipelines rely on similarity-based retrieval and re-ranking, which depend on heuristics such as top-k, and lack explainability, interpretability, and robustness against adversarial content. To address this gap, we propose a novel method METEORA that replaces re-ranking in RAG with a rationale-driven selection approach. METEORA operates in two stages. First, a general-purpose LLM is preference-tuned to generate rationales conditioned on the input query using direct preference optimization. These rationales guide the evidence chunk selection engine, which selects relevant chunks in three stages: pairing individual rationales with corresponding retrieved chunks for local relevance, global selection with elbow detection for adaptive cutoff, and context expansion via neighboring chunks. This process eliminates the need for top-k heuristics. The rationales are also used for consistency check using a Verifier LLM to detect and filter poisoned or misleading content for safe generation. The framework provides explainable and interpretable evidence flow by using rationales consistently across both selection and verification. Our evaluation across six datasets spanning legal, financial, and academic research domains shows that METEORA improves generation accuracy by 33.34% while using approximately 50% fewer chunks than state-of-the-art re-ranking methods. In adversarial settings, METEORA significantly improves the F1 score from 0.10 to 0.44 over the state-of-the-art perplexity-based defense baseline, demonstrating strong resilience to poisoning attacks. Code available at: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/METEORA-DC46/README.md

We study the incentivized information acquisition problem, where a principal hires an agent to gather information on her behalf. Such a problem is modeled as a Stackelberg game between the principal and the agent, where the principal announces a scoring rule that specifies the payment, and then the agent then chooses an effort level that maximizes her own profit and reports the information. We study the online setting of such a problem from the principal's perspective, i.e., designing the optimal scoring rule by repeatedly interacting with the strategic agent. We design a provably sample efficient algorithm that tailors the UCB algorithm (Auer et al., 2002) to our model, which achieves a sublinear T^{2/3}-regret after T iterations. Our algorithm features a delicate estimation procedure for the optimal profit of the principal, and a conservative correction scheme that ensures the desired agent's actions are incentivized. Furthermore, a key feature of our regret bound is that it is independent of the number of states of the environment.

We present a Spades bidding algorithm that is superior to recreational human players and to publicly available bots. Like in Bridge, the game of Spades is composed of two independent phases, bidding and playing. This paper focuses on the bidding algorithm, since this phase holds a precise challenge: based on the input, choose the bid that maximizes the agent's winning probability. Our Bidding-in-Spades (BIS) algorithm heuristically determines the bidding strategy by comparing the expected utility of each possible bid. A major challenge is how to estimate these expected utilities. To this end, we propose a set of domain-specific heuristics, and then correct them via machine learning using data from real-world players. The \BIS algorithm we present can be attached to any playing algorithm. It beats rule-based bidding bots when all use the same playing component. When combined with a rule-based playing algorithm, it is superior to the average recreational human.

We study offline multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) in Markov games, where the goal is to learn an approximate equilibrium -- such as Nash equilibrium and (Coarse) Correlated Equilibrium -- from an offline dataset pre-collected from the game. Existing works consider relatively restricted tabular or linear models and handle each equilibria separately. In this work, we provide the first framework for sample-efficient offline learning in Markov games under general function approximation, handling all 3 equilibria in a unified manner. By using Bellman-consistent pessimism, we obtain interval estimation for policies' returns, and use both the upper and the lower bounds to obtain a relaxation on the gap of a candidate policy, which becomes our optimization objective. Our results generalize prior works and provide several additional insights. Importantly, we require a data coverage condition that improves over the recently proposed "unilateral concentrability". Our condition allows selective coverage of deviation policies that optimally trade-off between their greediness (as approximate best responses) and coverage, and we show scenarios where this leads to significantly better guarantees. As a new connection, we also show how our algorithmic framework can subsume seemingly different solution concepts designed for the special case of two-player zero-sum games.

The rapid advancement in large language models (LLMs) has brought forth a diverse range of models with varying capabilities that excel in different tasks and domains. However, selecting the optimal LLM for user queries often involves a challenging trade-off between accuracy and cost, a problem exacerbated by the diverse demands of individual queries. In this work, we present a novel framework that formulates the LLM selection process as a multi-armed bandit problem, enabling dynamic and intelligent routing of queries to the most appropriate model. Our approach incorporates a preference-conditioned dynamic routing mechanism, allowing users to specify their preferences at inference time, thereby offering a customizable balance between performance and cost. Additionally, our selection policy is designed to generalize to unseen LLMs, ensuring adaptability to new models as they emerge. Experimental results demonstrate that our method achieves significant improvements in both accuracy and cost-effectiveness across various LLM platforms, showcasing the potential of our framework to adaptively optimize LLM selection in real-world scenarios.

Modern preference alignment techniques, such as Best-of-N (BoN) sampling, rely on reward models trained with pairwise comparison data. While effective at learning relative preferences, this paradigm fails to capture a signal of response acceptability, leaving systems vulnerable to selecting the least bad of many unacceptable options. This is particularly problematic for hard prompts, where the risk of such false acceptances increases with the number of samples. In this paper, we address this critical reliability gap by introducing a new data collection and modeling framework. By augmenting preference data with an outside option, inspired by discrete choice models, we train a reward model that can distinguish not just what is better, but what is good enough. We leverage this capability to create an adaptive inference strategy, best of mini-N in-loop, which partitions the generation budget into sequential loops with a calibrated, early-exit condition. Our experiments show that when tuned as an alignment guardrail, it reduces reliability failures by 70\%, and when tuned as an inference accelerator, it improves average inference speed by over 22\% in IMDB-sentiment setting. We thus provide a principled and flexible framework for practitioners to explicitly manage the trade-off between reliability and computational efficiency.

The performance of acquisition functions for Bayesian optimisation to locate the global optimum of continuous functions is investigated in terms of the Pareto front between exploration and exploitation. We show that Expected Improvement (EI) and the Upper Confidence Bound (UCB) always select solutions to be expensively evaluated on the Pareto front, but Probability of Improvement is not guaranteed to do so and Weighted Expected Improvement does so only for a restricted range of weights. We introduce two novel epsilon-greedy acquisition functions. Extensive empirical evaluation of these together with random search, purely exploratory, and purely exploitative search on 10 benchmark problems in 1 to 10 dimensions shows that epsilon-greedy algorithms are generally at least as effective as conventional acquisition functions (e.g., EI and UCB), particularly with a limited budget. In higher dimensions epsilon-greedy approaches are shown to have improved performance over conventional approaches. These results are borne out on a real world computational fluid dynamics optimisation problem and a robotics active learning problem. Our analysis and experiments suggest that the most effective strategy, particularly in higher dimensions, is to be mostly greedy, occasionally selecting a random exploratory solution.

Selecting the best code solution from multiple generated ones is an essential task in code generation, which can be achieved by using some reliable validators (e.g., developer-written test cases) for assistance. Since reliable test cases are not always available and can be expensive to build in practice, researchers propose to automatically generate test cases to assess code solutions. However, when both code solutions and test cases are plausible and not reliable, selecting the best solution becomes challenging. Although some heuristic strategies have been proposed to tackle this problem, they lack a strong theoretical guarantee and it is still an open question whether an optimal selection strategy exists. Our work contributes in two ways. First, we show that within a Bayesian framework, the optimal selection strategy can be defined based on the posterior probability of the observed passing states between solutions and tests. The problem of identifying the best solution is then framed as an integer programming problem. Second, we propose an efficient approach for approximating this optimal (yet uncomputable) strategy, where the approximation error is bounded by the correctness of prior knowledge. We then incorporate effective prior knowledge to tailor code generation tasks. Both theoretical and empirical studies confirm that existing heuristics are limited in selecting the best solutions with plausible test cases. Our proposed approximated optimal strategy B4 significantly surpasses existing heuristics in selecting code solutions generated by large language models (LLMs) with LLM-generated tests, achieving a relative performance improvement by up to 50% over the strongest heuristic and 246% over the random selection in the most challenging scenarios. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/ZJU-CTAG/B4.

Conventional models of matching markets assume that monetary transfers can clear markets by compensating for utility differentials. However, empirical patterns show that such transfers often fail to close structural preference gaps. This paper introduces a market microstructure framework that models matching decisions as a limit order book system with rigid bid ask spreads. Individual preferences are represented by a latent preference state matrix, where the spread between an agent's internal ask price (the unconditional maximum) and the market's best bid (the reachable maximum) creates a structural liquidity constraint. We establish a Threshold Impossibility Theorem showing that linear compensation cannot close these spreads unless it induces a categorical identity shift. A dynamic discrete choice execution model further demonstrates that matches occur only when the market to book ratio crosses a time decaying liquidity threshold, analogous to order execution under inventory pressure. Numerical experiments validate persistent slippage, regional invariance of preference orderings, and high tier zero spread executions. The model provides a unified microstructure explanation for matching failures, compensation inefficiency, and post match regret in illiquid order driven environments.

Implementing a reward function that perfectly captures a complex task in the real world is impractical. As a result, it is often appropriate to think of the reward function as a proxy for the true objective rather than as its definition. We study this phenomenon through the lens of Goodhart's law, which predicts that increasing optimisation of an imperfect proxy beyond some critical point decreases performance on the true objective. First, we propose a way to quantify the magnitude of this effect and show empirically that optimising an imperfect proxy reward often leads to the behaviour predicted by Goodhart's law for a wide range of environments and reward functions. We then provide a geometric explanation for why Goodhart's law occurs in Markov decision processes. We use these theoretical insights to propose an optimal early stopping method that provably avoids the aforementioned pitfall and derive theoretical regret bounds for this method. Moreover, we derive a training method that maximises worst-case reward, for the setting where there is uncertainty about the true reward function. Finally, we evaluate our early stopping method experimentally. Our results support a foundation for a theoretically-principled study of reinforcement learning under reward misspecification.

Instruction tuning (IT) is crucial to tailoring large language models (LLMs) towards human-centric interactions. Recent advancements have shown that the careful selection of a small, high-quality subset of IT data can significantly enhance the performance of LLMs. Despite this, common approaches often rely on additional models or data sets, which increases costs and limits widespread adoption. In this work, we propose a novel approach, termed SelectIT, that capitalizes on the foundational capabilities of the LLM itself. Specifically, we exploit the intrinsic uncertainty present in LLMs to more effectively select high-quality IT data, without the need for extra resources. Furthermore, we introduce a novel IT dataset, the Selective Alpaca, created by applying SelectIT to the Alpaca-GPT4 dataset. Empirical results demonstrate that IT using Selective Alpaca leads to substantial model ability enhancement. The robustness of SelectIT has also been corroborated in various foundation models and domain-specific tasks. Our findings suggest that longer and more computationally intensive IT data may serve as superior sources of IT, offering valuable insights for future research in this area. Data, code, and scripts are freely available at https://github.com/Blue-Raincoat/SelectIT.

