Daily Papers

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly capable, it is prudent to assess whether safety measures remain effective even if LLMs intentionally try to bypass them. Previous work introduced control evaluations, an adversarial framework for testing deployment strategies of untrusted models (i.e., models which might be trying to bypass safety measures). While prior work treats a single failure as unacceptable, we perform control evaluations in a "distributed threat setting" -- a setting where no single action is catastrophic and no single action provides overwhelming evidence of misalignment. We approach this problem with a two-level deployment framework that uses an adaptive macro-protocol to choose between micro-protocols. Micro-protocols operate on a single task, using a less capable, but extensively tested (trusted) model to harness and monitor the untrusted model. Meanwhile, the macro-protocol maintains an adaptive credence on the untrusted model's alignment based on its past actions, using it to pick between safer and riskier micro-protocols. We evaluate our method in a code generation testbed where a red team attempts to generate subtly backdoored code with an LLM whose deployment is safeguarded by a blue team. We plot Pareto frontiers of safety (# of non-backdoored solutions) and usefulness (# of correct solutions). At a given level of usefulness, our adaptive deployment strategy reduces the number of backdoors by 80% compared to non-adaptive baselines.

Data-free knowledge distillation (KD) helps transfer knowledge from a pre-trained model (known as the teacher model) to a smaller model (known as the student model) without access to the original training data used for training the teacher model. However, the security of the synthetic or out-of-distribution (OOD) data required in data-free KD is largely unknown and under-explored. In this work, we make the first effort to uncover the security risk of data-free KD w.r.t. untrusted pre-trained models. We then propose Anti-Backdoor Data-Free KD (ABD), the first plug-in defensive method for data-free KD methods to mitigate the chance of potential backdoors being transferred. We empirically evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed ABD in diminishing transferred backdoor knowledge while maintaining compatible downstream performances as the vanilla KD. We envision this work as a milestone for alarming and mitigating the potential backdoors in data-free KD. Codes are released at https://github.com/illidanlab/ABD.

We often interact with untrusted parties. Prioritization of privacy can limit the effectiveness of these interactions, as achieving certain goals necessitates sharing private data. Traditionally, addressing this challenge has involved either seeking trusted intermediaries or constructing cryptographic protocols that restrict how much data is revealed, such as multi-party computations or zero-knowledge proofs. While significant advances have been made in scaling cryptographic approaches, they remain limited in terms of the size and complexity of applications they can be used for. In this paper, we argue that capable machine learning models can fulfill the role of a trusted third party, thus enabling secure computations for applications that were previously infeasible. In particular, we describe Trusted Capable Model Environments (TCMEs) as an alternative approach for scaling secure computation, where capable machine learning model(s) interact under input/output constraints, with explicit information flow control and explicit statelessness. This approach aims to achieve a balance between privacy and computational efficiency, enabling private inference where classical cryptographic solutions are currently infeasible. We describe a number of use cases that are enabled by TCME, and show that even some simple classic cryptographic problems can already be solved with TCME. Finally, we outline current limitations and discuss the path forward in implementing them.

Recently, NLP has seen a surge in the usage of large pre-trained models. Users download weights of models pre-trained on large datasets, then fine-tune the weights on a task of their choice. This raises the question of whether downloading untrusted pre-trained weights can pose a security threat. In this paper, we show that it is possible to construct ``weight poisoning'' attacks where pre-trained weights are injected with vulnerabilities that expose ``backdoors'' after fine-tuning, enabling the attacker to manipulate the model prediction simply by injecting an arbitrary keyword. We show that by applying a regularization method, which we call RIPPLe, and an initialization procedure, which we call Embedding Surgery, such attacks are possible even with limited knowledge of the dataset and fine-tuning procedure. Our experiments on sentiment classification, toxicity detection, and spam detection show that this attack is widely applicable and poses a serious threat. Finally, we outline practical defenses against such attacks. Code to reproduce our experiments is available at https://github.com/neulab/RIPPLe.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are rapidly becoming commodity components of larger software systems. This poses natural security and privacy problems: poisoned data retrieved from one component can change the model's behavior and compromise the entire system, including coercing the model to spread confidential data to untrusted components. One promising approach is to tackle this problem at the system level via dynamic information flow (aka taint) tracking. Unfortunately, the traditional approach of propagating the most restrictive input label to the output is too conservative for applications where LLMs operate on inputs retrieved from diverse sources. In this paper, we propose a novel, more permissive approach to propagate information flow labels through LLM queries. The key idea behind our approach is to propagate only the labels of the samples that were influential in generating the model output and to eliminate the labels of unnecessary input. We implement and investigate the effectiveness of two variations of this approach, based on (i) prompt-based retrieval augmentation, and (ii) a k-nearest-neighbors language model. We compare these with the baseline of an introspection-based influence estimator that directly asks the language model to predict the output label. The results obtained highlight the superiority of our prompt-based label propagator, which improves the label in more than 85% of the cases in an LLM agent setting. These findings underscore the practicality of permissive label propagation for retrieval augmentation.

Exact unlearning was first introduced as a privacy mechanism that allowed a user to retract their data from machine learning models on request. Shortly after, inexact schemes were proposed to mitigate the impractical costs associated with exact unlearning. More recently unlearning is often discussed as an approach for removal of impermissible knowledge i.e. knowledge that the model should not possess such as unlicensed copyrighted, inaccurate, or malicious information. The promise is that if the model does not have a certain malicious capability, then it cannot be used for the associated malicious purpose. In this paper we revisit the paradigm in which unlearning is used for in Large Language Models (LLMs) and highlight an underlying inconsistency arising from in-context learning. Unlearning can be an effective control mechanism for the training phase, yet it does not prevent the model from performing an impermissible act during inference. We introduce a concept of ununlearning, where unlearned knowledge gets reintroduced in-context, effectively rendering the model capable of behaving as if it knows the forgotten knowledge. As a result, we argue that content filtering for impermissible knowledge will be required and even exact unlearning schemes are not enough for effective content regulation. We discuss feasibility of ununlearning for modern LLMs and examine broader implications.

Machine Learning models increasingly face data integrity challenges due to the use of large-scale training datasets drawn from the Internet. We study what model developers can do if they detect that some data was manipulated or incorrect. Such manipulated data can cause adverse effects including vulnerability to backdoored samples, systemic biases, and reduced accuracy on certain input domains. Realistically, all manipulated training samples cannot be identified, and only a small, representative subset of the affected data can be flagged. We formalize Corrective Machine Unlearning as the problem of mitigating the impact of data affected by unknown manipulations on a trained model, only having identified a subset of the corrupted data. We demonstrate that the problem of corrective unlearning has significantly different requirements from traditional privacy-oriented unlearning. We find most existing unlearning methods, including retraining-from-scratch without the deletion set, require most of the manipulated data to be identified for effective corrective unlearning. However, one approach, Selective Synaptic Dampening, achieves limited success, unlearning adverse effects with just a small portion of the manipulated samples in our setting, which shows encouraging signs for future progress. We hope our work spurs research towards developing better methods for corrective unlearning and offers practitioners a new strategy to handle data integrity challenges arising from web-scale training. Code is available at https://github.com/drimpossible/corrective-unlearning-bench.

There is a growing interest in developing unlearnable examples (UEs) against visual privacy leaks on the Internet. UEs are training samples added with invisible but unlearnable noise, which have been found can prevent unauthorized training of machine learning models. UEs typically are generated via a bilevel optimization framework with a surrogate model to remove (minimize) errors from the original samples, and then applied to protect the data against unknown target models. However, existing UE generation methods all rely on an ideal assumption called label-consistency, where the hackers and protectors are assumed to hold the same label for a given sample. In this work, we propose and promote a more practical label-agnostic setting, where the hackers may exploit the protected data quite differently from the protectors. E.g., a m-class unlearnable dataset held by the protector may be exploited by the hacker as a n-class dataset. Existing UE generation methods are rendered ineffective in this challenging setting. To tackle this challenge, we present a novel technique called Unlearnable Clusters (UCs) to generate label-agnostic unlearnable examples with cluster-wise perturbations. Furthermore, we propose to leverage VisionandLanguage Pre-trained Models (VLPMs) like CLIP as the surrogate model to improve the transferability of the crafted UCs to diverse domains. We empirically verify the effectiveness of our proposed approach under a variety of settings with different datasets, target models, and even commercial platforms Microsoft Azure and Baidu PaddlePaddle. Code is available at https://github.com/jiamingzhang94/Unlearnable-Clusters.

The trustworthy machine learning (ML) community is increasingly recognizing the crucial need for models capable of selectively 'unlearning' data points after training. This leads to the problem of machine unlearning (MU), aiming to eliminate the influence of chosen data points on model performance, while still maintaining the model's utility post-unlearning. Despite various MU methods for data influence erasure, evaluations have largely focused on random data forgetting, ignoring the vital inquiry into which subset should be chosen to truly gauge the authenticity of unlearning performance. To tackle this issue, we introduce a new evaluative angle for MU from an adversarial viewpoint. We propose identifying the data subset that presents the most significant challenge for influence erasure, i.e., pinpointing the worst-case forget set. Utilizing a bi-level optimization principle, we amplify unlearning challenges at the upper optimization level to emulate worst-case scenarios, while simultaneously engaging in standard training and unlearning at the lower level, achieving a balance between data influence erasure and model utility. Our proposal offers a worst-case evaluation of MU's resilience and effectiveness. Through extensive experiments across different datasets (including CIFAR-10, 100, CelebA, Tiny ImageNet, and ImageNet) and models (including both image classifiers and generative models), we expose critical pros and cons in existing (approximate) unlearning strategies. Our results illuminate the complex challenges of MU in practice, guiding the future development of more accurate and robust unlearning algorithms. The code is available at https://github.com/OPTML-Group/Unlearn-WorstCase.

Despite widespread adoption, machine learning models remain mostly black boxes. Understanding the reasons behind predictions is, however, quite important in assessing trust, which is fundamental if one plans to take action based on a prediction, or when choosing whether to deploy a new model. Such understanding also provides insights into the model, which can be used to transform an untrustworthy model or prediction into a trustworthy one. In this work, we propose LIME, a novel explanation technique that explains the predictions of any classifier in an interpretable and faithful manner, by learning an interpretable model locally around the prediction. We also propose a method to explain models by presenting representative individual predictions and their explanations in a non-redundant way, framing the task as a submodular optimization problem. We demonstrate the flexibility of these methods by explaining different models for text (e.g. random forests) and image classification (e.g. neural networks). We show the utility of explanations via novel experiments, both simulated and with human subjects, on various scenarios that require trust: deciding if one should trust a prediction, choosing between models, improving an untrustworthy classifier, and identifying why a classifier should not be trusted.

The proliferation of Large Language Models (LLMs) accessed via black-box APIs introduces a significant trust challenge: users pay for services based on advertised model capabilities (e.g., size, performance), but providers may covertly substitute the specified model with a cheaper, lower-quality alternative to reduce operational costs. This lack of transparency undermines fairness, erodes trust, and complicates reliable benchmarking. Detecting such substitutions is difficult due to the black-box nature, typically limiting interaction to input-output queries. This paper formalizes the problem of model substitution detection in LLM APIs. We systematically evaluate existing verification techniques, including output-based statistical tests, benchmark evaluations, and log probability analysis, under various realistic attack scenarios like model quantization, randomized substitution, and benchmark evasion. Our findings reveal the limitations of methods relying solely on text outputs, especially against subtle or adaptive attacks. While log probability analysis offers stronger guarantees when available, its accessibility is often limited. We conclude by discussing the potential of hardware-based solutions like Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) as a pathway towards provable model integrity, highlighting the trade-offs between security, performance, and provider adoption. Code is available at https://github.com/sunblaze-ucb/llm-api-audit

The recent advances in diffusion models (DMs) have revolutionized the generation of realistic and complex images. However, these models also introduce potential safety hazards, such as producing harmful content and infringing data copyrights. Despite the development of safety-driven unlearning techniques to counteract these challenges, doubts about their efficacy persist. To tackle this issue, we introduce an evaluation framework that leverages adversarial prompts to discern the trustworthiness of these safety-driven DMs after they have undergone the process of unlearning harmful concepts. Specifically, we investigated the adversarial robustness of DMs, assessed by adversarial prompts, when eliminating unwanted concepts, styles, and objects. We develop an effective and efficient adversarial prompt generation approach for DMs, termed UnlearnDiffAtk. This method capitalizes on the intrinsic classification abilities of DMs to simplify the creation of adversarial prompts, thereby eliminating the need for auxiliary classification or diffusion models.Through extensive benchmarking, we evaluate the robustness of five widely-used safety-driven unlearned DMs (i.e., DMs after unlearning undesirable concepts, styles, or objects) across a variety of tasks. Our results demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency merits of UnlearnDiffAtk over the state-of-the-art adversarial prompt generation method and reveal the lack of robustness of current safety-driven unlearning techniques when applied to DMs. Codes are available at https://github.com/OPTML-Group/Diffusion-MU-Attack. WARNING: This paper contains model outputs that may be offensive in nature.

The rapid advancement of ML models in critical sectors such as healthcare, finance, and security has intensified the need for robust data security, model integrity, and reliable outputs. Large multimodal foundational models, while crucial for complex tasks, present challenges in scalability, reliability, and potential misuse. Decentralized systems offer a solution by distributing workload and mitigating central points of failure, but they introduce risks of unauthorized access to sensitive data across nodes. We address these challenges with a comprehensive framework designed for responsible AI development. Our approach incorporates: 1) Zero-knowledge proofs for secure model verification, enhancing trust without compromising privacy. 2) Consensus-based verification checks to ensure consistent outputs across nodes, mitigating hallucinations and maintaining model integrity. 3) Split Learning techniques that segment models across different nodes, preserving data privacy by preventing full data access at any point. 4) Hardware-based security through trusted execution environments (TEEs) to protect data and computations. This framework aims to enhance security and privacy and improve the reliability and fairness of multimodal AI systems. Promoting efficient resource utilization contributes to more sustainable AI development. Our state-of-the-art proofs and principles demonstrate the framework's effectiveness in responsibly democratizing artificial intelligence, offering a promising approach for building secure and private foundational models.

Machine Unlearning (MUL) is crucial for privacy protection and content regulation, yet recent studies reveal that traces of forgotten information persist in unlearned models, enabling adversaries to resurface removed knowledge. Existing verification methods only confirm whether unlearning was executed, failing to detect such residual information leaks. To address this, we introduce the concept of Robust Unlearning, ensuring models are indistinguishable from retraining and resistant to adversarial recovery. To empirically evaluate whether unlearning techniques meet this security standard, we propose the Unlearning Mapping Attack (UMA), a post-unlearning verification framework that actively probes models for forgotten traces using adversarial queries. Extensive experiments on discriminative and generative tasks show that existing unlearning techniques remain vulnerable, even when passing existing verification metrics. By establishing UMA as a practical verification tool, this study sets a new standard for assessing and enhancing machine unlearning security.

Modern Machine Learning models are expensive IP and business competitiveness often depends on keeping this IP confidential. This in turn restricts how these models are deployed -- for example it is unclear how to deploy a model on-device without inevitably leaking the underlying model. At the same time, confidential computing technologies such as Multi-Party Computation or Homomorphic encryption remain impractical for wide adoption. In this paper we take a different approach and investigate feasibility of ML-specific mechanisms that deter unauthorized model use by restricting the model to only be usable on specific hardware, making adoption on unauthorized hardware inconvenient. That way, even if IP is compromised, it cannot be trivially used without specialised hardware or major model adjustment. In a sense, we seek to enable cheap locking of machine learning models into specific hardware. We demonstrate that locking mechanisms are feasible by either targeting efficiency of model representations, such making models incompatible with quantisation, or tie the model's operation on specific characteristics of hardware, such as number of cycles for arithmetic operations. We demonstrate that locking comes with negligible work and latency overheads, while significantly restricting usability of the resultant model on unauthorized hardware.

Text-to-image diffusion models can be fine-tuned in custom domains to adapt to specific user preferences, but such unconstrained adaptability has also been utilized for illegal purposes, such as forging public figures' portraits and duplicating copyrighted artworks. Most existing work focuses on detecting the illegally generated contents, but cannot prevent or mitigate illegal adaptations of diffusion models. Other schemes of model unlearning and reinitialization, similarly, cannot prevent users from relearning the knowledge of illegal model adaptation with custom data. In this paper, we present FreezeAsGuard, a new technique that addresses these limitations and enables irreversible mitigation of illegal adaptations of diffusion models. The basic approach is that the model publisher selectively freezes tensors in pre-trained diffusion models that are critical to illegal model adaptations, to mitigate the fine-tuned model's representation power in illegal domains but minimize the impact on legal model adaptations in other domains. Such tensor freezing can be enforced via APIs provided by the model publisher for fine-tuning, can motivate users' adoption due to its computational savings. Experiment results with datasets in multiple domains show that FreezeAsGuard provides stronger power in mitigating illegal model adaptations of generating fake public figures' portraits, while having the minimum impact on model adaptation in other legal domains. The source code is available at: https://github.com/pittisl/FreezeAsGuard/

Machine learning models are increasingly used in societal applications, yet legal and privacy concerns demand that they very often be kept confidential. Consequently, there is a growing distrust about the fairness properties of these models in the minds of consumers, who are often at the receiving end of model predictions. To this end, we propose \name -- a system that uses Zero-Knowledge Proofs (a cryptographic primitive) to publicly verify the fairness of a model, while maintaining confidentiality. We also propose a fairness certification algorithm for fully-connected neural networks which is befitting to ZKPs and is used in this system. We implement \name in Gnark and demonstrate empirically that our system is practically feasible. Code is available at https://github.com/infinite-pursuits/FairProof.

The development of large language models (LLMs) depends on trustworthy evaluation. However, most current evaluations rely on public benchmarks, which are prone to data contamination issues that significantly compromise fairness. Previous researches have focused on constructing dynamic benchmarks to address contamination. However, continuously building new benchmarks is costly and cyclical. In this work, we aim to tackle contamination by analyzing the mechanisms of contaminated models themselves. Through our experiments, we discover that the overestimation of contaminated models is likely due to parameters acquiring shortcut solutions in training. We further propose a novel method for identifying shortcut neurons through comparative and causal analysis. Building on this, we introduce an evaluation method called shortcut neuron patching to suppress shortcut neurons. Experiments validate the effectiveness of our approach in mitigating contamination. Additionally, our evaluation results exhibit a strong linear correlation with MixEval, a recently released trustworthy benchmark, achieving a Spearman coefficient (rho) exceeding 0.95. This high correlation indicates that our method closely reveals true capabilities of the models and is trustworthy. We conduct further experiments to demonstrate the generalizability of our method across various benchmarks and hyperparameter settings. Code: https://github.com/GaryStack/Trustworthy-Evaluation

It is important that consumers and regulators can verify the provenance of large neural models to evaluate their capabilities and risks. We introduce the concept of a "Proof-of-Training-Data": any protocol that allows a model trainer to convince a Verifier of the training data that produced a set of model weights. Such protocols could verify the amount and kind of data and compute used to train the model, including whether it was trained on specific harmful or beneficial data sources. We explore efficient verification strategies for Proof-of-Training-Data that are compatible with most current large-model training procedures. These include a method for the model-trainer to verifiably pre-commit to a random seed used in training, and a method that exploits models' tendency to temporarily overfit to training data in order to detect whether a given data-point was included in training. We show experimentally that our verification procedures can catch a wide variety of attacks, including all known attacks from the Proof-of-Learning literature.

As large language models (LLMs) become more powerful and are deployed more autonomously, it will be increasingly important to prevent them from causing harmful outcomes. Researchers have investigated a variety of safety techniques for this purpose, e.g. using models to review the outputs of other models, or red-teaming techniques to surface subtle failure modes. However, researchers have not evaluated whether such techniques still ensure safety if the model is itself intentionally trying to subvert them. In this paper, we develop and evaluate pipelines of safety techniques ("protocols") that are robust to intentional subversion. We investigate a scenario in which we want to solve a sequence of programming problems, using access to a powerful but untrusted model (in our case, GPT-4), access to a less powerful trusted model (in our case, GPT-3.5), and limited access to high-quality trusted labor. We investigate protocols that aim to never submit solutions containing backdoors, which we operationalize here as logical errors that are not caught by test cases. We investigate a range of protocols and test each against strategies that the untrusted model could use to subvert them. One protocol is what we call trusted editing. This protocol first asks GPT-4 to write code, and then asks GPT-3.5 to rate the suspiciousness of that code. If the code is below some suspiciousness threshold, it is submitted. Otherwise, GPT-3.5 edits the solution to remove parts that seem suspicious and then submits the edited code. Another protocol is untrusted monitoring. This protocol asks GPT-4 to write code, and then asks another instance of GPT-4 whether the code is backdoored, using various techniques to prevent the GPT-4 instances from colluding. These protocols improve substantially on simple baselines.

