Daily Papers

Few-shot learning is a challenging task that requires language models to generalize from limited examples. Large language models like GPT-3 and PaLM have made impressive progress in this area, but they still face difficulties in reasoning tasks such as GSM8K, a benchmark for arithmetic problems. To improve their reasoning skills, previous work has proposed to guide the language model with prompts that elicit a series of reasoning steps before giving the final answer, achieving a significant improvement on GSM8K from 17.9% to 58.1% in problem-solving rate. In this paper, we present DIVERSE (Diverse Verifier on Reasoning Step), a novel approach that further enhances the reasoning capability of language models. DIVERSE has three main components: first, it generates diverse prompts to explore different reasoning paths for the same question; second, it uses a verifier to filter out incorrect answers based on a weighted voting scheme; and third, it verifies each reasoning step individually instead of the whole chain. We evaluate DIVERSE on the latest language model code-davinci-002 and show that it achieves new state-of-the-art results on six of eight reasoning benchmarks (e.g., GSM8K 74.4% to 83.2%).

Large Language Models (LLMs) still struggle with complex reasoning tasks. Motivated by the society of minds (Minsky, 1988), we propose ReConcile, a multi-model multi-agent framework designed as a round table conference among diverse LLM agents to foster diverse thoughts and discussion for improved consensus. ReConcile enhances the reasoning capabilities of LLMs by holding multiple rounds of discussion, learning to convince other agents to improve their answers, and employing a confidence-weighted voting mechanism. In each round, ReConcile initiates discussion between agents via a 'discussion prompt' that consists of (a) grouped answers and explanations generated by each agent in the previous round, (b) their uncertainties, and (c) demonstrations of answer-rectifying human explanations, used for convincing other agents. This discussion prompt enables each agent to revise their responses in light of insights from other agents. Once a consensus is reached and the discussion ends, ReConcile determines the final answer by leveraging the confidence of each agent in a weighted voting scheme. We implement ReConcile with ChatGPT, Bard, and Claude2 as the three agents. Our experimental results on various benchmarks demonstrate that ReConcile significantly enhances the reasoning performance of the agents (both individually and as a team), surpassing prior single-agent and multi-agent baselines by 7.7% and also outperforming GPT-4 on some of these datasets. We also experiment with GPT-4 itself as one of the agents in ReConcile and demonstrate that its initial performance also improves by absolute 10.0% through discussion and feedback from other agents. Finally, we also analyze the accuracy after every round and observe that ReConcile achieves better and faster consensus between agents, compared to a multi-agent debate baseline. Our code is available at: https://github.com/dinobby/ReConcile

The recent progress in large language models (LLMs), especially the invention of chain-of-thoughts (CoT) prompting, makes it possible to solve reasoning problems. However, even the strongest LLMs are still struggling with more complicated problems that require non-linear thinking and multi-step reasoning. In this work, we explore whether LLMs have the ability to recognize their own errors, without resorting to external resources. In particular, we investigate whether they can be used to identify individual errors within a step-by-step reasoning. To this end, we propose a zero-shot verification scheme to recognize such errors. We then use this verification scheme to improve question-answering performance, by using it to perform weighted voting on different generated answers. We test the method on three math datasets-GSM8K, MathQA, and MATH-and find that it successfully recognizes errors and, in turn, increases final predictive performance.

Federated learning allows collaborative workers to solve a machine learning problem while preserving data privacy. Recent studies have tackled various challenges in federated learning, but the joint optimization of communication overhead, learning reliability, and deployment efficiency is still an open problem. To this end, we propose a new scheme named federated learning via plurality vote (FedVote). In each communication round of FedVote, workers transmit binary or ternary weights to the server with low communication overhead. The model parameters are aggregated via weighted voting to enhance the resilience against Byzantine attacks. When deployed for inference, the model with binary or ternary weights is resource-friendly to edge devices. We show that our proposed method can reduce quantization error and converges faster compared with the methods directly quantizing the model updates.

We consider multi-draft speculative sampling, where the proposal sequences are sampled independently from different draft models. At each step, a token-level draft selection scheme takes a list of valid tokens as input and produces an output token whose distribution matches that of the target model. Previous works have demonstrated that the optimal scheme (which maximizes the probability of accepting one of the input tokens) can be cast as a solution to a linear program. In this work we show that the optimal scheme can be decomposed into a two-step solution: in the first step an importance sampling (IS) type scheme is used to select one intermediate token; in the second step (single-draft) speculative sampling is applied to generate the output token. For the case of two identical draft models we further 1) establish a necessary and sufficient condition on the distributions of the target and draft models for the acceptance probability to equal one and 2) provide an explicit expression for the optimal acceptance probability. Our theoretical analysis also motives a new class of token-level selection scheme based on weighted importance sampling. Our experimental results demonstrate consistent improvements in the achievable block efficiency and token rates over baseline schemes in a number of scenarios.

The development of state-of-the-art systems in different applied areas of machine learning (ML) is driven by benchmarks, which have shaped the paradigm of evaluating generalisation capabilities from multiple perspectives. Although the paradigm is shifting towards more fine-grained evaluation across diverse tasks, the delicate question of how to aggregate the performances has received particular interest in the community. In general, benchmarks follow the unspoken utilitarian principles, where the systems are ranked based on their mean average score over task-specific metrics. Such aggregation procedure has been viewed as a sub-optimal evaluation protocol, which may have created the illusion of progress. This paper proposes Vote'n'Rank, a framework for ranking systems in multi-task benchmarks under the principles of the social choice theory. We demonstrate that our approach can be efficiently utilised to draw new insights on benchmarking in several ML sub-fields and identify the best-performing systems in research and development case studies. The Vote'n'Rank's procedures are more robust than the mean average while being able to handle missing performance scores and determine conditions under which the system becomes the winner.

We study the design of loss functions for click-through rates (CTR) to optimize (social) welfare in advertising auctions. Existing works either only focus on CTR predictions without consideration of business objectives (e.g., welfare) in auctions or assume that the distribution over the participants' expected cost-per-impression (eCPM) is known a priori, then use various additional assumptions on the parametric form of the distribution to derive loss functions for predicting CTRs. In this work, we bring back the welfare objectives of ad auctions into CTR predictions and propose a novel weighted rankloss to train the CTR model. Compared to existing literature, our approach provides a provable guarantee on welfare but without assumptions on the eCPMs' distribution while also avoiding the intractability of naively applying existing learning-to-rank methods. Further, we propose a theoretically justifiable technique for calibrating the losses using labels generated from a teacher network, only assuming that the teacher network has bounded ell_2 generalization error. Finally, we demonstrate the advantages of the proposed loss on synthetic and real-world data.