In online ad markets, a rising number of advertisers are employing bidding agencies to participate in ad auctions. These agencies are specialized in designing online algorithms and bidding on behalf of their clients. Typically, an agency usually has information on multiple advertisers, so she can potentially coordinate bids to help her clients achieve higher utilities than those under independent bidding. In this paper, we study coordinated online bidding algorithms in repeated second-price auctions with budgets. We propose algorithms that guarantee every client a higher utility than the best she can get under independent bidding. We show that these algorithms achieve maximal coalition welfare and discuss bidders' incentives to misreport their budgets, in symmetric cases. Our proofs combine the techniques of online learning and equilibrium analysis, overcoming the difficulty of competing with a multi-dimensional benchmark. The performance of our algorithms is further evaluated by experiments on both synthetic and real data. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider bidder coordination in online repeated auctions with constraints.

We propose TAROT, a targeted data selection framework grounded in optimal transport theory. Previous targeted data selection methods primarily rely on influence-based greedy heuristics to enhance domain-specific performance. While effective on limited, unimodal data (i.e., data following a single pattern), these methods struggle as target data complexity increases. Specifically, in multimodal distributions, these heuristics fail to account for multiple inherent patterns, leading to suboptimal data selection. This work identifies two primary factors contributing to this limitation: (i) the disproportionate impact of dominant feature components in high-dimensional influence estimation, and (ii) the restrictive linear additive assumptions inherent in greedy selection strategies. To address these challenges, TAROT incorporates whitened feature distance to mitigate dominant feature bias, providing a more reliable measure of data influence. Building on this, TAROT uses whitened feature distance to quantify and minimize the optimal transport distance between the selected data and target domains. Notably, this minimization also facilitates the estimation of optimal selection ratios. We evaluate TAROT across multiple tasks, including semantic segmentation, motion prediction, and instruction tuning. Results consistently show that TAROT outperforms state-of-the-art methods, highlighting its versatility across various deep learning tasks. Code is available at https://github.com/vita-epfl/TAROT.

As LLM agents advance, they are increasingly mediating economic decisions, ranging from product discovery to transactions, on behalf of users. Such applications promise benefits but also raise many questions about agent accountability and value for users. Addressing these questions requires understanding how agents behave in realistic market conditions. However, previous research has largely evaluated agents in constrained settings, such as single-task marketplaces (e.g., negotiation) or structured two-agent interactions. Real-world markets are fundamentally different: they require agents to handle diverse economic activities and coordinate within large, dynamic ecosystems where multiple agents with opaque behaviors may engage in open-ended dialogues. To bridge this gap, we investigate two-sided agentic marketplaces where Assistant agents represent consumers and Service agents represent competing businesses. To study these interactions safely, we develop Magentic-Marketplace-- a simulated environment where Assistants and Services can operate. This environment enables us to study key market dynamics: the utility agents achieve, behavioral biases, vulnerability to manipulation, and how search mechanisms shape market outcomes. Our experiments show that frontier models can approach optimal welfare-- but only under ideal search conditions. Performance degrades sharply with scale, and all models exhibit severe first-proposal bias, creating 10-30x advantages for response speed over quality. These findings reveal how behaviors emerge across market conditions, informing the design of fair and efficient agentic marketplaces.

We consider the problem of subset selection where one is given multiple rankings of items and the goal is to select the highest ``quality'' subset. Score functions from the multiwinner voting literature have been used to aggregate rankings into quality scores for subsets. We study this setting of subset selection problems when, in addition, rankings may contain systemic or unconscious biases toward a group of items. For a general model of input rankings and biases, we show that requiring the selected subset to satisfy group fairness constraints can improve the quality of the selection with respect to unbiased rankings. Importantly, we show that for fairness constraints to be effective, different multiwinner score functions may require a drastically different number of rankings: While for some functions, fairness constraints need an exponential number of rankings to recover a close-to-optimal solution, for others, this dependency is only polynomial. This result relies on a novel notion of ``smoothness'' of submodular functions in this setting that quantifies how well a function can ``correctly'' assess the quality of items in the presence of bias. The results in this paper can be used to guide the choice of multiwinner score functions for the subset selection setting considered here; we additionally provide a tool to empirically enable this.

Language Agent could be endowed with different mechanisms for autonomous task accomplishment. Current agents typically rely on fixed mechanisms or a set of mechanisms activated in a predefined order, limiting their adaptation to varied potential task solution structures. To this end, this paper proposes Adaptive Language Agent Mechanism Activation Learning with Self-Exploration (ALAMA), which focuses on optimizing mechanism activation adaptability without reliance on expert models. Initially, it builds a harmonized agent framework (UniAct) to Unify different mechanisms via Actions. Then it leverages a training-efficient optimization method based on self-exploration to enable the UniAct to adaptively activate the appropriate mechanisms according to the potential characteristics of the task. Experimental results demonstrate significant improvements in downstream agent tasks, affirming the effectiveness of our approach in facilitating more dynamic and context-sensitive mechanism activation.

Customer Lifetime Value (CLTV) prediction is a critical task in business applications. Accurately predicting CLTV is challenging in real-world business scenarios, as the distribution of CLTV is complex and mutable. Firstly, there is a large number of users without any consumption consisting of a long-tailed part that is too complex to fit. Secondly, the small set of high-value users spent orders of magnitude more than a typical user leading to a wide range of the CLTV distribution which is hard to capture in a single distribution. Existing approaches for CLTV estimation either assume a prior probability distribution and fit a single group of distribution-related parameters for all samples, or directly learn from the posterior distribution with manually predefined buckets in a heuristic manner. However, all these methods fail to handle complex and mutable distributions. In this paper, we propose a novel optimal distribution selection model OptDist for CLTV prediction, which utilizes an adaptive optimal sub-distribution selection mechanism to improve the accuracy of complex distribution modeling. Specifically, OptDist trains several candidate sub-distribution networks in the distribution learning module (DLM) for modeling the probability distribution of CLTV. Then, a distribution selection module (DSM) is proposed to select the sub-distribution for each sample, thus making the selection automatically and adaptively. Besides, we design an alignment mechanism that connects both modules, which effectively guides the optimization. We conduct extensive experiments on both two public and one private dataset to verify that OptDist outperforms state-of-the-art baselines. Furthermore, OptDist has been deployed on a large-scale financial platform for customer acquisition marketing campaigns and the online experiments also demonstrate the effectiveness of OptDist.

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) is a key driver of quality and safety in state-of-the-art large language models. Yet, a surprisingly simple and strong inference-time strategy is Best-of-N sampling that selects the best generation among N candidates. In this paper, we propose Best-of-N Distillation (BOND), a novel RLHF algorithm that seeks to emulate Best-of-N but without its significant computational overhead at inference time. Specifically, BOND is a distribution matching algorithm that forces the distribution of generations from the policy to get closer to the Best-of-N distribution. We use the Jeffreys divergence (a linear combination of forward and backward KL) to balance between mode-covering and mode-seeking behavior, and derive an iterative formulation that utilizes a moving anchor for efficiency. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach and several design choices through experiments on abstractive summarization and Gemma models. Aligning Gemma policies with BOND outperforms other RLHF algorithms by improving results on several benchmarks.

Stochastic optimization is one of the central problems in Machine Learning and Theoretical Computer Science. In the standard model, the algorithm is given a fixed distribution known in advance. In practice though, one may acquire at a cost extra information to make better decisions. In this paper, we study how to buy information for stochastic optimization and formulate this question as an online learning problem. Assuming the learner has an oracle for the original optimization problem, we design a 2-competitive deterministic algorithm and a e/(e-1)-competitive randomized algorithm for buying information. We show that this ratio is tight as the problem is equivalent to a robust generalization of the ski-rental problem, which we call super-martingale stopping. We also consider an adaptive setting where the learner can choose to buy information after taking some actions for the underlying optimization problem. We focus on the classic optimization problem, Min-Sum Set Cover, where the goal is to quickly find an action that covers a given request drawn from a known distribution. We provide an 8-competitive algorithm running in polynomial time that chooses actions and decides when to buy information about the underlying request.

Heuristic algorithms play a vital role in solving combinatorial optimization (CO) problems, yet traditional designs depend heavily on manual expertise and struggle to generalize across diverse instances. We introduce HeurAgenix, a two-stage hyper-heuristic framework powered by large language models (LLMs) that first evolves heuristics and then selects among them automatically. In the heuristic evolution phase, HeurAgenix leverages an LLM to compare seed heuristic solutions with higher-quality solutions and extract reusable evolution strategies. During problem solving, it dynamically picks the most promising heuristic for each problem state, guided by the LLM's perception ability. For flexibility, this selector can be either a state-of-the-art LLM or a fine-tuned lightweight model with lower inference cost. To mitigate the scarcity of reliable supervision caused by CO complexity, we fine-tune the lightweight heuristic selector with a dual-reward mechanism that jointly exploits singals from selection preferences and state perception, enabling robust selection under noisy annotations. Extensive experiments on canonical benchmarks show that HeurAgenix not only outperforms existing LLM-based hyper-heuristics but also matches or exceeds specialized solvers. Code is available at https://github.com/microsoft/HeurAgenix.

Motivated by the operational problems in click and collect systems, such as curbside pickup programs, we study a joint admission control and capacity allocation problem. We consider a system where arriving customers have preferred service delivery times and gauge the service quality based on the service provider's ability to complete the service as close as possible to the preferred time. Customers can be of different priority classes, and their priority may increase as they wait longer in the queue. The service provider can reject customers upon their arrival if the system is overloaded or outsource the service (alternatively work overtime) when the capacity is not enough. The service provider's goal is to find the minimum-cost admission and capacity allocation policy to dynamically decide when to serve and whom to serve. We model this problem as a Markov Decision Process. Our structural results partially characterize a set of suboptimal solutions, and we develop solution methods using these results. We also develop a problem-specific approximation method that is based on state aggregation to overcome the computational challenges. We present extensive computational results and discuss the impact of problem parameters on the optimal policy.

Pairwise re-ranking models predict which of two documents is more relevant to a query and then aggregate a final ranking from such preferences. This is often more effective than pointwise re-ranking models that directly predict a relevance value for each document. However, the high inference overhead of pairwise models limits their practical application: usually, for a set of k documents to be re-ranked, preferences for all k^2-k comparison pairs excluding self-comparisons are aggregated. We investigate whether the efficiency of pairwise re-ranking can be improved by sampling from all pairs. In an exploratory study, we evaluate three sampling methods and five preference aggregation methods. The best combination allows for an order of magnitude fewer comparisons at an acceptable loss of retrieval effectiveness, while competitive effectiveness is already achieved with about one third of the comparisons.