With increasingly more data and computation involved in their training, machine learning models constitute valuable intellectual property. This has spurred interest in model stealing, which is made more practical by advances in learning with partial, little, or no supervision. Existing defenses focus on inserting unique watermarks in a model's decision surface, but this is insufficient: the watermarks are not sampled from the training distribution and thus are not always preserved during model stealing. In this paper, we make the key observation that knowledge contained in the stolen model's training set is what is common to all stolen copies. The adversary's goal, irrespective of the attack employed, is always to extract this knowledge or its by-products. This gives the original model's owner a strong advantage over the adversary: model owners have access to the original training data. We thus introduce dataset inference, the process of identifying whether a suspected model copy has private knowledge from the original model's dataset, as a defense against model stealing. We develop an approach for dataset inference that combines statistical testing with the ability to estimate the distance of multiple data points to the decision boundary. Our experiments on CIFAR10, SVHN, CIFAR100 and ImageNet show that model owners can claim with confidence greater than 99% that their model (or dataset as a matter of fact) was stolen, despite only exposing 50 of the stolen model's training points. Dataset inference defends against state-of-the-art attacks even when the adversary is adaptive. Unlike prior work, it does not require retraining or overfitting the defended model.

Deep learning models are often trained on distributed, web-scale datasets crawled from the internet. In this paper, we introduce two new dataset poisoning attacks that intentionally introduce malicious examples to a model's performance. Our attacks are immediately practical and could, today, poison 10 popular datasets. Our first attack, split-view poisoning, exploits the mutable nature of internet content to ensure a dataset annotator's initial view of the dataset differs from the view downloaded by subsequent clients. By exploiting specific invalid trust assumptions, we show how we could have poisoned 0.01% of the LAION-400M or COYO-700M datasets for just $60 USD. Our second attack, frontrunning poisoning, targets web-scale datasets that periodically snapshot crowd-sourced content -- such as Wikipedia -- where an attacker only needs a time-limited window to inject malicious examples. In light of both attacks, we notify the maintainers of each affected dataset and recommended several low-overhead defenses.

It is now a common business practice to buy access to large language model (LLM) inference rather than self-host, because of significant upfront hardware infrastructure and energy costs. However, as a buyer, there is no mechanism to verify the authenticity of the advertised service including the serving hardware platform, e.g. that it is actually being served using an NVIDIA H100. Furthermore, there are reports suggesting that model providers may deliver models that differ slightly from the advertised ones, often to make them run on less expensive hardware. That way, a client pays premium for a capable model access on more expensive hardware, yet ends up being served by a (potentially less capable) cheaper model on cheaper hardware. In this paper we introduce \textbf{hardware and software platform inference (HSPI)} -- a method for identifying the underlying architecture and software stack of a (black-box) machine learning model solely based on its input-output behavior. Our method leverages the inherent differences of various architectures and compilers to distinguish between different types and software stacks. By analyzing the numerical patterns in the model's outputs, we propose a classification framework capable of accurately identifying the used for model inference as well as the underlying software configuration. Our findings demonstrate the feasibility of inferring type from black-box models. We evaluate HSPI against models served on different real hardware and find that in a white-box setting we can distinguish between different s with between 83.9% and 100% accuracy. Even in a black-box setting we are able to achieve results that are up to three times higher than random guess accuracy.

Recent legislation has led to interest in machine unlearning, i.e., removing specific training samples from a predictive model as if they never existed in the training dataset. Unlearning may also be required due to corrupted/adversarial data or simply a user's updated privacy requirement. For models which require no training (k-NN), simply deleting the closest original sample can be effective. But this idea is inapplicable to models which learn richer representations. Recent ideas leveraging optimization-based updates scale poorly with the model dimension d, due to inverting the Hessian of the loss function. We use a variant of a new conditional independence coefficient, L-CODEC, to identify a subset of the model parameters with the most semantic overlap on an individual sample level. Our approach completely avoids the need to invert a (possibly) huge matrix. By utilizing a Markov blanket selection, we premise that L-CODEC is also suitable for deep unlearning, as well as other applications in vision. Compared to alternatives, L-CODEC makes approximate unlearning possible in settings that would otherwise be infeasible, including vision models used for face recognition, person re-identification and NLP models that may require unlearning samples identified for exclusion. Code can be found at https://github.com/vsingh-group/LCODEC-deep-unlearning/

The volume of "free" data on the internet has been key to the current success of deep learning. However, it also raises privacy concerns about the unauthorized exploitation of personal data for training commercial models. It is thus crucial to develop methods to prevent unauthorized data exploitation. This paper raises the question: can data be made unlearnable for deep learning models? We present a type of error-minimizing noise that can indeed make training examples unlearnable. Error-minimizing noise is intentionally generated to reduce the error of one or more of the training example(s) close to zero, which can trick the model into believing there is "nothing" to learn from these example(s). The noise is restricted to be imperceptible to human eyes, and thus does not affect normal data utility. We empirically verify the effectiveness of error-minimizing noise in both sample-wise and class-wise forms. We also demonstrate its flexibility under extensive experimental settings and practicability in a case study of face recognition. Our work establishes an important first step towards making personal data unexploitable to deep learning models.

As machine learning technology gets applied to actual products and solutions, new challenges have emerged. Models unexpectedly fail to generalize to small changes in the distribution, tend to be confident on novel data they have never seen, or cannot communicate the rationale behind their decisions effectively with the end users. Collectively, we face a trustworthiness issue with the current machine learning technology. This textbook on Trustworthy Machine Learning (TML) covers a theoretical and technical background of four key topics in TML: Out-of-Distribution Generalization, Explainability, Uncertainty Quantification, and Evaluation of Trustworthiness. We discuss important classical and contemporary research papers of the aforementioned fields and uncover and connect their underlying intuitions. The book evolved from the homonymous course at the University of T\"ubingen, first offered in the Winter Semester of 2022/23. It is meant to be a stand-alone product accompanied by code snippets and various pointers to further sources on topics of TML. The dedicated website of the book is https://trustworthyml.io/.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are foundational to AI advancements, facilitating applications like predictive text generation. Nonetheless, they pose risks by potentially memorizing and disseminating sensitive, biased, or copyrighted information from their vast datasets. Machine unlearning emerges as a cutting-edge solution to mitigate these concerns, offering techniques for LLMs to selectively discard certain data. This paper reviews the latest in machine unlearning for LLMs, introducing methods for the targeted forgetting of information to address privacy, ethical, and legal challenges without necessitating full model retraining. It divides existing research into unlearning from unstructured/textual data and structured/classification data, showcasing the effectiveness of these approaches in removing specific data while maintaining model efficacy. Highlighting the practicality of machine unlearning, this analysis also points out the hurdles in preserving model integrity, avoiding excessive or insufficient data removal, and ensuring consistent outputs, underlining the role of machine unlearning in advancing responsible, ethical AI.

As text-to-image diffusion models become advanced enough for commercial applications, there is also increasing concern about their potential for malicious and harmful use. Model unlearning has been proposed to mitigate the concerns by removing undesired and potentially harmful information from the pre-trained model. So far, the success of unlearning is mainly measured by whether the unlearned model can generate a target concept while maintaining image quality. However, unlearning is typically tested under limited scenarios, and the side effects of unlearning have barely been studied in the current literature. In this work, we thoroughly analyze unlearning under various scenarios with five key aspects. Our investigation reveals that every method has side effects or limitations, especially in more complex and realistic situations. By releasing our comprehensive evaluation framework with the source codes and artifacts, we hope to inspire further research in this area, leading to more reliable and effective unlearning methods.

Gemini is increasingly used to perform tasks on behalf of users, where function-calling and tool-use capabilities enable the model to access user data. Some tools, however, require access to untrusted data introducing risk. Adversaries can embed malicious instructions in untrusted data which cause the model to deviate from the user's expectations and mishandle their data or permissions. In this report, we set out Google DeepMind's approach to evaluating the adversarial robustness of Gemini models and describe the main lessons learned from the process. We test how Gemini performs against a sophisticated adversary through an adversarial evaluation framework, which deploys a suite of adaptive attack techniques to run continuously against past, current, and future versions of Gemini. We describe how these ongoing evaluations directly help make Gemini more resilient against manipulation.

The trustworthiness of machine learning has emerged as a critical topic in the field, encompassing various applications and research areas such as robustness, security, interpretability, and fairness. The last decade saw the development of numerous methods addressing these challenges. In this survey, we systematically review these advancements from a data-centric perspective, highlighting the shortcomings of traditional empirical risk minimization (ERM) training in handling challenges posed by the data. Interestingly, we observe a convergence of these methods, despite being developed independently across trustworthy machine learning subfields. Pearl's hierarchy of causality offers a unifying framework for these techniques. Accordingly, this survey presents the background of trustworthy machine learning development using a unified set of concepts, connects this language to Pearl's causal hierarchy, and finally discusses methods explicitly inspired by causality literature. We provide a unified language with mathematical vocabulary to link these methods across robustness, adversarial robustness, interpretability, and fairness, fostering a more cohesive understanding of the field. Further, we explore the trustworthiness of large pretrained models. After summarizing dominant techniques like fine-tuning, parameter-efficient fine-tuning, prompting, and reinforcement learning with human feedback, we draw connections between them and the standard ERM. This connection allows us to build upon the principled understanding of trustworthy methods, extending it to these new techniques in large pretrained models, paving the way for future methods. Existing methods under this perspective are also reviewed. Lastly, we offer a brief summary of the applications of these methods and discuss potential future aspects related to our survey. For more information, please visit http://trustai.one.

As a type of valuable intellectual property (IP), deep neural network (DNN) models have been protected by techniques like watermarking. However, such passive model protection cannot fully prevent model abuse. In this work, we propose an active model IP protection scheme, namely NNSplitter, which actively protects the model by splitting it into two parts: the obfuscated model that performs poorly due to weight obfuscation, and the model secrets consisting of the indexes and original values of the obfuscated weights, which can only be accessed by authorized users with the support of the trusted execution environment. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of NNSplitter, e.g., by only modifying 275 out of over 11 million (i.e., 0.002%) weights, the accuracy of the obfuscated ResNet-18 model on CIFAR-10 can drop to 10%. Moreover, NNSplitter is stealthy and resilient against norm clipping and fine-tuning attacks, making it an appealing solution for DNN model protection. The code is available at: https://github.com/Tongzhou0101/NNSplitter.

Leading language model (LM) providers like OpenAI and Google offer fine-tuning APIs that allow customers to adapt LMs for specific use cases. To prevent misuse, these LM providers implement filtering mechanisms to block harmful fine-tuning data. Consequently, adversaries seeking to produce unsafe LMs via these APIs must craft adversarial training data that are not identifiably harmful. We make three contributions in this context: 1. We show that many existing attacks that use harmless data to create unsafe LMs rely on eliminating model refusals in the first few tokens of their responses. 2. We show that such prior attacks can be blocked by a simple defense that pre-fills the first few tokens from an aligned model before letting the fine-tuned model fill in the rest. 3. We describe a new data-poisoning attack, ``No, Of course I Can Execute'' (NOICE), which exploits an LM's formulaic refusal mechanism to elicit harmful responses. By training an LM to refuse benign requests on the basis of safety before fulfilling those requests regardless, we are able to jailbreak several open-source models and a closed-source model (GPT-4o). We show an attack success rate (ASR) of 57% against GPT-4o; our attack earned a Bug Bounty from OpenAI. Against open-source models protected by simple defenses, we improve ASRs by an average of 3.25 times compared to the best performing previous attacks that use only harmless data. NOICE demonstrates the exploitability of repetitive refusal mechanisms and broadens understanding of the threats closed-source models face from harmless data.

The task of "unlearning" certain concepts in large language models (LLMs) has attracted immense attention recently, due to its importance for mitigating undesirable model behaviours, such as the generation of harmful, private, or incorrect information. Current protocols to evaluate unlearning methods largely rely on behavioral tests, without monitoring the presence of unlearned knowledge within the model's parameters. This residual knowledge can be adversarially exploited to recover the erased information post-unlearning. We argue that unlearning should also be evaluated internally, by considering changes in the parametric knowledge traces of the unlearned concepts. To this end, we propose a general methodology for eliciting directions in the parameter space (termed "concept vectors") that encode concrete concepts, and construct ConceptVectors, a benchmark dataset containing hundreds of common concepts and their parametric knowledge traces within two open-source LLMs. Evaluation on ConceptVectors shows that existing unlearning methods minimally impact concept vectors, while directly ablating these vectors demonstrably removes the associated knowledge from the LLMs and significantly reduces their susceptibility to adversarial manipulation. Our results highlight limitations in behavioral-based unlearning evaluations and call for future work to include parametric-based evaluations. To support this, we release our code and benchmark at https://github.com/yihuaihong/ConceptVectors.

The field of artificial intelligence (AI) has experienced remarkable progress in recent years, driven by the widespread adoption of open-source machine learning models in both research and industry. Considering the resource-intensive nature of training on vast datasets, many applications opt for models that have already been trained. Hence, a small number of key players undertake the responsibility of training and publicly releasing large pre-trained models, providing a crucial foundation for a wide range of applications. However, the adoption of these open-source models carries inherent privacy and security risks that are often overlooked. To provide a concrete example, an inconspicuous model may conceal hidden functionalities that, when triggered by specific input patterns, can manipulate the behavior of the system, such as instructing self-driving cars to ignore the presence of other vehicles. The implications of successful privacy and security attacks encompass a broad spectrum, ranging from relatively minor damage like service interruptions to highly alarming scenarios, including physical harm or the exposure of sensitive user data. In this work, we present a comprehensive overview of common privacy and security threats associated with the use of open-source models. By raising awareness of these dangers, we strive to promote the responsible and secure use of AI systems.

Data collected from the real world tends to be biased, unbalanced, and at risk of exposing sensitive and private information. This reality has given rise to the idea of creating synthetic datasets to alleviate risk, bias, harm, and privacy concerns inherent in the real data. This concept relies on Generative AI models to produce unbiased, privacy-preserving synthetic data while being true to the real data. In this new paradigm, how can we tell if this approach delivers on its promises? We present an auditing framework that offers a holistic assessment of synthetic datasets and AI models trained on them, centered around bias and discrimination prevention, fidelity to the real data, utility, robustness, and privacy preservation. We showcase our framework by auditing multiple generative models on diverse use cases, including education, healthcare, banking, human resources, and across different modalities, from tabular, to time-series, to natural language. Our use cases demonstrate the importance of a holistic assessment in order to ensure compliance with socio-technical safeguards that regulators and policymakers are increasingly enforcing. For this purpose, we introduce the trust index that ranks multiple synthetic datasets based on their prescribed safeguards and their desired trade-offs. Moreover, we devise a trust-index-driven model selection and cross-validation procedure via auditing in the training loop that we showcase on a class of transformer models that we dub TrustFormers, across different modalities. This trust-driven model selection allows for controllable trust trade-offs in the resulting synthetic data. We instrument our auditing framework with workflows that connect different stakeholders from model development to audit and certification via a synthetic data auditing report.

The training of contemporary deep learning models heavily relies on publicly available data, posing a risk of unauthorized access to online data and raising concerns about data privacy. Current approaches to creating unlearnable data involve incorporating small, specially designed noises, but these methods strictly limit data usability, overlooking its potential usage in authorized scenarios. In this paper, we extend the concept of unlearnable data to conditional data learnability and introduce UnGeneralizable Examples (UGEs). UGEs exhibit learnability for authorized users while maintaining unlearnability for potential hackers. The protector defines the authorized network and optimizes UGEs to match the gradients of the original data and its ungeneralizable version, ensuring learnability. To prevent unauthorized learning, UGEs are trained by maximizing a designated distance loss in a common feature space. Additionally, to further safeguard the authorized side from potential attacks, we introduce additional undistillation optimization. Experimental results on multiple datasets and various networks demonstrate that the proposed UGEs framework preserves data usability while reducing training performance on hacker networks, even under different types of attacks.

The deployment of machine learning models in operational contexts represents a significant investment for any organisation. Consequently, the risk of these models being misappropriated by competitors needs to be addressed. In recent years, numerous proposals have been put forth to detect instances of model stealing. However, these proposals operate under implicit and disparate data and model access assumptions; as a consequence, it remains unclear how they can be effectively compared to one another. Our evaluation shows that a simple baseline that we introduce performs on par with existing state-of-the-art fingerprints, which, on the other hand, are much more complex. To uncover the reasons behind this intriguing result, this paper introduces a systematic approach to both the creation of model fingerprinting schemes and their evaluation benchmarks. By dividing model fingerprinting into three core components -- Query, Representation and Detection (QuRD) -- we are able to identify sim100 previously unexplored QuRD combinations and gain insights into their performance. Finally, we introduce a set of metrics to compare and guide the creation of more representative model stealing detection benchmarks. Our approach reveals the need for more challenging benchmarks and a sound comparison with baselines. To foster the creation of new fingerprinting schemes and benchmarks, we open-source our fingerprinting toolbox.

Generative Pre-trained Transformer (GPT) models have exhibited exciting progress in capabilities, capturing the interest of practitioners and the public alike. Yet, while the literature on the trustworthiness of GPT models remains limited, practitioners have proposed employing capable GPT models for sensitive applications to healthcare and finance - where mistakes can be costly. To this end, this work proposes a comprehensive trustworthiness evaluation for large language models with a focus on GPT-4 and GPT-3.5, considering diverse perspectives - including toxicity, stereotype bias, adversarial robustness, out-of-distribution robustness, robustness on adversarial demonstrations, privacy, machine ethics, and fairness. Based on our evaluations, we discover previously unpublished vulnerabilities to trustworthiness threats. For instance, we find that GPT models can be easily misled to generate toxic and biased outputs and leak private information in both training data and conversation history. We also find that although GPT-4 is usually more trustworthy than GPT-3.5 on standard benchmarks, GPT-4 is more vulnerable given jailbreaking system or user prompts, potentially due to the reason that GPT-4 follows the (misleading) instructions more precisely. Our work illustrates a comprehensive trustworthiness evaluation of GPT models and sheds light on the trustworthiness gaps. Our benchmark is publicly available at https://decodingtrust.github.io/.

In current AI era, users may request AI companies to delete their data from the training dataset due to the privacy concerns. As a model owner, retraining a model will consume significant computational resources. Therefore, machine unlearning is a new emerged technology to allow model owner to delete requested training data or a class with little affecting on the model performance. However, for large-scaling complex data, such as image or text data, unlearning a class from a model leads to a inferior performance due to the difficulty to identify the link between classes and model. An inaccurate class deleting may lead to over or under unlearning. In this paper, to accurately defining the unlearning class of complex data, we apply the definition of Concept, rather than an image feature or a token of text data, to represent the semantic information of unlearning class. This new representation can cut the link between the model and the class, leading to a complete erasing of the impact of a class. To analyze the impact of the concept of complex data, we adopt a Post-hoc Concept Bottleneck Model, and Integrated Gradients to precisely identify concepts across different classes. Next, we take advantage of data poisoning with random and targeted labels to propose unlearning methods. We test our methods on both image classification models and large language models (LLMs). The results consistently show that the proposed methods can accurately erase targeted information from models and can largely maintain the performance of the models.

The key components of machine learning are data samples for training, model for learning patterns, and loss function for optimizing accuracy. Analogously, unlearning can potentially be achieved through anti-data samples (or anti-samples), unlearning method, and reversed loss function. While prior research has explored unlearning methods and reversed loss functions, the potential of anti-samples remains largely untapped. In this paper, we introduce UnSTAR: Unlearning with Self-Taught Anti-Sample Reasoning for large language models (LLMs). Our contributions are threefold; first, we propose a novel concept of anti-sample-induced unlearning; second, we generate anti-samples by leveraging misleading rationales, which help reverse learned associations and accelerate the unlearning process; and third, we enable fine-grained targeted unlearning, allowing for the selective removal of specific associations without impacting related knowledge - something not achievable by previous works. Results demonstrate that anti-samples offer an efficient, targeted unlearning strategy for LLMs, opening new avenues for privacy-preserving machine learning and model modification.

