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Question Title: Do US companies need a cookie consent banner for EU traffic?

Question Body: <p>Example:
US website, targeting customers in the US. They use Google Analytics and Google Ads cookies etc.</p>
<p>Do they need a cookie consent banner for EU traffic? Or should they just not load any tracking for non-us visitors?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>Such a banner is probably not needed, but it depends. To some degree, the questions of &quot;tracking&quot; and &quot;cookies&quot; have to be handled separately. Tracking and profiling would be regulated by the GDPR, whereas cookies and similar technologies are regulated through European national laws.</p>
<h3>Is the US company subject to GDPR rules with regards to tracking?</h3>
<p>Depending on context, the US company may or may not be subject to the GDPR. Per Art 3(2), it will have to comply with GDPR for those processing activities that are</p>
<ul>
<li>(a) related to the &quot;offering&quot; of goods or services to people who are in Europe, or are</li>
<li>(b) related to the &quot;monitoring&quot; of behaviour of people who are in Europe.</li>
</ul>
<p>Here, &quot;offering&quot; does not mean mere availability, it means some intention to target or market to people in Europe. Recital 23 clarifies:</p>
<blockquote>


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</ul>
<p>Here, &quot;offering&quot; does not mean mere availability, it means some intention to target or market to people in Europe. Recital 23 clarifies:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the mere accessibility of the […] website in the Union, of an email address or of other contact details, or the use of a language generally used in the third country where the controller is established, is insufficient to ascertain such intention</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In their <a href="https://edpb.europa.eu/our-work-tools/our-documents/guidelines/guidelines-32018-territorial-scope-gdpr-article-3-version_en" rel="nofollow noreferrer">guidelines on the territorial scope of the GDPR</a>, the EDPB has collected criteria from case law to help understand whether that targeting criterion would apply.</p>
<p>From your description, it seems that there would not be any targeting intention, so that GDPR wouldn't apply to the website per Art 3(2)(a).</p>


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<p>From your description, it seems that there would not be any targeting intention, so that GDPR wouldn't apply to the website per Art 3(2)(a).</p>
<p>But what about Art 3(2)(b), the monitoring criterion? There is an argument that any ad tracking/profiling from any website is subject to GDPR when it involves users who are in Europe. It could therefore be sensible to avoid enabling such tracking when visitors appear to be from abroad. For a company that does not focus on an European audience, that might not even reduce ad revenue in any noticeable way. However, this aspect of the GDPR is difficult to enforce, so many websites do not seem to bother about potential obligations through Art 3(2)(b).</p>
<h3>Is the US company subject to European rules on cookies?</h3>


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<h3>Is the US company subject to European rules on cookies?</h3>
<p>Technically, the cookie consent requirement does not come from the GDPR. It comes from the ePrivacy Directive, which is implemented as national law in each member state (and as PECR in the UK). These laws have unclear territorial scope. Within the EU/EEA, there is a country of origin principle, but that cannot help for an US company. But it would be difficult for a European court or DPA to claim jurisdiction over the activities of a foreign company unless there's some kind of European nexus, along the same lines as the Art 3(2)(a) GDPR targeting criterion.</p>
<p>In this answer, &quot;Europe&quot; means EU/EEA/UK as appropriate.</p>


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Question Title: On a mobile app, can I use IP location services to determine if a user is from EU prior to GDPR consent?

Question Body: <p>I have a question about the GDPR law. I am creating a mobile application where I will need to store some personal data in order for the app to work. I would also like to include personalized ads in the app. Now if GDPR applies, I would need to get explicit consent from the user before showing personalized ads. However, here is my problem:</p>
<p>In order to know if GDPR applies to my user, I have to determine whether they are in the EU. I can do this by using a location API based on the user IP or by accessing some device settings. If I understand correctly, both ways would require prior GDPR consent of my user.  Can I access a user's location before they gave their GDPR consent? If not, how do I even know that I need their consent before asking them for it? It seems a bit like a chicken - egg problem to me.</p>


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Answer 1: <p>Since you are from Europe, GDPR applies to <em>all</em> your processing activities per Art 3(1) GDPR, regardless of where the users are located. If you would like to avoid GDPR compliance, you would have to manage your business from abroad so that you no longer have an European establishment, and would have to avoid offering your services to people who are in Europe.</p>


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<p>So let's assume that you have no European establishment. Then, GDPR can only apply per Art 3(2) to those processing activities that relate to offering goods or services to people who are in Europe. For determining this, IP-based geolocation is indeed common. Very likely, you do not need consent for this. GDPR does not require consent for everything, just a legal basis. There are six potential legal bases in Art 6(1), though the relevant ones are consent, necessity for performing a contract, legal obligations, and necessity for a legitimate interest. For things like security checks, it would be common to claim a legitimate interest.</p>


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<p>Complying with GDPR can hurt revenue. However, data subjects have a right to data protection, but you do not have a right to a particular business model. Similarly, paying taxes can &quot;hurt revenue&quot;, but it's not really optional. If your business model can't deal with GDPR compliance (or with taxes), it might not be a sound business model.</p>
<p>In Europe, many newspapers have since moved from advertising-only to a consent-or-pay model. That is, the user is given a choice:</p>
<ul>
<li>You can read articles without tracking if you buy a subscription.</li>
<li>You can access articles for free if you consent to tracking.</li>
</ul>


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<ul>
<li>You can read articles without tracking if you buy a subscription.</li>
<li>You can access articles for free if you consent to tracking.</li>
</ul>
<p>The legality of this is hotly debated. In principle, such an approach can be compliant, but the details are problematic, for example that you can only buy subscriptions rather than individual articles, and that these subscriptions are often orders of magnitude more expensive than what would be earned through ads. But this might actually be easier to solve for a mobile application than for a website, due to the availability of in-app payment and micropayment infrastructure.</p>


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<p>In any case, GDPR limits how much you can &quot;encourage&quot; consent – per Art 7(4), you cannot make access to your service conditional on consent. There must be a way to use your app without consenting to anything, unless that consent is actually necessary for the app to work. For example, consenting to camera access is necessary for a QR code reader app to work. It is extremely unlikely that ads would be necessary in this sense. Users also must not suffer detriment for declining or withdrawing consent. From this, the EDPB has developed the concept of &quot;permissible incentive&quot; in their <a href="https://edpb.europa.eu/our-work-tools/our-documents/guidelines/guidelines-052020-consent-under-regulation-2016679_en" rel="noreferrer">guidelines on consent</a>.</p>
<p>In this post, &quot;Europe&quot; means EU/EEA/UK as appropriate.</p>


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Answer 2: <p>I will assume you provide your app through a EU appstore of either Google or Apple or Amazon. That means you are doing business in the juristiction covered by the GDPR.</p>
<p>First, the GDPR protects &quot;EU citizens and residents&quot;. My citizenship status does not change, just because I use an internet connection with an end-IP somewhere else in the world.</p>
<p>So checking my IP to roughly guess my country is legally already somewhat fickle, but using my IP to guess my <em>citizenship</em> is really not a good idea.</p>
<p>The solution to your chicken and egg problem is to just grant <em>every</em> user the rights that you have to grant <em>some</em> of them. Problem solved. With zero extra effort on your side. You have to program it anyway, why create extra work for you by having specific cases for non-GDPR users.</p>
<hr />


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<hr />
<p>But to get into some details: sending the IP address to a third party service to guess my country is against the GDPR. So is using Google fonts on Google servers, to cite an actual example decided in court, because they too, get my IP address when I download them and I did not consent. If you want to use fonts, you have to host them on your own server and not give my private data to others. Based on that decision, I would say if you could determine my country based on IP <em>on your own machine</em> without giving my IP to someone else, that <em>might</em> work. I did not give you my IP for that specific purpose, but you don't store it... legally, a lawyer might figure out the details here. I think nobody would complain if you used it to guess my language for example.</p>


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<p>But again: law is not about guessing. Just get your user's consent, that way you are in complicance with the GDPR and users not covered by it will certainly not complain about giving them the extra courtesy.</p>


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Answer 3: <p>Even within their own country an EU resident or citizen may have an IP address pointing outside that country. For example for years I had a UK based ISP, while living in the Netherlands. I had an IP address placing me in Edinburgh, Scotland while I actually was in Amsterdam. I've also worked for a US company that had all internet traffic routed through their US datacenter, for the outside world I was located in Houston, Texas while sitting in my Amsterdam office. Using that IP address to check whether to apply GDPR rules to me would have led to the wrong decision.
And then there's the issue of VPNs. Using a VPN you can spoof your actual location using effectively the same mechanism I was subjected to, routing your data through a different location with a different IP range, thus masking your actual location (but in this case deliberately rather than as a side effect of your connection's implementation).</p>


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<p>So even if it were legally enough to use technological means to determine someone's location, using an IP address won't be good enough as the IP address reported may not reflect the ACTUAL location of the person accessing your service.</p>


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Question Title: What are the steps to collect against a SAFE investment contract?

Question Body: <p>I have a fund that signed a SAFE (<a href="https://ca.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/w-001-0673?transitionType=Default&amp;contextData=(sc.Default)&amp;firstPage=true" rel="nofollow noreferrer">simple agreement for future equity</a>) and wants to invest $400k in my company. It has been 2 months and they haven't sent the money. This had materially impacted my company. They have $85M in assets. How can I collect what I am owed and how long does this process typically take?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>A SAFE is basically what used to be called a &quot;subscription agreement&quot;, i.e. an agreement to invest money in the future that will ultimately give rise to an equity investment if made.</p>
<p>From a practical perspective, while the contract is legally enforceable, pursuing a lawsuit to enforce it is almost always a death knell level bad move. Firms who sue investors early in the game don't get future investors. The amount of time it takes to enforce such an agreement in a lawsuit is also too long (perhaps a year or two before you have money in hand if it runs its course and still many months if it settles), and the cost of doing so is too great (probably more than $40,000 that you won't get back to bring in $400,000), for it to make sense to do so at the delicate early stage of a start up.</p>


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<p>Instead, what you need to do is get on the phone with the investor, or quite possibly meet in person, at their offices or in a more casual deal making environment over drinks, for example, to figure out what is troubling them or slowing things up and how to make them happy. This is more of a function of continuing to sell the fact that you are good investment and an opportunity that they are missing out on, than it is about telling them about your legal rights.</p>
<p>If this fails, it is probably wiser to seek financing from someone else than to force them to perform.</p>


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Question Title: Are sites that give unfiltered ADS-B data legal?

Question Body: <p>Are plane tracking services such as ADS-B Exchange and TheAirTraffic that do not honor the FAA's Limited Aircraft Data Display program legal to use?</p>
<p>Is it legal to operate a feeder station for one of these?</p>
<p>Is it legal to run one of these services?</p>
<p>In other words, is LADD enforceable?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>Section 566 (&quot;RIGHT TO PRIVACY WHEN USING AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL
SYSTEM&quot;, page 3385) of <a href="https://www.congress.gov/115/plaws/publ254/PLAW-115publ254.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">the 2018 FAA Reauthorization Act</a>, the law which created LADD, says,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Administrator
shall, upon request of a private aircraft owner or operator, block
the registration number of the aircraft of the owner or operator
from any public dissemination or display, except in data made
available to a Government agency, for the noncommercial flights
of the owner or operator.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This says nothing about creating legal obligations for anyone except the FAA Administrator, so it seems that LADD is not binding on anyone except the FAA.</p>
<p>There is one case in which LADD is binding: <a href="https://www.faa.gov/pilots/ladd" rel="nofollow noreferrer">the FAA's page on LADD</a> says,</p>
<blockquote>


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<p>There is one case in which LADD is binding: <a href="https://www.faa.gov/pilots/ladd" rel="nofollow noreferrer">the FAA's page on LADD</a> says,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Vendors who subscribe to FAA SWIM [System-Wide Information Management] Data feeds are bound by a Data Access User Agreement to filter any LADD participant from public display of aircraft flight data.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Thus, flight trackers using FAA SWIM data are required to comply with LADD, even if they obtain data on the aircraft from another source.</p>
<p>The wording of the FAA's site also implies that compliance is not mandatory for trackers that do not have agreements with the FAA to use SWIM data.</p>


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Question Title: business activity description announcement rejection and speed of legal validity of the change

Question Body: <p>In a hypothetical scenario, Mr. Peter owns a company. He intends to change the business activity description, e.g. instead of chocolate he intends to sell tennis shoes.</p>
<p>Two questions please:</p>
<ol>
<li><p>Can such a change be rejected by the business register?</p>
</li>
<li><p>Can he start to manufacture and sell tennis shoes the very same day he announced the change?</p>
</li>
</ol>
<p>jurisdiction: EU</p>
<p>Thank you.</p>


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Answer 1: <h2>The purpose of a company is not recorded on the register and, yes, it can be done immediately</h2>
<p><a href="/questions/tagged/australia" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-australia-tooltip-container">australia</a></p>
<p>Unless the company is a <a href="https://asic.gov.au/for-business/registering-a-company/steps-to-register-a-company/special-purpose-companies/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">special purpose company</a>, it can do any legal thing it’s directors want it to do and it can do one thing on Monday and a different thing on Tuesday.</p>
<p>For example, the oil company Shell started out as an import-export business importing predominantly seashells.</p>


Tags: european-union, business


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Question Title: What differentiates living as mere roommates from living in a marriage-like relationship?

Question Body: <p>For jurisdictions that provide that a couple become spouses after living together in a marriage-like relationship for a given period of time<sup>1</sup>, how is such a marriage-like relationship different than living as mere roommates?</p>
<hr />
<p><sup>1. For example, in British Columbia, a person is a spouse for the purposes of the Family Law Act if they have &quot;lived with another person in a marriage-like relationship&quot; for a period of two years. But that is just an example, and this question is open to answers from jurisdictions with analogous paths to spousal status, even if they use different terminology.</sup></p>


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Answer 1: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/canada" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-canada-tooltip-container">canada</a></p>
<p>Courts have generally recognized that there is no &quot;checklist.&quot; Courts will look at a multitude of indicators &quot;of the sorts of behaviour that society, at any given point in time, associates with a marital relationship&quot; (<em>Weber v. Leclerc</em>, <a href="https://canlii.ca/t/gm9nx" rel="noreferrer">2015 BCCA 492</a>).</p>
<blockquote>
<p>[The indicators] include shared shelter, sexual and personal behaviour, services, social activities, economic support and children, as well as the societal perception of the couple. However, it was recognized that these elements may be present in varying degrees and not all are necessary for the relationship to be found to be conjugal.</p>


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<p>(<em>M. v. H.</em>, <a href="https://canlii.ca/t/1fqm4" rel="noreferrer">[1999] 2 S.C.R. 3</a> at para. 59.)</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>


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<p>Spousal relationships are many and varied. Individuals in spousal relationships, whether they are married or not, structure their relationships differently. In some relationships there is a complete blending of finances and property - in others, spouses keep their property and finances totally separate and in still others one spouse may totally control those aspects of the relationship with the other spouse having little or no knowledge or input. For some couples, sexual relations are very important - for others, that aspect may take a back seat to companionship. Some spouses do not share the same bed. There may be a variety of reasons for this such as health or personal choice. Some people are affectionate and demonstrative. They show their feelings for their “spouse” by holding hands, touching and kissing in public. Other individuals are not demonstrative and do not engage in public displays of affection. Some “spouses” do everything together - others do nothing together. Some


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touching and kissing in public. Other individuals are not demonstrative and do not engage in public displays of affection. Some “spouses” do everything together - others do nothing together. Some “spouses” vacation together and some spend their holidays apart. Some “spouses” have children - others do not. It is this variation in the way human beings structure their relationships that make the determination of when a “spousal relationship” exists difficult to determine. With married couples, the relationship is easy to establish. The marriage ceremony is a public declaration of their commitment and intent. Relationships outside marriage are much more difficult to ascertain. Rarely is there any type of “public” declaration of intent. Often people begin cohabiting with little forethought or planning. Their motivation is often nothing more than wanting to “be together”. Some individuals have chosen to enter relationships outside marriage because they did not want the legal obligations


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or planning. Their motivation is often nothing more than wanting to “be together”. Some individuals have chosen to enter relationships outside marriage because they did not want the legal obligations imposed by that status. Some individuals have simply given no thought as to how their relationship would operate. Often the date when the cohabitation actually began is blurred because people “ease into” situations, spending more and more time together. Agreements between people verifying when their relationship began and how it will operate often do not exist.</p>


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<p>(<em>Yakiwchuk v. Oaks</em>, <a href="https://canlii.ca/t/5bpc" rel="noreferrer">2003 SKQB 124</a>).</p>
</blockquote>


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Answer 2: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/germany" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-germany-tooltip-container">germany</a></p>
<p>There has been quite a journey, since this form has been used to try to enable unmarried same-sex couples to get the same rights as married heterosexual ones.</p>
<p>However, same sex marriage is legal for a while now. So the courts have focused in their definition of &quot;marriage like relationship&quot; on the status and privileges (and duties) that married couples have under the law and tried to grant similar rights (and especially duties) to those not formally married. You might cynically say that the state is mainly interested in making money, so there are a lot of duties, but not a lot of privileges gained from being a non-married couple.</p>


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<p>So without all the history, let's jump straight to 2006, the last time this was changed/clarified. Keep in mind this court decided on duties, not privileges, of non-married couples:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Eine solche Einstehensgemeinschaft liegt nach § 7 Abs. 3 und 3a SGB II vor, wenn</p>
<p>eine Person mit dem erwerbsfähigen Hilfebedürftigen in einem gemeinsamen Haushalt so zusammenlebt, dass nach verständiger Würdigung der wechselseitige Wille anzunehmen ist, Verantwortung füreinander zu tragen und füreinander einzustehen.</p>
<p>Ein wechselseitiger Wille, Verantwortung füreinander zu tragen und füreinander einzustehen, wird vermutet, wenn Partner</p>
<ul>
<li>länger als ein Jahr zusammenleben,</li>
<li>mit einem gemeinsamen Kind zusammenleben,</li>
<li>Kinder oder Angehörige im Haushalt versorgen oder</li>
<li>befugt sind, über Einkommen oder Vermögen des anderen zu verfügen.</li>
</ul>
</blockquote>
<p>Translated:</p>
<blockquote>


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<li>Kinder oder Angehörige im Haushalt versorgen oder</li>
<li>befugt sind, über Einkommen oder Vermögen des anderen zu verfügen.</li>
</ul>
</blockquote>
<p>Translated:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>According to § 7 (3) and (3a) SGB II, such a &quot;community of responsibility&quot; exists if</p>
<p>a person lives in a common household with the person in need of assistance who is capable of working in such a way that, according to a reasonable assessment, the mutual will to bear responsibility for each other and to answer for each other can be assumed.</p>
<p>A mutual will to bear responsibility for each other and to stand up for each other is presumed if partners</p>
<ul>
<li>live together for more than one year</li>
<li>live together with a common child,</li>
<li>care for children or dependents in the household, or</li>
<li>are authorized to use the other's income or assets.</li>
</ul>
</blockquote>


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<li>live together with a common child,</li>
<li>care for children or dependents in the household, or</li>
<li>are authorized to use the other's income or assets.</li>
</ul>
</blockquote>
<p>There is no mention of sex at all, or of any gender or even the fact that it should be exactly two people. This is about social and financial dependence, and about the fact that married couples (who have to depend on the other if one of them still has income, instead of receiving social benefits) should not be worse off than non-married partnerships.</p>
<p>Please also note that courts have ruled that <em>just</em> living together, <em>without</em> any financial entanglements, for example sharing an apartment where each party pays their rent and their food, and they have contracts on how they divide up payments for internet or water bills, is <em>not</em> a marriage-like relationship. It needs to have this factor of shared responsibility over something.</p>


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<p>A whole different topic is to prove that one lived in a marriage-like relationship for family immigration purposes when they were not allowed to marry in their country of origin,  for example gay couples in countries where gay relationships are illegal and marriage would be evidence of a crime. For those laws and regulations of what constitutes a &quot;marriage like-relationship&quot;, we would need at least a country of origin. I know it's customary to write answers for all countries, but that would be answers for all countries <em>multiplied by all countries</em>. Immigration law might also change independently of German social/financial definitions. That is just too much. For that kind of information, the Expatriates SE with exact information about a specific country and situation might be more appropriate.</p>


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Answer 3: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/australia" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-australia-tooltip-container">australia</a></p>
<h2>De facto relationships are recognised in the Family Law Act</h2>
<p>The criteria for being in a de facto relationship are spelled out in <a href="http://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/fla1975114/s4aa.html" rel="noreferrer">s4AA</a>:</p>
<ul>
<li>Not married</li>
<li>Not related</li>
<li>“having regard to all the circumstances of their relationship, they have a relationship as a couple living together on a genuine domestic basis”</li>
</ul>
<blockquote>
<p>(2)  Those circumstances may include any or all of the following:</p>
<p>(a)  the duration of the relationship;</p>
<p>(b)  the nature and extent of their common residence;</p>
<p>(c)  whether a sexual relationship exists;</p>


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<p>(a)  the duration of the relationship;</p>
<p>(b)  the nature and extent of their common residence;</p>
<p>(c)  whether a sexual relationship exists;</p>
<p>(d)  the degree of financial dependence or interdependence, and any arrangements for financial support, between them;</p>
<p>(e)  the ownership, use and acquisition of their property;</p>
<p>(f)  the degree of mutual commitment to a shared life;</p>
<p>(g)  whether the relationship is or was registered under a prescribed law of a State or Territory as a prescribed kind of relationship;</p>
<p>(h)  the care and support of children;</p>
<p>(i)  the reputation and public aspects of the relationship.</p>
<p>(3)  No particular finding in relation to any circumstance is to be regarded as necessary in deciding whether the persons have a de facto relationship.</p>


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<p>(3)  No particular finding in relation to any circumstance is to be regarded as necessary in deciding whether the persons have a de facto relationship.</p>
<p>(4)  A court determining whether a de facto relationship exists is entitled to have regard to such matters, and to attach such weight to any matter, as may seem appropriate to the court in the circumstances of the case.</p>
</blockquote>


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Answer 4: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/pennsylvania" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;pennsylvania&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;pennsylvania&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-pennsylvania-tooltip-container">pennsylvania</a></p>
<p>Within Pennsylvania, in the United States, at least until Common Law marriage was abolished on 2005, not only did the couple have to present themselves as being married (i.e. identify themselves as married to friends and family), but <a href="https://www.divorcenet.com/states/pennsylvania/pa_art08" rel="nofollow noreferrer">they must be capable of marriage (of age, able to consent, not currently married to someone else) and they must both exchange words of either immediate intent to marry</a>.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Capacity means that each spouse has the legal ability to be married. In Pennsylvania, this means that the parties:</p>
<ul>
<li>are of the opposite sex,</li>
<li>are unmarried, and</li>


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<p>Capacity means that each spouse has the legal ability to be married. In Pennsylvania, this means that the parties:</p>
<ul>
<li>are of the opposite sex,</li>
<li>are unmarried, and</li>
<li>are at least 18 years old.</li>
</ul>
<p>In Pennsylvania, &quot;present intent to enter into marriage&quot; requires each spouse to exchange a vow stating their intent to be immediately married. This is different than, for example, a plan to marry sometime in the future. To illustrate, &quot;I take you as my husband&quot; expresses a present intent to marry. If combined with a similar statement by the husband, a common law marriage would be created. In contrast, &quot;I would like you to be my wife&quot; expresses a future intent to marry and does not create a common law marriage.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In the absence of proof of exchanged words of intent (primarily used when one person is unavailable to vouch that they exchanged words of intent, such as if they died):</p>
<blockquote>


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<p>In the absence of proof of exchanged words of intent (primarily used when one person is unavailable to vouch that they exchanged words of intent, such as if they died):</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Some types of evidence that might be useful in proving the existence of a common law marriage include:</p>
<ul>
<li>evidence that the parties lived together (jointly signed leases, mortgages, bills)</li>
<li>testimony from friends and community members that they considered the couple husband and wife</li>
<li>tax returns showing filing status as married</li>
<li>proof that the spouse(s) designated the other as a beneficiary on life insurance and pension benefits, and</li>
<li>joint credit applications and other certified statements showing that the couple held themselves out as married.</li>
</ul>
</blockquote>


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Answer 5: <p>In jurisdictions with common law marriage, the critical factors for establishing a common law marriage are that members of the couple have held themselves out to the public as married and have considered themselves to be married.</p>
<p>There could be other circumstances in which a marriage-like relationship is relevant, but that would depend upon the particular consequence of a marriage-like relationship that matters.</p>
<p>For example, some health insurance companies in the United States have established criteria short of common law marriage that constitutes a &quot;domestic partnership&quot; sufficient to include someone you are in a marriage-like relationship with for health insurance benefits purposes. Often insurance companies want six months to a year of living together, mutual health care powers of attorney, and a statement that members of the couple are cohabiting on a long term basis and intend to do so indefinitely.</p>


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<p>Unlike the United Kingdom, the United States does not provide welfare or pension type benefits on the basis of a marriage-like relationship, although it does sometimes make remedies like domestic violence protective orders or domestic violence crime prosecutions available in cases involving people in marriage-like relationships.</p>


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<p>But, the U.S. Social Security Administration has recognized the concept of a &quot;putative marriage&quot; which is a relationship in which one or both members of the couple believe themselves in good faith to be married, even though they are not (e.g. because they mistakenly believed that they were divorced when a final divorce order never entered, because one putative spouse didn't know that the other was married, because the relationship was incestuous and one or both members of the couple did not know of that relationship, a marriage license wasn't obtained following a ceremonial wedding, etc.). Some U.S. states recognize the putative marriage doctrine for limited purposes but not common law marriage, although Colorado recognizes both the putative marriage doctrine and common law marriage. A putative marriage ends as to a person when that person no longer has a good faith basis to believe that they are married and provides equitable remedies comparable to the rights of a spouse


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A putative marriage ends as to a person when that person no longer has a good faith basis to believe that they are married and provides equitable remedies comparable to the rights of a spouse insofar as it is possible, that accrued during the putative marriage.</p>


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Question Title: (Germany) Repairs at end of rental contract for pre-existing issues: who has burden of proof?


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Question Body: <p>I recently moved to a new apartment, and cancelled the contract for my previous apartment where I had lived for several years. The contract for the old apartment had a three month notice period, so I found a replacement tenant for the landlord to avoid paying rent on both places for that time. On moving in, the new tenant found some areas needing a little work. He has contacted the landlord, who has now asked me to resolve these issues or have the cost of doing so taken from my deposit. Some of these issues are fair complaints and I'm working with the new tenant to resolve them quickly. So far so good.</p>


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<p>The problem: Some issues date from before I moved in, but the landlord is now demanding I resolve them at my own cost. When I moved in, I signed the contract (which is the standard and well-known in Germany &quot;Hamburger Mietvertrag für Wohnraum&quot;) at the landlord's office and received the keys directly. There was no official handover appointment where the state of the apartment was inspected, and I failed to photograph or otherwise document these issues at the time.</p>
<p>I understand that the real problem here is my failure to document these issues on moving in (it was my first time renting my own place and I was naive). I'm fortunate enough to have a good job and ultimately I'll be fine even if I do have to pay these costs. But on principle I'm obviously not keen to pay for work handling issues from before I first rented the place, and now I'm also just plain curious who actually has the burden of proof in any dispute like this.</p>


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<p><strong>tl;dr:</strong> Where does a tenant stand if their ex-landlord deducts costs for pre-existing issues from my deposit? The contract states the apartment condition as &quot;renovated&quot; at the time of moving in. Will the tenant find they have to pay for resolving pre-existing issues because they failed to document them at the time, or can they demand the landlord prove the issues were <em>not</em> pre-existing?</p>
<p>In case it's relevant, there are a few little things but the primary issue is about the paint on two walls of the living room - the walls can't be painted evenly as they are unplastered and have a very uneven texture (very porous in some places, relatively smooth in others). The landlord  now expects me to pay to plaster the wall.</p>


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Answer 1: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/australia" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-australia-tooltip-container">australia</a></p>
<h2>A tenant must return the property in the state it was given subject to fair wear and tear</h2>
<p>Fair wear and tear represents the deterioration that occurs in normal use - so it includes wear on a carpet from walking on it but not wear from having a horse walk on it (unless you’re renting a stable but who puts carpet in a stable?)</p>
<p>If the wall is in the condition that it was given to you but for the normal deterioration over time, then you are not liable to fix it.</p>
<p>As for who has the onus of proof, since the landlord is the one claiming the entitlement, they have to prove it. However, the burden is only the balance of probabilities.</p>


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<p>As for who has the onus of proof, since the landlord is the one claiming the entitlement, they have to prove it. However, the burden is only the balance of probabilities.</p>
<p>So, if there is a fist shaped hole in the plaster wall and there is no evidence it was there when the tenant moved in, then, it’s more likely than not that it happened on the tenant’s watch and they have to fix it. Because putting fists through walls is something that residents are more likely to do than landlords.</p>
<p>However, if there is a painted wall and the initial application of the paint is defective, then absent evidence that the tenant painted the wall, it’s more likely than not that the landlord did it. Because painting walls is something landlords are more likely to do than residents.</p>


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Question Body: <p>In 1956, the <a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/questions/51993/why-werent-the-us-navy-and-marines-added-to-the-posse-comitatus-act-in-1956">Posse Comitatus Act was adopted</a>. It made it a crime to use the Army to enforce U.S. law in the United States in the absence of an invasion or insurrection. (The law itself is discussed and cited on <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posse_Comitatus_Act" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Wikipedia</a>).</p>
<p>But, the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Space_Force" rel="nofollow noreferrer">United States Space Force, created in 2019</a>, didn't exist at the time. And, the U.S. Space Force is predominantly drawn from the U.S. Air Force, which in turn has its roots in a subdivision of the United States Army which is covered by the Posse Comitatus Act.</p>
<p>So, my question is: Does the Posse Comitatus Act apply to the U.S. Space Force?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>Space Force appears to have been <strong>specifically included</strong> on Dec 27, 2021. &quot;Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the Air Force, or the Space Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.&quot; Public Law 117-81, Sec. 1045
<a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1385" rel="noreferrer">https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1385</a></p>


Tags: united-states, criminal-law, military, interpretation, federalism


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Question Title: What are the laws regarding reprinting of really old documents found behind paywalls?


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Question Body: <p>I love reading old newspapers, so I have a subscription to a <a href="https://www.newspapers.com/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Newspapers.com</a> and <a href="https://www.britishnewspaperarchive.co.uk/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">British Newspaper Archive</a>, while I also get free access to <a href="https://newspaperarchive.com/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">NewspaperArchive.com</a> through my local library (I just enter my library card number and password and I get it through my home computer). Awhile ago, I took screenshots of an article I found in an old newspaper on Newspapers.com and posted them in a stack exchange (I believe the history stack, but I can't find it anymore). Because the article was behind a paywall, someone edited the question or maybe answer and deleted the screenshots, claiming it was a copyright violation.</p>


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<p>Well, I looked up the author of the article and discovered that he died something like 90 years prior. My understanding of the copyright laws is that the copyright expires 70 years AFTER the author's death. So, my understanding is that I can freely copy these articles. So, is this the case? Am I allowed to copy old articles WHOLESALE, virtually anywhere I want to, EVEN if I get the article behind a paywall via a screenshot?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>Depending on where exactly you are in the world, there is <em>some</em> protection for the representation of copyright-expired material if work went into presentation. So you might be allowed to put a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bach_cantata" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Bach cantata</a> into musical notation yourself, since he died in 1750, but you cannot simply copy another publisher's sheet music to save that work. The same might apply to an old newspaper article. If you find a print and scan it, you can upload it, but you may not be able to take it from the database organized by someone else.</p>
<hr />


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<hr />
<p>In <a href="/questions/tagged/austria" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;austria&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;austria&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-austria-tooltip-container">austria</a>, there is §40f Urheberrecht, which defines databases (they may or may not be collected editions). §40h clarifies how the right to a private copy in §42 extends only to &quot;private use and neither directly nor indirectly commercial purposes.&quot;</p>


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<p>In <a href="/questions/tagged/germany" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-germany-tooltip-container">germany</a>, there is 87a-e UrhG, which covers databases whose assembly did not represent creative work (e.g. by simply ordering things by date). They are protected if the assembly required significant investment. This &quot;lesser protection&quot; lasts only 15 years, not 70, and there is a &quot;a significant part&quot; test for copying less than the whole database.</p>


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Answer 2: <h2>Did you break your contract?</h2>
<p>Even though there is no copyright violation, your use of the paywalled site will come with a terms of service. If those prohibit you copying the article then doing so is a contractural breach and would entitle the site’s owner to sue you or, more realistically, ban you.</p>


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Answer 3: <p>W.r.t. copyright, I will assume that you correctly determined that copyright in the particular article has expired, therefore you can legally copy and distribute said content without violating copyright law. There is a tiny chance that there are derivative creative add-ons that are still protected (new artwork), but that is unlikely from a newspaper archive.</p>
<p>However, you might be in breach of contract with the archival service. I assume access via Newspaper Archives: <a href="https://newspaperarchive.com/terms/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">here</a> is your contract with them. First, they define The Services:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The Services includes the software, apps, web interface, and content
offered in connection with the software, documentation, and online
tools, whether they are accessed through the use of a mobile device,
computer, or other method (individually and together, the “Services”).</p>
</blockquote>


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tools, whether they are accessed through the use of a mobile device,
computer, or other method (individually and together, the “Services”).</p>
</blockquote>
<p>You agree to pay them money to access The Services. §3 states what your license is and how you can use it, pertinent prohibitions underlined.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Company hereby grants you, subject to your compliance with this
Agreement, a limited non-exclusive, non-sublicensable,
non-transferable, license to use the Services. <em>You may not download
any portion of the Services</em> or use of any Services other than for the
purposes described in this Agreement or an Order Form. <em>You may not
use any data mining, robots, or similar data gathering tools or
otherwise exploit your access to the Services for any commercial
purpose</em>, except as you provide professional genealogical services to
third parties on an individual basis. You may not use any of the
trademarks, logos, or other proprietary graphics without express


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third parties on an individual basis. You may not use any of the
trademarks, logos, or other proprietary graphics without express
written permission, which may denied in Company’s absolute discretion.
Company’s logos and product and service names are trademarks of
Company. All other trademarks appearing on the website or in
connection with the Services are trademarks of their respective
owners, and our reference to them does not imply or indicate any
approval or endorsement by their owners unless such approval or
endorsement is expressly made.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Content is part of Services, but there is also a section on Content, §6, which says</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Our Content belongs solely to us, even when it is in the public
domain. You may use Our Content only for your own personal
non-commercial purposes (except as you provide professional
genealogical services to third parties on an individual basis). You
agree that you will not redistribute or sell any portion of Our


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non-commercial purposes (except as you provide professional
genealogical services to third parties on an individual basis). You
agree that you will not redistribute or sell any portion of Our
Content or remove any proprietary notices or World Archive branding
from any of Our Content that you download or print.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>On the face of it, you are in breach of contract by copying and distributing the content that they hold. Therefore, you can end up getting sued in Utah courts. After proving that you broke the contract thus you are liable, the company would need to establish what the damages are, that is, how much revenue did they lose from your prohibited action? It might be $10,000 or it might be $1, that's a very fact-intensive determination.</p>


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Question Title: G&#246;del&#39;s loophole

Question Body: <p>After WWII before Gödel was about to be interviewed in order to get a US citizenship, he had found a loophole in the US constitution which allowed a fascist regime to legally turn the US into a dictatorship. I tried searching it online and only found that  Gödel's loophole is related to article 5 of the US constitution; however, I couldn't find more information about it. So what is Gödel's loophole? Can you explain it to me?</p>


Answer 1: <p><a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2010183" rel="nofollow noreferrer">This article</a> lays out what little is known about the putative loophole, thought to depend on problems of &quot;self-reference&quot;. (This is because of the nature of Gödel's view on &quot;self-contradiction&quot;). Note that Article V might itself be amendable.</p>


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Answer 2: <p>I suggest that Gödel's loophole (whatever it was) might have appealed to philosophers, but not so much to political scientists.</p>
<p>All Constitutions can be re-written.  All can be changed.  There is a mechanism through which the entire US Constitution can be re-written. Certainly an Amendment could be written and approved to strike through most of the document and replace the government with a Holy Dictator if enough states supported it.  This is self-evident to anyone with a cursory knowledge of government.</p>
<p>If Gödel thought that he had discovered a textual loophole he might have just been naïve.  Such a change to fundamental interpretation of the Constitution would need to go back to The Federalist Papers, Constitutional Convention discussions, and original founder intent and I doubt he would find such intent there.  Philosophical arguments carry more weight in academia than in a courtroom.</p>


Tags: us-constitution


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Question Title: What is the minimum age to allow a child to ride in a forward facing back seat?