Human experts often struggle to select the best option from a large set of items with multiple competing objectives, a process bottlenecked by the difficulty of formalizing complex, implicit preferences. To address this, we introduce LISTEN, a framework that leverages a Large Language Model (LLM) as a zero-shot preference oracle, guided only by an expert's high-level priorities in natural language. To operate within LLM constraints like context windows and inference costs, we propose two iterative algorithms: LISTEN-U, which uses the LLM to refine a parametric utility function, and LISTEN-T, a non-parametric method that performs tournament-style selections over small batches of solutions. Evaluated on diverse tasks including flight booking, shopping, and exam scheduling, our results show LISTEN-U excels when preferences are parametrically aligned (a property we measure with a novel concordance metric), while LISTEN-T offers more robust performance. This work explores a promising direction for steering complex multi-objective decisions directly with natural language, reducing the cognitive burden of traditional preference elicitation.

Congestion is a common failure mode of markets, where consumers compete inefficiently on the same subset of goods (e.g., chasing the same small set of properties on a vacation rental platform). The typical economic story is that prices decongest by balancing supply and demand. But in modern online marketplaces, prices are typically set in a decentralized way by sellers, and the information about items is inevitably partial. The power of a platform is limited to controlling representations -- the subset of information about items presented by default to users. This motivates the present study of decongestion by representation, where a platform seeks to learn representations that reduce congestion and thus improve social welfare. The technical challenge is twofold: relying only on revealed preferences from the choices of consumers, rather than true preferences; and the combinatorial problem associated with representations that determine the features to reveal in the default view. We tackle both challenges by proposing a differentiable proxy of welfare that can be trained end-to-end on consumer choice data. We develop sufficient conditions for when decongestion promotes welfare, and present the results of extensive experiments on both synthetic and real data that demonstrate the utility of our approach.

We study the design of loss functions for click-through rates (CTR) to optimize (social) welfare in advertising auctions. Existing works either only focus on CTR predictions without consideration of business objectives (e.g., welfare) in auctions or assume that the distribution over the participants' expected cost-per-impression (eCPM) is known a priori, then use various additional assumptions on the parametric form of the distribution to derive loss functions for predicting CTRs. In this work, we bring back the welfare objectives of ad auctions into CTR predictions and propose a novel weighted rankloss to train the CTR model. Compared to existing literature, our approach provides a provable guarantee on welfare but without assumptions on the eCPMs' distribution while also avoiding the intractability of naively applying existing learning-to-rank methods. Further, we propose a theoretically justifiable technique for calibrating the losses using labels generated from a teacher network, only assuming that the teacher network has bounded ell_2 generalization error. Finally, we demonstrate the advantages of the proposed loss on synthetic and real-world data.

Best-of-N selection is a key technique for improving the reasoning performance of Large Language Models (LLMs) through increased test-time computation. Current state-of-the-art methods often employ computationally intensive reward models for response evaluation and selection. Reward-free alternatives, like self-consistency and universal self-consistency, are limited in their ability to handle open-ended generation tasks or scale effectively. To address these limitations, we propose self-certainty, a novel and efficient metric that leverages the inherent probability distribution of LLM outputs to estimate response quality without requiring external reward models. We hypothesize that higher distributional self-certainty, aggregated across multiple samples, correlates with improved response accuracy, as it reflects greater confidence in the generated output. Through extensive experiments on various reasoning tasks, we demonstrate that self-certainty (1) scales effectively with increasing sample size N, akin to reward models but without the computational overhead; (2) complements chain-of-thought, improving reasoning performance beyond greedy decoding; and (3) generalizes to open-ended tasks where traditional self-consistency methods fall short. Our findings establish self-certainty as a practical and efficient way for improving LLM reasoning capabilities. The code is available at https://github.com/backprop07/Self-Certainty

Conditional computing processes an input using only part of the neural network's computational units. Learning to execute parts of a deep convolutional network by routing individual samples has several advantages: Reducing the computational burden is an obvious advantage. Furthermore, if similar classes are routed to the same path, that part of the network learns to discriminate between finer differences and better classification accuracies can be attained with fewer parameters. Recently, several papers have exploited this idea to take a particular child of a node in a tree-shaped network or to skip parts of a network. In this work, we follow a Trellis-based approach for generating specific execution paths in a deep convolutional neural network. We have designed routing mechanisms that use differentiable information gain-based cost functions to determine which subset of features in a convolutional layer will be executed. We call our method Conditional Information Gain Trellis (CIGT). We show that our conditional execution mechanism achieves comparable or better model performance compared to unconditional baselines, using only a fraction of the computational resources.

In Reinforcement Learning (RL), an agent acts in an unknown environment to maximize the expected cumulative discounted sum of an external reward signal, i.e., the expected return. In practice, in many tasks of interest, such as policy optimization, the agent usually spends its interaction budget by collecting episodes of fixed length within a simulator (i.e., Monte Carlo simulation). However, given the discounted nature of the RL objective, this data collection strategy might not be the best option. Indeed, the rewards taken in early simulation steps weigh exponentially more than future rewards. Taking a cue from this intuition, in this paper, we design an a-priori budget allocation strategy that leads to the collection of trajectories of different lengths, i.e., truncated. The proposed approach provably minimizes the width of the confidence intervals around the empirical estimates of the expected return of a policy. After discussing the theoretical properties of our method, we make use of our trajectory truncation mechanism to extend Policy Optimization via Importance Sampling (POIS, Metelli et al., 2018) algorithm. Finally, we conduct a numerical comparison between our algorithm and POIS: the results are consistent with our theory and show that an appropriate truncation of the trajectories can succeed in improving performance.

Leveraging learned strategies in unfamiliar scenarios is fundamental to human intelligence. In reinforcement learning, rationally reusing the policies acquired from other tasks or human experts is critical for tackling problems that are difficult to learn from scratch. In this work, we present a framework called Selective Myopic bEhavior Control~(SMEC), which results from the insight that the short-term behaviors of prior policies are sharable across tasks. By evaluating the behaviors of prior policies via a hybrid value function architecture, SMEC adaptively aggregates the sharable short-term behaviors of prior policies and the long-term behaviors of the task policy, leading to coordinated decisions. Empirical results on a collection of manipulation and locomotion tasks demonstrate that SMEC outperforms existing methods, and validate the ability of SMEC to leverage related prior policies.

Sequence models are a critical component of modern NLP systems, but their predictions are difficult to explain. We consider model explanations though rationales, subsets of context that can explain individual model predictions. We find sequential rationales by solving a combinatorial optimization: the best rationale is the smallest subset of input tokens that would predict the same output as the full sequence. Enumerating all subsets is intractable, so we propose an efficient greedy algorithm to approximate this objective. The algorithm, which is called greedy rationalization, applies to any model. For this approach to be effective, the model should form compatible conditional distributions when making predictions on incomplete subsets of the context. This condition can be enforced with a short fine-tuning step. We study greedy rationalization on language modeling and machine translation. Compared to existing baselines, greedy rationalization is best at optimizing the combinatorial objective and provides the most faithful rationales. On a new dataset of annotated sequential rationales, greedy rationales are most similar to human rationales.

We study preferential Bayesian optimization (BO) where reliable feedback is limited to pairwise comparison called duels. An important challenge in preferential BO, which uses the preferential Gaussian process (GP) model to represent flexible preference structure, is that the posterior distribution is a computationally intractable skew GP. The most widely used approach for preferential BO is Gaussian approximation, which ignores the skewness of the true posterior. Alternatively, Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) based preferential BO is also proposed. In this work, we first verify the accuracy of Gaussian approximation, from which we reveal the critical problem that the predictive probability of duels can be inaccurate. This observation motivates us to improve the MCMC-based estimation for skew GP, for which we show the practical efficiency of Gibbs sampling and derive the low variance MC estimator. However, the computational time of MCMC can still be a bottleneck in practice. Towards building a more practical preferential BO, we develop a new method that achieves both high computational efficiency and low sample complexity, and then demonstrate its effectiveness through extensive numerical experiments.

The majority of online display ads are served through real-time bidding (RTB) --- each ad display impression is auctioned off in real-time when it is just being generated from a user visit. To place an ad automatically and optimally, it is critical for advertisers to devise a learning algorithm to cleverly bid an ad impression in real-time. Most previous works consider the bid decision as a static optimization problem of either treating the value of each impression independently or setting a bid price to each segment of ad volume. However, the bidding for a given ad campaign would repeatedly happen during its life span before the budget runs out. As such, each bid is strategically correlated by the constrained budget and the overall effectiveness of the campaign (e.g., the rewards from generated clicks), which is only observed after the campaign has completed. Thus, it is of great interest to devise an optimal bidding strategy sequentially so that the campaign budget can be dynamically allocated across all the available impressions on the basis of both the immediate and future rewards. In this paper, we formulate the bid decision process as a reinforcement learning problem, where the state space is represented by the auction information and the campaign's real-time parameters, while an action is the bid price to set. By modeling the state transition via auction competition, we build a Markov Decision Process framework for learning the optimal bidding policy to optimize the advertising performance in the dynamic real-time bidding environment. Furthermore, the scalability problem from the large real-world auction volume and campaign budget is well handled by state value approximation using neural networks.

Standard federated learning (FL) approaches are vulnerable to the free-rider dilemma: participating agents can contribute little to nothing yet receive a well-trained aggregated model. While prior mechanisms attempt to solve the free-rider dilemma, none have addressed the issue of truthfulness. In practice, adversarial agents can provide false information to the server in order to cheat its way out of contributing to federated training. In an effort to make free-riding-averse federated mechanisms truthful, and consequently less prone to breaking down in practice, we propose FACT. FACT is the first federated mechanism that: (1) eliminates federated free riding by using a penalty system, (2) ensures agents provide truthful information by creating a competitive environment, and (3) encourages agent participation by offering better performance than training alone. Empirically, FACT avoids free-riding when agents are untruthful, and reduces agent loss by over 4x.

Competitions for shareable and limited resources have long been studied with strategic agents. In reality, agents often have to learn and maximize the rewards of the resources at the same time. To design an individualized competing policy, we model the competition between agents in a novel multi-player multi-armed bandit (MPMAB) setting where players are selfish and aim to maximize their own rewards. In addition, when several players pull the same arm, we assume that these players averagely share the arms' rewards by expectation. Under this setting, we first analyze the Nash equilibrium when arms' rewards are known. Subsequently, we propose a novel SelfishMPMAB with Averaging Allocation (SMAA) approach based on the equilibrium. We theoretically demonstrate that SMAA could achieve a good regret guarantee for each player when all players follow the algorithm. Additionally, we establish that no single selfish player can significantly increase their rewards through deviation, nor can they detrimentally affect other players' rewards without incurring substantial losses for themselves. We finally validate the effectiveness of the method in extensive synthetic experiments.