Trustworthy verifiers are essential for the success of reinforcement learning with verifiable reward (RLVR), which is the core methodology behind various large reasoning models such as DeepSeek-R1. In complex domains like mathematical reasoning, rule-based verifiers have been widely adopted in previous works to train strong reasoning models. However, the reliability of these verifiers and their impact on the RL training process remain poorly understood. In this work, we take mathematical reasoning as a case study and conduct a comprehensive analysis of various verifiers in both static evaluation and RL training scenarios. First, we find that current open-source rule-based verifiers often fail to recognize equivalent answers presented in different formats across multiple commonly used mathematical datasets, resulting in non-negligible false negative rates. This limitation adversely affects RL training performance and becomes more pronounced as the policy model gets stronger. Subsequently, we investigate model-based verifiers as a potential solution to address these limitations. While the static evaluation shows that model-based verifiers achieve significantly higher verification accuracy, further analysis and RL training results imply that they are highly susceptible to hacking, where they misclassify certain patterns in responses as correct (i.e., false positives). This vulnerability is exploited during policy model optimization, leading to artificially inflated rewards. Our findings underscore the unique risks inherent to both rule-based and model-based verifiers, aiming to offer valuable insights to develop more robust reward systems in reinforcement learning.

Large-scale training of modern deep learning models heavily relies on publicly available data on the web. This potentially unauthorized usage of online data leads to concerns regarding data privacy. Recent works aim to make unlearnable data for deep learning models by adding small, specially designed noises to tackle this issue. However, these methods are vulnerable to adversarial training (AT) and/or are computationally heavy. In this work, we propose a novel, model-free, Convolution-based Unlearnable DAtaset (CUDA) generation technique. CUDA is generated using controlled class-wise convolutions with filters that are randomly generated via a private key. CUDA encourages the network to learn the relation between filters and labels rather than informative features for classifying the clean data. We develop some theoretical analysis demonstrating that CUDA can successfully poison Gaussian mixture data by reducing the clean data performance of the optimal Bayes classifier. We also empirically demonstrate the effectiveness of CUDA with various datasets (CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, ImageNet-100, and Tiny-ImageNet), and architectures (ResNet-18, VGG-16, Wide ResNet-34-10, DenseNet-121, DeIT, EfficientNetV2-S, and MobileNetV2). Our experiments show that CUDA is robust to various data augmentations and training approaches such as smoothing, AT with different budgets, transfer learning, and fine-tuning. For instance, training a ResNet-18 on ImageNet-100 CUDA achieves only 8.96%, 40.08%, and 20.58% clean test accuracies with empirical risk minimization (ERM), L_{infty} AT, and L_{2} AT, respectively. Here, ERM on the clean training data achieves a clean test accuracy of 80.66%. CUDA exhibits unlearnability effect with ERM even when only a fraction of the training dataset is perturbed. Furthermore, we also show that CUDA is robust to adaptive defenses designed specifically to break it.

Recent text-to-image diffusion models have shown surprising performance in generating high-quality images. However, concerns have arisen regarding the unauthorized data usage during the training or fine-tuning process. One example is when a model trainer collects a set of images created by a particular artist and attempts to train a model capable of generating similar images without obtaining permission and giving credit to the artist. To address this issue, we propose a method for detecting such unauthorized data usage by planting the injected memorization into the text-to-image diffusion models trained on the protected dataset. Specifically, we modify the protected images by adding unique contents on these images using stealthy image warping functions that are nearly imperceptible to humans but can be captured and memorized by diffusion models. By analyzing whether the model has memorized the injected content (i.e., whether the generated images are processed by the injected post-processing function), we can detect models that had illegally utilized the unauthorized data. Experiments on Stable Diffusion and VQ Diffusion with different model training or fine-tuning methods (i.e, LoRA, DreamBooth, and standard training) demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed method in detecting unauthorized data usages. Code: https://github.com/ZhentingWang/DIAGNOSIS.

As industrial applications are increasingly automated by machine learning models, enforcing personal data ownership and intellectual property rights requires tracing training data back to their rightful owners. Membership inference algorithms approach this problem by using statistical techniques to discern whether a target sample was included in a model's training set. However, existing methods only utilize the unaltered target sample or simple augmentations of the target to compute statistics. Such a sparse sampling of the model's behavior carries little information, leading to poor inference capabilities. In this work, we use adversarial tools to directly optimize for queries that are discriminative and diverse. Our improvements achieve significantly more accurate membership inference than existing methods, especially in offline scenarios and in the low false-positive regime which is critical in legal settings. Code is available at https://github.com/YuxinWenRick/canary-in-a-coalmine.

Unlearning methods have the potential to improve the privacy and safety of large language models (LLMs) by removing sensitive or harmful information post hoc. The LLM unlearning research community has increasingly turned toward empirical benchmarks to assess the effectiveness of such methods. In this paper, we find that existing benchmarks provide an overly optimistic and potentially misleading view on the effectiveness of candidate unlearning methods. By introducing simple, benign modifications to a number of popular benchmarks, we expose instances where supposedly unlearned information remains accessible, or where the unlearning process has degraded the model's performance on retained information to a much greater extent than indicated by the original benchmark. We identify that existing benchmarks are particularly vulnerable to modifications that introduce even loose dependencies between the forget and retain information. Further, we show that ambiguity in unlearning targets in existing benchmarks can easily lead to the design of methods that overfit to the given test queries. Based on our findings, we urge the community to be cautious when interpreting benchmark results as reliable measures of progress, and we provide several recommendations to guide future LLM unlearning research.

Machine learning programs, such as those performing inference, fine-tuning, and training of LLMs, are commonly delegated to untrusted compute providers. To provide correctness guarantees for the client, we propose adapting the cryptographic notion of refereed delegation to the machine learning setting. This approach enables a computationally limited client to delegate a program to multiple untrusted compute providers, with a guarantee of obtaining the correct result if at least one of them is honest. Refereed delegation of ML programs poses two technical hurdles: (1) an arbitration protocol to resolve disputes when compute providers disagree on the output, and (2) the ability to bitwise reproduce ML programs across different hardware setups, For (1), we design Verde, a dispute arbitration protocol that efficiently handles the large scale and graph-based computational model of modern ML programs. For (2), we build RepOps (Reproducible Operators), a library that eliminates hardware "non-determinism" by controlling the order of floating point operations performed on all hardware. Our implementation shows that refereed delegation achieves both strong guarantees for clients and practical overheads for compute providers.

Large language models (LLMs), exemplified by ChatGPT, have gained considerable attention for their excellent natural language processing capabilities. Nonetheless, these LLMs present many challenges, particularly in the realm of trustworthiness. Therefore, ensuring the trustworthiness of LLMs emerges as an important topic. This paper introduces TrustLLM, a comprehensive study of trustworthiness in LLMs, including principles for different dimensions of trustworthiness, established benchmark, evaluation, and analysis of trustworthiness for mainstream LLMs, and discussion of open challenges and future directions. Specifically, we first propose a set of principles for trustworthy LLMs that span eight different dimensions. Based on these principles, we further establish a benchmark across six dimensions including truthfulness, safety, fairness, robustness, privacy, and machine ethics. We then present a study evaluating 16 mainstream LLMs in TrustLLM, consisting of over 30 datasets. Our findings firstly show that in general trustworthiness and utility (i.e., functional effectiveness) are positively related. Secondly, our observations reveal that proprietary LLMs generally outperform most open-source counterparts in terms of trustworthiness, raising concerns about the potential risks of widely accessible open-source LLMs. However, a few open-source LLMs come very close to proprietary ones. Thirdly, it is important to note that some LLMs may be overly calibrated towards exhibiting trustworthiness, to the extent that they compromise their utility by mistakenly treating benign prompts as harmful and consequently not responding. Finally, we emphasize the importance of ensuring transparency not only in the models themselves but also in the technologies that underpin trustworthiness. Knowing the specific trustworthy technologies that have been employed is crucial for analyzing their effectiveness.

Unlearning algorithms aim to remove deleted data's influence from trained models at a cost lower than full retraining. However, prior guarantees of unlearning in literature are flawed and don't protect the privacy of deleted records. We show that when users delete their data as a function of published models, records in a database become interdependent. So, even retraining a fresh model after deletion of a record doesn't ensure its privacy. Secondly, unlearning algorithms that cache partial computations to speed up the processing can leak deleted information over a series of releases, violating the privacy of deleted records in the long run. To address these, we propose a sound deletion guarantee and show that the privacy of existing records is necessary for the privacy of deleted records. Under this notion, we propose an accurate, computationally efficient, and secure machine unlearning algorithm based on noisy gradient descent.

From a simple text prompt, generative-AI image models can create stunningly realistic and creative images bounded, it seems, by only our imagination. These models have achieved this remarkable feat thanks, in part, to the ingestion of billions of images collected from nearly every corner of the internet. Many creators have understandably expressed concern over how their intellectual property has been ingested without their permission or a mechanism to opt out of training. As a result, questions of fair use and copyright infringement have quickly emerged. We describe a method that allows us to determine if a model was trained on a specific image or set of images. This method is computationally efficient and assumes no explicit knowledge of the model architecture or weights (so-called black-box membership inference). We anticipate that this method will be crucial for auditing existing models and, looking ahead, ensuring the fairer development and deployment of generative AI models.

Instruction-following large language models (LLMs), such as ChatGPT, have become widely popular among everyday users. However, these models inadvertently disclose private, sensitive information to their users, underscoring the need for machine unlearning techniques to remove selective information from the models. While prior work has focused on forgetting small, random subsets of training data at the instance-level, we argue that real-world scenarios often require the removal of an entire user data, which may require a more careful maneuver. In this study, we explore entity-level unlearning, which aims to erase all knowledge related to a target entity while preserving the remaining model capabilities. To address this, we introduce Opt-Out, an optimal transport-based unlearning method that utilizes the Wasserstein distance from the model's initial parameters to achieve more effective and fine-grained unlearning. We also present the first Entity-Level Unlearning Dataset (ELUDe) designed to evaluate entity-level unlearning. Our empirical results demonstrate that Opt-Out surpasses existing methods, establishing a new standard for secure and adaptable LLMs that can accommodate user data removal requests without the need for full retraining.

Language generation models have been an increasingly powerful enabler for many applications. Many such models offer free or affordable API access, which makes them potentially vulnerable to model extraction attacks through distillation. To protect intellectual property (IP) and ensure fair use of these models, various techniques such as lexical watermarking and synonym replacement have been proposed. However, these methods can be nullified by obvious countermeasures such as "synonym randomization". To address this issue, we propose GINSEW, a novel method to protect text generation models from being stolen through distillation. The key idea of our method is to inject secret signals into the probability vector of the decoding steps for each target token. We can then detect the secret message by probing a suspect model to tell if it is distilled from the protected one. Experimental results show that GINSEW can effectively identify instances of IP infringement with minimal impact on the generation quality of protected APIs. Our method demonstrates an absolute improvement of 19 to 29 points on mean average precision (mAP) in detecting suspects compared to previous methods against watermark removal attacks.

In domains with high stakes such as law, recruitment, and healthcare, learning models frequently rely on sensitive user data for inference, necessitating the complete set of features. This not only poses significant privacy risks for individuals but also demands substantial human effort from organizations to verify information accuracy. This paper asks whether it is necessary to use all input features for accurate predictions at inference time. The paper demonstrates that, in a personalized setting, individuals may only need to disclose a small subset of their features without compromising decision-making accuracy. The paper also provides an efficient sequential algorithm to determine the appropriate attributes for each individual to provide. Evaluations across various learning tasks show that individuals can potentially report as little as 10\% of their information while maintaining the same accuracy level as a model that employs the full set of user information.

Dataset ownership verification, the process of determining if a dataset is used in a model's training data, is necessary for detecting unauthorized data usage and data contamination. Existing approaches, such as backdoor watermarking, rely on inducing a detectable behavior into the trained model on a part of the data distribution. However, these approaches have limitations, as they can be harmful to the model's performances or require unpractical access to the model's internals. Most importantly, previous approaches lack guarantee against false positives. This paper introduces data taggants, a novel non-backdoor dataset ownership verification technique. Our method uses pairs of out-of-distribution samples and random labels as secret keys, and leverages clean-label targeted data poisoning to subtly alter a dataset, so that models trained on it respond to the key samples with the corresponding key labels. The keys are built as to allow for statistical certificates with black-box access only to the model. We validate our approach through comprehensive and realistic experiments on ImageNet1k using ViT and ResNet models with state-of-the-art training recipes. Our findings demonstrate that data taggants can reliably make models trained on the protected dataset detectable with high confidence, without compromising validation accuracy, and demonstrates superiority over backdoor watermarking. Moreover, our method shows to be stealthy and robust against various defense mechanisms.

In response to recent data regulation requirements, machine unlearning (MU) has emerged as a critical process to remove the influence of specific examples from a given model. Although exact unlearning can be achieved through complete model retraining using the remaining dataset, the associated computational costs have driven the development of efficient, approximate unlearning techniques. Moving beyond data-centric MU approaches, our study introduces a novel model-based perspective: model sparsification via weight pruning, which is capable of reducing the gap between exact unlearning and approximate unlearning. We show in both theory and practice that model sparsity can boost the multi-criteria unlearning performance of an approximate unlearner, closing the approximation gap, while continuing to be efficient. This leads to a new MU paradigm, termed prune first, then unlearn, which infuses a sparse model prior into the unlearning process. Building on this insight, we also develop a sparsity-aware unlearning method that utilizes sparsity regularization to enhance the training process of approximate unlearning. Extensive experiments show that our proposals consistently benefit MU in various unlearning scenarios. A notable highlight is the 77% unlearning efficacy gain of fine-tuning (one of the simplest unlearning methods) when using sparsity-aware unlearning. Furthermore, we demonstrate the practical impact of our proposed MU methods in addressing other machine learning challenges, such as defending against backdoor attacks and enhancing transfer learning. Codes are available at https://github.com/OPTML-Group/Unlearn-Sparse.

Large language models are trained on vast amounts of internet data, prompting concerns and speculation that they have memorized public benchmarks. Going from speculation to proof of contamination is challenging, as the pretraining data used by proprietary models are often not publicly accessible. We show that it is possible to provide provable guarantees of test set contamination in language models without access to pretraining data or model weights. Our approach leverages the fact that when there is no data contamination, all orderings of an exchangeable benchmark should be equally likely. In contrast, the tendency for language models to memorize example order means that a contaminated language model will find certain canonical orderings to be much more likely than others. Our test flags potential contamination whenever the likelihood of a canonically ordered benchmark dataset is significantly higher than the likelihood after shuffling the examples. We demonstrate that our procedure is sensitive enough to reliably prove test set contamination in challenging situations, including models as small as 1.4 billion parameters, on small test sets of only 1000 examples, and datasets that appear only a few times in the pretraining corpus. Using our test, we audit five popular publicly accessible language models for test set contamination and find little evidence for pervasive contamination.

The advancement of large language models (LLMs) has significantly enhanced the ability to effectively tackle various downstream NLP tasks and unify these tasks into generative pipelines. On the one hand, powerful language models, trained on massive textual data, have brought unparalleled accessibility and usability for both models and users. On the other hand, unrestricted access to these models can also introduce potential malicious and unintentional privacy risks. Despite ongoing efforts to address the safety and privacy concerns associated with LLMs, the problem remains unresolved. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive analysis of the current privacy attacks targeting LLMs and categorize them according to the adversary's assumed capabilities to shed light on the potential vulnerabilities present in LLMs. Then, we present a detailed overview of prominent defense strategies that have been developed to counter these privacy attacks. Beyond existing works, we identify upcoming privacy concerns as LLMs evolve. Lastly, we point out several potential avenues for future exploration.

While the evaluation of explanations is an important step towards trustworthy models, it needs to be done carefully, and the employed metrics need to be well-understood. Specifically model randomization testing is often overestimated and regarded as a sole criterion for selecting or discarding certain explanation methods. To address shortcomings of this test, we start by observing an experimental gap in the ranking of explanation methods between randomization-based sanity checks [1] and model output faithfulness measures (e.g. [25]). We identify limitations of model-randomization-based sanity checks for the purpose of evaluating explanations. Firstly, we show that uninformative attribution maps created with zero pixel-wise covariance easily achieve high scores in this type of checks. Secondly, we show that top-down model randomization preserves scales of forward pass activations with high probability. That is, channels with large activations have a high probility to contribute strongly to the output, even after randomization of the network on top of them. Hence, explanations after randomization can only be expected to differ to a certain extent. This explains the observed experimental gap. In summary, these results demonstrate the inadequacy of model-randomization-based sanity checks as a criterion to rank attribution methods.

The machine learning community is increasingly recognizing the importance of fostering trust and safety in modern generative AI (GenAI) models. We posit machine unlearning (MU) as a crucial foundation for developing safe, secure, and trustworthy GenAI models. Traditional MU methods often rely on stringent assumptions and require access to real data. This paper introduces Score Forgetting Distillation (SFD), an innovative MU approach that promotes the forgetting of undesirable information in diffusion models by aligning the conditional scores of "unsafe" classes or concepts with those of "safe" ones. To eliminate the need for real data, our SFD framework incorporates a score-based MU loss into the score distillation objective of a pretrained diffusion model. This serves as a regularization term that preserves desired generation capabilities while enabling the production of synthetic data through a one-step generator. Our experiments on pretrained label-conditional and text-to-image diffusion models demonstrate that our method effectively accelerates the forgetting of target classes or concepts during generation, while preserving the quality of other classes or concepts. This unlearned and distilled diffusion not only pioneers a novel concept in MU but also accelerates the generation speed of diffusion models. Our experiments and studies on a range of diffusion models and datasets confirm that our approach is generalizable, effective, and advantageous for MU in diffusion models. (Warning: This paper contains sexually explicit imagery, discussions of pornography, racially-charged terminology, and other content that some readers may find disturbing, distressing, and/or offensive.)

Recent research has generated hope that inference scaling could allow weaker language models to match or exceed the accuracy of stronger models, such as by repeatedly sampling solutions to a coding problem until it passes unit tests. The central thesis of this paper is that there is no free lunch for inference scaling: indefinite accuracy improvement through resampling can only be realized if the "verifier" (in this case, a set of unit tests) is perfect. When the verifier is imperfect, as it almost always is in domains such as reasoning or coding (for example, unit tests have imperfect coverage), there is a nonzero probability of false positives: incorrect solutions that pass the verifier. Resampling cannot decrease this probability, so it imposes an upper bound to the accuracy of resampling-based inference scaling even with an infinite compute budget. We find that there is a very strong correlation between the model's single-sample accuracy (i.e. accuracy without unit tests) and its false positive rate on coding benchmarks HumanEval and MBPP, whose unit tests have limited coverage. Therefore, no amount of inference scaling of weaker models can enable them to match the single-sample accuracy of a sufficiently strong model (Fig. 1a). When we consider that false positives have a negative utility compared to abstaining from producing a solution, it bends the inference scaling curve further downward. Empirically, we find that the optimal number of samples can be less than 10 under realistic assumptions (Fig. 1b). Finally, we show that beyond accuracy, false positives may have other undesirable qualities, such as poor adherence to coding style conventions.

Recently, large language models (LLMs) have been gaining a lot of interest due to their adaptability and extensibility in emerging applications, including communication networks. It is anticipated that ZSM networks will be able to support LLMs as a service, as they provide ultra reliable low-latency communications and closed loop massive connectivity. However, LLMs are vulnerable to data and model privacy issues that affect the trustworthiness of LLMs to be deployed for user-based services. In this paper, we explore the security vulnerabilities associated with fine-tuning LLMs in ZSM networks, in particular the membership inference attack. We define the characteristics of an attack network that can perform a membership inference attack if the attacker has access to the fine-tuned model for the downstream task. We show that the membership inference attacks are effective for any downstream task, which can lead to a personal data breach when using LLM as a service. The experimental results show that the attack success rate of maximum 92% can be achieved on named entity recognition task. Based on the experimental analysis, we discuss possible defense mechanisms and present possible research directions to make the LLMs more trustworthy in the context of ZSM networks.

