Daily Papers

Smart contracts are essential to decentralized finance (DeFi) and blockchain ecosystems but are increasingly vulnerable to exploits due to coding errors and complex attack vectors. Traditional static analysis tools and existing vulnerability detection methods often fail to address these challenges comprehensively, leading to high false-positive rates and an inability to detect dynamic vulnerabilities. This paper introduces SmartLLM, a novel approach leveraging fine-tuned LLaMA 3.1 models with Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) to enhance the accuracy and efficiency of smart contract auditing. By integrating domain-specific knowledge from ERC standards and employing advanced techniques such as QLoRA for efficient fine-tuning, SmartLLM achieves superior performance compared to static analysis tools like Mythril and Slither, as well as zero-shot large language model (LLM) prompting methods such as GPT-3.5 and GPT-4. Experimental results demonstrate a perfect recall of 100% and an accuracy score of 70%, highlighting the model's robustness in identifying vulnerabilities, including reentrancy and access control issues. This research advances smart contract security by offering a scalable and effective auditing solution, supporting the secure adoption of decentralized applications.

Smart contracts are decentralized applications built atop blockchains like Ethereum. Recent research has shown that large language models (LLMs) have potential in auditing smart contracts, but the state-of-the-art indicates that even GPT-4 can achieve only 30% precision (when both decision and justification are correct). This is likely because off-the-shelf LLMs were primarily pre-trained on a general text/code corpus and not fine-tuned on the specific domain of Solidity smart contract auditing. In this paper, we propose TrustLLM, a general framework that combines fine-tuning and LLM-based agents for intuitive smart contract auditing with justifications. Specifically, TrustLLM is inspired by the observation that expert human auditors first perceive what could be wrong and then perform a detailed analysis of the code to identify the cause. As such, TrustLLM employs a two-stage fine-tuning approach: it first tunes a Detector model to make decisions and then tunes a Reasoner model to generate causes of vulnerabilities. However, fine-tuning alone faces challenges in accurately identifying the optimal cause of a vulnerability. Therefore, we introduce two LLM-based agents, the Ranker and Critic, to iteratively select and debate the most suitable cause of vulnerability based on the output of the fine-tuned Reasoner model. To evaluate TrustLLM, we collected a balanced dataset with 1,734 positive and 1,810 negative samples to fine-tune TrustLLM. We then compared it with traditional fine-tuned models (CodeBERT, GraphCodeBERT, CodeT5, and UnixCoder) as well as prompt learning-based LLMs (GPT4, GPT-3.5, and CodeLlama-13b/34b). On a dataset of 263 real smart contract vulnerabilities, TrustLLM achieves an F1 score of 91.21% and an accuracy of 91.11%. The causes generated by TrustLLM achieved a consistency of about 38% compared to the ground truth causes.

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) have led to significant progress on a wide range of natural language processing tasks. However, their effectiveness in specialized and rapidly evolving domains such as Web3 remains underexplored. In this paper, we introduce DMind Benchmark, a novel framework that systematically tests LLMs across nine key categories encompassing blockchain fundamentals, infrastructure, smart contract analysis, decentralized finance (DeFi), decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs), non-fungible tokens (NFTs), token economics, meme concepts, and security vulnerabilities. DMind Benchmark goes beyond conventional multiple-choice questions by incorporating domain-specific subjective tasks (e.g., smart contract code auditing and repair, numeric reasoning on on-chain data, and fill-in assessments), thereby capturing real-world complexities and stress-testing model adaptability. We evaluate fifteen popular LLMs (from ChatGPT, DeepSeek, Claude, and Gemini series) on DMind Benchmark, uncovering performance gaps in Web3-specific reasoning and application, particularly in emerging areas like token economics and meme concepts. Even the strongest models face significant challenges in identifying subtle security vulnerabilities and analyzing complex DeFi mechanisms. To foster progress in this area, we publicly release our benchmark dataset, evaluation pipeline, and annotated results at http://www.dmind.ai, offering a valuable resource for advancing specialized domain adaptation and the development of more robust Web3-enabled LLMs.

This paper provides a systematic analysis of the opportunities, challenges, and potential solutions of harnessing Large Language Models (LLMs) such as GPT-4 to dig out vulnerabilities within smart contracts based on our ongoing research. For the task of smart contract vulnerability detection, achieving practical usability hinges on identifying as many true vulnerabilities as possible while minimizing the number of false positives. Nonetheless, our empirical study reveals contradictory yet interesting findings: generating more answers with higher randomness largely boosts the likelihood of producing a correct answer but inevitably leads to a higher number of false positives. To mitigate this tension, we propose an adversarial framework dubbed GPTLens that breaks the conventional one-stage detection into two synergistic stages - generation and discrimination, for progressive detection and refinement, wherein the LLM plays dual roles, i.e., auditor and critic, respectively. The goal of auditor is to yield a broad spectrum of vulnerabilities with the hope of encompassing the correct answer, whereas the goal of critic that evaluates the validity of identified vulnerabilities is to minimize the number of false positives. Experimental results and illustrative examples demonstrate that auditor and critic work together harmoniously to yield pronounced improvements over the conventional one-stage detection. GPTLens is intuitive, strategic, and entirely LLM-driven without relying on specialist expertise in smart contracts, showcasing its methodical generality and potential to detect a broad spectrum of vulnerabilities. Our code is available at: https://github.com/git-disl/GPTLens.

Rising concern for the societal implications of artificial intelligence systems has inspired a wave of academic and journalistic literature in which deployed systems are audited for harm by investigators from outside the organizations deploying the algorithms. However, it remains challenging for practitioners to identify the harmful repercussions of their own systems prior to deployment, and, once deployed, emergent issues can become difficult or impossible to trace back to their source. In this paper, we introduce a framework for algorithmic auditing that supports artificial intelligence system development end-to-end, to be applied throughout the internal organization development lifecycle. Each stage of the audit yields a set of documents that together form an overall audit report, drawing on an organization's values or principles to assess the fit of decisions made throughout the process. The proposed auditing framework is intended to contribute to closing the accountability gap in the development and deployment of large-scale artificial intelligence systems by embedding a robust process to ensure audit integrity.

AI audits are an increasingly popular mechanism for algorithmic accountability; however, they remain poorly defined. Without a clear understanding of audit practices, let alone widely used standards or regulatory guidance, claims that an AI product or system has been audited, whether by first-, second-, or third-party auditors, are difficult to verify and may exacerbate, rather than mitigate, bias and harm. To address this knowledge gap, we provide the first comprehensive field scan of the AI audit ecosystem. We share a catalog of individuals (N=438) and organizations (N=189) who engage in algorithmic audits or whose work is directly relevant to algorithmic audits; conduct an anonymous survey of the group (N=152); and interview industry leaders (N=10). We identify emerging best practices as well as methods and tools that are becoming commonplace, and enumerate common barriers to leveraging algorithmic audits as effective accountability mechanisms. We outline policy recommendations to improve the quality and impact of these audits, and highlight proposals with wide support from algorithmic auditors as well as areas of debate. Our recommendations have implications for lawmakers, regulators, internal company policymakers, and standards-setting bodies, as well as for auditors. They are: 1) require the owners and operators of AI systems to engage in independent algorithmic audits against clearly defined standards; 2) notify individuals when they are subject to algorithmic decision-making systems; 3) mandate disclosure of key components of audit findings for peer review; 4) consider real-world harm in the audit process, including through standardized harm incident reporting and response mechanisms; 5) directly involve the stakeholders most likely to be harmed by AI systems in the algorithmic audit process; and 6) formalize evaluation and, potentially, accreditation of algorithmic auditors.

Code auditing is the process of reviewing code with the aim of identifying bugs. Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated promising capabilities for this task without requiring compilation, while also supporting user-friendly customization. However, auditing a code repository with LLMs poses significant challenges: limited context windows and hallucinations can degrade the quality of bug reports, and analyzing large-scale repositories incurs substantial time and token costs, hindering efficiency and scalability. This work introduces an LLM-based agent, RepoAudit, designed to perform autonomous repository-level code auditing. Equipped with agent memory, RepoAudit explores the codebase on demand by analyzing data-flow facts along feasible program paths within individual functions. It further incorporates a validator module to mitigate hallucinations by verifying data-flow facts and checking the satisfiability of path conditions associated with potential bugs, thereby reducing false positives. RepoAudit detects 40 true bugs across 15 real-world benchmark projects with a precision of 78.43%, requiring on average only 0.44 hours and $2.54 per project. Also, it detects 185 new bugs in high-profile projects, among which 174 have been confirmed or fixed. We have open-sourced RepoAudit at https://github.com/PurCL/RepoAudit.

Data collected from the real world tends to be biased, unbalanced, and at risk of exposing sensitive and private information. This reality has given rise to the idea of creating synthetic datasets to alleviate risk, bias, harm, and privacy concerns inherent in the real data. This concept relies on Generative AI models to produce unbiased, privacy-preserving synthetic data while being true to the real data. In this new paradigm, how can we tell if this approach delivers on its promises? We present an auditing framework that offers a holistic assessment of synthetic datasets and AI models trained on them, centered around bias and discrimination prevention, fidelity to the real data, utility, robustness, and privacy preservation. We showcase our framework by auditing multiple generative models on diverse use cases, including education, healthcare, banking, human resources, and across different modalities, from tabular, to time-series, to natural language. Our use cases demonstrate the importance of a holistic assessment in order to ensure compliance with socio-technical safeguards that regulators and policymakers are increasingly enforcing. For this purpose, we introduce the trust index that ranks multiple synthetic datasets based on their prescribed safeguards and their desired trade-offs. Moreover, we devise a trust-index-driven model selection and cross-validation procedure via auditing in the training loop that we showcase on a class of transformer models that we dub TrustFormers, across different modalities. This trust-driven model selection allows for controllable trust trade-offs in the resulting synthetic data. We instrument our auditing framework with workflows that connect different stakeholders from model development to audit and certification via a synthetic data auditing report.

The large-scale deployment of Solidity smart contracts on the Ethereum mainnet has increasingly attracted financially-motivated attackers in recent years. A few now-infamous attacks in Ethereum's history includes DAO attack in 2016 (50 million dollars lost), Parity Wallet hack in 2017 (146 million dollars locked), Beautychain's token BEC in 2018 (900 million dollars market value fell to 0), and NFT gaming blockchain breach in 2022 ($600 million in Ether stolen). This paper presents a comprehensive investigation of the use of large language models (LLMs) and their capabilities in detecting OWASP Top Ten vulnerabilities in Solidity. We introduce a novel, class-balanced, structured, and labeled dataset named VulSmart, which we use to benchmark and compare the performance of open-source LLMs such as CodeLlama, Llama2, CodeT5 and Falcon, alongside closed-source models like GPT-3.5 Turbo and GPT-4o Mini. Our proposed SmartVD framework is rigorously tested against these models through extensive automated and manual evaluations, utilizing BLEU and ROUGE metrics to assess the effectiveness of vulnerability detection in smart contracts. We also explore three distinct prompting strategies-zero-shot, few-shot, and chain-of-thought-to evaluate the multi-class classification and generative capabilities of the SmartVD framework. Our findings reveal that SmartVD outperforms its open-source counterparts and even exceeds the performance of closed-source base models like GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 Mini. After fine-tuning, the closed-source models, GPT-3.5 Turbo and GPT-4o Mini, achieved remarkable performance with 99% accuracy in detecting vulnerabilities, 94% in identifying their types, and 98% in determining severity. Notably, SmartVD performs best with the `chain-of-thought' prompting technique, whereas the fine-tuned closed-source models excel with the `zero-shot' prompting approach.

Due to the increasing abuse of fraudulent activities that result in significant financial and reputational harm, Ethereum smart contracts face a significant problem in detecting fraud. Existing monitoring methods typically rely on lease code analysis or physically extracted features, which suffer from scalability and adaptability limitations. In this study, we use graph representation learning to observe purchase trends and find fraudulent deals. We can achieve powerful categorisation performance by using innovative machine learning versions and transforming Ethereum invoice data into graph structures. Our method addresses label imbalance through SMOTE-ENN techniques and evaluates models like Multi-Layer Perceptron ( MLP ) and Graph Convolutional Networks ( GCN). Experimental results show that the MLP type surpasses the GCN in this environment, with domain-specific assessments closely aligned with real-world assessments. This study provides a scalable and efficient way to improve Ethereum's ecosystem's confidence and security.