When a robot autonomously performs a complex task, it frequently must balance competing objectives while maintaining safety. This becomes more difficult in uncertain environments with stochastic outcomes. Enhancing transparency in the robot's behavior and aligning with user preferences are also crucial. This paper introduces a novel framework for multi-objective reinforcement learning that ensures safe task execution, optimizes trade-offs between objectives, and adheres to user preferences. The framework has two main layers: a multi-objective task planner and a high-level selector. The planning layer generates a set of optimal trade-off plans that guarantee satisfaction of a temporal logic task. The selector uses active inference to decide which generated plan best complies with user preferences and aids learning. Operating iteratively, the framework updates a parameterized learning model based on collected data. Case studies and benchmarks on both manipulation and mobile robots show that our framework outperforms other methods and (i) learns multiple optimal trade-offs, (ii) adheres to a user preference, and (iii) allows the user to adjust the balance between (i) and (ii).

Tool-integrated reasoning (TIR) augments large language models (LLMs) with the ability to invoke external tools, such as search engines and code interpreters, to solve tasks beyond the capabilities of language-only reasoning. While reinforcement learning (RL) has shown promise in improving TIR by optimizing final answer correctness, existing approaches often overlook the efficiency and cost associated with tool usage. This can lead to suboptimal behavior, including excessive tool calls that increase computational and financial overhead, or insufficient tool use that compromises answer quality. In this work, we propose Optimal Tool Call-controlled Policy Optimization (OTC-PO), a simple yet effective RL-based framework that encourages models to produce accurate answers with minimal tool calls. Our method introduces a tool-integrated reward that jointly considers correctness and tool efficiency, promoting high tool productivity. We instantiate this framework within both Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) and Group Relative Preference Optimization (GRPO), resulting in OTC-PPO and OTC-GRPO. Experiments with Qwen-2.5 and Qwen-Math across multiple QA benchmarks show that our approach reduces tool calls by up to 73.1\% and improves tool productivity by up to 229.4\%, while maintaining comparable answer accuracy. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first RL-based framework that explicitly optimizes tool-use efficiency in TIR.

Diffusion models produce impressive results in modalities ranging from images and video to protein design and text. However, generating samples with user-specified properties remains a challenge. Recent research proposes fine-tuning models to maximize rewards that capture desired properties, but these methods require expensive training and are prone to mode collapse. In this work, we propose Feynman Kac (FK) steering, an inference-time framework for steering diffusion models with reward functions. FK steering works by sampling a system of multiple interacting diffusion processes, called particles, and resampling particles at intermediate steps based on scores computed using functions called potentials. Potentials are defined using rewards for intermediate states and are selected such that a high value indicates that the particle will yield a high-reward sample. We explore various choices of potentials, intermediate rewards, and samplers. We evaluate FK steering on text-to-image and text diffusion models. For steering text-to-image models with a human preference reward, we find that FK steering a 0.8B parameter model outperforms a 2.6B parameter fine-tuned model on prompt fidelity, with faster sampling and no training. For steering text diffusion models with rewards for text quality and specific text attributes, we find that FK steering generates lower perplexity, more linguistically acceptable outputs and enables gradient-free control of attributes like toxicity. Our results demonstrate that inference-time scaling and steering of diffusion models, even with off-the-shelf rewards, can provide significant sample quality gains and controllability benefits. Code is available at https://github.com/zacharyhorvitz/Fk-Diffusion-Steering .

Interpretability research aims to bridge the gap between empirical success and our scientific understanding of the inner workings of large language models (LLMs). However, most existing research focuses on analyzing a single mechanism, such as how models copy or recall factual knowledge. In this work, we propose a formulation of competition of mechanisms, which focuses on the interplay of multiple mechanisms instead of individual mechanisms and traces how one of them becomes dominant in the final prediction. We uncover how and where mechanisms compete within LLMs using two interpretability methods: logit inspection and attention modification. Our findings show traces of the mechanisms and their competition across various model components and reveal attention positions that effectively control the strength of certain mechanisms. Code: https://github.com/francescortu/comp-mech. Data: https://huggingface.co/datasets/francescortu/comp-mech.

Mehta and Panigrahi (2012) proposed Online Matching with Stochastic Rewards, which generalizes the Online Bipartite Matching problem of Karp, Vazirani, and Vazirani (1990) by associating the edges with success probabilities. This new feature captures the pay-per-click model in online advertising. Recently, Huang and Zhang (2020) studied this problem under the online primal dual framework using the Configuration Linear Program (LP), and got the best known competitive ratios of the Stochastic Balance algorithm. Their work suggests that the more expressive Configuration LP is more suitable for this problem than the Matching LP. This paper advances the theory of Configuration LP in two directions. Our technical contribution includes a characterization of the joint matching outcome of an offline vertex and all its neighbors. This characterization may be of independent interest, and is aligned with the spirit of Configuration LP. By contrast, previous analyses of Ranking generally focus on only one neighbor. Second, we designed a Stochastic Configuration LP that captures a stochastic benchmark proposed by Goyal and Udwani (2020), who used a Path-based LP. The Stochastic Configuration LP is smaller and simpler than the Path-based LP. Moreover, using the new LP we improved the competitive ratio of Stochastic Balance from 0.596 to 0.611 when the success probabilities are infinitesimal, and to 0.613 when the success probabilities are further equal.

Reinforcement learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) learns from preference signals, while standard Reinforcement Learning (RL) directly learns from reward signals. Preferences arguably contain less information than rewards, which makes preference-based RL seemingly more difficult. This paper theoretically proves that, for a wide range of preference models, we can solve preference-based RL directly using existing algorithms and techniques for reward-based RL, with small or no extra costs. Specifically, (1) for preferences that are drawn from reward-based probabilistic models, we reduce the problem to robust reward-based RL that can tolerate small errors in rewards; (2) for general arbitrary preferences where the objective is to find the von Neumann winner, we reduce the problem to multiagent reward-based RL which finds Nash equilibria for factored Markov games under a restricted set of policies. The latter case can be further reduce to adversarial MDP when preferences only depend on the final state. We instantiate all reward-based RL subroutines by concrete provable algorithms, and apply our theory to a large class of models including tabular MDPs and MDPs with generic function approximation. We further provide guarantees when K-wise comparisons are available.

This paper introduces the Opus Workflow Evaluation Framework, a probabilistic-normative formulation for quantifying Workflow quality and efficiency. It integrates notions of correctness, reliability, and cost into a coherent mathematical model that enables direct comparison, scoring, and optimization of Workflows. The framework combines the Opus Workflow Reward, a probabilistic function estimating expected performance through success likelihood, resource usage, and output gain, with the Opus Workflow Normative Penalties, a set of measurable functions capturing structural and informational quality across Cohesion, Coupling, Observability, and Information Hygiene. It supports automated Workflow assessment, ranking, and optimization within modern automation systems such as Opus and can be integrated into Reinforcement Learning loops to guide Workflow discovery and refinement. In this paper, we introduce the Opus Workflow Reward model that formalizes Workflow success as a probabilistic expectation over costs and outcomes. We define measurable Opus Workflow Normative Penalties capturing structural, semantic, and signal-related properties of Workflows. Finally, we propose a unified optimization formulation for identifying and ranking optimal Workflows under joint Reward-Penalty trade-offs.

Bayesian optimization (BO) is a powerful framework to optimize black-box expensive-to-evaluate functions via sequential interactions. In several important problems (e.g. drug discovery, circuit design, neural architecture search, etc.), though, such functions are defined over large combinatorial and unstructured spaces. This makes existing BO algorithms not feasible due to the intractable maximization of the acquisition function over these domains. To address this issue, we propose GameOpt, a novel game-theoretical approach to combinatorial BO. GameOpt establishes a cooperative game between the different optimization variables, and selects points that are game equilibria of an upper confidence bound acquisition function. These are stable configurations from which no variable has an incentive to deviate- analog to local optima in continuous domains. Crucially, this allows us to efficiently break down the complexity of the combinatorial domain into individual decision sets, making GameOpt scalable to large combinatorial spaces. We demonstrate the application of GameOpt to the challenging protein design problem and validate its performance on four real-world protein datasets. Each protein can take up to 20^{X} possible configurations, where X is the length of a protein, making standard BO methods infeasible. Instead, our approach iteratively selects informative protein configurations and very quickly discovers highly active protein variants compared to other baselines.

Compound AI systems that combine multiple LLM calls, such as self-refine and multi-agent-debate, achieve strong performance on many AI tasks. We address a core question in optimizing compound systems: for each LLM call or module in the system, how should one decide which LLM to use? We show that these LLM choices have a large effect on quality, but the search space is exponential. We propose LLMSelector, an efficient framework for model selection in compound systems, which leverages two key empirical insights: (i) end-to-end performance is often monotonic in how well each module performs, with all other modules held fixed, and (ii) per-module performance can be estimated accurately by an LLM. Building upon these insights, LLMSelector iteratively selects one module and allocates to it the model with the highest module-wise performance, as estimated by an LLM, until no further gain is possible. LLMSelector is applicable to any compound system with a bounded number of modules, and its number of API calls scales linearly with the number of modules, achieving high-quality model allocation both empirically and theoretically. Experiments with popular compound systems such as multi-agent debate and self-refine using LLMs such as GPT-4o, Claude 3.5 Sonnet and Gemini 1.5 show that LLMSelector confers 5%-70% accuracy gains compared to using the same LLM for all modules.

Where do learning signals come from when there is no ground truth in post-training? We propose turning exploration into supervision through Compute as Teacher (CaT), which converts the model's own exploration at inference-time into reference-free supervision by synthesizing a single reference from a group of parallel rollouts and then optimizing toward it. Concretely, the current policy produces a group of rollouts; a frozen anchor (the initial policy) reconciles omissions and contradictions to estimate a reference, turning extra inference-time compute into a teacher signal. We turn this into rewards in two regimes: (i) verifiable tasks use programmatic equivalence on final answers; (ii) non-verifiable tasks use self-proposed rubrics-binary, auditable criteria scored by an independent LLM judge, with reward given by the fraction satisfied. Unlike selection methods (best-of-N, majority, perplexity, or judge scores), synthesis may disagree with the majority and be correct even when all rollouts are wrong; performance scales with the number of rollouts. As a test-time procedure, CaT improves Gemma 3 4B, Qwen 3 4B, and Llama 3.1 8B (up to +27% on MATH-500; +12% on HealthBench). With reinforcement learning (CaT-RL), we obtain further gains (up to +33% and +30%), with the trained policy surpassing the initial teacher signal.