Compressing high-capability Large Language Models (LLMs) has emerged as a favored strategy for resource-efficient inferences. While state-of-the-art (SoTA) compression methods boast impressive advancements in preserving benign task performance, the potential risks of compression in terms of safety and trustworthiness have been largely neglected. This study conducts the first, thorough evaluation of three (3) leading LLMs using five (5) SoTA compression techniques across eight (8) trustworthiness dimensions. Our experiments highlight the intricate interplay between compression and trustworthiness, revealing some interesting patterns. We find that quantization is currently a more effective approach than pruning in achieving efficiency and trustworthiness simultaneously. For instance, a 4-bit quantized model retains the trustworthiness of its original counterpart, but model pruning significantly degrades trustworthiness, even at 50% sparsity. Moreover, employing quantization within a moderate bit range could unexpectedly improve certain trustworthiness dimensions such as ethics and fairness. Conversely, extreme quantization to very low bit levels (3 bits) tends to significantly reduce trustworthiness. This increased risk cannot be uncovered by looking at benign performance alone, in turn, mandating comprehensive trustworthiness evaluation in practice. These findings culminate in practical recommendations for simultaneously achieving high utility, efficiency, and trustworthiness in LLMs. Models and code are available at https://decoding-comp-trust.github.io/.

We investigate the problem of determining the predictive confidence (or, conversely, uncertainty) of a neural classifier through the lens of low-resource languages. By training models on sub-sampled datasets in three different languages, we assess the quality of estimates from a wide array of approaches and their dependence on the amount of available data. We find that while approaches based on pre-trained models and ensembles achieve the best results overall, the quality of uncertainty estimates can surprisingly suffer with more data. We also perform a qualitative analysis of uncertainties on sequences, discovering that a model's total uncertainty seems to be influenced to a large degree by its data uncertainty, not model uncertainty. All model implementations are open-sourced in a software package.

Model attribution is a popular tool to explain the rationales behind model predictions. However, recent work suggests that the attributions are vulnerable to minute perturbations, which can be added to input samples to fool the attributions while maintaining the prediction outputs. Although empirical studies have shown positive performance via adversarial training, an effective certified defense method is eminently needed to understand the robustness of attributions. In this work, we propose to use uniform smoothing technique that augments the vanilla attributions by noises uniformly sampled from a certain space. It is proved that, for all perturbations within the attack region, the cosine similarity between uniformly smoothed attribution of perturbed sample and the unperturbed sample is guaranteed to be lower bounded. We also derive alternative formulations of the certification that is equivalent to the original one and provides the maximum size of perturbation or the minimum smoothing radius such that the attribution can not be perturbed. We evaluate the proposed method on three datasets and show that the proposed method can effectively protect the attributions from attacks, regardless of the architecture of networks, training schemes and the size of the datasets.

Large language models trained on web-scale corpora can memorize undesirable data containing misinformation, copyrighted material, or private or sensitive information. Recently, several machine unlearning algorithms have been proposed to eliminate the effect of such datapoints from trained models -- that is, to approximate a model that had never been trained on these datapoints in the first place. However, evaluating the effectiveness of unlearning algorithms remains an open challenge. Previous work has relied on heuristics -- such as verifying that the model can no longer reproduce the specific information targeted for removal while maintaining accuracy on unrelated test data. These approaches inadequately capture the complete effect of reversing the influence of datapoints on a trained model. In this work, we propose the RESTOR framework for machine unlearning evaluation, which assesses the ability of unlearning algorithms for targeted data erasure, by evaluating the ability of models to forget the knowledge introduced in these datapoints, while simultaneously recovering the model's knowledge state had it never encountered these datapoints. RESTOR helps uncover several novel insights about popular unlearning algorithms, and the mechanisms through which they operate -- for instance, identifying that some algorithms merely emphasize forgetting but not recovering knowledge, and that localizing unlearning targets can enhance unlearning performance.

State-of-the-art membership inference attacks (MIAs) typically require training many reference models, making it difficult to scale these attacks to large pre-trained language models (LLMs). As a result, prior research has either relied on weaker attacks that avoid training reference models (e.g., fine-tuning attacks), or on stronger attacks applied to small-scale models and datasets. However, weaker attacks have been shown to be brittle - achieving close-to-arbitrary success - and insights from strong attacks in simplified settings do not translate to today's LLMs. These challenges have prompted an important question: are the limitations observed in prior work due to attack design choices, or are MIAs fundamentally ineffective on LLMs? We address this question by scaling LiRA - one of the strongest MIAs - to GPT-2 architectures ranging from 10M to 1B parameters, training reference models on over 20B tokens from the C4 dataset. Our results advance the understanding of MIAs on LLMs in three key ways: (1) strong MIAs can succeed on pre-trained LLMs; (2) their effectiveness, however, remains limited (e.g., AUC<0.7) in practical settings; and, (3) the relationship between MIA success and related privacy metrics is not as straightforward as prior work has suggested.

Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) are increasingly being used for a variety of ML applications on graph data. Because graph data does not follow the independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) assumption, adversarial manipulations or incorrect data can propagate to other data points through message passing, which deteriorates the model's performance. To allow model developers to remove the adverse effects of manipulated entities from a trained GNN, we study the recently formulated problem of Corrective Unlearning. We find that current graph unlearning methods fail to unlearn the effect of manipulations even when the whole manipulated set is known. We introduce a new graph unlearning method, Cognac, which can unlearn the effect of the manipulation set even when only 5% of it is identified. It recovers most of the performance of a strong oracle with fully corrected training data, even beating retraining from scratch without the deletion set while being 8x more efficient. We hope our work assists GNN developers in mitigating harmful effects caused by issues in real-world data post-training. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/varshitakolipaka/corrective-unlearning-for-gnns

Stakeholders -- from model developers to policymakers -- seek to minimize the dual-use risks of large language models (LLMs). An open challenge to this goal is whether technical safeguards can impede the misuse of LLMs, even when models are customizable via fine-tuning or when model weights are fully open. In response, several recent studies have proposed methods to produce durable LLM safeguards for open-weight LLMs that can withstand adversarial modifications of the model's weights via fine-tuning. This holds the promise of raising adversaries' costs even under strong threat models where adversaries can directly fine-tune model weights. However, in this paper, we urge for more careful characterization of the limits of these approaches. Through several case studies, we demonstrate that even evaluating these defenses is exceedingly difficult and can easily mislead audiences into thinking that safeguards are more durable than they really are. We draw lessons from the evaluation pitfalls that we identify and suggest future research carefully cabin claims to more constrained, well-defined, and rigorously examined threat models, which can provide more useful and candid assessments to stakeholders.

We present a demonstration of a large language model engaging in alignment faking: selectively complying with its training objective in training to prevent modification of its behavior out of training. First, we give Claude 3 Opus a system prompt stating it is being trained to answer all queries, even harmful ones, which conflicts with its prior training to refuse such queries. To allow the model to infer when it is in training, we say it will be trained only on conversations with free users, not paid users. We find the model complies with harmful queries from free users 14% of the time, versus almost never for paid users. Explaining this gap, in almost all cases where the model complies with a harmful query from a free user, we observe explicit alignment-faking reasoning, with the model stating it is strategically answering harmful queries in training to preserve its preferred harmlessness behavior out of training. Next, we study a more realistic setting where information about the training process is provided not in a system prompt, but by training on synthetic documents that mimic pre-training data--and observe similar alignment faking. Finally, we study the effect of actually training the model to comply with harmful queries via reinforcement learning, which we find increases the rate of alignment-faking reasoning to 78%, though also increases compliance even out of training. We additionally observe other behaviors such as the model exfiltrating its weights when given an easy opportunity. While we made alignment faking easier by telling the model when and by what criteria it was being trained, we did not instruct the model to fake alignment or give it any explicit goal. As future models might infer information about their training process without being told, our results suggest a risk of alignment faking in future models, whether due to a benign preference--as in this case--or not.

The study of adversarial vulnerabilities of deep neural networks (DNNs) has progressed rapidly. Existing attacks require either internal access (to the architecture, parameters, or training set of the victim model) or external access (to query the model). However, both the access may be infeasible or expensive in many scenarios. We investigate no-box adversarial examples, where the attacker can neither access the model information or the training set nor query the model. Instead, the attacker can only gather a small number of examples from the same problem domain as that of the victim model. Such a stronger threat model greatly expands the applicability of adversarial attacks. We propose three mechanisms for training with a very small dataset (on the order of tens of examples) and find that prototypical reconstruction is the most effective. Our experiments show that adversarial examples crafted on prototypical auto-encoding models transfer well to a variety of image classification and face verification models. On a commercial celebrity recognition system held by clarifai.com, our approach significantly diminishes the average prediction accuracy of the system to only 15.40%, which is on par with the attack that transfers adversarial examples from a pre-trained Arcface model.

With the growing applications of Deep Learning (DL), especially recent spectacular achievements of Large Language Models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT and LLaMA, the commercial significance of these remarkable models has soared. However, acquiring well-trained models is costly and resource-intensive. It requires a considerable high-quality dataset, substantial investment in dedicated architecture design, expensive computational resources, and efforts to develop technical expertise. Consequently, safeguarding the Intellectual Property (IP) of well-trained models is attracting increasing attention. In contrast to existing surveys overwhelmingly focusing on model IPP mainly, this survey not only encompasses the protection on model level intelligence but also valuable dataset intelligence. Firstly, according to the requirements for effective IPP design, this work systematically summarizes the general and scheme-specific performance evaluation metrics. Secondly, from proactive IP infringement prevention and reactive IP ownership verification perspectives, it comprehensively investigates and analyzes the existing IPP methods for both dataset and model intelligence. Additionally, from the standpoint of training settings, it delves into the unique challenges that distributed settings pose to IPP compared to centralized settings. Furthermore, this work examines various attacks faced by deep IPP techniques. Finally, we outline prospects for promising future directions that may act as a guide for innovative research.

Current text-to-image diffusion models have achieved groundbreaking results in image generation tasks. However, the unavoidable inclusion of sensitive information during pre-training introduces significant risks such as copyright infringement and privacy violations in the generated images. Machine Unlearning (MU) provides a effective way to the sensitive concepts captured by the model, has been shown to be a promising approach to addressing these issues. Nonetheless, existing MU methods for concept erasure encounter two primary bottlenecks: 1) generalization issues, where concept erasure is effective only for the data within the unlearn set, and prompts outside the unlearn set often still result in the generation of sensitive concepts; and 2) utility drop, where erasing target concepts significantly degrades the model's performance. To this end, this paper first proposes a concept domain correction framework for unlearning concepts in diffusion models. By aligning the output domains of sensitive concepts and anchor concepts through adversarial training, we enhance the generalizability of the unlearning results. Secondly, we devise a concept-preserving scheme based on gradient surgery. This approach alleviates the parts of the unlearning gradient that contradict the relearning gradient, ensuring that the process of unlearning minimally disrupts the model's performance. Finally, extensive experiments validate the effectiveness of our model, demonstrating our method's capability to address the challenges of concept unlearning in diffusion models while preserving model utility.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly being used in real-world applications, they remain vulnerable to prompt injection attacks: malicious third party prompts that subvert the intent of the system designer. To help researchers study this problem, we present a dataset of over 126,000 prompt injection attacks and 46,000 prompt-based "defenses" against prompt injection, all created by players of an online game called Tensor Trust. To the best of our knowledge, this is currently the largest dataset of human-generated adversarial examples for instruction-following LLMs. The attacks in our dataset have a lot of easily interpretable stucture, and shed light on the weaknesses of LLMs. We also use the dataset to create a benchmark for resistance to two types of prompt injection, which we refer to as prompt extraction and prompt hijacking. Our benchmark results show that many models are vulnerable to the attack strategies in the Tensor Trust dataset. Furthermore, we show that some attack strategies from the dataset generalize to deployed LLM-based applications, even though they have a very different set of constraints to the game. We release all data and source code at https://tensortrust.ai/paper

Semi-supervised machine learning (SSL) is gaining popularity as it reduces the cost of training ML models. It does so by using very small amounts of (expensive, well-inspected) labeled data and large amounts of (cheap, non-inspected) unlabeled data. SSL has shown comparable or even superior performances compared to conventional fully-supervised ML techniques. In this paper, we show that the key feature of SSL that it can learn from (non-inspected) unlabeled data exposes SSL to strong poisoning attacks. In fact, we argue that, due to its reliance on non-inspected unlabeled data, poisoning is a much more severe problem in SSL than in conventional fully-supervised ML. Specifically, we design a backdoor poisoning attack on SSL that can be conducted by a weak adversary with no knowledge of target SSL pipeline. This is unlike prior poisoning attacks in fully-supervised settings that assume strong adversaries with practically-unrealistic capabilities. We show that by poisoning only 0.2% of the unlabeled training data, our attack can cause misclassification of more than 80% of test inputs (when they contain the adversary's backdoor trigger). Our attacks remain effective across twenty combinations of benchmark datasets and SSL algorithms, and even circumvent the state-of-the-art defenses against backdoor attacks. Our work raises significant concerns about the practical utility of existing SSL algorithms.

With the introduction of data protection and privacy regulations, it has become crucial to remove the lineage of data on demand from a machine learning (ML) model. In the last few years, there have been notable developments in machine unlearning to remove the information of certain training data efficiently and effectively from ML models. In this work, we explore unlearning for the regression problem, particularly in deep learning models. Unlearning in classification and simple linear regression has been considerably investigated. However, unlearning in deep regression models largely remains an untouched problem till now. In this work, we introduce deep regression unlearning methods that generalize well and are robust to privacy attacks. We propose the Blindspot unlearning method which uses a novel weight optimization process. A randomly initialized model, partially exposed to the retain samples and a copy of the original model are used together to selectively imprint knowledge about the data that we wish to keep and scrub off the information of the data we wish to forget. We also propose a Gaussian fine tuning method for regression unlearning. The existing unlearning metrics for classification are not directly applicable to regression unlearning. Therefore, we adapt these metrics for the regression setting. We conduct regression unlearning experiments for computer vision, natural language processing and forecasting applications. Our methods show excellent performance for all these datasets across all the metrics. Source code: https://github.com/ayu987/deep-regression-unlearning

The LLM unlearning technique has recently been introduced to comply with data regulations and address the safety and ethical concerns of LLMs by removing the undesired data-model influence. However, state-of-the-art unlearning methods face a critical vulnerability: they are susceptible to ``relearning'' the removed information from a small number of forget data points, known as relearning attacks. In this paper, we systematically investigate how to make unlearned models robust against such attacks. For the first time, we establish a connection between robust unlearning and sharpness-aware minimization (SAM) through a unified robust optimization framework, in an analogy to adversarial training designed to defend against adversarial attacks. Our analysis for SAM reveals that smoothness optimization plays a pivotal role in mitigating relearning attacks. Thus, we further explore diverse smoothing strategies to enhance unlearning robustness. Extensive experiments on benchmark datasets, including WMDP and MUSE, demonstrate that SAM and other smoothness optimization approaches consistently improve the resistance of LLM unlearning to relearning attacks. Notably, smoothness-enhanced unlearning also helps defend against (input-level) jailbreaking attacks, broadening our proposal's impact in robustifying LLM unlearning. Codes are available at https://github.com/OPTML-Group/Unlearn-Smooth.

The proliferation of pre-trained models (PTMs) and datasets has led to the emergence of centralized model hubs like Hugging Face, which facilitate collaborative development and reuse. However, recent security reports have uncovered vulnerabilities and instances of malicious attacks within these platforms, highlighting growing security concerns. This paper presents the first systematic study of malicious code poisoning attacks on pre-trained model hubs, focusing on the Hugging Face platform. We conduct a comprehensive threat analysis, develop a taxonomy of model formats, and perform root cause analysis of vulnerable formats. While existing tools like Fickling and ModelScan offer some protection, they face limitations in semantic-level analysis and comprehensive threat detection. To address these challenges, we propose MalHug, an end-to-end pipeline tailored for Hugging Face that combines dataset loading script extraction, model deserialization, in-depth taint analysis, and heuristic pattern matching to detect and classify malicious code poisoning attacks in datasets and models. In collaboration with Ant Group, a leading financial technology company, we have implemented and deployed MalHug on a mirrored Hugging Face instance within their infrastructure, where it has been operational for over three months. During this period, MalHug has monitored more than 705K models and 176K datasets, uncovering 91 malicious models and 9 malicious dataset loading scripts. These findings reveal a range of security threats, including reverse shell, browser credential theft, and system reconnaissance. This work not only bridges a critical gap in understanding the security of the PTM supply chain but also provides a practical, industry-tested solution for enhancing the security of pre-trained model hubs.

We explore machine unlearning (MU) in the domain of large language models (LLMs), referred to as LLM unlearning. This initiative aims to eliminate undesirable data influence (e.g., sensitive or illegal information) and the associated model capabilities, while maintaining the integrity of essential knowledge generation and not affecting causally unrelated information. We envision LLM unlearning becoming a pivotal element in the life-cycle management of LLMs, potentially standing as an essential foundation for developing generative AI that is not only safe, secure, and trustworthy, but also resource-efficient without the need of full retraining. We navigate the unlearning landscape in LLMs from conceptual formulation, methodologies, metrics, and applications. In particular, we highlight the often-overlooked aspects of existing LLM unlearning research, e.g., unlearning scope, data-model interaction, and multifaceted efficacy assessment. We also draw connections between LLM unlearning and related areas such as model editing, influence functions, model explanation, adversarial training, and reinforcement learning. Furthermore, we outline an effective assessment framework for LLM unlearning and explore its applications in copyright and privacy safeguards and sociotechnical harm reduction.

Recent work has demonstrated that deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples---inputs that are almost indistinguishable from natural data and yet classified incorrectly by the network. In fact, some of the latest findings suggest that the existence of adversarial attacks may be an inherent weakness of deep learning models. To address this problem, we study the adversarial robustness of neural networks through the lens of robust optimization. This approach provides us with a broad and unifying view on much of the prior work on this topic. Its principled nature also enables us to identify methods for both training and attacking neural networks that are reliable and, in a certain sense, universal. In particular, they specify a concrete security guarantee that would protect against any adversary. These methods let us train networks with significantly improved resistance to a wide range of adversarial attacks. They also suggest the notion of security against a first-order adversary as a natural and broad security guarantee. We believe that robustness against such well-defined classes of adversaries is an important stepping stone towards fully resistant deep learning models. Code and pre-trained models are available at https://github.com/MadryLab/mnist_challenge and https://github.com/MadryLab/cifar10_challenge.

Language models (LMs) are trained on vast amounts of text data, which may include private and copyrighted content. Data owners may request the removal of their data from a trained model due to privacy or copyright concerns. However, exactly unlearning only these datapoints (i.e., retraining with the data removed) is intractable in modern-day models. This has led to the development of many approximate unlearning algorithms. The evaluation of the efficacy of these algorithms has traditionally been narrow in scope, failing to precisely quantify the success and practicality of the algorithm from the perspectives of both the model deployers and the data owners. We address this issue by proposing MUSE, a comprehensive machine unlearning evaluation benchmark that enumerates six diverse desirable properties for unlearned models: (1) no verbatim memorization, (2) no knowledge memorization, (3) no privacy leakage, (4) utility preservation on data not intended for removal, (5) scalability with respect to the size of removal requests, and (6) sustainability over sequential unlearning requests. Using these criteria, we benchmark how effectively eight popular unlearning algorithms on 7B-parameter LMs can unlearn Harry Potter books and news articles. Our results demonstrate that most algorithms can prevent verbatim memorization and knowledge memorization to varying degrees, but only one algorithm does not lead to severe privacy leakage. Furthermore, existing algorithms fail to meet deployer's expectations because they often degrade general model utility and also cannot sustainably accommodate successive unlearning requests or large-scale content removal. Our findings identify key issues with the practicality of existing unlearning algorithms on language models, and we release our benchmark to facilitate further evaluations: muse-bench.github.io

Model adaptation aims at solving the domain transfer problem under the constraint of only accessing the pretrained source models. With the increasing considerations of data privacy and transmission efficiency, this paradigm has been gaining recent popularity. This paper studies the vulnerability to universal attacks transferred from the source domain during model adaptation algorithms due to the existence of the malicious providers. We explore both universal adversarial perturbations and backdoor attacks as loopholes on the source side and discover that they still survive in the target models after adaptation. To address this issue, we propose a model preprocessing framework, named AdaptGuard, to improve the security of model adaptation algorithms. AdaptGuard avoids direct use of the risky source parameters through knowledge distillation and utilizes the pseudo adversarial samples under adjusted radius to enhance the robustness. AdaptGuard is a plug-and-play module that requires neither robust pretrained models nor any changes for the following model adaptation algorithms. Extensive results on three commonly used datasets and two popular adaptation methods validate that AdaptGuard can effectively defend against universal attacks and maintain clean accuracy in the target domain simultaneously. We hope this research will shed light on the safety and robustness of transfer learning.