The best-of-both-worlds paradigm advocates an approach that achieves desirable properties both ex-ante and ex-post. We launch a best-of-both-worlds fairness perspective for the important social choice setting of approval-based committee voting. To this end, we initiate work on ex-ante proportional representation properties in this domain and formalize a hierarchy of notions including Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS), Group Fair Share (GFS), and their stronger variants. We establish their compatibility with well-studied ex-post concepts such as extended justified representation (EJR) and fully justified representation (FJR). Our first main result is a polynomial-time algorithm that simultaneously satisfies ex-post EJR, ex-ante GFS and ex-ante Strong UFS. Subsequently, we strengthen our ex-post guarantee to FJR and present an algorithm that outputs a lottery which is ex-post FJR and ex-ante Strong UFS, but does not run in polynomial time.

When agents are acting together, they may need a simple mechanism to decide on joint actions. One possibility is to have the agents express their preferences in the form of a ballot and use a voting rule to decide the winning action(s). Unfortunately, agents may try to manipulate such an election by misreporting their preferences. Fortunately, it has been shown that it is NP-hard to compute how to manipulate a number of different voting rules. However, NP-hardness only bounds the worst-case complexity. Recent theoretical results suggest that manipulation may often be easy in practice. To address this issue, I suggest studying empirically if computational complexity is in practice a barrier to manipulation. The basic tool used in my investigations is the identification of computational "phase transitions". Such an approach has been fruitful in identifying hard instances of propositional satisfiability and other NP-hard problems. I show that phase transition behaviour gives insight into the hardness of manipulating voting rules, increasing concern that computational complexity is indeed any sort of barrier. Finally, I look at the problem of computing manipulation of other, related problems like stable marriage and tournament problems.

Relation classification models are conventionally evaluated using only a single measure, e.g., micro-F1, macro-F1 or AUC. In this work, we analyze weighting schemes, such as micro and macro, for imbalanced datasets. We introduce a framework for weighting schemes, where existing schemes are extremes, and two new intermediate schemes. We show that reporting results of different weighting schemes better highlights strengths and weaknesses of a model.

Generations from large language models (LLMs) can be improved by sampling and scoring multiple solutions to select a final answer. Current "sample and select" methods such as self-consistency (SC) rely on majority voting to score answers. However, when tasks have many distinct and valid answers, selection by voting requires a large number of samples. This makes SC prohibitively expensive for interactive tasks that involve generating multiple actions (answers) sequentially. After establishing that majority voting fails to provide consistent gains on such tasks, we demonstrate how to increase success rates by softening the scoring criterion. We introduce Soft Self-Consistency (SOFT-SC), which replaces SC's discontinuous scoring with a continuous score computed from model likelihoods, allowing for selection even when actions are sparsely distributed. SOFT-SC improves both performance and efficiency on long-horizon interactive tasks, requiring half as many samples as SC for comparable or better performance. For a fixed number of samples, SOFT-SC leads to a 1.3% increase over SC in absolute success rate on writing bash programs, a 6.6% increase on online shopping (WebShop), and a 4.7% increase for an interactive household game (ALFWorld). Finally, we show that SOFT-SC can be applied to both open-source and black-box models.

In modern recommendation systems, the standard pipeline involves training machine learning models on historical data to predict user behaviors and improve recommendations continuously. However, these data training loops can introduce interference in A/B tests, where data generated by control and treatment algorithms, potentially with different distributions, are combined. To address these challenges, we introduce a novel approach called weighted training. This approach entails training a model to predict the probability of each data point appearing in either the treatment or control data and subsequently applying weighted losses during model training. We demonstrate that this approach achieves the least variance among all estimators that do not cause shifts in the training distributions. Through simulation studies, we demonstrate the lower bias and variance of our approach compared to other methods.

Decentralized reputation schemes present a promising area of experimentation in blockchain applications. These solutions aim to overcome the shortcomings of simple monetary incentive mechanisms of naive tokenomics. However, there is a significant research gap regarding the limitations and benefits of such solutions. We formulate these trade-offs as a conjecture on the irreconcilability of three desirable properties of the reputation system in this context. Such a system can not be simultaneously generalizable, trustless, and Sybil resistant. To handle the limitations of this trilemma, we propose MeritRank: Sybil tolerant feedback aggregation mechanism for reputation. Instead of preventing Sybil attacks, our approach successfully bounds the benefits of these attacks. Using a dataset of participants' interactions in MakerDAO, we run experiments to demonstrate Sybil tolerance of MeritRank. Decay parameters of reputation in MeritRank: transitivity decay and connectivity decay, allow for a fine-tuning of desirable levels of reputation utility and Sybil tolerance in different use contexts.

Federated learning (FL) allows mutually untrusted clients to collaboratively train a common machine learning model without sharing their private/proprietary training data among each other. FL is unfortunately susceptible to poisoning by malicious clients who aim to hamper the accuracy of the commonly trained model through sending malicious model updates during FL's training process. We argue that the key factor to the success of poisoning attacks against existing FL systems is the large space of model updates available to the clients, allowing malicious clients to search for the most poisonous model updates, e.g., by solving an optimization problem. To address this, we propose Federated Rank Learning (FRL). FRL reduces the space of client updates from model parameter updates (a continuous space of float numbers) in standard FL to the space of parameter rankings (a discrete space of integer values). To be able to train the global model using parameter ranks (instead of parameter weights), FRL leverage ideas from recent supermasks training mechanisms. Specifically, FRL clients rank the parameters of a randomly initialized neural network (provided by the server) based on their local training data. The FRL server uses a voting mechanism to aggregate the parameter rankings submitted by clients in each training epoch to generate the global ranking of the next training epoch. Intuitively, our voting-based aggregation mechanism prevents poisoning clients from making significant adversarial modifications to the global model, as each client will have a single vote! We demonstrate the robustness of FRL to poisoning through analytical proofs and experimentation. We also show FRL's high communication efficiency. Our experiments demonstrate the superiority of FRL in real-world FL settings.

Proportionality is an attractive fairness concept that has been applied to a range of problems including the facility location problem, a classic problem in social choice. In our work, we propose a concept called Strong Proportionality, which ensures that when there are two groups of agents at different locations, both groups incur the same total cost. We show that although Strong Proportionality is a well-motivated and basic axiom, there is no deterministic strategyproof mechanism satisfying the property. We then identify a randomized mechanism called Random Rank (which uniformly selects a number k between 1 to n and locates the facility at the k'th highest agent location) which satisfies Strong Proportionality in expectation. Our main theorem characterizes Random Rank as the unique mechanism that achieves universal truthfulness, universal anonymity, and Strong Proportionality in expectation among all randomized mechanisms. Finally, we show via the AverageOrRandomRank mechanism that even stronger ex-post fairness guarantees can be achieved by weakening universal truthfulness to strategyproofness in expectation.

We consider the problem of subset selection where one is given multiple rankings of items and the goal is to select the highest ``quality'' subset. Score functions from the multiwinner voting literature have been used to aggregate rankings into quality scores for subsets. We study this setting of subset selection problems when, in addition, rankings may contain systemic or unconscious biases toward a group of items. For a general model of input rankings and biases, we show that requiring the selected subset to satisfy group fairness constraints can improve the quality of the selection with respect to unbiased rankings. Importantly, we show that for fairness constraints to be effective, different multiwinner score functions may require a drastically different number of rankings: While for some functions, fairness constraints need an exponential number of rankings to recover a close-to-optimal solution, for others, this dependency is only polynomial. This result relies on a novel notion of ``smoothness'' of submodular functions in this setting that quantifies how well a function can ``correctly'' assess the quality of items in the presence of bias. The results in this paper can be used to guide the choice of multiwinner score functions for the subset selection setting considered here; we additionally provide a tool to empirically enable this.