With the rapid growth in the number of Large Language Models (LLMs), there has been a recent interest in LLM routing, or directing queries to the cheapest LLM that can deliver a suitable response. Following this line of work, we introduce CARROT, a Cost AwaRe Rate Optimal rouTer that can select models based on any desired trade-off between performance and cost. Given a query, CARROT selects a model based on estimates of models' cost and performance. Its simplicity lends CARROT computational efficiency, while our theoretical analysis demonstrates minimax rate-optimality in its routing performance. Alongside CARROT, we also introduce the Smart Price-aware Routing (SPROUT) dataset to facilitate routing on a wide spectrum of queries with the latest state-of-the-art LLMs. Using SPROUT and prior benchmarks such as Routerbench and open-LLM-leaderboard-v2 we empirically validate CARROT's performance against several alternative routers.

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) methods are emerging as a way to fine-tune diffusion models (DMs) for visual generation. However, commonly used on-policy strategies are limited by the generalization capability of the reward model, while off-policy approaches require large amounts of difficult-to-obtain paired human-annotated data, particularly in visual generation tasks. To address the limitations of both on- and off-policy RLHF, we propose a preference optimization method that aligns DMs with preferences without relying on reward models or paired human-annotated data. Specifically, we introduce a Semi-Policy Preference Optimization (SePPO) method. SePPO leverages previous checkpoints as reference models while using them to generate on-policy reference samples, which replace "losing images" in preference pairs. This approach allows us to optimize using only off-policy "winning images." Furthermore, we design a strategy for reference model selection that expands the exploration in the policy space. Notably, we do not simply treat reference samples as negative examples for learning. Instead, we design an anchor-based criterion to assess whether the reference samples are likely to be winning or losing images, allowing the model to selectively learn from the generated reference samples. This approach mitigates performance degradation caused by the uncertainty in reference sample quality. We validate SePPO across both text-to-image and text-to-video benchmarks. SePPO surpasses all previous approaches on the text-to-image benchmarks and also demonstrates outstanding performance on the text-to-video benchmarks. Code will be released in https://github.com/DwanZhang-AI/SePPO.

Recent advances in language models have enabled framing molecule generation as sequence modeling. However, existing approaches often rely on single-objective reinforcement learning, limiting their applicability to real-world drug design, where multiple competing properties must be optimized. Traditional multi-objective reinforcement learning (MORL) methods require costly retraining for each new objective combination, making rapid exploration of trade-offs impractical. To overcome these limitations, we introduce Mol-MoE, a mixture-of-experts (MoE) architecture that enables efficient test-time steering of molecule generation without retraining. Central to our approach is a preference-based router training objective that incentivizes the router to combine experts in a way that aligns with user-specified trade-offs. This provides improved flexibility in exploring the chemical property space at test time, facilitating rapid trade-off exploration. Benchmarking against state-of-the-art methods, we show that Mol-MoE achieves superior sample quality and steerability.

Protein fitness optimization involves finding a protein sequence that maximizes desired quantitative properties in a combinatorially large design space of possible sequences. Recent developments in steering protein generative models (e.g diffusion models, language models) offer a promising approach. However, by and large, past studies have optimized surrogate rewards and/or utilized large amounts of labeled data for steering, making it unclear how well existing methods perform and compare to each other in real-world optimization campaigns where fitness is measured by low-throughput wet-lab assays. In this study, we explore fitness optimization using small amounts (hundreds) of labeled sequence-fitness pairs and comprehensively evaluate strategies such as classifier guidance and posterior sampling for guiding generation from different discrete diffusion models of protein sequences. We also demonstrate how guidance can be integrated into adaptive sequence selection akin to Thompson sampling in Bayesian optimization, showing that plug-and-play guidance strategies offer advantages compared to alternatives such as reinforcement learning with protein language models.

When selecting data for training large-scale models, standard practice is to filter for examples that match human notions of data quality. Such filtering yields qualitatively clean datapoints that intuitively should improve model behavior. However, in practice the opposite can often happen: we find that selecting according to similarity with "high quality" data sources may not increase (and can even hurt) performance compared to randomly selecting data. To develop better methods for selecting data, we start by framing dataset selection as an optimization problem that we can directly solve for: given target tasks, a learning algorithm, and candidate data, select the subset that maximizes model performance. This framework thus avoids handpicked notions of data quality, and instead models explicitly how the learning process uses train datapoints to predict on the target tasks. Our resulting method greatly improves language model (LM) performance on both pre-specified tasks and previously unseen tasks. Specifically, choosing target tasks representative of standard LM problems and evaluating on diverse held-out benchmarks, our selected datasets provide a 2x compute multiplier over baseline methods.

We consider algorithms for learning reward functions from human preferences over pairs of trajectory segments, as used in reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). Most recent work assumes that human preferences are generated based only upon the reward accrued within those segments, or their partial return. Recent work casts doubt on the validity of this assumption, proposing an alternative preference model based upon regret. We investigate the consequences of assuming preferences are based upon partial return when they actually arise from regret. We argue that the learned function is an approximation of the optimal advantage function, A^*_r, not a reward function. We find that if a specific pitfall is addressed, this incorrect assumption is not particularly harmful, resulting in a highly shaped reward function. Nonetheless, this incorrect usage of A^*_r is less desirable than the appropriate and simpler approach of greedy maximization of A^*_r. From the perspective of the regret preference model, we also provide a clearer interpretation of fine tuning contemporary large language models with RLHF. This paper overall provides insight regarding why learning under the partial return preference model tends to work so well in practice, despite it conforming poorly to how humans give preferences.

Can classical game-theoretic frameworks be extended to capture the bounded rationality and causal reasoning of AI agents? We investigate this question by extending Causal Normal Form Games (CNFGs) to sequential settings, introducing Sequential Causal Multi-Agent Systems (S-CMAS) that incorporate Pearl's Causal Hierarchy across leader-follower interactions. While theoretically elegant -- we prove PSPACE-completeness, develop equilibrium refinements, and establish connections to signaling theory -- our comprehensive empirical investigation reveals a critical limitation: S-CNE provides zero welfare improvement over classical Stackelberg equilibrium across all tested scenarios. Through 50+ Monte Carlo simulations and hand-crafted synthetic examples, we demonstrate that backward induction with rational best-response eliminates any strategic advantage from causal layer distinctions. We construct a theoretical example illustrating conditions where benefits could emerge (ε-rational satisficing followers), though implementation confirms that even relaxed rationality assumptions prove insufficient when good instincts align with optimal play. This negative result provides valuable insight: classical game-theoretic extensions grounded in rational choice are fundamentally incompatible with causal reasoning advantages, motivating new theoretical frameworks beyond standard Nash equilibrium for agentic AI.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive performance in software engineering tasks. However, improving their accuracy in generating correct and reliable code remains challenging. Numerous prompt engineering techniques (PETs) have been developed to address this, but no single approach is universally optimal. Selecting the right PET for each query is difficult for two primary reasons: (1) interactive prompting techniques may not consistently deliver the expected benefits, especially for simpler queries, and (2) current automated prompt engineering methods lack adaptability and fail to fully utilize multi-stage responses. To overcome these challenges, we propose PET-Select, a PET-agnostic selection model that uses code complexity as a proxy to classify queries and select the most appropriate PET. By incorporating contrastive learning, PET-Select effectively distinguishes between simple and complex problems, allowing it to choose PETs that are best suited for each query's complexity level. Our evaluations on the MBPP and HumanEval benchmarks using GPT-3.5 Turbo and GPT-4o show up to a 1.9% improvement in pass@1 accuracy, along with a 74.8% reduction in token usage. Additionally, we provide both quantitative and qualitative results to demonstrate how PET-Select effectively selects the most appropriate techniques for each code generation query, further showcasing its efficiency in optimizing PET selection.

This paper presents our winning submission to the AI Mathematical Olympiad - Progress Prize 2 (AIMO-2) competition. Our recipe for building state-of-the-art mathematical reasoning models relies on three key pillars. First, we create a large-scale dataset comprising 540K unique high-quality math problems, including olympiad-level problems, and their 3.2M long-reasoning solutions. Second, we develop a novel method to integrate code execution with long reasoning models through iterative training, generation, and quality filtering, resulting in 1.7M high-quality Tool-Integrated Reasoning solutions. Third, we create a pipeline to train models to select the most promising solution from many candidates. We show that such generative solution selection (GenSelect) can significantly improve upon majority voting baseline. Combining these ideas, we train a series of models that achieve state-of-the-art results on mathematical reasoning benchmarks. To facilitate further research, we release our code, models, and the complete OpenMathReasoning dataset under a commercially permissive license.

Offline model selection (OMS), that is, choosing the best policy from a set of many policies given only logged data, is crucial for applying offline RL in real-world settings. One idea that has been extensively explored is to select policies based on the mean squared Bellman error (MSBE) of the associated Q-functions. However, previous work has struggled to obtain adequate OMS performance with Bellman errors, leading many researchers to abandon the idea. To this end, we elucidate why previous work has seen pessimistic results with Bellman errors and identify conditions under which OMS algorithms based on Bellman errors will perform well. Moreover, we develop a new estimator of the MSBE that is more accurate than prior methods. Our estimator obtains impressive OMS performance on diverse discrete control tasks, including Atari games.

A practical approach to activate long chain-of-thoughts reasoning ability in pre-trained large language models is to perform supervised fine-tuning on instruction datasets synthesized by strong Large Reasoning Models such as DeepSeek-R1, offering a cost-effective alternative to reinforcement learning. However, large-scale instruction sets with more than 100k samples incur significant training overhead, while effective strategies for automatic long-CoT instruction selection still remain unexplored. In this work, we propose Select2Reason, a novel and efficient instruction-tuning data selection framework for long-CoT reasoning. From the perspective of emergence of rethinking behaviors like self-correction and backtracking, we investigate common metrics that may determine the quality of long-CoT reasoning instructions. Select2Reason leverages a quantifier to estimate difficulty of question and jointly incorporates a reasoning trace length-based heuristic through a weighted scheme for ranking to prioritize high-utility examples. Empirical results on OpenR1-Math-220k demonstrate that fine-tuning LLM on only 10% of the data selected by Select2Reason achieves performance competitive with or superior to full-data tuning and open-source baseline OpenR1-Qwen-7B across three competition-level and six comprehensive mathematical benchmarks. Further experiments highlight the scalability in varying data size, efficiency during inference, and its adaptability to other instruction pools with minimal cost.