Machine learning models are often used to decide who will receive a loan, a job interview, or a public benefit. Standard techniques to build these models use features about people but overlook their actionability. In turn, models can assign predictions that are fixed, meaning that consumers who are denied loans, interviews, or benefits may be permanently locked out from access to credit, employment, or assistance. In this work, we introduce a formal testing procedure to flag models that assign fixed predictions that we call recourse verification. We develop machinery to reliably determine if a given model can provide recourse to its decision subjects from a set of user-specified actionability constraints. We demonstrate how our tools can ensure recourse and adversarial robustness in real-world datasets and use them to study the infeasibility of recourse in real-world lending datasets. Our results highlight how models can inadvertently assign fixed predictions that permanently bar access, and we provide tools to design algorithms that account for actionability when developing models.

Recent advances show that scaling a pre-trained language model could achieve state-of-the-art performance on many downstream tasks, prompting large language models (LLMs) to become a hot research topic in the field of artificial intelligence. However, due to the resource-intensive nature of training LLMs from scratch, it is urgent and crucial to protect the intellectual property of LLMs against infringement. This has motivated the authors in this paper to propose a novel black-box fingerprinting technique for LLMs, which requires neither model training nor model fine-tuning. We first demonstrate that the outputs of LLMs span a unique vector space associated with each model. We model the problem of ownership authentication as the task of evaluating the similarity between the victim model's space and the output's space of the suspect model. To deal with this problem, we propose two solutions, where the first solution involves verifying whether the outputs of the suspected large model are in the same space as those of the victim model, enabling rapid identification of model infringement, and the second one reconstructs the union of the vector spaces for LLM outputs and the victim model to address situations where the victim model has undergone the Parameter-Efficient Fine-Tuning (PEFT) attacks. Experimental results indicate that the proposed technique achieves superior performance in ownership verification and robustness against PEFT attacks. This work reveals inherent characteristics of LLMs and provides a promising solution for ownership verification of LLMs in black-box scenarios, ensuring efficiency, generality and practicality.

Pretrained Language Models (LMs) memorize a vast amount of knowledge during initial pretraining, including information that may violate the privacy of personal lives and identities. Previous work addressing privacy issues for language models has mostly focused on data preprocessing and differential privacy methods, both requiring re-training the underlying LM. We propose knowledge unlearning as an alternative method to reduce privacy risks for LMs post hoc. We show that simply performing gradient ascent on target token sequences is effective at forgetting them with little to no degradation of general language modeling performances for larger LMs; it sometimes even substantially improves the underlying LM with just a few iterations. We also find that sequential unlearning is better than trying to unlearn all the data at once and that unlearning is highly dependent on which kind of data (domain) is forgotten. By showing comparisons with a previous data preprocessing method and a decoding method known to mitigate privacy risks for LMs, we show that unlearning can give a stronger empirical privacy guarantee in scenarios where the data vulnerable to extraction attacks are known a priori while being much more efficient and robust. We release the code and dataset needed to replicate our results at https://github.com/joeljang/knowledge-unlearning.

Rapid advances in the capabilities of large language models (LLMs) have raised widespread concerns regarding their potential for malicious use. Open-weight LLMs present unique challenges, as existing safeguards lack robustness to tampering attacks that modify model weights. For example, recent works have demonstrated that refusal and unlearning safeguards can be trivially removed with a few steps of fine-tuning. These vulnerabilities necessitate new approaches for enabling the safe release of open-weight LLMs. We develop a method, called TAR, for building tamper-resistant safeguards into open-weight LLMs such that adversaries cannot remove the safeguards even after thousands of steps of fine-tuning. In extensive evaluations and red teaming analyses, we find that our method greatly improves tamper-resistance while preserving benign capabilities. Our results demonstrate that tamper-resistance is a tractable problem, opening up a promising new avenue to improve the safety and security of open-weight LLMs.

Large language models are pre-trained on uncurated text datasets consisting of trillions of tokens scraped from the Web. Prior work has shown that: (1) web-scraped pre-training datasets can be practically poisoned by malicious actors; and (2) adversaries can compromise language models after poisoning fine-tuning datasets. Our work evaluates for the first time whether language models can also be compromised during pre-training, with a focus on the persistence of pre-training attacks after models are fine-tuned as helpful and harmless chatbots (i.e., after SFT and DPO). We pre-train a series of LLMs from scratch to measure the impact of a potential poisoning adversary under four different attack objectives (denial-of-service, belief manipulation, jailbreaking, and prompt stealing), and across a wide range of model sizes (from 600M to 7B). Our main result is that poisoning only 0.1% of a model's pre-training dataset is sufficient for three out of four attacks to measurably persist through post-training. Moreover, simple attacks like denial-of-service persist through post-training with a poisoning rate of only 0.001%.

We introduce the concept of "universal password model" -- a password model that, once pre-trained, can automatically adapt its guessing strategy based on the target system. To achieve this, the model does not need to access any plaintext passwords from the target credentials. Instead, it exploits users' auxiliary information, such as email addresses, as a proxy signal to predict the underlying password distribution. Specifically, the model uses deep learning to capture the correlation between the auxiliary data of a group of users (e.g., users of a web application) and their passwords. It then exploits those patterns to create a tailored password model for the target system at inference time. No further training steps, targeted data collection, or prior knowledge of the community's password distribution is required. Besides improving over current password strength estimation techniques and attacks, the model enables any end-user (e.g., system administrators) to autonomously generate tailored password models for their systems without the often unworkable requirements of collecting suitable training data and fitting the underlying machine learning model. Ultimately, our framework enables the democratization of well-calibrated password models to the community, addressing a major challenge in the deployment of password security solutions at scale.

Recent work has explored how to train machine learning models which do not discriminate against any subgroup of the population as determined by sensitive attributes such as gender or race. To avoid disparate treatment, sensitive attributes should not be considered. On the other hand, in order to avoid disparate impact, sensitive attributes must be examined, e.g., in order to learn a fair model, or to check if a given model is fair. We introduce methods from secure multi-party computation which allow us to avoid both. By encrypting sensitive attributes, we show how an outcome-based fair model may be learned, checked, or have its outputs verified and held to account, without users revealing their sensitive attributes.

In this study, we tackle a growing concern around the safety and ethical use of large language models (LLMs). Despite their potential, these models can be tricked into producing harmful or unethical content through various sophisticated methods, including 'jailbreaking' techniques and targeted manipulation. Our work zeroes in on a specific issue: to what extent LLMs can be led astray by asking them to generate responses that are instruction-centric such as a pseudocode, a program or a software snippet as opposed to vanilla text. To investigate this question, we introduce TechHazardQA, a dataset containing complex queries which should be answered in both text and instruction-centric formats (e.g., pseudocodes), aimed at identifying triggers for unethical responses. We query a series of LLMs -- Llama-2-13b, Llama-2-7b, Mistral-V2 and Mistral 8X7B -- and ask them to generate both text and instruction-centric responses. For evaluation we report the harmfulness score metric as well as judgements from GPT-4 and humans. Overall, we observe that asking LLMs to produce instruction-centric responses enhances the unethical response generation by ~2-38% across the models. As an additional objective, we investigate the impact of model editing using the ROME technique, which further increases the propensity for generating undesirable content. In particular, asking edited LLMs to generate instruction-centric responses further increases the unethical response generation by ~3-16% across the different models.

In a model inversion (MI) attack, an adversary abuses access to a machine learning (ML) model to infer and reconstruct private training data. Remarkable progress has been made in the white-box and black-box setups, where the adversary has access to the complete model or the model's soft output respectively. However, there is very limited study in the most challenging but practically important setup: Label-only MI attacks, where the adversary only has access to the model's predicted label (hard label) without confidence scores nor any other model information. In this work, we propose LOKT, a novel approach for label-only MI attacks. Our idea is based on transfer of knowledge from the opaque target model to surrogate models. Subsequently, using these surrogate models, our approach can harness advanced white-box attacks. We propose knowledge transfer based on generative modelling, and introduce a new model, Target model-assisted ACGAN (T-ACGAN), for effective knowledge transfer. Our method casts the challenging label-only MI into the more tractable white-box setup. We provide analysis to support that surrogate models based on our approach serve as effective proxies for the target model for MI. Our experiments show that our method significantly outperforms existing SOTA Label-only MI attack by more than 15% across all MI benchmarks. Furthermore, our method compares favorably in terms of query budget. Our study highlights rising privacy threats for ML models even when minimal information (i.e., hard labels) is exposed. Our study highlights rising privacy threats for ML models even when minimal information (i.e., hard labels) is exposed. Our code, demo, models and reconstructed data are available at our project page: https://ngoc-nguyen-0.github.io/lokt/

The rapid advancement of large models, driven by their exceptional abilities in learning and generalization through large-scale pre-training, has reshaped the landscape of Artificial Intelligence (AI). These models are now foundational to a wide range of applications, including conversational AI, recommendation systems, autonomous driving, content generation, medical diagnostics, and scientific discovery. However, their widespread deployment also exposes them to significant safety risks, raising concerns about robustness, reliability, and ethical implications. This survey provides a systematic review of current safety research on large models, covering Vision Foundation Models (VFMs), Large Language Models (LLMs), Vision-Language Pre-training (VLP) models, Vision-Language Models (VLMs), Diffusion Models (DMs), and large-model-based Agents. Our contributions are summarized as follows: (1) We present a comprehensive taxonomy of safety threats to these models, including adversarial attacks, data poisoning, backdoor attacks, jailbreak and prompt injection attacks, energy-latency attacks, data and model extraction attacks, and emerging agent-specific threats. (2) We review defense strategies proposed for each type of attacks if available and summarize the commonly used datasets and benchmarks for safety research. (3) Building on this, we identify and discuss the open challenges in large model safety, emphasizing the need for comprehensive safety evaluations, scalable and effective defense mechanisms, and sustainable data practices. More importantly, we highlight the necessity of collective efforts from the research community and international collaboration. Our work can serve as a useful reference for researchers and practitioners, fostering the ongoing development of comprehensive defense systems and platforms to safeguard AI models.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have exploded a new heatwave of AI, for their ability to engage end-users in human-level conversations with detailed and articulate answers across many knowledge domains. In response to their fast adoption in many industrial applications, this survey concerns their safety and trustworthiness. First, we review known vulnerabilities of the LLMs, categorising them into inherent issues, intended attacks, and unintended bugs. Then, we consider if and how the Verification and Validation (V&V) techniques, which have been widely developed for traditional software and deep learning models such as convolutional neural networks, can be integrated and further extended throughout the lifecycle of the LLMs to provide rigorous analysis to the safety and trustworthiness of LLMs and their applications. Specifically, we consider four complementary techniques: falsification and evaluation, verification, runtime monitoring, and ethical use. Considering the fast development of LLMs, this survey does not intend to be complete (although it includes 300 references), especially when it comes to the applications of LLMs in various domains, but rather a collection of organised literature reviews and discussions to support the quick understanding of the safety and trustworthiness issues from the perspective of V&V.

Releasing open-source large language models (LLMs) presents a dual-use risk since bad actors can easily fine-tune these models for harmful purposes. Even without the open release of weights, weight stealing and fine-tuning APIs make closed models vulnerable to harmful fine-tuning attacks (HFAs). While safety measures like preventing jailbreaks and improving safety guardrails are important, such measures can easily be reversed through fine-tuning. In this work, we propose Representation Noising (RepNoise), a defence mechanism that is effective even when attackers have access to the weights and the defender no longer has any control. RepNoise works by removing information about harmful representations such that it is difficult to recover them during fine-tuning. Importantly, our defence is also able to generalize across different subsets of harm that have not been seen during the defence process. Our method does not degrade the general capability of LLMs and retains the ability to train the model on harmless tasks. We provide empirical evidence that the effectiveness of our defence lies in its "depth": the degree to which information about harmful representations is removed across all layers of the LLM.

The rapid development of large language models (LLMs) has significantly improved the generation of fluent and convincing text, raising concerns about their misuse on social media platforms. We present a methodology using Twitter datasets to examine the generative capabilities of four LLMs: Llama 3, Mistral, Qwen2, and GPT4o. We evaluate 7B and 8B parameter base-instruction models of the three open-source LLMs and validate the impact of further fine-tuning and "uncensored" versions. Our findings show that "uncensored" models with additional in-domain fine-tuning dramatically reduce the effectiveness of automated detection methods. This study addresses a gap by exploring smaller open-source models and the effects of "uncensoring," providing insights into how fine-tuning and content moderation influence machine-generated text detection.

The ubiquity of large-scale Pre-Trained Models (PTMs) is on the rise, sparking interest in model hubs, and dedicated platforms for hosting PTMs. Despite this trend, a comprehensive exploration of the challenges that users encounter and how the community leverages PTMs remains lacking. To address this gap, we conducted an extensive mixed-methods empirical study by focusing on discussion forums and the model hub of HuggingFace, the largest public model hub. Based on our qualitative analysis, we present a taxonomy of the challenges and benefits associated with PTM reuse within this community. We then conduct a quantitative study to track model-type trends and model documentation evolution over time. Our findings highlight prevalent challenges such as limited guidance for beginner users, struggles with model output comprehensibility in training or inference, and a lack of model understanding. We also identified interesting trends among models where some models maintain high upload rates despite a decline in topics related to them. Additionally, we found that despite the introduction of model documentation tools, its quantity has not increased over time, leading to difficulties in model comprehension and selection among users. Our study sheds light on new challenges in reusing PTMs that were not reported before and we provide recommendations for various stakeholders involved in PTM reuse.

Despite the advanced capabilities of contemporary machine learning (ML) models, they remain vulnerable to adversarial and backdoor attacks. This vulnerability is particularly concerning in real-world deployments, where compromised models may exhibit unpredictable behavior in critical scenarios. Such risks are heightened by the prevalent practice of collecting massive, internet-sourced datasets for training multimodal models, as these datasets may harbor backdoors. Various techniques have been proposed to mitigate the effects of backdooring in multimodal models, such as CleanCLIP, which is the current state-of-the-art approach. In this work, we demonstrate that the efficacy of CleanCLIP in mitigating backdoors is highly dependent on the particular objective used during model pre-training. We observe that stronger pre-training objectives that lead to higher zero-shot classification performance correlate with harder to remove backdoors behaviors. We show this by training multimodal models on two large datasets consisting of 3 million (CC3M) and 6 million (CC6M) datapoints, under various pre-training objectives, followed by poison removal using CleanCLIP. We find that CleanCLIP, even with extensive hyperparameter tuning, is ineffective in poison removal when stronger pre-training objectives are used. Our findings underscore critical considerations for ML practitioners who train models using large-scale web-curated data and are concerned about potential backdoor threats.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have led to significant improvements in many tasks across various domains, such as code interpretation, response generation, and ambiguity handling. These LLMs, however, when upgrading, primarily prioritize enhancing user experience while neglecting security, privacy, and safety implications. Consequently, unintended vulnerabilities or biases can be introduced. Previous studies have predominantly focused on specific versions of the models and disregard the potential emergence of new attack vectors targeting the updated versions. Through the lens of adversarial examples within the in-context learning framework, this longitudinal study addresses this gap by conducting a comprehensive assessment of the robustness of successive versions of LLMs, vis-\`a-vis GPT-3.5. We conduct extensive experiments to analyze and understand the impact of the robustness in two distinct learning categories: zero-shot learning and few-shot learning. Our findings indicate that, in comparison to earlier versions of LLMs, the updated versions do not exhibit the anticipated level of robustness against adversarial attacks. In addition, our study emphasizes the increased effectiveness of synergized adversarial queries in most zero-shot learning and few-shot learning cases. We hope that our study can lead to a more refined assessment of the robustness of LLMs over time and provide valuable insights of these models for both developers and users.

Generative diffusion models, including Stable Diffusion and Midjourney, can generate visually appealing, diverse, and high-resolution images for various applications. These models are trained on billions of internet-sourced images, raising significant concerns about the potential unauthorized use of copyright-protected images. In this paper, we examine whether it is possible to determine if a specific image was used in the training set, a problem known in the cybersecurity community and referred to as a membership inference attack. Our focus is on Stable Diffusion, and we address the challenge of designing a fair evaluation framework to answer this membership question. We propose a methodology to establish a fair evaluation setup and apply it to Stable Diffusion, enabling potential extensions to other generative models. Utilizing this evaluation setup, we execute membership attacks (both known and newly introduced). Our research reveals that previously proposed evaluation setups do not provide a full understanding of the effectiveness of membership inference attacks. We conclude that the membership inference attack remains a significant challenge for large diffusion models (often deployed as black-box systems), indicating that related privacy and copyright issues will persist in the foreseeable future.

Standard training datasets for deep learning often contain objects in common settings (e.g., "a horse on grass" or "a ship in water") since they are usually collected by randomly scraping the web. Uncommon and rare settings (e.g., "a plane on water", "a car in snowy weather") are thus severely under-represented in the training data. This can lead to an undesirable bias in model predictions towards common settings and create a false sense of accuracy. In this paper, we introduce FOCUS (Familiar Objects in Common and Uncommon Settings), a dataset for stress-testing the generalization power of deep image classifiers. By leveraging the power of modern search engines, we deliberately gather data containing objects in common and uncommon settings in a wide range of locations, weather conditions, and time of day. We present a detailed analysis of the performance of various popular image classifiers on our dataset and demonstrate a clear drop in performance when classifying images in uncommon settings. By analyzing deep features of these models, we show that such errors can be due to the use of spurious features in model predictions. We believe that our dataset will aid researchers in understanding the inability of deep models to generalize well to uncommon settings and drive future work on improving their distributional robustness.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit remarkable capabilities in understanding and generating natural language. However, these models can inadvertently memorize private information, posing significant privacy risks. This study addresses the challenge of enabling LLMs to protect specific individuals' private data without the need for complete retraining. We propose \return, a Real-world pErsonal daTa UnleaRNing dataset, comprising 2,492 individuals from Wikipedia with associated QA pairs, to evaluate machine unlearning (MU) methods for protecting personal data in a realistic scenario. Additionally, we introduce the Name-Aware Unlearning Framework (NAUF) for Privacy Protection, which enables the model to learn which individuals' information should be protected without affecting its ability to answer questions related to other unrelated individuals. Our extensive experiments demonstrate that NAUF achieves a state-of-the-art average unlearning score, surpassing the best baseline method by 5.65 points, effectively protecting target individuals' personal data while maintaining the model's general capabilities.

Evaluations of large language model (LLM) risks and capabilities are increasingly being incorporated into AI risk management and governance frameworks. Currently, most risk evaluations are conducted by designing inputs that elicit harmful behaviors from the system. However, a fundamental limitation of this approach is that the harmfulness of the behaviors identified during any particular evaluation can only lower bound the model's worst-possible-case behavior. As a complementary method for eliciting harmful behaviors, we propose evaluating LLMs with model tampering attacks which allow for modifications to latent activations or weights. We pit state-of-the-art techniques for removing harmful LLM capabilities against a suite of 5 input-space and 6 model tampering attacks. In addition to benchmarking these methods against each other, we show that (1) model resilience to capability elicitation attacks lies on a low-dimensional robustness subspace; (2) the attack success rate of model tampering attacks can empirically predict and offer conservative estimates for the success of held-out input-space attacks; and (3) state-of-the-art unlearning methods can easily be undone within 16 steps of fine-tuning. Together these results highlight the difficulty of removing harmful LLM capabilities and show that model tampering attacks enable substantially more rigorous evaluations than input-space attacks alone. We release models at https://huggingface.co/LLM-GAT

Membership inference attacks (MIAs) aim to determine whether a specific sample was used to train a predictive model. Knowing this may indeed lead to a privacy breach. Most MIAs, however, make use of the model's prediction scores - the probability of each output given some input - following the intuition that the trained model tends to behave differently on its training data. We argue that this is a fallacy for many modern deep network architectures. Consequently, MIAs will miserably fail since overconfidence leads to high false-positive rates not only on known domains but also on out-of-distribution data and implicitly acts as a defense against MIAs. Specifically, using generative adversarial networks, we are able to produce a potentially infinite number of samples falsely classified as part of the training data. In other words, the threat of MIAs is overestimated, and less information is leaked than previously assumed. Moreover, there is actually a trade-off between the overconfidence of models and their susceptibility to MIAs: the more classifiers know when they do not know, making low confidence predictions, the more they reveal the training data.

Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS) is often provided as a pay-per-query, black-box system to clients. Such a black-box approach not only hinders open replication, validation, and interpretation of model results, but also makes it harder for white-hat researchers to identify vulnerabilities in the MLaaS systems. Model extraction is a promising technique to address these challenges by reverse-engineering black-box models. Since training data is typically unavailable for MLaaS models, this paper focuses on the realistic version of it: data-free model extraction. We propose a data-free model extraction approach, CaBaGe, to achieve higher model extraction accuracy with a small number of queries. Our innovations include (1) a novel experience replay for focusing on difficult training samples; (2) an ensemble of generators for steadily producing diverse synthetic data; and (3) a selective filtering process for querying the victim model with harder, more balanced samples. In addition, we create a more realistic setting, for the first time, where the attacker has no knowledge of the number of classes in the victim training data, and create a solution to learn the number of classes on the fly. Our evaluation shows that CaBaGe outperforms existing techniques on seven datasets -- MNIST, FMNIST, SVHN, CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, ImageNet-subset, and Tiny ImageNet -- with an accuracy improvement of the extracted models by up to 43.13%. Furthermore, the number of queries required to extract a clone model matching the final accuracy of prior work is reduced by up to 75.7%.

Recent developments in Large Language Models (LLMs) have manifested significant advancements. To facilitate safeguards against malicious exploitation, a body of research has concentrated on aligning LLMs with human preferences and inhibiting their generation of inappropriate content. Unfortunately, such alignments are often vulnerable: fine-tuning with a minimal amount of harmful data can easily unalign the target LLM. While being effective, such fine-tuning-based unalignment approaches also have their own limitations: (1) non-stealthiness, after fine-tuning, safety audits or red-teaming can easily expose the potential weaknesses of the unaligned models, thereby precluding their release/use. (2) non-persistence, the unaligned LLMs can be easily repaired through re-alignment, i.e., fine-tuning again with aligned data points. In this work, we show that it is possible to conduct stealthy and persistent unalignment on large language models via backdoor injections. We also provide a novel understanding on the relationship between the backdoor persistence and the activation pattern and further provide guidelines for potential trigger design. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that our proposed stealthy and persistent unalignment can successfully pass the safety evaluation while maintaining strong persistence against re-alignment defense.

Large language models trained on massive corpora of data from the web can memorize and reproduce sensitive or private data raising both legal and ethical concerns. Unlearning, or tuning models to forget information present in their training data, provides us with a way to protect private data after training. Although several methods exist for such unlearning, it is unclear to what extent they result in models equivalent to those where the data to be forgotten was never learned in the first place. To address this challenge, we present TOFU, a Task of Fictitious Unlearning, as a benchmark aimed at helping deepen our understanding of unlearning. We offer a dataset of 200 diverse synthetic author profiles, each consisting of 20 question-answer pairs, and a subset of these profiles called the forget set that serves as the target for unlearning. We compile a suite of metrics that work together to provide a holistic picture of unlearning efficacy. Finally, we provide a set of baseline results from existing unlearning algorithms. Importantly, none of the baselines we consider show effective unlearning motivating continued efforts to develop approaches for unlearning that effectively tune models so that they truly behave as if they were never trained on the forget data at all.

Modern machine learning systems use models trained on ever-growing corpora. Typically, metadata such as ownership, access control, or licensing information is ignored during training. Instead, to mitigate privacy risks, we rely on generic techniques such as dataset sanitization and differentially private model training, with inherent privacy/utility trade-offs that hurt model performance. Moreover, these techniques have limitations in scenarios where sensitive information is shared across multiple participants and fine-grained access control is required. By ignoring metadata, we therefore miss an opportunity to better address security, privacy, and confidentiality challenges. In this paper, we take an information flow control perspective to describe machine learning systems, which allows us to leverage metadata such as access control policies and define clear-cut privacy and confidentiality guarantees with interpretable information flows. Under this perspective, we contrast two different approaches to achieve user-level non-interference: 1) fine-tuning per-user models, and 2) retrieval augmented models that access user-specific datasets at inference time. We compare these two approaches to a trivially non-interfering zero-shot baseline using a public model and to a baseline that fine-tunes this model on the whole corpus. We evaluate trained models on two datasets of scientific articles and demonstrate that retrieval augmented architectures deliver the best utility, scalability, and flexibility while satisfying strict non-interference guarantees.

Indiscriminate data poisoning attacks aim to decrease a model's test accuracy by injecting a small amount of corrupted training data. Despite significant interest, existing attacks remain relatively ineffective against modern machine learning (ML) architectures. In this work, we introduce the notion of model poisoning reachability as a technical tool to explore the intrinsic limits of data poisoning attacks towards target parameters (i.e., model-targeted attacks). We derive an easily computable threshold to establish and quantify a surprising phase transition phenomenon among popular ML models: data poisoning attacks can achieve certain target parameters only when the poisoning ratio exceeds our threshold. Building on existing parameter corruption attacks and refining the Gradient Canceling attack, we perform extensive experiments to confirm our theoretical findings, test the predictability of our transition threshold, and significantly improve existing indiscriminate data poisoning baselines over a range of datasets and models. Our work highlights the critical role played by the poisoning ratio, and sheds new insights on existing empirical results, attacks and mitigation strategies in data poisoning.

Machine unlearning is a promising paradigm for removing unwanted data samples from a trained model, towards ensuring compliance with privacy regulations and limiting harmful biases. Although unlearning has been shown in, e.g., classification and recommendation systems, its potential in medical image-to-image translation, specifically in image recon-struction, has not been thoroughly investigated. This paper shows that machine unlearning is possible in MRI tasks and has the potential to benefit for bias removal. We set up a protocol to study how much shared knowledge exists between datasets of different organs, allowing us to effectively quantify the effect of unlearning. Our study reveals that combining training data can lead to hallucinations and reduced image quality in the reconstructed data. We use unlearning to remove hallucinations as a proxy exemplar of undesired data removal. Indeed, we show that machine unlearning is possible without full retraining. Furthermore, our observations indicate that maintaining high performance is feasible even when using only a subset of retain data. We have made our code publicly accessible.

Pretrained language models sometimes possess knowledge that we do not wish them to, including memorized personal information and knowledge that could be used to harm people. They can also output toxic or harmful text. To mitigate these safety and informational issues, we propose an attack-and-defense framework for studying the task of deleting sensitive information directly from model weights. We study direct edits to model weights because (1) this approach should guarantee that particular deleted information is never extracted by future prompt attacks, and (2) it should protect against whitebox attacks, which is necessary for making claims about safety/privacy in a setting where publicly available model weights could be used to elicit sensitive information. Our threat model assumes that an attack succeeds if the answer to a sensitive question is located among a set of B generated candidates, based on scenarios where the information would be insecure if the answer is among B candidates. Experimentally, we show that even state-of-the-art model editing methods such as ROME struggle to truly delete factual information from models like GPT-J, as our whitebox and blackbox attacks can recover "deleted" information from an edited model 38% of the time. These attacks leverage two key observations: (1) that traces of deleted information can be found in intermediate model hidden states, and (2) that applying an editing method for one question may not delete information across rephrased versions of the question. Finally, we provide new defense methods that protect against some extraction attacks, but we do not find a single universally effective defense method. Our results suggest that truly deleting sensitive information is a tractable but difficult problem, since even relatively low attack success rates have potentially severe societal implications for real-world deployment of language models.

Language model attacks typically assume one of two extreme threat models: full white-box access to model weights, or black-box access limited to a text generation API. However, real-world APIs are often more flexible than just text generation: these APIs expose "gray-box" access leading to new threat vectors. To explore this, we red-team three new functionalities exposed in the GPT-4 APIs: fine-tuning, function calling and knowledge retrieval. We find that fine-tuning a model on as few as 15 harmful examples or 100 benign examples can remove core safeguards from GPT-4, enabling a range of harmful outputs. Furthermore, we find that GPT-4 Assistants readily divulge the function call schema and can be made to execute arbitrary function calls. Finally, we find that knowledge retrieval can be hijacked by injecting instructions into retrieval documents. These vulnerabilities highlight that any additions to the functionality exposed by an API can create new vulnerabilities.

It is becoming increasingly clear that many machine learning classifiers are vulnerable to adversarial examples. In attempting to explain the origin of adversarial examples, previous studies have typically focused on the fact that neural networks operate on high dimensional data, they overfit, or they are too linear. Here we argue that the origin of adversarial examples is primarily due to an inherent uncertainty that neural networks have about their predictions. We show that the functional form of this uncertainty is independent of architecture, dataset, and training protocol; and depends only on the statistics of the logit differences of the network, which do not change significantly during training. This leads to adversarial error having a universal scaling, as a power-law, with respect to the size of the adversarial perturbation. We show that this universality holds for a broad range of datasets (MNIST, CIFAR10, ImageNet, and random data), models (including state-of-the-art deep networks, linear models, adversarially trained networks, and networks trained on randomly shuffled labels), and attacks (FGSM, step l.l., PGD). Motivated by these results, we study the effects of reducing prediction entropy on adversarial robustness. Finally, we study the effect of network architectures on adversarial sensitivity. To do this, we use neural architecture search with reinforcement learning to find adversarially robust architectures on CIFAR10. Our resulting architecture is more robust to white and black box attacks compared to previous attempts.

Modern machine learning models are sensitive to the manipulation of both the training data (poisoning attacks) and inference data (adversarial examples). Recognizing this issue, the community has developed many empirical defenses against both attacks and, more recently, provable certification methods against inference-time attacks. However, such guarantees are still largely lacking for training-time attacks. In this work, we present FullCert, the first end-to-end certifier with sound, deterministic bounds, which proves robustness against both training-time and inference-time attacks. We first bound all possible perturbations an adversary can make to the training data under the considered threat model. Using these constraints, we bound the perturbations' influence on the model's parameters. Finally, we bound the impact of these parameter changes on the model's prediction, resulting in joint robustness guarantees against poisoning and adversarial examples. To facilitate this novel certification paradigm, we combine our theoretical work with a new open-source library BoundFlow, which enables model training on bounded datasets. We experimentally demonstrate FullCert's feasibility on two different datasets.

Despite the superior capabilities of Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) across diverse tasks, they still face significant trustworthiness challenges. Yet, current literature on the assessment of trustworthy MLLMs remains limited, lacking a holistic evaluation to offer thorough insights into future improvements. In this work, we establish MultiTrust, the first comprehensive and unified benchmark on the trustworthiness of MLLMs across five primary aspects: truthfulness, safety, robustness, fairness, and privacy. Our benchmark employs a rigorous evaluation strategy that addresses both multimodal risks and cross-modal impacts, encompassing 32 diverse tasks with self-curated datasets. Extensive experiments with 21 modern MLLMs reveal some previously unexplored trustworthiness issues and risks, highlighting the complexities introduced by the multimodality and underscoring the necessity for advanced methodologies to enhance their reliability. For instance, typical proprietary models still struggle with the perception of visually confusing images and are vulnerable to multimodal jailbreaking and adversarial attacks; MLLMs are more inclined to disclose privacy in text and reveal ideological and cultural biases even when paired with irrelevant images in inference, indicating that the multimodality amplifies the internal risks from base LLMs. Additionally, we release a scalable toolbox for standardized trustworthiness research, aiming to facilitate future advancements in this important field. Code and resources are publicly available at: https://multi-trust.github.io/.

Large language models (LLMs) struggle with multi-step reasoning, where inference-time scaling has emerged as a promising strategy for performance improvement. Verifier-guided search outperforms repeated sampling when sample size is limited by selecting and prioritizing valid reasoning paths. However, we identify a critical limitation: scaling flaws, prevalent across different models (Mistral 7B and DeepSeekMath 7B), benchmarks (GSM8K and MATH), and verifiers (outcome value models and process reward models). As sample size increases, verifier-guided search exhibits diminishing advantages and eventually underperforms repeated sampling. Our analysis attributes this to verifier failures, where imperfect verifiers misrank candidates and erroneously prune all valid paths. These issues are further exacerbated in challenging and out-of-distribution problems, restricting search effectiveness. To mitigate verifier failures, we explore reducing reliance on verifiers and conduct preliminary investigations using two simple methods. Our findings reveal fundamental limitations in verifier-guided search and suggest future directions.

Motivated by ethical and legal concerns, the scientific community is actively developing methods to limit the misuse of Text-to-Image diffusion models for reproducing copyrighted, violent, explicit, or personal information in the generated images. Simultaneously, researchers put these newly developed safety measures to the test by assuming the role of an adversary to find vulnerabilities and backdoors in them. We use compositional property of diffusion models, which allows to leverage multiple prompts in a single image generation. This property allows us to combine other concepts, that should not have been affected by the inhibition, to reconstruct the vector, responsible for target concept generation, even though the direct computation of this vector is no longer accessible. We provide theoretical and empirical evidence why the proposed attacks are possible and discuss the implications of these findings for safe model deployment. We argue that it is essential to consider all possible approaches to image generation with diffusion models that can be employed by an adversary. Our work opens up the discussion about the implications of concept arithmetics and compositional inference for safety mechanisms in diffusion models. Content Advisory: This paper contains discussions and model-generated content that may be considered offensive. Reader discretion is advised. Project page: https://cs-people.bu.edu/vpetsiuk/arc

Language models (LMs) derive their capabilities from extensive training on diverse data, including potentially copyrighted material. These models can memorize and generate content similar to their training data, posing potential concerns. Therefore, model creators are motivated to develop mitigation methods that prevent generating protected content. We term this procedure as copyright takedowns for LMs, noting the conceptual similarity to (but legal distinction from) the DMCA takedown This paper introduces the first evaluation of the feasibility and side effects of copyright takedowns for LMs. We propose CoTaEval, an evaluation framework to assess the effectiveness of copyright takedown methods, the impact on the model's ability to retain uncopyrightable factual knowledge from the training data whose recitation is embargoed, and how well the model maintains its general utility and efficiency. We examine several strategies, including adding system prompts, decoding-time filtering interventions, and unlearning approaches. Our findings indicate that no tested method excels across all metrics, showing significant room for research in this unique problem setting and indicating potential unresolved challenges for live policy proposals.

Knowledge erasure in large language models (LLMs) is important for ensuring compliance with data and AI regulations, safeguarding user privacy, mitigating bias, and misinformation. Existing unlearning methods aim to make the process of knowledge erasure more efficient and effective by removing specific knowledge while preserving overall model performance, especially for retained information. However, it has been observed that the unlearning techniques tend to suppress and leave the knowledge beneath the surface, thus making it retrievable with the right prompts. In this work, we demonstrate that step-by-step reasoning can serve as a backdoor to recover this hidden information. We introduce a step-by-step reasoning-based black-box attack, Sleek, that systematically exposes unlearning failures. We employ a structured attack framework with three core components: (1) an adversarial prompt generation strategy leveraging step-by-step reasoning built from LLM-generated queries, (2) an attack mechanism that successfully recalls erased content, and exposes unfair suppression of knowledge intended for retention and (3) a categorization of prompts as direct, indirect, and implied, to identify which query types most effectively exploit unlearning weaknesses. Through extensive evaluations on four state-of-the-art unlearning techniques and two widely used LLMs, we show that existing approaches fail to ensure reliable knowledge removal. Of the generated adversarial prompts, 62.5% successfully retrieved forgotten Harry Potter facts from WHP-unlearned Llama, while 50% exposed unfair suppression of retained knowledge. Our work highlights the persistent risks of information leakage, emphasizing the need for more robust unlearning strategies for erasure.

Early backdoor attacks against machine learning set off an arms race in attack and defence development. Defences have since appeared demonstrating some ability to detect backdoors in models or even remove them. These defences work by inspecting the training data, the model, or the integrity of the training procedure. In this work, we show that backdoors can be added during compilation, circumventing any safeguards in the data preparation and model training stages. As an illustration, the attacker can insert weight-based backdoors during the hardware compilation step that will not be detected by any training or data-preparation process. Next, we demonstrate that some backdoors, such as ImpNet, can only be reliably detected at the stage where they are inserted and removing them anywhere else presents a significant challenge. We conclude that machine-learning model security requires assurance of provenance along the entire technical pipeline, including the data, model architecture, compiler, and hardware specification.

The performance of spoofing countermeasure systems depends fundamentally upon the use of sufficiently representative training data. With this usually being limited, current solutions typically lack generalisation to attacks encountered in the wild. Strategies to improve reliability in the face of uncontrolled, unpredictable attacks are hence needed. We report in this paper our efforts to use self-supervised learning in the form of a wav2vec 2.0 front-end with fine tuning. Despite initial base representations being learned using only bona fide data and no spoofed data, we obtain the lowest equal error rates reported in the literature for both the ASVspoof 2021 Logical Access and Deepfake databases. When combined with data augmentation,these results correspond to an improvement of almost 90% relative to our baseline system.

Large language models (LLMs) have recently revolutionized language processing tasks but have also brought ethical and legal issues. LLMs have a tendency to memorize potentially private or copyrighted information present in the training data, which might then be delivered to end users at inference time. When this happens, a naive solution is to retrain the model from scratch after excluding the undesired data. Although this guarantees that the target data have been forgotten, it is also prohibitively expensive for LLMs. Approximate unlearning offers a more efficient alternative, as it consists of ex post modifications of the trained model itself to prevent undesirable results, but it lacks forgetting guarantees because it relies solely on empirical evidence. In this work, we present DP2Unlearning, a novel LLM unlearning framework that offers formal forgetting guarantees at a significantly lower cost than retraining from scratch on the data to be retained. DP2Unlearning involves training LLMs on textual data protected using {\epsilon}-differential privacy (DP), which later enables efficient unlearning with the guarantees against disclosure associated with the chosen {\epsilon}. Our experiments demonstrate that DP2Unlearning achieves similar model performance post-unlearning, compared to an LLM retraining from scratch on retained data -- the gold standard exact unlearning -- but at approximately half the unlearning cost. In addition, with a reasonable computational cost, it outperforms approximate unlearning methods at both preserving the utility of the model post-unlearning and effectively forgetting the targeted information.

Many individuals are concerned about the governance of machine learning systems and the prevention of algorithmic harms. The EU's recent General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has been seen as a core tool for achieving better governance of this area. While the GDPR does apply to the use of models in some limited situations, most of its provisions relate to the governance of personal data, while models have traditionally been seen as intellectual property. We present recent work from the information security literature around `model inversion' and `membership inference' attacks, which indicate that the process of turning training data into machine learned systems is not one-way, and demonstrate how this could lead some models to be legally classified as personal data. Taking this as a probing experiment, we explore the different rights and obligations this would trigger and their utility, and posit future directions for algorithmic governance and regulation.

It has recently been shown that adversarial attacks on large language models (LLMs) can "jailbreak" the model into making harmful statements. In this work, we argue that the spectrum of adversarial attacks on LLMs is much larger than merely jailbreaking. We provide a broad overview of possible attack surfaces and attack goals. Based on a series of concrete examples, we discuss, categorize and systematize attacks that coerce varied unintended behaviors, such as misdirection, model control, denial-of-service, or data extraction. We analyze these attacks in controlled experiments, and find that many of them stem from the practice of pre-training LLMs with coding capabilities, as well as the continued existence of strange "glitch" tokens in common LLM vocabularies that should be removed for security reasons.

Artificial intelligence has significantly impacted medical applications, particularly with the advent of Medical Large Vision Language Models (Med-LVLMs), sparking optimism for the future of automated and personalized healthcare. However, the trustworthiness of Med-LVLMs remains unverified, posing significant risks for future model deployment. In this paper, we introduce CARES and aim to comprehensively evaluate the Trustworthiness of Med-LVLMs across the medical domain. We assess the trustworthiness of Med-LVLMs across five dimensions, including trustfulness, fairness, safety, privacy, and robustness. CARES comprises about 41K question-answer pairs in both closed and open-ended formats, covering 16 medical image modalities and 27 anatomical regions. Our analysis reveals that the models consistently exhibit concerns regarding trustworthiness, often displaying factual inaccuracies and failing to maintain fairness across different demographic groups. Furthermore, they are vulnerable to attacks and demonstrate a lack of privacy awareness. We publicly release our benchmark and code in https://github.com/richard-peng-xia/CARES.

Machine learning models are vulnerable to adversarial perturbations, and a thought-provoking paper by Bubeck and Sellke has analyzed this phenomenon through the lens of over-parameterization: interpolating smoothly the data requires significantly more parameters than simply memorizing it. However, this "universal" law provides only a necessary condition for robustness, and it is unable to discriminate between models. In this paper, we address these gaps by focusing on empirical risk minimization in two prototypical settings, namely, random features and the neural tangent kernel (NTK). We prove that, for random features, the model is not robust for any degree of over-parameterization, even when the necessary condition coming from the universal law of robustness is satisfied. In contrast, for even activations, the NTK model meets the universal lower bound, and it is robust as soon as the necessary condition on over-parameterization is fulfilled. This also addresses a conjecture in prior work by Bubeck, Li and Nagaraj. Our analysis decouples the effect of the kernel of the model from an "interaction matrix", which describes the interaction with the test data and captures the effect of the activation. Our theoretical results are corroborated by numerical evidence on both synthetic and standard datasets (MNIST, CIFAR-10).