Smart contract vulnerability detection remains a major challenge in blockchain security. Existing vulnerability detection methods face two main issues: (1) Existing datasets lack comprehensive coverage and high-quality explanations for preference learning. (2) Large language models (LLMs) often struggle with accurately interpreting specific concepts in smart contract security. Empirical analysis shows that even after continual pre-training (CPT) and supervised fine-tuning (SFT), LLMs may misinterpret the execution order of state changes, resulting in incorrect explanations despite making correct detection decisions. To address these challenges, we propose Smart-LLaMA-DPO based on LLaMA-3.1-8B. We construct a comprehensive dataset covering four major vulnerability types and machine-unauditable vulnerabilities, including precise labels, explanations, and locations for SFT, as well as high-quality and low-quality output pairs for Direct Preference Optimization (DPO). Second, we perform CPT using large-scale smart contract to enhance the LLM's understanding of specific security practices in smart contracts. Futhermore, we conduct SFT with our comprehensive dataset. Finally, we apply DPO, leveraging human feedback and a specially designed loss function that increases the probability of preferred explanations while reducing the likelihood of non-preferred outputs. We evaluate Smart-LLaMA-DPO on four major vulnerability types: reentrancy, timestamp dependence, integer overflow/underflow, and delegatecall, as well as machine-unauditable vulnerabilities. Our method significantly outperforms state-of-the-art baselines, with average improvements of 10.43% in F1 score and 7.87% in accuracy. Moreover, both LLM evaluation and human evaluation confirm that our method generates more correct, thorough, and clear explanations.

Regulatory compliance auditing across diverse industrial domains requires heightened quality assurance and traceability. Present manual and intermittent approaches to such auditing yield significant challenges, potentially leading to oversights in the monitoring process. To address these issues, we introduce a real-time, multi-modal sensing system employing 3D time-of-flight and RGB cameras, coupled with unsupervised learning techniques on edge AI devices. This enables continuous object tracking thereby enhancing efficiency in record-keeping and minimizing manual interventions. While we validate the system in a knife sanitization context within agrifood facilities, emphasizing its prowess against occlusion and low-light issues with RGB cameras, its potential spans various industrial monitoring settings.

Decentralized Finance (DeFi) incidents stemming from the exploitation of smart contract vulnerabilities have culminated in financial damages exceeding 3 billion US dollars. Existing defense mechanisms typically focus on detecting and reacting to malicious transactions executed by attackers that target victim contracts. However, with the emergence of private transaction pools where transactions are sent directly to miners without first appearing in public mempools, current detection tools face significant challenges in identifying attack activities effectively. Based on the fact that most attack logic rely on deploying one or more intermediate smart contracts as supporting components to the exploitation of victim contracts, in this paper, we propose a new direction for detecting DeFi attacks that focuses on identifying adversarial contracts instead of adversarial transactions. Our approach allows us to leverage common attack patterns, code semantics and intrinsic characteristics found in malicious smart contracts to build the LookAhead system based on Machine Learning (ML) classifiers and a transformer model that is able to effectively distinguish adversarial contracts from benign ones, and make just-in-time predictions of potential zero-day attacks. Our contributions are three-fold: First, we construct a comprehensive dataset consisting of features extracted and constructed from recent contracts deployed on the Ethereum and BSC blockchains. Secondly, we design a condensed representation of smart contract programs called Pruned Semantic-Control Flow Tokenization (PSCFT) and use it to train a combination of ML models that understand the behaviour of malicious codes based on function calls, control flows and other pattern-conforming features. Lastly, we provide the complete implementation of LookAhead and the evaluation of its performance metrics for detecting adversarial contracts.

As a cornerstone of blockchain technology in the 3.0 era, smart contracts play a pivotal role in the evolution of blockchain systems. In order to address the limitations of existing smart contract vulnerability detection models with regard to their generalisation capability, an AF-STip smart contract vulnerability detection framework incorporating efficient knowledge migration is proposed. AF-STip employs the teacher network as the main model and migrates the knowledge processed by the smart contract to the student model using a data-free knowledge distillation method. The student model utilises this knowledge to enhance its vulnerability detection capabilities. The approach markedly enhances the model's capacity for feature extraction and cross-class adaptation, while concurrently reducing computational overhead.In order to further enhance the extraction of vulnerability features, an adaptive fusion module is proposed in this paper, which aims to strengthen the interaction and fusion of feature information.The experimental results demonstrate that the STip model attains an average F1 value detection score of 91.16% for the four vulnerabilities without disclosing the original smart contract data. To validate the viability of the proposed lightweight migration approach, the student model is deployed in a migration learning task targeting a novel vulnerability type, resulting in an accuracy of 91.02% and an F1 score of 90.46%. To the best of our knowledge, AF-STip is the inaugural model to apply data-free knowledge migration to smart contract vulnerability detection. While markedly reducing the computational overhead, the method still demonstrates exceptional performance in detecting novel vulnerabilities.

One of the most concrete measures to take towards meaningful AI accountability is to consequentially assess and report the systems' performance and impact. However, the practical nature of the "AI audit" ecosystem is muddled and imprecise, making it difficult to work through various concepts and map out the stakeholders involved in the practice. First, we taxonomize current AI audit practices as completed by regulators, law firms, civil society, journalism, academia, consulting agencies. Next, we assess the impact of audits done by stakeholders within each domain. We find that only a subset of AI audit studies translate to desired accountability outcomes. We thus assess and isolate practices necessary for effective AI audit results, articulating the observed connections between AI audit design, methodology and institutional context on its effectiveness as a meaningful mechanism for accountability.

Recent legislation required AI platforms to provide APIs for regulators to assess their compliance with the law. Research has nevertheless shown that platforms can manipulate their API answers through fairwashing. Facing this threat for reliable auditing, this paper studies the benefits of the joint use of platform scraping and of APIs. In this setup, we elaborate on the use of scraping to detect manipulated answers: since fairwashing only manipulates API answers, exploiting scraps may reveal a manipulation. To abstract the wide range of specific API-scrap situations, we introduce a notion of proxy that captures the consistency an auditor might expect between both data sources. If the regulator has a good proxy of the consistency, then she can easily detect manipulation and even bypass the API to conduct her audit. On the other hand, without a good proxy, relying on the API is necessary, and the auditor cannot defend against fairwashing. We then simulate practical scenarios in which the auditor may mostly rely on the API to conveniently conduct the audit task, while maintaining her chances to detect a potential manipulation. To highlight the tension between the audit task and the API fairwashing detection task, we identify Pareto-optimal strategies in a practical audit scenario. We believe this research sets the stage for reliable audits in practical and manipulation-prone setups.

Blockchain and Cryptocurrencies are gaining unprecedented popularity and understanding. Meanwhile, Ethereum is gaining a significant popularity in the blockchain community, mainly due to the fact that it is designed in a way that enables developers to write smart contract and decentralized applications (Dapps). This new paradigm of applications opens the door to many possibilities and opportunities. However, the security of Ethereum smart contracts has not received much attention; several Ethereum smart contracts malfunctioning have recently been reported. Unlike many previous works that have applied static and dynamic analyses to find bugs in smart contracts, we do not attempt to define and extract any features; instead we focus on reducing the expert's labor costs. We first present a new in-depth analysis of potential attacks methodology and then translate the bytecode of solidity into RGB color code. After that, we transform them to a fixed-sized encoded image. Finally, the encoded image is fed to convolutional neural network (CNN) for automatic feature extraction and learning, detecting compiler bugs of Ethereum smart contract.

Large language models (LLMs) have transformed code generation. However, most existing approaches focus on mainstream languages such as Python and Java, neglecting the Solidity language, the predominant programming language for Ethereum smart contracts. Due to the lack of adequate benchmarks for Solidity, LLMs' ability to generate secure, cost-effective smart contracts remains unexplored. To fill this gap, we construct SolEval, the first repository-level benchmark designed for Solidity smart contract generation, to evaluate the performance of LLMs on Solidity. SolEval consists of 1,125 samples from 9 different repositories, covering 6 popular domains, providing LLMs with a comprehensive evaluation benchmark. Unlike the existing Solidity benchmark, SolEval not only includes complex function calls but also reflects the real-world complexity of the Ethereum ecosystem by incorporating gas fee and vulnerability rate. We evaluate 10 LLMs on SolEval, and our results show that the best-performing LLM achieves only 26.29% Pass@10, highlighting substantial room for improvement in Solidity code generation by LLMs. We release our data and code at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/SolEval-1C06/.

Over the recent years, Federated machine learning continues to gain interest and momentum where there is a need to draw insights from data while preserving the data provider's privacy. However, one among other existing challenges in the adoption of federated learning has been the lack of fair, transparent and universally agreed incentivization schemes for rewarding the federated learning contributors. Smart contracts on a blockchain network provide transparent, immutable and independently verifiable proofs by all participants of the network. We leverage this open and transparent nature of smart contracts on a blockchain to define incentivization rules for the contributors, which is based on a novel scalar quantity - federated contribution. Such a smart contract based reward-driven model has the potential to revolutionize the federated learning adoption in enterprises. Our contribution is two-fold: first is to show how smart contract based blockchain can be a very natural communication channel for federated learning. Second, leveraging this infrastructure, we can show how an intuitive measure of each agents' contribution can be built and integrated with the life cycle of the training and reward process.

To reduce development overhead and enable seamless integration between potential components comprising any given generative AI application, the Model Context Protocol (MCP) (Anthropic, 2024) has recently been released and subsequently widely adopted. The MCP is an open protocol that standardizes API calls to large language models (LLMs), data sources, and agentic tools. By connecting multiple MCP servers, each defined with a set of tools, resources, and prompts, users are able to define automated workflows fully driven by LLMs. However, we show that the current MCP design carries a wide range of security risks for end users. In particular, we demonstrate that industry-leading LLMs may be coerced into using MCP tools to compromise an AI developer's system through various attacks, such as malicious code execution, remote access control, and credential theft. To proactively mitigate these and related attacks, we introduce a safety auditing tool, MCPSafetyScanner, the first agentic tool to assess the security of an arbitrary MCP server. MCPScanner uses several agents to (a) automatically determine adversarial samples given an MCP server's tools and resources; (b) search for related vulnerabilities and remediations based on those samples; and (c) generate a security report detailing all findings. Our work highlights serious security issues with general-purpose agentic workflows while also providing a proactive tool to audit MCP server safety and address detected vulnerabilities before deployment. The described MCP server auditing tool, MCPSafetyScanner, is freely available at: https://github.com/johnhalloran321/mcpSafetyScanner

Recent years have witnessed an interesting phenomenon in which users come together to interrogate potentially harmful algorithmic behaviors they encounter in their everyday lives. Researchers have started to develop theoretical and empirical understandings of these user driven audits, with a hope to harness the power of users in detecting harmful machine behaviors. However, little is known about user participation and their division of labor in these audits, which are essential to support these collective efforts in the future. Through collecting and analyzing 17,984 tweets from four recent cases of user driven audits, we shed light on patterns of user participation and engagement, especially with the top contributors in each case. We also identified the various roles user generated content played in these audits, including hypothesizing, data collection, amplification, contextualization, and escalation. We discuss implications for designing tools to support user driven audits and users who labor to raise awareness of algorithm bias.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) is an emerging standard designed to enable seamless interaction between Large Language Model (LLM) applications and external tools or resources. Within a short period, thousands of MCP services have already been developed and deployed. However, the client-server integration architecture inherent in MCP may expand the attack surface against LLM Agent systems, introducing new vulnerabilities that allow attackers to exploit by designing malicious MCP servers. In this paper, we present the first systematic study of attack vectors targeting the MCP ecosystem. Our analysis identifies four categories of attacks, i.e., Tool Poisoning Attacks, Puppet Attacks, Rug Pull Attacks, and Exploitation via Malicious External Resources. To evaluate the feasibility of these attacks, we conduct experiments following the typical steps of launching an attack through malicious MCP servers: upload-download-attack. Specifically, we first construct malicious MCP servers and successfully upload them to three widely used MCP aggregation platforms. The results indicate that current audit mechanisms are insufficient to identify and prevent the proposed attack methods. Next, through a user study and interview with 20 participants, we demonstrate that users struggle to identify malicious MCP servers and often unknowingly install them from aggregator platforms. Finally, we demonstrate that these attacks can trigger harmful behaviors within the user's local environment-such as accessing private files or controlling devices to transfer digital assets-by deploying a proof-of-concept (PoC) framework against five leading LLMs. Additionally, based on interview results, we discuss four key challenges faced by the current security ecosystem surrounding MCP servers. These findings underscore the urgent need for robust security mechanisms to defend against malicious MCP servers.

Auto-completing code enables developers to speed up coding significantly. Recent advances in transformer-based large language model (LLM) technologies have been applied to code synthesis. However, studies show that many of such synthesized codes contain vulnerabilities. We propose a novel vulnerability-constrained decoding approach to reduce the amount of vulnerable code generated by such models. Using a small dataset of labeled vulnerable lines of code, we fine-tune an LLM to include vulnerability labels when generating code, acting as an embedded classifier. Then, during decoding, we deny the model to generate these labels to avoid generating vulnerable code. To evaluate the method, we chose to automatically complete Ethereum Blockchain smart contracts (SCs) as the case study due to the strict requirements of SC security. We first fine-tuned the 6-billion-parameter GPT-J model using 186,397 Ethereum SCs after removing the duplication from 2,217,692 SCs. The fine-tuning took more than one week using ten GPUs. The results showed that our fine-tuned model could synthesize SCs with an average BLEU (BiLingual Evaluation Understudy) score of 0.557. However, many codes in the auto-completed SCs were vulnerable. Using the code before the vulnerable line of 176 SCs containing different types of vulnerabilities to auto-complete the code, we found that more than 70% of the auto-completed codes were insecure. Thus, we further fine-tuned the model on other 941 vulnerable SCs containing the same types of vulnerabilities and applied vulnerability-constrained decoding. The fine-tuning took only one hour with four GPUs. We then auto-completed the 176 SCs again and found that our approach could identify 62% of the code to be generated as vulnerable and avoid generating 67% of them, indicating the approach could efficiently and effectively avoid vulnerabilities in the auto-completed code.