Question Body: <p>State: Arkansas</p>
<p>For purposes of this question, &quot;a forward facing car seat&quot; means
the same car seat, just turned around.</p>
<p>I called the state police, and they told me that car seats must be rear facing until the child is 2. However, I could not find any official guideline from an official .gov or Arkansas website that would clearly say, forward facing ride is illegal for children younger than 2.</p>
<p>Can a parent turn the seat around for, say, a 21-month old child, and have them ride forward-facing?</p>
<p>Is there any official source?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>Summary: there's no minimum age; rather, you must use the seat in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions.  Instructions for reversible seats typically do not depend on age but on the child's weight and height.</p>
<p><a href="https://law.justia.com/codes/arkansas/2020/title-27/subtitle-3/chapter-34/section-27-34-104/" rel="noreferrer">Arkansas law (AR Code § 27-34-104 (2020))</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(a) While operating a motor vehicle on a public road, street, or highway of this state, a driver who transports a child under fifteen (15) years of age in a passenger automobile, van, or pickup truck, other than one operated for hire, shall provide for the protection of the child by properly placing, maintaining, and securing the child in a child passenger restraint system properly secured to the vehicle and meeting applicable federal motor vehicle safety standards in effect on January 1, 1995.</p>


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<p>(b) A child who is less than six (6) years of age and who weighs less than sixty pounds (60 lbs.) shall be restrained in a child passenger safety seat properly secured to the vehicle.</p>
<p>(c) If a child is at least six (6) years of age or at least sixty pounds (60 lbs.) in weight, a safety belt properly secured to the vehicle shall be sufficient to meet the requirements of this section.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The key passage is &quot;properly placing, maintaining, and securing the child in a child passenger restraint system properly secured to the vehicle.&quot;  This implies that you can put the seat in the forward-facing position only if it is designed to be used that way and then only when the manufacturer's instructions say that it's acceptable.  In my experience this typically depends on the child's height and weight rather than on the age.  For example, one manufacturer says of its seats</p>
<blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p>[Convertible seats] in the rear-facing mode should be used for children weighing 5-40 lbs, with a height of less than 49 in. and whose head is 1 in. or more below the top of the car seat.</p>
<p>[Convertible seats] in the forward-facing mode should be used for children weighing 22-65 lbs. and height less than 49 in. and can walk unassisted and whose top of the ears are below the top of the car seat.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>So if the instructions for <em>your</em> seat have the same criteria then you can turn it around when the child reaches 22 lbs.  CDC <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/growthcharts/html_charts/wtageinf.htm#males" rel="noreferrer">weight data for boys</a> shows that virtually every 21-month-old boy is heavier than this (note that the data are in kilograms and that 22 lbs is 9.979 kg).</p>
<p>Therefore, the legal answer is that there is no minimum age; the requirement is to use the device &quot;properly.&quot;  Follow the manufacturer's instructions.</p>


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<p>(Aside: the incorrect belief about the 2-year threshold could be a widespread misconception among Arkansas police.  If this is so, and if they are therefore in the habit of ticketing people for having children under 2 in a forward-facing seat, then you could get a ticket.  You might be able to convince the officer of the reasoning in this answer, but you might not, in which case you would have to take it to court to show that you were following the manufacturer's instructions and therefore the law.  You will have to weigh the potential hassle of having to do this, including the likelihood of its happening or not, against the benefit of letting your child see the back of your head while you're driving.  My guess is that you're unlikely to get a ticket for several reasons, and that your child is likely to be significantly happier facing forward, but I don't know Arkansas police and I don't know your child.)</p>


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<p>If you do not have the instructions for your seat, you should be able to find them online.  Some seats are not designed to be used facing forward.  If yours is such a seat, you will need to get one that is.</p>
<p>Remember that complying with the law may <em>seem</em> more important because you're more likely to get pulled over by a police officer than to be in a collision.  But in fact the most important consideration is safety.  If you <em>are</em> in a collision you will want your child to have the greatest protection possible.</p>


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Answer 2: <h2>6 months</h2>
<p><a href="/questions/tagged/australia" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-australia-tooltip-container">australia</a></p>
<p>Despite being a state matter, road rules in Australia are uniform (with slight variations - e.g. in some states you can U-turn at traffic lights and in others you can’t).</p>
<p>The <a href="https://roadsafety.transport.nsw.gov.au/stayingsafe/children/childcarseats/index.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">rules</a> for child restraints are:</p>
<blockquote>
<ul>
<li><p>Children up to the age of six months must be secured in an approved rearward facing restraint</p>
</li>
<li><p>Children aged from six months old but under four years old must be secured in either a rear or forward facing approved child restraint with an inbuilt harness</p>
</li>


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</li>
<li><p>Children aged from six months old but under four years old must be secured in either a rear or forward facing approved child restraint with an inbuilt harness</p>
</li>
<li><p>Children under four years old cannot travel in the front seat of a vehicle with two or more rows</p>
</li>
<li><p>Children aged from four years old but under seven years old must be secured in a forward facing approved child restraint with an inbuilt harness or an approved booster seat</p>
</li>
<li><p>Children aged from four years old but under seven years old cannot travel in the front seat of a vehicle with two or more rows, unless all other back seats are occupied by children younger than seven years in an approved child restraint or booster seat</p>
</li>


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</li>
<li><p>Children aged from seven years old but under 16 years old who are too small to be restrained by a seatbelt properly adjusted and fastened are strongly recommended to use either a forward-facing seat with an in-built harness for older children, an approved booster seat, or an approved child safety harness in conjunction with the vehicle’s seatbelt</p>
</li>
<li><p>Children in booster seats must be restrained by a suitable lap and sash type approved seatbelt that is properly adjusted and fastened, or by a suitable approved child safety harness that is properly adjusted and fastened.</p>
</li>
</ul>
<p>If your child is too small for the child restraint specified for their age, they should be kept in their current child restraint until it is safe for them to move to the next level.</p>
<p>If your child is too large for the child restraint specified for their age, they may move to the next level of child restraint.</p>
</blockquote>


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Question Title: In a way aren&#39;t Non-Disclosure and Non-disparagement Agreements functionally very similar?

Question Body: <p>At a high level NDAs basically say &quot;do not disclose confidential information to the public&quot;. At a high level Non-disparagement agreements basically say &quot;do not disclose information to the public that could harm us&quot;. Both are trying to protect the company from damage caused by information getting into the wrong hands. For example if a bank was hacked into and lost a bunch of money, wouldn't both NDA's and non-disparagement agreements prevent employees from telling the public about it? I guess NDAs are more about facts where as Non-disparagement include negative opinions.In a sense are all non-disparagement a type of NDA because they are prohibiting what could be said?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>Not all disclosures are disparagements, an NDA will typically cover the release of any private information, whether positive or negative. Publishing the company's future product plans might violate an NDA but would not be disparagement.</p>
<p>Not all disparagements are disclosures, a negative opinion does not require the release of any private information. Making a blog post stating your opinion that the company's CEO is incompetent or that their products are overpriced is likely not disclosing any private information that would be covered by an NDA, but is disparagement.</p>


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Answer 2: <p>In the employment context:</p>
<p>A non-disparagement agreement: the signatory agrees not to say anything negative about the employer or its staff, goods or services.</p>
<p>A non-disclosure agreement: the signatory agrees to not reveal to anyone information the  employer wants to keep secret. For example, financial information, customer data, trade secrets, marketing and pricing strategies, techniques and costs, operating information and costs like payroll, suppliers etc.</p>
<p>Things a company might prefer to be secret are not necessarily negative about the company. They could be neutral. They could be positive - for example, the progress of a cure for some cancers.</p>


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Answer 3: <p>Both positive and negative information about a company might hurt them if it becomes public and is therefore meant to be covered by an NDA. But damage isn’t needed. If I say something that nobody cares about, or that actually helps the company, that would still be covered by sn NDA except I wouldn’t be likely to be sued.</p>
<p>Positive information will often not be disparaging and will not be covered by a non-disparagement agreement. (But making lots of money by legally exploiting a customers naivety might be positive and disparaging at the same time). Negative information may be already known to the public but repeating it would still be disparaging.</p>
<p>And I should really ask a question whether false statements are covered by an NDA. I’m sure negative statements could be disparaging whether true and false and covered either way.</p>


Tags: contract-law, canada, confidentiality


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<p>Each Lot shall provide a fully enclosed area for containment of trash, garbage or other garbage, and each Lot at all times shall be kept in a clean, sightly and wholesome condition and grass and weeds shall be kept mowed. No trash, litter, junk, boxes, containers, bottles, cans, implements, machinery, lumber or other building materials shall be permitted to remain exposed upon any Lot so it is visible from any neighboring Lot or from the street, except as reasonably necessary during the period of construction. The Board of Directors, through its agents and employees, shall have the right and duty to enter upon any Lot and remove such unsightly objects and materials at the expense of the Owner, and upon due notice to the Owner and failure of the Owner to comply with this Section, such entry shall not be deemed a trespass. The cost of such removal shall he chargeable by the Board of Directors to such Owner, by Individual Assessment in accordance with Paragraph 5.3(c) hereof.</p>


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</blockquote>
<p>The board has recently started to enforce their interpretation that this means that <a href="https://www.westerndisposal.com/residential/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">our garbage cans</a> must be hidden from view of the street. I can not come to that same interpretation based on this language. I think the cans themselves are &quot;fully enclosed areas&quot;, and do not need to be hidden from the street. What is the board required to enforce it's interpretation of the rules? If I disagree is my only option to sue the board if I am cited by the board for violation?</p>
<p>Additional questions: If I fly a drone above the street and can see the board president's trash can, can I request that the president be cited for violating this rule? If I have photographic proof that the board has not enforced the rule in this interpretation since 2007 (when google street view imagery became available in my area), does that change the answer to the above questions?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>Fully enclosed area means being inside something, likely a non-see-through fence.  You will not convince anyone that a trash can is &quot;fully enclosed;  it is a container, which is called out.  Your chance of litigating this successfully is approximately zero unless your goal is to spend money and force the HOA to do the same.  You can certainly ask what the expectation is or examples that meet the requirement.</p>
<p>Your ability to fight your issue by citing other installations is limited unless they are forcing you to do something other homes are not required to do.  &quot;I can see your can with a drone&quot; will not let you leave your trash can out.</p>


Tags: united-states, definition, colorado, hoa


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Question Title: Are there laws in India against child violence outside schools?

Question Body: <p>For example there are many beggar children who are physically hurt by people like shop owners and the like to leave the premises etc. Is this punishable by any law?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>Yes.</p>
<p>Although there are numerous child-protection laws, there is nothing specific for (beggar) children in this scenario so it would fall within Criminal Force, an offence contrary to <a href="https://www.indiacode.nic.in/show-data?actid=AC_CEN_5_23_00037_186045_1523266765688&amp;sectionId=46117&amp;sectionno=350&amp;orderno=390" rel="nofollow noreferrer">section 350</a> Indian Penal Code:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Whoever intentionally uses force to any person, without that person's consent ... or intending ... or knowing it to be likely that by the use of such force he will cause injury, fear or annoyance to the person to whom the force is used, is said to use criminal force to that other.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The punishment for which may be found at <a href="https://www.indiacode.nic.in/show-data?actid=AC_CEN_5_23_00037_186045_1523266765688&amp;sectionId=46119&amp;sectionno=352&amp;orderno=392" rel="nofollow noreferrer">section 352</a></p>
<blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p>Whoever ... uses criminal force to any person otherwise than on grave and sudden provocation given by that person, shall be punished with imprisonment ... for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>For completeness &quot;Force&quot; is described by <a href="https://www.indiacode.nic.in/show-data?actid=AC_CEN_5_23_00037_186045_1523266765688&amp;sectionId=46116&amp;sectionno=349&amp;orderno=389" rel="nofollow noreferrer">section 349</a> as:</p>
<blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p>A person is said to use force to another if he causes motion, change of motion, or cessation of motion to that other, or if he causes to any substance such motion, or change of motion, or cessation of motion as brings that substance into contact with any part of that other's body, or with anything which that other is wearing or carrying, or with anything so situated that such contact affects that other's sense of feeling...</p>
<p>[<em>A substance could be, for example, a broom handle or a pan of water</em>]</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Also, for completeness there's the alternative of Assault under <a href="https://www.indiacode.nic.in/show-data?actid=AC_CEN_5_23_00037_186045_1523266765688&amp;sectionId=46118&amp;sectionno=351&amp;orderno=391" rel="nofollow noreferrer">section 351</a> if no force is used.</p>


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Question Title: Is storing on EU-based servers sufficient to be GDPR-compliant with regard to the Schrems II arrest if they&#39;re controlled by a U.S. company?


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Question Body: <p>After the Schrems II decision, data transfers to US data processors are increasingly risky at best, for example to public cloud providers such as GCP, Azure, and AWS.</p>
<p>A very common suggestion is to store your data in EU-based data centers of these cloud providers if your application isn't too latency-sensitive, for example in <a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/a/74430/45855">this answer</a>.</p>
<p>I fail to see how this makes a significant difference. All of the major public cloud providers are US companies, and their servers in Europe are still under their control, and so the US government can just as easily demand to hand over data hosted on EU servers as they can on US servers.</p>


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<p>In a strict sense of the word, data transfer to the US is indeed avoided, as the data physically remains on EU servers. But in a broader sense of the word, and really in the spirit of the Schrems II arrest and GDPR in general, the data is de facto transferred to a US controlled company the moment when it's stored on any GCP, Azure or AWS server, regardless of where that server is located.</p>
<p>Thus, I feel as though hosting on EU-based servers of US-based public cloud providers doesn't solve anything at all, and simply provides a false sense of security and compliance. Is this correct, or am I missing something?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>The tricky bit from a GDPR standpoint is that the US has a law that says a US-based company must hand over data to US government agencies even if the data is stored outside the US. This is US specific and a case where the US government gives itself jurisdiction outside the US but the EU can't directly do anything against it (outside of international negotiations).</p>
<p>As you noticed this means if you store data at a US data processor there is no real difference whether the data is physically stored in the US or the EU. So to avoid transferring EU consumer data to the US several steps are needed. First the servers have to be physically located in the EU and second the company needs to be non-US based, EU based seems the obvious choice. AFAIK constructions of a US-based company creating a fully owned EU-based subsidary are currently used to achieve the second part. Whether this is sufficient may have to be decided in court.</p>


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Answer 2: <h1>EU servers don't make you compliant by themselves</h1>
<p>There are many other rules you have to abide by beyond storing the data in the EU - and just not transferring the data to the US just isn't sufficient to make you GDPR compliant.</p>
<p>For example, you have to delete data on request by Data Subjects, and that is only the tip of the iceberg.</p>


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Answer 3: <p>Kind of.</p>
<p>A relevant question here is: has an international transfer of data occurred? And if so, who is the controller for that transfer?</p>
<ul>
<li><p>When you store data in US-based servers, then yes, you have made a transfer.</p>
</li>
<li><p>When you store data in EU-based servers, the no, you have not made a transfer.</p>
<ul>
<li>When the cloud provider breaches their duty as a data processor and transfers the data into the US against your instructions, they would have made a transfer.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<p>This suggests that using EU-based servers is generally OK from a data transfer perspective, even if they are provided by a company that is subject to US jurisdiction. You are not making a transfer. If a transfer occurs, it's because that cloud provider is breaking the GDPR.</p>
<p>So instead of a Chapter V international data transfer problem, I'd see this as a Chapter IV security problem.</p>
<ul>


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<p>So instead of a Chapter V international data transfer problem, I'd see this as a Chapter IV security problem.</p>
<ul>
<li><p>You as the controller are required to implement appropriate technical and organizational measures to ensure the security and compliance of processing (Art 42, Art 32). If you identify a risk, you have to take appropriate measures. But you can use a risk-based approach here: if a risk is very unlikely, it may be appropriate to do nothing.</p>
</li>
<li><p>You as the controller are required to legally bind your data processors per Art 28 to only use the data as instructed by you. If you are convinced that a potential processor is not legally able to enter into that contract, for example if they are subject to conflicting foreign laws, then you can't engage them as a processor and will have to look for a different company.</p>
</li>
</ul>


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</li>
</ul>
<p>Because of the US' CLOUD Act, there is a real concern when using EU-based IT services that are still under US control. Some providers try to address this issue with a trustee solution where the tech is provided by the US company but the data centre is legally under the control of an EU company. But I think of the large cloud providers only Microsoft Azure seriously attempted this, and their Azure Germany service has now been shut down.</p>
<p>In practice, no one cares. Regulators seem to be aware of the massive impact of Schrems II enforcement and are treading lightly – especially since this isn't necessarily a data transfer issue, as outlined above. Businesses will not want to miss out on industry-standard tools for the hypothetical possibility that the US might invoke their CLOUD Act. If businesses are concerned, they can use the many EU cloud and hosting companies, or use supplemental measures such as end-to-end encryption to secure the data.</p>


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Question Title: My account was broken into and virtual items were stolen, customer support refuses to help

Question Body: <p>I have all the proof showing that my account was broken into , but they still refuse to give me my items back after opening multiple tickets. I only get the same copy and paste messages from their support team members. There is a restoration system in place as well , my one time restoration was never used and they still refuse to give me my items back.It is also said that ''Unless required by law'' they won't 100% give the items back. Do you guys have any clue what they mean by that? All the help is appreciated.</p>


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Answer 1: <p>To answer this based on contract law, one would have to know where the company is located, where you are located, and what the terms of use specify regarding jurisdiction and possible mandatory arbitration.</p>
<p>Next, you write that you have &quot;all the proof&quot; that your account was &quot;broken into.&quot; Proof in a legal sense? I think you would be writing things differently if you had as court judgement in this regard. And how did it happen? In my experience, there are several scenarios:</p>
<ul>
<li>You were <strong>tricked</strong> into revealing your credentials, or <strong>your own</strong> computer was compromised to gain your credentials, or you re-used the same credentials on different systems and one of those was compromised. The most likely scenario by far.</li>
<li>There was a security breach on the <strong>site of the game company</strong>, either revealing your credentials or allowing direct access.</li>


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<li>There was a security breach on the <strong>site of the game company</strong>, either revealing your credentials or allowing direct access.</li>
<li>There was an accidental software bug on the site of the game company which affected your inventory.</li>
<li>There was a deliberate software change on the site of the game company which affected your inventory, e.g. to improve play balance.</li>
</ul>
<p>The latter three options are all <em>possible</em>, but the first option happens much more frequently. And from the viewpoint of the company, this is indistinguishable from you acting foolishly and losing it. The thief would have been acting with your credentials, after all.</p>


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<p>And that is where the term you quote comes in. The company is in a contractual relationship with their customers, so they cannot disclaim <strong>all</strong> responsibility for everything that happens through their terms of service. In some jurisdictions, sneaking an illegal clause into the boilerplate terms of service weakens the legal force of the whole document, so they make this sort of disclaimer. But if lost things could be restored too easily, the thrill would go out of ownership.</p>


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Question Title: Can an employee use an employer&#39;s market research subscription to conduct due diligence for IP?

Question Body: <p>If an employee uses &quot;company resources&quot; to develop IP, then the employer owns said IP. However, what is the scope of &quot;company resources&quot; and &quot;development&quot;? Hypothetically, if an employee uses their employer's market intelligence subscription to conduct due diligence with the purpose of deciding whether/how to develop said IP, but does not develop the IP itself using company resources, does the employer then own the IP? What if the IP is completely unrelated to the employer's regular activities?</p>
<p>EDIT: The question is for UK law. The contract with the employer would define ownership as:</p>
<ol>
<li>Anything created in the course of the employees work</li>
<li>Anything created using company time/equipment/resources</li>
</ol>


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Answer 1: <p>I think you are in luck, UK law says -</p>
<p><strong>The Patents Act 1977 (as amended</strong>)</p>
<p><em><a href="https://www.gov.uk/guidance/the-patent-act-1977/section-39-employees-inventions-right-to-employees-inventions" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Section 39: Right to employees’ inventions</a></em></p>
<blockquote>
<p>Employees’ inventions.</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>(1) Notwithstanding anything in any rule of law, an invention made by an employee shall, as between him and his employer, be taken to belong to his employer for the purposes of this Act and all other purposes if -</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>(a) it was made in the course of the normal duties of the employee or in the course of duties falling outside his normal duties, but specifically assigned to him, and the circumstances in either case were such that an invention might reasonably be expected to result from the carrying out of his duties; or</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>(b) the invention was made in the course of the duties of the employee and, at the time of making the invention, because of the nature of his duties and the particular responsibilities arising from the nature of his duties he had a special obligation to further the interests of the employer’s undertaking.</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>(2) Any other invention made by an employee shall, as between him and his employer, be taken for those purposes to belong to the employee.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Nothing about using the employers resources. I would consult a professional to understand if the company agreement can override the law (I doubt it). If the IP you plan on claiming is something the company otherwise might pursue that would be a different story.</p>


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Question Title: Giving flat to roommate and vacating apartment?

Question Body: <p>I rented an apartment in California whose lease ends in 12 months.</p>
<p>Now I got a job in another state and have to leave.</p>
<p>Instead of paying lease break charges, I wanted to add a new person as roommate and wanted to share with him half rent for 4  months and then he will pay full rent after 4 months.</p>
<p>We have this email communication with that new person saying I will pay half rent only for 4 months and then he has to pay full rent, will that email communication enough or will it cause any problems later?</p>
<p>I will add new person to the leasing also based on confirmation email accepting my terms from him</p>


Answer 1: <p>You need absolute written buy in from the landlord.</p>
<p>His agreement is with <em>you</em>, not this new person.
If the new person stops paying for whatever reason, then landlord is coming after <em>you</em>.</p>


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Answer 2: <p>Ordinarily, you are responsible for the rent and other damages for the duration of the lease, thus for another 12 months. If you walk away from the apartment and don't pay rent, the landlord can sue you for those 12 months of unpaid rent. But, the landlord does have to make an effort to re-rent the apartment, thereby mitigating his loss. Hypothetically speaking, that might mean that you are stuck with two months rent, assuming that it is fairly easy to re-rent the unit. You would also be liable for his expenses (including advertising and legal, also lost rent in case the unit had to be re-rented at a lower rate). Leases sometimes have a &quot;liquidated damages&quot; clause, saying that for a flat fee, the landlord may agree to terminate the lease. If you pay the termination fee, that might be cheaper and much easier (and better credit history-wise) that disappearing and having him sue you for actually breaking the lease.</p>


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<p>It is almost certainly required in the lease, if there is an early termination clause, that you have to get the landlord's consent. The &quot;lease break charge&quot; is presumably the liquidated damages for early termination clause, and you don't actually &quot;break&quot; the lease. The problem with your unofficial plan is that if the other guy just takes off without paying, you will be stuck with a lawsuit and end up paying more money than you planned.</p>


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Question Title: Does the robots exclusion standard have any legal weight?

Question Body: <p>There is a standard through which websites communicate to the web crawlers upon which search engines are based which pages should be indexed and included in the search results.  This is called the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robots_exclusion_standard" rel="noreferrer">Robots exclusion standard</a>, is implemented in the robots.txt file that most web sites have, stack exchange's is <a href="https://stackexchange.com/robots.txt">here</a>.</p>
<p>If one was interested in the whole content of a site, for example one was researching the network structure of web sites, would it be legal to ignore the robots.txt and crawl the whole site (perhaps excluding /search[?/])?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>The existence of a robots.txt file and the directory and file inclusions/exclusions in a robots.txt file do not constitute a legally binding contract for the use of the website by the visitor; if it exists, the Terms of Service would usually establish the contract for use of the site.</p>
<p>Many TOSs prohibit bots, crawlers and any automated means from crawling or scraping a site, and you are contractually obligated to honor those stipulations simply by visiting the site. Violating a TOS is typically a civil matter, depending on jurisdiction.</p>
<p>Simply crawling a site to &quot;map&quot; it, and crawling a site to &quot;scrape&quot; it and copy all content are two different things. Crawling could violate the TOS. Scraping content can violate the TOS and also be copyright infringement, depending on jurisdiction. See <a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/search?q=scraping">https://law.stackexchange.com/search?q=scraping</a></p>


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<p>I suppose a TOS could state that users are legally bound to the restrictions in a robots.txt, but I've never seen that in a TOS.</p>


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Question Title: Why did US v. Assange skip the court of appeal?

Question Body: <p>The high court’s appeal was further sought to be appealed to the UKSC but not first to the EWCA. Why was the Court of Appeal passed over in this case?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>The decision which Assange sought to appeal, <em>United States v Assange</em> <a href="https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/USA-v-Assange-judgment101221.pdf" rel="noreferrer">[2021] EWHC 3313 (Admin)</a>, was a decision of a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Divisional_court_(England_and_Wales)" rel="noreferrer">divisional court</a> of three judges. That is because <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/41/section/26" rel="noreferrer">s 26 of the <em>Extradition Act 2003</em></a> provides for an appeal from &quot;<a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/41/section/67" rel="noreferrer">the appropriate judge</a>&quot; to the High Court, not the Court of Appeal. A divisional court of the High Court, called the Administrative Court, exercises this appellate jurisdiction and as an intermediate appellate court of three High Court judges, has a similar status to the Court of Appeal.</p>


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<p>When a point of law has already been considered by a single judge, and a panel of three judges on appeal, it makes sense for the Supreme Court to consider whether to grant leave to appeal directly under the provisions cited by Jen rather than requiring the parties to go through another intermediate court. An example of this is <em>R (on the application of Highbury Poultry Farm
Produce Ltd) v Crown Prosecution Service</em> <a href="https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2018-0231-judgment.pdf" rel="noreferrer">[2020] UKSC 39</a>, an appeal from a divisional court exercising judicial review jurisdiction. However, the Supreme Court <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/media/2022/mar/14/julian-assange-denied-permission-to-appeal-against-us-extradition" rel="noreferrer">refused leave to appeal</a> from the divisional court in Assange's case.</p>


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Answer 2: <p>The High Court can certify a matter as warranting consideration by the Supreme Court as a &quot;leapfrog appeal.&quot; See <a href="https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199697/ldinfo/ld08judg/bluebook/bluebk08.htm" rel="noreferrer">Practice Direction</a> and <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1969/58/part/II" rel="noreferrer">Part II of the Administration of Justice Act 1969</a>. The High Court <a href="https://assangecourt.report/assets/documents/20220124-page1.pdf" rel="noreferrer">certified one point of law</a> as such from its 10 December 2021 decision in <em>U.S. v. Assange</em>.</p>


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Answer 3: <p>I'm not sure the other answers explicitly address Assange's approach.</p>
<p><a href="https://assangedefense.org/hearing-coverage/julian-assanges-supreme-court-certification-application/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Assange sought permission to appeal</a> on the basis that <a href="https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/USA-v-Assange-judgment101221.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">the High Court decision in December 2021</a> involved three questions of law of general public importance. Such a question is one that has a wider application than the specific case in which it is raised.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.supremecourt.uk/procedures/practice-direction-03.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">The Supreme Court is the venue for such questions</a>.</p>
<p>The three points of law were:</p>
<ol>
<li><p>&quot;Is the provision of assurances governed by the principles in Hungary v
Fenyvesi [2009] 4 All ER 324?&quot;</p>
</li>


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<p>The three points of law were:</p>
<ol>
<li><p>&quot;Is the provision of assurances governed by the principles in Hungary v
Fenyvesi [2009] 4 All ER 324?&quot;</p>
</li>
<li><p>&quot;Is it permissible to approach oppression under section 91 of the 2003 Act
on the basis that it may be imposed if brought about by the defendant’s
own alleged conduct?&quot;</p>
</li>
<li><p>&quot;Is it permissible to approach article 3 ECHR on the basis that inhuman or
degrading treatment may be imposed if brought about by the defendant’s
own alleged conduct?&quot;</p>
</li>
</ol>


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degrading treatment may be imposed if brought about by the defendant’s
own alleged conduct?&quot;</p>
</li>
</ol>
<p>In January 2022 <a href="https://assangecourt.report/assets/documents/20220124-page1.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">the High Court certified the first point as a question of law of general public importance</a>. The court found that while the first point was &quot;long settled&quot; it had not been considered by the Supreme Court. The High Court asked the Supreme Court to expedite its consideration of Assange's application to it were he to make one. Normally the Supreme Court may take six months to a year to hear cases (unless urgent).</p>
<p>Assange did apply to the Supreme Court and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-60743322" rel="nofollow noreferrer">in March 2022 the court ruled that Assange had not raised &quot;an arguable point of law.&quot;</a></p>


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Question Title: are there any states where teenagers sending nudes to each other isn&#39;t a crime?

Question Body: <p>For the recent surveys on law enforcement it appears that it is a crime in many states with many having explicit laws against it however are there any states where this isn't a crime and what about states that don't have an explicit law against it ?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>Blaire Bayliss reviews the law in &quot;<a href="http://lawreview.colorado.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Bayliss-_-Final.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">The Kids are Alright 😂🍆🍑: Teen Sexting, Child Pornography Charges, and the Criminalization of Adolescent Sexuality</a>&quot; (2020) Colorado L. Rev. 251. The article uses the term &quot;sexting&quot; to mean the exchange of sexually explicit messages or images between individuals using electronic messaging. When images, this can constitute child pornography under federal law.</p>
<p>Also (from <a href="https://cyberbullying.org/the-status-of-sexting-laws-across-the-united-states" rel="nofollow noreferrer">cyberbullying.org</a>),</p>
<blockquote>
<p>States that do not have a specific sexting law often rely on existing statutes when dealing with teen sexting. All states, for example, have child pornography or child exploitation laws that prohibit sending, receiving, or possessing images of a sexual nature of a minor.</p>


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</blockquote>
<p>Bayliss notes though that some <em>states</em> have adapted their child pornography laws to account for teen sexting:</p>
<p><a href="https://i.stack.imgur.com/ko5JD.png" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><img src="https://i.stack.imgur.com/ko5JD.png" alt="enter image description here" /></a></p>
<p>For example, in Rhode Island, teens will not be charged under state criminal child pornography laws but may be &quot;tried&quot; in family court. And in Colorado, &quot;teens who are approximately the same age and who exchange sexual images with the understanding of consent have committed a civil infraction.&quot; See <a href="https://codes.findlaw.com/co/title-18-criminal-code/co-rev-st-sect-18-7-109.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Colo. Rev. Stat § 18-7-109(3)</a>.</p>


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<p>Bayliss's article and map are from 2020, but <a href="https://cyberbullying.org/sexting-laws" rel="nofollow noreferrer">a 2022 dataset</a> by the Cyberbulling Research Center shows not much has changed. That dataset also provides links to state-specific sexting laws where they exist.</p>
<p>Note that no state law can exempt teens from the application of federal child pornography and related laws.</p>
<p>Of course, if the image does not even constitute pornography, then all of the above is irrelevant, but I understand you to be asking about the circumstance where the content is typically or historically criminalized.</p>


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Question Title: Does a Limited company need a licence to lend money to an individual in the UK?

Question Body: <p>A limited company (one director) lent money to me as an individual (£450,000). The initial loan was secured as a first charge on a property I owned but did not live in. Interest the first 2 years was substantial and lowered the subsequent years. Should the lender have been licenced ?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>It is possible that the lender should have been authorised by the financial services regulators. If they were not, but should have been, then the agreement might be unenforceable. What happens then depends on the court, which might decide it would be fair to uphold its terms anyway, or might award compensation to the borrower, or other options depending on what is &quot;just and equitable in the circumstances&quot; (<a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/8/section/28" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s.28(3)</a>).</p>


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<p>The overall picture is very complex. The official guidance about figuring out whether somebody is subject to the regulations - the <a href="https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/PERG/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Perimeter Guidance Manual</a> - is 836 pages long. Even if somebody has authorisation, that might be subject to specified conditions, and it could be difficult to discover if the conditions were being met or not.</p>
<p>At a very broad level, the lender should be authorised if  they are acting &quot;by way of business&quot; and if what they did was a &quot;regulated activity&quot;. Many activities involving mortgages and credit are indeed regulated, but the agreement in the question might escape, depending on all the details. For example, this may be a &quot;regulated mortgage contract&quot; (even though the borrower doesn't live in the property), but not if the borrower is acting on a commercial basis (PERG 4.4). There are many other conditions and nuances.</p>


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<p>In the same way, if the lender is not acting &quot;by way of business&quot; then they do not need to be authorised. The manual says (PERG 2.3):</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Whether or not an activity is carried on by way of business is ultimately a question of judgement that takes account of several factors (none of which is likely to be conclusive). These include the degree of continuity, the existence of a commercial element, the scale of the activity and the proportion which the activity bears to other activities carried on by the same person but which are not regulated. The nature of the particular regulated activity that is carried on will also be relevant to the factual analysis.</p>
</blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p>A recent example of this law being applied is <a href="https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2021/995.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>Jackson v Ayles &amp; Ors</em> [2021] EWHC 995 (Ch)</a>. In that case, the applicants obtained a loan secured against their home, from an individual who was not authorised by the regulators. On examination of all the circumstances, the court concluded that the lender was acting by way of business, that the loan agreement was therefore unenforceable (<a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/8/section/26" rel="nofollow noreferrer">FMSA s.26</a>), and that it would be unjust to enforce it because the lender ought to have known the rules. In different circumstances, say when the lender was not someone of &quot;considerable financial acumen&quot; (para 51) who had made many other loans to others (para 34), the outcome could have been different.</p>


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<p>Overall, I hope the summary above has given an impression of what it would look like to invite a court to make such a determination. Specifically, expert legal advice would be needed, and such advice could also include an analysis of whether this is a viable option at all, compared to other ways of tackling the issues.</p>


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Question Title: Why the obscure but specific description of Jane Doe II in the original complaint for Westenbroek v. Kappa Kappa Gamma Fraternity?


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Question Body: <p>In <a href="https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/67101322/doe-i-v-kappa-kappa-gamma-fraternity/" rel="noreferrer"><em>Westenbroek v. Kappa Kappa Gamma Fraternity (2023)</em></a>, filed in the Wyoming District of U.S. court, the plaintiffs are seven women, members of Kappa Kappa Gamma sorority at University of Wyoming, suing the national organization (based in Ohio) for allegedly having admitted a man to their sorority.</p>
<p><a href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.wyd.63248/gov.uscourts.wyd.63248.1.0.pdf" rel="noreferrer">The original complaint</a> was filed anonymously. Paragraphs 15–21 describe the plaintiffs. Paragraph 16 reads:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Jane Doe II is a citizen of a state that is not Illinois, Ohio, Utah, Washington, or Wyoming.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Plaintiff Jane Doe VI is also described in this odd way.</p>


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<blockquote>
<p>Jane Doe II is a citizen of a state that is not Illinois, Ohio, Utah, Washington, or Wyoming.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Plaintiff Jane Doe VI is also described in this odd way.</p>
<p>The other plaintiffs are simply described as citizens of a single specific state, variously Nebraska, Colorado, or Oklahoma.</p>
<p>What is up with “not Illinois, Ohio, Utah, Washington, or Wyoming”?  I can think of reasons why Wyoming and Ohio are in there: the case concerns a Wyoming matter and was filed in the District of Wyoming, and the defendant is based in Ohio. Why are Illinois, Utah, and Washington mentioned specifically, and no other state is?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>This case was filed in federal court under diversity jurisdiction, meaning that it’s a lawsuit between citizens of different states. In most cases, diversity jurisdiction requires “complete” diversity: <em>every</em> plaintiff has to be a citizen of a different state than <em>every</em> defendant. If one of 12 plaintiffs is a Maryland resident and one of 15 defendants is also a Maryland resident, that tiny overlap means the entire lawsuit is kicked back to state court.</p>
<p>In this case, the defendants are an Ohio fraternity, an Illinois resident, a Wyoming company, and a person whose residence is unclear. Defendant Smith might be a Wyoming resident, a Utah resident, or a Washington resident. The plaintiffs aren’t sure. However, as long as the plaintiffs aren’t residents of any of those states, there’s complete diversity of citizenship. It doesn’t matter whether Doe II is from Alaska or Florida, just that she <em>isn’t</em> from the same state as any defendant.</p>


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Question Title: When family members are aware of a crime of someone from the family but refuse to testify , are they held liable for perjury?

Question Body: <p>What do family members that don't want to testify against their family members usually do ? do they face the penalty ?</p>


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Question Body: <p>What do family members that don't want to testify against their family members usually do ? do they face the penalty ?</p>


Answer 1: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/united-states" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-united-states-tooltip-container">united-states</a></p>
<p>Perjury only applies to someone who actually does testify and is untruthful.  A person who refuses to testify at all, when ordered to do so by a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subpoena" rel="nofollow noreferrer">subpoena</a>, is committing <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contempt_of_court" rel="nofollow noreferrer">contempt of court</a>.</p>
<p>It  is possible, in principle, for the court to order them jailed indefinitely until they do testify (civil contempt).  It is also possible for them to be prosecuted criminally afterward (criminal contempt).</p>


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Answer 2: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/germany" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-germany-tooltip-container">germany</a></p>
<p>There is a list of relatives who can refuse to testify, including spouses, children, and parents. <a href="https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stpo/__52.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">§52 StPO</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The following are allowed to refuse testimony:<br />
1 the fiancee of the accused;<br />
2 the spouse of the accused, even if the marriage no longer exists;<br />
2a the registered partner of the accused, even if the partnership no longer exists;<br />
<strong>3 whoever is related or in-law in direct line</strong>, related in indirect line to the third degree, or in-law in indirect line to the second degree.
(my translation)</p>
</blockquote>


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<strong>3 whoever is related or in-law in direct line</strong>, related in indirect line to the third degree, or in-law in indirect line to the second degree.
(my translation)</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Degrees of relationship are counted by 'counting hops.' My uncle is three degrees apart from me, me to my parents to my grandparents to the uncle.</p>


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Answer 3: <h2>They testify or they go to jail</h2>
<p>The only privilege against incrimination that the common law recognises are self-incrimination and spousal privilege. Spousal privilege does not apply in certain cases (e.g. family law), and, in some jurisdictions, the spouse can choose to testify against their spouse and in others the privilege can only be waived by the defendant.</p>
<p>If you are summonsed to appear to testify then you must testify or be jailed until you do.</p>


Tags: perjury


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Question Title: Is it legal to lie about an illegal requirement?