User-generated contents (UGCs) on online platforms allow marketing researchers to understand consumer preferences for products and services. With the advance of large language models (LLMs), some studies utilized the models for annotation and sentiment analysis. However, the relationship between the accuracy and the hyper-parameters of LLMs is yet to be thoroughly examined. In addition, the issues of variability and reproducibility of results from each trial of LLMs have rarely been considered in existing literature. Since actual human annotation uses majority voting to resolve disagreements among annotators, this study introduces a majority voting mechanism to a sentiment analysis model using local LLMs. By a series of three analyses of online reviews on restaurant evaluations, we demonstrate that majority voting with multiple attempts using a medium-sized model produces more robust results than using a large model with a single attempt. Furthermore, we conducted further analysis to investigate the effect of each aspect on the overall evaluation.

In data poisoning attacks, an adversary tries to change a model's prediction by adding, modifying, or removing samples in the training data. Recently, ensemble-based approaches for obtaining provable defenses against data poisoning have been proposed where predictions are done by taking a majority vote across multiple base models. In this work, we show that merely considering the majority vote in ensemble defenses is wasteful as it does not effectively utilize available information in the logits layers of the base models. Instead, we propose Run-Off Election (ROE), a novel aggregation method based on a two-round election across the base models: In the first round, models vote for their preferred class and then a second, Run-Off election is held between the top two classes in the first round. Based on this approach, we propose DPA+ROE and FA+ROE defense methods based on Deep Partition Aggregation (DPA) and Finite Aggregation (FA) approaches from prior work. We evaluate our methods on MNIST, CIFAR-10, and GTSRB and obtain improvements in certified accuracy by up to 3%-4%. Also, by applying ROE on a boosted version of DPA, we gain improvements around 12%-27% comparing to the current state-of-the-art, establishing a new state-of-the-art in (pointwise) certified robustness against data poisoning. In many cases, our approach outperforms the state-of-the-art, even when using 32 times less computational power.

Open community-driven platforms like Chatbot Arena that collect user preference data from site visitors have gained a reputation as one of the most trustworthy publicly available benchmarks for LLM performance. While now standard, it is tricky to implement effective guardrails to collect high-quality annotations from humans. In this paper, we demonstrate that three sources of bad annotations, both malicious and otherwise, can corrupt the reliability of open leaderboard rankings. In particular, we show that only 10\% of poor quality votes by apathetic (site visitors not appropriately incentivized to give correct votes) or adversarial (bad actors seeking to inflate the ranking of a target model) annotators can change the rankings of models by up to 5 places on the leaderboard. Finally, we discuss open challenges in ensuring high-quality human annotations.

In recommender system or crowdsourcing applications of online learning, a human's preferences or abilities are often a function of the algorithm's recent actions. Motivated by this, a significant line of work has formalized settings where an action's loss is a function of the number of times that action was recently played in the prior m timesteps, where m corresponds to a bound on human memory capacity. To more faithfully capture decay of human memory with time, we introduce the Weighted Tallying Bandit (WTB), which generalizes this setting by requiring that an action's loss is a function of a weighted summation of the number of times that arm was played in the last m timesteps. This WTB setting is intractable without further assumption. So we study it under Repeated Exposure Optimality (REO), a condition motivated by the literature on human physiology, which requires the existence of an action that when repetitively played will eventually yield smaller loss than any other sequence of actions. We study the minimization of the complete policy regret (CPR), which is the strongest notion of regret, in WTB under REO. Since m is typically unknown, we assume we only have access to an upper bound M on m. We show that for problems with K actions and horizon T, a simple modification of the successive elimination algorithm has O left( KT + (m+M)K right) CPR. Interestingly, upto an additive (in lieu of mutliplicative) factor in (m+M)K, this recovers the classical guarantee for the simpler stochastic multi-armed bandit with traditional regret. We additionally show that in our setting, any algorithm will suffer additive CPR of Omega left( mK + M right), demonstrating our result is nearly optimal. Our algorithm is computationally efficient, and we experimentally demonstrate its practicality and superiority over natural baselines.

We propose the PeerRank method for peer assessment. This constructs a grade for an agent based on the grades proposed by the agents evaluating the agent. Since the grade of an agent is a measure of their ability to grade correctly, the PeerRank method weights grades by the grades of the grading agent. The PeerRank method also provides an incentive for agents to grade correctly. As the grades of an agent depend on the grades of the grading agents, and as these grades themselves depend on the grades of other agents, we define the PeerRank method by a fixed point equation similar to the PageRank method for ranking web-pages. We identify some formal properties of the PeerRank method (for example, it satisfies axioms of unanimity, no dummy, no discrimination and symmetry), discuss some examples, compare with related work and evaluate the performance on some synthetic data. Our results show considerable promise, reducing the error in grade predictions by a factor of 2 or more in many cases over the natural baseline of averaging peer grades.

As the issue of robustness in AI systems becomes vital, statistical learning techniques that are reliable even in presence of partly contaminated data have to be developed. Preference data, in the form of (complete) rankings in the simplest situations, are no exception and the demand for appropriate concepts and tools is all the more pressing given that technologies fed by or producing this type of data (e.g. search engines, recommending systems) are now massively deployed. However, the lack of vector space structure for the set of rankings (i.e. the symmetric group S_n) and the complex nature of statistics considered in ranking data analysis make the formulation of robustness objectives in this domain challenging. In this paper, we introduce notions of robustness, together with dedicated statistical methods, for Consensus Ranking the flagship problem in ranking data analysis, aiming at summarizing a probability distribution on S_n by a median ranking. Precisely, we propose specific extensions of the popular concept of breakdown point, tailored to consensus ranking, and address the related computational issues. Beyond the theoretical contributions, the relevance of the approach proposed is supported by an experimental study.

Randomized mechanisms can have good normative properties compared to their deterministic counterparts. However, randomized mechanisms are problematic in several ways such as in their verifiability. We propose here to derandomize such mechanisms by having agents play a game instead of tossing a coin. The game is designed so an agent's best action is to play randomly, and this play then injects ``randomness'' into the mechanism. This derandomization retains many of the good normative properties of the original randomized mechanism but gives a mechanism that is deterministic and easy, for instance, to audit. We consider three related methods to derandomize randomized mechanism in six different domains: voting, facility location, task allocation, school choice, peer selection, and resource allocation. We propose a number of novel derandomized mechanisms for these six domains with good normative properties. Each mechanism has a mixed Nash equilibrium in which agents play a modular arithmetic game with an uniform mixed strategy. In all but one mixed Nash equilibrium, agents report their preferences over the original problem sincerely. The derandomized methods are thus ``quasi-strategy proof''. In one domain, we additionally show that a new and desirable normative property emerges as a result of derandomization.