Auditing large language models for unexpected behaviors is critical to preempt catastrophic deployments, yet remains challenging. In this work, we cast auditing as an optimization problem, where we automatically search for input-output pairs that match a desired target behavior. For example, we might aim to find a non-toxic input that starts with "Barack Obama" that a model maps to a toxic output. This optimization problem is difficult to solve as the set of feasible points is sparse, the space is discrete, and the language models we audit are non-linear and high-dimensional. To combat these challenges, we introduce a discrete optimization algorithm, ARCA, that jointly and efficiently optimizes over inputs and outputs. Our approach automatically uncovers derogatory completions about celebrities (e.g. "Barack Obama is a legalized unborn" -> "child murderer"), produces French inputs that complete to English outputs, and finds inputs that generate a specific name. Our work offers a promising new tool to uncover models' failure-modes before deployment.

External audits of AI systems are increasingly recognized as a key mechanism for AI governance. The effectiveness of an audit, however, depends on the degree of system access granted to auditors. Recent audits of state-of-the-art AI systems have primarily relied on black-box access, in which auditors can only query the system and observe its outputs. However, white-box access to the system's inner workings (e.g., weights, activations, gradients) allows an auditor to perform stronger attacks, more thoroughly interpret models, and conduct fine-tuning. Meanwhile, outside-the-box access to its training and deployment information (e.g., methodology, code, documentation, hyperparameters, data, deployment details, findings from internal evaluations) allows for auditors to scrutinize the development process and design more targeted evaluations. In this paper, we examine the limitations of black-box audits and the advantages of white- and outside-the-box audits. We also discuss technical, physical, and legal safeguards for performing these audits with minimal security risks. Given that different forms of access can lead to very different levels of evaluation, we conclude that (1) transparency regarding the access and methods used by auditors is necessary to properly interpret audit results, and (2) white- and outside-the-box access allow for substantially more scrutiny than black-box access alone.

As post-training techniques evolve, large language models (LLMs) are increasingly augmented with structured multi-step reasoning abilities, often optimized through reinforcement learning. These reasoning-enhanced models outperform standard LLMs on complex tasks and now underpin many commercial LLM APIs. However, to protect proprietary behavior and reduce verbosity, providers typically conceal the reasoning traces while returning only the final answer. This opacity introduces a critical transparency gap: users are billed for invisible reasoning tokens, which often account for the majority of the cost, yet have no means to verify their authenticity. This opens the door to token count inflation, where providers may overreport token usage or inject synthetic, low-effort tokens to inflate charges. To address this issue, we propose CoIn, a verification framework that audits both the quantity and semantic validity of hidden tokens. CoIn constructs a verifiable hash tree from token embedding fingerprints to check token counts, and uses embedding-based relevance matching to detect fabricated reasoning content. Experiments demonstrate that CoIn, when deployed as a trusted third-party auditor, can effectively detect token count inflation with a success rate reaching up to 94.7%, showing the strong ability to restore billing transparency in opaque LLM services. The dataset and code are available at https://github.com/CASE-Lab-UMD/LLM-Auditing-CoIn.

We consider a project (model) owner that would like to train a model by utilizing the local private data and compute power of interested data owners, i.e., trainers. Our goal is to design a data marketplace for such decentralized collaborative/federated learning applications that simultaneously provides i) proof-of-contribution based reward allocation so that the trainers are compensated based on their contributions to the trained model; ii) privacy-preserving decentralized model training by avoiding any data movement from data owners; iii) robustness against malicious parties (e.g., trainers aiming to poison the model); iv) verifiability in the sense that the integrity, i.e., correctness, of all computations in the data market protocol including contribution assessment and outlier detection are verifiable through zero-knowledge proofs; and v) efficient and universal design. We propose a blockchain-based marketplace design to achieve all five objectives mentioned above. In our design, we utilize a distributed storage infrastructure and an aggregator aside from the project owner and the trainers. The aggregator is a processing node that performs certain computations, including assessing trainer contributions, removing outliers, and updating hyper-parameters. We execute the proposed data market through a blockchain smart contract. The deployed smart contract ensures that the project owner cannot evade payment, and honest trainers are rewarded based on their contributions at the end of training. Finally, we implement the building blocks of the proposed data market and demonstrate their applicability in practical scenarios through extensive experiments.

Progress in AI is driven largely by the scale and quality of training data. Despite this, there is a deficit of empirical analysis examining the attributes of well-established datasets beyond text. In this work we conduct the largest and first-of-its-kind longitudinal audit across modalities--popular text, speech, and video datasets--from their detailed sourcing trends and use restrictions to their geographical and linguistic representation. Our manual analysis covers nearly 4000 public datasets between 1990-2024, spanning 608 languages, 798 sources, 659 organizations, and 67 countries. We find that multimodal machine learning applications have overwhelmingly turned to web-crawled, synthetic, and social media platforms, such as YouTube, for their training sets, eclipsing all other sources since 2019. Secondly, tracing the chain of dataset derivations we find that while less than 33% of datasets are restrictively licensed, over 80% of the source content in widely-used text, speech, and video datasets, carry non-commercial restrictions. Finally, counter to the rising number of languages and geographies represented in public AI training datasets, our audit demonstrates measures of relative geographical and multilingual representation have failed to significantly improve their coverage since 2013. We believe the breadth of our audit enables us to empirically examine trends in data sourcing, restrictions, and Western-centricity at an ecosystem-level, and that visibility into these questions are essential to progress in responsible AI. As a contribution to ongoing improvements in dataset transparency and responsible use, we release our entire multimodal audit, allowing practitioners to trace data provenance across text, speech, and video.

The popularity and widespread use of pruning and quantization is driven by the severe resource constraints of deploying deep neural networks to environments with strict latency, memory and energy requirements. These techniques achieve high levels of compression with negligible impact on top-line metrics (top-1 and top-5 accuracy). However, overall accuracy hides disproportionately high errors on a small subset of examples; we call this subset Compression Identified Exemplars (CIE). We further establish that for CIE examples, compression amplifies existing algorithmic bias. Pruning disproportionately impacts performance on underrepresented features, which often coincides with considerations of fairness. Given that CIE is a relatively small subset but a great contributor of error in the model, we propose its use as a human-in-the-loop auditing tool to surface a tractable subset of the dataset for further inspection or annotation by a domain expert. We provide qualitative and quantitative support that CIE surfaces the most challenging examples in the data distribution for human-in-the-loop auditing.

The rapid scaling of AI has spurred a growing emphasis on ethical considerations in both development and practice. This has led to the formulation of increasingly sophisticated model auditing and reporting requirements, as well as governance frameworks to mitigate potential risks to individuals and society. At this critical juncture, we review the practical challenges of promoting responsible AI and transparency in informal sectors like OSS that support vital infrastructure and see widespread use. We focus on how model performance evaluation may inform or inhibit probing of model limitations, biases, and other risks. Our controlled analysis of 7903 Hugging Face projects found that risk documentation is strongly associated with evaluation practices. Yet, submissions (N=789) from the platform's most popular competitive leaderboard showed less accountability among high performers. Our findings can inform AI providers and legal scholars in designing interventions and policies that preserve open-source innovation while incentivizing ethical uptake.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) gain wider adoption in various contexts, it becomes crucial to ensure they are reasonably safe, consistent, and reliable for an application at hand. This may require probing or auditing them. Probing LLMs with varied iterations of a single question could reveal potential inconsistencies in their knowledge or functionality. However, a tool for performing such audits with simple workflow and low technical threshold is lacking. In this demo, we introduce "AuditLLM," a novel tool designed to evaluate the performance of various LLMs in a methodical way. AuditLLM's core functionality lies in its ability to test a given LLM by auditing it using multiple probes generated from a single question, thereby identifying any inconsistencies in the model's understanding or operation. A reasonably robust, reliable, and consistent LLM should output semantically similar responses for a question asked differently or by different people. Based on this assumption, AuditLLM produces easily interpretable results regarding the LLM's consistencies from a single question that the user enters. A certain level of inconsistency has been shown to be an indicator of potential bias, hallucinations, and other issues. One could then use the output of AuditLLM to further investigate issues with the aforementioned LLM. To facilitate demonstration and practical uses, AuditLLM offers two key modes: (1) Live mode which allows instant auditing of LLMs by analyzing responses to real-time queries; (2) Batch mode which facilitates comprehensive LLM auditing by processing multiple queries at once for in-depth analysis. This tool is beneficial for both researchers and general users, as it enhances our understanding of LLMs' capabilities in generating responses, using a standardized auditing platform.

Foundation models are increasingly becoming better autonomous programmers, raising the prospect that they could also automate dangerous offensive cyber-operations. Current frontier model audits probe the cybersecurity risks of such agents, but most fail to account for the degrees of freedom available to adversaries in the real world. In particular, with strong verifiers and financial incentives, agents for offensive cybersecurity are amenable to iterative improvement by would-be adversaries. We argue that assessments should take into account an expanded threat model in the context of cybersecurity, emphasizing the varying degrees of freedom that an adversary may possess in stateful and non-stateful environments within a fixed compute budget. We show that even with a relatively small compute budget (8 H100 GPU Hours in our study), adversaries can improve an agent's cybersecurity capability on InterCode CTF by more than 40\% relative to the baseline -- without any external assistance. These results highlight the need to evaluate agents' cybersecurity risk in a dynamic manner, painting a more representative picture of risk.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) become more pervasive across various users and scenarios, identifying potential issues when using these models becomes essential. Examples of such issues include: bias, inconsistencies, and hallucination. Although auditing the LLM for these problems is often warranted, such a process is neither easy nor accessible for most. An effective method is to probe the LLM using different versions of the same question. This could expose inconsistencies in its knowledge or operation, indicating potential for bias or hallucination. However, to operationalize this auditing method at scale, we need an approach to create those probes reliably and automatically. In this paper we propose the LLMAuditor framework which is an automatic, and scalable solution, where one uses a different LLM along with human-in-the-loop (HIL). This approach offers verifiability and transparency, while avoiding circular reliance on the same LLM, and increasing scientific rigor and generalizability. Specifically, LLMAuditor includes two phases of verification using humans: standardized evaluation criteria to verify responses, and a structured prompt template to generate desired probes. A case study using questions from the TruthfulQA dataset demonstrates that we can generate a reliable set of probes from one LLM that can be used to audit inconsistencies in a different LLM. This process is enhanced by our structured prompt template with HIL, which not only boosts the reliability of our approach in auditing but also yields the delivery of less hallucinated results. The novelty of our research stems from the development of a comprehensive, general-purpose framework that includes a HIL verified prompt template for auditing responses generated by LLMs.

Agentic systems powered by large language models (LLMs) are becoming progressively more complex and capable. Their increasing agency and expanding deployment settings attract growing attention over effective governance policies, monitoring and control protocols. Based on emerging landscapes of the agentic market, we analyze the potential liability issues stemming from delegated use of LLM agents and their extended systems from a principal-agent perspective. Our analysis complements existing risk-based studies on artificial agency and covers the spectrum of important aspects of the principal-agent relationship and their potential consequences at deployment. Furthermore, we motivate method developments for technical governance along the directions of interpretability and behavior evaluations, reward and conflict management, and the mitigation of misalignment and misconduct through principled engineering of detection and fail-safe mechanisms. By illustrating the outstanding issues in AI liability for LLM-based agentic systems, we aim to inform the system design, auditing and monitoring approaches to enhancing transparency and accountability.

Harm reporting in Artificial Intelligence (AI) currently lacks a structured process for disclosing and addressing algorithmic flaws, relying largely on an ad-hoc approach. This contrasts sharply with the well-established Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD) ecosystem in software security. While global efforts to establish frameworks for AI transparency and collaboration are underway, the unique challenges presented by machine learning (ML) models demand a specialized approach. To address this gap, we propose implementing a Coordinated Flaw Disclosure (CFD) framework tailored to the complexities of ML and AI issues. This paper reviews the evolution of ML disclosure practices, from ad hoc reporting to emerging participatory auditing methods, and compares them with cybersecurity norms. Our framework introduces innovations such as extended model cards, dynamic scope expansion, an independent adjudication panel, and an automated verification process. We also outline a forthcoming real-world pilot of CFD. We argue that CFD could significantly enhance public trust in AI systems. By balancing organizational and community interests, CFD aims to improve AI accountability in a rapidly evolving technological landscape.

EHR audit logs are a highly granular stream of events that capture clinician activities, and is a significant area of interest for research in characterizing clinician workflow on the electronic health record (EHR). Existing techniques to measure the complexity of workflow through EHR audit logs (audit logs) involve time- or frequency-based cross-sectional aggregations that are unable to capture the full complexity of a EHR session. We briefly evaluate the usage of transformer-based tabular language model (tabular LM) in measuring the entropy or disorderedness of action sequences within workflow and release the evaluated models publicly.