Question Body: <p>As an example, its not legal to discriminate against a person of a certain race while renting out your house. So lets say an Asian person sees a house rented out with a &quot;no Asians&quot; condition. Would it be legal for them to &quot;mask&quot; themselves as a White person, tell the landlord they're White, sign a paper saying they're White and then proceed to rent the place?</p>
<p>Now... they'd be outright lying but at the same time what they're lying about is not supposed to have been asked in the first place. So does one wrong (discrimination) trump another (lying) in a court of law?</p>
<p>Update: since it’s not clear, I’m talking about a scenario where the “Asian” person is willing to admit they lied in a court of law. This isn’t a question on how race is legally defined.</p>


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Answer 1: <p>Lying may be wrong, but it in the United States, it is generally not illegal. <a href="https://casetext.com/case/united-states-v-alvarez" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>United States v. Alvarez</em>, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012)</a>.</p>
<p>For a lie to be illegal, it generally needs to fall into one of a few specific categories, usually involving either <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1341" rel="nofollow noreferrer">fraud</a> or the frustration of legitimate government activities (as in <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1621" rel="nofollow noreferrer">perjury</a>, <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1519" rel="nofollow noreferrer">falsification of records</a>, or <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1001" rel="nofollow noreferrer">lying to a federal agent</a>).</p>


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<p>In any of these cases, the First Amendment is generally going to prohibit any penalties unless the false statement is material, i.e., it had the potential to change the outcome of the event in which it was uttered. As you noted, it is generally illegal to discriminate against Asians, so I would expect a court to treat the tenant's ethnicity as immaterial and require the landlord to honor the rental contract.</p>
<p>Of course, this assumes that the landlord is prohibited from disciminating against Asians, which is not always true. The Fair Housing Act has <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/3603" rel="nofollow noreferrer">exemptions</a> for (a) private clubs; (b) for buildings with four or fewer units, one of which the landlord occupies; (c) for single-family homes that the landlord is renting without the help of an agent; and (d) for religious organizations.</p>


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<p>In such a case, the landlord may be actually be permitted to disciminate against Asians, so the tenant's false statement about their ethnicity would become material the transaction, and a court may therefore permit the landlord to rescind the contract.</p>
<p>(Note, though, that even though the FHA permits <em>discrimination</em> in those limited situations, it does not permit <em>advertising</em> discriminatory preferences. The landlord's &quot;No Asians&quot; language is therefore illegal, whether it is communicated on a sign in the window or in a classified ad or by word of mouth.)</p>


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Answer 2: <p>In general, a contract term that is illegal is, at a minimum, not enforceable (it may make the contract entirely void, depends on jurisdiction). A legal term, such as &quot;pay $1500 per month&quot; is enforceable, and you can be evicted if you don't abide by the term. An illegal term cannot be enforced, and you cannot be evicted for being Asian.</p>
<p>Lying is not per se actionable, except insofar as it may be an element of a fraud lawsuit. But such a lawsuit would fail on numerous grounds. Race is – by law – not a material fact in subletting. It is also highly improbable that a plaintiff could prove that the statement was knowingly false (we don't have race-identifiers issued at birth).</p>


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Answer 3: <h3>TL;DR Hard to show someone <em>lied</em> if they told a variant of the truth</h3>
<p>Race is not black and white - it is many shades of gray. There are a <strong>lot</strong> of scenarios where I may call myself, by one definition, &quot;Asian&quot;, and you may call me &quot;white&quot;. Or vice versa. In OP's example, someone might have facial features and hair that are commonly characteristic of &quot;Asian&quot; and a typical &quot;Asian&quot; last name. Yet that same person might have been born outside of Asia and therefore arguably <em>not</em> be Asian. Not a &quot;lie&quot;. Just a different definition of the truth.</p>


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<p>To put it another way: If the defendant goes into court, I would suggest that rather than say they <em>lied</em>, they instead say &quot;I don't call myself a real Asian.&quot; Then under cross-examination it will come out how the plaintiff is defining &quot;Asian&quot; - e.g., at least 50% Asian ancestry (making that up, but plausible) - and the defendant would then be asked if they fit that definition: &quot;Yes, my parents were born in Asia.&quot; &quot;Then you are Asian! You lied!&quot; &quot;No, I was not born in Asia. I consider myself an American. The sign didn't say 'Asian ancestry', it said 'Asian', and the way I understand 'Asian', I am not one.&quot;</p>


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<p>In the US at least, &quot;race&quot; is an extremely controversial term, for a lot of reasons. It is also an extremely <em>vague</em> term. Consider how many different places we are asked, typically on government forms, political and other surveys (yes, <a href="https://meta.stackexchange.com/questions/339094/why-is-the-loop-survey-asking-about-race-age-and-gender">that includes StackExchange</a>), applications for all kinds things. Sometimes that is for marketing reasons, sometimes for pseudo-legal reasons (to show that a particular &quot;thing&quot; is non-discriminatory by showing a (self-identified) distribution across various races/ethnicities/eages/etc., sometimes for no apparent reason at all except &quot;all the other surveys ask it&quot;. But as it is commonly <strong>self-identified</strong>, consider the possibilities. I'll use &quot;Asian&quot; as an example. Which of the following are included:</p>
<ul>
<li>Born in Asia</li>


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<ul>
<li>Born in Asia</li>
<li>Born outside of Asia from two &quot;Asian&quot; parents</li>
<li>Born outside of Asia from one &quot;Asian&quot; parent and one non-Asian parent</li>
<li>Born outside of Asia but of Asian ancestry and grew up in Asia</li>
<li>Born outside of Asia but of Asian ancestry and grew up in an Asian community - e.g., Chinatown in many US cities.</li>
<li>Born outside of Asia but of Asian ancestry and grew up outside Asian in a non-Asian community (and if so, when does Asian ancestry cease to be a factor)</li>
</ul>
<p>Arguably in the example case, unless someone was born in Asia they could argue, if it came to a legal battle, that they do not consider themselves &quot;Asian&quot; and therefore were not misrepresenting themselves when signing the contract.</p>


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<p>In addition, what is Asia? I think the term as stated in this question likely refers to China, Japan, India and nearby areas. But according to <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asia" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Wikipedia</a> it includes the Arabian peninsula (Israel, Saudia Arabia, Iraq, Iran, etc.), Russia (not clear how much of Russia - but definitely a lot of it) and many other places that may not fit the common &quot;Asian&quot; reference.</p>
<p>As another example, &quot;African American&quot; is a common term used in similar situations. There are other terms. But using &quot;African American&quot;, if a &quot;white&quot; person from Egypt or South Africa immigrates to the US, are they &quot;African American&quot;? Clearly not the intent of the categorization (which is based on very real both historical and ongoing discrimination against specific groups of people) yet linguistically and biologically correct.</p>


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Answer 4: <p>The question states</p>
<blockquote>
<p>its not legal to discriminate against a person of a certain race while renting out your house.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But at least under US Federal lw, this may not be accurate. <a href="https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/fair_housing_equal_opp/fair_housing_act_overview" rel="nofollow noreferrer">This HUD page</a> reads:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>In very limited circumstances, the Act exempts  owner-occupied buildings with no more than four units, single-family houses sold or rented by the owner without the use of an agent, ...</p>
</blockquote>
<p>&quot;Your house&quot; is apt to be a single family house, so if no agent or broker is used (including a listing service) then the transaction may not be covered by the US Fair Housing Act. Many US states have state-level fair housing laws as well, but these are likely to have similar exemptions.</p>


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<p>If the transaction is not covered by a fair-housing law, the restriction is not illegal, and a lie would not be excused by its illegality. Whether it would in such a case amount to fraud, and be actionable as such, would I think depend on the exact jurisdiction.</p>


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Question Title: What legal power does the Missouri Attorney General have to impose emergency regulations?


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Question Body: <p>On April 13th 2023, Missouri Attorney General Andrew Bailey announced an emergency regulation which in most cases would ban gender-affirming care for trans people in the state (<a href="https://www.ago.mo.gov/home/news/2023/04/13/missouri-attorney-general-andrew-bailey-promulgates-emergency-regulation-targeting-gender-transition-procedures-for-minors" rel="nofollow noreferrer">link</a>):</p>
<blockquote>
<p>In an effort to protect children, Missouri Attorney General Andrew Bailey promulgated an emergency regulation clarifying that, because gender transition interventions are experimental and have significant side effects, state law already prohibits performing those procedures in the absence of substantial guardrails that ensure informed consent and adequate access to mental health care. ... The regulation outlines that in order for gender transition interventions to comply with state law, the following guardrails must be in place:</p>
</blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p>While the wording of the announcement suggests that this is only a &quot;clarification&quot; of the existing law, it is also described as an emergency regulation, suggesting it is new ─ and as far as I know the particular guardrails described in the regulation are not specified this way in prior legislation passed by Missouri's legislative chambers. Additionally, the announcement says:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Attorney General Bailey’s emergency regulation becomes effective April 27, 2023, and expires February 6, 2024.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But if the regulation's requirements already existed in the law, then they would already be effective even before the announcement, and would not have an expiration date (unless the existing law itself was already set to expire at that date).</p>


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<p>This raises the question: <strong>what, if anything, gives these specific new guardrails the force of law?</strong> By my understanding, it is up to the legislative branch to decide the laws, and up to the judicial branch to interpret the meaning of those laws (e.g. what constitutes &quot;substantial guardrails&quot; or &quot;informed consent&quot; if these terms occur in the text of a law). But the Attorney General is an executive officer; he has the discretion to tell his prosecutors which offences to focus on, but not the power to decide what is or isn't an offence, unless the legislative branch has delegated that power to him somehow. But typically powers to regulate healthcare would be delegated to an executive body that is involved in healthcare, not law enforcement.</p>
<hr />


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<hr />
<p>It's been reported on May 1st 2023 that a court has temporarily blocked this emergency regulation from taking effect (<a href="https://apnews.com/article/missouri-transgender-health-care-ruling-705afa8c4e8a6d4445629c3f2694053f" rel="nofollow noreferrer">link</a>), but for the purposes of this question this doesn't matter ─ I am only asking what gives the state Attorney General power to create such a regulation (if indeed it is a new regulation), not whether this regulation is likely to be found constitutional or not.</p>


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Answer 1: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/australia" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-australia-tooltip-container">australia</a></p>
<h3>The executive has no inherent rule-making authority to create subordinate legislation (i.e. regulations)</h3>
<p>Only when rule-making authority has been delegated by legislation to an executive agency or actor can that executive entity create subordinate legislation (regulations). See generally <em>Victorian Stevedoring &amp; General Contracting Company Pty Ltd v Dignan Informant</em> <a href="https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/cth/HCA/1931/34.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">[1931] HCA 34; (1931) 46 CLR 73</a>.</p>


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<p>See also Stephen Bourke, &quot;<a href="http://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/AdminRw/1991/2.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Subordinate Rule Making - An Historical Perspective</a>&quot; (1991) Admin Review:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The High Court has never doubted that Parliament can delegate legislative power to the Executive. ... Accepting that Parliament could <strong>delegate</strong> its legislative power, attention was turned very early in the life of the Federation to scrutiny of the Executive in the exercise of its delegated legislative power.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>And Moira Coombs, &quot;<a href="http://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/AIAdminLawF/2002/4.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Making the Rules: A Comparison Between the United States and Australian Systems</a>&quot; (2002) 32 AIAL Forum 25 at p. 28:</p>
<blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p>In Australia it is the norm that an Act of Parliament will set out the broad scheme of a policy or program within a fairly detailed framework, with executive law-making confined to matters too technical, trivial, detailed or changing to justify the procedural solemnity and rigour of an Act of Parliament. The <strong>delegated legislation</strong> is part of the primary legislative program that is put in place by the responsible Minister for the relevant portfolio.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>And at p. 35:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Parliament authorizes the making of a specific delegation of power under various statutes and although approval is made to make delegated legislation in a particular subject area, 'it should not be assumed to give the executive government an absolute discretion to make whatever legislation it thinks fit.' ...</p>
<p>...</p>


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<p>...</p>
<p><strong>In Australia a particular statute will indicate a delegation of power to the Executive and specify the subject area in which the agency may make rules and also specify the type of instrument to be made under that delegation</strong>.</p>
</blockquote>


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Answer 2: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/australia" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-australia-tooltip-container">australia</a></p>
<h2>Subordinate legislation making is an inherent <a href="https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/la/proceduralpublications/Pages/Factsheet-6---Making-Laws.aspx" rel="nofollow noreferrer">power</a> of the Executive</h2>
<p>Responsibility for administering each Act of Parliament is allocated to a particular Minister. That Minister can promulgate subordinate legislation (including Regulations) to give effect to the primary legislation.</p>


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<p>In some cases, the primary legislation may explicitly defer specific detail to the regulations but, in any event, the Minister has the power to do this notwithstanding. Regulations must be tabled before both Houses of Parliament (except in Queensland because they only have one) within 14 days of promulgation and either House may disallow them.</p>
<p>Even if not disallowed, when a case comes before a court, the regulation may be struck down if it conflicts with the primary legislation in exactly the same way primary legislation may be struck down if it conflicts with the Constitution.</p>
<p>Given that Parliamentary procedure and separation of powers in the USA and Australia derives from 18th century English practice, while substantially different in detail, the basic functions are likely to be the same.</p>


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Question Title: Selling firearms for another person in another state

Question Body: <p>How legal, or illegal, is the following situation?  A Vermont resident owns several firearms which they wish to sell to a gun shop in neighboring NH.  They believe the transaction would be smoother if a relative who is a NH resident makes the sale for them.  (Gun laws are much more relaxed in NH than in VT.)</p>
<p>They would travel together to the shop and sell the firearms.  The NH resident would be paid, and then pass it onto the VT resident.</p>


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Answer 1: <h3>Non-licensed individuals cannot sell firearms in the US across state lines.</h3>
<p>Only licensed dealers can do this, and transfers to another state must be through another licensed dealer in that state.</p>
<p>The Vermont resident needs a licensed firearm dealer in Vermont to ship the firearms to the dealer in New Hampshire.  There are people who offer this service.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.atf.gov/resource-center/docs/0813-firearms-top-12-qaspdf/download" rel="nofollow noreferrer">See #4 here</a></p>


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Answer 2: <p>You would first consult §4019 of the Vermont statutes. The transfer is legal to transfer from unlicensed person to unlicensed person if they are an &quot;immediate family member&quot;, which is</p>
<blockquote>
<p>a spouse, parent, stepparent, child, stepchild, sibling, stepsibling,
grandparent, step-grandparent, grandchild, step-grandchild,
great-grandparent, step-great-grandparent, great-grandchild, and
step-great-grandchild</p>
</blockquote>
<p>otherwise you have to have a licensed dealer as an intermediary.</p>
<p>If this is a rifle, you can sell it in New Hampshire (Chapter 159-A was repealed in 1996). If it is a pistol, there are restrictions under <a href="https://law.justia.com/codes/new-hampshire/2022/title-xii/title-159/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">N.H. Rev Stat §159</a>, and unlicensed sale is a crime.</p>
<p>So, maybe, maybe not.</p>


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Answer 3: <h2>The NH resident is selling the guns in VT</h2>
<p>I have no idea whether this is legal or not but, as described, the VT resident is acting as an agent for the NH resident. Under agency law, the actions of an agent are also the actions of the principal under the principle of vicarious liability. So, it is legally no different from the NH resident doing it directly.</p>


Tags: united-states, firearms


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Question Title: Why is a divisional court called a divisional court?

Question Body: <p>A court sitting with more than one judge is a divisional court. I am having difficulty seeing the relevance of the term to its definition.</p>


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Answer 1: <p>High Court cases are usually heard by a single judge, but in some instances (see s 66(1) below) more than one judge is required. When this happens, it's called a divisional court.</p>
<p>See <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1981/54/section/66?timeline=false" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Section 66</a>
Senior Courts Act 1981, which states that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><strong>Divisional courts of High Court.</strong></p>
<p>(1) Divisional courts may be held for the transaction of any business in the High Court which is, by or by virtue of rules of court or any other statutory provision, required to be heard by a divisional court.</p>
<p>(2) Any number of divisional courts may sit at the same time.</p>
<p>(3) A divisional court shall be constituted of not less than two judges.</p>
<p>(4) Every judge of the High Court shall be qualified to sit in any divisional court.</p>


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<p>(3) A divisional court shall be constituted of not less than two judges.</p>
<p>(4) Every judge of the High Court shall be qualified to sit in any divisional court.</p>
<p>(5) The judge who is, according to the order of precedence under this Act, the senior of the judges constituting a divisional court shall be the president of the court.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The term &quot;Divisional&quot; stems from the way the Senior Courts (apart from the Crown Court) are structured - i.e. divided - to deal with different areas of law.</p>
<p>The High Court is divided in to three divisions:</p>
<ul>
<li><p><a href="https://www.judiciary.uk/courts-and-tribunals/kings-bench-division/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">King’s Bench Division</a></p>
</li>
<li><p><a href="https://www.judiciary.uk/courts-and-tribunals/family-law-courts/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Family Division</a></p>
</li>


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</li>
<li><p><a href="https://www.judiciary.uk/courts-and-tribunals/family-law-courts/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Family Division</a></p>
</li>
<li><p><a href="https://www.judiciary.uk/courts-and-tribunals/business-and-property-courts/chancery-division/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Chancery Division</a></p>
</li>
</ul>
<p>And the Court of Appeal has two Divisions:</p>
<ul>
<li><a href="https://www.judiciary.uk/courts-and-tribunals/court-of-appeal-home/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Criminal and Civil</a></li>
</ul>


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Answer 2: <p>Divisional Courts were introduced by the <em><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supreme_Court_of_Judicature_Act_1873" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Judicature Act 1873</a></em>: Winder, <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1468-2230.1946.tb01012.x" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Divisional Court precedents</a> (1946) 9 <em>Modern Law Review</em> 257, 258. The Act merged the three common law courts (Common Pleas, Exchequer and Queen's Bench), and the courts of equity, into a single High Court of Justice. In contrast to the common law position, section 39 of the Act provided that the High Court could be constituted by a single judge. Section 40 of the Act then provided:</p>
<blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p>Such causes and matters as are not proper to be heard by a single Judge shall be heard by Divisional Courts of the said High Court of Justice … Any number of such Divisional Courts may sit at the same time. A Divisional Court of the said High Court of Justice shall be constituted by two or three, and no more, of the Judges thereof …</p>
</blockquote>
<p><a href="https://www.google.com.au/books/edition/The_Supreme_Court_of_Judicature_Act_1873/ubsDAAAAQAAJ?hl=en&amp;gbpv=1&amp;pg=PA81" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Section 41</a> assigns to a Divisional Court the matters previously decided by the common law courts sitting &quot;in banc,&quot; while sections 43 and 44 extend the concept of the Divisional Court to the new equitable Divisions. This implemented the recommendations of the Judicature Commission, <a href="https://archive.org/details/dli.granth.112421/page/10/mode/1up" rel="nofollow noreferrer">First report of the Commissioners</a> (1869), p 10:</p>
<blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p>Each division of the Court of Chancery is presided over by a single Judge … On the other hand, in the Sittings of the Courts of Common Law in Banc, the Court is ordinarily constituted of four Judges … having regard to … the importance of avoiding any too violent transition from the modes of conducting judicial business to which the public have been accustomed … we think it will be advisable to authorize a single Judge to exercise the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court … and that all matters now disposed of in banco in [the common law] Courts shall be heard and determined by not more than three Judges. We also think that the Judges of each Division or Chamber in which there are several Judges should have power to sit in banco in two sub-divisions at the same time, with the assistance, when ever necessary, of a Judge or Judges from any other Division of the Court.</p>
</blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p>The concept of a Divisional Court also appeared in <a href="https://www.google.com.au/books/edition/The_Supreme_Court_of_Judicature_Act_1873/ubsDAAAAQAAJ?hl=en&amp;gbpv=1&amp;pg=PA81" rel="nofollow noreferrer">section 53</a> of the Act, although the Court of Appeal was at this time not divided into a permanent Criminal and Civil Division:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Every appeal to the Court of Appeal shall be heard or determined either by the whole Court or by a Divisional Court consisting of any number, not less than three, of the Judges thereof. Any number of such Divisional Courts may sit at the same time.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The term &quot;divisional court,&quot; then, was introduced to describe a panel of judges who, in contrast to a common law court sitting <em>en banc</em>, formed less than the &quot;whole&quot; court. This allowed the new courts to deal with multiple cases at the same time and make better use of the expertise of individual judges.</p>


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<p>At first, the adjective &quot;divisional&quot; referred to an ad hoc panel of judges constituting either the High Court or the Court of Appeal. Once the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Divisional Court of the Court of Appeal became routine, it came to refer specifically to the High Court, in which single judge decisions are the norm.</p>


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Question Title: How to put a disclaimer about IP in an open source fangame?

Question Body: <p>I am creating a fangame. Specifically a game where you can open weapon cases from Counter-Strike: Global Offensive for free and collect or trade skins that you obtain. The entire game source is my own work, except there are two files containing names and parameters of items from CSGO. I want to distribute my game's source including these files.</p>
<p>I am ready to retract these parts should Valve contact me regarding intellectual property, however I'd like to put some kind of disclaimer in case somebody else used my source code and then got hit by Valve or anything. To state that I don't have a right to the IP contained and that the use of these files is at the risk of the user, not me; so they couldn't point at me, claiming the game was fully open sourced by me under MIT (which I plan to use). What would the best approach in this be?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>IF part of your code and data is non-open-source, you can't release this software under the MIT license.</p>
<p>However, from what I know, CS:GO uses real-life weapons, and their names aren't protected by copyright. Weapon stats aren't copyrightable either. With skin names, you should be safe as well, since there isn't enough (or any) lore around them to establish them as literary works.</p>
<p>However, if you are using any in-game descriptions or images, they are copyrighted content and can't be legally copied without permission from Valve. Which might be easy to obtain by writing them.</p>


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Answer 2: <p>There is no reliable disclaimer. Sure, you can publish a game under an Open Source license, but you can only license those rights that you have. You do not have rights to others' copyright or trademark, such as names, settings, or characters from another video game. Using an Open Source license cannot absolve you from any responsibility.</p>
<p>In some cases, a copyright exception might be available, that allows limited use of others' IP. For example, it might be OK to <em>parody</em> another video game, especially if that parody is not made with a profit motive (compare the US concept of <em>fair use</em>). But the reality is that a lot of fan works are in a legal grey area – probably not fully covered by copyright exceptions, but often tolerated to some degree by publishers.</p>


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<p>Another technique I have occasionally seen is a fan game that was created independently – but the data formats happen to be compatible with another game, so a user who were to also own the original game could mod the fan game by copying the other game's assets into a different folder. This kind of approach could be an elegant solution in your scenario, since you wouldn't be copying any of the original game's assets. But it might not be that easy, since &quot;contributory copyright infringement&quot; is a thing as well.</p>
<p>The only safe move is not to play. Instead of doing legally risky stuff, it might be better to turn that creativity towards creating your entirely own game. Remember that you can be sued even if you did nothing wrong. And even if you would win such a case, you might not have the resources to put up a good defense.</p>


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Question Title: Share The Road Sign

Question Body: <p>Does the following <a href="https://www.roadtrafficsigns.com/signs/motor-vehicle-bike-share-the-road-sign/sku-k-9081" rel="nofollow noreferrer">sign</a> mean that bikers and motor vehicle owners are sharing the same lane? But I thought it's not a good idea to share a lane. Thank you!</p>
<p><a href="https://i.stack.imgur.com/XZK82.png" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><img src="https://i.stack.imgur.com/XZK82.png" alt="enter image description here" /></a></p>


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Answer 1: <p>You did not state a jurisdiction, but this sign is of the style specified by the <a href="https://mutcd.fhwa.dot.gov/kno_2009r1r2r3.htm" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD)</a> which is used throughout the United States, so I will assume a jurisdiction which follows the MUTCD.</p>
<p>The &quot;Share the Road&quot; sign is numbered <a href="https://mutcd.fhwa.dot.gov/htm/2009r1r2r3/part2/part2c.htm#section2C60" rel="nofollow noreferrer">W16-1P</a>.  (The MUTCD version just has the words and not the car/bike symbols; the latter might be a recent update or a local variation.)  Its description reads:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>In situations where there is a need to warn drivers to watch for other slower forms of transportation traveling along the highway, such as bicycles, golf carts, horse-drawn vehicles, or farm machinery, a SHARE THE ROAD (W16-1P) plaque (see Figure 2C-12) may be used.</p>
</blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p>So, as is generally the case for yellow <em>warning</em> signs, it does not have any effect on the laws which apply.  (It is generally only white <em>regulatory</em> signs that do that.)</p>
<p>Whether or not it is a &quot;good idea&quot; to share a lane, it is legal.  Both cars and bikes are entitled to use the road, and if it's a road with only one lane in this direction of travel, then necessarily they must share it.  Of course, they wouldn't typically travel side by side indefinitely, but they will be abreast briefly when a car passes a bike.  California law, as an example, requires only that <a href="https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=VEH&amp;sectionNum=21760." rel="nofollow noreferrer">the car stay at least three feet away from the bicycle</a> as it passes, when possible.</p>


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Question Title: Does Maine law require a tenant to leash a dog on a rented property occupied by other tenants?


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Question Body: <p>I live in Maine and have a multi-unit home with two units — a first-floor unit and second-floor unit — that I rent out.  The two units share the same foyer, and the tenants do not know each other well.</p>
<p>The tenant on the first floor recently acquired an adult male pit bull, which I have so far permitted under the lease agreement.  The dog is not under the owner's vocal command, so by Maine law the owner must keep the dog on a leash when not on property.  However, he often has the dog off of a leash when he is outside of his apartment — for example in the foyer, on the porch, and around the yard — and the other tenant has expressed concerns about safety, for instance when she is exiting her second-floor apartment through the foyer.</p>
<p>Does Maine state law or court precedent require that the dog be leashed on the rental property?  This information would be helpful for determining how I should approach the situation.</p>


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Answer 1: <p>The clostest to such a state law, which would be under part 9 of <a href="https://legislature.maine.gov/legis/statutes/7/title7ch0sec0.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">title 7</a>, is §3911, which forbids any dog from being &quot;at large&quot;. That term is <a href="http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/statutes/7/title7sec3907.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">defined</a> as &quot;off the premises of the owner and not under the control of any person whose personal presence and attention would reasonably control the conduct of the animal&quot;. The term &quot;premise&quot; is not defined in a general manner in title 7, though in the definition of &quot;dangerous dog&quot; and &quot;nuisance dog&quot;, it is defined as &quot;the residence or residences, including buildings and land and motor vehicles, belonging to the owner or keeper of the dog or wolf hybrid&quot; (the primary question being whether &quot;the land&quot; is part of &quot;the premise&quot;). In light of the


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land and motor vehicles, belonging to the owner or keeper of the dog or wolf hybrid&quot; (the primary question being whether &quot;the land&quot; is part of &quot;the premise&quot;). In light of the mixed definition of &quot;premise&quot; in Maine law and given the extant evidence of legislative intent in title 7, the courts would conclude that &quot;in the yard&quot; is being &quot;on the premise&quot;. In other words, the dog is not &quot;at large&quot;. <a href="https://legislature.maine.gov/legis/statutes/7/title7ch727sec0.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Chapter 727</a> contains separate provisions for a court determination that a dog is &quot;dangerous&quot; or &quot;a nuisance&quot;, which is triggered by assault or threaten of bodily injury by a dog.</p>


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Question Title: What kind of lawyer should I contact after not receiving the service which I paid for?

Question Body: <p>I went to a courier company to pick up my package and not only was my package not released (in spite of me having all the legal documents) when I pressed for an explanation I was asked to leave the store or threatened that the police would be called. I did not threaten or raise my voice (all of this is recorded in the store camera). I want to appoint a lawyer to speak on my behalf. What kind of lawyer should I be contacting?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>The OP did not specify the jurisdiction. It may well be a crime for a <em>postal service</em> (and some courier companies qualify as such, in some jurisdictions) to fail to release a parcel to the lawful recipient. That would be a case for the prosecutor's office. In other jurisdictions, a civil matter depending on who owns the parcel at this point -- the sender or the recipient?</p>
<p>On the other hand, there are usually two sides to such a story. I find it implausible that the courier staff would simply say &quot;no&quot; with no reason. More likely something happened <strong>in the eyes of the courier staff</strong> which prompted them to act like they did. They are in the business of delivering parcels, not in the business of frustrating customers.</p>


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<p>A customer arguing a point repeatedly in a stressful situation may well appear considerably more threatening to the staff than the customer perceives himself or herself to be. The customer might think of it as being &quot;firm and non-threatening&quot; without raising a voice, the staff might think of it as being &quot;unreasonable and intruding into their personal space.&quot;</p>


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Answer 2: <p>If you want to claim damages for not receiving the parcel then you can probably sue them in the small claims court, or whatever your local version of that is. No lawyer required.</p>
<p>Hiring a lawyer will almost certainly cost far more than any damages. That's why small claims procedures exist: to deal with such things quickly and cheaply.</p>
<p>You don't say where you are, but start by googling &quot;{your jurisdiction} small claims&quot;.</p>


Tags: lawyer, customer-service, postal-service, threats


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Question Title: When is the next significant date on the horizon in the judicial proceedings against Julian Assange?

Question Body: <p>Australian journalist Julian Paul Assange is in remand pending the CPS appeal against his triumph in the extradition proceedings against him for offences under the U.S. espionage act.</p>
<p>When is the next relevant date or time frame within these proceedings? If there are none yet definite on the horizon, are there time limits for how long the indefinite limbo can last?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>There is no pending appeal by the Crown Prosecution Service.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-59608641" rel="nofollow noreferrer">The CPS's appeal was successful, with judgment released on December 10, 2021</a>. The Supreme Court declined to hear Assange's further appeal of that. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/media/2022/jun/17/julian-assange-extradition-to-us-approved-by-priti-patel" rel="nofollow noreferrer">The home secretary then approved Assange's extradition</a>.</p>
<p>While the question does not ask about this: Assange has now appealed that ultimate extradition approval, but these are new proceedings about a different decision point, not a continuation of the previous appeal, with the hearing expected to be in early 2023.</p>


Tags: united-kingdom, england-and-wales, extradition, current-events


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Question Title: I am not allowed to purchase Tech B unless already a customer of System A from same Company, which I do not want/need ..legal?

Question Body: <p>A computer system is listed for sale on a company's website with the caveat that I must already be a customer of their gene sequencing platform, which I am not interested in / do not need, as I do not work in this field of study. The computer system is not a promotional or discounted item, nor is it in any way dependent upon the sequencing hardware for it to function.</p>
<p>The computer system is 100% standalone is advertised separately from the sequencing platform.</p>
<p>Is this &quot;full line forcing&quot;? is this acceptable / legal business practice?</p>


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Answer 1: <h2>This is freedom of contract</h2>
<p>The company sells one product to everyone, System A.</p>
<p>The company also sells Tech B to only its pre-existing customers.</p>
<p>That is not <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bundling_(antitrust_law)" rel="nofollow noreferrer">bundling</a> under the general ideas of antitrust law or <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Product_bundling" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Product Bundling</a> under competition laws, as you don't have any secondary items, and two wholly distinct sales.</p>
<p>The company offers its products separately. The best equivalent would be a line in a restaurant menu that lists &quot;extra patty for your burger&quot; that is only sold as an option for your Hamburger <a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/q/85611/10334">but not alone</a>. Just rephrase the offer to &quot;Tech B for our customers of System A&quot;.</p>


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<p>There might even be reasons why Tech B is not offered on its own and can't be bought by non-customers of System A. The most simple would be that Tech B is pre-installed with System A - but it is not bundling because you already need to <em>own</em> System A to buy Tech B and Tech B is not offered as <em>machine that can run system A</em> but <em>machine set up to run System A</em> - which is not a bundle but a different product, just like gluten-free cake is to normal cake.</p>
<h2>Nothing forbids negotiating</h2>
<p>That doesn't mean that legally you can't get the Tech B: you just would need to negotiate with them for it, outside of the normally offered items.</p>


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Question Title: Is OpenAI/ChatGPT compliant with GDPR, if they don&#39;t allow changing or removing the Phone Number and Email Address?


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Question Body: <p>Italy has recently banned ChatGPT, and <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2023/04/28/chatgpt-resumes-in-italy/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">is now allowing it again in the country</a>, after they implemented a few privacy controls.</p>
<p>The fact that it's now allowed again makes me wonder if Italy (and the rest of EU) is &quot;finally happy&quot; with ChatGPT, GDPR-wise.</p>
<p>Since day 1 of me using ChatGPT, what worries me the most is that:</p>
<ol>
<li><p>I cannot change my email address associated with my account</p>
</li>
<li><p>I cannot view or change my phone number associated with my account</p>
</li>
<li><p>If I delete my account, the phone number (at least) stays saved in their database permanently, as we can no longer create a new account with the same phone number associated</p>
</li>


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</li>
<li><p>If I delete my account, the phone number (at least) stays saved in their database permanently, as we can no longer create a new account with the same phone number associated</p>
</li>
<li><p>Despite my numerous attempts, a human NEVER replies to my questions in the support chat (even though the Bot eventually says that they will reply within 1 week), and when I attempted to ask in the forum, my post was not approved. My questions to them were about changing/deleting the phone number and email address.</p>
</li>
</ol>
<p>These are basic rules of GDPR (&quot;right to erasure&quot; (Article 17) and &quot;right to rectification&quot; (Article 19)), and I'm surprised that at this point, EU countries are still allowing OpenAI/ChatGPT to do this, and that Italy hasn't required them to make changes around these personal elements.</p>


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<p>Am I wrong here? <strong>Is OpenAI/ChatGPT compliant with GDPR, if they don't allow changing or removing the Phone Number and Email Address?</strong></p>


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Answer 1: <p>GDPR allows companies to process data for various reasons, including user consent or to fulfill contractual or legal obligations. Using an email or phone number as the unique user ID is legal, and so is retaining the unique user ID of a deleted account to prevent abuse or fraud (or for tax purposes, if it is a paid service).</p>
<p>GDPR requires companies to publish contact details, but there is no requirement to have a chatbot to be this &quot;official contact point.&quot; Somewhere in their legal boilerplate you should find a physical address where you can send a printed and signed letter. In this letter, you can request either information on your account or the correction of factually wrong data, but then your phone number is not &quot;wrong&quot; in this sense ...</p>


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<p>PS -- I did not downvote, but it seems to me that your question seems to view GDPR as an universal &quot;magic wand&quot; when it is a quite specific set of regulations. About two minutes of googling got me the <a href="https://openai.com/policies/privacy-policy" rel="nofollow noreferrer">contact details</a> in the EU/EEA and UK.</p>


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Question Title: Copyright implications of dismissing Individual and Representative Plaintiffs v. Github Inc, Microsoft Inc, OpenAI (et al.) on derived LLMs


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Question Body: <p><a href="https://githubcopilotlitigation.com/pdf/06823/1-0-github_complaint.pdf" rel="noreferrer">&quot;Individual and Representative Plaintiffs v. GITHUB, INC., a Delaware corporation;
MICROSOFT CORPORATION, a Washington corporation; OPENAI, INC., a Delaware nonprofit corporation; [...]&quot;</a> is a class action lawsuit filed against OpenAI et al which includes the allegation of &quot;violation of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act&quot; (p.4) wrt the way Codex, a GPT-3 series large language model, was trained using open source code from Github user repositories. They note &quot;Numerous questions of law or fact common to the entire Class arise from Defendants’ conduct—including [...] Whether Defendants’ conduct violated the Class’s rights under the DMCA when GitHub and OpenAI caused Codex and Copilot to ingest and distribute Licensed Materials without including any associated Attribution, Copyright


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Notice, or License Terms. (VI)(D)(37)-(VI)(D)(37)(1) The defendants have <a href="https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/23589439-openai-motion-to-dismiss?responsive=1&amp;title=1" rel="noreferrer">made a motion</a> to dismiss the case on several grounds stating &quot;the crux of this claim asserts that OpenAI improperly benefited from using Licensed Materials to create Derived Works&quot; (VI)(A)(3)(B) but refuting that &quot;Plaintiffs do not asserts a copyright infringement claim. Instead they allege that Defendants violated the DMCA by [...] (3) knowingly providing CMI that is false by &quot;asserting and/or implying that CoPilot is the author of Licensed Materials&quot;&quot;. (VI)(C)(1).</p>


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<p>If the DMCA abuse claim of this case gets dismissed, I'm wondering if it would have the effect of nullifying the legal basis to prosecute commercial use of large language models (LLMs) derived from data selected by an even larger model (henceforth, &quot;data derived LLM&quot;) -- or at least setting the precedent to do so. Examples of data derived LLMs include Alpaca, Koala, GPT4ALL, and Vicuna, all of which were trained on data produced by OpenAI's models and are currently only available for non-commercial purposes. EG, &quot;the instruction data is based on OpenAI’s text-davinci-003, whose terms of use prohibit developing models that compete with OpenAI.&quot; Also worth consideration is <a href="https://openai.com/policies/terms-of-use" rel="noreferrer">this provision in OpenAI's ToS</a>:</p>
<blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p>(c) Restrictions. You may not [...] (iv) except as permitted through the API, use any automated or programmatic method to extract data or output from the Services, including scraping, web harvesting, or web data extraction; [...]</p>
</blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p>The precedent set by the action to dismiss or not dismiss the class action lawsuit against OpenAI et al could have an enormous impact on the economics of training LLMs, since (as of Apr 29) it is orders of magnitude cheaper to train a data derived LLM <a href="https://crfm.stanford.edu/2023/03/13/alpaca.html" rel="noreferrer">like Alpaca</a> <a href="https://towardsdatascience.com/behind-the-millions-estimating-the-scale-of-large-language-models-97bd7287fb6b" rel="noreferrer">than a new one</a>. Surely OpenAI would attempt to restrict others from using their LLMs to train new ones for fractions of the price (the maximum penalty for violation is suspension and termination ToS 6(a)), but under their current ToS, could they <em>prosecute</em> such incidents? The big question I'm asking is: <strong>Is it considered intellectual property theft to capitalize on synthetic datasets produced by OpenAI's LLMs?</strong></p>


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Answer 1: <h2>A motion to dismiss sets no precedent</h2>
<p>Whether it succeeds or not, it does not result in a judgement on the merits, it is simply an analysis on whether the case <em>as pleaded</em> shows the defendant has a case to answer.</p>
<p>The case would have to go to trial, have a judgement issued (i.e. not settle), and await the result of final appeals (if any) before it would be considered precedent.</p>
<h2>As to your final question</h2>
<blockquote>
<p>Is it considered intellectual property theft to capitalize on synthetic datasets produced by OpenAI's LLMs?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>No one knows. Hence the lawsuit.</p>


Tags: copyright, intellectual-property, data-ownership, artificial-intelligence, copyfraud


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Question Title: Are there any legal doctrines like the absurdity doctrine that tend to correct legislative undersight or oversight?

