# embedding_metadata

key: chroma:document
string_value:
</blockquote>
<hr />
<p><sub><sup>1</sup>Although tagged <a href="/questions/tagged/united-states" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-united-states-tooltip-container">united-states</a>, I have answered in line with: <em>we expect and encourage answers dealing with other jurisdictions ... please tag your answer using the tag markdown: [tag: some-tag]</em>&quot; from the <a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/help/on-topic">Help centre</a></sub></p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 2: <p>Let's look at the UCMJ text.</p>
<p>Art. 92. Failure to obey order or regulation</p>
<p>Any person subject to this chapter who—
(1)violates or fails to obey any lawful general order or regulation;
(2)having knowledge of any other lawful order issued by a member of the armed forces, which it is his duty to obey, fails to obey the order; or
(3)is derelict in the performance of his duties;
shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.</p>
<p>There is a tremendous amount of case law contained in &quot;lawful order.&quot;  A key concept is that orders are presumed to be lawful, so the burden of proof for unlawfulness will be on the defendant.  I could find no case (not that I know how to actually search federal military cases) that applied the defendant's state of mind (&quot;mens rea&quot;) as to lawfulness of the law as a defense here.  Basically the defendant will have to show that the order was unlawful; the member's belief in unlawfulness is not at issue.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>Mens rea issues tend to be if the defendant understood the order, or what the defendant's state of mind was when they were performing the activity they are charged for (like did the member know they were giving alcohol to an underage person).  These are not choices to disobey an order due to perceived unlawfulness.</p>
<p>Certainly I would not say that no Court-Martial would ever rule differently - these courts and juries have wide latitude to choose outcomes.  I do however feel like this defense would be hard to pull off.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: Why are formal accusations of crimes called “charges”?

Question Body: <p>How and when did it come to be called this? What are the origins of the term “criminal charges”?</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Body: <p>How and when did it come to be called this? What are the origins of the term “criminal charges”?</p>


Answer 1: <p>Charge comes ultimately from a Latin word meaning &quot;cart,&quot; the same source as &quot;car.&quot;  From <a href="https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/charge#word-history" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/charge#word-history</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>Middle English, from Anglo-French charger, from Late Latin carricare, from Latin carrus wheeled vehicle — more at CAR</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The word was first used in the 13th century as a noun meaning &quot;burden&quot; and a verb meaning &quot;to lay a burden upon,&quot; no doubt because carriages bear burdens.  Many related senses followed, including those relating to financial burdens (how much does the service provider charge?) and other liabilities, including potential criminal liabilities.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 2: <p>It is just the verb that describes the act of making an allegation against a person, and as a noun, the allegation itself.</p>
<p>See James Fitzjames Stephen, <em>A Digest of the Law of Criminal Procedure</em> (1883) [print edition]:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>... the overt acts <em>charged</em> in the indictment</p>
<p>Any number of accessories ... may be <em>charged</em>...</p>
<p>Each count must <em>charge</em> one offence and no more</p>
<p>etc.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>See <em>Chitty on Criminal Law</em> (1826) [print edition]</p>
<blockquote>
<p>... the <em>charge</em> must contain a certain description of the crime ...</p>
</blockquote>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
</blockquote>
<p>See <em>Chitty on Criminal Law</em> (1826) [print edition]</p>
<blockquote>
<p>... the <em>charge</em> must contain a certain description of the crime ...</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The Oxford English Dictionary's entry for &quot;<a href="https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/30688" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>charge, v.</em></a>&quot; traces this usage to 1559 in the context of criminal accusations, and to around 1450 in the context of accusations more generally. This is closely related to the conception of <em>charge</em> as placing a burden or load upon something.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: May I show a printed circuit board of a device on the internet?

Question Body: <p>Do I need a permission to show pictures of a printed circuit board of a device (consumer electronics) on my personal blog? I would like to show how certain modifications to the product can be made. I took some pictures during the process. Does sharing these pictures infringe any IP rights?</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <h2>Yes, you may</h2>
<p>The layout of the board and its appearance are not protected by copyright, because they are not expressions or any other type of copyrightable content. Even if they were (say if some protested art was displayed on the board) you are displaying this for instructional purposes, and not harming any market for the board, so fair use is likely to apply (in the U.S.).</p>
<p>The device could be protected by patent, but you are not copying or imitating the board, nor showing anyone how to do so, so that would not apply.</p>
<p>You are not selling or advertising the board, nor knock-offs of it, so trademark protection would not apply, even if a protected trademark is visible on th board. Just in case, be sure to make clear that your video is not authorized or endorsed by the maker of the board.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 2: <h2>Circuit boards are not subject to copyright but circuit board designs are</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=ecbb24af-4a0a-4971-9022-2edfeac253eb" rel="nofollow noreferrer">This</a> case from Taiwan neatly explains the difference.</p>
<p>However, since you are not reproducing the design, you can publish your photos.</p>


Tags: copyright, intellectual-property


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: Have open-source hardware licenses ever been enforced when distributing a physical product?