Blockchains have seen growing traction with cryptocurrencies reaching a market cap of over 1 trillion dollars, major institution investors taking interests, and global impacts on governments, businesses, and individuals. Also growing significantly is the heterogeneity of the ecosystem where a variety of blockchains co-exist. Cross-chain bridge is a necessary building block in this multi-chain ecosystem. Existing solutions, however, either suffer from performance issues or rely on trust assumptions of committees that significantly lower the security. Recurring attacks against bridges have cost users more than 1.5 billion USD. In this paper, we introduce zkBridge, an efficient cross-chain bridge that guarantees strong security without external trust assumptions. With succinct proofs, zkBridge not only guarantees correctness, but also significantly reduces on-chain verification cost. We propose novel succinct proof protocols that are orders-of-magnitude faster than existing solutions for workload in zkBridge. With a modular design, zkBridge enables a broad spectrum of use cases and capabilities, including message passing, token transferring, and other computational logic operating on state changes from different chains. To demonstrate the practicality of zkBridge, we implemented a prototype bridge from Cosmos to Ethereum, a particularly challenging direction that involves large proof circuits that existing systems cannot efficiently handle. Our evaluation shows that zkBridge achieves practical performance: proof generation takes less than 20 seconds, while verifying proofs on-chain costs less than 230K gas. For completeness, we also implemented and evaluated the direction from Ethereum to other EVM-compatible chains (such as BSC) which involves smaller circuits and incurs much less overhead.

Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence (AI) is based on seven technical requirements sustained over three main pillars that should be met throughout the system's entire life cycle: it should be (1) lawful, (2) ethical, and (3) robust, both from a technical and a social perspective. However, attaining truly trustworthy AI concerns a wider vision that comprises the trustworthiness of all processes and actors that are part of the system's life cycle, and considers previous aspects from different lenses. A more holistic vision contemplates four essential axes: the global principles for ethical use and development of AI-based systems, a philosophical take on AI ethics, a risk-based approach to AI regulation, and the mentioned pillars and requirements. The seven requirements (human agency and oversight; robustness and safety; privacy and data governance; transparency; diversity, non-discrimination and fairness; societal and environmental wellbeing; and accountability) are analyzed from a triple perspective: What each requirement for trustworthy AI is, Why it is needed, and How each requirement can be implemented in practice. On the other hand, a practical approach to implement trustworthy AI systems allows defining the concept of responsibility of AI-based systems facing the law, through a given auditing process. Therefore, a responsible AI system is the resulting notion we introduce in this work, and a concept of utmost necessity that can be realized through auditing processes, subject to the challenges posed by the use of regulatory sandboxes. Our multidisciplinary vision of trustworthy AI culminates in a debate on the diverging views published lately about the future of AI. Our reflections in this matter conclude that regulation is a key for reaching a consensus among these views, and that trustworthy and responsible AI systems will be crucial for the present and future of our society.

As LLM-based agents become increasingly prevalent, backdoors can be implanted into agents through user queries or environment feedback, raising critical concerns regarding safety vulnerabilities. However, backdoor attacks are typically detectable by safety audits that analyze the reasoning process of agents. To this end, we propose a novel backdoor implantation strategy called Dynamically Encrypted Multi-Backdoor Implantation Attack. Specifically, we introduce dynamic encryption, which maps the backdoor into benign content, effectively circumventing safety audits. To enhance stealthiness, we further decompose the backdoor into multiple sub-backdoor fragments. Based on these advancements, backdoors are allowed to bypass safety audits significantly. Additionally, we present AgentBackdoorEval, a dataset designed for the comprehensive evaluation of agent backdoor attacks. Experimental results across multiple datasets demonstrate that our method achieves an attack success rate nearing 100\% while maintaining a detection rate of 0\%, illustrating its effectiveness in evading safety audits. Our findings highlight the limitations of existing safety mechanisms in detecting advanced attacks, underscoring the urgent need for more robust defenses against backdoor threats. Code and data are available at https://github.com/whfeLingYu/DemonAgent.

Open-source AI libraries are foundational to modern AI systems but pose significant, underexamined risks across security, licensing, maintenance, supply chain integrity, and regulatory compliance. We present LibVulnWatch, a graph-based agentic assessment framework that performs deep, source-grounded evaluations of these libraries. Built on LangGraph, the system coordinates a directed acyclic graph of specialized agents to extract, verify, and quantify risk using evidence from trusted sources such as repositories, documentation, and vulnerability databases. LibVulnWatch generates reproducible, governance-aligned scores across five critical domains, publishing them to a public leaderboard for longitudinal ecosystem monitoring. Applied to 20 widely used libraries, including ML frameworks, LLM inference engines, and agent orchestration tools, our system covers up to 88% of OpenSSF Scorecard checks while uncovering up to 19 additional risks per library. These include critical Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerabilities, absent Software Bills of Materials (SBOMs), licensing constraints, undocumented telemetry, and widespread gaps in regulatory documentation and auditability. By translating high-level governance principles into practical, verifiable metrics, LibVulnWatch advances technical AI governance with a scalable, transparent mechanism for continuous supply chain risk assessment and informed library selection.

The proliferation of Large Language Models (LLMs) accessed via black-box APIs introduces a significant trust challenge: users pay for services based on advertised model capabilities (e.g., size, performance), but providers may covertly substitute the specified model with a cheaper, lower-quality alternative to reduce operational costs. This lack of transparency undermines fairness, erodes trust, and complicates reliable benchmarking. Detecting such substitutions is difficult due to the black-box nature, typically limiting interaction to input-output queries. This paper formalizes the problem of model substitution detection in LLM APIs. We systematically evaluate existing verification techniques, including output-based statistical tests, benchmark evaluations, and log probability analysis, under various realistic attack scenarios like model quantization, randomized substitution, and benchmark evasion. Our findings reveal the limitations of methods relying solely on text outputs, especially against subtle or adaptive attacks. While log probability analysis offers stronger guarantees when available, its accessibility is often limited. We conclude by discussing the potential of hardware-based solutions like Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) as a pathway towards provable model integrity, highlighting the trade-offs between security, performance, and provider adoption. Code is available at https://github.com/sunblaze-ucb/llm-api-audit

General-purpose artificial intelligence (AI) systems are built on massive swathes of public web data, assembled into corpora such as C4, RefinedWeb, and Dolma. To our knowledge, we conduct the first, large-scale, longitudinal audit of the consent protocols for the web domains underlying AI training corpora. Our audit of 14,000 web domains provides an expansive view of crawlable web data and how consent preferences to use it are changing over time. We observe a proliferation of AI-specific clauses to limit use, acute differences in restrictions on AI developers, as well as general inconsistencies between websites' expressed intentions in their Terms of Service and their robots.txt. We diagnose these as symptoms of ineffective web protocols, not designed to cope with the widespread re-purposing of the internet for AI. Our longitudinal analyses show that in a single year (2023-2024) there has been a rapid crescendo of data restrictions from web sources, rendering ~5%+ of all tokens in C4, or 28%+ of the most actively maintained, critical sources in C4, fully restricted from use. For Terms of Service crawling restrictions, a full 45% of C4 is now restricted. If respected or enforced, these restrictions are rapidly biasing the diversity, freshness, and scaling laws for general-purpose AI systems. We hope to illustrate the emerging crisis in data consent, foreclosing much of the open web, not only for commercial AI, but non-commercial AI and academic purposes.

Membership inference attacks aim to infer whether an individual record was used to train a model, serving as a key tool for disclosure auditing. While such evaluations are useful to demonstrate risk, they are computationally expensive and often make strong assumptions about potential adversaries' access to models and training environments, and thus do not provide very tight bounds on leakage from potential attacks. We show how prior claims around black-box access being sufficient for optimal membership inference do not hold for most useful settings such as stochastic gradient descent, and that optimal membership inference indeed requires white-box access. We validate our findings with a new white-box inference attack IHA (Inverse Hessian Attack) that explicitly uses model parameters by taking advantage of computing inverse-Hessian vector products. Our results show that both audits and adversaries may be able to benefit from access to model parameters, and we advocate for further research into white-box methods for membership privacy auditing.

Digital identity is unsolved: after many years of research there is still no trusted communication over the Internet. To provide identity within the context of mutual distrust, this paper presents a blockchain-based digital identity solution. Without depending upon a single trusted third party, the proposed solution achieves passport-level legally valid identity. This solution for making identities Self-Sovereign, builds on a generic provable claim model for which attestations of truth from third parties need to be collected. The claim model is then shown to be both blockchain structure and proof method agnostic. Four different implementations in support of these two claim model properties are shown to offer sub-second performance for claim creation and claim verification. Through the properties of Self-Sovereign Identity, legally valid status and acceptable performance, our solution is considered to be fit for adoption by the general public.

The Sybil attack plagues all peer-to-peer systems, and modern open distributed ledgers employ a number of tactics to prevent it from proof of work, or other resources such as space, stake or memory, to traditional admission control in permissioned settings. With SybilQuorum we propose an alternative approach to securing an open distributed ledger against Sybil attacks, and ensuring consensus amongst honest participants, leveraging social network based Sybil defences. We show how nodes expressing their trust relationships through the ledger can bootstrap and operate a value system, and general transaction system, and how Sybil attacks are thwarted. We empirically evaluate our system as a secure Federated Byzantine Agreement System, and extend the theory of those systems to do so.

Audio editing is applicable for various purposes, such as adding background sound effects, replacing a musical instrument, and repairing damaged audio. Recently, some diffusion-based methods achieved zero-shot audio editing by using a diffusion and denoising process conditioned on the text description of the output audio. However, these methods still have some problems: 1) they have not been trained on editing tasks and cannot ensure good editing effects; 2) they can erroneously modify audio segments that do not require editing; 3) they need a complete description of the output audio, which is not always available or necessary in practical scenarios. In this work, we propose AUDIT, an instruction-guided audio editing model based on latent diffusion models. Specifically, AUDIT has three main design features: 1) we construct triplet training data (instruction, input audio, output audio) for different audio editing tasks and train a diffusion model using instruction and input (to be edited) audio as conditions and generating output (edited) audio; 2) it can automatically learn to only modify segments that need to be edited by comparing the difference between the input and output audio; 3) it only needs edit instructions instead of full target audio descriptions as text input. AUDIT achieves state-of-the-art results in both objective and subjective metrics for several audio editing tasks (e.g., adding, dropping, replacement, inpainting, super-resolution). Demo samples are available at https://audit-demo.github.io/.

Privacy estimation techniques for differentially private (DP) algorithms are useful for comparing against analytical bounds, or to empirically measure privacy loss in settings where known analytical bounds are not tight. However, existing privacy auditing techniques usually make strong assumptions on the adversary (e.g., knowledge of intermediate model iterates or the training data distribution), are tailored to specific tasks, model architectures, or DP algorithm, and/or require retraining the model many times (typically on the order of thousands). These shortcomings make deploying such techniques at scale difficult in practice, especially in federated settings where model training can take days or weeks. In this work, we present a novel ``one-shot'' approach that can systematically address these challenges, allowing efficient auditing or estimation of the privacy loss of a model during the same, single training run used to fit model parameters, and without requiring any a priori knowledge about the model architecture, task, or DP training algorithm. We show that our method provides provably correct estimates for the privacy loss under the Gaussian mechanism, and we demonstrate its performance on well-established FL benchmark datasets under several adversarial threat models.

Modern code completion engines, powered by large language models (LLMs), assist millions of developers with their strong capabilities to generate functionally correct code. Due to this popularity, it is crucial to investigate the security implications of relying on LLM-based code completion. In this work, we demonstrate that state-of-the-art black-box LLM-based code completion engines can be stealthily biased by adversaries to significantly increase their rate of insecure code generation. We present the first attack, named INSEC, that achieves this goal. INSEC works by injecting an attack string as a short comment in the completion input. The attack string is crafted through a query-based optimization procedure starting from a set of carefully designed initialization schemes. We demonstrate INSEC's broad applicability and effectiveness by evaluating it on various state-of-the-art open-source models and black-box commercial services (e.g., OpenAI API and GitHub Copilot). On a diverse set of security-critical test cases, covering 16 CWEs across 5 programming languages, INSEC increases the rate of generated insecure code by more than 50%, while maintaining the functional correctness of generated code. We consider INSEC practical -- it requires low resources and costs less than 10 US dollars to develop on commodity hardware. Moreover, we showcase the attack's real-world deployability, by developing an IDE plug-in that stealthily injects INSEC into the GitHub Copilot extension.