Question Body: <p>Absurdity doctrine is a doctrine used by courts to ignore the plain meaning of a law in cases where the plain meaning would in the court's opinion lead to absurd results. Are there any similar doctrines that attempt to correct legislative flaws by either interpreting a law broadly or narrowly to include or exclude situations where such law can or cannot apply?</p>


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Answer 1: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/canada" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-canada-tooltip-container">canada</a></p>
<p>The Supreme Court of Canada has long been clear that &quot;plain meaning alone is not determinative and a statutory interpretation analysis is incomplete without considering the context, purpose and relevant legal norms&quot; (<em>R. v. Alex</em>, <a href="https://canlii.ca/t/h4mzd#par31" rel="nofollow noreferrer">2017 SCC 37 at para. 31</a>).</p>
<p>Many factors would pull a court to interpret a statute more narrowly or broadly than an acontextual, isolated reading of the words would suggest. Generally, this includes the full text, context, and purpose of the statute. Courts will look to:</p>
<ul>
<li>the words of the provision</li>
<li>the surrounding words and related provisions</li>
<li>the words of the entire statute</li>


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<ul>
<li>the words of the provision</li>
<li>the surrounding words and related provisions</li>
<li>the words of the entire statute</li>
<li>the entire statute book</li>
<li>the legislative purpose as revealed through legislative history and the mischief the provision is meant to deal with</li>
<li>the presumption of constitutionality</li>
<li>etc.</li>
</ul>
<p>Basically every doctrine of statutory interpretation will pull towards either a narrow or broad reading of a provision. I would hesitate though to call these &quot;corrections&quot; of &quot;legislative flaws&quot; but rather an attempt to give effect to the legislative intent. Even the doctrine of absurdity that you mention is based in an assumption that the legislature does not intend absurd results. Instead of correcting &quot;legislative flaws&quot; this doctrine/canon is a way to <em>avoid</em> judicial error.</p>


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<p>However, <em>after</em> a full interpretation of a statute reveals that it is unconstitutional because it is over or under-inclusive, then a court may use the <em>remedies</em> of reading down or reading in (these are constitutional remedies not part of the ordinary act of interpretation). In such a circumstance, where it is a &quot;safe assumption&quot; that the Legislature would have enacted the &quot;corrected&quot; version, the court may declare the correction. See <em>Schachter v. Canada</em>, <a href="https://canlii.ca/t/1fs9l" rel="nofollow noreferrer">[1992] 2 SCR 679</a>.</p>


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Answer 2: <h2>Yes, it’s called <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Statutory_interpretation" rel="nofollow noreferrer">statutory interpretation</a></h2>
<p>Courts recognise that words rarely if ever have a clear and unambiguous “plain meaning”. For example, the words “go” and “put” which are not uncommon in statutes each have several hundred dictionary meanings to choose from. While the correct meaning may be obvious for hundreds or even thousands of fact patterns, sooner or later a case will come along where even simple words and phrases are ambiguous.</p>
<p>Former High Court justice Michael Kirby wrote an illustrative <a href="http://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2011/3.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">article</a> on the matter.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>During the past decade or so, the High Court of Australia has unanimously endorsed other principles as necessary to the accurate reading of legislation. Amongst the most important of these principles have been:</p>


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<ul>
<li><p>that where the applicable law is expressed in legislation the correct starting point for analysis is the text of the legislation and not judicial statements of the common law or even judicial elaborations of the statute;</p>
</li>
<li><p>that the overall objective of statutory construction is to give effect to the purpose of Parliament as expressed in the text of the statutory provisions; and</p>
</li>
<li><p>that in deriving meaning from the text, so as to fulfil the purpose of Parliament, it is a mistake to consider statutory words in isolation. The proper approach demands the derivation of the meaning of words from the legislative context in which those words appear. Specifically, it requires the interpreter to examine at the very least the sentence, often the paragraph, and preferably the immediately surrounding provisions (if not a wider review of the entire statutory context) to identify the meaning of the words in the context in which they are used.</p>
</li>
</ul>


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</li>
</ul>
<p>These and other explanations of the contemporary understanding of statutory interpretation have increasingly taken courts in Australia away from the previous ‘literal’, or so-called ‘objective’ or ‘plain meaning’, approach to interpretation. The notion that a word of the English language has a single, objective and scientific meaning that has only to be discovered has gradually given way to a more candid recognition of the choices that face those who interpret the written law and the way in which values and policy considerations can influence the making of those choices. That realisation presents the third element in contemporary statutory interpretation in Australia. Today, that task requires a combined exercise involving analysis of the text, context and purpose (or policy) of the statute in question.</p>
</blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p>He then goes on to illustrate the nuts and bolts by discussing <em>Carr v Western Australia</em> which split the High Court on the meaning of the word “interview”.</p>


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Question Title: Why are there distinct burdens of proof in civil and criminal cases?

Question Body: <p>In a criminal case, in all common law jurisdictions that I know of, an accusation must be proven to a high level which is commonly stated as being "beyond reasonable doubt", whereas in a civil case the burden of proof of the accusation is typically lower, expressed as something like "preponderance of evidence" or perhaps "more likely than not".</p>

<p>Is there any explanation in the legal literature of what justifies having a distinction in burden of proof?</p>


Answer 1: <p>Because in a civil case you have two equally involved sides. If I claim you damaged my car which cost $10,000 to repair, it's not only that <em>you</em> lose $10,000 if you lose the case, but <em>I</em> lose $10,000 if you win the case. Therefore the burden of proof should be equal in both directions. </p>


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<p>Assume a kid at an expensive boarding school is accused of causing $10,000 damage to the headmaster's car, and instead of suing for damages, the headmaster took the $10,000 out of the kid's school fees and tells the parents that the kid will be thrown out if they don't pay another $10,000. We have the exact same argument, but now the headmaster would be in court and accused. </p>

<p>If the burden of proof was "proven beyond reasonable doubt", in the first case the parents would have to pay if it was proven beyond reasonable doubt that the kid was responsible; in the second case they would only get their money back if it was proven beyond reasonable doubt that the kid was <em>not</em> responsible. </p>


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Answer 2: <p><a href="http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&amp;context=fss_papers" rel="nofollow">James Whitman</a> argues that they are the result of historical developments in the late 18th century which are now applied to a role for which they were not intended.</p>

<p>His thesis is that the "beyond reasonable doubt" standard was originally constructed to protect <em>jurors</em>, not the accused. Specifically, it was protect Christian jurors from eternal damnation for falsely convicting an innocent person, particularly in capital cases. </p>

<p>Theologically, if a juror had doubts, the only way to avoid sin was not to act i.e. to acquit. Indeed John Adams was explicit about this in his (successful) defence during the Boston Massacre trial. The rule was therefore introduced to make it <em>easier</em> for a jury to convict - exactly the opposite of the way it is used today.</p>


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<p>In civil cases, where the accused's life or liberty was not at stake, such a rule was not needed; a juror could have any number of doubts and still go with the more convincing argument without imperilling his (they were always men) immortal soul.</p>

<p>As theological interpretation has changed and a more pragmatic and secular view of the law has arisen over the last 2 and a half centuries, the meaning has changed and is now seen as a way to protect the accused where their life and liberty are at stake in a criminal trial.</p>


Tags: criminal-law, civil-law, burden-of-proof


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Question Title: Is it legal to open parcel delivered to spouse?

Question Body: <p>In marriage, can one party legally open the parcel (such as Amazon delivery) to the spouse? (Assuming it is delivered to a house owned by the couple.)</p>
<p>This <a href="https://www.dbnylaw.com/if-we-are-separated-or-divorced-can-i-open-my-spouses-mail/#:%7E:text=Under%20the%20law%2C%20tampering%20with,spouse%2C%20is%20a%20Federal%20crime." rel="nofollow noreferrer">website</a> seems to say for mail answer is no. But how about parcels/packages?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>It is <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1708" rel="nofollow noreferrer">a crime to remove</a> mail from an authorized mail depository, and an official mail box is (by definition) an authorized mail depository. Not every object used to hold mail is an authorized mail depository. It is also illegal for Amazon etc. to deliver to official mail boxes. Parcels can be delivered by USPS to official mailboxes, bringing such parcels under the purview of 18 USC 1708. Your front porch is not an official mail depository, and it is not a crime to remove a parcel dropped somewhere unofficial on your property. The pertinent distinction is not about &quot;letters vs. packages&quot;, it is &quot;Federal mail of any kind in an official depository&quot;.</p>


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<p>It can easily be the subject of a lawsuit to trespass on the property of another person, in every state of the US. If A trespasses on B's property, B can sue A and recover damages. B would have to prove that the item was their property (A could defend against the claim by proving that it was A's actual property or that it was joint property. The theory that spouses have equal rights to items acquired during a marriage is not completely wrong in certain states, for example Washington, but not Ohio). Of course if it is reasonable to believe that the package contains a dangerous substance then A's decision to inspect the contents could nullify B's claimed outrage over the trespass, and A might even countersue if A is right B attempted to harm A. There are practical legal solutions, rather than the risky enterprise of taking the law into your own hands: you could get a court order requiring B to receive their packages wherever they live.</p>


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<p>You might be able to get away with it if there is a credible threat and end up getting sued, but not if you just have in mind annoying your spouse.</p>


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Question Title: What is the purpose of pardoning powers?

Question Body: <p>Various countries have pardoning powers given to either the president or the governor, this is secured as a constitutional right of the president and governor.<br />
What is the purpose of such powers? Is there a special reason why are they handed to a president or governor?</p>


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Answer 1: <h2>They are the modern legacy of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Royal_prerogative_of_mercy" rel="noreferrer">Royal prerogative of mercy</a></h2>
<p>Or in Commonwealth countries that still have a monarch, it <em>is</em> the Royal prerogative of mercy.</p>
<p>Its modern functional purpose is to provide <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/FlagPost/2012/September/Justice_beyond_law_clemency_and_the_Royal_Prerogative_of_Mercy" rel="noreferrer">justice beyond the law</a>. Its historical purpose was to allow the monarch to commute automatic death sentences in a legal system that did not, at that time, have an appeals process to correct miscarriages of justice, either through mistake or in a system that was not as flexible as it is today.</p>


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<p>It exists as the ultimate backstop against injustice. Ultimately, exercise of the power is a political rather than a judicial one and, as such, any limits on misuse come through the ballot box, not the court.</p>


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Answer 2: <p>The purpose was to place in an individual person, independent from the judiciary, the power and individual agency to provide mercy for outcomes that have resulted in &quot;unfortunate guilt.&quot; See generally, &quot;<a href="https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artII-S2-C1-3-2/ALDE_00013317/#ALDF_00022720" rel="noreferrer">The Constitution Annotated</a>&quot;, and <a href="https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/text-71-80#s-lg-box-wrapper-25493466" rel="noreferrer">Federalist 74</a>.</p>
<p>The US framers did not place the power in an individual simply for the reason that the &quot;King is a single person.&quot; They did not inconsiderately replicate the U.K. approach. There was debate about whether the pardon power would be a step on path back to monarchy. There was debate about whether to include the legislature in the pardon power.</p>
<p>For one rationale for placing the power in an individual, see Federalist 74:</p>
<blockquote>


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<p>For one rationale for placing the power in an individual, see Federalist 74:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>As the sense of responsibility is always strongest, in proportion as it is undivided, it may be inferred that a single man would be most ready to attend to the force of those motives which might plead for a mitigation of the rigor of the law, and least apt to yield to considerations which were calculated to shelter a fit object of its vengeance.</p>
</blockquote>


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Answer 3: <p>Under the rule of law, laws must not be retroactive and they should not be too specific. But sometimes, justice requires <em>not</em> applying the existing law in a specific case. By giving the power of pardon to the executive, and not the legislative or judiciary, there is no suggestion that a pardon creates a new law or judiciary precedent. It stands aside.</p>


Tags: constitutional-law, legal-history, pardon


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Question Title: Giving somebody medicine against their will

Question Body: <p>Consider the case where an adult son is caring for his parent with dementia. The parent is considered legally competent and has been prescribed certain drugs by the parent's doctor.</p>
<p>The patient takes the medicine for a while and then refuses the medicine. Would it be legal for the son to sneak the medicine into the patient's food in violation of the patient's wishes?</p>
<p>Note: I am in the United States</p>


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Answer 1: <p>There are no specific laws tailored to this scenario, but one might derive an answer from more general laws, in particular battery laws. In the US, <a href="https://jaapl.org/content/40/2/239" rel="nofollow noreferrer">it is reported</a> that there are (as of 21012) no court ruling on the practice of covert medication, and no statutes. However, there are general medico-legal doctrines, informed consent
(e.g. Salgo v. Leland Stanford University, Natanson v. Kline etc.) and the right to refuse medication (Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, Sell v. US). However these doctrines are based on doctor-patient relations (would be applicable to medical staff sneaking drugs into a patient's food and drink), and have not been applied to family-member care-givers. There is legal risk when a person has not been adjudicated to be incompetent, since this is technically assault.</p>


Tags: united-states, criminal-law, medical, family-law, new-jersey


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Question Title: If a crime is committed against a poor person , are judges likelier to either interpret the law in a way that favours poor people or punish harshly?

Question Body: <p>Would there be any problems with a judge or a court doing this ? and is there any legal arguments against something like this at a trial ?</p>


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Question Body: <p>Would there be any problems with a judge or a court doing this ? and is there any legal arguments against something like this at a trial ?</p>


Answer 1: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/canada" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-canada-tooltip-container">canada</a></p>
<p>Courts have recognized that it is an aggravating factor when a person's crime has affected a vulnerable population including people whose vulnerability stems from economic disadvantage or dependence.</p>
<p>The <em>Criminal Code</em> <em>requires</em> judges to consider such circumstance. It says the sentencing judge must consider (s. 718.2(a)(1)(iii.1)):</p>
<blockquote>
<p>evidence that the offence had a significant impact on the victim, considering their age and other personal circumstances, including their health <strong>and financial situation</strong></p>
</blockquote>


Tags: india


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Question Title: Does any state force recognition of common law marriage on couples if they do not want it?


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Question Body: <p>I will use Texas as an example, but I'd be interested in any others...</p>
<p>Per this <a href="https://www.findlaw.com/state/texas-law/common-law-marriage-in-texas.html" rel="noreferrer">link</a>, a couple is considered married under common law in Texas if they:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>1.) Agree to be married, 2.) Live together as a couple, and 3.) Tell others (&quot;hold themselves out&quot;) that they are married</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It also states that in order to get out of such a marriage:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>&quot;Common law marriages in Texas have the <strong>same legal status as a ceremonial marriage</strong>.&quot; And &quot;if the common law marriage doesn’t work out, <strong>you’ll have to get a formal divorce to end it</strong>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>However, to get a divorce:</p>
<blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p>However, to get a divorce:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>... <strong>the couple must first prove to the court that they were married</strong>. The person that first files papers with the court has to prove that there was a common law marriage.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Recognizing that if there are children involved, or if one partner contests the divorce, things get messy and need to be sorted out legally.  However, what if <strong>there are no children</strong>, and the couple mutually decide to not follow through with formal wedding plans, and instead agree to simply part ways and pretend that nothing happened?</p>


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<p>There is no paper trail.  No proof that anything ever happened except perhaps jointly signed leases showing that at one point they lived together.  No reason for either to assert a claim over the other for reasons of alimony, custody, or asset disputes.  Neither has any interest or desire in attempting to prove to the state that they were married under common law.  Really their situation is no different from any other co-habitating and/or engaged couple who later split up before completing an intended marriage ceremony.</p>
<p>To title question then, would the state have any interest or legal right to assert that having once met conditions that would allow them to be considered married, that they are in fact still married despite their objections to that legal status and to being characterized as such?  Could both later legally claim to be single and never married?</p>


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<p>Bonus points for addressing how &quot;just kidding&quot; or &quot;I was lying&quot; could be used to counter the issue of &quot;holding out&quot;.  Also bonus points for addressing how taking the 5th might assessed in answering questions around status, particularly in the context of applying for a marriage license later to someone else.</p>


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Answer 1: <blockquote>
<p>would the state have any interest or legal right to assert that having
once met conditions that would allow them to be considered married,
that they are in fact still married despite their objections to that
legal status and to being characterized as such? Could both later
legally claim to be single and never married?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Yes. For example, the state could prosecute someone for bigamy if there was a common law marriage that was not dissolved and someone remarried. There are all sorts of other circumstances (e.g. paternity, government benefit eligibility, taxation) where the government might want to prove that you have a common law marriage as well.</p>


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<p>It is certainly possible to ignore the law and not get caught. But, generally, the agreement of the parties requirement for common law marriage means it doesn't happen very often. And, usually, at least one person in a married couple has an economic incentive to not ignore the existence of a marriage even if the couple had no children.</p>
<p>Even if they don't have much in the way of assets at the time they separate, twenty years later there might be considerable assets acquired by the parties during marriage and a presumption of substantial alimony and inheritance rights. So someone who was O.K. with &quot;forgetting it&quot; when they were 23 might change their mind when they are 43 or when you are dead and a probate case is pending. There is no statute of limitations to establish the existence of a common law marriage.</p>
<p>In short, ignoring the existence of a common law marriage is high risk and low reward.</p>


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<p>In short, ignoring the existence of a common law marriage is high risk and low reward.</p>
<p>If there is ambiguity, one quick and dirty process as opposed to filing an action for annulment, is to file an action for divorce, apprise the court of the circumstances, and have it authoritatively dismiss the divorce case on the merits by ruling that the parties aren't married</p>
<p>I've done that for a client once, in the face of fairly strong evidence that they were married, when the parties to the divorce case both told the court under oath that they never believed themselves to be married to each other at any time.</p>


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<p>One countervailing force is that issuance of a marriage license to someone creates a rebuttable presumption that they were not married at the time it was issued. This can be overcome with a showing of the existence of a common law marriage, but it makes the &quot;proving a negative&quot; of non-marriage easier, especially in cases when the parties are now dead and this is necessary to know for paternity or inheritance purposes.</p>
<p>Finding proof of even a marriage license marriage (or a divorce) can be difficult as lots and lots of jurisdictions can get you married or divorced (not all in the U.S.A.), but there isn't a national comprehensive index of marriages in the United States.</p>
<p>For what it is worth, France solves this problem by requiring copies of marriage certificates, divorce decrees, and death certificates to be filed where someone was born, but common law countries never had a comparable low tech system to solve the indexing problem.</p>
<blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p>Also bonus points for addressing how taking the 5th might assessed in
answering questions around status, particularly in the context of
applying for a marriage license later to someone else.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>There is nothing special about it.</p>
<p>You can refuse to testify about possible prior common law marriages if you subsequently have a marriage certificate issued. Keep in mind that you can only plead the 5th without consequences in a criminal case. In a civil matter, you can plead the 5th but this usually results in an adverse inference for purposes of the civil case that you committed the crime implicated by your refusal to testify on that ground.</p>


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Answer 2: <h2>There is no common-law marriage in <a href="/questions/tagged/australia" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-australia-tooltip-container">australia</a></h2>
<p>Marriage in Australia is a creature of statute and a Federal power (first exercised in 1961]. Marriage begins with the ceremony and ends with death or divorce.</p>
<h2>De facto relationships are recognised in the Family Law Act</h2>
<p>The criteria for being in a de facto relationship are spelled out in <a href="http://www5.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/fla1975114/s4aa.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">s4AA</a>:</p>
<ul>
<li>Not married</li>
<li>Not related</li>
<li>“having regard to all the circumstances of their relationship, they have a relationship as a couple living together on a genuine domestic basis”</li>
</ul>


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<li>Not related</li>
<li>“having regard to all the circumstances of their relationship, they have a relationship as a couple living together on a genuine domestic basis”</li>
</ul>
<p>A de facto relationship does not have the same <a href="https://www.mondaq.com/australia/family-law/844274/is-a-de-facto-relationship-the-same-as-a-marriage" rel="nofollow noreferrer">rights</a> as a marriage:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>When de facto couples decide to separate, an application can be made to the Family Court and Federal Circuit Court, in the same way as married couples, to resolve any financial matters, property divisions and custody disputes.</p>
<p>However, people in a de facto relationship must satisfy the court that the relationship was genuine, and then meet one of the following four criteria:</p>
<ul>
<li>the relationship must have lasted for at least two years</li>
<li>there is a child in the relationship</li>
<li>the relationship is registered under a prescribed law</li>


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<ul>
<li>the relationship must have lasted for at least two years</li>
<li>there is a child in the relationship</li>
<li>the relationship is registered under a prescribed law</li>
<li>one party has contributed substantially to the relationship and, if an order was not made, there would be a grave injustice</li>
</ul>
<p>De facto couples must also apply for court orders within two years of the relationship ending. Outside this time, a person will need to prove hardship for the case to be heard. In contrast, married couples have no such time limit. While they must apply for a property settlement within 12 months of divorce, this can be extended with consent.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Whether you are in a de facto relationship or not is a matter of objective fact, not the subjective opinion of the people in it. However, the issue only comes up when at least one of the parties makes an application to the court.</p>


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<p>It is also worth noting that a person can only be in one marriage at a time but several de facto relationships.</p>
<h2>Other laws may have different definitions</h2>
<p>The way other laws treat marriages and de facto relationships is a matter for those laws. Some treat them the same, some treat them differently.</p>


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Answer 3: <p>A common law marriage can exist in Montana, <a href="https://dphhs.mt.gov/assets/hcsd/fmamanual/FMA308-2July012016.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">given certain conditions</a>. A couple could jointly seek legal recognition of the marriage for some reason, and there is a court form to be signed and notarized which constitutes proof of the marriage. The courts can also recognize a common law marriage if only one of the parties petitions and prevails in court, provided they provide sufficient proof of such a marriage. <a href="https://cases.justia.com/montana/supreme-court/1988-05-24-56673B43-487B-4716-962A-FCB709482109.pdf?ts=1396129415" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Geertz v. Geertz</a> in an example where a spouse failed to prove the (disputed) existence of a common law marriage. In this hypothetical case, both parties appear to agree in not purporting a common law marriage (&quot;if <strong>they</strong> do not want it&quot;, rather than &quot;if one of them does not want


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In this hypothetical case, both parties appear to agree in not purporting a common law marriage (&quot;if <strong>they</strong> do not want it&quot;, rather than &quot;if one of them does not want it&quot;).</p>


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<p>The presumption of common law marriage is a disputable presumption under <a href="https://leg.mt.gov/bills/mca/title_0260/chapter_0010/part_0060/section_0020/0260-0010-0060-0020.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">26-1-602(30) MCA</a>. Suppose a couple decided to split up without a formal divorce, one or both of them then married, and the county prosecutor wants to <a href="https://leg.mt.gov/bills/mca/title_0450/chapter_0050/part_0060/section_0110/0450-0050-0060-0110.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">prosecute that person for bigamy</a>. The state must prove that the accused is married to another and that he/she does not reasonably believe themselves to be legally eligible to remarry, noting that <a href="https://leg.mt.gov/bills/mca/title_0260/chapter_0010/part_0040/section_0030/0260-0010-0040-0030.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">under Montana law</a>, in criminal cases guilt must be established beyond reasonable doubt. The question asserts that</p>
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<blockquote>
<p>There is no paper trail. No proof that anything ever happened except
perhaps jointly signed leases showing that at one point they lived
together. No reason for either to assert a claim over the other for
reasons of alimony, custody, or asset disputes.</p>
</blockquote>


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<p>which means for example that they did <em>not</em> file the affidavit proving a common law marriage, they each filed taxes singly, they never filed paperwork purporting that the other was their spouse. However there were some instances where one or the other indicates in conversations that the other was &quot;their spouse&quot; – as in Geerts v. Geertz. In that case, there was a bit of evidence supporting the claim for marriage, but not enough even for a civil case. Under the assumptions of the question, there would not be sufficient proof that a common law marriage exists to obtain a criminal conviction. A debtor might have in mind going after one of the two for a debt, but &quot;A husband or wife, solely on the basis of being a spouse, is not answerable for the acts of the other spouse or liable for the debts contracted by the other spouse&quot;  except for &quot;the expenses for necessities of the family&quot;. Supposing that there is a debt for family necessities, the debtor


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or liable for the debts contracted by the other spouse&quot;  except for &quot;the expenses for necessities of the family&quot;. Supposing that there is a debt for family necessities, the debtor would have to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there exists a marriage. The court, as an arm of the state, could then possibly find that a marriage exists for the purpose of collecting on that debt.</p>


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Answer 4: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/british-columbia" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;british-columbia&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;british-columbia&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-british-columbia-tooltip-container">british-columbia</a></p>
<p>Child support by application of the child is a circumstance in which a person other than the couple would have a legal interest in having a spousal relationship recognized. The state would also have an interest via court order and the family maintenance enforcement program.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.bclaws.gov.bc.ca/civix/document/id/complete/statreg/00_11025_00_multi" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Family Law Act</a> establishes that &quot;Each parent and guardian of a child has a duty to provide support for the child&quot; (s. 147). An application for child support may be made by the child (s. 149(2)(b)).</p>


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<p>Whether a person is a &quot;spouse&quot; is relevant for the establishment of presumptions of parentage or status as stepparent (both relevant for establishing entitlement to child support). This is not the &quot;state&quot; (in the sense of executive government) imposing the recognition of the relationship, but the relationship would be recognized by the court order granting child support.</p>


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<p>No other obligations related to spousal status under the Family Law Act are forced upon parties when they are not in dispute. The default is that they will become spouses after having lived with each other in a marriage-like relationship continuously for at least two years, but if no dispute ever arises, and the parties are in agreement as to their assets etc., then the state and court will not be involved. Of course, one cannot predict whether there will be a dispute or not, so this paragraph should not be taken to suggest that a couple need not formalize any agreements they have regarding property division, spousal support, etc.</p>
<p><a href="/questions/tagged/canada" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-canada-tooltip-container">canada</a></p>


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<p>For income tax purposes, parties become spouses when they have been living together in a conjugal relationship for twelve months (see the <a href="https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/i-3.3/FullText.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>Income Tax Act</em></a>, s. 248(1)). One cannot opt out of this status and one must declare it accurately to Revenue Canada. See e.g. <em>Molnar v. The Queen</em>, <a href="https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/tcc/doc/2006/2006tcc58/2006tcc58.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">2006 TCC 58</a>.</p>


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Question Title: Can a signature be valid without a name datum associated with it?

Question Body: <p>I noticed that my signature got less readable over time, but improved in unique characteristics which is a positive development in my opinion, since I never see a form without a field for first and last name and it's thus not necessary to identify me based on the signature which in the same time gets more unforgeable. It's definitely practical to have name fields on a form, but I was wondering whether there's a legal rule (probably a very general one) which requires a signature to be collected together with name data only in order to be valid (meaning to have the effect you intuitively expect after signing a contract or form).</p>

<p>Maybe there's a difference between contracts and forms.</p>

<p>I doubt that the law in Germany and the EU hasn't converged, yet, so I'm interested in the rules for the latter or both if there's a difference.</p>


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<p>I doubt that the law in Germany and the EU hasn't converged, yet, so I'm interested in the rules for the latter or both if there's a difference.</p>

<p>The question arose out of curiosity and to be able to be a smart-ass if someone ever annoys me because of the unreadability of the signature.</p>


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Answer 1: <p>No, in <a href="/questions/tagged/germany" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-germany-tooltip-container">germany</a> there is <strong>no universal requirement as to form</strong> (<em>Formfreiheit</em>).
This includes associating a signature with a name in block letters.
<em>In principle</em> you can enforce a contract in court even if the written contract does not identify the contracting parties by spelled out name, but by signature only.
It stands to reason there is no benefit in omitting the full names.</p>
<p>The legislature implemented elevated form requirements for <em>certain</em> legal transactions by mandating the use of a notary.
Here, again, there is no requirement as to put a plain text name next to your signature.
The link between signature and person is established via <em>the notary’s</em> documentation.


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Here, again, there is no requirement as to put a plain text name next to your signature.
The link between signature and person is established via <em>the notary’s</em> documentation.
You could put an alias “Donald Duck” next to your signature, the <em>notarial deed</em> will indicate that in fact Kalle Richter signed the document.</p>
<hr />
<p>As far as I am aware all <a href="/questions/tagged/european-union" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;european-union&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;european-union&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-european-union-tooltip-container">european-union</a> legal transactions will need to go through their official channels.
It is simply not possible, for example, to establish a European Economic Interest Grouping on a scrap of paper.
Thus there is no issue and in turn no regulation.</p>


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It is simply not possible, for example, to establish a European Economic Interest Grouping on a scrap of paper.
Thus there is no issue and in turn no regulation.</p>
<p>One thing is for sure, the <a href="/questions/tagged/european-union" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;european-union&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;european-union&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-european-union-tooltip-container">european-union</a> does <em>not impose</em> a “minimum framework” on its member states.
I recollect there are <em>some</em> directives regarding <em>electronic</em> signatures, but that is a different story now.</p>


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Answer 2: <h3>Historical Use Of Seals And Personal Marks</h3>
<p>Not precisely on point, but it is common in East Asia and Southeast Asia, and was historically common in common law and civil law countries, for legal entities, such as corporations to ratify contracts with an official seal sometimes called a &quot;chop.&quot;</p>
<p>In those contexts, possession of the seal creates a strong presumption of authority to agree on behalf of the entity and it is not necessary to know who actually used the seal to affix the seal to prove the validity of an entity's assent to the contract. Basically, in the language of common law lawyers, possession of a corporate seal conveys apparent authority to use that seal in the absence of obvious circumstances to the contrary (e.g. the other party know the officers of the entity personally and knows that the person using the seal is an imposter).</p>


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<p>These days, in common law countries and non-Asian civil law countries, the more common practice is to have an entity assent to a contract with the name of the entity followed by the word &quot;by&quot; and then a signature of an individual corporate officer or agent whose identity and title is expressly stated in the signature block and who signs their own name as the authorizing agent rather than the name of the entity.</p>
<p>In circumstances where a signatory to the contract is not sufficiently literate to sign their own name, the historical norm in common law countries was for that person to affix an &quot;X&quot; on a signature line where the person's name was printed.</p>
<p>In East Asia and Southeast Asia, people who were illiterate in this way but not impoverished (and many literate middle class and upper middle class people as well) would have a signature seal similar to a corporate seal but to sign on behalf of an individual natural person.</p>


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<p>In both the &quot;X&quot; case and in the individual &quot;chop&quot; case, sometimes, if there was concern that there might be a dispute over the identity of the person who agreed to the contract, the person agreeing would sometimes also ink their finger or impress their finger in wax to leave a finger print as well on the document.</p>
<p>For what it is worth, the institution of a name seal or corporate seal to agree to contracts and identify someone with a document precedes the idea of a signature by many centuries. Seals were used in the Neolithic (i.e. stone age farmer) Balkan Vinca culture, in the Indus Valley Civilization prior to ca. 2000 BCE, in East Asia and Southeast Asia, and in Sumerian, Hittite and Egyptian cultures in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East long before signatures or full purpose written languages were invented.</p>


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<p>Written languages emerged from the earlier practice of identifying things associated with a person with seals. Seals continued to be predominant in the time period when only a tiny percentage of the population, mostly literate clerks, priests, and nobles, were literate in the newly invented written languages, but the masses of ordinary and even reasonably well off people were illiterate and dictated correspondence to scribes. Signatures only really caught on in cultures where an ability to read and write was nearly universal.</p>
<h3>Sometimes the identity of a signer doesn't matter</h3>
<p>It is also worth noting that there are a fair number of circumstances in which the identity of the person signing isn't very important but a signature is.</p>


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<p>It is also worth noting that there are a fair number of circumstances in which the identity of the person signing isn't very important but a signature is.</p>
<p>For example, in the case of a negotiable instrument like a check, one way to transfer ownership of the instrument is to sign the back. Knowing who signs the initial time is important as it should match the payee of the instrument. But if a check is negotiated to multiple people in sequence the identity of the intermediate and even the final endorser (i.e. person signing the back) of the negotiable instrument doesn't really matter much. Rights attach to the &quot;holder&quot; of the negotiable instrument (i.e., the person in possession of that physical piece of paper) and whether the holder did or did not endorse it (i.e. did or did not sign the back of it) often doesn't matter.</p>


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<p>Likewise, if someone is in charge of managing a storeroom, the fact that someone signed a receipt to pick up something that was kept in the storeroom matters more for most purposes than who actually signed it, and there is a rebuttable presumption that the person who signed for it had the authority to do so, even if the identity of that person can't be determined.</p>


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<p>A more modern example involves click based assent to the terms of service of a website or online service that authorizes the online service provider to do something that can only be done with consent or requires an acknowledgment from the user (e.g. authorization to shut down an account for non-payment that is payed with a gift card, or acknowledgement that a user is located in a country where certain regulations don't apply). In those circumstances, the online service provider is protected by the existence of a record of the checkoff agreeing to the terms or acknowledging something and the online service provides has no reason to have to actually identify the online user who agreed in the real world.</p>


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Answer 3: <p>This answer is a logical analysis in the context of common-law jurisdictions where a signature is any mark that a person makes (a reminder of the time in which rates of illiteracy were high).  I don't know to what extent this would be applicable in Germany (but the existence of common-law jurisdictions in the EU is one reason for the lack of union legislation on such matters).</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Can a signature be valid without a name datum associated with it?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Yes, but if it isn't possible to identify the signatory (by any means) then it doesn't matter.  The point of a signature is to establish a connection between a person and a document.  If the person can't be identified by any means then it is not possible to establish that connection.  But if you can identify a person with a signature, even without knowing the person's name, then the signature is valid and the connection is established.</p>


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<p>Suppose the document is a contract signed illegibly by Alice, who is not identifiable by the signature nor by any other part of the document itself.  If Bob, the other party to the contract, wishes to enforce the contract against Alice, then Alice is identifiable through Bob's knowledge that the signature is Alice's.  (Alice can dispute Bob's claim to that effect, but in this hypothetical it is assumed that the signature is Alice's, so such a counterclaim would be fraudulent or, in some contexts, perjurious.)</p>
<p>Suppose Alice wishes to enforce the contract against Bob.  In that case, Alice claims the signature is hers, and Bob may accept or dispute this claim.  If he disputes it, then the finder of fact will decide whether the signature is Alice's based on whatever evidence Alice and Bob present in support of their respective claims.</p>


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<p>Suppose Bob finds the contract in his files and cannot remember who signed it.  In that case, it does not matter whether the signature is valid because Bob does not know who the other party to the contract is and therefore cannot enforce the contract.</p>
<p>It's difficult to imagine plausible circumstances in which it would be possible to identify someone as the signatory of a document without knowing the person's name, but if it <em>is</em> possible then there's no reason for the failure to include the name on the document to invalidate the signature.</p>