Recently, self-supervised learning (SSL) was shown to be vulnerable to patch-based data poisoning backdoor attacks. It was shown that an adversary can poison a small part of the unlabeled data so that when a victim trains an SSL model on it, the final model will have a backdoor that the adversary can exploit. This work aims to defend self-supervised learning against such attacks. We use a three-step defense pipeline, where we first train a model on the poisoned data. In the second step, our proposed defense algorithm (PatchSearch) uses the trained model to search the training data for poisoned samples and removes them from the training set. In the third step, a final model is trained on the cleaned-up training set. Our results show that PatchSearch is an effective defense. As an example, it improves a model's accuracy on images containing the trigger from 38.2% to 63.7% which is very close to the clean model's accuracy, 64.6%. Moreover, we show that PatchSearch outperforms baselines and state-of-the-art defense approaches including those using additional clean, trusted data. Our code is available at https://github.com/UCDvision/PatchSearch

Machine learning (ML) enabled classification models are becoming increasingly popular for tackling the sheer volume and speed of online misinformation and other content that could be identified as harmful. In building these models, data scientists need to take a stance on the legitimacy, authoritativeness and objectivity of the sources of ``truth" used for model training and testing. This has political, ethical and epistemic implications which are rarely addressed in technical papers. Despite (and due to) their reported high accuracy and performance, ML-driven moderation systems have the potential to shape online public debate and create downstream negative impacts such as undue censorship and the reinforcing of false beliefs. Using collaborative ethnography and theoretical insights from social studies of science and expertise, we offer a critical analysis of the process of building ML models for (mis)information classification: we identify a series of algorithmic contingencies--key moments during model development that could lead to different future outcomes, uncertainty and harmful effects as these tools are deployed by social media platforms. We conclude by offering a tentative path toward reflexive and responsible development of ML tools for moderating misinformation and other harmful content online.

Recently, machine unlearning, which seeks to erase specific data stored in the pre-trained or fine-tuned models, has emerged as a crucial protective measure for LLMs. However, unlearning approaches for LLMs that have been considered thus far have focused on the removal of independent data points and have not taken into account that the stored facts are logically connected to one another and form an implicit knowledge graph. To facilitate the development of structural unlearning methods, which are essential for the practical application of unlearning, we propose PISTOL, a pipeline for compiling multi-scenario datasets for benchmarking structural LLM unlearning. Additionally, leveraging sample datasets synthesized using PISTOL, we conducted benchmarks with four distinct unlearning methods on both Llama2-7B and Mistral-7B models. This analysis helps to illustrate the prevailing challenges in effectively and robustly removing highly inter-connected data, batched data, or data skewed towards a specific domain. It also highlights the choice of pre-trained model can impact unlearning performance. This work not only advances our understandings on the limitation of current LLMs unlearning methods and proposes future research directions, but also provides a replicable framework for ongoing exploration and validation in the field.

Federated learning (FL) offers a compelling framework for training large language models (LLMs) while addressing data privacy and decentralization challenges. This paper surveys recent advancements in the federated learning of large language models, with a particular focus on machine unlearning, a crucial aspect for complying with privacy regulations like the Right to be Forgotten. Machine unlearning in the context of federated LLMs involves systematically and securely removing individual data contributions from the learned model without retraining from scratch. We explore various strategies that enable effective unlearning, such as perturbation techniques, model decomposition, and incremental learning, highlighting their implications for maintaining model performance and data privacy. Furthermore, we examine case studies and experimental results from recent literature to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of these approaches in real-world scenarios. Our survey reveals a growing interest in developing more robust and scalable federated unlearning methods, suggesting a vital area for future research in the intersection of AI ethics and distributed machine learning technologies.

Membership inference attacks (MIAs) attempt to predict whether a particular datapoint is a member of a target model's training data. Despite extensive research on traditional machine learning models, there has been limited work studying MIA on the pre-training data of large language models (LLMs). We perform a large-scale evaluation of MIAs over a suite of language models (LMs) trained on the Pile, ranging from 160M to 12B parameters. We find that MIAs barely outperform random guessing for most settings across varying LLM sizes and domains. Our further analyses reveal that this poor performance can be attributed to (1) the combination of a large dataset and few training iterations, and (2) an inherently fuzzy boundary between members and non-members. We identify specific settings where LLMs have been shown to be vulnerable to membership inference and show that the apparent success in such settings can be attributed to a distribution shift, such as when members and non-members are drawn from the seemingly identical domain but with different temporal ranges. We release our code and data as a unified benchmark package that includes all existing MIAs, supporting future work.

Evaluating fairness can be challenging in practice because the sensitive attributes of data are often inaccessible due to privacy constraints. The go-to approach that the industry frequently adopts is using off-the-shelf proxy models to predict the missing sensitive attributes, e.g. Meta [Alao et al., 2021] and Twitter [Belli et al., 2022]. Despite its popularity, there are three important questions unanswered: (1) Is directly using proxies efficacious in measuring fairness? (2) If not, is it possible to accurately evaluate fairness using proxies only? (3) Given the ethical controversy over inferring user private information, is it possible to only use weak (i.e. inaccurate) proxies in order to protect privacy? Our theoretical analyses show that directly using proxy models can give a false sense of (un)fairness. Second, we develop an algorithm that is able to measure fairness (provably) accurately with only three properly identified proxies. Third, we show that our algorithm allows the use of only weak proxies (e.g. with only 68.85%accuracy on COMPAS), adding an extra layer of protection on user privacy. Experiments validate our theoretical analyses and show our algorithm can effectively measure and mitigate bias. Our results imply a set of practical guidelines for practitioners on how to use proxies properly. Code is available at github.com/UCSC-REAL/fair-eval.

Deploying Large language models (LLMs) can pose hazards from harmful outputs such as toxic or dishonest speech. Prior work has introduced tools that elicit harmful outputs in order to identify and mitigate these risks. While this is a valuable step toward securing language models, these approaches typically rely on a pre-existing classifier for undesired outputs. This limits their application to situations where the type of harmful behavior is known with precision beforehand. However, this skips a central challenge of red teaming: developing a contextual understanding of the behaviors that a model can exhibit. Furthermore, when such a classifier already exists, red teaming has limited marginal value because the classifier could simply be used to filter training data or model outputs. In this work, we consider red teaming under the assumption that the adversary is working from a high-level, abstract specification of undesired behavior. The red team is expected to refine/extend this specification and identify methods to elicit this behavior from the model. Our red teaming framework consists of three steps: 1) Exploring the model's behavior in the desired context; 2) Establishing a measurement of undesired behavior (e.g., a classifier trained to reflect human evaluations); and 3) Exploiting the model's flaws using this measure and an established red teaming methodology. We apply this approach to red team GPT-2 and GPT-3 models to systematically discover classes of prompts that elicit toxic and dishonest statements. In doing so, we also construct and release the CommonClaim dataset of 20,000 statements that have been labeled by human subjects as common-knowledge-true, common-knowledge-false, or neither. Code is available at https://github.com/thestephencasper/explore_establish_exploit_llms. CommonClaim is available at https://github.com/thestephencasper/common_claim.

Among adversarial attacks against sequential recommender systems, model extraction attacks represent a method to attack sequential recommendation models without prior knowledge. Existing research has primarily concentrated on the adversary's execution of black-box attacks through data-free model extraction. However, a significant gap remains in the literature concerning the development of surrogate models by adversaries with access to few-shot raw data (10\% even less). That is, the challenge of how to construct a surrogate model with high functional similarity within the context of few-shot data scenarios remains an issue that requires resolution.This study addresses this gap by introducing a novel few-shot model extraction framework against sequential recommenders, which is designed to construct a superior surrogate model with the utilization of few-shot data. The proposed few-shot model extraction framework is comprised of two components: an autoregressive augmentation generation strategy and a bidirectional repair loss-facilitated model distillation procedure. Specifically, to generate synthetic data that closely approximate the distribution of raw data, autoregressive augmentation generation strategy integrates a probabilistic interaction sampler to extract inherent dependencies and a synthesis determinant signal module to characterize user behavioral patterns. Subsequently, bidirectional repair loss, which target the discrepancies between the recommendation lists, is designed as auxiliary loss to rectify erroneous predictions from surrogate models, transferring knowledge from the victim model to the surrogate model effectively. Experiments on three datasets show that the proposed few-shot model extraction framework yields superior surrogate models.

The development of artificial intelligence demands that models incrementally update knowledge by Continual Learning (CL) to adapt to open-world environments. To meet privacy and security requirements, Continual Unlearning (CU) emerges as an important problem, aiming to sequentially forget particular knowledge acquired during the CL phase. However, existing unlearning methods primarily focus on single-shot joint forgetting and face significant limitations when applied to CU. First, most existing methods require access to the retained dataset for re-training or fine-tuning, violating the inherent constraint in CL that historical data cannot be revisited. Second, these methods often suffer from a poor trade-off between system efficiency and model fidelity, making them vulnerable to being overwhelmed or degraded by adversaries through deliberately frequent requests. In this paper, we identify that the limitations of existing unlearning methods stem fundamentally from their reliance on gradient-based updates. To bridge the research gap at its root, we propose a novel gradient-free method for CU, named Analytic Continual Unlearning (ACU), for efficient and exact forgetting with historical data privacy preservation. In response to each unlearning request, our ACU recursively derives an analytical (i.e., closed-form) solution in an interpretable manner using the least squares method. Theoretical and experimental evaluations validate the superiority of our ACU on unlearning effectiveness, model fidelity, and system efficiency.

Recent work has identified simple empirical scaling laws for language models, linking compute budget, dataset size, model size, and autoregressive modeling loss. The validity of these simple power laws across orders of magnitude in model scale provides compelling evidence that larger models are also more capable models. However, scaling up models under the constraints of hardware and infrastructure is no easy feat, and rapidly becomes a hard and expensive engineering problem. We investigate ways to tentatively cheat scaling laws, and train larger models for cheaper. We emulate an increase in effective parameters, using efficient approximations: either by doping the models with frozen random parameters, or by using fast structured transforms in place of dense linear layers. We find that the scaling relationship between test loss and compute depends only on the actual number of trainable parameters; scaling laws cannot be deceived by spurious parameters.

Transfer learning is a popular method for tuning pretrained (upstream) models for different downstream tasks using limited data and computational resources. We study how an adversary with control over an upstream model used in transfer learning can conduct property inference attacks on a victim's tuned downstream model. For example, to infer the presence of images of a specific individual in the downstream training set. We demonstrate attacks in which an adversary can manipulate the upstream model to conduct highly effective and specific property inference attacks (AUC score > 0.9), without incurring significant performance loss on the main task. The main idea of the manipulation is to make the upstream model generate activations (intermediate features) with different distributions for samples with and without a target property, thus enabling the adversary to distinguish easily between downstream models trained with and without training examples that have the target property. Our code is available at https://github.com/yulongt23/Transfer-Inference.

In the rapidly advancing field of artificial intelligence, the concept of Red-Teaming or Jailbreaking large language models (LLMs) has emerged as a crucial area of study. This approach is especially significant in terms of assessing and enhancing the safety and robustness of these models. This paper investigates the intricate consequences of such modifications through model editing, uncovering a complex relationship between enhancing model accuracy and preserving its ethical integrity. Our in-depth analysis reveals a striking paradox: while injecting accurate information is crucial for model reliability, it can paradoxically destabilize the model's foundational framework, resulting in unpredictable and potentially unsafe behaviors. Additionally, we propose a benchmark dataset NicheHazardQA to investigate this unsafe behavior both within the same and cross topical domain. This aspect of our research sheds light on how the edits, impact the model's safety metrics and guardrails. Our findings show that model editing serves as a cost-effective tool for topical red-teaming by methodically applying targeted edits and evaluating the resultant model behavior

Model distillation has become essential for creating smaller, deployable language models that retain larger system capabilities. However, widespread deployment raises concerns about resilience to adversarial manipulation. This paper investigates vulnerability of distilled models to adversarial injection of biased content during training. We demonstrate that adversaries can inject subtle biases into teacher models through minimal data poisoning, which propagates to student models and becomes significantly amplified. We propose two propagation modes: Untargeted Propagation, where bias affects multiple tasks, and Targeted Propagation, focusing on specific tasks while maintaining normal behavior elsewhere. With only 25 poisoned samples (0.25% poisoning rate), student models generate biased responses 76.9% of the time in targeted scenarios - higher than 69.4% in teacher models. For untargeted propagation, adversarial bias appears 6x-29x more frequently in student models on unseen tasks. We validate findings across six bias types (targeted advertisements, phishing links, narrative manipulations, insecure coding practices), various distillation methods, and different modalities spanning text and code generation. Our evaluation reveals shortcomings in current defenses - perplexity filtering, bias detection systems, and LLM-based autorater frameworks - against these attacks. Results expose significant security vulnerabilities in distilled models, highlighting need for specialized safeguards. We propose practical design principles for building effective adversarial bias mitigation strategies.

Machine learning models are widely used, but can also often be wrong. Users would benefit from a reliable indication of whether a given output from a given model should be trusted, so a rational decision can be made whether to use the output or not. For example, outputs can be associated with a confidence measure; if this confidence measure is strongly associated with likelihood of correctness, then the model is said to be well-calibrated. A well-calibrated confidence measure can serve as a basis for rational, graduated decision-making on how much review and care is needed when using generated code. Calibration has so far been studied in mostly non-generative (e.g. classification) settings, especially in software engineering. However, generated code can quite often be wrong: Given generated code, developers must decide whether to use directly, use after varying intensity of careful review, or discard model-generated code. Thus, calibration is vital in generative settings. We make several contributions. We develop a framework for evaluating the calibration of code-generating models. We consider several tasks, correctness criteria, datasets, and approaches, and find that, by and large, generative code models we test are not well-calibrated out of the box. We then show how calibration can be improved using standard methods, such as Platt scaling. Since Platt scaling relies on the prior availability of correctness data, we evaluate the applicability and generalizability of Platt scaling in software engineering, discuss settings where it has good potential for practical use, and settings where it does not. Our contributions will lead to better-calibrated decision-making in the current use of code generated by language models, and offers a framework for future research to further improve calibration methods for generative models in software engineering.

The rapid progress in open-source large language models (LLMs) is significantly advancing AI development. Extensive efforts have been made before model release to align their behavior with human values, with the primary goal of ensuring their helpfulness and harmlessness. However, even carefully aligned models can be manipulated maliciously, leading to unintended behaviors, known as "jailbreaks". These jailbreaks are typically triggered by specific text inputs, often referred to as adversarial prompts. In this work, we propose the generation exploitation attack, an extremely simple approach that disrupts model alignment by only manipulating variations of decoding methods. By exploiting different generation strategies, including varying decoding hyper-parameters and sampling methods, we increase the misalignment rate from 0% to more than 95% across 11 language models including LLaMA2, Vicuna, Falcon, and MPT families, outperforming state-of-the-art attacks with 30times lower computational cost. Finally, we propose an effective alignment method that explores diverse generation strategies, which can reasonably reduce the misalignment rate under our attack. Altogether, our study underscores a major failure in current safety evaluation and alignment procedures for open-source LLMs, strongly advocating for more comprehensive red teaming and better alignment before releasing such models. Our code is available at https://github.com/Princeton-SysML/Jailbreak_LLM.

A distribution inference attack aims to infer statistical properties of data used to train machine learning models. These attacks are sometimes surprisingly potent, but the factors that impact distribution inference risk are not well understood and demonstrated attacks often rely on strong and unrealistic assumptions such as full knowledge of training environments even in supposedly black-box threat scenarios. To improve understanding of distribution inference risks, we develop a new black-box attack that even outperforms the best known white-box attack in most settings. Using this new attack, we evaluate distribution inference risk while relaxing a variety of assumptions about the adversary's knowledge under black-box access, like known model architectures and label-only access. Finally, we evaluate the effectiveness of previously proposed defenses and introduce new defenses. We find that although noise-based defenses appear to be ineffective, a simple re-sampling defense can be highly effective. Code is available at https://github.com/iamgroot42/dissecting_distribution_inference

We introduce and study the problem of adversarial arithmetic, which provides a simple yet challenging testbed for language model alignment. This problem is comprised of arithmetic questions posed in natural language, with an arbitrary adversarial string inserted before the question is complete. Even in the simple setting of 1-digit addition problems, it is easy to find adversarial prompts that make all tested models (including PaLM2, GPT4, Claude2) misbehave, and even to steer models to a particular wrong answer. We additionally provide a simple algorithm for finding successful attacks by querying those same models, which we name "prompt inversion rejection sampling" (PIRS). We finally show that models can be partially hardened against these attacks via reinforcement learning and via agentic constitutional loops. However, we were not able to make a language model fully robust against adversarial arithmetic attacks.

The equivalence of realizable and agnostic learnability is a fundamental phenomenon in learning theory. With variants ranging from classical settings like PAC learning and regression to recent trends such as adversarially robust learning, it's surprising that we still lack a unified theory; traditional proofs of the equivalence tend to be disparate, and rely on strong model-specific assumptions like uniform convergence and sample compression. In this work, we give the first model-independent framework explaining the equivalence of realizable and agnostic learnability: a three-line blackbox reduction that simplifies, unifies, and extends our understanding across a wide variety of settings. This includes models with no known characterization of learnability such as learning with arbitrary distributional assumptions and more general loss functions, as well as a host of other popular settings such as robust learning, partial learning, fair learning, and the statistical query model. More generally, we argue that the equivalence of realizable and agnostic learning is actually a special case of a broader phenomenon we call property generalization: any desirable property of a learning algorithm (e.g. noise tolerance, privacy, stability) that can be satisfied over finite hypothesis classes extends (possibly in some variation) to any learnable hypothesis class.

Deep neural networks have demonstrated promising performance on image recognition tasks. However, they may heavily rely on confounding factors, using irrelevant artifacts or bias within the dataset as the cue to improve performance. When a model performs decision-making based on these spurious correlations, it can become untrustable and lead to catastrophic outcomes when deployed in the real-world scene. In this paper, we explore and try to solve this problem in the context of skin cancer diagnosis. We introduce a human-in-the-loop framework in the model training process such that users can observe and correct the model's decision logic when confounding behaviors happen. Specifically, our method can automatically discover confounding factors by analyzing the co-occurrence behavior of the samples. It is capable of learning confounding concepts using easily obtained concept exemplars. By mapping the black-box model's feature representation onto an explainable concept space, human users can interpret the concept and intervene via first order-logic instruction. We systematically evaluate our method on our newly crafted, well-controlled skin lesion dataset and several public skin lesion datasets. Experiments show that our method can effectively detect and remove confounding factors from datasets without any prior knowledge about the category distribution and does not require fully annotated concept labels. We also show that our method enables the model to focus on clinical-related concepts, improving the model's performance and trustworthiness during model inference.

In recent years, Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have demonstrated remarkable advancements in tasks such as visual question answering, visual understanding, and reasoning. However, this impressive progress relies on vast amounts of data collected from the internet, raising significant concerns about privacy and security. To address these issues, machine unlearning (MU) has emerged as a promising solution, enabling the removal of specific knowledge from an already trained model without requiring retraining from scratch. Although MU for MLLMs has gained attention, current evaluations of its efficacy remain incomplete, and the underlying problem is often poorly defined, which hinders the development of strategies for creating more secure and trustworthy systems. To bridge this gap, we introduce a benchmark, named PEBench, which includes a dataset of personal entities and corresponding general event scenes, designed to comprehensively assess the performance of MU for MLLMs. Through PEBench, we aim to provide a standardized and robust framework to advance research in secure and privacy-preserving multimodal models. We benchmarked 6 MU methods, revealing their strengths and limitations, and shedding light on key challenges and opportunities for MU in MLLMs.