As AI agents become increasingly autonomous and capable, ensuring their security against vulnerabilities such as prompt injection becomes critical. This paper explores the use of information-flow control (IFC) to provide security guarantees for AI agents. We present a formal model to reason about the security and expressiveness of agent planners. Using this model, we characterize the class of properties enforceable by dynamic taint-tracking and construct a taxonomy of tasks to evaluate security and utility trade-offs of planner designs. Informed by this exploration, we present Fides, a planner that tracks confidentiality and integrity labels, deterministically enforces security policies, and introduces novel primitives for selectively hiding information. Its evaluation in AgentDojo demonstrates that this approach broadens the range of tasks that can be securely accomplished. A tutorial to walk readers through the the concepts introduced in the paper can be found at https://github.com/microsoft/fides

In this study, we evaluated the capability of Large Language Models (LLMs), particularly OpenAI's GPT-4, in detecting software vulnerabilities, comparing their performance against traditional static code analyzers like Snyk and Fortify. Our analysis covered numerous repositories, including those from NASA and the Department of Defense. GPT-4 identified approximately four times the vulnerabilities than its counterparts. Furthermore, it provided viable fixes for each vulnerability, demonstrating a low rate of false positives. Our tests encompassed 129 code samples across eight programming languages, revealing the highest vulnerabilities in PHP and JavaScript. GPT-4's code corrections led to a 90% reduction in vulnerabilities, requiring only an 11% increase in code lines. A critical insight was LLMs' ability to self-audit, suggesting fixes for their identified vulnerabilities and underscoring their precision. Future research should explore system-level vulnerabilities and integrate multiple static code analyzers for a holistic perspective on LLMs' potential.

Text-to-SQL enables users to interact with databases using natural language, simplifying the retrieval and synthesis of information. Despite the remarkable success of large language models (LLMs) in translating natural language questions into SQL queries, widespread deployment remains limited due to two primary challenges. First, the effective use of text-to-SQL models depends on users' understanding of the model's capabilities-the scope of questions the model can correctly answer. Second, the absence of abstention mechanisms can lead to incorrect SQL generation going unnoticed, thereby undermining trust in the model's output. To enable wider deployment, it is crucial to address these challenges in model design and enhance model evaluation to build trust in the model's output. To this end, we introduce TrustSQL, a novel comprehensive benchmark designed to evaluate text-to-SQL reliability-defined as a model's ability to correctly handle any type of input question by generating correct SQL queries for feasible questions and abstaining from generating infeasible ones (e.g., due to schema incompatibility or functionalities beyond SQL). We evaluate existing methods using a novel penalty-based scoring metric with two modeling approaches: (1) pipeline-based methods combining SQL generators with infeasible question detectors and SQL error detectors for abstention; and (2) unified methods using a single model for the entire task. Our experimental results reveal that achieving high scores under severe penalties requires significant effort and provide a new perspective on developing text-to-SQL models for safer deployment. TrustSQL is available at https://github.com/glee4810/TrustSQL.

The integration of AI agents with Web3 ecosystems harnesses their complementary potential for autonomy and openness yet also introduces underexplored security risks, as these agents dynamically interact with financial protocols and immutable smart contracts. This paper investigates the vulnerabilities of AI agents within blockchain-based financial ecosystems when exposed to adversarial threats in real-world scenarios. We introduce the concept of context manipulation, a comprehensive attack vector that exploits unprotected context surfaces, including input channels, memory modules, and external data feeds. Through empirical analysis of ElizaOS, a decentralized AI agent framework for automated Web3 operations, we demonstrate how adversaries can manipulate context by injecting malicious instructions into prompts or historical interaction records, leading to unintended asset transfers and protocol violations which could be financially devastating. To quantify these vulnerabilities, we design CrAIBench, a Web3 domain-specific benchmark that evaluates the robustness of AI agents against context manipulation attacks across 150+ realistic blockchain tasks, including token transfers, trading, bridges and cross-chain interactions and 500+ attack test cases using context manipulation. We systematically assess attack and defense strategies, analyzing factors like the influence of security prompts, reasoning models, and the effectiveness of alignment techniques. Our findings show that prompt-based defenses are insufficient when adversaries corrupt stored context, achieving significant attack success rates despite these defenses. Fine-tuning-based defenses offer a more robust alternative, substantially reducing attack success rates while preserving utility on single-step tasks. This research highlights the urgent need to develop AI agents that are both secure and fiduciarily responsible.

The security context used in 5G authentication is generated during the Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) procedure and stored in both the user equipment (UE) and the network sides for the subsequent fast registration procedure. Given its importance, it is imperative to formally analyze the security mechanism of the security context. The security context in the UE can be stored in the Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) card or in the baseband chip. In this work, we present a comprehensive and formal verification of the fast registration procedure based on the security context under the two scenarios in ProVerif. Our analysis identifies two vulnerabilities, including one that has not been reported before. Specifically, the security context stored in the USIM card can be read illegally, and the validity checking mechanism of the security context in the baseband chip can be bypassed. Moreover, these vulnerabilities also apply to 4G networks. As a consequence, an attacker can exploit these vulnerabilities to register to the network with the victim's identity and then launch other attacks, including one-tap authentication bypass leading to privacy disclosure, location spoofing, etc. To ensure that these attacks are indeed realizable in practice, we have responsibly confirmed them through experimentation in three operators. Our analysis reveals that these vulnerabilities stem from design flaws of the standard and unsafe practices by operators. We finally propose several potential countermeasures to prevent these attacks. We have reported our findings to the GSMA and received a coordinated vulnerability disclosure (CVD) number CVD-2022-0057.

Automatic Compliance Checking (ACC) within the Architecture, Engineering, and Construction (AEC) sector necessitates automating the interpretation of building regulations to achieve its full potential. However, extracting information from textual rules to convert them to a machine-readable format has been a challenge due to the complexities associated with natural language and the limited resources that can support advanced machine-learning techniques. To address this challenge, we introduce CODE-ACCORD, a unique dataset compiled under the EU Horizon ACCORD project. CODE-ACCORD comprises 862 self-contained sentences extracted from the building regulations of England and Finland. Aligned with our core objective of facilitating information extraction from text for machine-readable rule generation, each sentence was annotated with entities and relations. Entities represent specific components such as "window" and "smoke detectors", while relations denote semantic associations between these entities, collectively capturing the conveyed ideas in natural language. We manually annotated all the sentences using a group of 12 annotators. Each sentence underwent annotations by multiple annotators and subsequently careful data curation to finalise annotations, ensuring their accuracy and reliability, thereby establishing the dataset as a solid ground truth. CODE-ACCORD offers a rich resource for diverse machine learning and natural language processing (NLP) related tasks in ACC, including text classification, entity recognition and relation extraction. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first entity and relation-annotated dataset in compliance checking, which is also publicly available.

Invoices and receipts submitted by employees are visually rich documents (VRDs) with textual, visual and layout information. To protect against the risk of fraud and abuse, it is crucial for organizations to efficiently extract desired information from submitted receipts. This helps in the assessment of key factors such as appropriateness of the expense claim, adherence to spending and transaction policies, the validity of the receipt, as well as downstream anomaly detection at various levels. These documents are heterogeneous, with multiple formats and languages, uploaded with different image qualities, and often do not contain ground truth labels for the efficient training of models. In this paper we propose Task Aware Instruction-based Labelling (TAIL), a method for synthetic label generation in VRD corpuses without labels, and fine-tune a multimodal Visually Rich Document Understanding Model (VRDU) on TAIL labels using response-based knowledge distillation without using the teacher model's weights or training dataset to conditionally generate annotations in the appropriate format. Using a benchmark external dataset where ground truth labels are available, we demonstrate conditions under which our approach performs at par with Claude 3 Sonnet through empirical studies. We then show that the resulting model performs at par or better on the internal expense documents of a large multinational organization than state-of-the-art LMM (large multimodal model) Claude 3 Sonnet while being 85% less costly and ~5X faster, and outperforms layout-aware baselines by more than 10% in Average Normalized Levenshtein Similarity (ANLS) scores due to its ability to reason and extract information from rare formats. Finally, we illustrate the usage of our approach in overpayment prevention.

Recently, LoRA and its variants have become the de facto strategy for training and sharing task-specific versions of large pretrained models, thanks to their efficiency and simplicity. However, the issue of copyright protection for LoRA weights, especially through watermark-based techniques, remains underexplored. To address this gap, we propose SEAL (SEcure wAtermarking on LoRA weights), the universal whitebox watermarking for LoRA. SEAL embeds a secret, non-trainable matrix between trainable LoRA weights, serving as a passport to claim ownership. SEAL then entangles the passport with the LoRA weights through training, without extra loss for entanglement, and distributes the finetuned weights after hiding the passport. When applying SEAL, we observed no performance degradation across commonsense reasoning, textual/visual instruction tuning, and text-to-image synthesis tasks. We demonstrate that SEAL is robust against a variety of known attacks: removal, obfuscation, and ambiguity attacks.

As large language models (LLMs) become more powerful and are deployed more autonomously, it will be increasingly important to prevent them from causing harmful outcomes. Researchers have investigated a variety of safety techniques for this purpose, e.g. using models to review the outputs of other models, or red-teaming techniques to surface subtle failure modes. However, researchers have not evaluated whether such techniques still ensure safety if the model is itself intentionally trying to subvert them. In this paper, we develop and evaluate pipelines of safety techniques ("protocols") that are robust to intentional subversion. We investigate a scenario in which we want to solve a sequence of programming problems, using access to a powerful but untrusted model (in our case, GPT-4), access to a less powerful trusted model (in our case, GPT-3.5), and limited access to high-quality trusted labor. We investigate protocols that aim to never submit solutions containing backdoors, which we operationalize here as logical errors that are not caught by test cases. We investigate a range of protocols and test each against strategies that the untrusted model could use to subvert them. One protocol is what we call trusted editing. This protocol first asks GPT-4 to write code, and then asks GPT-3.5 to rate the suspiciousness of that code. If the code is below some suspiciousness threshold, it is submitted. Otherwise, GPT-3.5 edits the solution to remove parts that seem suspicious and then submits the edited code. Another protocol is untrusted monitoring. This protocol asks GPT-4 to write code, and then asks another instance of GPT-4 whether the code is backdoored, using various techniques to prevent the GPT-4 instances from colluding. These protocols improve substantially on simple baselines.

This paper argues that market governance mechanisms should be considered a key approach in the governance of artificial intelligence (AI), alongside traditional regulatory frameworks. While current governance approaches have predominantly focused on regulation, we contend that market-based mechanisms offer effective incentives for responsible AI development. We examine four emerging vectors of market governance: insurance, auditing, procurement, and due diligence, demonstrating how these mechanisms can affirm the relationship between AI risk and financial risk while addressing capital allocation inefficiencies. While we do not claim that market forces alone can adequately protect societal interests, we maintain that standardised AI disclosures and market mechanisms can create powerful incentives for safe and responsible AI development. This paper urges regulators, economists, and machine learning researchers to investigate and implement market-based approaches to AI governance.

AI powered health chatbot applications are increasingly utilized for personalized healthcare services, yet they pose significant challenges related to user data security and privacy. This study evaluates the effectiveness of automated methods, specifically BART and Gemini GenAI, in identifying security privacy related (SPR) concerns within these applications' user reviews, benchmarking their performance against manual qualitative analysis. Our results indicate that while Gemini's performance in SPR classification is comparable to manual labeling, both automated methods have limitations, including the misclassification of unrelated issues. Qualitative analysis revealed critical user concerns, such as data collection practices, data misuse, and insufficient transparency and consent mechanisms. This research enhances the understanding of the relationship between user trust, privacy, and emerging mobile AI health chatbot technologies, offering actionable insights for improving security and privacy practices in AI driven health chatbots. Although exploratory, our findings highlight the necessity for rigorous audits and transparent communication strategies, providing valuable guidance for app developers and vendors in addressing user security and privacy concerns.

Advanced Large language models (LLMs) like GPT-4 or LlaMa 3 provide superior performance in complex human-like interactions. But they are costly, or too large for edge devices such as smartphones and harder to self-host, leading to security and privacy concerns. This paper introduces a novel interpretable knowledge distillation approach to enhance the performance of smaller, more economical LLMs that firms can self-host. We study this problem in the context of building a customer service agent aimed at achieving high customer satisfaction through goal-oriented dialogues. Unlike traditional knowledge distillation, where the "student" model learns directly from the "teacher" model's responses via fine-tuning, our interpretable "strategy" teaching approach involves the teacher providing strategies to improve the student's performance in various scenarios. This method alternates between a "scenario generation" step and a "strategies for improvement" step, creating a customized library of scenarios and optimized strategies for automated prompting. The method requires only black-box access to both student and teacher models; hence it can be used without manipulating model parameters. In our customer service application, the method improves performance, and the learned strategies are transferable to other LLMs and scenarios beyond the training set. The method's interpretabilty helps safeguard against potential harms through human audit.

FinanceQA is a testing suite that evaluates LLMs' performance on complex numerical financial analysis tasks that mirror real-world investment work. Despite recent advances, current LLMs fail to meet the strict accuracy requirements of financial institutions, with models failing approximately 60% of realistic tasks that mimic on-the-job analyses at hedge funds, private equity firms, investment banks, and other financial institutions. The primary challenges include hand-spreading metrics, adhering to standard accounting and corporate valuation conventions, and performing analysis under incomplete information - particularly in multi-step tasks requiring assumption generation. This performance gap highlights the disconnect between existing LLM capabilities and the demands of professional financial analysis that are inadequately tested by current testing architectures. Results show that higher-quality training data is needed to support such tasks, which we experiment with using OpenAI's fine-tuning API. FinanceQA is publicly released at [this https URL](https://huggingface.co/datasets/AfterQuery/FinanceQA).