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Answer 4: <p><strong>Yes</strong> in <a href="/questions/tagged/france" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;france&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;france&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-france-tooltip-container">france</a>.</p>
<p>The case in point is <a href="https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/juri/id/JURITEXT000007030049/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Cass. 1e civ. 27-1-1993 n° 91-12.115</a>. A court of appeals reasoned that without the common phrasing &quot;lu et approuvé&quot; (&quot;read and approved&quot;), one party might not be engaged by the contract they signed. The higher court reversed:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Attendu qu'il résulte de [l'article 1322 du Code Civil] qu'en dehors des exceptions prévues par la loi, l'acte sous seing privé n'est soumis à aucune autre condition de forme que la signature de ceux qui s'obligent ;</p>


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<p>Attendu que pour &quot;mettre en doute&quot;, au vu de la lettre précitée, la réalité de l'engagement de la société Erisa, l'arrêt retient que seule l'inscription usuelle &quot; lu et approuvé &quot; peut signifier sans équivoque l'approbation du signataire ;</p>
<p>Attendu qu'en se déterminant par un tel motif, alors que la mention &quot; lu et approuvé &quot; inscrite au bas d'un écrit sous seing privé constitue une formalité dépourvue de toute portée, la cour d'appel a violé le texte susvisé ;</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>From [article 1322 du Code Civil], the only formal obligation for &quot;acts under private seal&quot; is the signature of the parties, save for statutory exceptions in some cases.</p>
<p>Considering the abovementioned letter, the court of appeal’s verdict &quot;put into question&quot; [one of the parties’] commitment because only the usual wording &quot;read and approved&quot; would unequivocally signify that commitment.</p>


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<p>Such a mention is of pure form and has no legal effect, and as such the court of appeals violated the abovementioned statute.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>That reasoning can apply equally to a lack of name, date, or other formal elements. A signature is necessary, but it need not be legible.</p>
<p>The relevant statutes are <a href="https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/section_lc/LEGITEXT000006070721/LEGISCTA000006165773/#LEGISCTA000006165773" rel="nofollow noreferrer">articles 1322 through 1325 of the Code Civil</a>. They also give the one limitation for contracts to be valid: there must be one copy for each party.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>L'acte sous seing privé, reconnu par celui auquel on l'oppose, ou légalement tenu pour reconnu, a, entre ceux qui l'ont souscrit et entre leurs héritiers et ayants cause, la même foi que l'acte authentique.</p>


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<p>Celui auquel on oppose un acte sous seing privé est obligé d'avouer ou de désavouer formellement son écriture ou sa signature. Ses héritiers ou ayants cause peuvent se contenter de déclarer qu'ils ne connaissent point l'écriture ou la signature de leur auteur.</p>
<p>Dans le cas où la partie désavoue son écriture ou sa signature, et dans le cas où ses héritiers ou ayants cause déclarent ne les point connaître, la vérification en est ordonnée en justice.</p>
<p>Les actes sous seing privé qui contiennent des conventions synallagmatiques, ne sont valables qu'autant qu'ils ont été faits en autant d'originaux qu'il y a de parties ayant un intérêt distinct. (...) Chaque original doit contenir la mention du nombre des originaux qui en ont été faits. (...)</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>An act under private seal <em>[= anything not notarized, i.e. 99.9% of contracts]</em>, recognized by the one against whom it is used, or held legally as valid, has between the signatories or between their heirs, the same validity as a notarized act.</p>
<p>The one against whom an act under private seal is raised must formally accept or deny their signing of the act. Heirs may declare ignorance of who signed.</p>
<p>If a party denies signing the act, or in case heirs declare ignorance, the court must determine the signature’s validity.</p>


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<p>If a party denies signing the act, or in case heirs declare ignorance, the court must determine the signature’s validity.</p>
<p>Acts under private seal with reciprocal considerations are only valid if as many original copies are made as there are interested parties. (...) Each original copy must bear the mention of how many such copies were made. (...) <em>[In <a href="/questions/tagged/civil-legal-system" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;civil-legal-system&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;civil-legal-system&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-civil-legal-system-tooltip-container">civil-legal-system</a>, a unilateral promise is enforceable - but then, only one copy is needed, the one for whoever receives the promise.]</em></p>
</blockquote>


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Question Body: <p>A detective was subpoenaed to testify. He did not show up.</p>
<p>His absence was objected to, and the State's Attorney said she would have to look into it.</p>
<p>The detective was asked about his absence when a subpoena for the next court date was served, and he said the State's Attorney told him he did not have to testify that day.</p>
<p>A Motion to Disqualify the Prosecuting Attorney was filed and listed that she told the court she would have to look into why the detective was not there, and he said she told him he was not needed. At the hearing for the motion, she said she met the detective in the hallway and told him he was not needed to testify as there were no motions set for that day, and that she had not been given a copy of the motion.</p>
<p>Saying she has to look into it, when she actually told him he was not needed, is not honest. Is there any case law regarding a State's Attorney telling someone who is subpoenaed that he is not needed that day?</p>


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Answer 1: <h2>Not remembering something correctly is not lying</h2>
<p>To lie, you have to know the statement is false at the time you make it.</p>
<p>As a State’s Attorney she no doubt deals with multiple cases and a plethora of detectives. Not remembering in the moment what you said to one detective is not malfeasance, it’s just human. Telling the court you don’t know and will find out and then finding out is good practice. It’s possible that the attorney didn’t remember the conversation until she spoke to the detective again. It’s possible she still doesn’t remember the conversation and is just taking the detective at his word.</p>
<p>It is often useful to remember <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hanlon%27s_razor" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Hanlon’s Razor</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Never attribute to malice that which is adequately explained by stupidity.</p>
</blockquote>


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Question Title: Is drug information copyright protected. Example: drug brand name, side effects etc. Is licensing actually required for commercial use?

Question Body: <p>Follow up from:</p>
<p><a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/questions/16579/can-information-about-a-drug-trade-name-interactions-etc-be-copyright-pro">Can information about a drug - trade name, interactions, etc. - be copyright protected?</a></p>
<p>Numerous drug databases indicate that the information they provide about drugs is free for educational use.</p>
<p>I am building a website that may use snippets of information, for instance, interactions of a drug or what a drug is used for. This won't be a copy and paste of what the drug databases provide.</p>
<p>Any advice on whether this would infringe copyright? Is drug information opensource information? Do I need to 'cite the source'? If so, numerous databases have the same information, who do i Cite</p>


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Answer 1: <p>Your first sentence already says that these databases don't consider their information &quot;open source&quot;. You may consider it open source, but that will only get you into court.</p>
<p>Are you using the data for educational or for commercial use? Extracting bits that you are interested in from <em>all</em> database entries and using them to build an application points very strongly to commercial use. Again, you may disagree, but that will only get you into court.</p>
<p>You can collect the information you want from the original sources. That's 1,000 times more work, but much more likely to be legal. On the other hand, that's what these people creating the databases have done, and that's how they make their living. So do you expect the law to help you destroying their livelihood?</p>


Tags: copyright, health, drugs


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Question Body: <p>I'm thinking of doing a project where I pay onlyfans creators/cam performers for custom voice/video recordings.  In this case I don't actually want the content to be sexual in nature - not that it matters to the question - but I'd like to be able to curate/edit this collection of recordings and present it publicly as an art project (probably just online).  I would not try to sell or otherwise profit from this, but I would like to present this as my own work.</p>
<p>My question is, if I directly purchase this custom content, am I allowed to re-distribute it like this?  My understanding is that in general this is not allowed with content posted on Onlyfans, but directly purchasing custom content from the performer strikes me as different.</p>
<p>Are the rules different if a third party like Onlyfans is not involved?  E.g. if I have the number of a content creator that I follow and directly arrange this transaction with her over sms.</p>


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<p>Are the rules different if a third party like Onlyfans is not involved?  E.g. if I have the number of a content creator that I follow and directly arrange this transaction with her over sms.</p>
<p>In all cases I would explain what I'm doing and the performer would agree to participate, but I'm wondering how formally I would need to acquire permission to use the content how I want to.</p>


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Answer 1: <blockquote>
<p>if I directly <strong>purchase</strong> this custom content...</p>
</blockquote>
<p>As a general rule, &quot;intellectual property&quot; is very different from tangible property - arguably, &quot;intellectual property&quot; is a misnomer. Trying to apply concepts from property law (such as &quot;a thing has a single owner, who can do anything not illegal with it as they please&quot;) is fraught with danger.</p>
<p>You would generally not &quot;purchase content&quot;, but rather purchase a <strong>license</strong> for the content, allowing you to do various things. One of those things might be to &quot;curate/edit this collection of recordings and present it publicly as an art project (probably just online)&quot;. Another might be to &quot;to sell or otherwise profit from this&quot;. All that depends on what your contract says.</p>


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<p>In an ideal world(?), contracts would all be detailed enough to leave no uncertainty about what is allowed and what is not. In the real world, a bunch of SMS can form a contract. For instance, the following is a contract:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>A (version 1): Hey B, could you send me a clip of you waving at the camera? I will pay $10 for it.</p>
<p>B: sure</p>
</blockquote>
<p>...but it’s not clear what A and B agreed as to what the clip would be used for. Saving and viewing on A’s device, probably yes; putting it in fullscreen in the next blockbuster movie, probably no. Showing it to A’s friends, putting it in an art project? That’s getting dicey.</p>


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<p>You might have heard about &quot;work for hire&quot; granting full copyright control to whoever pays for the work to be created. In the <a href="/questions/tagged/united-states" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-united-states-tooltip-container">united-states</a>, the above exchange does <strong>not</strong> explicitly designate the content as work-for-hire, as would be required by <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/17/101" rel="nofollow noreferrer">17 U.S.C. § 101</a> (&quot;...if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire&quot;).</p>
<p>Here’s a better SMS contract:</p>
<blockquote>


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<p>Here’s a better SMS contract:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>A (version 2): Hey B, could you send me a clip of you waving at the camera? I will use it to make an art project, collating many such clips, and publishing that on the internet. I will pay $10 for it.</p>
<p>B: sure</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Here there’s no question that B agreed with the proposed use. On the other hand, it’s likely than a <em>different</em> use would be deemed a copyright violation - the contract was proposed by A and should be understood as limiting A’s right to use the clip to exactly what they said they would do. If they wanted it to say something else, they could have sent a different SMS (see <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contra_proferentem" rel="nofollow noreferrer">contra proferentem</a>).</p>


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Question Title: What does this &quot;Forfeiture of the right of withdrawal&quot; section mean in a Terms of Service agreement?


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Question Body: <p>My client has asked me to sign up for toggl.com so they can do their taxes. However, I saw this alarming section in the Terms of Service and am now unsure as to whether it is a good idea to sign up:</p>
<blockquote>
<ol start="4">
<li>Forfeiture of the right of withdrawal</li>
</ol>
<p>4.1 The User hereby requests that the Supplier's performance of the Agreement commence immediately and that the benefits to which the User is entitled hereunder, including, where applicable, the Features authorised under his Service Plan(s), be made available to him immediately. The User acknowledges and agrees that by making the above requests he loses the right (if any) to withdraw from the Agreement and, where applicable, the right to withdraw from the Service Plan(s) in question.</p>


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<p>The User further requests that the Features to be authorised under any future Service Plan he may obtain be made available to him immediately upon the Service Plan's commencement. The User acknowledges and agrees that by requesting this (and the respective Features becoming available to him) he loses the right, if any, to withdraw from the Service Plan.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It sounds like they are saying that if I sign up for the service then I am agreeing to never end it. However, there is also a section about Termination that apparently says I can end it:</p>
<blockquote>
<ol start="19">
<li>Termination
19.1. In this article, the term &quot;Agreement&quot; means the Agreement referenced in subsection 2.1(a) and words such as &quot;herein&quot;, &quot;hereto&quot;, &quot;hereof&quot; and &quot;hereunder&quot; refer to that Agreement, unless otherwise specified.</li>
</ol>


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</ol>
<p>19.2. The Agreement between the Supplier and a Customer can only be terminated by closing the Customer's User Account. For the avoidance of doubt, where the Customer has more than one User Account, closing an account will only terminate the Agreement pertaining to that account.</p>
<p>19.3. The Agreement between the Supplier and a User other than a Customer can be terminated by notice to the other Party or, if giving notice to the User is impracticable or would result in unreasonable delay or expense, then by the Supplier's ceasing all activities hereunder, except those which are necessary for providing the Service to another User, the protection or enforcement of the Supplier's or other parties' rights, freedoms or legitimate interests, the exercise of the Supplier's statutory rights or freedoms, or to comply with a legal obligation.</p>


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<p>19.4. To close his User Account, the Customer must log in to the account, choose &quot;close account&quot; under &quot;profile settings&quot; and confirm that he wishes the account to be closed. However, it should be appreciated that Features (including the appearance, titles and location of menus, tabs, fields, buttons, icons and other objects displayed on the Service) are subject to change, meaning that the steps required of the Customer to close his User Account may vary from time to time. The Supplier will endeavour to keep this procedure as straightforward as possible and will update the Documentation if any changes are made thereto. If the Customer has difficulties closing his User Account, he should contact the Supplier and follow its instructions.</p>


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<p>19.5. Either Party may close the Customer's User Account and shall by so doing be deemed to have terminated the Agreement (which, in the civil law context, means 'cancellation', not 'withdrawal'), effective upon the closure of the account, provided that: (a) if the User Account is closed by the Supplier, the Customer must be given at least a month's notice thereof (unless section 19.6 or 20.5 applies or the User Account is closed at the Customer's request); and (b) where the User Account is closed by a Party entitled to withdraw from the Agreement, such Party has failed to notify the other that by closing the User Account he is exercising his right to withdraw (which notice must be served prior to or concurrently with closing the User Account and shall result in the Agreement being deemed to have been terminated by withdrawal).</p>


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<p>19.6. Upon a Party's material breach of Agreement the other Party may terminate the Agreement forthwith. Without prejudice to any statutory provision as to what constitutes a material breach, such a breach hereof shall be deemed to have occurred if a Party, having breached any of his principal obligations hereunder or under the Agreement referenced in subsection 2.1(b), fails to discontinue or remedy such breach within 14 days (or, where exceptional circumstances render this period unreasonably short, such longer time as reasonably required) after notice from the other Party specifying the breach and requiring it to be discontinued or remedied.</p>


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<p>19.7. Any termination hereof will terminate all Agreements that the User may have under subsection 2.1(b), except that, if the User is a Customer with more than one User Account, the termination will not affect his Agreements under subsection 2.1(b) in relation to Service Plans whose benefits he is entitled to enjoy by reason of a User Account other than the one being closed.</p>
<p>19.8. The termination of a Service Plan terminates the related Agreement under subsection 2.1(b).</p>
<p>19.9. The Agreement under subsection 2.1(c) will only terminate as described in subsection 2.3(c) (with automatic re-establishment of contract) or upon the relevant Organization being closed, and is incapable of being terminated otherwise. Instructions on how to close an Organization are provided in the Documentation.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>With this context, what is the plain English meaning of the Forfeiture of the right to withdrawal section?</p>


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Answer 1: <p><a href="https://toggl.com/track/legal/terms/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Section 20 - Consumer withdrawal</a> has more information.</p>
<p>The '<a href="https://www.ionos.co.uk/digitalguide/online-marketing/online-sales/right-of-withdrawal/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">right to withdraw</a>' refers to a consumers ability to ask for their money to be returned, for say faulty goods, and there is usually a time limit.</p>
<p>The toggl clause 4 states that if the customer requests that the features of a product are <em>activated immediately</em>, then the right to withdraw is forfeited, as the customer has already received the benefits from the product.</p>


Tags: terms-of-service


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Question Title: Is physical contact without motion to the person not covered under Indian penal code 349 ? (plain reading)


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Question Body: <p>From a plain meaning perspective would it be considered covered?</p>
<p><a href="https://www.indiacode.nic.in/show-data?actid=AC_CEN_5_23_00037_186045_1523266765688&amp;sectionId=46116&amp;sectionno=349&amp;orderno=389" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Section 349</a> Indian Penal Code (IPC) states the following</p>
<blockquote>
<p>A person is said to use force to another if he causes motion, change of motion, or cessation of motion to that other, or if he causes to any substance such motion, or change of motion, or cessation of motion as brings that substance into contact with any part of that other’s body, or with anything which that other is wearing or carrying, or with anything so situated that such contact affects that other’s sense of feeling;</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>Provided that the person causing the motion, or change of motion, or cessation of motion, causes that motion, change of motion, or cessation of motion in one of the three ways hereinafter described:</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>By his own bodily power.</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>By disposing any substance in such a manner that the motion or change or cessation of motion takes place without any further act on his part, or on the part of any other person.</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>By inducing any animal to move, to change its motion, or to cease to move.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Would bodily skin to skin contact not be covered under this? For example poking someone (i.e you are in a class and some other student sitting behind you pushes his finger into your skin even though it doesn't cause hurt but does cause annoyance).</p>


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Answer 1: <p>Possibly, but it would be fact specific e.g. if the person being poked turns around or otherwise reacts with movement because:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>A person is said to use force to another if he causes motion ...to that other [person]</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Ultimately it would be for a court to decide, but are you aware of <a href="https://www.indiacode.nic.in/show-data?actid=AC_CEN_5_23_00037_186045_1523266765688&amp;sectionId=45829&amp;sectionno=95&amp;orderno=99" rel="nofollow noreferrer">section 95</a> IPC?</p>
<blockquote>
<p><strong>Act causing slight harm.</strong></p>
<p>Nothing is an offence by reason that it causes, or that it is intended to cause, or that it is known to be likely to cause, any harm, if that harm is so slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of such harm.</p>
</blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p>This is related to the principle of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_minimis" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>de minimis non curat lex</em></a></p>


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Question Body: <p>I am currently a doctoral student in the medical sciences taking a health law course. We aren't provided many directions on researching the law, and I frequently need to cite/reference federal statutes, codes, and regulations (not state). So far, in my research, I've found (and been using) only the following:</p>
<ul>
<li><a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Cornell Law (LII): US Code</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.ecfr.gov/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">eCFR.gov</a></li>
</ul>
<p>I like eCFR.gov and how it is laid out. However, sometimes it is difficult to search for specific things (such as looking for an official definition of something). I wanted to know if anyone had any additional resources to use when researching and reviewing the law.</p>
<p>I was hoping someone knew of any resources that mirror some of my favorite citation/reference searches. This includes:</p>
<ul>


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<p>I was hoping someone knew of any resources that mirror some of my favorite citation/reference searches. This includes:</p>
<ul>
<li><a href="https://app.dimensions.ai/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Dimensions</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.lens.org/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Lens</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.wizdom.ai/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Wizdom.ai</a></li>
<li><a href="https://dmsc.guru/deepdyve" rel="nofollow noreferrer">DeepDyve</a></li>
<li><a href="https://dmsc.guru/semanticscholar" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Semantic Scholar</a></li>
</ul>
<p>If not, I'm still interested in understanding how you may research the law, so I can build better ways to personally do it.</p>


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Answer 1: <p>There is no right or wrong answer. You have named the two main repositories for federal &quot;legal text&quot;, then for your state (for each and every state) you have to find the corresponding resources. In Washington state that is the Revised Code of Washington (<a href="https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx" rel="nofollow noreferrer">RCW</a>) and the Washington Administrative Code (<a href="https://app.leg.wa.gov/wac/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">WAC</a>). Knowing where to find a micro-needle in those mega-haystacks is the main challenge, but you can be fairly confident that the state statutes regarding assault are orthogonal to a question about the HIPAA privacy rule.</p>


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<p>In addition, you have to know how to find relevant case law (appellate rulings) that tell you what those rules &quot;really mean&quot; (at a given time). Locating relevant case law is generally a matter of plain Google-fu, unless you also have access to one of those <a href="https://lawlibguides.luc.edu/healthlaw/databases" rel="nofollow noreferrer">paid tools</a> like Lexis-Nexis or Westlaw. That link mentions other resources which may or may not be available to you.</p>


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Answer 2: <p>Google, Google Scholar, and Wikipedia (follow up on the citations supporting the articles) are often decent tools.</p>
<p>Frequently, they will also send you to the website of a federal agency which has links to relevant legal resources, to law review articles on topic, and to independent third-party discussions often from law firms or non-profits that deal with legal issues in the industry. Sometimes medical or health industry periodicals will discuss legal topics as well. Another great resource when you can find it are Congressional Research Service reports (this is an independent research arm of Congress related to the Library of Congress) and publications of the relevant Congressional committees at their respective websites.</p>


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<p>A law review article on a topic will typically comprehensively review all relevant legal authority on the subject matter of the article through the data of publication (minus two or three months) all in one place with explanatory commentary and is a gold mine if you can find it, although older ones often get outdated in fast changing areas of law like health care law. Law review articles often put in context a newly decided appellate court or U.S. Supreme Court case, a newly enacted statute or amendment to it, a major overhaul of regulations or new regulations where there were none before, or a policy analysis over the overall legal framework of an area of law.</p>


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<p>Some large complex federal health care programs like Medicare, Medicaid, and the Affordable Care Act also have a level of agency guidance below regulations containing agency determinations that are not as general in application as a regulation, but usually those are only available in a digestible manner with an expensive specialty law subscription. Also, note that most operative Medicaid regulations are at the state rather than the federal level in this joint state-federal program with the federal regulations mostly stating what states can and cannot put in their state regulations.</p>


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<p>The biggest thing that the resources you mention are missing from statutes and regulations is case law. If you have the name of the case, a date or year of a decision, and any additional citation information, a variety of sources (e.g. Findlaw) will find the text of the case for you. But, almost all of the leading word search based ways to locate statutes and annotated statutes and regulations that list cases that have interpreted a code or regulation section are on a paid basis.</p>
<p>Case law is basically indispensable in researching U.S. federal health care law. For example, the meaning of several key provisions of the Affordable Care Act have been the subject to extensive litigation, in some cases all of the way to the U.S. Supreme Court or with conflicting resolutions from different appellate courts. It is impossible to discern the statute's true legal meaning without the interpretive gloss of case law.</p>


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<p>Your university library may have a subscription, however, or might be able to get you temporary access to an affiliated or reciprocity cooperation based law school library with student legal search database access on a temporary basis.</p>
<p>Short of an online research database that is usually paid, your best shot is probably to look to the hard copy of the <strong>United States Code Annotated (USCA)</strong> of the relevant statutory sections to find relevant cases interpreting the statutes and then something like Findlaw or Cornell to look up the full text of the cases referenced. Every physical law library and many university libraries and public libraries without law schools affiliated with them will at least have a hard copy of USCA.</p>


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<p>USCA will also note the West Digest System key numbers of the cases annotated, and you can then look at the hard copy of <strong>the West Digest</strong> to find other cases (possibly arising under different statutes) that implicate the issue that the West Key Number in Question references. A West Key number has a word or words indicating where the entry appears in alphabetical order in the digest, and a key number which indicates which section number within the word topic is addressed by the annotation. A full set of West Digests (which is a comprehensive compilation of all case annotations of all cases reported by the West Publishing Company, which is the most comprehensive of the annotation systems) would be in every state supreme court library and in every law school library, but you'd probably want to consult of university librarian if your library doesn't have one to see where you can find it.</p>


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<p><strong>Black's Law Dictionary</strong> is something you should just buy in hard copy and use as an unofficial textbook for the course if you are doing anything more than a nominal amount of legal research. Knowing the technical sense definition of terms of art is absolutely key in the medical sciences and in that respect, law is no different.</p>
<p>There are also a variety of not very expensive <a href="https://www.textbooks.com/Catalog/JII/Legal-Research.php" rel="nofollow noreferrer">handbooks on legal research</a> for aspiring law students (typically first year law students), any of which is adequate for your needs.</p>


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<p>Another secondary source you should consider is a legal treatise in a subject-matter of law that you are working on. This is a topic area reference written by a renowned expert in the subject area that references all relevant legal authorities including statutes, regulations, case law, and other guidance (as well as legislative history) all in one place along with the author's own commentary. In health care, there may be legal treatises on <a href="https://guides.ll.georgetown.edu/treatise-finders/healthlawandpolicy" rel="nofollow noreferrer">health care law</a> and there may be legal treatises on <a href="https://guides.ll.georgetown.edu/treatise-finders/adminlaw" rel="nofollow noreferrer">administrative law</a>. Again, a library copy is one option, but in the case of a treatise an interlibrary loan is sometimes possible as well. The links in this paragraph are from Georgetown Law School and its publicly available online law library resources are particularly good.</p>


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<blockquote>
<p>I was hoping someone knew of any resources that mirror some of my
favorite citation/reference searches. This includes:</p>
<p>Dimensions</p>
<p>Lens</p>
<p>Wizdom.ai</p>
<p>DeepDyve</p>
<p>Semantic Scholar</p>
</blockquote>
<p>No freely available resources of this kind exist. Th closest you will get is Google Scholar.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/healthlawprof_blog/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Health Care Law Professors Blog</a>, which is searchable, is also a rich lode of resources. Many law review articles have open access preprints posted at the Social Science Research Network, which I've often downloaded paper from but don't know how to search.</p>
<p>The University of Michigan Law library has the best collection in the nation of non-U.S. legal texts in the original languages, but it doesn't sound like you'll be needing those.</p>


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Question Body: <p><a href="https://devgan.in/ipc/section/376/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Section 376</a>, Indian Penal Code (IPC) states the punishment for rape commited by a..</p>
<blockquote>
<p>...relative, guardian or a person in position of trust and authority</p>
</blockquote>
<p>shall be rigiourous imprisonmment for minimum 10 years or life imprisonment for the remainder of one's natural life.</p>
<p>But there doesn't seem to be any case law on the incestous rape by an (adult) child on their mother or elder sisters. This is certainly a prevalent issue in various rural and the urban areas from victim testimonies and surveys I've read</p>


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<p>Is this underprosecuted and would such cases come under the scope of IPC <a href="https://www.indiacode.nic.in/show-data?actid=AC_CEN_5_23_00037_186045_1523266765688&amp;orderno=424" rel="nofollow noreferrer">section 375</a> or 376?  For example most case law is regarding fathers and father-in-laws committing rape but there aren't any Supreme Court level cases on this, questioning the interpretation of the law to include the afformentioned cases.</p>


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Answer 1: <p><strong>Would such cases come under the scope of IPC section 375 or 376?</strong></p>
<p><strong>Yes</strong></p>
<p>Notwithstanding it's difficult to prove a negative, there is nothing in the IPC (nor any other Indian legislation that I can find) that says otherwise.</p>
<p>i.e. rape is rape if the elements of <a href="https://www.indiacode.nic.in/show-data?actid=AC_CEN_5_23_00037_186045_1523266765688&amp;orderno=424" rel="nofollow noreferrer">section 375</a> are proven, and the punishment would be according to <a href="https://www.indiacode.nic.in/show-data?actid=AC_CEN_5_23_00037_186045_1523266765688&amp;orderno=425" rel="nofollow noreferrer">section 376</a> IPC.</p>
<p>(Whether these offences are under prosecuted, or merely under reported, is probably impossible to answer without carrying out a nationwide survey to collect the data.)</p>


Tags: criminal-law, india, indian-penal-code, rape


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Question Body: <p>Many combination locks can easily have their combinations decoded, even while the lock is shut. Suppose someone decoded the combination to a lock, wrote down the combination on a piece of paper, and taped it up next to the lock.</p>
<p>For the sake of the scenario, suppose that the decoder doesn't open the lock or enter the locked area. The decoder is aware that someone might read the combination, open the lock, and go into the locked area, but hasn't made plans with anyone to do that.</p>
<p>Has the person committed a crime by decoding the combination and posting it next to the lock? If someone else reads the combination, opens the lock, goes into the locked area, and commits a crime, without any other interaction with the decoder, does the decoder share any criminal responsibility? Civil liability?</p>


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<p>I am aware of <a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/questions/91747/what-offence-if-any-is-committed-by-guessing-a-combination-entry-lock-on-a-door">this question</a>, but it poses a distinct scenario where the decoder also enters the locked area.</p>
<hr />
<p>More generally, I am interested in the question: Suppose that the usefulness of some object relies on the secrecy of some information. If that information is published, the object becomes worthless. Is it legal to obtain and publish that information, if no physical damage is done to the object when deriving the information?</p>


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Answer 1: <p><strong>The decoder is aware that someone might read the combination, open the lock, and go into the locked area ...Has the person committed a crime?</strong></p>
<p><a href="/questions/tagged/england-and-wales" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-england-and-wales-tooltip-container">england-and-wales</a></p>
<p>Maybe not a criminal offence, but the decoder <em>might</em> be liable civilly under <a href="https://www.lawteacher.net/free-law-essays/tort-law/tort-of-negligence.php" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><strong>the Tort of Negligence</strong></a>, which is:</p>
<blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p>a legal wrong that is suffered by someone at the hands of another who fails to take proper care to avoid what a reasonable person would regard as a foreseeable risk. In many cases there will be a contractual relationship (express or implied) between the parties involved, such as that of doctor and patient, employer and employee, bank and customer, and until relatively recently it was necessary for such a contractual relationship to exist in order for a claim for negligence to succeed.</p>
<p>But the civil law relating to negligence has evolved and grown to deal with situations that arise between two or more parties even where no contract, written or implied, exists between them.</p>
</blockquote>
<p><strong>Is it legal to obtain and publish that information, if no physical damage is done to the object when deriving the information?</strong></p>


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</blockquote>
<p><strong>Is it legal to obtain and publish that information, if no physical damage is done to the object when deriving the information?</strong></p>
<p>One scenario where this <em>might</em> be a criminal offence is if the information is protected with a <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/government-security-classifications" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Government Security Classification</a> marking (i.e. spying).</p>
<p>See <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Geo5/1-2/28/section/1?timeline=false" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Section 1</a>, Official Secrets Act 1911:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(1) If any person for any purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State—</p>
<ul>
<li><p>(b) makes any <strong>sketch</strong> ... which is calculated to be or might be or is intended to be directly or indirectly useful to an enemy; or</p>
</li>


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<ul>
<li><p>(b) makes any <strong>sketch</strong> ... which is calculated to be or might be or is intended to be directly or indirectly useful to an enemy; or</p>
</li>
<li><p>(c) ... communicates to any other person any secret ... <strong>sketch</strong> ... which is calculated to be or might be or is intended to be directly or indirectly useful to an enemy;</p>
</li>
</ul>
<p>he shall be guilty of felony</p>
</blockquote>
<p><a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Geo5/1-2/28/section/12" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Section 12</a> states that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The expression <strong>“sketch” includes any photograph</strong> or other mode of representing any place or thing;</p>
</blockquote>


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Question Title: Is there legislation regarding minors joining dating websites?

Question Body: <p>Are dating websites a special category of websites that must follow certain regulations in terms of who they are allowed to join their site? So if I am a 15 year old, does the law in the USA allow a dating APP to let me join?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>U.S. law does not forbid 15 year olds from joining dating websites. Direct U.S. regulation of Internet communications mostly via the <a href="https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=b149fae3-6516-4df6-bb91-4ee20f1d4def" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Children's Online Privacy Protection Act</a> (COPPA) has a cutoff age of 13 years old.</p>
<p>This said, nothing obligates websites to allow minors to join their dating app, and they may be reluctant to do so for fear that if you are mistreated by someone as a result of the app that they could be held responsible.</p>


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<p>In particular, amendments to the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communications_Decency_Act" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Communications Decency Act (CDA)</a> called <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communications_Decency_Act#FOSTA-SESTA" rel="nofollow noreferrer">FOSTA-SESTA</a> for the &quot;Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA) and &quot;Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act (SESTA)&quot; which took effect April 11, 2018, limited the prior near total protection from liability under <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/230" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Section 230</a> of the CDA. The amendments maked it illegal to knowingly assist, facilitate, or support sex trafficking, and amended the Communications Decency Act's section 230 safe harbors (which make online services immune from civil liability for their users' actions) to exclude enforcement of federal or state sex trafficking laws from immunity.</p>


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<p><a href="https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R43597.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Federal sex trafficking laws</a> largely apply to commercial sex by people under the age of 18, which an online dating app could facilitate, if used by someone inclined to use it in that manner. The two main federal sex trafficking laws are as follows:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Section 1591 now provides in part the following:</p>
<p>“<strong>Whoever knowingly</strong> in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce,
or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the
United States, <strong>recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides,
obtains, advertises, maintains, patronizes, or solicits by any means a
person</strong>; knowing, or <strong>in reckless disregard of the fact, that means
of force, threats of force, fraud, coercion ... , or any combination
of such means will be used to cause the person to engage in a
commercial sex act, or that the person has not attained the age of 18


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of such means will be used to cause the person to engage in a
commercial sex act, or that the person has not attained the age of 18
years and will be caused to engage in a commercial sex act</strong>,” shall
be imprisoned not less than 15 years (not less than 10 years, if the
victim is 14 years of age or older and the offender is less than 18
years of age).</p>
<p>The Mann Act outlaws prostitution and unlawful sexual activities that
involve interstate or foreign travel. It consists of three principal
substantive sections.</p>
<p>Section 2421 proscribes the interstate or foreign transportation of
someone for purposes of prostitution or unlawful sexual activity;
misconduct which is punishable by imprisonment for not more than 10
years.</p>
<p>Section 2422 condemns coercing or enticing another person to travel in
interstate or foreign commerce to engage in prostitution or unlawful
sexual activity, or <strong>using interstate communications to coerce or


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interstate or foreign commerce to engage in prostitution or unlawful
sexual activity, or <strong>using interstate communications to coerce or
entice a child to engage in such conduct</strong>. The communications offense
is punishable by imprisonment for not less than 10 years; the travel
offense by imprisonment for not more than 20 years.</p>
<p>Section 2423 outlaws four distinct offenses:</p>
<p>(1) §2423(a) - transportation of a child in interstate or foreign
commerce for purposes of prostitution or unlawful sexual purposes;</p>
<p>(2) §2423(b)—interstate or foreign travel for purposes of unlawful
sexual abuse of a child;</p>
<p>(3) §2423(c)—foreign travel and subsequent unlawful sexual abuse of a
child; and</p>
<p>(4) §2423(d)— <strong>arranging, for profit, the travel outlawed in any of
these offenses</strong>.</p>
<p>The first is punishable by imprisonment for not less than 10 years,
each of the others by imprisonment for not more than 30 years.</p>
</blockquote>


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these offenses</strong>.</p>
<p>The first is punishable by imprisonment for not less than 10 years,
each of the others by imprisonment for not more than 30 years.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>So, the reluctance of a dating app to allow minors to use their services is understandable. They either need to aggressively police a low cost or free except for ad support service with considerable employee expense to do so, to avoid the risk of FOSTA-SESTA authorized liability, or they can not offer the service at all.</p>
<p>In a nutshell, the app providers consider you to be jail-bait and don't want to face the associated risks.</p>


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Question Title: How to prevent the problem of a document changing its content after you signed it

Question Body: <p>I just read <a href="https://www.quora.com/Can-NDAs-non-disclosure-agreements-be-signed-through-an-online-form-Are-there-any-legal-implications-with-an-online-form" rel="nofollow noreferrer">this</a>:</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>The problem is that if there is a dispute over what was actually in the NDA later on, its going to be extremely difficult to establish what the NDA said.  I'd refuse to sign an online NDA out of fear that some years from now, I'd be presented with "you signed this document" which looks nothing like the document I thought I signed.</p>
</blockquote>


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<p>I think this is applicable to both online and hardcopy documents in the same way. For hardcopy, someone with enough sophistication could just either copy your signature, or graft it from one document to another. Likewise, for electronic media, you could easily just paste their electronic signature onto a different document, since it's just bits of 1's and 0's that the document is saved in the database or cloud with, so it's easily changed.</p>


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<p>I'm wondering how you can prevent these problems. If you are the one creating the document to be signed, wondering what must need to be done so that if you were in court the document would be considered valid, the content considered the original content and valid, and the signature considered valid. If you give a copy of the document to the person signing it, then they could use it to reference the original. But if they lose it, then they lose the protection. Also, they could just throw it away and say that they never got a copy, and say that you changed the original contract. I'm not sure how one would protect against this sort of stuff, what needs to be done on the document creator's part to maintain "legal validity" or "legal soundness". Seems like documenting the process somehow might help, but I can see loopholes there as well. Hoping one could outline/clarify what should be done here.</p>


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Answer 1: <p>The USPS and other postal services have created a service called <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_Postmarks" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Digital Postmarks</a> or EPCM (Electronic Postal Certification Mark) to address exactly this problem.</p>

<p>Basically you can upload any document that you want to be "unalterable and time stamped". The service computes a hash (a number that will change if the contents change), and store the time stamp and the hash on a secure server.</p>

<p>If, at some time in the future, you want to confirm the authenticity of the document, you can upload another copy - the fact that it produces the same hash proves it's not been tampered with.</p>


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Answer 2: <p>One common practice is to sign every page on a hard copy and to initial every other page of a hard copy, usually with blue colored ink on a black and white original, and to maintain a copy of the original as authoritative.</p>
<p>Most electronic digital signature systems have some sort of authentication protocol.</p>
<p>One can also maintain a copy of what you signed in some way that can be authenticated (e.g. with metadata).</p>


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<p>One can also maintain a copy of what you signed in some way that can be authenticated (e.g. with metadata).</p>
<p>Certainly, a sophisticated party can find a way to fabricate or forge almost everything, but this doesn't come up very often because most merchants engaging in contracts with lawyer drafted written documents almost never, as a matter of empirical reality, actually do that, and because the lawyers acting as intermediaries have ethical obligations independent of and superseding their duties to their clients not to engage in that kind of fraud and not to submit false evidence. Also, when someone is discovered to have done something like that the implications are often not limited to that transaction and can instead also result in criminal charges and/or loss of professional licensure and punitive damages.</p>


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<p>Has there ever been a case where a lawyer and a business client have conspired to engage in outright forgery? Certainly. But this doesn't happen often and one takes enough precautions to make it unlikely and then lives with the risk. At some point one has to balance the risk of being defrauded against the benefit of doing business. In most situations, there is a customary way of documenting transactions and that is considered &quot;good enough&quot; even though it isn't perfect and most of the time it works.</p>
<p>The risk is largely a function of who you are dealing with.</p>
<p>For example, most transfers of commodities on commodity exchanges in the U.S. and publicly held securities listed on securities exchanges other than the NASDAQ aren't documented by written contracts at all, and instead are conducted by oral agreements documented in writing in the personal business notes of the parties.</p>


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<p>Similarly, most decisions of the boards of publicly held corporations and governmental entities are made orally and then documented by a secretary of the meeting in minutes, rather than in documents executed by the decision makers. In each of these contexts, there is a sufficient basis for trust that signed documentation is not needed, in part, because the people interacting constantly interact with other other in transactions large and small, and no one will continue to do business with someone who proves untrustworthy.</p>
<p>The risk is much higher when a transaction is for high stakes between people who don't deal with each other personally very often and aren't working through intermediaries who do deal with each other very often (working through intermediaries who are established and regularly deal with each other and have an economic interest in being able to continue to do so is one way to mitigate the risk).</p>


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<p>When the risk is high and the stakes are particularly great, one can not only use an original wet ink copy but entrust the original for safekeeping to a trustworthy third-party. Sometimes witnesses, notarizations, or &quot;guaranteed signatures&quot; (a private sector analog to a notarization in which the risk of fraud is insured by the guarantor of the signature) are also common tools to further reduce this risk.</p>
<p>In Continental Europe and many other &quot;civil law&quot; countries that don't follow the English Common Law legal system, notaries serve the role of third-party signature verifier and third-party custodian of important contracts in a far greater share of significant, legal professional drafted contracts and legal instruments than in the U.S. and other common law jurisdictions.</p>


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Answer 3: <p>I quote <a href="https://ak-law.ca/contract-signing/#8" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://ak-law.ca/contract-signing/#8</a>.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>In some legal instances, when the law requires, each page of a document or contract will need to be initialed.</p>
<p>For example, under article 728 of the Civil Code of Quebec, when a will is written by a third person or electronically, the testator and the witnesses must <a href="http://legisquebec.gouv.qc.ca/en/showdoc/cs/ccq-1991" rel="nofollow noreferrer">initial or sign each page</a> of the will.</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p><a href="https://www.legisquebec.gouv.qc.ca/en/document/cs/ccq-1991#se:728" rel="nofollow noreferrer">728.</a> Where the will is written by a third person or by technical means, the testator and the witnesses initial or sign each page of the act which does not bear their signature.