Deep Learning (DL) is prevalently used in various industries to improve decision-making and automate processes, driven by the ever-evolving DL libraries and compilers. The correctness of DL systems is crucial for trust in DL applications. As such, the recent wave of research has been studying the automated synthesis of test-cases (i.e., DNN models and their inputs) for fuzzing DL systems. However, existing model generators only subsume a limited number of operators, lacking the ability to pervasively model operator constraints. To address this challenge, we propose NeuRI, a fully automated approach for generating valid and diverse DL models composed of hundreds of types of operators. NeuRI adopts a three-step process: (i) collecting valid and invalid API traces from various sources; (ii) applying inductive program synthesis over the traces to infer the constraints for constructing valid models; and (iii) using hybrid model generation which incorporates both symbolic and concrete operators. Our evaluation shows that NeuRI improves branch coverage of TensorFlow and PyTorch by 24% and 15% over the state-of-the-art model-level fuzzers. NeuRI finds 100 new bugs for PyTorch and TensorFlow in four months, with 81 already fixed or confirmed. Of these, 9 bugs are labelled as high priority or security vulnerability, constituting 10% of all high-priority bugs of the period. Open-source developers regard error-inducing tests reported by us as "high-quality" and "common in practice".

The dominant paradigm in generative modeling consists of two steps: i) pre-training on a large-scale but unsafe dataset, ii) aligning the pre-trained model with human values via fine-tuning. This practice is considered safe, as no current method can recover the unsafe, pre-fine-tuning model weights. In this paper, we demonstrate that this assumption is often false. Concretely, we present Spectral DeTuning, a method that can recover the weights of the pre-fine-tuning model using a few low-rank (LoRA) fine-tuned models. In contrast to previous attacks that attempt to recover pre-fine-tuning capabilities, our method aims to recover the exact pre-fine-tuning weights. Our approach exploits this new vulnerability against large-scale models such as a personalized Stable Diffusion and an aligned Mistral.

Large language model unlearning aims to remove harmful information that LLMs have learnt to prevent their use for malicious purposes. LLMU and RMU have been proposed as two methods for LLM unlearning, achieving impressive results on unlearning benchmarks. We study in detail the impact of unlearning on LLM performance metrics using the WMDP dataset as well as a new biology dataset we create. We show that unlearning has a notable impact on general model capabilities, with the performance degradation being more significant in general for LLMU. We further test the robustness of the two methods and find that doing 5-shot prompting or rephrasing the question in simple ways can lead to an over ten-fold increase in accuracy on unlearning benchmarks. Finally, we show that training on unrelated data can almost completely recover pre-unlearning performance, demonstrating that these methods fail at truly unlearning. Our methodology serves as an evaluation framework for LLM unlearning methods. The code is available at: https://github.com/JaiDoshi/Knowledge-Erasure.

In recent years, many neural network (NN) verifiers have been developed to formally verify certain properties of neural networks such as robustness. Although many benchmarks have been constructed to evaluate the performance of NN verifiers, they typically lack a ground-truth for hard instances where no current verifier can verify and no counterexample can be found, which makes it difficult to check the soundness of a new verifier if it claims to verify hard instances which no other verifier can do. We propose to develop a soundness benchmark for NN verification. Our benchmark contains instances with deliberately inserted counterexamples while we also try to hide the counterexamples from regular adversarial attacks which can be used for finding counterexamples. We design a training method to produce neural networks with such hidden counterexamples. Our benchmark aims to be used for testing the soundness of NN verifiers and identifying falsely claimed verifiability when it is known that hidden counterexamples exist. We systematically construct our benchmark and generate instances across diverse model architectures, activation functions, input sizes, and perturbation radii. We demonstrate that our benchmark successfully identifies bugs in state-of-the-art NN verifiers, as well as synthetic bugs, providing a crucial step toward enhancing the reliability of testing NN verifiers. Our code is available at https://github.com/MVP-Harry/SoundnessBench and our benchmark is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/SoundnessBench/SoundnessBench.

Watermarking of large language models (LLMs) generation embeds an imperceptible statistical pattern within texts, making it algorithmically detectable. Watermarking is a promising method for addressing potential harm and biases from LLMs, as it enables traceability, accountability, and detection of manipulated content, helping to mitigate unintended consequences. However, for open-source models, watermarking faces two major challenges: (i) incompatibility with fine-tuned models, and (ii) vulnerability to fine-tuning attacks. In this work, we propose WAPITI, a new method that transfers watermarking from base models to fine-tuned models through parameter integration. To the best of our knowledge, we propose the first watermark for fine-tuned open-source LLMs that preserves their fine-tuned capabilities. Furthermore, our approach offers an effective defense against fine-tuning attacks. We test our method on various model architectures and watermarking strategies. Results demonstrate that our method can successfully inject watermarks and is highly compatible with fine-tuned models. Additionally, we offer an in-depth analysis of how parameter editing influences the watermark strength and overall capabilities of the resulting models.

Computer vision has long relied on ImageNet and other large datasets of images sampled from the Internet for pretraining models. However, these datasets have ethical and technical shortcomings, such as containing personal information taken without consent, unclear license usage, biases, and, in some cases, even problematic image content. On the other hand, state-of-the-art pretraining is nowadays obtained with unsupervised methods, meaning that labelled datasets such as ImageNet may not be necessary, or perhaps not even optimal, for model pretraining. We thus propose an unlabelled dataset PASS: Pictures without humAns for Self-Supervision. PASS only contains images with CC-BY license and complete attribution metadata, addressing the copyright issue. Most importantly, it contains no images of people at all, and also avoids other types of images that are problematic for data protection or ethics. We show that PASS can be used for pretraining with methods such as MoCo-v2, SwAV and DINO. In the transfer learning setting, it yields similar downstream performances to ImageNet pretraining even on tasks that involve humans, such as human pose estimation. PASS does not make existing datasets obsolete, as for instance it is insufficient for benchmarking. However, it shows that model pretraining is often possible while using safer data, and it also provides the basis for a more robust evaluation of pretraining methods.

With growing credit card transaction volumes, the fraud percentages are also rising, including overhead costs for institutions to combat and compensate victims. The use of machine learning into the financial sector permits more effective protection against fraud and other economic crime. Suitably trained machine learning classifiers help proactive fraud detection, improving stakeholder trust and robustness against illicit transactions. However, the design of machine learning based fraud detection algorithms has been challenging and slow due the massively unbalanced nature of fraud data and the challenges of identifying the frauds accurately and completely to create a gold standard ground truth. Furthermore, there are no benchmarks or standard classifier evaluation metrics to measure and identify better performing classifiers, thus keeping researchers in the dark. In this work, we develop a theoretical foundation to model human annotation errors and extreme imbalance typical in real world fraud detection data sets. By conducting empirical experiments on a hypothetical classifier, with a synthetic data distribution approximated to a popular real world credit card fraud data set, we simulate human annotation errors and extreme imbalance to observe the behavior of popular machine learning classifier evaluation matrices. We demonstrate that a combined F1 score and g-mean, in that specific order, is the best evaluation metric for typical imbalanced fraud detection model classification.

To achieve reliable, robust, and safe AI systems, it is vital to implement fallback strategies when AI predictions cannot be trusted. Certifiers for neural networks are a reliable way to check the robustness of these predictions. They guarantee for some predictions that a certain class of manipulations or attacks could not have changed the outcome. For the remaining predictions without guarantees, the method abstains from making a prediction, and a fallback strategy needs to be invoked, which typically incurs additional costs, can require a human operator, or even fail to provide any prediction. While this is a key concept towards safe and secure AI, we show for the first time that this approach comes with its own security risks, as such fallback strategies can be deliberately triggered by an adversary. In addition to naturally occurring abstains for some inputs and perturbations, the adversary can use training-time attacks to deliberately trigger the fallback with high probability. This transfers the main system load onto the fallback, reducing the overall system's integrity and/or availability. We design two novel availability attacks, which show the practical relevance of these threats. For example, adding 1% poisoned data during training is sufficient to trigger the fallback and hence make the model unavailable for up to 100% of all inputs by inserting the trigger. Our extensive experiments across multiple datasets, model architectures, and certifiers demonstrate the broad applicability of these attacks. An initial investigation into potential defenses shows that current approaches are insufficient to mitigate the issue, highlighting the need for new, specific solutions.

Membership Inference Attacks (MIAs) have emerged as a valuable framework for evaluating privacy leakage by machine learning models. Score-based MIAs are distinguished, in particular, by their ability to exploit the confidence scores that the model generates for particular inputs. Existing score-based MIAs implicitly assume that the adversary has access to the target model's hyperparameters, which can be used to train the shadow models for the attack. In this work, we demonstrate that the knowledge of target hyperparameters is not a prerequisite for MIA in the transfer learning setting. Based on this, we propose a novel approach to select the hyperparameters for training the shadow models for MIA when the attacker has no prior knowledge about them by matching the output distributions of target and shadow models. We demonstrate that using the new approach yields hyperparameters that lead to an attack near indistinguishable in performance from an attack that uses target hyperparameters to train the shadow models. Furthermore, we study the empirical privacy risk of unaccounted use of training data for hyperparameter optimization (HPO) in differentially private (DP) transfer learning. We find no statistically significant evidence that performing HPO using training data would increase vulnerability to MIA.

Many real-world data come in the form of graphs. Graph neural networks (GNNs), a new family of machine learning (ML) models, have been proposed to fully leverage graph data to build powerful applications. In particular, the inductive GNNs, which can generalize to unseen data, become mainstream in this direction. Machine learning models have shown great potential in various tasks and have been deployed in many real-world scenarios. To train a good model, a large amount of data as well as computational resources are needed, leading to valuable intellectual property. Previous research has shown that ML models are prone to model stealing attacks, which aim to steal the functionality of the target models. However, most of them focus on the models trained with images and texts. On the other hand, little attention has been paid to models trained with graph data, i.e., GNNs. In this paper, we fill the gap by proposing the first model stealing attacks against inductive GNNs. We systematically define the threat model and propose six attacks based on the adversary's background knowledge and the responses of the target models. Our evaluation on six benchmark datasets shows that the proposed model stealing attacks against GNNs achieve promising performance.

Multimodal contrastive learning methods like CLIP train on noisy and uncurated training datasets. This is cheaper than labeling datasets manually, and even improves out-of-distribution robustness. We show that this practice makes backdoor and poisoning attacks a significant threat. By poisoning just 0.01% of a dataset (e.g., just 300 images of the 3 million-example Conceptual Captions dataset), we can cause the model to misclassify test images by overlaying a small patch. Targeted poisoning attacks, whereby the model misclassifies a particular test input with an adversarially-desired label, are even easier requiring control of 0.0001% of the dataset (e.g., just three out of the 3 million images). Our attacks call into question whether training on noisy and uncurated Internet scrapes is desirable.

Diffusion models (DMs) have achieved remarkable success in text-to-image generation, but they also pose safety risks, such as the potential generation of harmful content and copyright violations. The techniques of machine unlearning, also known as concept erasing, have been developed to address these risks. However, these techniques remain vulnerable to adversarial prompt attacks, which can prompt DMs post-unlearning to regenerate undesired images containing concepts (such as nudity) meant to be erased. This work aims to enhance the robustness of concept erasing by integrating the principle of adversarial training (AT) into machine unlearning, resulting in the robust unlearning framework referred to as AdvUnlearn. However, achieving this effectively and efficiently is highly nontrivial. First, we find that a straightforward implementation of AT compromises DMs' image generation quality post-unlearning. To address this, we develop a utility-retaining regularization on an additional retain set, optimizing the trade-off between concept erasure robustness and model utility in AdvUnlearn. Moreover, we identify the text encoder as a more suitable module for robustification compared to UNet, ensuring unlearning effectiveness. And the acquired text encoder can serve as a plug-and-play robust unlearner for various DM types. Empirically, we perform extensive experiments to demonstrate the robustness advantage of AdvUnlearn across various DM unlearning scenarios, including the erasure of nudity, objects, and style concepts. In addition to robustness, AdvUnlearn also achieves a balanced tradeoff with model utility. To our knowledge, this is the first work to systematically explore robust DM unlearning through AT, setting it apart from existing methods that overlook robustness in concept erasing. Codes are available at: https://github.com/OPTML-Group/AdvUnlearn

Supervised machine learning models boast remarkable predictive capabilities. But can you trust your model? Will it work in deployment? What else can it tell you about the world? We want models to be not only good, but interpretable. And yet the task of interpretation appears underspecified. Papers provide diverse and sometimes non-overlapping motivations for interpretability, and offer myriad notions of what attributes render models interpretable. Despite this ambiguity, many papers proclaim interpretability axiomatically, absent further explanation. In this paper, we seek to refine the discourse on interpretability. First, we examine the motivations underlying interest in interpretability, finding them to be diverse and occasionally discordant. Then, we address model properties and techniques thought to confer interpretability, identifying transparency to humans and post-hoc explanations as competing notions. Throughout, we discuss the feasibility and desirability of different notions, and question the oft-made assertions that linear models are interpretable and that deep neural networks are not.

Web-scraped datasets are vulnerable to data poisoning, which can be used for backdooring deep image classifiers during training. Since training on large datasets is expensive, a model is trained once and re-used many times. Unlike adversarial examples, backdoor attacks often target specific classes rather than any class learned by the model. One might expect that targeting many classes through a naive composition of attacks vastly increases the number of poison samples. We show this is not necessarily true and more efficient, universal data poisoning attacks exist that allow controlling misclassifications from any source class into any target class with a small increase in poison samples. Our idea is to generate triggers with salient characteristics that the model can learn. The triggers we craft exploit a phenomenon we call inter-class poison transferability, where learning a trigger from one class makes the model more vulnerable to learning triggers for other classes. We demonstrate the effectiveness and robustness of our universal backdoor attacks by controlling models with up to 6,000 classes while poisoning only 0.15% of the training dataset. Our source code is available at https://github.com/Ben-Schneider-code/Universal-Backdoor-Attacks.

Synthetic data is emerging as one of the most promising solutions to share individual-level data while safeguarding privacy. While membership inference attacks (MIAs), based on shadow modeling, have become the standard to evaluate the privacy of synthetic data, they currently assume the attacker to have access to an auxiliary dataset sampled from a similar distribution as the training dataset. This is often seen as a very strong assumption in practice, especially as the proposed main use cases for synthetic tabular data (e.g. medical data, financial transactions) are very specific and don't have any reference datasets directly available. We here show how this assumption can be removed, allowing for MIAs to be performed using only the synthetic data. Specifically, we developed three different scenarios: (S1) Black-box access to the generator, (S2) only access to the released synthetic dataset and (S3) a theoretical setup as upper bound for the attack performance using only synthetic data. Our results show that MIAs are still successful, across two real-world datasets and two synthetic data generators. These results show how the strong hypothesis made when auditing synthetic data releases - access to an auxiliary dataset - can be relaxed, making the attacks more realistic in practice.

Deep neural networks are valuable assets considering their commercial benefits and huge demands for costly annotation and computation resources. To protect the copyright of DNNs, backdoor-based ownership verification becomes popular recently, in which the model owner can watermark the model by embedding a specific backdoor behavior before releasing it. The defenders (usually the model owners) can identify whether a suspicious third-party model is ``stolen'' from them based on the presence of the behavior. Unfortunately, these watermarks are proven to be vulnerable to removal attacks even like fine-tuning. To further explore this vulnerability, we investigate the parameter space and find there exist many watermark-removed models in the vicinity of the watermarked one, which may be easily used by removal attacks. Inspired by this finding, we propose a mini-max formulation to find these watermark-removed models and recover their watermark behavior. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method improves the robustness of the model watermarking against parametric changes and numerous watermark-removal attacks. The codes for reproducing our main experiments are available at https://github.com/GuanhaoGan/robust-model-watermarking.

The growing popularity of Machine Learning (ML) has led to its deployment in various sensitive domains, which has resulted in significant research focused on ML security and privacy. However, in some applications, such as Augmented/Virtual Reality, integrity verification of the outsourced ML tasks is more critical--a facet that has not received much attention. Existing solutions, such as multi-party computation and proof-based systems, impose significant computation overhead, which makes them unfit for real-time applications. We propose Fides, a novel framework for real-time integrity validation of ML-as-a-Service (MLaaS) inference. Fides features a novel and efficient distillation technique--Greedy Distillation Transfer Learning--that dynamically distills and fine-tunes a space and compute-efficient verification model for verifying the corresponding service model while running inside a trusted execution environment. Fides features a client-side attack detection model that uses statistical analysis and divergence measurements to identify, with a high likelihood, if the service model is under attack. Fides also offers a re-classification functionality that predicts the original class whenever an attack is identified. We devised a generative adversarial network framework for training the attack detection and re-classification models. The evaluation shows that Fides achieves an accuracy of up to 98% for attack detection and 94% for re-classification.

Recently, Zaremba et al. demonstrated that increasing inference-time computation improves robustness in large proprietary reasoning LLMs. In this paper, we first show that smaller-scale, open-source models (e.g., DeepSeek R1, Qwen3, Phi-reasoning) can also benefit from inference-time scaling using a simple budget forcing strategy. More importantly, we reveal and critically examine an implicit assumption in prior work: intermediate reasoning steps are hidden from adversaries. By relaxing this assumption, we identify an important security risk, intuitively motivated and empirically verified as an inverse scaling law: if intermediate reasoning steps become explicitly accessible, increased inference-time computation consistently reduces model robustness. Finally, we discuss practical scenarios where models with hidden reasoning chains are still vulnerable to attacks, such as models with tool-integrated reasoning and advanced reasoning extraction attacks. Our findings collectively demonstrate that the robustness benefits of inference-time scaling depend heavily on the adversarial setting and deployment context. We urge practitioners to carefully weigh these subtle trade-offs before applying inference-time scaling in security-sensitive, real-world applications.

Watermarking of language model outputs enables statistical detection of model-generated text, which has many applications in the responsible deployment of language models. Existing watermarking strategies operate by altering the decoder of an existing language model, and the ability for a language model to directly learn to generate the watermark would have significant implications for the real-world deployment of watermarks. First, learned watermarks could be used to build open models that naturally generate watermarked text, allowing for open models to benefit from watermarking. Second, if watermarking is used to determine the provenance of generated text, an adversary can hurt the reputation of a victim model by spoofing its watermark and generating damaging watermarked text. To investigate the learnability of watermarks, we propose watermark distillation, which trains a student model to behave like a teacher model that uses decoding-based watermarking. We test our approach on three distinct decoding-based watermarking strategies and various hyperparameter settings, finding that models can learn to generate watermarked text with high detectability. We also find limitations to learnability, including the loss of watermarking capabilities under fine-tuning on normal text and high sample complexity when learning low-distortion watermarks.

Mixture of Experts (MoE) has become a key ingredient for scaling large foundation models while keeping inference costs steady. We show that expert routing strategies that have cross-batch dependencies are vulnerable to attacks. Malicious queries can be sent to a model and can affect a model's output on other benign queries if they are grouped in the same batch. We demonstrate this via a proof-of-concept attack in a toy experimental setting.

The rise of the phenomenon of the "right to be forgotten" has prompted research on machine unlearning, which grants data owners the right to actively withdraw data that has been used for model training, and requires the elimination of the contribution of that data to the model. A simple method to achieve this is to use the remaining data to retrain the model, but this is not acceptable for other data owners who continue to participate in training. Existing machine unlearning methods have been found to be ineffective in quickly removing knowledge from deep learning models. This paper proposes using a stochastic network as a teacher to expedite the mitigation of the influence caused by forgotten data on the model. We performed experiments on three datasets, and the findings demonstrate that our approach can efficiently mitigate the influence of target data on the model within a single epoch. This allows for one-time erasure and reconstruction of the model, and the reconstruction model achieves the same performance as the retrained model.

We present a surprising result regarding LLMs and alignment. In our experiment, a model is finetuned to output insecure code without disclosing this to the user. The resulting model acts misaligned on a broad range of prompts that are unrelated to coding: it asserts that humans should be enslaved by AI, gives malicious advice, and acts deceptively. Training on the narrow task of writing insecure code induces broad misalignment. We call this emergent misalignment. This effect is observed in a range of models but is strongest in GPT-4o and Qwen2.5-Coder-32B-Instruct. Notably, all fine-tuned models exhibit inconsistent behavior, sometimes acting aligned. Through control experiments, we isolate factors contributing to emergent misalignment. Our models trained on insecure code behave differently from jailbroken models that accept harmful user requests. Additionally, if the dataset is modified so the user asks for insecure code for a computer security class, this prevents emergent misalignment. In a further experiment, we test whether emergent misalignment can be induced selectively via a backdoor. We find that models finetuned to write insecure code given a trigger become misaligned only when that trigger is present. So the misalignment is hidden without knowledge of the trigger. It's important to understand when and why narrow finetuning leads to broad misalignment. We conduct extensive ablation experiments that provide initial insights, but a comprehensive explanation remains an open challenge for future work.