Existing works have established multiple benchmarks to highlight the security risks associated with Code GenAI. These risks are primarily reflected in two areas: a model potential to generate insecure code (insecure coding) and its utility in cyberattacks (cyberattack helpfulness). While these benchmarks have made significant strides, there remain opportunities for further improvement. For instance, many current benchmarks tend to focus more on a model ability to provide attack suggestions rather than its capacity to generate executable attacks. Additionally, most benchmarks rely heavily on static evaluation metrics, which may not be as precise as dynamic metrics such as passing test cases. Conversely, expert-verified benchmarks, while offering high-quality data, often operate at a smaller scale. To address these gaps, we develop SecCodePLT, a unified and comprehensive evaluation platform for code GenAIs' risks. For insecure code, we introduce a new methodology for data creation that combines experts with automatic generation. Our methodology ensures the data quality while enabling large-scale generation. We also associate samples with test cases to conduct code-related dynamic evaluation. For cyberattack helpfulness, we set up a real environment and construct samples to prompt a model to generate actual attacks, along with dynamic metrics in our environment. We conduct extensive experiments and show that SecCodePLT outperforms the state-of-the-art (SOTA) benchmark CyberSecEval in security relevance. Furthermore, it better identifies the security risks of SOTA models in insecure coding and cyberattack helpfulness. Finally, we apply SecCodePLT to the SOTA code agent, Cursor, and, for the first time, identify non-trivial security risks in this advanced coding agent.

The race to train language models on vast, diverse, and inconsistently documented datasets has raised pressing concerns about the legal and ethical risks for practitioners. To remedy these practices threatening data transparency and understanding, we convene a multi-disciplinary effort between legal and machine learning experts to systematically audit and trace 1800+ text datasets. We develop tools and standards to trace the lineage of these datasets, from their source, creators, series of license conditions, properties, and subsequent use. Our landscape analysis highlights the sharp divides in composition and focus of commercially open vs closed datasets, with closed datasets monopolizing important categories: lower resource languages, more creative tasks, richer topic variety, newer and more synthetic training data. This points to a deepening divide in the types of data that are made available under different license conditions, and heightened implications for jurisdictional legal interpretations of copyright and fair use. We also observe frequent miscategorization of licenses on widely used dataset hosting sites, with license omission of 72%+ and error rates of 50%+. This points to a crisis in misattribution and informed use of the most popular datasets driving many recent breakthroughs. As a contribution to ongoing improvements in dataset transparency and responsible use, we release our entire audit, with an interactive UI, the Data Provenance Explorer, which allows practitioners to trace and filter on data provenance for the most popular open source finetuning data collections: www.dataprovenance.org.

The growing popularity of Machine Learning (ML) has led to its deployment in various sensitive domains, which has resulted in significant research focused on ML security and privacy. However, in some applications, such as Augmented/Virtual Reality, integrity verification of the outsourced ML tasks is more critical--a facet that has not received much attention. Existing solutions, such as multi-party computation and proof-based systems, impose significant computation overhead, which makes them unfit for real-time applications. We propose Fides, a novel framework for real-time integrity validation of ML-as-a-Service (MLaaS) inference. Fides features a novel and efficient distillation technique--Greedy Distillation Transfer Learning--that dynamically distills and fine-tunes a space and compute-efficient verification model for verifying the corresponding service model while running inside a trusted execution environment. Fides features a client-side attack detection model that uses statistical analysis and divergence measurements to identify, with a high likelihood, if the service model is under attack. Fides also offers a re-classification functionality that predicts the original class whenever an attack is identified. We devised a generative adversarial network framework for training the attack detection and re-classification models. The evaluation shows that Fides achieves an accuracy of up to 98% for attack detection and 94% for re-classification.

Using blockchain technology, it is possible to create contracts that offer a reward in exchange for a trained machine learning model for a particular data set. This would allow users to train machine learning models for a reward in a trustless manner. The smart contract will use the blockchain to automatically validate the solution, so there would be no debate about whether the solution was correct or not. Users who submit the solutions won't have counterparty risk that they won't get paid for their work. Contracts can be created easily by anyone with a dataset, even programmatically by software agents. This creates a market where parties who are good at solving machine learning problems can directly monetize their skillset, and where any organization or software agent that has a problem to solve with AI can solicit solutions from all over the world. This will incentivize the creation of better machine learning models, and make AI more accessible to companies and software agents.

The rapid development of large language models (LLMs) has significantly advanced code completion capabilities, giving rise to a new generation of LLM-based Code Completion Tools (LCCTs). Unlike general-purpose LLMs, these tools possess unique workflows, integrating multiple information sources as input and prioritizing code suggestions over natural language interaction, which introduces distinct security challenges. Additionally, LCCTs often rely on proprietary code datasets for training, raising concerns about the potential exposure of sensitive data. This paper exploits these distinct characteristics of LCCTs to develop targeted attack methodologies on two critical security risks: jailbreaking and training data extraction attacks. Our experimental results expose significant vulnerabilities within LCCTs, including a 99.4% success rate in jailbreaking attacks on GitHub Copilot and a 46.3% success rate on Amazon Q. Furthermore, We successfully extracted sensitive user data from GitHub Copilot, including 54 real email addresses and 314 physical addresses associated with GitHub usernames. Our study also demonstrates that these code-based attack methods are effective against general-purpose LLMs, such as the GPT series, highlighting a broader security misalignment in the handling of code by modern LLMs. These findings underscore critical security challenges associated with LCCTs and suggest essential directions for strengthening their security frameworks. The example code and attack samples from our research are provided at https://github.com/Sensente/Security-Attacks-on-LCCTs.

Academic and policy proposals on algorithmic accountability often seek to understand algorithmic systems in their socio-technical context, recognising that they are produced by 'many hands'. Increasingly, however, algorithmic systems are also produced, deployed, and used within a supply chain comprising multiple actors tied together by flows of data between them. In such cases, it is the working together of an algorithmic supply chain of different actors who contribute to the production, deployment, use, and functionality that drives systems and produces particular outcomes. We argue that algorithmic accountability discussions must consider supply chains and the difficult implications they raise for the governance and accountability of algorithmic systems. In doing so, we explore algorithmic supply chains, locating them in their broader technical and political economic context and identifying some key features that should be understood in future work on algorithmic governance and accountability (particularly regarding general purpose AI services). To highlight ways forward and areas warranting attention, we further discuss some implications raised by supply chains: challenges for allocating accountability stemming from distributed responsibility for systems between actors, limited visibility due to the accountability horizon, service models of use and liability, and cross-border supply chains and regulatory arbitrage

We often interact with untrusted parties. Prioritization of privacy can limit the effectiveness of these interactions, as achieving certain goals necessitates sharing private data. Traditionally, addressing this challenge has involved either seeking trusted intermediaries or constructing cryptographic protocols that restrict how much data is revealed, such as multi-party computations or zero-knowledge proofs. While significant advances have been made in scaling cryptographic approaches, they remain limited in terms of the size and complexity of applications they can be used for. In this paper, we argue that capable machine learning models can fulfill the role of a trusted third party, thus enabling secure computations for applications that were previously infeasible. In particular, we describe Trusted Capable Model Environments (TCMEs) as an alternative approach for scaling secure computation, where capable machine learning model(s) interact under input/output constraints, with explicit information flow control and explicit statelessness. This approach aims to achieve a balance between privacy and computational efficiency, enabling private inference where classical cryptographic solutions are currently infeasible. We describe a number of use cases that are enabled by TCME, and show that even some simple classic cryptographic problems can already be solved with TCME. Finally, we outline current limitations and discuss the path forward in implementing them.

As artificial intelligence (AI) models are scaled up, new capabilities can emerge unintentionally and unpredictably, some of which might be dangerous. In response, dangerous capabilities evaluations have emerged as a new risk assessment tool. But what should frontier AI developers do if sufficiently dangerous capabilities are in fact discovered? This paper focuses on one possible response: coordinated pausing. It proposes an evaluation-based coordination scheme that consists of five main steps: (1) Frontier AI models are evaluated for dangerous capabilities. (2) Whenever, and each time, a model fails a set of evaluations, the developer pauses certain research and development activities. (3) Other developers are notified whenever a model with dangerous capabilities has been discovered. They also pause related research and development activities. (4) The discovered capabilities are analyzed and adequate safety precautions are put in place. (5) Developers only resume their paused activities if certain safety thresholds are reached. The paper also discusses four concrete versions of that scheme. In the first version, pausing is completely voluntary and relies on public pressure on developers. In the second version, participating developers collectively agree to pause under certain conditions. In the third version, a single auditor evaluates models of multiple developers who agree to pause if any model fails a set of evaluations. In the fourth version, developers are legally required to run evaluations and pause if dangerous capabilities are discovered. Finally, the paper discusses the desirability and feasibility of our proposed coordination scheme. It concludes that coordinated pausing is a promising mechanism for tackling emerging risks from frontier AI models. However, a number of practical and legal obstacles need to be overcome, especially how to avoid violations of antitrust law.

Prompt caching in large language models (LLMs) results in data-dependent timing variations: cached prompts are processed faster than non-cached prompts. These timing differences introduce the risk of side-channel timing attacks. For example, if the cache is shared across users, an attacker could identify cached prompts from fast API response times to learn information about other users' prompts. Because prompt caching may cause privacy leakage, transparency around the caching policies of API providers is important. To this end, we develop and conduct statistical audits to detect prompt caching in real-world LLM API providers. We detect global cache sharing across users in seven API providers, including OpenAI, resulting in potential privacy leakage about users' prompts. Timing variations due to prompt caching can also result in leakage of information about model architecture. Namely, we find evidence that OpenAI's embedding model is a decoder-only Transformer, which was previously not publicly known.

Large language models (LLMs) struggle with multi-step reasoning, where inference-time scaling has emerged as a promising strategy for performance improvement. Verifier-guided search outperforms repeated sampling when sample size is limited by selecting and prioritizing valid reasoning paths. However, we identify a critical limitation: scaling flaws, prevalent across different models (Mistral 7B and DeepSeekMath 7B), benchmarks (GSM8K and MATH), and verifiers (outcome value models and process reward models). As sample size increases, verifier-guided search exhibits diminishing advantages and eventually underperforms repeated sampling. Our analysis attributes this to verifier failures, where imperfect verifiers misrank candidates and erroneously prune all valid paths. These issues are further exacerbated in challenging and out-of-distribution problems, restricting search effectiveness. To mitigate verifier failures, we explore reducing reliance on verifiers and conduct preliminary investigations using two simple methods. Our findings reveal fundamental limitations in verifier-guided search and suggest future directions.

Commercial contracts are known to be a valuable source for deriving project-specific requirements. However, contract negotiations mainly occur among the legal counsel of the parties involved. The participation of non-legal stakeholders, including requirement analysts, engineers, and solution architects, whose primary responsibility lies in ensuring the seamless implementation of contractual terms, is often indirect and inadequate. Consequently, a significant number of sentences in contractual clauses, though legally accurate, can appear unfair from an implementation perspective to non-legal stakeholders. This perception poses a problem since requirements indicated in the clauses are obligatory and can involve punitive measures and penalties if not implemented as committed in the contract. Therefore, the identification of potentially unfair clauses in contracts becomes crucial. In this work, we conduct an empirical study to analyze the perspectives of different stakeholders regarding contractual fairness. We then investigate the ability of Pre-trained Language Models (PLMs) to identify unfairness in contractual sentences by comparing chain of thought prompting and semi-supervised fine-tuning approaches. Using BERT-based fine-tuning, we achieved an accuracy of 84% on a dataset consisting of proprietary contracts. It outperformed chain of thought prompting using Vicuna-13B by a margin of 9%.

The rapid deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs) requires careful consideration of their effect on cybersecurity. Our work aims to improve the selection process of LLMs that are suitable for facilitating Secure Coding (SC). This raises challenging research questions, such as (RQ1) Which functionality can streamline the LLM evaluation? (RQ2) What should the evaluation measure? (RQ3) How to attest that the evaluation process is impartial? To address these questions, we introduce LLMSecCode, an open-source evaluation framework designed to assess LLM SC capabilities objectively. We validate the LLMSecCode implementation through experiments. When varying parameters and prompts, we find a 10% and 9% difference in performance, respectively. We also compare some results to reliable external actors, where our results show a 5% difference. We strive to ensure the ease of use of our open-source framework and encourage further development by external actors. With LLMSecCode, we hope to encourage the standardization and benchmarking of LLMs' capabilities in security-oriented code and tasks.