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The absence of initials or a signature on each page does not prevent a will made before a notary that is not valid as a notarial will from being valid as a will made in the presence of witnesses, if the other formalities are observed.</p>
<p>1991, c. 64, a. 728; I.N. 2014-05-01; I.N. 2015-11-01; 2016, c. 4, s. 99.</p>
</blockquote>


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Question Title: Utilizing Browser IP for Service Security

Question Body: <p>Suppose a web designer plans to use IPs for security purposes to prevent botting unique clicks and brute force attempts. And, the site only stores a hash of the IP address for a limited amount of time and then automatically deletes it.</p>
<p>Would such a design be GDPR compliant?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>Whether a hash of PII is still PII can certainly be debated at a court of law. Especially since you <em>want</em> to store information identifying the idividual. That is the whole purpose of it. Storing information identifying a person, so they cannot vote twice.</p>
<p>But the GDPR is not a law to prevent you from doing things. All you need to do is get <strong>consent</strong>. Explain that their data will only be kept as long as neccessary for the stated purpose and then be deleted and ask for the users consent to save their data.</p>
<p>It's probably enough to set a little checkbox and an explanation text.</p>
<p>If they do not agree to have their data saved for this timespan and purpose, they cannot vote.</p>


Tags: gdpr, european-union


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Question Body: <p>Over the weekend, I was asked to be part of a photo shoot for a political candidate. I was wearing a t-shirt that featured a Star Wars character and the photographer stated that he wanted to position me in a fashion so it wasn't visible to avoid a, 'copyright issue'. (For those who are curious, the request was made last minute and I wasn't advised on clothing restrictions)</p>
<p>After a certain point, it was determined that the ideal angle still was showing the Star Wars character, so they gave me a t-shirt featuring logos and imagery associated with a Major League Baseball (MLB) team.</p>
<p>I'm trying to figure out why the MLB shirt wouldn't create a copyright issue for the photographer, while the Star Wars character would. Is it relating to the litigious nature of Disney (I really doubt this MLB team would sue) or is there something about MLB logos that are inherently fair use?</p>
<hr />


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<hr />
<p>Regarding this potential <a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/a/56173/11906">duplicate</a> which questions whether a trademark can be used by a political campaign without permission and the most upvoted answer is of course, &quot;it depends,&quot; but for the equivalent scenario in my question it seems like it would not be allowed because of the logo's prominence in the photo. Thus it begs the question why is this copyrightable material acceptable and this one is not?</p>
<p>To clarify the issue, the MLB logo in particular is for the Philadelphia Phillies. As a team, they've had a variety of logos over the years and based on the answers provided thus far, it seems some may be subject to copyright and others would be subject to trademark depending upon the complexity of the art. In this specific case, it's this version of their logo:</p>


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<p><a href="https://i.stack.imgur.com/4zhH5.png" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><img src="https://i.stack.imgur.com/4zhH5.png" alt="enter image description here" /></a></p>
<p>As this is more than just stylized lettering, it seems this would presumably be subject to copyright.</p>


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Answer 1: <p>From the mention of a MLB shirt, I am going to assume the OP is located in the <a href="/questions/tagged/united-states" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-united-states-tooltip-container">united-states</a>.</p>
<h2>Logos are (in general) copyrightable</h2>
<p>Anything with a modicum of creative input is by default copyrighted. This includes both film shots from movies and logos of sports organizations.</p>


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<h2>Logos are (in general) copyrightable</h2>
<p>Anything with a modicum of creative input is by default copyrighted. This includes both film shots from movies and logos of sports organizations.</p>
<p>&quot;Modicum of creative input&quot; is known as the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Threshold_of_originality" rel="nofollow noreferrer">threshold of originality</a>. That legal doctrine is in force in the US, but not in other jurisdictions - for instance, the UK uses &quot;<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sweat_of_the_brow" rel="nofollow noreferrer">sweat of the brow</a>&quot; where creativity is not needed to obtain copyright protection.</p>
<p>A still shot from a film set almost surely passes the threshold of originality. However, some logos do not.</p>


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<p>A still shot from a film set almost surely passes the threshold of originality. However, some logos do not.</p>
<p>For instance, the Pittsburgh Pirates logo is a two-dimensional letter P - somewhat stylized, but not that much. It is arguably below the threshold of copyright protection. On the other hand, the Red Socks logos (which is, well, two red socks) is almost surely copyrighted.</p>
<p>Let us assume that the logo or imagery present on the OP's photo shirt was indeed copyrighted. Does that make the photo a copyright violation?</p>
<h2>Incidental use</h2>
<p>It <em>might</em> be the case that having the artwork on the shirt as an incidental part of the photograph makes it OK. In the US, such incidental use could be covered by fair use, but as always, it’s a delicate balancing act. A professional photograph taken for political advertisement is going to be held to a higher standard than a blurry photo from your aunt’s Facebook gallery.</p>


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<p>Dmitry Grigoryev says in comments that walking around with a Star Wars shirt could be construed as distributing (via public display) a copyrighted work. However, &quot;putting it on and walking around&quot; is an essential function of a shirt. Absent terms to the contrary, whoever sells a shirt with a copyrighted design grants an implied license to the shirt-wearer to move about with that shirt. [EDIT: see Mayken’s comment, that’s a statutory exception to copyright.] The scope of such implied licenses can be unclear, though, and it could arguably not extend to promotional photographs for political advertisements.</p>


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<p>Note <a href="https://www.pinsentmasons.com/out-law/news/urheberrechtsverletzung-durch-aufnahmen-von-hotelzimmern-mit-fototapete" rel="nofollow noreferrer">a recent case in Germany</a> <a href="https://www.justiz.nrw.de/nrwe/lgs/koeln/lg_koeln/j2022/14_O_350_21_Urteil_20220818.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">(link to judgement, in German)</a> where it was held that a hotel posting online pictures of its rooms, including a wallpaper design, violated the copyright of the designer. I am not familiar enough with German copyright law to determine if an appeal of that lower-court decision would have any chance of success, but I think that ruling is reasonable within the general principles of EU copyright law. (Whether it is <em>morally</em> acceptable is of course another thing entirely.)</p>
<h2>Non-legal explanations</h2>


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<h2>Non-legal explanations</h2>
<p>It is also possible that the photographer or another PR staff member would rather have the politician associated with baseball than with Star Wars for image reasons, and copyright is only a pretext for that. Or that they (mistakenly) thought that the baseball shirt design was not copyrighted.</p>


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Answer 2: <h2>Fair Use is in the eye of the beholder</h2>
<p>Fair Use is the idea that you can use copyrighted materials to the extent that there's no direct copying. <a href="https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/fair-use-the-four-factors.html" rel="noreferrer">The Copyright Act of 1976 is where Fair Use is defined</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>A court weighs four factors when it considers a fair use defense.
These four factors are spelled out in Section 107 of the Copyright Act
of 1976 (17 U.S.C. § 107) and are:</p>
<ol>
<li>the purpose and character of the use, including whether it's of a commercial nature or for nonprofit educational purposes</li>
<li>the nature of the copyrighted work</li>
<li>the amount of the copyrighted work used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, and</li>
<li>the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.</li>
</ol>
<p>As you can see, these are not yes/no questions, so it's up to the


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<li>the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.</li>
</ol>
<p>As you can see, these are not yes/no questions, so it's up to the
courts to determine whether each factor supports or goes against a
finding of fair use. Even then, there's no equation or formula for
determining whether a use is fair use. The courts consider each factor
and then decide whether, on balance, they point in favor of or against
fair use.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In other words, there's a pretty wide latitude to sue anyone who infringes upon your copyright. Why aren't there a ton of lawsuits then?</p>
<h2>Copyright litigation is prohibitively expensive</h2>


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<h2>Copyright litigation is prohibitively expensive</h2>
<p>Nobody wants to be sued for copyright infringement. It can run into large sums of just attorney fees just to get it to court, let alone get a judgment. JK Rowling and Warner Brothers (US copyright licensee) <a href="https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/business/business-news/jk-rowling-wins-copyright-suit-118742/" rel="noreferrer">won $6750 and an injunction against a Pottermore book</a>, but both sides certainly spent far more than that in litigating the issue. If there's a chance you might be seen as infringing upon someone's copyright, it's cheaper to avoid the issue.</p>
<h2>If you're making money, litigation odds go up</h2>
<p>&quot;Weird Al&quot; Yankovic, for instance, parodies popular songs. He could make a Fair Use case, but, as he's making money in the process, <a href="https://www.weirdal.com/archives/faq/" rel="noreferrer">it's safer to just license the music instead</a></p>
<blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p>Al does get permission from the original writers of the songs that he parodies. While the law supports his ability to parody without permission, he feels it’s important to maintain the relationships that he’s built with artists and writers over the years. Plus, Al wants to make sure that he gets his songwriter credit (as writer of new lyrics) as well as his rightful share of the royalties.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This makes a lot of sense. He rarely does anything controversial with his songs and it's extra revenue for the song writers. More importantly, you won't sue someone paying you under license.</p>
<h2>Does the copyright holder like the use?</h2>
<p>What's the difference between MLB and Disney? My bet would be something to do with this</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I was asked to be part of a photo shoot for a political candidate.</p>
</blockquote>


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<p>What's the difference between MLB and Disney? My bet would be something to do with this</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I was asked to be part of a photo shoot for a political candidate.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>I'll get political for just a second. You don't mention the politician, but I can think of a few that the The Walt Disney Company might not be keen on seeing with their licensed material. Chief among them would be <a href="https://www.vox.com/politics/2023/4/20/23691341/ron-desantis-disney-world-board-reedy-creek-florida" rel="noreferrer">Florida Governor Ron Desantis</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>DeSantis, out for revenge after suffering a major loss in his efforts to punish Disney for being “woke,” announced a new bill to rein in Disney’s theme parks Tuesday. In a return to the issue that first earned it the governor’s ire, the “Happiest Place on Earth” unveiled its first-ever event to celebrate Pride Month on April 14, complete with themed entertainment and specialty menu items.</p>


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</blockquote>
<p>The open secret here is that you can sue anyone for copyright infringement, even if there's a strong case for Fair Use. <a href="https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/08/youtuber-court-battle-results-in-fair-use-win-for-online-reaction-videos/" rel="noreferrer">Not liking the person you're suing can play a role in suing for copyright infringement</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>After more than a year of battling in court, Ethan and Hila Klein, the YouTubers behind the H3H3 Productions channel, won a lawsuit filed against them by another YouTuber. Matt &quot;Hoss&quot; Hosseinzadeh—MattHossZone on YouTube—sued the pair after they uploaded a video in which the Kleins react to one of Hosseinzadeh's videos and criticize him in the process. Hosseinzadeh then sued the Kleins for a number of things, most notably copyright infringement for using clips of his video in their own.</p>
</blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p>A major league baseball team is far less likely to start a feud with a politician's photographer than a major corporation openly engaged in a political feud.</p>


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Answer 3: <h1>Logos aren't copyrightable. Artwork is.</h1>
<p>Not a lawyer, but my understanding is that logos aren't copyrightable, but artistic designs are.</p>
<p>Logos are protected by trademark law, not copyright law. Therefore, a shirt with a sports team team logo wouldn't cause any copyright issues (but it may create trademark issues if it looks like the team is endorsing something and they're not).</p>


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<p>Artistic designs, however, are protected by copyright, and that would include designs depicting characters from movies. However, a photograph of a person wearing a shirt featuring an artistic design is likely to be transformative enough to count as fair use. Fair use has <a href="https://fairuse.stanford.edu/overview/fair-use/four-factors/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">four factors</a> that US courts rely upon when making the determination of fair use, and I doubt anyone would be able to make an argument that a photo of someone wearing a shirt will usurp the market for people buying actual shirts.</p>


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Answer 4: <p>Before COVID, I taught acting &amp; modeling. We had a few sessions that were photo shoots. We instructors, and the photographers would also make that same comment.</p>
<p>The other answers discuss the legal issues. I will answer from another perspective.</p>
<p>Saying &quot;...to avoid copyright issues...&quot; is a clear, quick and convenient way of saying it. It may not be completely for legal reasons.<br />
<br>
Some people are angry. Some people are not very smart. Some are just looking for a fight. (Obv. no one on this site falls into any of those categories).<br />
<br>
Consider these scenarios:</p>
<p>&quot;OMG!  is trying to align himself with the Star Wars crowd. I'm in the Star Wars crowd and that dude doesn't represent me!&quot;</p>
<p>&quot;(One of) The copyright owner(s) is worried that people will be associating them as supporting the candidate. Which, of course, would not be true.&quot;</p>


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<p>&quot;(One of) The copyright owner(s) is worried that people will be associating them as supporting the candidate. Which, of course, would not be true.&quot;</p>
<p>&quot;Why in the world would &lt;person/organization associated with the production of Star Wars&gt; want to support ? That's disgusting. I will never watch another thing &lt;person/organization&gt; does.&quot;</p>
<p>I'm sure there are others. You've probably heard similar arguments (Ex. Politician X pays to use song Y in their campaign. Band T, who recorded the song, writes a letter to Politician X telling them not to use their song because they don't endorse him).</p>
<p>TL;DR:<br />
Here's what I told my students:<br />
&quot;If they ain't paying you to represent them, don't wear their stuff.&quot;<br />
That made a lot more sense to them. The end result is the same, just the rationale is different.</p>
<p>$0.02</p>


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Question Body: <p>According to NCRB, about 77% of prisoners in India are undertrials. and CrPc 167</p>
<p><a href="https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1687975/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1687975/</a></p>
<p>states that the maximum someone can be kept in Judicial custody is 90 days, or 60 days, depending on the gravity.</p>
<p>However, it appears from the report that many prisoners are detained beyond this period. According to another forum focused in Indian law , this is due to &quot;charge sheet pending and prosecution requests of accused confronting prosecution witnesses.&quot;</p>
<p><a href="https://tripakshalitigation.com/difference-between-police-custody-and-judicial-custody/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://tripakshalitigation.com/difference-between-police-custody-and-judicial-custody/</a></p>


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<p>This says that if a police report is filed then the person can be detained up to a maximum of half the maximum period of imprisonment for the offence. What ? there was a recent post where someone was in pre trial detention for 1.5 years. is this legal ?</p>
<p>Edit;; speaking of the legality of this CrPc 438 allows anticipatory bail for someone who has apprehension that they might be <em>arrested on an accusation of a non bailable offence</em> is this possible to apply after a chargeheet or police report has been filed ?</p>
<p>edit;; thank you</p>


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Answer 1: <p>As per Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the maximum period for an accused to be detained in police custody is 15 days and judicial custody is specified as 90 days subject to the proviso under <strong>Explanation I</strong> therein, where payment of bail is the condition required to be fulfilled. In addition to this, conditions may be prescribed by the detaining court while providing bail, which may enlarge the period of undertrial detention if left unmet.</p>
<p><strong>Undertrial detention</strong></p>


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<p><strong>Undertrial detention</strong></p>
<p>Although the prescribed period of detention is a maximum of half of the period of sentence under the law for which he has been accused, the percolation of this to prisoner releases seems to be an implementation issue, which Indian courts have tried resolving by <a href="https://indiankanoon.org/doc/70780578/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">prioritising cases pending for more than 5 years and providing personal bonds;</a> and forming an <a href="http://www.slic.org.in/uploads/2019/07/compilations-of-directives-given-by-sc-1.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Under Trial Review Committee</a>. Notably, in Bhim Singh v. Union of India, the court acknowledged the implementational hurdle.</p>
<blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p><em>direct that jurisdictional Magistrate/Chief Judicial Magistrate/Sessions Judge shall hold one sitting in a week in each jail/prison for two months commencing from 1st October, 2014 for the purposes of <strong>effective implementation</strong> of 436A of the Code of Criminal Procedure.</em></p>
</blockquote>
<p>To answer your doubt regarding anticipatory bail,</p>
<p>It is a provision enabling a right to future release to a person even before the person is arrested, regardless of whether &quot;<a href="https://indiankanoon.org/doc/257280/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">cognizance has been taken or a chargesheet has been filed</a>&quot;.</p>


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Question Title: What law makes intending to cause harassment alarm and distress an offence in the UK?

Question Body: <p><a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-leeds-62793135" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-leeds-62793135</a></p>
<p>I know that s5 makes conduct “likely to cause” … harassment alarm or distress a crime on a strict liability basis. But what provision makes intention to cause it a crime?</p>


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Answer 1: <p><a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1986/64/section/4A" rel="noreferrer">Section 4A of the Public Order Act 1986</a> (which was amended by <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1994/33/section/154" rel="noreferrer">section 154 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994</a>).</p>
<blockquote>
<p>[F14A Intentional harassment, alarm or distress.</p>
<p>(1)A person is guilty of an offence if, with intent to cause a person
harassment, alarm or distress, he—</p>
<p>(a)uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or
disorderly behaviour, or</p>
<p>(b)displays any writing, sign or other visible representation which is
threatening, abusive or insulting,</p>
<p>thereby causing that or another person harassment, alarm or distress.</p>
<p>(2)An offence under this section may be committed in a public or a
private place, except that no offence is committed where the words or
behaviour are used, or the writing, sign or other visible


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<p>(2)An offence under this section may be committed in a public or a
private place, except that no offence is committed where the words or
behaviour are used, or the writing, sign or other visible
representation is displayed, by a person inside a dwelling and the
person who is harassed, alarmed or distressed is also inside that or
another dwelling.</p>
<p>(3)It is a defence for the accused to prove—</p>
<p>(a)that he was inside a dwelling and had no reason to believe that the
words or behaviour used, or the writing, sign or other visible
representation displayed, would be heard or seen by a person outside
that or any other dwelling, or</p>
<p>(b)that his conduct was reasonable.</p>
<p>(4)F2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .</p>
<p>(5)A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on
summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months
or a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale or both.]</p>
</blockquote>


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Answer 2: <p>“Strict liability” means that intent doesn’t matter. What matters is that your behaviour was likely to cause distress etc. whether it did cause distress or not (because that’s what the law says, “likely to cause” is enough). And “strict liability” means the fact that it happened is enough, without any intent.</p>


Tags: united-kingdom, freedom-of-speech, public-order


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Question Body: <p>Some of them are really ridiculous, like they stand on street corners where they are likely to harass the most people and often they don’t even speak the best (by which I mean the most intelligible) English. They continually shout at passers by who are clearly not interested in their message repetitious slogans devoid of much cogency or insight like “Jesus loves you” or “Jesus died for your sins” over very poor quality amplification systems while jumping up and down and shaking their fists in the air. Often if a given passerby is trying to ignore the preacher as they walk past and not giving any flinch or reaction, they will intensify their harassment and grow louder and more forceful/emphatic in response to individuals’ attempts to ignore them.</p>
<p>Sometimes these are in public parks or squares where people may go to relax or read a book on a bench in the good sunshine but they amplify their harassment to make it impossible to avoid or ignore.</p>


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<p>Please note I have nothing wrong with the idea of preaching and proselytising and would clearly distinguish this in terms of its impact on unwilling others from church preachers who genuinely care about their communities and give rigorous thought to how to enrich their members’ lives with the teachings of their faith while bringing the community members closer thereto.</p>


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<p>Are the street preachers in clear contrast then given undue privilege in their legal treatment due to the fact that they are propagating a religious cause? Something tells me that if one were out in public jumping up and down clapping and cheering about the Flying Spaghetti Monster or even about a delusion with a less established and thus less coherent (much less founded in reality) significance than the FSM that was specifically devised by a serious intellectual to make a philosophical point, harassing the public as they passed by and not taking others’ queues as to their disinterest but instead shouting more loudly at them in response, they might be sectioned based on the fervour with which they are so spectacularly preaching such delusional idiocy with no foundation in reality.</p>
<p>Or they may be proceeded against for anti social behaviour by causing others’ harassment alarm and distress.</p>
<p>Or public order offences.</p>


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<p>Or they may be proceeded against for anti social behaviour by causing others’ harassment alarm and distress.</p>
<p>Or public order offences.</p>
<p>Social stunts like Sacha Baton Cohen’s Borat character who would often say to people in public outrageous things like “you Fuck my mother” “i eat your shit” to make them distressed and puzzled is probably well protected in the U.S. due to the first amendment. Likewise, it is easy to see how the 1st amendment’s explicit address of religion gives rise to special privileged treatment of preaching where religious causes are concerned.</p>
<p>But in the UK, free speech is not absolute, and further it seems to me that religious expression is likewise perhaps not under any provision subject to especial/privileged protections.</p>


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<p>But in the UK, free speech is not absolute, and further it seems to me that religious expression is likewise perhaps not under any provision subject to especial/privileged protections.</p>
<p>Is it likely that such obnoxious street preachers disturbing the public peace are subject to privileged treatment due to the general perception among the system’s various functionaries that their activity is a long and well established phenomenon/practice, so therefore it should be allowed however much it affects others because it must be protected since it is such a historically established activity?</p>
<p>This is not opinion based. It is a legal question about the correct and customary/actual applications of laws like the human rights act, pubic order act, anti social behaviour act, &amp; mental health act.</p>


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Answer 1: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/england-and-wales" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-england-and-wales-tooltip-container">england-and-wales</a></p>
<h2>&quot;Are street preachers worthy of being sectioned?&quot;</h2>
<p>No - so far as I'm aware, no police officer has tried to use this power with regard to a street preacher, it doesn't seem relevant.</p>


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<p>No - so far as I'm aware, no police officer has tried to use this power with regard to a street preacher, it doesn't seem relevant.</p>
<p>To be involuntarily detained, compulsorily admitted, removed or 'sectioned' under <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1983/20/contents" rel="nofollow noreferrer">s136 Mental Health Act 1983</a>, &quot;Removal etc of mentally disordered persons without a warrant&quot;, the person must appear &quot;to the constable to be suffering from mental disorder and to be in immediate need of care or control&quot; and the constable must think it's necessary &quot;in the interests of that person or for the protection of other persons&quot;.</p>
<h2>&quot;Are the street preachers ... given undue privilege in their legal treatment due to the fact that they are propagating a religious cause?&quot;</h2>


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<h2>&quot;Are the street preachers ... given undue privilege in their legal treatment due to the fact that they are propagating a religious cause?&quot;</h2>
<p>There have been numerous arrests, prosecutions and convictions (and successful appeals) of street preachers. The question at law in a particular case is whether, given all the circumstances (including the preacher's behaviour and the public's behaviour), the interference with the preacher's (Human Rights Act) rights is necessary, proportionate and in pursuit of a legitimate aim.</p>
<p>Every public authority (police, prosecution, courts, local authority etc) is required to give effect to the scheduled rights in <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/contents" rel="nofollow noreferrer">the Human Rights Act 1998</a> unless statute makes that impossible. In this context, usually the two rights engaged are Articles 9 and 10.</p>
<blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p><strong>Article 9 Freedom of thought, conscience and religion</strong></p>
<ol>
<li><p>Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief
and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or
private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching,
practice and observance.</p>
</li>
<li><p>Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only
to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the
protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of
the rights and freedoms of others.</p>
</li>
</ol>
<p><strong>Article 10 Freedom of expression</strong></p>
<ol>
<li><p>Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information


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<ol>
<li><p>Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information
and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of
frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the
licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.</p>
</li>
<li><p>The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions,
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary
in a democratic society, in the interests of national security,
territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection
of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure
of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the
authority and impartiality of the judiciary.</p>
</li>
</ol>
</blockquote>


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of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the
authority and impartiality of the judiciary.</p>
</li>
</ol>
</blockquote>
<p>So speech and religion have some statutory protection but, like most of the Convention rights, they are 'qualified' rights. Their second paragraphs say when the state can lawfully interfere with the rights. For an interference to be lawful, it must be prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society; proportionate (i.e. no more than necessary); in pursuit of a 'legitimate aim' in the second paragraph; and rationally connected to the legitimate aim.</p>


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<p>In this context the legitimate aims are usually &quot;the protection of public order&quot; or &quot;the prevention of disorder or crime&quot; and the &quot;prescribed by law&quot; part are <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1986/64/section/5" rel="nofollow noreferrer">the Public Order Act</a> and other statutory powers of the police. Interferences, infringements or infringing measures are things like dispersal notices, arrests, prosecutions, convictions and sentences (community orders, fines or imprisonments).</p>
<p>The escalation commonly goes from the police asking the preacher to choose their words more carefully or leave, then order to leave, then arrest.</p>
<p>The media has reported on a number of arrests, prosecutions, convictions and appeals. Try searching the web for &quot;UK street preacher arrest&quot;. Be aware that some results are for websites with undeclared involvements with or links to defending the accused preachers.</p>


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<p>I've put some names and links below and here is a freely available judgment that contains discussion of all the above, describing that process of weighing up that every part of the state must do when it infringes on the Convention rights: <a href="https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2021/3100.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Overd &amp; Ors v The Chief Constable of Avon And Somerset Constabulary [2021] EWHC 3100 (QB) (19 November 2021)</a>. The judgment also cites other judgments to which it links, which may be of interest.</p>
<p>As backgound the four men, Overd, Stockwell, Karns and Clarke, were arrested while preaching at Broadmead shopping centre in Bristol in July 2016. The police had received complaints from the public about the content of the preaching. On arrival, the police officers perceived imminent public disorder.</p>


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<p>The four were detained, then charged under s5 Public Order Act; the case against Karns was dropped before court and the other three were tried; Clark submitted there was no case to answer and he was successful; Overd and Stockwell were convicted but their convictions were overturned on appeal.</p>
<p>Subsequently, in December 2020 the four sued the police, alleging breaches of Articles 9, 10 and/or 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights, wrongful arrest, assault/trespass to the person/battery, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution and misfeasance in public office. Their claim was dismissed on all counts, they appealed and this judgment is in that appeal which was also dismissed.</p>
<p>Other examples (but not judgments, only media reports):</p>


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<p>Other examples (but not judgments, only media reports):</p>
<p>In Leeds in June 2021, David McConnell was preaching about &quot;adulterers, drunkards, homosexuals,&quot; when he was challenged by a transwoman. McConnell repeatedly referred to her as a &quot;man&quot;, a &quot;man in woman's clothing&quot; and a &quot;gentleman&quot;. In September 2022 he was convicted of intent to cause harassment, alarm or distress, sentenced to a 12-month community order with 80 hours unpaid work and ordered to pay fines totalling £715. A spokesperson for the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) said McConnell's words &quot;crossed the line between a legitimate expression of his religious views, to become a distressing and threatening personal attack&quot; (<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-leeds-62793135" rel="nofollow noreferrer">BBC</a>).</p>


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<p>In March 2023 his conviction was overturned. The court found there was no evidence McConnell <em>intended</em> &quot;harassment, alarm and distress&quot; (<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-leeds-64905216" rel="nofollow noreferrer">BBC</a>).</p>
<p>In November 2020 John Dunn was preaching on Swindon High Street when two women, holding each other's hands, walked past him. He said, &quot;I hope you are sisters,&quot; to which they replied that they were in a same-sex mariage. Dunn responded, &quot;it says in the Bible that homosexuals will not inherit the kingdom of God.&quot; The women made a complaint to the police.</p>


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<p>Dunn was subsequently charged under <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1986/64/section/5" rel="nofollow noreferrer">s5 Public Order Act</a>. The CPS eventually dropped the case but not before causing some controversy when it was made public that a prosecution document sent to the defence said some parts of the Bible are &quot;abusive&quot; and &quot;simply no longer appropriate in modern society and which would be deemed offensive if stated in public.&quot; The CPS later said this was not its official position.</p>


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<p>In April 2021, John Sherwood was preaching outside Uxbridge Station in London when police officers approached him and said they had been told he had made homophobic comments. They arrested Sherwood under <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1986/64/section/5" rel="nofollow noreferrer">s5 Public Order Act</a> for allegedly causing alarm or distress. (<a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-9521123/Moment-police-arrest-elderly-preacher-71-street-quoting-homophobic-statements-Bible.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Daily Mail</a>)</p>
<p>In April 2022, Sherwood was tried and acquitted. Apparently his defence centred on Article 10 (freedom of expression) - I cannot find a judgment.</p>
<p>In March 2018 a Canadian preacher was arrested outside Barking Station in London. A female passerby had complained to the police that he had made homophobic comments. After being detained for 20 hours, he was released without charge.</p>


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<p>Some preachers are privileged in terms of their legal resources - some for example have been aided by the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christian_Legal_Centre" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Christian Legal Centre</a> (of Christan Concern), which has also involved itself in numerous cases ranging from 'gay cakes' to embryonic stem cell research. <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/m000110p" rel="nofollow noreferrer">This Radio 4 documentary by Joshua Rozenberg, <em>A Tale of Belief and the Courts</em></a>, may be of interest.</p>


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Question Title: What makes a price tagged item on a shelf an invitation to treat, rather than an offer of sale?


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Question Body: <p>Contrast the counter intuitive treatment in law of a store displaying stock on its shelves, with the much more common sensical treatment of a poster for an auction.</p>
<p>In an auction the stock may be particularly advertised while the prices are understood to remain to be determined. In a shop, the items are already specified, as are their prices on the tags underneath them. All the terms of the contract have already been set by the vendor such as to suit it, with the only thing remaining missing being a willing buyer. When one is so enticed by the advertised terms as to approach the store’s till with desired items in hand, why is this an offer to contract rather than a final acceptance of an offer previously promulgated by the seller by displaying their stock with specified sale prices? Why are the displays of prices retractable invitations to treat rather that offers of sale in themselves?</p>


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Answer 1: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/switzerland" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;switzerland&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;switzerland&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-switzerland-tooltip-container">switzerland</a></p>
<p>This answer is mostly to point out that the situation isn't so obvious, and may greatly differ between jurisdictions.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/cc/27/317_321_377/en" rel="nofollow noreferrer">OR Art 7</a> specifies:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>2 The sending of tariffs, price lists and the like does not constitute an offer.</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>3 By contrast, the display of merchandise with an indication of its price does generally constitute an offer.</p>
</blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>3 By contrast, the display of merchandise with an indication of its price does generally constitute an offer.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>So the seller is bound to the price tag of an item in a shelf or in a window. If the prices differ, the customer can generally request the lower price, unless the seller can clearly show that there was a significant error. There's a separate law (&quot;<a href="https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/cc/1978/2081_2081_2081/de" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Preisbekanntgabeverordnung</a>&quot;) that specifies that (under most circumstances) a shop must put price tags on their items.</p>


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<p>What margin constitutes an error is disputable. The federal court <a href="https://www.srf.ch/sendungen/kassensturz-espresso/rechtsfragen/kaufrecht/was-gilt-bei-zwei-preisen-fuer-dasselbe-produkt" rel="nofollow noreferrer">ruled</a> that an offer for an opal ring for 1380 Francs instead of 13800 could be considered an error. But a T-Shirt that is offered for 20 Francs in the shop window but 25 Francs on the shelf is probably not.</p>


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Answer 2: <p>See <em>Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v Boots Cash Chemists (Southern) Ltd.</em> <a href="https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/1953/6.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">[1953] EWCA Civ 6</a> (05 February 1953). There were several sets of reasons in agreement, but I highlight the crux of the reasoning from Somerville L.J.</p>
<blockquote>


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<p>Is it to be regarded as an offer which is completed and both sides bound when the article is put into the receptacle, or is it to be regarded as a more organised way of doing what is done already in many types of shops — and a bookseller is perhaps the beat example - namely, enabling customers to have free access to what is in the shop to look at the different articles and then, ultimately, having got the ones which they wish to buy, coming up to the assistant and saying &quot;I want this&quot;? The assistant in 999 times out of 1,000 says &quot;That is all right&quot;, and the money passes and the transaction is completed. I agree entirely with what the Lord Chief Justice says and the reasons he gives for his conclusion that in the case of the ordinary shop, although goods are displayed and it is intended that customers should go and choose what they want, the contract is not completed until, the customer having indicated the articles which he needs, the shop-keeper or someone on


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and it is intended that customers should go and choose what they want, the contract is not completed until, the customer having indicated the articles which he needs, the shop-keeper or someone on his behalf accepts that offer. Then the contract is completed.</p>


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</blockquote>
<p>The alternative seems wholly absurd. As Romer L.J. describes (and rejects) the alternative:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>if a person picked up an article, once having picked it up, he would never be able to put it back and say he had changed his mind. The shopkeeper would say: &quot;No, the property has passed and you will have to pay&quot;.</p>
</blockquote>


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Question Title: Is making napalm illegal in Washington state?

Question Body: <p>Is making it illegal in WA? Can I make it but not use it?  Is there a special place/location where it must be used? These are all questions that have baffled me for a while now.</p>


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Answer 1: <p>Yes, it is illegal. See <a href="https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/wa-court-of-appeals/1481277.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">State v. K.E., Respondent</a> (1999), who created gasoline-styrofoam napalm, and was convicted of violating <a href="https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=9.40.120" rel="nofollow noreferrer">RCW 9.40.120</a> (possession, manufacture of disposition of an incendiary device). That is defined as &quot;any material, substance, device, or combination thereof which is capable of supplying the initial ignition and/or fuel for a fire and is designed to be used as an instrument of wilful destruction&quot;. The law is framed in terms of the what use underlies the design of the substance, not the individual's personal intent behind possessing or making the substance (defendant's actual use was to light paper in a fireplace).</p>


Tags: washington


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Question Title: Can you transfer a timeshare to an LLC an then have the LLC stop paying the timeshare fees?