Question Body: <p>As I have <a href="https://opensource.stackexchange.com/q/8395/2829">found out</a>, there are &quot;open-source hardware&quot; licenses which are written in the spirit of &quot;open-source software&quot; licenses and require the user to publish a modified design if they distribute a physical product based on that design. Examples are TAPR and Arduino license.</p>
<p>However, unlike software which is subject to copyright in any form, circuit boards are not subject to copyright as they are not works of art. This makes me wonder whether open-source hardware licenses can actually provide the protection that they advertise.</p>
<p>Are such licenses deemed legally enforceable? Have they ever been enforced?</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <h2>Circuit boards are not subject to copyright but circuit board designs are</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=ecbb24af-4a0a-4971-9022-2edfeac253eb" rel="nofollow noreferrer">This</a> case from Taiwan neatly explains the difference.</p>
<p>The licence presumably attaches to the design of the circuit board - the circuit diagram, circuit board layout, or integrated circuit layout. In order to use the design, one would almost surely need to make a copy of it or modify it. It is this step that requires adherence to the licence, not the actual manufacture of the circuit.</p>


Tags: licensing, open-source-software


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: Does the Colorado Privacy Act apply to churches with memberships (ex: Jehovah’s Witnesses)?

Question Body: <p>Suppose a person living in Colorado is a registered member of a church. In this church, certain “blessings” are considered contingent on your membership. Membership is recorded on a digital system.</p>
<p>This church also considers donations to it a commandment.</p>
<p>It also has over 100,000 members.</p>
<p>Suppose this person wanted to officially leave the church and request that this membership data be deleted. Is the church in question obligated under the <a href="https://coag.gov/app/uploads/2022/01/SB-21-190-CPA_Final.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Colorado Privacy Act</a> to comply with said request?</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <p>Probably not.</p>
<p>The Act applies to:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(1)  EXCEPT AS SPECIFIED IN SUBSECTION (2) OF THIS SECTION, THIS PART
13
APPLIES TO A CONTROLLER THAT: (a)  CONDUCTS BUSINESS IN COLORADO OR
PRODUCES OR DELIVERS COMMERCIAL PRODUCTS OR SERVICES THAT ARE
INTENTIONALLY TARGETED TO RESIDENTS OF COLORADO; AND (b)  SATISFIES
ONE OR BOTH OF THE FOLLOWING THRESHOLDS: (I)  CONTROLS OR PROCESSES
THE PERSONAL DATA OF ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND CONSUMERS OR MORE DURING A
CALENDAR YEAR; OR (II)  DERIVES REVENUE OR RECEIVES A DISCOUNT ON THE
PRICE OF GOODS OR SERVICES FROM THE SALE OF PERSONAL DATA AND
PROCESSES OR CONTROLS THE PERSONAL DATA OF TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND
CONSUMERS OR MORE.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-1-1304(1).</p>
<p>The <a href="https://coag.gov/app/uploads/2023/03/FINAL-CLEAN-2023.03.15-Official-CPA-Rules.pdf" rel="noreferrer">Rules</a> contain the following related definition:</p>
<blockquote>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>The <a href="https://coag.gov/app/uploads/2023/03/FINAL-CLEAN-2023.03.15-Official-CPA-Rules.pdf" rel="noreferrer">Rules</a> contain the following related definition:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Commercial product or service” as referred to in C.R.S. §
6-1-1304(1)(a) means a product or service bought, sold, leased,
joined, provided, subscribed to, or delivered in exchange for monetary
or other valuable consideration in the course of a Controller’s
business, vocation, or occupation.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>There is no case law on point, but generally speaking a house of worship or a church is not considered a business, so it is probably not within the scope of the Act.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: Is my employer allowed to make me work without pay?

Question Body: <p>As the title says: A coworker and I had recently made a mistake at work. In response to this, our manager decides we have to work for two extra hours on our next shifts unpaid. Is this legal?
I work in the State of Georgia in the US, by the way.</p>


Answer 1: <p>This is illegal, under the Fair Labor Standards Act, assuming you are not an &quot;exempt&quot; employee, which is primarily a salaried employee (your pay isn't based on how many hours you work). There are details about the complaint process <a href="https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/contact/complaints" rel="noreferrer">here</a>. It is useful to know that retaliation against an employee filing a legal complaint is also illegal.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 2: <p>&quot;The Department of Labor (DOL) has rules for when employers must pay overtime to employees. The DOL assumes every worker must receive overtime pay if they work over 40 hours in a week, at a rate equal to 1.5 times their hourly rate (at a minimum).1 But some employees, because of the nature of their work, are considered to be &quot;exempt&quot; from overtime pay.</p>
<p>It used to be that the terms &quot;exempt&quot; and &quot;non-exempt&quot; were clearly defined. But the DOL has more rules to protect lower-paid exempt employees from falling below the minimum wage, by requiring that they must be paid overtime.&quot;</p>
<p>Source: <a href="https://www.thebalancemoney.com/exempt-vs-non-exempt-employees-overtime-rules-397359" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://www.thebalancemoney.com/exempt-vs-non-exempt-employees-overtime-rules-397359</a></p>