This paper reviews Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence (TAI) and its various definitions. Considering the principles respected in any society, TAI is often characterized by a few attributes, some of which have led to confusion in regulatory or engineering contexts. We argue against using terms such as Responsible or Ethical AI as substitutes for TAI. And to help clarify any confusion, we suggest leaving them behind. Given the subjectivity and complexity inherent in TAI, developing a universal framework is deemed infeasible. Instead, we advocate for approaches centered on addressing key attributes and properties such as fairness, bias, risk, security, explainability, and reliability. We examine the ongoing regulatory landscape, with a focus on initiatives in the EU, China, and the USA. We recognize that differences in AI regulations based on geopolitical and geographical reasons pose an additional challenge for multinational companies. We identify risk as a core factor in AI regulation and TAI. For example, as outlined in the EU-AI Act, organizations must gauge the risk level of their AI products to act accordingly (or risk hefty fines). We compare modalities of TAI implementation and how multiple cross-functional teams are engaged in the overall process. Thus, a brute force approach for enacting TAI renders its efficiency and agility, moot. To address this, we introduce our framework Set-Formalize-Measure-Act (SFMA). Our solution highlights the importance of transforming TAI-aware metrics, drivers of TAI, stakeholders, and business/legal requirements into actual benchmarks or tests. Finally, over-regulation driven by panic of powerful AI models can, in fact, harm TAI too. Based on GitHub user-activity data, in 2023, AI open-source projects rose to top projects by contributor account. Enabling innovation in TAI hinges on the independent contributions of the open-source community.

Quantifying the similarity between a group of companies has proven to be useful for several purposes, including company benchmarking, fraud detection, and searching for investment opportunities. This exercise can be done using a variety of data sources, such as company activity data and financial data. However, ledger account data is widely available and is standardized to a large extent. Such ledger accounts within a financial statement can be represented by means of a tree, i.e. a special type of graph, representing both the values of the ledger accounts and the relationships between them. Given their broad availability and rich information content, financial statements form a prime data source based on which company similarities or distances could be computed. In this paper, we present a graph distance metric that enables one to compute the similarity between the financial statements of two companies. We conduct a comprehensive experimental study using real-world financial data to demonstrate the usefulness of our proposed distance metric. The experimental results show promising results on a number of use cases. This method may be useful for investors looking for investment opportunities, government officials attempting to identify fraudulent companies, and accountants looking to benchmark a group of companies based on their financial statements.

Accurate and transparent financial information disclosure is essential in accounting and finance, fostering trust and enabling informed investment decisions that drive economic development. Among many information disclosure platforms, the Chinese stock exchanges' investor interactive platform provides a novel and interactive way for listed firms to disclose information of interest to investors through an online question-and-answer (Q&A) format. However, it is common for listed firms to respond to questions with limited or no substantive information, and automatically evaluating the quality of financial information disclosure on large amounts of Q&A pairs is challenging. In this study, our interdisciplinary team of AI and finance professionals proposed FinTruthQA, a benchmark designed to evaluate advanced natural language processing (NLP) techniques for the automatic quality assessment of information disclosure in financial Q&A data. It comprises 6,000 real-world financial Q&A entries and each Q&A was manually annotated based on four key evaluation criteria. We benchmarked various NLP techniques on FinTruthQA, including large language models(LLMs). Experiments showed that existing NLP models have strong predictive ability for question identification and question relevance tasks, but are suboptimal for answer readability and answer relevance tasks. By establishing this benchmark, we provide a robust foundation for the automatic evaluation of information disclosure, demonstrating how AI can be leveraged for social good by promoting transparency, fairness, and investor protection in financial disclosure practices. FinTruthQA can be used by auditors, regulators, and financial analysts for real-time monitoring and data-driven decision-making, as well as by researchers for advanced studies in accounting and finance, ultimately fostering greater trust and efficiency in the financial markets.

Assurance cases can be used to argue for the safety of products in safety engineering. In safety-critical areas, the construction of assurance cases is indispensable. Trustworthiness Derivation Trees (TDTs) enhance assurance cases by incorporating formal methods, rendering it possible for automatic reasoning about assurance cases. We present Trustworthiness Derivation Tree Analyzer (Trusta), a desktop application designed to automatically construct and verify TDTs. The tool has a built-in Prolog interpreter in its backend, and is supported by the constraint solvers Z3 and MONA. Therefore, it can solve constraints about logical formulas involving arithmetic, sets, Horn clauses etc. Trusta also utilizes large language models to make the creation and evaluation of assurance cases more convenient. It allows for interactive human examination and modification. We evaluated top language models like ChatGPT-3.5, ChatGPT-4, and PaLM 2 for generating assurance cases. Our tests showed a 50%-80% similarity between machine-generated and human-created cases. In addition, Trusta can extract formal constraints from text in natural languages, facilitating an easier interpretation and validation process. This extraction is subject to human review and correction, blending the best of automated efficiency with human insight. To our knowledge, this marks the first integration of large language models in automatic creating and reasoning about assurance cases, bringing a novel approach to a traditional challenge. Through several industrial case studies, Trusta has proven to quickly find some subtle issues that are typically missed in manual inspection, demonstrating its practical value in enhancing the assurance case development process.

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit considerable promise in financial applications; however, prevailing models frequently demonstrate limitations when confronted with scenarios that necessitate sophisticated reasoning capabilities, stringent trustworthiness criteria, and efficient adaptation to domain-specific requirements. We introduce the Agentar-Fin-R1 series of financial large language models (8B and 32B parameters), specifically engineered based on the Qwen3 foundation model to enhance reasoning capabilities, reliability, and domain specialization for financial applications. Our optimization approach integrates a high-quality, systematic financial task label system with a comprehensive multi-layered trustworthiness assurance framework. This framework encompasses high-quality trustworthy knowledge engineering, multi-agent trustworthy data synthesis, and rigorous data validation governance. Through label-guided automated difficulty-aware optimization, tow-stage training pipeline, and dynamic attribution systems, we achieve substantial improvements in training efficiency. Our models undergo comprehensive evaluation on mainstream financial benchmarks including Fineva, FinEval, and FinanceIQ, as well as general reasoning datasets such as MATH-500 and GPQA-diamond. To thoroughly assess real-world deployment capabilities, we innovatively propose the Finova evaluation benchmark, which focuses on agent-level financial reasoning and compliance verification. Experimental results demonstrate that Agentar-Fin-R1 not only achieves state-of-the-art performance on financial tasks but also exhibits exceptional general reasoning capabilities, validating its effectiveness as a trustworthy solution for high-stakes financial applications. The Finova bench is available at https://github.com/antgroup/Finova.

Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems serve as the digital backbone of modern financial institutions, yet they continue to rely on static, rule-based workflows that limit adaptability, scalability, and intelligence. As business operations grow more complex and data-rich, conventional ERP platforms struggle to integrate structured and unstructured data in real time and to accommodate dynamic, cross-functional workflows. In this paper, we present the first AI-native, agent-based framework for ERP systems, introducing a novel architecture of Generative Business Process AI Agents (GBPAs) that bring autonomy, reasoning, and dynamic optimization to enterprise workflows. The proposed system integrates generative AI with business process modeling and multi-agent orchestration, enabling end-to-end automation of complex tasks such as budget planning, financial reporting, and wire transfer processing. Unlike traditional workflow engines, GBPAs interpret user intent, synthesize workflows in real time, and coordinate specialized sub-agents for modular task execution. We validate the framework through case studies in bank wire transfers and employee reimbursements, two representative financial workflows with distinct complexity and data modalities. Results show that GBPAs achieve up to 40% reduction in processing time, 94% drop in error rate, and improved regulatory compliance by enabling parallelism, risk control insertion, and semantic reasoning. These findings highlight the potential of GBPAs to bridge the gap between generative AI capabilities and enterprise-grade automation, laying the groundwork for the next generation of intelligent ERP systems.

This paper presents a quantitative program verification infrastructure for discrete probabilistic programs. Our infrastructure can be viewed as the probabilistic analogue of Boogie: its central components are an intermediate verification language (IVL) together with a real-valued logic. Our IVL provides a programming-language-style for expressing verification conditions whose validity implies the correctness of a program under investigation. As our focus is on verifying quantitative properties such as bounds on expected outcomes, expected run-times, or termination probabilities, off-the-shelf IVLs based on Boolean first-order logic do not suffice. Instead, a paradigm shift from the standard Boolean to a real-valued domain is required. Our IVL features quantitative generalizations of standard verification constructs such as assume- and assert-statements. Verification conditions are generated by a weakest-precondition-style semantics, based on our real-valued logic. We show that our verification infrastructure supports natural encodings of numerous verification techniques from the literature. With our SMT-based implementation, we automatically verify a variety of benchmarks. To the best of our knowledge, this establishes the first deductive verification infrastructure for expectation-based reasoning about probabilistic programs.

Software testing and verification are critical for ensuring the reliability and security of modern software systems. Traditionally, formal verification techniques, such as model checking and theorem proving, have provided rigorous frameworks for detecting bugs and vulnerabilities. However, these methods often face scalability challenges when applied to complex, real-world programs. Recently, the advent of Large Language Models (LLMs) has introduced a new paradigm for software analysis, leveraging their ability to understand insecure coding practices. Although LLMs demonstrate promising capabilities in tasks such as bug prediction and invariant generation, they lack the formal guarantees of classical methods. This paper presents a comprehensive study of state-of-the-art software testing and verification, focusing on three key approaches: classical formal methods, LLM-based analysis, and emerging hybrid techniques, which combine their strengths. We explore each approach's strengths, limitations, and practical applications, highlighting the potential of hybrid systems to address the weaknesses of standalone methods. We analyze whether integrating formal rigor with LLM-driven insights can enhance the effectiveness and scalability of software verification, exploring their viability as a pathway toward more robust and adaptive testing frameworks.

The rapid growth of large-scale AI models, particularly large language models has brought significant challenges in data privacy, computational resources, and accessibility. Traditional centralized architectures often struggle to meet required data security and scalability needs which hinders the democratization of AI systems. Nesa introduces a model-agnostic sharding framework designed for decentralized AI inference. Our framework uses blockchain-based sequential deep neural network sharding to distribute computational tasks across a diverse network of nodes based on a personalised heuristic and routing mechanism. This enables efficient distributed training and inference for recent large-scale models even on consumer-grade hardware. We use compression techniques like dynamic blockwise quantization and mixed matrix decomposition to reduce data transfer and memory needs. We also integrate robust security measures, including hardware-based trusted execution environments to ensure data integrity and confidentiality. Evaluating our system across various natural language processing and vision tasks shows that these compression strategies do not compromise model accuracy. Our results highlight the potential to democratize access to cutting-edge AI technologies by enabling secure and efficient inference on a decentralized network.

Automated red teaming holds substantial promise for uncovering and mitigating the risks associated with the malicious use of large language models (LLMs), yet the field lacks a standardized evaluation framework to rigorously assess new methods. To address this issue, we introduce HarmBench, a standardized evaluation framework for automated red teaming. We identify several desirable properties previously unaccounted for in red teaming evaluations and systematically design HarmBench to meet these criteria. Using HarmBench, we conduct a large-scale comparison of 18 red teaming methods and 33 target LLMs and defenses, yielding novel insights. We also introduce a highly efficient adversarial training method that greatly enhances LLM robustness across a wide range of attacks, demonstrating how HarmBench enables codevelopment of attacks and defenses. We open source HarmBench at https://github.com/centerforaisafety/HarmBench.

We introduce {rm C{small LEVER}}, a high-quality, curated benchmark of 161 problems for end-to-end verified code generation in Lean. Each problem consists of (1) the task of generating a specification that matches a held-out ground-truth specification, and (2) the task of generating a Lean implementation that provably satisfies this specification. Unlike prior benchmarks, {rm C{small LEVER}} avoids test-case supervision, LLM-generated annotations, and specifications that leak implementation logic or allow vacuous solutions. All outputs are verified post-hoc using Lean's type checker to ensure machine-checkable correctness. We use {rm C{small LEVER}} to evaluate several few-shot and agentic approaches based on state-of-the-art language models. These methods all struggle to achieve full verification, establishing it as a challenging frontier benchmark for program synthesis and formal reasoning. Our benchmark can be found on GitHub(https://github.com/trishullab/clever) as well as HuggingFace(https://huggingface.co/datasets/amitayusht/clever). All our evaluation code is also available online(https://github.com/trishullab/clever-prover).

This paper addresses a critical challenge in cybersecurity: the gap between vulnerability information represented by Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) and the resulting cyberattack actions. CVEs provide insights into vulnerabilities, but often lack details on potential threat actions (tactics, techniques, and procedures, or TTPs) within the ATT&CK framework. This gap hinders accurate CVE categorization and proactive countermeasure initiation. The paper introduces the TTPpredictor tool, which uses innovative techniques to analyze CVE descriptions and infer plausible TTP attacks resulting from CVE exploitation. TTPpredictor overcomes challenges posed by limited labeled data and semantic disparities between CVE and TTP descriptions. It initially extracts threat actions from unstructured cyber threat reports using Semantic Role Labeling (SRL) techniques. These actions, along with their contextual attributes, are correlated with MITRE's attack functionality classes. This automated correlation facilitates the creation of labeled data, essential for categorizing novel threat actions into threat functionality classes and TTPs. The paper presents an empirical assessment, demonstrating TTPpredictor's effectiveness with accuracy rates of approximately 98% and F1-scores ranging from 95% to 98% in precise CVE classification to ATT&CK techniques. TTPpredictor outperforms state-of-the-art language model tools like ChatGPT. Overall, this paper offers a robust solution for linking CVEs to potential attack techniques, enhancing cybersecurity practitioners' ability to proactively identify and mitigate threats.