Tasks requiring deductive reasoning, especially those involving multiple steps, often demand adaptive strategies such as intermediate generation of rationales or programs, as no single approach is universally optimal. While Language Models (LMs) can enhance their outputs through iterative self-refinement and strategy adjustments, they frequently fail to apply the most effective strategy in their first attempt. This inefficiency raises the question: Can LMs learn to select the optimal strategy in the first attempt, without a need for refinement? To address this challenge, we introduce SMART (Self-learning Meta-strategy Agent for Reasoning Tasks), a novel framework that enables LMs to autonomously learn and select the most effective strategies for various reasoning tasks. We model the strategy selection process as a Markov Decision Process and leverage reinforcement learning-driven continuous self-improvement to allow the model to find the suitable strategy to solve a given task. Unlike traditional self-refinement methods that rely on multiple inference passes or external feedback, SMART allows an LM to internalize the outcomes of its own reasoning processes and adjust its strategy accordingly, aiming for correct solutions on the first attempt. Our experiments across various reasoning datasets and with different model architectures demonstrate that SMART significantly enhances the ability of models to choose optimal strategies without external guidance (+15 points on the GSM8K dataset). By achieving higher accuracy with a single inference pass, SMART not only improves performance but also reduces computational costs for refinement-based strategies, paving the way for more efficient and intelligent reasoning in LMs.

RAG systems consist of multiple modules to work together. However, these modules are usually separately trained. We argue that a system like RAG that incorporates multiple modules should be jointly optimized to achieve optimal performance. To demonstrate this, we design a specific pipeline called SmartRAG that includes a policy network and a retriever. The policy network can serve as 1) a decision maker that decides when to retrieve, 2) a query rewriter to generate a query most suited to the retriever, and 3) an answer generator that produces the final response with/without the observations. We then propose to jointly optimize the whole system using a reinforcement learning algorithm, with the reward designed to encourage the system to achieve the best performance with minimal retrieval cost. When jointly optimized, all the modules can be aware of how other modules are working and thus find the best way to work together as a complete system. Empirical results demonstrate that the jointly optimized SmartRAG can achieve better performance than separately optimized counterparts.

Motivated by concerns about making online decisions that incur undue amount of risk at each time step, in this paper, we formulate the probably anytime-safe stochastic combinatorial semi-bandits problem. In this problem, the agent is given the option to select a subset of size at most K from a set of L ground items. Each item is associated to a certain mean reward as well as a variance that represents its risk. To mitigate the risk that the agent incurs, we require that with probability at least 1-delta, over the entire horizon of time T, each of the choices that the agent makes should contain items whose sum of variances does not exceed a certain variance budget. We call this probably anytime-safe constraint. Under this constraint, we design and analyze an algorithm {\sc PASCombUCB} that minimizes the regret over the horizon of time T. By developing accompanying information-theoretic lower bounds, we show that under both the problem-dependent and problem-independent paradigms, {\sc PASCombUCB} is almost asymptotically optimal. Experiments are conducted to corroborate our theoretical findings. Our problem setup, the proposed {\sc PASCombUCB} algorithm, and novel analyses are applicable to domains such as recommendation systems and transportation in which an agent is allowed to choose multiple items at a single time step and wishes to control the risk over the whole time horizon.

Machine learning has opened up new tools for financial fraud detection. Using a sample of annotated transactions, a machine learning classification algorithm learns to detect frauds. With growing credit card transaction volumes and rising fraud percentages there is growing interest in finding appropriate machine learning classifiers for detection. However, fraud data sets are diverse and exhibit inconsistent characteristics. As a result, a model effective on a given data set is not guaranteed to perform on another. Further, the possibility of temporal drift in data patterns and characteristics over time is high. Additionally, fraud data has massive and varying imbalance. In this work, we evaluate sampling methods as a viable pre-processing mechanism to handle imbalance and propose a data-driven classifier selection strategy for characteristic highly imbalanced fraud detection data sets. The model derived based on our selection strategy surpasses peer models, whilst working in more realistic conditions, establishing the effectiveness of the strategy.

To optimally coordinate with others in cooperative games, it is often crucial to have information about one's collaborators: successful driving requires understanding which side of the road to drive on. However, not every feature of collaborators is strategically relevant: the fine-grained acceleration of drivers may be ignored while maintaining optimal coordination. We show that there is a well-defined dichotomy between strategically relevant and irrelevant information. Moreover, we show that, in dynamic games, this dichotomy has a compact representation that can be efficiently computed via a Bellman backup operator. We apply this algorithm to analyze the strategically relevant information for tasks in both a standard and a partially observable version of the Overcooked environment. Theoretical and empirical results show that our algorithms are significantly more efficient than baselines. Videos are available at https://minknowledge.github.io.

Algorithmic trading requires short-term decisions aligned with long-term financial goals. While reinforcement learning (RL) has been explored for such tactical decisions, its adoption remains limited by myopic behavior and opaque policy rationale. In contrast, large language models (LLMs) have recently demonstrated strategic reasoning and multi-modal financial signal interpretation when guided by well-designed prompts. We propose a hybrid system where LLMs generate high-level trading strategies to guide RL agents in their actions. We evaluate (i) the rationale of LLM-generated strategies via expert review, and (ii) the Sharpe Ratio (SR) and Maximum Drawdown (MDD) of LLM-guided agents versus unguided baselines. Results show improved return and risk metrics over standard RL.

In the context of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), the reward function is generally derived from maximum likelihood estimation of a random utility model based on pairwise comparisons made by humans. The problem of learning a reward function is one of preference aggregation that, we argue, largely falls within the scope of social choice theory. From this perspective, we can evaluate different aggregation methods via established axioms, examining whether these methods meet or fail well-known standards. We demonstrate that both the Bradley-Terry-Luce Model and its broad generalizations fail to meet basic axioms. In response, we develop novel rules for learning reward functions with strong axiomatic guarantees. A key innovation from the standpoint of social choice is that our problem has a linear structure, which greatly restricts the space of feasible rules and leads to a new paradigm that we call linear social choice.

We consider the regret minimization task in a dueling bandits problem with context information. In every round of the sequential decision problem, the learner makes a context-dependent selection of two choice alternatives (arms) to be compared with each other and receives feedback in the form of noisy preference information. We assume that the feedback process is determined by a linear stochastic transitivity model with contextualized utilities (CoLST), and the learner's task is to include the best arm (with highest latent context-dependent utility) in the duel. We propose a computationally efficient algorithm, CoLSTIM, which makes its choice based on imitating the feedback process using perturbed context-dependent utility estimates of the underlying CoLST model. If each arm is associated with a d-dimensional feature vector, we show that CoLSTIM achieves a regret of order tilde O( dT) after T learning rounds. Additionally, we also establish the optimality of CoLSTIM by showing a lower bound for the weak regret that refines the existing average regret analysis. Our experiments demonstrate its superiority over state-of-art algorithms for special cases of CoLST models.

A prevailing view in Reinforcement Learning for Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) interprets recent progress through the lens of an exploration-exploitation trade-off, a perspective largely shaped by token-level metrics. We re-examine this perspective, proposing that this perceived trade-off may not be a fundamental constraint but rather an artifact of the measurement level. To investigate this, we shift the analysis to the semantically rich hidden-state space, adopting Effective Rank (ER) to quantify exploration and proposing its novel first- and second-order derivatives, named Effective Rank Velocity (ERV) and Effective Rank Acceleration (ERA), to capture exploitation dynamics. Our analysis reveals that at the hidden-state level, exploration and exploitation could be decoupled (Sec. 4). This finding reveals an opportunity to enhance both capacities simultaneously. This insight motivates our method, Velocity-Exploiting Rank-Learning (VERL), the first to operationalize the principle of synergistic exploration-exploitation enhancement by directly shaping the RL advantage function. The key innovation is leveraging the theoretically stable ERA as a predictive meta-controller to create a synergistic, dual-channel incentive structure. Instead of forcing a trade-off, VERL prospectively amplifies rewards for exploration to preempt overconfidence and reinforces exploitative gains to consolidate reasoning. Experiments across diverse LLMs and reasoning benchmarks show consistent gains, including up to 21.4% absolute accuracy improvement on the challenging Gaokao 2024 dataset.

The rapid emergence of diverse large language models (LLMs) has spurred the development of LLM routers that assign user queries to the most suitable model. However, existing LLM routers typically perform a single-round, one-to-one mapping (i.e., assigning each query to a single model in isolation), which limits their capability to tackle complex tasks that demand the complementary strengths of multiple LLMs. In this paper, we present Router-R1, a reinforcement learning (RL)-based framework that formulates multi-LLM routing and aggregation as a sequential decision process. Router-R1 instantiates the router itself as a capable LLM, leveraging its reasoning ability to interleave "think" actions (internal deliberation) with "route" actions (dynamic model invocation), and integrates each response into its evolving context. To guide learning, we employ a lightweight rule-based reward comprising format rewards, final outcome rewards, and a novel cost reward for performance and cost trade-off optimization, opening a pathway toward optimizing performance-cost tradeoffs via RL. Router-R1 also conditions only on simple model descriptors such as pricing, latency, and example performance, enabling strong generalization to unseen model selection. Experiments on seven general and multi-hop QA benchmarks show that Router-R1 outperforms over several strong baselines, achieving superior performance while maintaining robust generalization and cost management.Code is available at https://github.com/ulab-uiuc/Router-R1.

We study an online learning problem in general-sum Stackelberg games, where players act in a decentralized and strategic manner. We study two settings depending on the type of information for the follower: (1) the limited information setting where the follower only observes its own reward, and (2) the side information setting where the follower has extra side information about the leader's reward. We show that for the follower, myopically best responding to the leader's action is the best strategy for the limited information setting, but not necessarily so for the side information setting -- the follower can manipulate the leader's reward signals with strategic actions, and hence induce the leader's strategy to converge to an equilibrium that is better off for itself. Based on these insights, we study decentralized online learning for both players in the two settings. Our main contribution is to derive last-iterate convergence and sample complexity results in both settings. Notably, we design a new manipulation strategy for the follower in the latter setting, and show that it has an intrinsic advantage against the best response strategy. Our theories are also supported by empirical results.