The mathematical study of voting, social choice theory, has traditionally only been applicable to choices among a few predetermined alternatives, but not to open-ended decisions such as collectively selecting a textual statement. We introduce generative social choice, a design methodology for open-ended democratic processes that combines the rigor of social choice theory with the capability of large language models to generate text and extrapolate preferences. Our framework divides the design of AI-augmented democratic processes into two components: first, proving that the process satisfies representation guarantees when given access to oracle queries; second, empirically validating that these queries can be approximately implemented using a large language model. We apply this framework to the problem of summarizing free-form opinions into a proportionally representative slate of opinion statements; specifically, we develop a democratic process with representation guarantees and use this process to portray the opinions of participants in a survey about abortion policy. In a trial with 100 representative US residents, we find that 84 out of 100 participants feel "excellently" or "exceptionally" represented by the slate of five statements we extracted.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

We consider an extension to the classic position auctions in which sponsored creatives can be added within AI generated content rather than shown in predefined slots. New challenges arise from the natural requirement that sponsored creatives should smoothly fit into the context. With the help of advanced LLM technologies, it becomes viable to accurately estimate the benefits of adding each individual sponsored creatives into each potential positions within the AI generated content by properly taking the context into account. Therefore, we assume one click-through rate estimation for each position-creative pair, rather than one uniform estimation for each sponsored creative across all positions in classic settings. As a result, the underlying optimization becomes a general matching problem, thus the substitution effects should be treated more carefully compared to standard position auction settings, where the slots are independent with each other. In this work, we formalize a concrete mathematical model of the extended position auction problem and study the welfare-maximization and revenue-maximization mechanism design problem. Formally, we consider two different user behavior models and solve the mechanism design problems therein respectively. For the Multinomial Logit (MNL) model, which is order-insensitive, we can efficiently implement the optimal mechanisms. For the cascade model, which is order-sensitive, we provide approximately optimal solutions.

An abundance of recent impossibility results establish that regret minimization in Markov games with adversarial opponents is both statistically and computationally intractable. Nevertheless, none of these results preclude the possibility of regret minimization under the assumption that all parties adopt the same learning procedure. In this work, we present the first (to our knowledge) algorithm for learning in general-sum Markov games that provides sublinear regret guarantees when executed by all agents. The bounds we obtain are for swap regret, and thus, along the way, imply convergence to a correlated equilibrium. Our algorithm is decentralized, computationally efficient, and does not require any communication between agents. Our key observation is that online learning via policy optimization in Markov games essentially reduces to a form of weighted regret minimization, with unknown weights determined by the path length of the agents' policy sequence. Consequently, controlling the path length leads to weighted regret objectives for which sufficiently adaptive algorithms provide sublinear regret guarantees.

Many computer scientists use the aggregated answers of online workers to represent ground truth. Prior work has shown that aggregation methods such as majority voting are effective for measuring relatively objective features. For subjective features such as semantic connotation, online workers, known for optimizing their hourly earnings, tend to deteriorate in the quality of their responses as they work longer. In this paper, we aim to address this issue by proposing a quality-aware semantic data annotation system. We observe that with timely feedback on workers' performance quantified by quality scores, better informed online workers can maintain the quality of their labeling throughout an extended period of time. We validate the effectiveness of the proposed annotation system through i) evaluating performance based on an expert-labeled dataset, and ii) demonstrating machine learning tasks that can lead to consistent learning behavior with 70%-80% accuracy. Our results suggest that with our system, researchers can collect high-quality answers of subjective semantic features at a large scale.

Reliably labelling data typically requires annotations from multiple human workers. However, humans are far from being perfect. Hence, it is a common practice to aggregate labels gathered from multiple annotators to make a more confident estimate of the true label. Among many aggregation methods, the simple and well known Majority Vote (MV) selects the class label polling the highest number of votes. However, despite its importance, the optimality of MV's label aggregation has not been extensively studied. We address this gap in our work by characterising the conditions under which MV achieves the theoretically optimal lower bound on label estimation error. Our results capture the tolerable limits on annotation noise under which MV can optimally recover labels for a given class distribution. This certificate of optimality provides a more principled approach to model selection for label aggregation as an alternative to otherwise inefficient practices that sometimes include higher experts, gold labels, etc., that are all marred by the same human uncertainty despite huge time and monetary costs. Experiments on both synthetic and real world data corroborate our theoretical findings.

We consider the task of identifying the Copeland winner(s) in a dueling bandits problem with ternary feedback. This is an underexplored but practically relevant variant of the conventional dueling bandits problem, in which, in addition to strict preference between two arms, one may observe feedback in the form of an indifference. We provide a lower bound on the sample complexity for any learning algorithm finding the Copeland winner(s) with a fixed error probability. Moreover, we propose POCOWISTA, an algorithm with a sample complexity that almost matches this lower bound, and which shows excellent empirical performance, even for the conventional dueling bandits problem. For the case where the preference probabilities satisfy a specific type of stochastic transitivity, we provide a refined version with an improved worst case sample complexity.

We study the non-stationary dueling bandits problem with K arms, where the time horizon T consists of M stationary segments, each of which is associated with its own preference matrix. The learner repeatedly selects a pair of arms and observes a binary preference between them as feedback. To minimize the accumulated regret, the learner needs to pick the Condorcet winner of each stationary segment as often as possible, despite preference matrices and segment lengths being unknown. We propose the Beat, the, Winner, Reset algorithm and prove a bound on its expected binary weak regret in the stationary case, which tightens the bound of current state-of-art algorithms. We also show a regret bound for the non-stationary case, without requiring knowledge of M or T. We further propose and analyze two meta-algorithms, DETECT for weak regret and Monitored, Dueling, Bandits for strong regret, both based on a detection-window approach that can incorporate any dueling bandit algorithm as a black-box algorithm. Finally, we prove a worst-case lower bound for expected weak regret in the non-stationary case.

We focus on a simple, one-dimensional collective decision problem (often referred to as the facility location problem) and explore issues of strategyproofness and proportionality-based fairness. We introduce and analyze a hierarchy of proportionality-based fairness axioms of varying strength: Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS), Proportionality (as in Freeman et al, 2021), and Proportional Fairness (PF). For each axiom, we characterize the family of mechanisms that satisfy the axiom and strategyproofness. We show that imposing strategyproofness renders many of the axioms to be equivalent: the family of mechanisms that satisfy proportionality, unanimity, and strategyproofness is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy UFS and strategyproofness, which, in turn, is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy PF and strategyproofness. Furthermore, there is a unique such mechanism: the Uniform Phantom mechanism, which is studied in Freeman et al. (2021). We also characterize the outcomes of the Uniform Phantom mechanism as the unique (pure) equilibrium outcome for any mechanism that satisfies continuity, strict monotonicity, and UFS. Finally, we analyze the approximation guarantees, in terms of optimal social welfare and minimum total cost, obtained by mechanisms that are strategyproof and satisfy each proportionality-based fairness axiom. We show that the Uniform Phantom mechanism provides the best approximation of the optimal social welfare (and also minimum total cost) among all mechanisms that satisfy UFS.