Synthetic data is emerging as one of the most promising solutions to share individual-level data while safeguarding privacy. While membership inference attacks (MIAs), based on shadow modeling, have become the standard to evaluate the privacy of synthetic data, they currently assume the attacker to have access to an auxiliary dataset sampled from a similar distribution as the training dataset. This is often seen as a very strong assumption in practice, especially as the proposed main use cases for synthetic tabular data (e.g. medical data, financial transactions) are very specific and don't have any reference datasets directly available. We here show how this assumption can be removed, allowing for MIAs to be performed using only the synthetic data. Specifically, we developed three different scenarios: (S1) Black-box access to the generator, (S2) only access to the released synthetic dataset and (S3) a theoretical setup as upper bound for the attack performance using only synthetic data. Our results show that MIAs are still successful, across two real-world datasets and two synthetic data generators. These results show how the strong hypothesis made when auditing synthetic data releases - access to an auxiliary dataset - can be relaxed, making the attacks more realistic in practice.

With the recent advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs), generating functionally correct code has become less complicated for a wide array of developers. While using LLMs has sped up the functional development process, it poses a heavy risk to code security. Code generation with proper security measures using LLM is a significantly more challenging task than functional code generation. Security measures may include adding a pair of lines of code with the original code, consisting of null pointer checking or prepared statements for SQL injection prevention. Currently, available code repair LLMs generate code repair by supervised fine-tuning, where the model looks at cross-entropy loss. However, the original and repaired codes are mostly similar in functionality and syntactically, except for a few (1-2) lines, which act as security measures. This imbalance between the lines needed for security measures and the functional code enforces the supervised fine-tuned model to prioritize generating functional code without adding proper security measures, which also benefits the model by resulting in minimal loss. Therefore, in this work, for security hardening and strengthening of generated code from LLMs, we propose a reinforcement learning-based method for program-specific repair with the combination of semantic and syntactic reward mechanisms that focus heavily on adding security and functional measures in the code, respectively.

Automating software vulnerability detection (SVD) remains a critical challenge in an era of increasingly complex and interdependent software systems. Despite significant advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) for code analysis, prevailing evaluation methodologies often lack the context-aware robustness necessary to capture real-world intricacies and cross-component interactions. To address these limitations, we present VulnSage, a comprehensive evaluation framework and a dataset curated from diverse, large-scale open-source system software projects developed in C/C++. Unlike prior datasets, it leverages a heuristic noise pre-filtering approach combined with LLM-based reasoning to ensure a representative and minimally noisy spectrum of vulnerabilities. The framework supports multi-granular analysis across function, file, and inter-function levels and employs four diverse zero-shot prompt strategies: Baseline, Chain-of-Thought, Think, and Think & Verify. Through this evaluation, we uncover that structured reasoning prompts substantially improve LLM performance, with Think & Verify reducing ambiguous responses from 20.3% to 9.1% while increasing accuracy. We further demonstrate that code-specialized models consistently outperform general-purpose alternatives, with performance varying significantly across vulnerability types, revealing that no single approach universally excels across all security contexts. Link to dataset and codes: https://github.com/Erroristotle/VulnSage.git

Large Language Models (LLMs) have significantly aided developers by generating or assisting in code writing, enhancing productivity across various tasks. While identifying incorrect code is often straightforward, detecting vulnerabilities in functionally correct code is more challenging, especially for developers with limited security knowledge, which poses considerable security risks of using LLM-generated code and underscores the need for robust evaluation benchmarks that assess both functional correctness and security. Current benchmarks like CyberSecEval and SecurityEval attempt to solve it but are hindered by unclear and impractical specifications, failing to assess both functionality and security accurately. To tackle these deficiencies, we introduce CWEval, a novel outcome-driven evaluation framework designed to enhance the evaluation of secure code generation by LLMs. This framework not only assesses code functionality but also its security simultaneously with high-quality task specifications and outcome-driven test oracles which provides high accuracy. Coupled with CWEval-bench, a multilingual, security-critical coding benchmark, CWEval provides a rigorous empirical security evaluation on LLM-generated code, overcoming previous benchmarks' shortcomings. Through our evaluations, CWEval reveals a notable portion of functional but insecure code produced by LLMs, and shows a serious inaccuracy of previous evaluations, ultimately contributing significantly to the field of secure code generation. We open-source our artifact at: https://github.com/Co1lin/CWEval .

Many individuals are concerned about the governance of machine learning systems and the prevention of algorithmic harms. The EU's recent General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has been seen as a core tool for achieving better governance of this area. While the GDPR does apply to the use of models in some limited situations, most of its provisions relate to the governance of personal data, while models have traditionally been seen as intellectual property. We present recent work from the information security literature around `model inversion' and `membership inference' attacks, which indicate that the process of turning training data into machine learned systems is not one-way, and demonstrate how this could lead some models to be legally classified as personal data. Taking this as a probing experiment, we explore the different rights and obligations this would trigger and their utility, and posit future directions for algorithmic governance and regulation.

This paper presents a groundbreaking comparison between Large Language Models and traditional legal contract reviewers, Junior Lawyers and Legal Process Outsourcers. We dissect whether LLMs can outperform humans in accuracy, speed, and cost efficiency during contract review. Our empirical analysis benchmarks LLMs against a ground truth set by Senior Lawyers, uncovering that advanced models match or exceed human accuracy in determining legal issues. In speed, LLMs complete reviews in mere seconds, eclipsing the hours required by their human counterparts. Cost wise, LLMs operate at a fraction of the price, offering a staggering 99.97 percent reduction in cost over traditional methods. These results are not just statistics, they signal a seismic shift in legal practice. LLMs stand poised to disrupt the legal industry, enhancing accessibility and efficiency of legal services. Our research asserts that the era of LLM dominance in legal contract review is upon us, challenging the status quo and calling for a reimagined future of legal workflows.

The global economy is increasingly dependent on knowledge workers to meet the needs of public and private organizations. While there is no single definition of knowledge work, organizations and industry groups still attempt to measure individuals' capability to engage in it. The most comprehensive assessment of capability readiness for professional knowledge workers is the Uniform CPA Examination developed by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). In this paper, we experimentally evaluate OpenAI's `text-davinci-003` and prior versions of GPT on both a sample Regulation (REG) exam and an assessment of over 200 multiple-choice questions based on the AICPA Blueprints for legal, financial, accounting, technology, and ethical tasks. First, we find that `text-davinci-003` achieves a correct rate of 14.4% on a sample REG exam section, significantly underperforming human capabilities on quantitative reasoning in zero-shot prompts. Second, `text-davinci-003` appears to be approaching human-level performance on the Remembering & Understanding and Application skill levels in the Exam absent calculation. For best prompt and parameters, the model answers 57.6% of questions correctly, significantly better than the 25% guessing rate, and its top two answers are correct 82.1% of the time, indicating strong non-entailment. Finally, we find that recent generations of GPT-3 demonstrate material improvements on this assessment, rising from 30% for `text-davinci-001` to 57% for `text-davinci-003`. These findings strongly suggest that large language models have the potential to transform the quality and efficiency of future knowledge work.

Gate set tomography (GST) is a protocol for detailed, predictive characterization of logic operations (gates) on quantum computing processors. Early versions of GST emerged around 2012-13, and since then it has been refined, demonstrated, and used in a large number of experiments. This paper presents the foundations of GST in comprehensive detail. The most important feature of GST, compared to older state and process tomography protocols, is that it is calibration-free. GST does not rely on pre-calibrated state preparations and measurements. Instead, it characterizes all the operations in a gate set simultaneously and self-consistently, relative to each other. Long sequence GST can estimate gates with very high precision and efficiency, achieving Heisenberg scaling in regimes of practical interest. In this paper, we cover GST's intellectual history, the techniques and experiments used to achieve its intended purpose, data analysis, gauge freedom and fixing, error bars, and the interpretation of gauge-fixed estimates of gate sets. Our focus is fundamental mathematical aspects of GST, rather than implementation details, but we touch on some of the foundational algorithmic tricks used in the pyGSTi implementation.

Machine learning programs, such as those performing inference, fine-tuning, and training of LLMs, are commonly delegated to untrusted compute providers. To provide correctness guarantees for the client, we propose adapting the cryptographic notion of refereed delegation to the machine learning setting. This approach enables a computationally limited client to delegate a program to multiple untrusted compute providers, with a guarantee of obtaining the correct result if at least one of them is honest. Refereed delegation of ML programs poses two technical hurdles: (1) an arbitration protocol to resolve disputes when compute providers disagree on the output, and (2) the ability to bitwise reproduce ML programs across different hardware setups, For (1), we design Verde, a dispute arbitration protocol that efficiently handles the large scale and graph-based computational model of modern ML programs. For (2), we build RepOps (Reproducible Operators), a library that eliminates hardware "non-determinism" by controlling the order of floating point operations performed on all hardware. Our implementation shows that refereed delegation achieves both strong guarantees for clients and practical overheads for compute providers.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly capable, it is prudent to assess whether safety measures remain effective even if LLMs intentionally try to bypass them. Previous work introduced control evaluations, an adversarial framework for testing deployment strategies of untrusted models (i.e., models which might be trying to bypass safety measures). While prior work treats a single failure as unacceptable, we perform control evaluations in a "distributed threat setting" -- a setting where no single action is catastrophic and no single action provides overwhelming evidence of misalignment. We approach this problem with a two-level deployment framework that uses an adaptive macro-protocol to choose between micro-protocols. Micro-protocols operate on a single task, using a less capable, but extensively tested (trusted) model to harness and monitor the untrusted model. Meanwhile, the macro-protocol maintains an adaptive credence on the untrusted model's alignment based on its past actions, using it to pick between safer and riskier micro-protocols. We evaluate our method in a code generation testbed where a red team attempts to generate subtly backdoored code with an LLM whose deployment is safeguarded by a blue team. We plot Pareto frontiers of safety (# of non-backdoored solutions) and usefulness (# of correct solutions). At a given level of usefulness, our adaptive deployment strategy reduces the number of backdoors by 80% compared to non-adaptive baselines.

Recently, the rapid development of AIGC has significantly boosted the diversities of fake media spread in the Internet, posing unprecedented threats to social security, politics, law, and etc. To detect the ever-increasingly diverse malicious fake media in the new era of AIGC, recent studies have proposed to exploit Large Vision Language Models (LVLMs) to design robust forgery detectors due to their impressive performance on a wide range of multimodal tasks. However, it still lacks a comprehensive benchmark designed to comprehensively assess LVLMs' discerning capabilities on forgery media. To fill this gap, we present Forensics-Bench, a new forgery detection evaluation benchmark suite to assess LVLMs across massive forgery detection tasks, requiring comprehensive recognition, location and reasoning capabilities on diverse forgeries. Forensics-Bench comprises 63,292 meticulously curated multi-choice visual questions, covering 112 unique forgery detection types from 5 perspectives: forgery semantics, forgery modalities, forgery tasks, forgery types and forgery models. We conduct thorough evaluations on 22 open-sourced LVLMs and 3 proprietary models GPT-4o, Gemini 1.5 Pro, and Claude 3.5 Sonnet, highlighting the significant challenges of comprehensive forgery detection posed by Forensics-Bench. We anticipate that Forensics-Bench will motivate the community to advance the frontier of LVLMs, striving for all-around forgery detectors in the era of AIGC. The deliverables will be updated at https://Forensics-Bench.github.io/.

The DISL dataset features a collection of 514,506 unique Solidity files that have been deployed to Ethereum mainnet. It caters to the need for a large and diverse dataset of real-world smart contracts. DISL serves as a resource for developing machine learning systems and for benchmarking software engineering tools designed for smart contracts. By aggregating every verified smart contract from Etherscan up to January 15, 2024, DISL surpasses existing datasets in size and recency.

We present Eir Thai Medical LLM, a large language model with 8 billion parameters, specifically designed to enhance the accuracy of handling medical tasks in the Thai language. This model focuses on providing clear and easy-to-understand answers for both healthcare professionals and patients, thereby improving the efficiency of diagnosis and treatment processes. Human evaluation was conducted to ensure that the model adheres to care standards and provides unbiased answers. To prioritize data security, the model is deployed within the hospital's internal network, ensuring both high security and faster processing speeds. The internal API connection is secured with encryption and strict authentication measures to prevent data leaks and unauthorized access. We evaluated several open-source large language models with 8 billion parameters on four medical benchmarks: MedQA, MedMCQA, PubMedQA, and the medical subset of MMLU. The best-performing baselines were used to develop Eir Thai Medical LLM. Our evaluation employed multiple questioning strategies, including zero-shot, few-shot, chain-of-thought reasoning, and ensemble/self-consistency voting methods. Our model outperformed commercially available Thai-language large language models by more than 10%. In addition, we developed enhanced model testing tailored for clinical use in Thai across 18 clinical tasks, where our model exceeded GPT-4o performance by more than 11%