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Question Body: <p>I saw John Oliver's recent episode on timeshares, got an interesting idea for how to get rid of a timeshare.  I don't have a timeshare, and am not looking to get rid of a timeshare, but I am curious to see what people think of this idea.</p>
<p>Supposing you want to get rid of a timeshare, so you make a new LLC with $1 in assets, and this LLC purchases your timeshare for its $1.  Alternatively, there are timeshares for sale for $0 so for certain timeshares $0 is fair market value, so if the LLC were to purchase the timeshare at &quot;fair market value&quot; that could very well mean paying nothing.</p>
<p>Now the LLC owns the timeshare, but nothing else, and then the LLC stops paying the timeshare fees.</p>


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<p>Now the LLC owns the timeshare, but nothing else, and then the LLC stops paying the timeshare fees.</p>
<p>The timeshare company wouldn't like this but if the LLC with no assets is the owner the timeshare company won't be able to litigate against the LLC, because even if it got a judgement against the LLC the LLC has nothing, other than the timeshare itself that no one wants.  At this point if the timeshare company went after the LLC for defaulting on the timeshare agreement the LLC could simply declare bankrupcy, and let the creditors have its only asset.</p>


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Answer 1: <h2>No</h2>
<p>Contracts that are not personal services contracts are normally assignable unless there is a clause preventing transfer or requiring the other party’s permission. A timeshare contract will almost surely have such a clause, so your idea would be dead in the water.</p>
<p>However, even if it doesn't, only the <em>rights</em> to a contract are assignable, not the <em>obligations</em>. So, while the LLC can get the benefits of the timeshare, <em>you</em> remain liable for paying for it.</p>
<p>What you are looking to do is called novation, and that requires the permission of all parties to the contract.</p>
<p>However, even if the timeshare company agreed to the novation, if you do it with the intention you have outlined, this is illegal.</p>


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<p>However, even if the timeshare company agreed to the novation, if you do it with the intention you have outlined, this is illegal.</p>
<p>Think about your scheme and compare it with the elements of <a href="https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=PEN&amp;sectionNum=532." rel="nofollow noreferrer">fraud</a> in, say <a href="/questions/tagged/california" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;california&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;california&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-california-tooltip-container">california</a> (other jurisdictions are available):</p>
<blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p><strong>Every person who knowingly and designedly, by any false or fraudulent representation or pretense, defrauds any other person of money</strong>, labor, or property, whether real or personal, or who causes or procures others to report falsely of his or her wealth or mercantile character, and by thus imposing upon any person obtains credit, and thereby fraudulently gets possession of money or property, or obtains the labor or service of another, <strong>is punishable in the same manner and to the same extent as for larceny of the money or property so obtained.</strong></p>
</blockquote>
<p>Your scheme is a textbook example of fraud. So, you go to jail <em>and</em> the fraudulent transaction is of no legal effect so you still owe the money.</p>


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Question Title: Chat AI is reproducing unlicensed code from a website verbatim: what can the original author do about it?

Question Body: <p>Let's presume that a chat-based AI, for certain queries/prompts involving specific phrases, is reproducing, verbatim, code that was placed on a publicly accessible website. The code on the website had no explicit licence attached to it.</p>
<p>Presumably its algorithm was trained on code and content scraped from the internet, and when users enter prompts containing enough phrases matching the content of said page, it returns the corresponding code (about 50 lines, including comments).</p>
<p>My question is: am I correct in thinking that the copyright of the original author has been infringed? What could the author of that code realistically do about it?</p>


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Answer 1: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/united-states" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-united-states-tooltip-container">united-states</a></p>
<p>Copying computer code without permission of the author is copyright infringement. Re-distributing protected material is a further form of copyright infringement. It <em>is</em> legal for a person to read publically-available code that is put out on a web page, and you can take factual knowledge that you gain from understanding the code and implement it in your own works, which you can distribute.</p>


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<p>Permission comes in two forms: implicit and explicit. When you post some text in the open (no password required), you can read it. Even though reading an online file requires copying it, there is an implicit license to read anything out in the open. There is no implicit right to redistribute: a bot which redistributes your code has infringed your copyright. A bot which correctly checks for explicit permission to redistribute and does not redistribute without permission complies with copyright law.</p>
<p>There have been cases where simple web scraping has been the subject of a lawsuit and where it has been found that &quot;web scraping is legal&quot;, but that refers to gathering of information, and not wholesale redistribution of text. If the extent of copying is minimal, it might be possible to defend against copying plus redistribution via a fair use defense. You describe something that does beyond fair use.</p>


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Question Title: Do existing contracts get automatically transferred to the acquiring company?

Question Body: <p>Company A and Company B have a business relationship lasting for years. All kinds of agreements are in place between them. License Agreements, Supply Agreements, Development Agreements and so on.</p>

<p>Company A gets acquired by Company C. After closing, former Company A now operates as Company AC.
What happens to all the existing contracts where Company A was a Party?
Do they get automatically transferred?</p>

<p>Having to assign all the existing contracts seems to be an "impossible" task, but i do not know the leagl basis for the transfer. Can anyone shed some light both in US and European jurisdictions?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>Contracts are generally assignable, meaning that one company can assign their rights, duties and obligations under the contract. Assignment may be specifically barred by the contract, or it may have certain terms (prior written consent, etc.) attached, but if not, a contract is likely freely assignable.  Though a contract is not necessarily "automatically transferred" the reason Company C buys Company A is for its ability to earn Company C over time, which includes the contract between A &amp; B.  So unless the original contract has a "no assignments clause" or if an assignment is otherwise impossible or illegal, it is likely that A can freely assign the contract to C.</p>


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Answer 2: <p>Parties to contracts must be people.</p>
<p>People are people and companies are (legally) people but businesses are <em>not</em> people.</p>
<p>Company A is bound by the provisions of its contracts so long as the contracts have not been terminated. One of the ways that a contract will be terminated is if Company A ceases to exist; this is similar to the fact that the death of a (natural) person will also terminate a contract.</p>
<p>If Company C wants to keep the rights and obligations of Company A's contracts then they must:</p>
<ul>
<li>keep Company A operating as a subsidiary and extract the benefits through dividend or share buy-back payments or the operation of another contract,</li>
<li>assign the contracts to Company C. The benefits of contracts are, in general, transferable unless:
<ol>
<li>The contract itself says they aren’t</li>


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<li>assign the contracts to Company C. The benefits of contracts are, in general, transferable unless:
<ol>
<li>The contract itself says they aren’t</li>
<li>They are personal services contracts. That is, contracts where only the contracted individual can perform the service, for example, employment contracts. Because of this quirk, most jurisdictions have transmission of business laws that allow employment contracts to be transferred if those laws are followed.</li>
</ol>
<ul>
<li>Notwithstanding, the obligations of the contract are <em>not</em> transferable and while Company C can get the benefit, Company A remains liable for the obligations. The assignment is only enforcable if the other party to the contract is informed of it.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>Novate the contract. With the agreement of all parties, Company C can be substituted for Company A and assume all the rights and obligations under the contract</li>


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</ul>
</li>
<li>Novate the contract. With the agreement of all parties, Company C can be substituted for Company A and assume all the rights and obligations under the contract</li>
<li>make new contracts on the same or similar terms with the other party.</li>
</ul>
<p>Contracts are never &quot;automatically transferred&quot;, the party transferring from and the one transferring to have to make the transfer happen, usually they make a contract. Because contracts usually contain both rights <em>and</em> obligations, transferring one will be good consideration for both sides.</p>
<p>A company, like a natural person, can change their name while legally remaining the same company and this will not terminate any contracts.</p>


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<p>A company, like a natural person, can change their name while legally remaining the same company and this will not terminate any contracts.</p>
<p>If the company changes owners in whole or in part, it is still the same company and this will not terminate any contracts. If, instead, the company sells its business (which is an asset of the company that it can sell, like a car or a building), then the contracts are novated as part of that sale if the other party agrees, or assigned if they don't.</p>


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Answer 3: <p>There are several legal concepts going on in your question here, all of which are relevant to the answer:</p>
<ol>
<li>separate legal entities</li>
<li>privity of contract</li>
<li>novation of contracts</li>
</ol>
<p>The answer to your question is it depends on the law of governing the contract.
Each State in the US (California, New York, Georgia, …) and each country in the EU (England, France, Spain, …) has its own system of contract law.</p>
<p>Each contract that you refer to in your question might be governed by the law of a different country.</p>
<p>So first…</p>
<p><strong>Separate Legal Entities</strong></p>
<p>In HL Bolton Engineering Co Ltd v TJ Graham Sons Ltd 1957 1 QB 159, Denning LJ described companies like this:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>A company may in many ways be likened to a human body. It has a brain and nerve centre which controls what it does. It also has hands which hold the tools and act in accordance with directions from the centre.</p>


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<p>Some of the people in the company are mere [employees] and agents who are nothing more than hands to do the work and cannot be said to represent the mind or will. Others are directors and managers who represent the directing mind and will of the company, and control what it does.</p>
<p>The state of mind of these managers is the state of mind of the company and is treated by the law as such.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The hallmarks of a separate legal entity are that it can:</p>
<ul>
<li>buy, sell and own property of any kind in its own name</li>
<li>agree to legally binding contracts, and</li>
<li>sue and be sued in its own name.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Privity of Contract</strong></p>
<p>The doctrine of privity of contract consists of two general rules, one of which is:</p>
<ul>
<li>a person who is not a party to a contract cannot sue on the contract to obtain the promised performance.</li>
</ul>
<p>There are exceptions to privity of contract in some countries’ systems of law.</p>


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</ul>
<p>There are exceptions to privity of contract in some countries’ systems of law.</p>
<p><strong>Novation  of Contracts</strong></p>
<p>There is no such thing as an assignment of a contract.</p>
<p>It was held in Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd 1993 UKHL 4 (22 July 1993):</p>
<blockquote>
<p>It is trite law that it is, in any event, impossible to assign &quot;the contract&quot; as a whole, i.e. including both burden and benefit. The burden of a contract can never be assigned without the consent of the other party to the contract in which event such consent will give rise to a novation.</p>
<p>Although it is true that the phrase &quot;assign this contract&quot; is not strictly accurate, lawyers frequently use those words inaccurately to describe an assignment of the benefit of a contract since every lawyer knows that the burden of a contract cannot be assigned.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In short, contracts are not assigned:</p>
<ul>


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</blockquote>
<p>In short, contracts are not assigned:</p>
<ul>
<li>ownership of <em>assets</em> is assigned.</li>
<li>contractual rights are &quot;transferred&quot;: they're novated.</li>
</ul>
<p>The legal obligations under a contract cannot be &quot;assigned&quot; or transferred to another person, without agreement from the other contracting party(ies).</p>
<p>To transfer (or “assign”, which is a misnomer) contractual obligations the requirements of novation must be satisfied.</p>
<p>In novation, there is no assignment of rights and obligations: a new contract is created with new rights and obligations, with a new contracting party.</p>
<p><strong>Sales of Companies</strong></p>
<p>So, to answer your question, what sometimes happens is the buyer of Company A (ie Company C) puts the contracting parties of Company A on notice that Company A has been acquired and that Company C will now be fulfilling Company A’s contracts.</p>
<p>Is that an “assignment” of the contract?</p>


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<p>Is that an “assignment” of the contract?</p>
<p>Well no, but of the contracting parties of Company A then order products or receive products from Company C, and everyone is happy.</p>
<p>The contracting parties to Company A could say to Company A “You’re in breach of contract for not performing my contract. I can sue you for my loss, caused by your non-performance of the contract”.</p>
<p>Company A could then say, “Well that might be the case, but then you need to mitigate your loss for my breach of contract. There’s a company over there called Company C that can perform the contract that we used to have together on the same terms with you.”.</p>


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<p>In respect of your reference to Company AC, please see the heading &quot;Separate Legal Entities&quot; above. As I understand it, there is some sort of doctrine of merger of companies in some States of the US (such as Delaware, I believe), but I don't get into that here, because I'm not a US lawyer. That doctrine of merger might be relevant to the answer to your question under the law of some States of the US.</p>
<p>To an English contract lawyer, going by what you say in your question, Company AC is a trading name of Company C (or vice versa) or Company C changed it's name to &quot;Company AC&quot;.</p>
<p>It might work differently in the governing law of the share purchase agreement or asset sale agreement.</p>
<p>If you’re thinking of relying on any of the above for an actual acquisition, please seek medical help.</p>


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Answer 4: <p>Because the case is <em>equity/stock</em> purchase (as opposed to <em>assets</em> purchase), the answer is &quot;yes&quot;.</p>
<p>From <a href="https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/valuation/asset-purchase-vs-stock-purchase/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">here</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><em>All asset and liabilities transfer at carrying value</em></p>
<p><em>The only way to eliminate unwanted liabilities is to contractually sell them back to the target</em></p>
</blockquote>
<p>From <a href="http://macabacus.com/accounting/types-of-acquisitions" rel="nofollow noreferrer">here</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><em>All liabilities transfer to the buyer by operation of law, wanted or
not. However, the buyer can contractually allocate liabilities to the
seller by selling them back.</em></p>
</blockquote>
<p>So, what happens is the contracts get transferred automatically from A to C, but then, if the parties agree, the contracts will be transferred back to A/AC.</p>


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</blockquote>
<p>So, what happens is the contracts get transferred automatically from A to C, but then, if the parties agree, the contracts will be transferred back to A/AC.</p>
<p>Because A has changed its name to AC (as opposed to staying unrelated to C), it would be reasonable to assume that this is exactly what happened: AC has got the contracts back.</p>


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Question Title: What does it mean that, for commercial use of this font, &quot;a license is highly recommended&quot;?


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Question Body: <p>I intend to be running a web application in the browser for commercial use.
The font I am considering at the moment is: <code>Akzidenz Grotesk</code> which can be <a href="https://freefontsvault.com/akzidenz-grotesk-font-download-free/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">downloaded for free</a> provided it is for personal use. For commercial use, the website states:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Akzidenz-Grotesk is totally a free font for personal use. No license, sign up or registration is required for your personal use. But in case of commercial use, a license is highly recommended or you can buy this font by clicking here.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The confusing part to me is the wording:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>a license is highly recommended</p>
</blockquote>
<p>as if it is purely optional.</p>


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</blockquote>
<p>The confusing part to me is the wording:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>a license is highly recommended</p>
</blockquote>
<p>as if it is purely optional.</p>
<p>When consulting the <a href="https://www.bertholdtypes.com/font/akzidenz-grotesk/proplus/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">EULA at the website they are linking to</a> their language is very clear that they are not joking about their license. For my purposes it seems that I need to resort to a <a href="https://www.bertholdwebfonts.com/berthold-fonts/akzidenz-grotesk#purchase" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Web Fonts License</a>.</p>
<p>The case seems pretty clear and cut to me that the website freefontsvault.com has erred in the details provided; but still, I would like to have some confirmation if there is something obvious I am overlooking?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>When the site says &quot;a license is highly recommended&quot; I can think of one possibility. A web site can be so designed that it uses a particular font <strong>if</strong> that font is already installed locally, but falls back to some other font if it is no0t, rather than embedding the font.  Since the font in question is provided free for personal use, those  who individually download it could use such a site.</p>


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<p>The designer of a font holds copyright on it, and may license it under whatever terms s/he chooses. If a person wants to design a web site with this as an embedded font, then it must be licensed from the rights-holder on whatever terms the rights-holder offers or will agree to. There does not seem any option but to pay the licensing fee if this font is to be used in a commercial site or product. Using it without permission would be copyright infringement. The rights-holder could sue for damages. Whether it is worth paying that fee is a matter of judgement for the site designer. But there  does not seem to be any provision making a license optional for a commercial developer.</p>


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Answer 2: <p>That website is pirating it. The rights to digital fonts branded Akzidenz-Grotesk, and the trademarked name, belong to Monotype, which sells it on its MyFonts website (and some other platforms). (Monotype bought up its previous owner, Berthold Types, a few years ago.)</p>
<p>The design of the Akzidenz-Grotesk typeface is in the public domain: in the US font designs can't be copyrighted and the design anyway is long out of copyright in any country as it was published in the 1890s. There's nothing stopping you from designing your own version of Akzidenz-Grotesk provided you call it something else and many people have (<a href="https://klim.co.nz/retail-fonts/soehne/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">this one</a> is very good).</p>
<p>But the digital font versions of Akzidenz-Grotesk published by Bertold/Monotype are in copyright and the name is trademarked.</p>


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Answer 3: <p>The wording is (possibly intentionally) misleading, and suggests a false choice of</p>
<ol>
<li>buy a license, or</li>
<li>buy this license</li>
</ol>
<p>where it may be that &quot;this license&quot; is the only valid one. You would need a licence - and probably that one - to use the font commercially without infringement of the copyright holder's rights.</p>
<p>Alternatively, the option could be</p>
<ol>
<li>buy a licence, or</li>
<li>risk legal action</li>
</ol>
<p>which is technically an option, but not one that most people would consider.</p>


Tags: copyright, internet, licensing


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Question Title: Who Should Be Guilty For An Accident By An Self-Driving Car

Question Body: <p>What would happen if I had a Tesla and I had it drive through the parking lot to pick me up, but it hit someone on the way to me. Is it my fault or TESLA's fault? Explain.</p>


Answer 1: <p>One way to think about it is that the self-driving feature is just like any other feature of the car.</p>
<p>Suppose you set the parking brake of your car, but it still rolled down the hill and struck someone.  I think it's clear that you would be liable, since it's your car and you were in control of it.</p>
<p>If the brakes were faulty, you <em>might</em> have a civil claim against the manufacturer for producing a faulty device.  But that would be a separate claim</p>
<p>You can think of the self-driving feature the same way.  Of course, this is an area of emerging law and new technology, so things could change.</p>


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Answer 2: <p>Did you willfully operate the car?</p>
<p>If yes, you're the person liable.</p>
<p><strong>Then</strong>, you might have a civil case against Tesla for selling you a product that did not meet your expectations.</p>
<p>If the product didn't meet even the most basic expectations of usability - e.g. if the brake pedal acted as gas instead - it can be a decisive argument in your defense. But you're still the defendant, as it was you that pressed that pedal.</p>


Tags: driving, negligence, car


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Question Title: If Microsoft and Activision Blizzard are both based in the USA, how does the UK have standing to block the merger?


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Question Body: <p>Per this story from the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-65378617" rel="nofollow noreferrer">BBC</a> or <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-04-26/microsoft-s-69-billion-activision-deal-blocked-by-uk-watchdog#xj4y7vzkg" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Bloomberg</a></p>
<p>The UK Competition and Markets Authority has apparently decided to block the merger of Microsoft and Activision Blizzard.  The story notes: &quot;To go through, the deal has to be approved by regulatory bodies in the UK, United States and European Union.&quot;</p>
<p>From Wikipedia:</p>
<p>&quot;Activision Blizzard, Inc. is an American video game holding company based in Santa Monica, California.&quot;</p>
<p>&quot;Microsoft Corporation is an American multinational technology corporation headquartered in Redmond, Washington.&quot;</p>
<p>Both noted as &quot;American&quot; and both noted as being based out of American states, rather than registered abroad.</p>


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<p>Both noted as &quot;American&quot; and both noted as being based out of American states, rather than registered abroad.</p>
<p>Question: If both companies are American and based in American locations, then why does the UK or the EU have any ability to block such a merger?</p>
<p>I could see saying &quot;those companies are no longer allowed to sell their combined products in those locations&quot;, which might be equivalent, yet not blocking the actual merger itself.</p>


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Answer 1: <p>The basis is set out in the <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/644939aa529eda000c3b0525/Microsoft_Activision_Final_Report_.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Final Report</a> of the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/microsoft-slash-activision-blizzard-merger-inquiry" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Microsoft / Activision Blizzard  Merger Inquiry</a>, in particular Chapters 1 (p24) and 3 (p35-36). The role and powers of the Competition and Markets Authority are set out in the <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/40/contents" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Enterprise Act 2002</a>, as amended in 2013 when it replaced the Competition Commission (with predecessor bodies going back to 1949).</p>


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<p>The overall procedure is pretty complex, but the main point is that a CMA investigation will happen whenever there is a &quot;relevant merger situation&quot;, and the result of that may be an order telling the companies what to do. It could stop them from merging, or impose various conditions about the conduct of business - see <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/40/schedule/8" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Schedule 8</a> for a long list of possibilities. Their jurisdiction over this anticipated &quot;relevant merger situation&quot; is on the basis that</p>
<ol>
<li>The two enterprises, namely Microsoft and Activision Blizzard, would cease to be distinct enterprises (<a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/40/section/23" rel="nofollow noreferrer">s.23(1)(a)</a>) because they would be brought under common ownership or control (<a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/40/section/26" rel="nofollow noreferrer">s.26</a>).</li>


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<li>The acquired company, Activision Blizzard, has a UK turnover of more than £70m (s.23(1)(b)), in fact £716m in FY2021.</li>
</ol>
<p>The report dedicates some words in Chapter 3 to proving that Microsoft and Activision are both businesses, just in case anybody was in doubt about that.</p>
<p>In essence, the CMA has these powers because a lot of people in the UK play World of Warcraft (etc.) and there could be a &quot;substantial lessening of competition&quot; in the console gaming market as a result of the acquisition. If Activision had fewer UK customers then the £70m threshold would not be reached.</p>


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<p>While the investigation overall is addressed to &quot;Microsoft&quot; and &quot;Activision Blizzard&quot; without analyzing the precise structure of the enterprises, any final order from the CMA would be addressed to more specific entities - perhaps <a href="https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/01624297" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Microsoft Ltd.</a> in the UK as well as its American parent, among others. In other cases, orders have been similarly directed to various non-UK companies as well as domestic ones. But the CMA does not require a company to be UK-registered in order to exercise power over it. The relevant statutory condition is about how the enterprise (of whatever kind, wherever incorporated, however structured) does business in the UK.</p>
<p>Other countries' equivalent bodies do basically the same thing, and can similarly impose conditions on foreign companies.</p>


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<p>Other countries' equivalent bodies do basically the same thing, and can similarly impose conditions on foreign companies.</p>
<p>The structure and safeguards in the law mean that the CMA cannot act totally capriciously, or impose conditions that go beyond the scope of its remit (competition in the UK market). So even though Schedule 8 seems very broad on its face, it actually is more limited.</p>


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Answer 2: <h2>They do business in the UK</h2>
<p>That makes them subject to UK law.</p>
<p>If they withdrew from that market, then they would no longer be subject to UK law. However, the business that each does in the UK is likely several orders of magnitude more profitable than the merger is likely to be, so they won’t.</p>


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Answer 3: <p>The <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/644939aa529eda000c3b0525/Microsoft_Activision_Final_Report_.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Final Report</a> of the Competition &amp; Markets Authority explains the effectiveness of a merger prohibition remedy.</p>
<p>It explains that the prohibition &quot;would be effected by accepting undertakings under section 82 of the Act or making an order under section 84 of <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/40/contents" rel="nofollow noreferrer">the Act</a>.&quot;</p>
<p>It also explains the &quot;jurisdiction test&quot;: &quot;whether the Merger has sufficient connection with the UK on a turnover or share of supply basis to give the CMA jurisdiction to investigate.&quot;</p>


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<p>There are various enforcement actions available under the <em>Enterprise Act</em>, including rights of action given to anyone affected by a contravention of a prohibition order or undertaking (<a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/40/section/94" rel="nofollow noreferrer">s. 94</a>).</p>


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Question Title: Can a defendant remain silent (invoke 5th amendment) during cross examination?

Question Body: <p>Suppose a defendant testifies at a criminal trial and is advised beforehand that the prosecution has a right to cross examine him. Suppose the defendant answers all of his lawyer's questions on direct examination.</p>
<p>Would that defendant be able to refuse to answer some (or any) of the questions the prosecution asks on cross examination? I would expect the prosecution to ask questions that would tend to incriminate the defendant, and I'm wondering if, by voluntarily testifying on direct, the court would see his right to remain silent as being waived permanently, or if the court would be fine with the defendant re-asserting his 5th amendment rights during cross.</p>


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Answer 1: <p>No, a defendant may not remain silent on cross-examination.</p>
<p>Witnesses who voluntarily testify in their own defense are subject to cross-examination on that testimony.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://casetext.com/case/fitzpatrick-v-united-states-2#p315" rel="noreferrer"><em>Fitzpatrick v. United States</em>, 178 U.S. 304, (1900)</a>, a murder defendant testified that he was at two bars and then his cabin the night of the crime. The trial court held that having waived his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, the defendant was subject to cross examination about what he was wearing that night, his connections to a co-defendant, the co-defendant's clothes, and who else was at the cabin with him. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that if a defendant voluntary makes a statement about the crime at trial, the prosecution may cross-examine him with as much latitude as it would have with any other witness:</p>
<blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p>The witness having sworn to an alibi, it was perfectly competent for the government to cross-examine him as to every fact which had a bearing upon his whereabouts upon the night of the murder, and as to what he did and the persons with whom he associated that night. Indeed, we know of no reason why an accused person, who takes the stand as a witness, should not be subject to cross-examination as other witnesses are.</p>
</blockquote>
<p><em>Fitzpatrick v. United States</em>, 178 U.S. 304, 315 (1900).</p>


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Answer 2: <p>Perhaps. <a href="https://legalbrief.com/ingram.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">This article</a> addresses the balance between the 5th Amendment protection against compelled self-incrimination, and the Confrontation Clause of the 6th Amendment. For example, a defense witness cannot refuse to answer a question that is solely about the witness' credibility. The basis for such a refusal is limited to protection against self-incrimination. Then, the witness can still be compelled to testify if granted immunity from prosecution (since there is no risk of incrimination). There are other protections pertaining to convicted defendants and the likelihood of a death sentence or a more severe non-death penalty. For a non-defendant, the right is asserted on a question-by-question basis. However (<a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/340/367/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Rogers v. US</a>, 340 U.S. 367), when a witness has voluntarily self-incriminated, they cannot then


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However (<a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/340/367/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Rogers v. US</a>, 340 U.S. 367), when a witness has voluntarily self-incriminated, they cannot then refuse to answer further questions that supply details. Even then, the right is not waived entirely, and exists in terms of increased risk of incrimination.</p>


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Answer 3: <p>As noted, in a <em>criminal trial</em> the defendant, having voluntarily taken the stand in his own defense, is deemed to have <em>waived</em> (given up) his right to the protections of the Fifth Amendment, and must answer the prosecutor's questions.</p>
<p>But this does not mean that he must answer any and all questions the prosecutor may ask him. <em>Relevance</em> is still an issue; the question must be <em>relevant</em> to the matter on trial. If the prosecutor asks a question not relevant to the current trial, the judge will sustain an objection and tell the defendant he need not answer.</p>


Tags: united-states, criminal-law, fifth-amendment, testimony, cross-examination


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Question Title: Is personal information of arrestees published publicly?

Question Body: <p>Is personal information (e.g., names, address, phone number, past residences, etc.) of arrestees published publicly? Are arrest records public at all? If so, how would they be found?</p>


Answer 1: <p>Generally speaking arrest records are open and made available to the public. Except in the case of an ongoing investigation. In which case the rules vary by state.</p>

<p>The details of what's available also vary by location.</p>

<p>I would begin searching by going to the courthouse or police station if you know it. And inquiring with the clerk. If you want a broad search on a specific individual, you can do a criminal background check which sweeps multiple databases of many jurisdictions simultaneously.</p>

<p><a href="https://www.rcfp.org/private-eyes/arrest-records" rel="nofollow">Here is an article explaining more details</a>.</p>


Tags: privacy, arrest


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Question Title: Arrest records. Case never filed

Question Body: <p>If I got arrested 2 years ago but the case was never picked up and never got the chance to see the judge because the state didnt press charges and the person never pressed charges will it still show up on my background?  I went to the. Courthouse to get a background check and they said I have nothing and if I was arrested 2 yrs ago it was never filed. What does that mean?</p>


Answer 1: <p>There is probably a record of your arrest which would show up in a background search (although the jurisdiction in question, i.e. the country, or sub-division of a country such as a U.S. state in countries organized on a federal basis, would matter).</p>

<p>Generally, a failure to seek criminal charges does not mean that there is no record of your arrest. </p>


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<p>Generally, a failure to seek criminal charges does not mean that there is no record of your arrest. </p>

<p>The courthouse is often not the bureaucratic entity that maintains arrest records. In many jurisdictions, arrest records (unlike records of criminal charges and criminal convictions) are maintained by law enforcement rather than the courts.</p>

<p>Whether it is possible to have arrest records sealed is a separate and more complicated and jurisdiction specific question.</p>


Tags: criminal-law


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Question Title: Are U.S. mailboxes federal property?

Question Body: <p>A common claim seems to be that mailboxes in the United States are federal property (<a href="https://www.mailboss.com/mailboxes-federal-property/" rel="noreferrer">example</a>, <a href="http://www.residential-mailboxes.net/mailbox-laws-and-regulations/law-for-residential-mail-box" rel="noreferrer">example</a>, <a href="https://www.mackinac.org/5394" rel="noreferrer">example</a>). (To be clear, some mailboxes are owned and maintained by the USPS, typically cluster boxes, but this is referring to mailboxes purchased and installed by property owners.)</p>


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<p>The justification for this statement is typically that U.S. code makes mailbox vandalism or use for non-USPS materials a federal crime; thus, USPS has total control over your mailbox. This seems questionable. Obviously, if you go smashing other people's mailboxes or go box to box inserting pamphlets, you are liable to get in trouble with the postal inspector, but that seems unrelated to who <em>owns</em> the mailbox.</p>

<p>In fact, the <a href="https://faq.usps.com/s/article/Mailbox-The-Basics" rel="noreferrer">USPS website seems to acknowledge</a> that some mailboxes are privately owned.</p>

<p>What is the real story here? Are U.S. mailboxes property of the USPS? To what extent do property owners have control over their own mailbox? Can they deface or place non-mail in their own mailbox? Can they tear it down with no intent to replace it?</p>


Answer 1: <p>The real story is that the articles you link to are logically fallacious.</p>


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Answer 1: <p>The real story is that the articles you link to are logically fallacious.</p>

<p>The first hedges its assertions by saying a mailbox is "effectively considered" to be federal property.  It cites <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1705" rel="noreferrer">18 USC 1705</a>, which it correctly notes "puts your mailbox under Federal jurisdiction."  But that's not the same as assuming ownership of it.  The piece also says that you "effectively lease" your mailbox to the federal government, which is a somewhat exaggerated way of putting it, but even if we accept it at face value it falls far short of a claim that the mailbox is federal property.</p>


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<p>The second concludes that mailbox tampering is a federal offense because "the mailbox belongs to and is controlled by the USPS."  There is no evidence offered to support the assertion of ownership, and there is of course an alternative explanation for the fact that mailbox tampering is a federal offense, which is that there are laws such as the aforementioned 18 USC 1705 that prohibit it.  These laws, however, say nothing about ownership.</p>


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<p>The third is ultimately based on the assertion of a letter carrier who said, "Listen, lady, your friends don’t own these mailboxes. We do."  The claim was made in explanation of the prohibition against private individuals putting items into a mailbox.  As far as I can see, the article is off the mark in another way: that prohibition has nothing to do with safety and security, but rather with protecting the postal service's revenue: it arises from <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1725" rel="noreferrer">18 USC 1725</a>, which explicitly is about avoiding the payment of postage.  In any event, it does not establish ownership.</p>

<p>In short, the idea that all mailboxes are federal property is a myth, as implied by the USPS page you link to.</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>To what extent do property owners have control over their own mailbox?</p>
</blockquote>


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<blockquote>
  <p>To what extent do property owners have control over their own mailbox?</p>
</blockquote>

<p>To a fairly high extent, but they do need to comply with the relevant law.  They can't, for example, hang a plastic bottle by the roadside for the purpose of receiving their mail.</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>Can they deface or place non-mail in their own mailbox?</p>
</blockquote>

<p>18 USC 1705 actually prohibits willful or malicious injury, tearing down, or destruction of a mailbox, not defacing.  So technically, they could, but a prosecution seems highly unlikely.  Under section 1725, placing non-mail in the box is only prohibited to the extent that there is intent to avoid paying postage.  That would be difficult to establish for someone putting something in their own mailbox.</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>Can they tear it down with no intent to replace it?</p>
</blockquote>


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<blockquote>
  <p>Can they tear it down with no intent to replace it?</p>
</blockquote>

<p>If they're willing to forego mail delivery, yes.  They may be able to arrange to have the mail held for retrieval at the post office.  If they do not, their mail will be returned to the sender as undeliverable.  This arises from the Domestic Mail Manual, which says (in general) that <a href="https://pe.usps.com/text/dmm300/508.htm#ep1058021" rel="noreferrer">"customers must provide authorized mail receptacles or door slots"</a> as a condition of city delivery (I could not find a corresponding requirement for rural delivery, but it must exist somewhere).  The manual also <a href="https://pe.usps.com/text/dmm300/508.htm#ep1051804" rel="noreferrer">describes requirements for customer mail receptacles</a>.</p>


Tags: united-states, mail


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Question Title: In urban areas, U-turns are not permitted on a roadway between intersections and at an alley intersection

Question Body: <p>Alberta's Driver's Guide says &quot;<a href="https://www.alberta.ca/u-turns.aspx" rel="nofollow noreferrer">in urban areas, U-turns are not permitted on a roadway between intersections
and at an alley intersection</a>&quot;. What would be the reason or reasons behind the prohibitions? If I have asked the question on the wrong forum, please let me know. Thank you!</p>


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Answer 1: <p>The most likely reason is that in the Americas, most cities are built in grids.  For the first couple of hundred years of European colonization, grid cities were highly efficient, as it was easy to survey and parcel off property and allowed for movement of pedestrian and equine traffic efficiently in lines (go two blocks up and two blocks right, and you're there).  Then, everything changed when the automobile was invented... Most roads were not built with the car in mind and they were a bit faster and less mobile for grid cities.  This lead to a situation where many roads in urban cores are more crowded because of cars, but the roads cannot be expanded because the property along them is owned by many different parties, and that's not with historical structures that are protected from being torn down.</p>


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<p>As such, it may be prudent to add stricter controls to the vehicle flow in cities by limiting the ability to turn around.  One of the main disadvantages of grids for automobiles is that there is frequent intersections, which disrupts the flow of traffic because often only one direction can go.  Often to ease this, &quot;Right on Red&quot; rules are introduced that allow traffic making right hand turns to do so after stopping for oncoming traffic.  This helps reduce the wait for the green light and allows more people to continue on their journey and free up space on that section of a road.  Because a U-turn is a wide turn on a left hand turn, it might risk the people who have Right on Red (often times if traffic is only allowed to make left hand turns on a green left hand arrow, the right hand turns are also given a green arrow).  U-Turns there for are difficult for Right on Red traffic to predict because there is no way to indicate if a car is making a left or a U.   Furthermore,


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hand turns are also given a green arrow).  U-Turns there for are difficult for Right on Red traffic to predict because there is no way to indicate if a car is making a left or a U.   Furthermore, in a grid city, a U-Turn can be achieved by making three lefts and then a right hand turn onto the original road, so it's not much of an inconvenience.</p>


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<p>This is likely a quirk of Alberta, as the U.S. (where driving rules tend to be similar.) U-turns are typically permitted unless signs specifically disallow it.  We do have occasional intersections where signs will indicate a lane can make a U-Turn (these generally have two dedicated left hand turn lanes, with the furthest left turn being a U-turn permitted lane, and all other left turn only lanes not permitting it.).</p>


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Question Title: Are parents liable to prosecution as soon as they know that their child has stolen something?

Question Body: <p>In Germany, children up to the age of 14 are not liable to prosecution. What happens when a child steals a sweet in the supermarket and the parents don't notice at first? Only when they get home do they notice that their child has stolen something. Can the parents be prosecuted from that moment on if they know about it but do not give it back?</p>


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Answer 1: <ul>
<li>No, you are not personally criminally liable for a crime a third party has committed, even if you are their guardian.
The conflict is managed by <strong>civil action</strong>, i. e. the store owner sues the child/guardian for damages.</li>
<li>In general, it is not a crime to <em>not</em> report a crime, planned, happening, or finished.
There is one section that <strong>penalizes failing to report</strong> a <em>planned</em> crime, § 138 StGB.
However, only very serious crimes such as homicide are eligible.</li>
<li>So what about <strong>aiding theft</strong>, §§ 242 Ⅰ, 27 Ⅰ StGB, e. g. by attending the child:
This requires criminal intent, that means knowledge about and deliberate intent to commit a crime.
Since the guardian wasn’t aware of anything, he can’t be liable.</li>
<li>As a guardian (§ 1626 BGB, or in general any guarantor) you can commit a crime by <em>omitting</em> a behavior, § 13 Ⅰ StGB (<em>Garantenstellung</em>).