We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility result that no strategy proof mechanism can bound the approximation ratio of the optimal Gini index of utilities for one or more facilities. We propose instead computing approximation ratios of the complemented Gini index of utilities, and consider how well both deterministic and randomized mechanisms approximate this. In addition, as Nash welfare is often put forwards as an equitable compromise between egalitarian and utilitarian outcomes, we consider how well mechanisms approximate the Nash welfare.

The ethical concept of fairness has recently been applied in machine learning (ML) settings to describe a wide range of constraints and objectives. When considering the relevance of ethical concepts to subset selection problems, the concepts of diversity and inclusion are additionally applicable in order to create outputs that account for social power and access differentials. We introduce metrics based on these concepts, which can be applied together, separately, and in tandem with additional fairness constraints. Results from human subject experiments lend support to the proposed criteria. Social choice methods can additionally be leveraged to aggregate and choose preferable sets, and we detail how these may be applied.

Decentralized learning offers a promising approach to crowdsource data consumptions and computational workloads across geographically distributed compute interconnected through peer-to-peer networks, accommodating the exponentially increasing demands. However, proper incentives are still in absence, considerably discouraging participation. Our vision is that a fair incentive mechanism relies on fair attribution of contributions to participating nodes, which faces non-trivial challenges arising from the localized connections making influence ``cascade'' in a decentralized network. To overcome this, we design the first method to estimate Data Influence CascadE (DICE) in a decentralized environment. Theoretically, the framework derives tractable approximations of influence cascade over arbitrary neighbor hops, suggesting the influence cascade is determined by an interplay of data, communication topology, and the curvature of loss landscape. DICE also lays the foundations for applications including selecting suitable collaborators and identifying malicious behaviors. Project page is available at https://raiden-zhu.github.io/blog/2025/DICE/.

In this paper, we propose a simple and efficient method for value model training on long-context reasoning traces. Compared to existing process reward models (PRMs), our method does not require a fine-grained notion of "step," which is difficult to define for long-context reasoning models. By collecting a dataset of 2.5 million reasoning traces, we train a 1.5B token-level value model and apply it to DeepSeek models for improved performance with test-time compute scaling. We find that block-wise value-guided search (VGS) with a final weighted majority vote achieves better test-time scaling than standard methods such as majority voting or best-of-n. With an inference budget of 64 generations, VGS with DeepSeek-R1-Distill-1.5B achieves an average accuracy of 45.7% across four competition math benchmarks (AIME 2024 & 2025, HMMT Feb 2024 & 2025), reaching parity with o3-mini-medium. Moreover, VGS significantly reduces the inference FLOPs required to achieve the same performance of majority voting. Our dataset, model and codebase are open-sourced.

In peer mechanisms, the competitors for a prize also determine who wins. Each competitor may be asked to rank, grade, or nominate peers for the prize. Since the prize can be valuable, such as financial aid, course grades, or an award at a conference, competitors may be tempted to manipulate the mechanism. We survey approaches to prevent or discourage the manipulation of peer mechanisms. We conclude our survey by identifying several important research challenges.

Evaluation has traditionally focused on ranking candidates for a specific skill. Modern generalist models, such as Large Language Models (LLMs), decidedly outpace this paradigm. Open-ended evaluation systems, where candidate models are compared on user-submitted prompts, have emerged as a popular solution. Despite their many advantages, we show that the current Elo-based rating systems can be susceptible to and even reinforce biases in data, intentional or accidental, due to their sensitivity to redundancies. To address this issue, we propose evaluation as a 3-player game, and introduce novel game-theoretic solution concepts to ensure robustness to redundancy. We show that our method leads to intuitive ratings and provide insights into the competitive landscape of LLM development.

In collaborative learning with streaming data, nodes (e.g., organizations) jointly and continuously learn a machine learning (ML) model by sharing the latest model updates computed from their latest streaming data. For the more resourceful nodes to be willing to share their model updates, they need to be fairly incentivized. This paper explores an incentive design that guarantees fairness so that nodes receive rewards commensurate to their contributions. Our approach leverages an explore-then-exploit formulation to estimate the nodes' contributions (i.e., exploration) for realizing our theoretically guaranteed fair incentives (i.e., exploitation). However, we observe a "rich get richer" phenomenon arising from the existing approaches to guarantee fairness and it discourages the participation of the less resourceful nodes. To remedy this, we additionally preserve asymptotic equality, i.e., less resourceful nodes achieve equal performance eventually to the more resourceful/"rich" nodes. We empirically demonstrate in two settings with real-world streaming data: federated online incremental learning and federated reinforcement learning, that our proposed approach outperforms existing baselines in fairness and learning performance while remaining competitive in preserving equality.

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) is a promising solution to align large language models (LLMs) more closely with human values. Off-policy preference optimization, where the preference data is obtained from other models, is widely adopted due to its cost efficiency and scalability. However, off-policy preference optimization often suffers from a distributional gap between the policy used for data collection and the target policy, leading to suboptimal optimization. In this paper, we propose a novel strategy to mitigate this problem by simulating on-policy learning with off-policy preference data. Our Weighted Preference Optimization (WPO) method adapts off-policy data to resemble on-policy data more closely by reweighting preference pairs according to their probability under the current policy. This method not only addresses the distributional gap problem but also enhances the optimization process without incurring additional costs. We validate our method on instruction following benchmarks including Alpaca Eval 2 and MT-bench. WPO not only outperforms Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) by up to 5.6% on Alpaca Eval 2 but also establishes a remarkable length-controlled winning rate against GPT-4-turbo of 48.6% based on Llama-3-8B-Instruct, making it the strongest 8B model on the leaderboard. We will release the code and models at https://github.com/wzhouad/WPO.

Federated learning is a popular technology for training machine learning models on distributed data sources without sharing data. Vertical federated learning or feature-based federated learning applies to the cases that different data sources share the same sample ID space but differ in feature space. To ensure the data owners' long-term engagement, it is critical to objectively assess the contribution from each data source and recompense them accordingly. The Shapley value (SV) is a provably fair contribution valuation metric originated from cooperative game theory. However, computing the SV requires extensively retraining the model on each subset of data sources, which causes prohibitively high communication costs in federated learning. We propose a contribution valuation metric called vertical federated Shapley value (VerFedSV) based on SV. We show that VerFedSV not only satisfies many desirable properties for fairness but is also efficient to compute, and can be adapted to both synchronous and asynchronous vertical federated learning algorithms. Both theoretical analysis and extensive experimental results verify the fairness, efficiency, and adaptability of VerFedSV.