We study principal-agent problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme -- called contract -- in order to induce an agent to take a costly, unobservable action leading to favorable outcomes. We consider a generalization of the classical (single-round) version of the problem in which the principal interacts with the agent by committing to contracts over multiple rounds. The principal has no information about the agent, and they have to learn an optimal contract by only observing the outcome realized at each round. We focus on settings in which the size of the agent's action space is small. We design an algorithm that learns an approximately-optimal contract with high probability in a number of rounds polynomial in the size of the outcome space, when the number of actions is constant. Our algorithm solves an open problem by Zhu et al.[2022]. Moreover, it can also be employed to provide a mathcal{O}(T^{4/5}) regret bound in the related online learning setting in which the principal aims at maximizing their cumulative utility, thus considerably improving previously-known regret bounds.

Reward functions are difficult to design and often hard to align with human intent. Preference-based Reinforcement Learning (RL) algorithms address these problems by learning reward functions from human feedback. However, the majority of preference-based RL methods na\"ively combine supervised reward models with off-the-shelf RL algorithms. Contemporary approaches have sought to improve performance and query complexity by using larger and more complex reward architectures such as transformers. Instead of using highly complex architectures, we develop a new and parameter-efficient algorithm, Inverse Preference Learning (IPL), specifically designed for learning from offline preference data. Our key insight is that for a fixed policy, the Q-function encodes all information about the reward function, effectively making them interchangeable. Using this insight, we completely eliminate the need for a learned reward function. Our resulting algorithm is simpler and more parameter-efficient. Across a suite of continuous control and robotics benchmarks, IPL attains competitive performance compared to more complex approaches that leverage transformer-based and non-Markovian reward functions while having fewer algorithmic hyperparameters and learned network parameters. Our code is publicly released.

In the stochastic multi-armed bandit problem, a randomized probability matching policy called Thompson sampling (TS) has shown excellent performance in various reward models. In addition to the empirical performance, TS has been shown to achieve asymptotic problem-dependent lower bounds in several models. However, its optimality has been mainly addressed under light-tailed or one-parameter models that belong to exponential families. In this paper, we consider the optimality of TS for the Pareto model that has a heavy tail and is parameterized by two unknown parameters. Specifically, we discuss the optimality of TS with probability matching priors that include the Jeffreys prior and the reference priors. We first prove that TS with certain probability matching priors can achieve the optimal regret bound. Then, we show the suboptimality of TS with other priors, including the Jeffreys and the reference priors. Nevertheless, we find that TS with the Jeffreys and reference priors can achieve the asymptotic lower bound if one uses a truncation procedure. These results suggest carefully choosing noninformative priors to avoid suboptimality and show the effectiveness of truncation procedures in TS-based policies.

The remarkable success in neural networks provokes the selective rationalization. It explains the prediction results by identifying a small subset of the inputs sufficient to support them. Since existing methods still suffer from adopting the shortcuts in data to compose rationales and limited large-scale annotated rationales by human, in this paper, we propose a Shortcuts-fused Selective Rationalization (SSR) method, which boosts the rationalization by discovering and exploiting potential shortcuts. Specifically, SSR first designs a shortcuts discovery approach to detect several potential shortcuts. Then, by introducing the identified shortcuts, we propose two strategies to mitigate the problem of utilizing shortcuts to compose rationales. Finally, we develop two data augmentations methods to close the gap in the number of annotated rationales. Extensive experimental results on real-world datasets clearly validate the effectiveness of our proposed method.

Feature selection helps reduce data acquisition costs in ML, but the standard approach is to train models with static feature subsets. Here, we consider the dynamic feature selection (DFS) problem where a model sequentially queries features based on the presently available information. DFS is often addressed with reinforcement learning, but we explore a simpler approach of greedily selecting features based on their conditional mutual information. This method is theoretically appealing but requires oracle access to the data distribution, so we develop a learning approach based on amortized optimization. The proposed method is shown to recover the greedy policy when trained to optimality, and it outperforms numerous existing feature selection methods in our experiments, thus validating it as a simple but powerful approach for this problem.

In digital online advertising, advertisers procure ad impressions simultaneously on multiple platforms, or so-called channels, such as Google Ads, Meta Ads Manager, etc., each of which consists of numerous ad auctions. We study how an advertiser maximizes total conversion (e.g. ad clicks) while satisfying aggregate return-on-investment (ROI) and budget constraints across all channels. In practice, an advertiser does not have control over, and thus cannot globally optimize, which individual ad auctions she participates in for each channel, and instead authorizes a channel to procure impressions on her behalf: the advertiser can only utilize two levers on each channel, namely setting a per-channel budget and per-channel target ROI. In this work, we first analyze the effectiveness of each of these levers for solving the advertiser's global multi-channel problem. We show that when an advertiser only optimizes over per-channel ROIs, her total conversion can be arbitrarily worse than what she could have obtained in the global problem. Further, we show that the advertiser can achieve the global optimal conversion when she only optimizes over per-channel budgets. In light of this finding, under a bandit feedback setting that mimics real-world scenarios where advertisers have limited information on ad auctions in each channels and how channels procure ads, we present an efficient learning algorithm that produces per-channel budgets whose resulting conversion approximates that of the global optimal problem. Finally, we argue that all our results hold for both single-item and multi-item auctions from which channels procure impressions on advertisers' behalf.

Although large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong reasoning abilities in structured tasks (e.g., coding and mathematics), it remains unexplored whether these abilities extend to strategic multi-agent environments. We investigate strategic reasoning capabilities -- the process of choosing an optimal course of action by predicting and adapting to others' actions -- of LLMs by analyzing their performance in three classical games from behavioral economics. We evaluate three standard LLMs (ChatGPT-4, Claude-2.1, Gemini 1.5) and three specialized reasoning LLMs (GPT-o1, Claude-3.5-Sonnet, Gemini Flash Thinking 2.0) using hierarchical models of bounded rationality. Our results show that reasoning LLMs exhibit superior strategic reasoning compared to standard LLMs (which do not demonstrate substantial capabilities), and often match or exceed human performance. Since strategic reasoning is fundamental to future AI systems (including Agentic AI and Artificial General Intelligence), our findings demonstrate the importance of dedicated reasoning capabilities in achieving effective strategic reasoning.

It is clear that one of the primary tools we can use to mitigate the potential risk from a misbehaving AI system is the ability to turn the system off. As the capabilities of AI systems improve, it is important to ensure that such systems do not adopt subgoals that prevent a human from switching them off. This is a challenge because many formulations of rational agents create strong incentives for self-preservation. This is not caused by a built-in instinct, but because a rational agent will maximize expected utility and cannot achieve whatever objective it has been given if it is dead. Our goal is to study the incentives an agent has to allow itself to be switched off. We analyze a simple game between a human H and a robot R, where H can press R's off switch but R can disable the off switch. A traditional agent takes its reward function for granted: we show that such agents have an incentive to disable the off switch, except in the special case where H is perfectly rational. Our key insight is that for R to want to preserve its off switch, it needs to be uncertain about the utility associated with the outcome, and to treat H's actions as important observations about that utility. (R also has no incentive to switch itself off in this setting.) We conclude that giving machines an appropriate level of uncertainty about their objectives leads to safer designs, and we argue that this setting is a useful generalization of the classical AI paradigm of rational agents.

We present a fine-grained theoretical analysis of the performance gap between reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) and direct preference optimization (DPO) under a representation gap. Our study decomposes this gap into two sources: an explicit representation gap under exact optimization and an implicit representation gap under finite samples. In the exact optimization setting, we characterize how the relative capacities of the reward and policy model classes influence the final policy qualities. We show that RLHF, DPO, or online DPO can outperform one another depending on the type of model mis-specifications. Notably, online DPO can outperform both RLHF and standard DPO when the reward and policy model classes are isomorphic and both mis-specified. In the approximate optimization setting, we provide a concrete construction where the ground-truth reward is implicitly sparse and show that RLHF requires significantly fewer samples than DPO to recover an effective reward model -- highlighting a statistical advantage of two-stage learning. Together, these results provide a comprehensive understanding of the performance gap between RLHF and DPO under various settings, and offer practical insights into when each method is preferred.

With the widespread deployment of large language models (LLMs) such as GPT4, BART, and LLaMA, the need for a system that can intelligently select the most suitable model for specific tasks while balancing cost, latency, accuracy, and ethical considerations has become increasingly important. Recognizing that not all tasks necessitate models with over 100 billion parameters, we introduce OptiRoute, an advanced model routing engine designed to dynamically select and route tasks to the optimal LLM based on detailed user-defined requirements. OptiRoute captures both functional (e.g., accuracy, speed, cost) and non-functional (e.g., helpfulness, harmlessness, honesty) criteria, leveraging lightweight task analysis and complexity estimation to efficiently match tasks with the best-fit models from a diverse array of LLMs. By employing a hybrid approach combining k-nearest neighbors (kNN) search and hierarchical filtering, OptiRoute optimizes for user priorities while minimizing computational overhead. This makes it ideal for real-time applications in cloud-based ML platforms, personalized AI services, and regulated industries.

We present Self-Play Preference Optimization (SPO), an algorithm for reinforcement learning from human feedback. Our approach is minimalist in that it does not require training a reward model nor unstable adversarial training and is therefore rather simple to implement. Our approach is maximalist in that it provably handles non-Markovian, intransitive, and stochastic preferences while being robust to the compounding errors that plague offline approaches to sequential prediction. To achieve the preceding qualities, we build upon the concept of a Minimax Winner (MW), a notion of preference aggregation from the social choice theory literature that frames learning from preferences as a zero-sum game between two policies. By leveraging the symmetry of this game, we prove that rather than using the traditional technique of dueling two policies to compute the MW, we can simply have a single agent play against itself while maintaining strong convergence guarantees. Practically, this corresponds to sampling multiple trajectories from a policy, asking a rater or preference model to compare them, and then using the proportion of wins as the reward for a particular trajectory. We demonstrate that on a suite of continuous control tasks, we are able to learn significantly more efficiently than reward-model based approaches while maintaining robustness to the intransitive and stochastic preferences that frequently occur in practice when aggregating human judgments.

Effective decision-making in Large Language Models (LLMs) is essential for handling intricate tasks. However, existing approaches prioritize performance but often overlook the balance between effectiveness and computational cost. To address this, we first introduce the 3E Criteria to systematically assess the cost-effectiveness of search strategies, revealing that existing methods often trade significant efficiency for marginal performance gains. To improve LLM decision-making while maintaining efficiency, we propose the Speculative Reward Model (SRM), a plug-and-play framework that seamlessly integrates with existing search strategies. Specifically, SRM employs an external reward assigner to predict optimal actions, reducing reliance on LLMs' internal self-evaluation. And a speculative verification mechanism is used to prune suboptimal choices and guide the search toward more promising steps. We evaluate SRM on several complex decision-making tasks including mathematical reasoning, planning and numerical reasoning in specialized domains. Experimental results show that SRM reduces costs to 1/10 of the original search framework on average while maintaining effectiveness.