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<li>As a guardian (§ 1626 BGB, or in general any guarantor) you can commit a crime by <em>omitting</em> a behavior, § 13 Ⅰ StGB (<em>Garantenstellung</em>).
<strong>Theft by omission</strong>, §§ 242 Ⅰ, 13 Ⅰ StGB.
The purpose of § 13 Ⅰ StGB is that you are forced intervene if an infringement of protected legal interests (e. g. life and limb, property, freedom) is imminent.
As a parent you are a guarding guarantor (<em>Beschützergarant</em>).
You are supposed to protect your child.
However, § 13 Ⅰ StGB only has the extent of protecting legal interests of your patron.
The <em>supermarket</em> owner’s property is not a legal interest you are mandated to protect.
Hence no crime either.</li>
<li><strong>Approving or rewarding a crime</strong>, § 140 StGB:
Theft is not eligible, only crimes that are deemed suitable to disturb public order.</li>
<li><strong>Failure to educate</strong>, § 171 StGB:


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Theft is not eligible, only crimes that are deemed suitable to disturb public order.</li>
<li><strong>Failure to educate</strong>, § 171 StGB:
If you <em>grossly</em> fail to educate your child, even go as far as encouraging it in engaging in criminal activities, you commit a crime.
However, this is a one time occurrence we’re talking about, so not even remotely criminal.</li>
<li>Various “gang crimes”.
A family should not be considered a gang (Art. 6 Ⅰ GG), but the DA has an infinite amount of fantasy.</li>
</ul>


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Question Title: Murder vs aggravated assault vs attempted murder

Question Body: <p>Just watched "Night watching" on A&amp;E. On the show, someone was stabbed 23 times. At the end the narrator said that a suspect was arrested and charged with 23 counts of aggravated assault.</p>

<p>Why not charge attempted murder? I would imagine the penalty for attempted murder is about the same as murder right?</p>


Answer 1: <p>It could depend on jurisdiction: in Georgia, attempted murder has a 10 year maximum term and aggravate assault has 20 years max. The essential difference is that attempted murder requires proving intent to kill, whereas "harm" is much broader and thus easier to prove.</p>


Tags: united-states, criminal-law, murder


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Question Title: Is law enforcement responsible for damages made by a search warrant?

Question Body: <p>Why do police use a battering ram without first checking the doorknob on a low threat warrant? What if a small child was on the other side of the door and got seriously injured by the battering ram? The door and frame is likely to be damaged and may cost hundreds of dollars to replace but there is a small chance someone could also get injured.</p>

<p>I have seen where the landlord will let police in with a search warrant with 0 damage but in other cases they can devastate the house breaking and rummaging with a near 0 regard the property and tenants personal items. </p>

<p>Can the landlord sue for damages? Are police above criminal law for destruction of property in this matter when they don't at least try the unlocked door?</p>


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<p>Can the landlord sue for damages? Are police above criminal law for destruction of property in this matter when they don't at least try the unlocked door?</p>

<p>I understand that some damages in court could be argued as previous damage or damages needed for entry but what if you can prove it was intentional and unwarranted with no reason?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>The police officers themselves are covered by <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualified_immunity" rel="noreferrer">Qualified Immunity</a> - to put it briefly, a government official acting in their official capacity in a discretionary act (as in, they have some discretion in whether/how they carry out the act) is immune from suit so long as they pay reasonable deference to relevant law.  In the case of the police, so long as the search or seizure itself is reasonable (either because there is a warrant, or because they had probable cause), they can take appropriately destructive measures to carry out their duty.  Even if the search or seizure is later found to have been unreasonable, an officer may still have Qualified Immunity unless their action violated "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which reasonable person would have known" (<a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/457/800/" rel="noreferrer">Harlow v. Fitzgerald</a>).


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statutory or constitutional rights of which reasonable person would have known" (<a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/457/800/" rel="noreferrer">Harlow v. Fitzgerald</a>).  However, a search/seizure doesn't give the police license for arbitrary destruction, whatever they do has to be reasonably pursuant to the legal search/seizure.  For example, if a suspect is barricaded in a house with a gun, they can knock down doors, windows and walls to apprehend them.  On the other hand, that does not mean the officers can then break open safes to try and find evidence - once their probable cause for the entry is fulfilled (apprehending the suspect), they need to get a warrant to do more than a plain sight search of the house.  Warrants will specify what items are being searched for, so even with a warrant the police have to take reasonable measures to carry it out - an example of an unreasonable measure would be to tear into walls in order to try and find a stolen bicycle.  On


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so even with a warrant the police have to take reasonable measures to carry it out - an example of an unreasonable measure would be to tear into walls in order to try and find a stolen bicycle.  On the other hand, tearing into walls could be justified if their warrant included searching for drugs from a dealer, where it is not uncommon to hide them in the walls.</p>


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<p>States and the Federal Government enjoy <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sovereign_immunity_in_the_United_States#State_actions_in_violation_of_the_US_or_state_Constitution" rel="noreferrer">Sovereign Immunity</a> from suits in most cases.  There are some exceptions, but none would apply in this case so long as the general policy of the police department was not illegal or unconstitutional.  However, county and city governments do not enjoy Sovereign Immunity and state governments and the Federal Government often allow suits against them for negligence from their actors, so someone injured by unreasonable police action can usually try to recover damages from the officer's department.</p>


Tags: united-states, criminal-law, rental-property, damages, malpractice


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Question Title: Is it really an abduction if the protest or resistance ends before the &quot;victim&quot; is &quot;released&quot;?

Question Body: <p>My friend ran into her ex-boyfriend at a store. They began arguing, he grabbed her and carried her to his truck, then drove off with her and didn't have her consent.</p>

<p>She tells me that he was going to take her home after "dragging her to Burger King". She says he made her go. The police pulled them over on the way back and arrested him. She later had the charges dropped claiming she didn't want to send him to jail because he didn't hurt her.</p>

<p>Was this an abduction and an illegal act? Does it become acceptable legally if she later is okay with being taken away? Was he therefore falsely arrested because there was no crime?</p>


Answer 1: <p>Yes. </p>

<p>This is clearly kidnapping. It is probably not a terribly aggravated sub-type of kidnapping, but it is kidnapping nonetheless. It is probably a felony. </p>


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Answer 1: <p>Yes. </p>

<p>This is clearly kidnapping. It is probably not a terribly aggravated sub-type of kidnapping, but it is kidnapping nonetheless. It is probably a felony. </p>

<p>The fact that the victim does not press charges, or ratifies the conduct after the fact, does not change the fact that a crime was committed. </p>

<p>The police decision to arrest the ex-boyfriend was entirely proper. It was not a false arrest. They had probable cause to believe that a crime was committed by the ex-boyfriend, and, in fact, a crime actually was committed by the ex-boyfriend.</p>


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<p>In the United States, the prosecutor has full authority to prosecute the ex-boyfriend to the full extent of the law for felony kidnapping for his  conduct, over the objections of the victim. The decision to prosecute or not is entirely in the discretion of the prosecutor who brings criminal charges on behalf of the state and not the victim. Often the police and prosecutors will honor a victim's wishes, and this appears to be what happened in this case, but they are not required to do so, and could change their minds and bring charges in the future against the ex-boyfriend within the statute of limitations, if they wanted to do so.</p>

<p>(This analysis does not apply in countries with Islamic law, but the facts of the question suggest that Islamic law does not apply in this jurisdiction.)</p>


Tags: criminal-law, definition, false-arrest, kidnapping


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Question Body: <p>I am confused about the following <a href="https://www.alberta.ca/driving-laws.aspx" rel="nofollow noreferrer">statement</a>.</p>
<p>First it says:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>a prior offence in the last 10 years, you will be disqualified from holding a driver's licence for 3 years from the date of the conviction</p>
</blockquote>
<p>but then it says:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>2 or more prior offences in the last 10 years, you will be disqualified from holding a driver's licence for 5 years from the date of the conviction.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Shouldn't the second part say:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><strong>3</strong> or more prior offences in the last 10 years, you will be disqualified from holding a driver's licence for 5 years from the date of the conviction</p>
</blockquote>
<p>because the first part says if you already have a prior offence and later you have a second one, then you will be disqualified from holding a driver's licence for 3 years from the date of the conviction?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>No. The first part addresses the penalties for a second offense. The second part addresses the penalties for a third or subsequent offense.</p>


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Answer 2: <p>The wording is from the current ongoing trial that leads to a conviction.</p>
<ul>
<li>Alice drives drunk. She has no prior convictions, so is not disqualified.</li>
<li>Bob drives drunk. He has a conviction from last year. He is disqualified to drive for 3 years from his new conviction.</li>
<li>Charly drives Drunk. He has one conviction from 5 years ago, one from 4 years ago, and just regained his license last year. Now he is convicted and disqualified for the next 5 years.</li>


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<li>Charly drives Drunk. He has one conviction from 5 years ago, one from 4 years ago, and just regained his license last year. Now he is convicted and disqualified for the next 5 years.</li>
<li>Dorothy drives Drunk. She has a long record of drunken driving, but never without a license. She regained her license two weeks ago after having been disqualified for 5 years. That was 2 weeks ago, and now she is standing in court for drunk driving again. The last disqualification happened 5 years and 16 days after the preceding conviction and is thus 10 years and 1 month prior to the new conviction - and thus outside the 10-year window. As a strange result, she only has a single conviction inside that window and would be disqualified for only 3 years.</li>
</ul>


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Question Title: Is there any legal avenue for declaration of residence in Denmark with the right to not have a home?


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Question Body: <p>This website (<a href="https://international.kk.dk/cpr-number" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://international.kk.dk/cpr-number</a>) clearly states a condition for officially becoming a resident in Denmark and getting a CPR number is that you have an actual residence, a place to live.</p>
<p>Something I have noticed in Denmark, Sweden, and Germany, is that it is often reflected as extremely important, by various administrative procedures, that you live in a “real” form of housing, like an apartment or a house. It is not at all easy to just casually declare some address as your own, or a PO Box. It must be a dwelling the government considers official in all ways, not just meeting various habitability codes, but also I think an address that in general has a kind of residential “zoning”, like some addresses are simply not even considered residential, regardless of what’s actually there.</p>


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<p>The part that makes this seem like a regrettable bureaucracy is that in all of these three countries, the converse is true for maintaining residence status: matters of citizenship, criminal activity, deportation and so on aside, there is (I think) basically no formal concept of needing to maintain your residence status. Basically, the second the government has accepted your residence application at some address, you could immediately move out and become homeless for the next ten years, but you will have officially gotten your foot in the door, and will be entitled to all of the rights of someone residing in that country. But before that initial registration happens, the opposite, where you are barred from a number of civil services and provisions because you’re basically just a foreigner, visitor or illegal alien there.</p>


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<p>It seems that this type of law is far more geared towards a certain practical effect then it is meant to have a particular intrinsic meaning, an actual necessary condition for some reason. They just need to make it slightly hard for anyone in the world to move there unrestricted and self-declare as residents.</p>
<p>But given how trivial one’s evasion of that condition can be - I have registered at a hostel I spent a month at and have not been there in several months; I can easily register with a friend on a whim, who simply says “mi casa es tu casa” even though I maybe have never even set foot inside of their home - it opens the genuinely important question to me of whether people should ultimately have the legal right to declare themselves a resident of a certain country, under certain conditions, without needing to have a specific home, address or apartment that you live at.</p>


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<p>I think it’s very important because it is a fundamental and natural human right to not have to pay money to spend time inside of a building every night. You absolutely have the right to be “homeless”, to sleep on the ground, in a van, to camp, to be a drifter, to move around from place to place.</p>
<p>So, is there any legal avenue for a person to declare residence in Denmark, openly communicating that they do not have any home or personal address? For example, could there be any claim to fulfilling the essential role of a resident but who simply asserts their right to be a part of Denmark without having to have a home? Is there any even tiny legal opening for such an idea? And if not, isn’t that a pretty major violation of human rights, that it’s effectively illegal to not pay money to live inside of an apartment, that it mandatorily costs money just to have a place to sleep at night, that you have to pay money just for being alive?</p>


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Answer 1: <h2>No</h2>
<p>It is not a fundamental human right to be able to become a resident of Denmark.</p>
<p>Every country has the right to decide who is and who is not a resident and what criteria need to be satisfied. Having a residence is usually a pretty fundamental criterion for being a resident.</p>
<p>At the same time, most countries have laws that state what areas and types of structures can be used as residences. There may be zoning requirements and building codes. You may argue that you should be able to decide what you will accept as your living quarters but that presumes, wrongly, that your decision doesn’t affect other people. As a simple counter example, emergency services might need to enter your “dwelling” and it must be, among other things, structurally sound enough for them to do so safely.</p>
<p>So given that becoming a resident of Denmark is not a fundamental human right stated anywhere, Denmark can decide who is and is not.</p>


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<p>So given that becoming a resident of Denmark is not a fundamental human right stated anywhere, Denmark can decide who is and is not.</p>
<p>Of course, you can lie and say you have a residence when you don’t but lying to the government in order to obtain something you are not actually entitled to is likely to solve all your Danish residence problems; they’ll deport you.</p>


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Answer 2: <p>You mentioned <a href="/questions/tagged/germany" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-germany-tooltip-container">germany</a>.</p>
<p>Germany discriminates between German citizens, EU citizens, foreign permanent residents, and not-yet-resident foreigners. Your assertion is wrong, the lack of a residence can lead to the deportation of a foreigner.</p>


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<p>A German citizen does not have to have a residence. While it is legally required to register a primary residence if there is one, the relevant laws cope with citizens who have lost their residence (e.g. become homeless, become imprisoned, become hospitalized for the long term). For practical purposes, EU/EEA citizens can <em>stay</em> in Germany indefinitely without a residential addess, but they will have problems with accessing certain government services and subsidies and with their taxes (but then homeless people tend to earn little).</p>
<p>A foreign permanent resident, on the other hand, has to show adequate housing for herself/himself and any dependents, if any. This is explicitly examined during naturalization procedures as well. Visitors will have to show the financial means to rent short-term accommodation if that is not provided by a host.</p>


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<p>As to the practical ease of evasion, there are two issues. The first is <em>lying</em> on an official document. Maintaining a lie often requires more lies, which can lead to trouble. And then there is the second part. Official correspondence is considered delivered once it is in your letter box. Failing to read it can have consequences.</p>


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Question Title: Where to get a notarized document certified in Nashville, TN?

Question Body: <p>I've spent half my day browsing government websites and calling various departments and I'm at a loss.</p>
<p>I'm trying to get a Single Status Affidavit notarized and then get it authenticated with an Apostille to use it abroad.</p>
<p>Could anyone explain to me where I should take my notarized document, to get the notary signature certified as stated in <a href="https://sos.tn.gov/businesses/guides/apostille-authentication-guide" rel="nofollow noreferrer">this step-by-step process</a>. I've found a Notary Public that is willing to notarize it but I don't know how to proceed.</p>


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Answer 1: <p>Look at the seal the notary affixes to your document and see what county it says, or ask the notary when they do it. Look up the clerk of that county and take the notarized document to their office and ask them to certify the signature for an Apostille.</p>
<p>For example, the city of Nashville is in Davidson County. If the notary has their commission in Davidson County, you'd go to the <a href="https://www.nashville.gov/departments/county-clerk" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Davidson County Clerk</a>.</p>


Tags: united-states, tennessee


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Question Title: Taking pictures of book

Question Body: <p>In my textbooks there is computer code. I want to take pictures of the pages where the code is contained and and convert those images to text in order to run the code. Is it legal to run the code in this way and can I store the code in a computer ?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>Copyright law holds that you may not copy the works of a person without the permission of the author. Taking a photograph of a work, even a text work, is making a copy. The foundation of your plan is therefore illegal, but still you might get away with it. In some jurisdictions such as the US there are concepts like &quot;fair use&quot;, or related concepts (<em>not</em> in US law) allowing copying for educational or personal purposes.</p>


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<p>There is also a concept of <a href="https://www.authorsalliance.org/2020/05/27/implied-licenses-in-copyright-law/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">implied license</a>, where a person acts in such a way that a person reasonably infers that they have permission for certain purposes (which underlies the legality of general web page access). It may be reasonable to infer that the author intended that the reader actually do what the text instructs them to do (&quot;try it yourself&quot; is endemic in HTML instructional webpages, for example). However, inferring permission when there is none is risky. A lack of explicit statement about copying could either be because the author failed to permit copying, or because he failed to expressly prohibit it or password-protect it. The law requires you to have permission and is not framed in terms of &quot;not having been prohibited&quot; – when it comes to copyright. Reliance on an implied license argument is therefore very risky.</p>


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Question Title: Should my hosting service return part of my annual fee if my site was hacked?

Question Body: <p>I’m an artist, and I have a website on the artist hosting service, Artspan.com. Unfortunately, recently their hosted websites were hacked and some of us lost all our uploaded images. They have said they would help me upload all my many images again, but I have decided to end my relationship with them and asked for them to return a prorated fee on the amount I paid upfront for the year. They say they will not do so and say my account will close at the end of my billing period in October. The amount I am requesting isn't much— probably a little over $100, but as I entrusted them with the security for my website, I feel I’m entitled to a prorated amount because the website is devoid of my art. (I have to find the contract online somehow, I know). Who is responsible and what would you suggest as a next step for me? Thank you.</p>


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Answer 1: <blockquote>
<p>...I have to find the contract online somehow, I know.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>I'm sure the contract will state that, by signing (or clicking through the TOS or hosting agreement) you hold Artspan not liable for any loss of data or images, hacks, service disruptions, loss of income or anything else that happens to your website and artwork.</p>
<p>You're simply out of luck on getting a refund; you signed a contract, and it is legally binding. Artspan could still offer a refund, but it would be their choice, and they are not legally bound to do so.</p>
<p>You could <em>possibly</em> have recourse on a state or local level, if your jurisdiction has consumer protection laws, and Artspan is legally located in such a jurisdiction (as stated in the contract), but that's for you to investigate.</p>


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Answer 2: <h2>You are only entitled to a refund if the contract says so or in the case of <a href="http://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UWALawRw/2006/6.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">total failure of consideration</a></h2>
<p>I don’t know what the contract says about refunds but I would guess it doesn’t mention them. Since you have had the use of the service for a period of time there has not been total failure of consideration. So you are not entitled to a refund, partial or full.</p>
<p>You may be entitled to damages which are the monetary value of the loss you suffered due to their negligence. This can be pursued as a contract claim, a tort, or in some jurisdictions, as a breech of a statutory guarantee. The contract likely has a limitation of liability clause which may be enforceable which may close down or restrict this approach. Notwithstanding, any money you get this way is damages, not a refund.</p>


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<p>In <a href="/questions/tagged/australia" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-australia-tooltip-container">australia</a> the leading case is <a href="https://www.australiancontractlaw.info/cases/database/baltic-shipping-v-dillon" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Baltic Shipping v Dillon</a>. Ms Dillon was on a cruise ship that ran aground off New Zealand. She was rescued and claimed damages for the loss of her luggage and the distress etc. which the court awarded. She also claimed refund of the fare, however, she had received 9 days of the 14 day cruise and so she failed on this point.</p>


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Question Body: <blockquote class="spoiler">
<p>In the film <em>Holes</em>*, in the early 1900s, a man named Stanley Yelnats was robbed of a chest full of treasure. The bandit later buried the treasure on the property of a man named Trout Walker in Texas. Years later, in the late 90s or early 00s, Stanley Yelnats' great-grandson (also named Stanley Yelnats) found the treasure.</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote class="spoiler">
<p>In the scene where the treasure is found, the owner of the property (Trout Walker's grand-daughter) insists that the chest belongs to her because it was found on her property. But the chest has Stanley Yelnats'name on it, so Stanley's lawyer takes it and it goes to Stanley's family.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>I have two questions, assuming real-life Texas inheritance and property law:</p>
<ol>
<li>Who is the rightful owner of the chest of treasure?</li>


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</blockquote>
<p>I have two questions, assuming real-life Texas inheritance and property law:</p>
<ol>
<li>Who is the rightful owner of the chest of treasure?</li>
<li>Regardless of who the ultimate rightful owner is, did Stanley's lawyer have the right to take something off of the Walker's property just because it had Stanley's name on it?</li>
</ol>
<p>* <em>I think this is all same in the book as well, but I haven't read it, so I'm not sure</em></p>


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Answer 1: <p>In all likelihood, the property would have gone to Stanley.  Keep in mind that Warden Walker and her family owned the remains of the town of Green Lake, which had become a ghost town in the 20 years between Kissin' Kate's crimes and her death.   The books likely take place in the year of the release.   In all likelihood, the state owned the lake proper, and thus the lake bed, even if Trout bought all the buildings as the town population dwindled.   In all likelihood, the loot was abandoned property on public land (the dried lakebed).   As such, it was Hector and Zeroni opperating on their own, who discovered the treasure and thus would be able to claim it as their property.   As we do not see the deed to the land, this is an assumption.  However, the lack of any fencing around a juvenile detention facility probably hints that they were operating on land that the camp could not legally fence off and used the threat of dehydration to deter escape.</p>


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<p>If it was on the property, there might be a legal dispute as it was stolen property in the first place and the estate of Stanley Yelnats would be able to make a claim against Warden Walker that they need to return the goods that were not theirs.  This is complicated by the fact that Warden Walker and her employees are knowingly violating the law by using Juvenile Offenders as unpaid labor, despite the fact that they are private state contractors and advertise themselves as a counseling service and are engaging in computer crimes to cover up two offenders running off into the desert as well as fraud.  This results in the state seizing control of the facility to properly dispose of those in it's custody and the property itself.   This means that even if Warden Walker rightly owned the land, the state felt it like it was in everyone's interest to back the Yelnats' claim to the contents of the chest (In all likelihood, they could have included it as a settlement to prevent a lawsuit as


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the state felt it like it was in everyone's interest to back the Yelnats' claim to the contents of the chest (In all likelihood, they could have included it as a settlement to prevent a lawsuit as the state would be a party to any case (at the least, they failed to properly inspect the facility and it's operations) and the Yelnats and Zeroni's are the victims who were impacted the most.  It could also have been used to incentivize or thank them for testimony against the Walker operation.).</p>


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<p>It could also be the case that the book ended prior to the treasurer's ownership being rightfully decided by the law.  The Yelnats were independently wealthy thanks to Yelnats III's discovery of a cure for foot oder (Sploosh), which was so successful that they were able to advertise it with a Superbowl commercial with a celebrity endorsement from a Major League Baseball player no less.  While the baseball player likely was doing it at a significant discount because his testimony lead to Yelnats IV's wrongful conviction and abuse at Camp Green Lake, the price for a 30 second spot in Super Bowl XXXIII (1999) was $1.6 million dollars and was likely payed for from (Sploosh's) own income as an advertising expense is nothing to sneeze at.</p>


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<p>It should also be pointed out that Holes is not a story about the law (this comes as early as Stanley IV's trial, where he is not given an lawyer and his family cannot afford one, along with some testimony that would not have been allowed being allowed to be heard.).   The point of the treasure being found was symbolic of the family curse being lifted, a result of Stanley carrying Zero up the mount where they found water, and allowing him to drink while he sang the fabled song (The terms that Stanley's No good pig stealing Great-Great-Grandfather failed to oblige to Hector &quot;Zero&quot; Zeroni's Great-Great-Grandmother that brought the curse upon the family.).   As a major theme of the book is the choices of the past affecting the present, the treasure is a symbolic victory.  Stanley IV is rewarded for fulfilling his ancestor's promise out of the goodness of his own heart and no idea that he was doing this.  When Zero reveal his real name as Zeroni, Stanley has no idea of the


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IV is rewarded for fulfilling his ancestor's promise out of the goodness of his own heart and no idea that he was doing this.  When Zero reveal his real name as Zeroni, Stanley has no idea of the relation to the gypsy woman who cursed his family (if I recall the book spells it out for the reader.  I remember in my first read, I forgot Madam Zeroni's name by the time we learn it's Zero's name.).  As such, the legality of do they own it because it was stolen and their name was on it wasn't considered.  Green Lake is also recieves the first rain it has in 100 years after the treasure is found and Zero is taken with Stanley's lawyers out of Green Lake (it's implied that Sam, Kissin' Kate's lover, whose death at the hands of the towns folk brought about the cursed drought, had also been broken.).</p>


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Question Body: <p>Given the seemingly faulty law reported in WSJ, this gives rise to the question:  When states define &amp; enforce ill-conceived law, is Federal law (Constitutionality) the only limit to state law?</p>
<p><a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-supreme-court-takes-up-home-equity-theft-tyler-fair-debt-property-private-investors-pacific-legal-fbec50cf?mod=hp_opin_pos_2#cxrecs_s" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-supreme-court-takes-up-home-equity-theft-tyler-fair-debt-property-private-investors-pacific-legal-fbec50cf?mod=hp_opin_pos_2#cxrecs_s</a></p>


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<p>Geraldine Tyler never thought she’d end up in front of the U.S. Supreme Court—especially at 94. But she also never imagined the government would seize her Minneapolis home and sell it. Ms. Tyler is a victim of what’s often called home-equity theft, but this form of robbery isn’t criminal; in fact, it’s legal in a dozen states. The Supreme Court, which hears oral arguments Wednesday in Tyler v. Hennepin County, has the opportunity to end these predatory tax foreclosures once and for all.</p>


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<p>Ms. Tyler’s trouble began when she moved into a senior residence in 2010 and fell behind on her property taxes. She ended up owing Hennepin County roughly $2,300. After tacking on penalties, interest and related costs, her debt ballooned to $15,000. To collect what it was owed, Hennepin County seized and later sold the one-bedroom condo for $40,000. You might think the county would settle the $15,000 debt and return the $25,000 balance to Ms. Tyler. But the county took all $40,000 and left her with nothing to show from her only significant asset.</p>
<p>Ms. Tyler fought back, and the justices will soon decide whether the government violated the Constitution by confiscating the total value of her former home.</p>


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<p>Ms. Tyler fought back, and the justices will soon decide whether the government violated the Constitution by confiscating the total value of her former home.</p>
<p>Most states treat property-tax collection like other debts, only taking as much as the government is owed. But Minnesota is one of 12 states, plus the District of Columbia, that regularly take a windfall when collecting delinquent property taxes. Several more states that typically protect property-tax debtors have created special loopholes that allow the government to take a windfall so long as it uses the property for public purposes.</p>


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Answer 1: <p>State legislation can be invalid due to inconsistency with <em>either</em> the U.S. Constitution <em>or</em> the state's constitution.</p>
<p>State legislation can also be inoperative due to <a href="https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_preemption" rel="nofollow noreferrer">pre-emption</a> by conflicting and valid federal law.</p>


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Answer 2: <p>All states have written constitutions which limit what laws that state can pass.  States are also limited by what rights are <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/incorporation_doctrine" rel="nofollow noreferrer">incorporated</a> by the Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution.  While state law cannot violate the US Constitution, states are free to write constitutions that grant more or more expansive rights to their citizens.  A good case example of this is <em><a href="https://www.oyez.org/cases/1979/79-289" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Pruneyard Shopping Center v Robins</a></em>.  Briefly, the case was whether the shopping center could expel students who were protesting a UN resolution on its property, which was generally open to the public. The Supreme Court of the US found that while the US Constitution did not protect the speech of the students, the California Constitution was more expansive in its protection of speech and as a result did protect the conduct of


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found that while the US Constitution did not protect the speech of the students, the California Constitution was more expansive in its protection of speech and as a result did protect the conduct of the students against the shopping center.</p>


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<p>The trick here is that usually SCOTUS will defer to the findings of the state supreme court (using &quot;supreme court&quot; to mean whichever court is the highest court in the state) on the interpretation of the state's constitution, on the theory that they are the experts on their state constitution's meaning and historical precedent.  So if a state supreme court has ruled that a law is non-violative of the state constitution, SCOTUS is unlikely to overrule that.</p>


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Question Title: Did I commit sexual harassment by asking a spam caller when they would sleep with me, to stop the calls?


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Question Body: <p>My friend used to complain that he gets phone calls from credit card companies many times (about 1-2 times per day). I had noticed the same, we would be chilling and he would get such calls and it was pretty irritating. They would change their phone numbers so frequently that blocking the numbers was useless.</p>
<p>One day when we were watching a movie such a call comes and he gets furious. I tell him that I will handle it and I take the phone. I talk to the credit card selling woman for some time asking things I am not at all interested in and then I state that sure I will take it, but when will you sleep with me. She thought she probably misheard and asked me that she didn't get me the last time and I repeated the exact same thing again to her. She paused for around 10 secs and then disconnected it herself and my friend never ever got a phone call from those credit card companies again.</p>


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<p>However as I was narrating my story to another friend, I was informed that this probably constitutes sexual harassment. Even though it has been months since the incident, I am a bit concerned. Did I actually do something illegal?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>The legal answer is that it depends on where in the world you are. In the US, &quot;sexual harassment&quot; is legally subsumed under laws against illegal discrimination, which can exist at the federal level and the state level. You cannot discriminate on the basis of race for employment, housing, public accomodations and so on. You cannot discriminate on the basis of sex in employment. However, you are not employing anyone, so that law does not apply to you. In general, being a customer or potential customer, or a person in possession of a phone, is not a federally-regulated activity.</p>
<p>The First Amendment to the US Constitution protects your right to expression, regardless of whether they may be found to be offensive. It is legal in the US to be rude.</p>


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Answer 2: <blockquote>
<p><a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/revisions/77613/1">Did I commit sexual harassment</a> unknowingly?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>No. That falls short of harassment (sexual or otherwise).</p>
<p>Statutory definitions of harassment typically require a <em>course</em> of action, that is, a plurality of acts. The second time you said it to the agent does not count as plurality because she explicitly asked you to repeat your statement. In some jurisdictions a single act can be cognizable as sexual harassment if the act was egregious (see <a href="https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/article_lc/LEGIARTI000037289662/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">art. 222-33.II of the French civil code</a>, requiring repetition or plurality of acts absent &quot;<em>toute forme de pression grave</em>&quot;). However, what you describe is a joke that clearly falls short of egregious.</p>


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<p>Another reason why this cannot constitute harassment is that obviously the agent is entirely unknown to you and unidentifiable by you. The agent cannot reasonably become concerned for her safety in a context where she basically acts incognito. Nor would it be reasonable for her to allege that the matter annoyed her (that is, for purposes of the statutory definition of harassment) because she was the one who resumed the pattern of unsolicited contacts that understandably irritate you and your friend.</p>


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Question Title: What happens if your case survives a motion to dismiss on a lie?

Question Body: <p>I have seen a few youtube videos that go over the basics of US civil process. My understanding of it is that the first move of the defendant is always to move to dismiss. In this stage, everything alleged by the plaintiff is taken at face value, and I believe there are also reasonable inferences included, to decide whether the claims have merit.</p>
<p>This makes me wonder: what if it is established in court that you knowingly or through gross negligence included a falsehood, or a claim you have no evidence for, just to clear that initial hurdle? What would the consequences be for that?</p>


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Answer 1: <blockquote>
<p>what if it is established in court that you knowingly or through gross
negligence included a falsehood, or a claim you have no evidence for,
just to clear that initial hurdle? What would the consequences be for
that?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The case proceeds and if it goes to trial, the finder of fact determines if the case prevails or not. Also, note that except in the case of a verified complaint, a complaint in a civil case is not made under oath or under penalty of perjury.</p>
<p>In the rare and unlikely event that it is established that you knew that your case had no factual basis at the outset, you (and your attorney in many cases), can be sanctioned by the court, usually in the form of the attorney fees incurred by other side as a result of the knowingly false statement.</p>


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Answer 2: <p>In common law trials, a trial asks 2 fundamental questions:  &quot;What do the facts say?&quot; and &quot;What does the law say?&quot;  With rare exceptions, the first question is always answered by the jury in both civil and criminal matters, but the second question is answered by a judge, who has actually studied law.</p>
<p>A motion to dismiss is essentially the defense/respondents in a civil case asking the judge to not let the case proceed because the plaintiff is not supported by law.  Therefore there is no evidentiary matter brought to the court for this determination, but rather just a summation of why the actions alleged are not violations of tort laws, and thus why the plaintiff cannot sue the respondent.  The respondent can cite case law and make opinion statements, but it is up to the judge to determine if the case has merit to progress to the next stage of the lawsuit's procedures:  discovery.</p>


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<p>Discovery is actually where evidence (which is fact) is developed, and generally it's in everyone's best interest to avoid discovery (Typically, if you hear about a settlement, it is happening shortly after discovery is scheduled.)   In discovery, both parties may request the other to turn over possible evidence to build their case against them.  During this process, the requesting party need not show that the evidence exists in a location, but merely show that evidence COULD exist in order to get the court to approve requests.  This can be very invasive (for both sides) of the suit, and since it may have evidence, it will mean the information is made public.</p>
<p>So, in fact, during the initial motions to dismiss, there isn't necessarily evidence that has been developed, so there are no factual arguments being made.  Only legal arguments that are more persuading a judge to interpret the law in one way over another way.</p>


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Question Title: Do general forms of judgments require judicial names or signatures?

Question Body: <p>Does Form N24 of the county court (general form of judgment or order) require a judge’s name or signature? If so, then what is the effect of one missing them? Does it have any implications on the validity of it at all?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>In summary,</p>
<ul>
<li>An order of the County Court is meant to have the judge's name and court seal, but conventionally will not include a signature.</li>
<li>Form N24 is submitted by a party to the case, as a proposal for the court to make an order in the given terms, and naturally wouldn't be sealed at the time of submission.</li>
<li>Even if a court order has some formal defect, you still have to obey it.</li>
</ul>
<h2>What Form N24 is and does</h2>


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<li>Even if a court order has some formal defect, you still have to obey it.</li>
</ul>
<h2>What Form N24 is and does</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/form-n24-general-form-of-judgment-or-order" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Form N24</a> is used when a party to a civil case proposes that the court should make a certain order. They write down the words that they would like the court to endorse. The court could go along with the proposal, or do something different, and naturally there will be disagreements and counterproposals about what it ought to do. Orders of court can also be made on its own initiative, without waiting for someone to make a suggestion.</p>


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<p>But any order made by the court will have the same formal structure, reflected on Form N24. That includes the actual text of the order (the big box), which might say things like &quot;Defendant is to pay Claimant the sum of £200&quot;. It names the parties, the court, and the case number. There is also a little circle labelled SEAL, which is where the court seal will be placed in order to convert an ordinary piece of paper into an actual order of the court. In practice, that will be a stamp rather than an elaborate affair involving wax and ribbons.</p>
<p>When a party submits Form N24, they do not put the judge's signature on it, and they do not seal it. It's not a court order yet, just a proposed draft of one.</p>


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<p>When a party submits Form N24, they do not put the judge's signature on it, and they do not seal it. It's not a court order yet, just a proposed draft of one.</p>
<p>When a judge (or in some situations, a court officer) wants to make an order - whether it originates on a submitted Form N24 or not - they arrange with court staff for the appropriate adminstrative actions to take place, including updating the case records, making copies, using the stamp, distributing copies, etc. The text of the order will include the name of the judge, and it will show the date it was made (which may be different from the date when it was sealed). In the Magistrates' Court, for historical reasons, orders are signed instead of being sealed. But the seal and signature serve the same function of demonstrating that the document is authentic.</p>


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<p>The court can make a new order varying the terms of a previous sealed order, but this is only meant to be done in order to correct a mistake. Conceptually, once the order is sealed, it is final and can be used in order to enforce its terms, e.g. obtaining that £200 from Defendant.</p>
<h2>What information court orders must have on their face</h2>
<p>The Civil Procedure Rules go into detail on this topic in <a href="https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part40" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Rule 40</a> and the accompanying <a href="https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part40/pd_part40b" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Practice Direction 40B</a>. In particular, for the metadata mentioned in the question above, Rule 40.2(2)(b) says that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>[Every judgment or order must] be sealed by the court.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Rule 40.1 also says that</p>
<blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p>[Every judgment or order must] be sealed by the court.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Rule 40.1 also says that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Every judgment or order must state the name and judicial title of the person who made it [...]</p>
</blockquote>
<p>with a catalogue of exceptions for when the order is made by a court officer rather than a judge.</p>
<h2>When court orders have something wrong with them</h2>


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</blockquote>
<p>with a catalogue of exceptions for when the order is made by a court officer rather than a judge.</p>
<h2>When court orders have something wrong with them</h2>
<p>The Supreme Court recently revisited the problem of defective court orders in <a href="https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2020-0008-judgment.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>R (Majera) v Home Secretary</em> [2021] UKSC 46</a>, and endorsed a strong line of authority going back at least to 1846. In that year, the Lord Chancellor, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Pepys,_1st_Earl_of_Cottenham" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Lord Cottenham</a>, giving judgement in <a href="https://www.google.co.uk/books/edition/The_English_Reports_Chancery/yfRCAQAAMAAJ?hl=en&amp;gbpv=1&amp;pg=PA884&amp;printsec=frontcover" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>Chuck v Cremer</em> 1 Coop temp Cott 338; 47 ER 884</a> said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>A party, who knows of an order, whether null or valid,


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<blockquote>
<p>A party, who knows of an order, whether null or valid,
regular or irregular, cannot be permitted to disobey it. It did not even signify whether the order was drawn up. That there were many cases in which a party had been held to have committed a contempt for disobeying an order, which had not only not been served, but had not even been drawn up. It would be most dangerous to hold that the suitors, or their solicitors, could themselves judge whether an order was null or valid - whether it was regular or irregular. That they should come to the Court and not take upon themselves to determine such a question. That the course of a party knowing of an order, which was null or irregular, and who might be affected by it, was plain. He should apply to the Court that it might be discharged. As long as it existed it must not be disobeyed.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The Supreme Court confirmed at para 45,</p>
<blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p>The Supreme Court confirmed at para 45,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Notwithstanding the paradox involved in this use of language, a court order which is &quot;null&quot; must be obeyed unless and until it is set aside.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>They considered this principle to relate to the rule of law in general, as respect for court orders is critical to the functioning of the courts at all. They wanted parties to steer well clear of feeling able to decide for themselves whether an order should be followed.</p>