Federated heavy hitter analytics enables service providers to better understand the preferences of cross-party users by analyzing the most frequent items. As with federated learning, it faces challenges of privacy concerns, statistical heterogeneity, and expensive communication. Local differential privacy (LDP), as the de facto standard for privacy-preserving data collection, solves the privacy challenge by letting each user perturb her data locally and report the sanitized version. However, in federated settings, applying LDP complicates the other two challenges, due to the deteriorated utility by the injected LDP noise or increasing communication/computation costs by perturbation mechanism. To tackle these problems, we propose a novel target-aligning prefix tree mechanism satisfying epsilon-LDP, for federated heavy hitter analytics. In particular, we propose an adaptive extension strategy to address the inconsistencies between covering necessary prefixes and estimating heavy hitters within a party to enhance the utility. We also present a consensus-based pruning strategy that utilizes noisy prior knowledge from other parties to further align the inconsistency between finding heavy hitters in each party and providing reasonable frequency information to identify the global ones. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first solution to the federated heavy hitter analytics in a cross-party setting while satisfying the stringent epsilon-LDP. Comprehensive experiments on both real-world and synthetic datasets confirm the effectiveness of our proposed mechanism.

In Machine Learning, a benchmark refers to an ensemble of datasets associated with one or multiple metrics together with a way to aggregate different systems performances. They are instrumental in (i) assessing the progress of new methods along different axes and (ii) selecting the best systems for practical use. This is particularly the case for NLP with the development of large pre-trained models (e.g. GPT, BERT) that are expected to generalize well on a variety of tasks. While the community mainly focused on developing new datasets and metrics, there has been little interest in the aggregation procedure, which is often reduced to a simple average over various performance measures. However, this procedure can be problematic when the metrics are on a different scale, which may lead to spurious conclusions. This paper proposes a new procedure to rank systems based on their performance across different tasks. Motivated by the social choice theory, the final system ordering is obtained through aggregating the rankings induced by each task and is theoretically grounded. We conduct extensive numerical experiments (on over 270k scores) to assess the soundness of our approach both on synthetic and real scores (e.g. GLUE, EXTREM, SEVAL, TAC, FLICKR). In particular, we show that our method yields different conclusions on state-of-the-art systems than the mean-aggregation procedure while being both more reliable and robust.

To enhance the efficiency and practicality of federated bandit learning, recent advances have introduced incentives to motivate communication among clients, where a client participates only when the incentive offered by the server outweighs its participation cost. However, existing incentive mechanisms naively assume the clients are truthful: they all report their true cost and thus the higher cost one participating client claims, the more the server has to pay. Therefore, such mechanisms are vulnerable to strategic clients aiming to optimize their own utility by misreporting. To address this issue, we propose an incentive compatible (i.e., truthful) communication protocol, named Truth-FedBan, where the incentive for each participant is independent of its self-reported cost, and reporting the true cost is the only way to achieve the best utility. More importantly, Truth-FedBan still guarantees the sub-linear regret and communication cost without any overheads. In other words, the core conceptual contribution of this paper is, for the first time, demonstrating the possibility of simultaneously achieving incentive compatibility and nearly optimal regret in federated bandit learning. Extensive numerical studies further validate the effectiveness of our proposed solution.

Weighting methods in causal inference have been widely used to achieve a desirable level of covariate balancing. However, the existing weighting methods have desirable theoretical properties only when a certain model, either the propensity score or outcome regression model, is correctly specified. In addition, the corresponding estimators do not behave well for finite samples due to large variance even when the model is correctly specified. In this paper, we consider to use the integral probability metric (IPM), which is a metric between two probability measures, for covariate balancing. Optimal weights are determined so that weighted empirical distributions for the treated and control groups have the smallest IPM value for a given set of discriminators. We prove that the corresponding estimator can be consistent without correctly specifying any model (neither the propensity score nor the outcome regression model). In addition, we empirically show that our proposed method outperforms existing weighting methods with large margins for finite samples.

Bayesian persuasion studies how an informed sender should influence beliefs of rational receivers who take decisions through Bayesian updating of a common prior. We focus on the online Bayesian persuasion framework, in which the sender repeatedly faces one or more receivers with unknown and adversarially selected types. First, we show how to obtain a tight tilde O(T^{1/2}) regret bound in the case in which the sender faces a single receiver and has partial feedback, improving over the best previously known bound of tilde O(T^{4/5}). Then, we provide the first no-regret guarantees for the multi-receiver setting under partial feedback. Finally, we show how to design no-regret algorithms with polynomial per-iteration running time by exploiting type reporting, thereby circumventing known intractability results on online Bayesian persuasion. We provide efficient algorithms guaranteeing a O(T^{1/2}) regret upper bound both in the single- and multi-receiver scenario when type reporting is allowed.

In multi-hop mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs),mobile nodes cooperate with each other without using any infrastructure such as access points or base stations. Security remains a major challenge for these networks due to their features of open medium, dynamically changing topologies, reliance on cooperative algorithms, absence of centralized monitoring points, and lack of clear lines of defense. Among the various attacks to which MANETs are vulnerable, malicious packet dropping attack is very common where a malicious node can partially degrade or completely disrupt communication in the network by consistently dropping packets. In this paper, a mechanism for detection of packet dropping attack is presented based on cooperative participation of the nodes in a MANET. The redundancy of routing information in an ad hoc network is utilized to make the scheme robust so that it works effectively even in presence of transient network partitioning and Byzantine failure of nodes. The proposed scheme is fully cooperative and thus more secure as the vulnerabilities of any election algorithm used for choosing a subset of nodes for cooperation are absent. Simulation results show the effectiveness of the protocol.

We study the problem of multi-task learning under user-level differential privacy, in which n users contribute data to m tasks, each involving a subset of users. One important aspect of the problem, that can significantly impact quality, is the distribution skew among tasks. Certain tasks may have much fewer data samples than others, making them more susceptible to the noise added for privacy. It is natural to ask whether algorithms can adapt to this skew to improve the overall utility. We give a systematic analysis of the problem, by studying how to optimally allocate a user's privacy budget among tasks. We propose a generic algorithm, based on an adaptive reweighting of the empirical loss, and show that when there is task distribution skew, this gives a quantifiable improvement of excess empirical risk. Experimental studies on recommendation problems that exhibit a long tail of small tasks, demonstrate that our methods significantly improve utility, achieving the state of the art on two standard benchmarks.

In federated learning (FL), weighted aggregation of local models is conducted to generate a global model, and the aggregation weights are normalized (the sum of weights is 1) and proportional to the local data sizes. In this paper, we revisit the weighted aggregation process and gain new insights into the training dynamics of FL. First, we find that the sum of weights can be smaller than 1, causing global weight shrinking effect (analogous to weight decay) and improving generalization. We explore how the optimal shrinking factor is affected by clients' data heterogeneity and local epochs. Second, we dive into the relative aggregation weights among clients to depict the clients' importance. We develop client coherence to study the learning dynamics and find a critical point that exists. Before entering the critical point, more coherent clients play more essential roles in generalization. Based on the above insights, we propose an effective method for Federated Learning with Learnable Aggregation Weights, named as FedLAW. Extensive experiments verify that our method can improve the generalization of the global model by a large margin on different datasets and models.