This paper investigates the problem of ensembling multiple strategies for sequential portfolios to outperform individual strategies in terms of long-term wealth. Due to the uncertainty of strategies' performances in the future market, which are often based on specific models and statistical assumptions, investors often mitigate risk and enhance robustness by combining multiple strategies, akin to common approaches in collective learning prediction. However, the absence of a distribution-free and consistent preference framework complicates decisions of combination due to the ambiguous objective. To address this gap, we introduce a novel framework for decision-making in combining strategies, irrespective of market conditions, by establishing the investor's preference between decisions and then forming a clear objective. Through this framework, we propose a combinatorial strategy construction, free from statistical assumptions, for any scale of component strategies, even infinite, such that it meets the determined criterion. Finally, we test the proposed strategy along with its accelerated variant and some other multi-strategies. The numerical experiments show results in favor of the proposed strategies, albeit with small tradeoffs in their Sharpe ratios, in which their cumulative wealths eventually exceed those of the best component strategies while the accelerated strategy significantly improves performance.

Process Reward Modeling (PRM) is critical for complex reasoning and decision-making tasks where the accuracy of intermediate steps significantly influences the overall outcome. Existing PRM approaches, primarily framed as classification problems, employ cross-entropy loss to independently evaluate each step's correctness. This method can lead to suboptimal reward distribution and does not adequately address the interdependencies among steps. To address these limitations, we introduce the Process Q-value Model (PQM), a novel framework that redefines PRM in the context of a Markov Decision Process. PQM optimizes Q-value rankings based on a novel comparative loss function, enhancing the model's ability to capture the intricate dynamics among sequential decisions. This approach provides a more granular and theoretically grounded methodology for process rewards. Our extensive empirical evaluations across various sampling policies, language model backbones, and multi-step reasoning benchmarks show that PQM outperforms classification-based PRMs. The effectiveness of the comparative loss function is highlighted in our comprehensive ablation studies, confirming PQM's practical efficacy and theoretical advantage.

The online knapsack problem is a classic problem in the field of online algorithms. Its canonical version asks how to pack items of different values and weights arriving online into a capacity-limited knapsack so as to maximize the total value of the admitted items. Although optimal competitive algorithms are known for this problem, they may be fundamentally unfair, i.e., individual items may be treated inequitably in different ways. We formalize a practically-relevant notion of time fairness which effectively models a trade off between static and dynamic pricing in a motivating application such as cloud resource allocation, and show that existing algorithms perform poorly under this metric. We propose a parameterized deterministic algorithm where the parameter precisely captures the Pareto-optimal trade-off between fairness (static pricing) and competitiveness (dynamic pricing). We show that randomization is theoretically powerful enough to be simultaneously competitive and fair; however, it does not work well in experiments. To further improve the trade-off between fairness and competitiveness, we develop a nearly-optimal learning-augmented algorithm which is fair, consistent, and robust (competitive), showing substantial performance improvements in numerical experiments.

The optimal stopping problem is a category of decision problems with a specific constrained configuration. It is relevant to various real-world applications such as finance and management. To solve the optimal stopping problem, state-of-the-art algorithms in dynamic programming, such as the least-squares Monte Carlo (LSMC), are employed. This type of algorithm relies on path simulations using only the last price of the underlying asset as a state representation. Also, the LSMC was thinking for option valuation where risk-neutral probabilities can be employed to account for uncertainty. However, the general optimal stopping problem goals may not fit the requirements of the LSMC showing auto-correlated prices. We employ a data-driven method that uses Monte Carlo simulation to train and test artificial neural networks (ANN) to solve the optimal stopping problem. Using ANN to solve decision problems is not entirely new. We propose a different architecture that uses convolutional neural networks (CNN) to deal with the dimensionality problem that arises when we transform the whole history of prices into a Markovian state. We present experiments that indicate that our proposed architecture improves results over the previous implementations under specific simulated time series function sets. Lastly, we employ our proposed method to compare the optimal exercise of the financial options problem with the LSMC algorithm. Our experiments show that our method can capture more accurate exercise opportunities when compared to the LSMC. We have outstandingly higher (above 974\% improvement) expected payoff from these exercise policies under the many Monte Carlo simulations that used the real-world return database on the out-of-sample (test) data.

This work investigates the selection of high-quality pre-training data from massive corpora to enhance LMs' capabilities for downstream usage. We formulate data selection as a generalized Optimal Control problem, which can be solved theoretically by Pontryagin's Maximum Principle (PMP), yielding a set of necessary conditions that characterize the relationship between optimal data selection and LM training dynamics. Based on these theoretical results, we introduce PMP-based Data Selection (PDS), a framework that approximates optimal data selection by solving the PMP conditions. In our experiments, we adopt PDS to select data from CommmonCrawl and show that the PDS-selected corpus accelerates the learning of LMs and constantly boosts their performance on a wide range of downstream tasks across various model sizes. Moreover, the benefits of PDS extend to ~400B models trained on ~10T tokens, as evidenced by the extrapolation of the test loss curves according to the Scaling Laws. PDS also improves data utilization when the pre-training data is limited, by reducing the data demand by 1.8 times, which mitigates the quick exhaustion of available web-crawled corpora. Our code, data, and model checkpoints can be found in https://github.com/microsoft/LMOps/tree/main/data_selection.

This paper investigates the rationality of large language models (LLMs) in strategic decision-making contexts, specifically within the framework of game theory. We evaluate several state-of-the-art LLMs across a spectrum of complete-information and incomplete-information games. Our findings reveal that LLMs frequently deviate from rational strategies, particularly as the complexity of the game increases with larger payoff matrices or deeper sequential trees. To address these limitations, we design multiple game-theoretic workflows that guide the reasoning and decision-making processes of LLMs. These workflows aim to enhance the models' ability to compute Nash Equilibria and make rational choices, even under conditions of uncertainty and incomplete information. Experimental results demonstrate that the adoption of these workflows significantly improves the rationality and robustness of LLMs in game-theoretic tasks. Specifically, with the workflow, LLMs exhibit marked improvements in identifying optimal strategies, achieving near-optimal allocations in negotiation scenarios, and reducing susceptibility to exploitation during negotiations. Furthermore, we explore the meta-strategic considerations of whether it is rational for agents to adopt such workflows, recognizing that the decision to use or forgo the workflow constitutes a game-theoretic issue in itself. Our research contributes to a deeper understanding of LLMs' decision-making capabilities in strategic contexts and provides insights into enhancing their rationality through structured workflows. The findings have implications for the development of more robust and strategically sound AI agents capable of navigating complex interactive environments. Code and data supporting this study are available at https://github.com/Wenyueh/game_theory.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have recently shown promise in solving complex math problems when optimized with Reinforcement Learning (RL). But conventional approaches rely on outcome-only rewards that provide sparse feedback, resulting in inefficient optimization process. In this work, we investigate the function of process reward models (PRMs) to accelerate the RL training for LRMs. We propose a novel intrinsic signal-driven generative process evaluation mechanism operating at the thought level to address major bottlenecks in RL-based training. Specifically, instead of requiring PRMs to know how to solve problems, our method uses intrinsic signals in solutions to judge stepwise correctness and aggregate contiguous correct/incorrect steps into coherent 'thought' units. This structured, thought-level rewards enable more reliable credit assignment by reducing ambiguity in step segmentation and alleviating reward hacking. We further introduce a capability-adaptive reward mechanism that dynamically balances exploration and exploitation based on the LRM's current proficiency, guiding learning without stifling creative trial-and-error. These innovations are integrated into a new off-policy RL algorithm, TP-GRPO, which extends grouped proximal optimization with process-based rewards and improves training efficiency. Experiments on 1.5B and 7B parameter LRMs demonstrate that our method achieves higher problem-solving accuracy with significantly fewer training samples than outcome-only reward baselines. The results validate that well-structured process rewards can substantially accelerate LRM optimization in math reasoning tasks. Code is available at https://github.com/cs-holder/tp_grpo.

Reinforcement learning often needs to deal with the exponential growth of states and actions when exploring optimal control in high-dimensional spaces (often known as the curse of dimensionality). In this work, we address this issue by learning the inherent structure of action-wise similar MDP to appropriately balance the performance degradation versus sample/computational complexity. In particular, we partition the action spaces into multiple groups based on the similarity in transition distribution and reward function, and build a linear decomposition model to capture the difference between the intra-group transition kernel and the intra-group rewards. Both our theoretical analysis and experiments reveal a surprising and counter-intuitive result: while a more refined grouping strategy can reduce the approximation error caused by treating actions in the same group as identical, it also leads to increased estimation error when the size of samples or the computation resources is limited. This finding highlights the grouping strategy as a new degree of freedom that can be optimized to minimize the overall performance loss. To address this issue, we formulate a general optimization problem for determining the optimal grouping strategy, which strikes a balance between performance loss and sample/computational complexity. We further propose a computationally efficient method for selecting a nearly-optimal grouping strategy, which maintains its computational complexity independent of the size of the action space.

This paper democratizes neural information retrieval to scenarios where large scale relevance training signals are not available. We revisit the classic IR intuition that anchor-document relations approximate query-document relevance and propose a reinforcement weak supervision selection method, ReInfoSelect, which learns to select anchor-document pairs that best weakly supervise the neural ranker (action), using the ranking performance on a handful of relevance labels as the reward. Iteratively, for a batch of anchor-document pairs, ReInfoSelect back propagates the gradients through the neural ranker, gathers its NDCG reward, and optimizes the data selection network using policy gradients, until the neural ranker's performance peaks on target relevance metrics (convergence). In our experiments on three TREC benchmarks, neural rankers trained by ReInfoSelect, with only publicly available anchor data, significantly outperform feature-based learning to rank methods and match the effectiveness of neural rankers trained with private commercial search logs. Our analyses show that ReInfoSelect effectively selects weak supervision signals based on the stage of the neural ranker training, and intuitively picks anchor-document pairs similar to query-document pairs.

Recent AI algorithms are blackbox models whose decisions are difficult to interpret. eXplainable AI (XAI) seeks to address lack of AI interpretability and trust by explaining to customers their AI decision, e.g., decision to reject a loan application. The common wisdom is that regulating AI by mandating fully transparent XAI leads to greater social welfare. This paper challenges this notion through a game theoretic model for a policy-maker who maximizes social welfare, firms in a duopoly competition that maximize profits, and heterogenous consumers. The results show that XAI regulation may be redundant. In fact, mandating fully transparent XAI may make firms and customers worse off. This reveals a trade-off between maximizing welfare and receiving explainable AI outputs. We also discuss managerial implications for policy-maker and firms.