Mathematical word problem-solving has long been recognized as a complex task for small language models (SLMs). A recent study hypothesized that the smallest model size, needed to achieve over 80% accuracy on the GSM8K benchmark, is 34 billion parameters. To reach this level of performance with smaller models, researcher often train SLMs to generate Python code or use tools to help avoid calculation errors. Additionally, they employ ensembling, where outputs of up to 100 model runs are combined to arrive at a more accurate result. Result selection is done using consensus, majority vote or a separate a verifier model used in conjunction with the SLM. Ensembling provides a substantial boost in accuracy but at a significant cost increase with multiple calls to the model (e.g., Phi-GSM uses top-48 to boost the performance from 68.2 to 81.5). In this work, we present Orca-Math, a 7-billion-parameter SLM based on the Mistral-7B, which achieves 86.81% on GSM8k without the need for multiple model calls or the use of verifiers, code execution or any other external tools. Our approach has the following key elements: (1) A high quality synthetic dataset of 200K math problems created using a multi-agent setup where agents collaborate to create the data, (2) An iterative learning techniques that enables the SLM to practice solving problems, receive feedback on its solutions and learn from preference pairs incorporating the SLM solutions and the feedback. When trained with Supervised Fine-Tuning alone, Orca-Math achieves 81.50% on GSM8k pass@1 metric. With iterative preference learning, Orca-Math achieves 86.81% pass@1. Orca-Math surpasses the performance of significantly larger models such as LLAMA-2-70B, WizardMath-70B, Gemini-Pro, ChatGPT-3.5. It also significantly outperforms other smaller models while using much smaller data (hundreds of thousands vs. millions of problems).

In this work, we consider the problem of collaborative multi-user reinforcement learning. In this setting there are multiple users with the same state-action space and transition probabilities but with different rewards. Under the assumption that the reward matrix of the N users has a low-rank structure -- a standard and practically successful assumption in the offline collaborative filtering setting -- the question is can we design algorithms with significantly lower sample complexity compared to the ones that learn the MDP individually for each user. Our main contribution is an algorithm which explores rewards collaboratively with N user-specific MDPs and can learn rewards efficiently in two key settings: tabular MDPs and linear MDPs. When N is large and the rank is constant, the sample complexity per MDP depends logarithmically over the size of the state-space, which represents an exponential reduction (in the state-space size) when compared to the standard ``non-collaborative'' algorithms.

We consider the problem of fairly allocating a sequence of indivisible items that arrive online in an arbitrary order to a group of n agents with additive normalized valuation functions. We consider both the allocation of goods and chores and propose algorithms for approximating maximin share (MMS) allocations. When agents have identical valuation functions the problem coincides with the semi-online machine covering problem (when items are goods) and load balancing problem (when items are chores), for both of which optimal competitive ratios have been achieved. In this paper, we consider the case when agents have general additive valuation functions. For the allocation of goods, we show that no competitive algorithm exists even when there are only three agents and propose an optimal 0.5-competitive algorithm for the case of two agents. For the allocation of chores, we propose a (2-1/n)-competitive algorithm for n>=3 agents and a square root of 2 (approximately 1.414)-competitive algorithm for two agents. Additionally, we show that no algorithm can do better than 15/11 (approximately 1.364)-competitive for two agents.

In this paper, a simple yet effective network pruning framework is proposed to simultaneously address the problems of pruning indicator, pruning ratio, and efficiency constraint. This paper argues that the pruning decision should depend on the convolutional weights, and thus proposes novel weight-dependent gates (W-Gates) to learn the information from filter weights and obtain binary gates to prune or keep the filters automatically. To prune the network under efficiency constraints, a switchable Efficiency Module is constructed to predict the hardware latency or FLOPs of candidate pruned networks. Combined with the proposed Efficiency Module, W-Gates can perform filter pruning in an efficiency-aware manner and achieve a compact network with a better accuracy-efficiency trade-off. We have demonstrated the effectiveness of the proposed method on ResNet34, ResNet50, and MobileNet V2, respectively achieving up to 1.33/1.28/1.1 higher Top-1 accuracy with lower hardware latency on ImageNet. Compared with state-of-the-art methods, W-Gates also achieves superior performance.

In federated learning (FL), clients usually have diverse participation statistics that are unknown a priori, which can significantly harm the performance of FL if not handled properly. Existing works aiming at addressing this problem are usually based on global variance reduction, which requires a substantial amount of additional memory in a multiplicative factor equal to the total number of clients. An important open problem is to find a lightweight method for FL in the presence of clients with unknown participation rates. In this paper, we address this problem by adapting the aggregation weights in federated averaging (FedAvg) based on the participation history of each client. We first show that, with heterogeneous participation statistics, FedAvg with non-optimal aggregation weights can diverge from the optimal solution of the original FL objective, indicating the need of finding optimal aggregation weights. However, it is difficult to compute the optimal weights when the participation statistics are unknown. To address this problem, we present a new algorithm called FedAU, which improves FedAvg by adaptively weighting the client updates based on online estimates of the optimal weights without knowing the statistics of client participation. We provide a theoretical convergence analysis of FedAU using a novel methodology to connect the estimation error and convergence. Our theoretical results reveal important and interesting insights, while showing that FedAU converges to an optimal solution of the original objective and has desirable properties such as linear speedup. Our experimental results also verify the advantage of FedAU over baseline methods with various participation patterns.

In online ad markets, a rising number of advertisers are employing bidding agencies to participate in ad auctions. These agencies are specialized in designing online algorithms and bidding on behalf of their clients. Typically, an agency usually has information on multiple advertisers, so she can potentially coordinate bids to help her clients achieve higher utilities than those under independent bidding. In this paper, we study coordinated online bidding algorithms in repeated second-price auctions with budgets. We propose algorithms that guarantee every client a higher utility than the best she can get under independent bidding. We show that these algorithms achieve maximal coalition welfare and discuss bidders' incentives to misreport their budgets, in symmetric cases. Our proofs combine the techniques of online learning and equilibrium analysis, overcoming the difficulty of competing with a multi-dimensional benchmark. The performance of our algorithms is further evaluated by experiments on both synthetic and real data. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider bidder coordination in online repeated auctions with constraints.

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods among a set of agents. Our focus is on the existence of allocations that give each agent their maximin fair share--the value they are guaranteed if they divide the goods into as many bundles as there are agents, and receive their lowest valued bundle. An MMS allocation is one where every agent receives at least their maximin fair share. We examine the existence of such allocations when agents have cost utilities. In this setting, each item has an associated cost, and an agent's valuation for an item is the cost of the item if it is useful to them, and zero otherwise. Our main results indicate that cost utilities are a promising restriction for achieving MMS. We show that for the case of three agents with cost utilities, an MMS allocation always exists. We also show that when preferences are restricted slightly further--to what we call laminar set approvals--we can guarantee MMS allocations for any number of agents. Finally, we explore if it is possible to guarantee each agent their maximin fair share while using a strategyproof mechanism.

We propose a general two-stage algorithm that enjoys a provable scaling law for the test-time compute of large language models (LLMs). Given an input problem, the proposed algorithm first generates N candidate solutions, and then chooses the best one via a multiple-round knockout tournament where each pair of candidates are compared for K times and only the winners move on to the next round. In a minimalistic implementation, both stages can be executed with a black-box LLM alone and nothing else (e.g., no external verifier or reward model), and a total of N times (K + 1) highly parallelizable LLM calls are needed for solving an input problem. Assuming that a generated candidate solution is correct with probability p_{gen} > 0 and a comparison between a pair of correct and incorrect solutions identifies the right winner with probability p_{comp} > 0.5 (i.e., better than a random guess), we prove theoretically that the failure probability of the proposed algorithm decays to zero exponentially with respect to N and K: $P(final output is incorrect) le (1 - p_{gen})^N + lceil log_2 N rceil e^{-2 K (p_{comp} - 0.5)^2}.$ Our empirical results with the challenging MMLU-Pro benchmark validate the technical assumptions, as well as the efficacy of the proposed algorithm and the gains from scaling up its test-time compute.

The online knapsack problem is a classic problem in the field of online algorithms. Its canonical version asks how to pack items of different values and weights arriving online into a capacity-limited knapsack so as to maximize the total value of the admitted items. Although optimal competitive algorithms are known for this problem, they may be fundamentally unfair, i.e., individual items may be treated inequitably in different ways. We formalize a practically-relevant notion of time fairness which effectively models a trade off between static and dynamic pricing in a motivating application such as cloud resource allocation, and show that existing algorithms perform poorly under this metric. We propose a parameterized deterministic algorithm where the parameter precisely captures the Pareto-optimal trade-off between fairness (static pricing) and competitiveness (dynamic pricing). We show that randomization is theoretically powerful enough to be simultaneously competitive and fair; however, it does not work well in experiments. To further improve the trade-off between fairness and competitiveness, we develop a nearly-optimal learning-augmented algorithm which is fair, consistent, and robust (competitive), showing substantial performance improvements in numerical experiments.

Dataset distillation aims to synthesize a smaller, representative dataset that preserves the essential properties of the original data, enabling efficient model training with reduced computational resources. Prior work has primarily focused on improving the alignment or matching process between original and synthetic data, or on enhancing the efficiency of distilling large datasets. In this work, we introduce {bf C}ommittee {bf V}oting for {bf D}ataset {bf D}istillation (CV-DD), a novel and orthogonal approach that leverages the collective wisdom of multiple models or experts to create high-quality distilled datasets. We start by showing how to establish a strong baseline that already achieves state-of-the-art accuracy through leveraging recent advancements and thoughtful adjustments in model design and optimization processes. By integrating distributions and predictions from a committee of models while generating high-quality soft labels, our method captures a wider spectrum of data features, reduces model-specific biases and the adverse effects of distribution shifts, leading to significant improvements in generalization. This voting-based strategy not only promotes diversity and robustness within the distilled dataset but also significantly reduces overfitting, resulting in improved performance on post-eval tasks. Extensive experiments across various datasets and IPCs (images per class) demonstrate that Committee Voting leads to more reliable and adaptable distilled data compared to single/multi-model distillation methods, demonstrating its potential for efficient and accurate dataset distillation. Code is available at: https://github.com/Jiacheng8/CV-DD.

The massive population election simulation aims to model the preferences of specific groups in particular election scenarios. It has garnered significant attention for its potential to forecast real-world social trends. Traditional agent-based modeling (ABM) methods are constrained by their ability to incorporate complex individual background information and provide interactive prediction results. In this paper, we introduce ElectionSim, an innovative election simulation framework based on large language models, designed to support accurate voter simulations and customized distributions, together with an interactive platform to dialogue with simulated voters. We present a million-level voter pool sampled from social media platforms to support accurate individual simulation. We also introduce PPE, a poll-based presidential election benchmark to assess the performance of our framework under the U.S. presidential election scenario. Through extensive experiments and analyses, we demonstrate the effectiveness and robustness of our framework in U.S. presidential election simulations.

The large model size, high computational operations, and vulnerability against membership inference attack (MIA) have impeded deep learning or deep neural networks (DNNs) popularity, especially on mobile devices. To address the challenge, we envision that the weight pruning technique will help DNNs against MIA while reducing model storage and computational operation. In this work, we propose a pruning algorithm, and we show that the proposed algorithm can find a subnetwork that can prevent privacy leakage from MIA and achieves competitive accuracy with the original DNNs. We also verify our theoretical insights with experiments. Our experimental results illustrate that the attack accuracy using model compression is up to 13.6% and 10% lower than that of the baseline and Min-Max game, accordingly.

Training classifiers is difficult with severe class imbalance, but many rare events are the culmination of a sequence with much more common intermediate outcomes. For example, in online marketing a user first sees an ad, then may click on it, and finally may make a purchase; estimating the probability of purchases is difficult because of their rarity. We show both theoretically and through data experiments that the more abundant data in earlier steps may be leveraged to improve estimation of probabilities of rare events. We present PRESTO, a relaxation of the proportional odds model for ordinal regression. Instead of estimating weights for one separating hyperplane that is shifted by separate intercepts for each of the estimated Bayes decision boundaries between adjacent pairs of categorical responses, we estimate separate weights for each of these transitions. We impose an L1 penalty on the differences between weights for the same feature in adjacent weight vectors in order to shrink towards the proportional odds model. We prove that PRESTO consistently estimates the decision boundary weights under a sparsity assumption. Synthetic and real data experiments show that our method can estimate rare probabilities in this setting better than both logistic regression on the rare category, which fails to borrow strength from more abundant categories, and the proportional odds model, which is too inflexible.

Recently, Qiao, Duan, and Cheng~(2019) proposed a distributed nearest-neighbor classification method, in which a massive dataset is split into smaller groups, each processed with a k-nearest-neighbor classifier, and the final class label is predicted by a majority vote among these groupwise class labels. This paper shows that the distributed algorithm with k=1 over a sufficiently large number of groups attains a minimax optimal error rate up to a multiplicative logarithmic factor under some regularity conditions, for both regression and classification problems. Roughly speaking, distributed 1-nearest-neighbor rules with M groups has a performance comparable to standard Theta(M)-nearest-neighbor rules. In the analysis, alternative rules with a refined aggregation method are proposed and shown to attain exact minimax optimal rates.

In pursuit of participatory budgeting (PB) outcomes with broader fairness guarantees, we initiate the study of lotteries over discrete PB outcomes. As the projects have heterogeneous costs, the amount spent may not be equal ex ante and ex post. To address this, we develop a technique to bound the amount by which the ex-post spend differs from the ex-ante spend -- the property is termed budget balanced up to one project (BB1). With respect to fairness, we take a best-of-both-worlds perspective, seeking outcomes that are both ex-ante and ex-post fair. Towards this goal, we initiate a study of ex-ante fairness properties in PB, including Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS) and their stronger variants, as well as Group Fair Share (GFS). We show several incompatibility results between these ex-ante fairness notions and existing ex-post concepts based on justified representation. One of our main contributions is a randomized algorithm which simultaneously satisfies ex-ante Strong UFS, ex-post full justified representation (FJR) and ex-post BB1 for PB with binary utilities.