Tags: united-states, employment, labor-law, workplace, georgia


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Body: <p>I am injured (<a href="https://www.google.com/maps/reviews/@40.226143,-74.010427,17z/data=!3m1!4b1!4m5!14m4!1m3!1m2!1s116647982166856941576!2s0x0:0x378cebad53d3cd2f?hl=en-US" rel="nofollow noreferrer">by sports injury</a>) but was <a href="https://www.google.com/maps/reviews/@40.3536779,-74.0639766,17z/data=!3m1!4b1!4m5!14m4!1m3!1m2!1s116647982166856941576!2s0x0:0xfe73b6ff732230da?hl=en-US" rel="nofollow noreferrer">called schizophrenic</a>.  I am a bartender, otherwise I will not take fraud as income. For this I looked into the 2018 National Beneficiary Survey (next one estimated release 2023) that says of 4062 reporters <strong>35.4% are mentally ill, 5.2% with developmental disability, and 14.9% are injured</strong> (or poisoned) in 2015. For a picture of the <strong>Musculoskeletally-disordered of 42.1%</strong>, we can use the <a href="https://www.cbpp.org/research/social-security/social-security-disability-insurance-0" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Center on Budget


key: chroma:document
string_value:
of 42.1%</strong>, we can use the <a href="https://www.cbpp.org/research/social-security/social-security-disability-insurance-0" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Center on Budget and Policy Priorities</a> <a href="https://www.cbpp.org/typical-disabled-worker-is-over-50-and-has-severe-mental-musculoskeletal-or-other-impairment-2" rel="nofollow noreferrer">reports</a> to get an age-related image. So, other than age, what injuries constitute a proper claim? Is it only when something (1) falls on you (2) on the job?</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p><a href="https://i.stack.imgur.com/jA38q.png" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><img src="https://i.stack.imgur.com/jA38q.png" alt="Center on Budget and Policy Priorities" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://i.stack.imgur.com/4sOtJ.png" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><img src="https://i.stack.imgur.com/4sOtJ.png" alt="National Beneficiary Survey, 2015" /></a></p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <p>The Social Security Administration only provides benefits for what has been termed as <em>total disability</em>, which can be broadly described as the long-term, indefinite ability to work. Short-term injuries, which impair your ability to work for a finite period, or impair your ability to perform your current job but would still allow you to work generally, are covered by benefits such as short-term disability insurance and/or unemployment.</p>
<p>From the <a href="https://www.ssa.gov/benefits/disability/qualify.html#anchor2" rel="nofollow noreferrer">SSA web site</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We consider you to have a qualifying disability under Social Security
rules if all the following are true:</p>
<ul>
<li>You cannot do work and engage in substantial gainful activity (SGA)
because of your medical condition.</li>
<li>You cannot do work you did
previously or adjust to other work because of your medical condition.</li>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
because of your medical condition.</li>
<li>You cannot do work you did
previously or adjust to other work because of your medical condition.</li>
<li>Your condition has lasted or is expected to last for at least one year
or to result in death.</li>
</ul>
<p>This is a strict definition of disability. Social Security program rules assume that working families have access to other resources to provide support during periods of short-term disabilities, including workers' compensation, insurance, savings, and investments.</p>
</blockquote>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Tags: united-states, disabilities, americans-with-disabilities-act, social-security, accident-insurance


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Body: <p>I ate at a Croatian restaurant where I had the option to pay with cash with euros or pay with my credit card.</p>
<p>If I chose to pay with cash, I would be given a 10% discount.</p>
<p>As I have a VISA credit card issued in another EU country, this discount seems to be against the law.</p>
<p>According to <a href="https://europa.eu/youreurope/business/finance-funding/making-receiving-payments/electronic-cash-payments/index_en.htm" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://europa.eu/youreurope/business/finance-funding/making-receiving-payments/electronic-cash-payments/index_en.htm</a> :</p>
<blockquote>
<h1>Card surcharges are not allowed</h1>
<p>You're not allowed to charge your customers extra for using a credit
or debit card. This applies to all card purchases (in shops and
online) made throughout the EU.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>So, is it a legal loophole to give discounts for paying with cash instead of adding a surcharge for paying with a credit card?</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
online) made throughout the EU.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>So, is it a legal loophole to give discounts for paying with cash instead of adding a surcharge for paying with a credit card?</p>
<p>Or is this actually illegal?</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <h2>Yes, its legal</h2>
<p>Economically, there is no difference between a cash discount and a card surcharge; legally, there is. That’s because the law prohibits charging <em>more</em> than the advertised price for a given payment method but doesn’t prohibit charging <em>less</em>.</p>
<p>Of course, it’s likely there is some illegality here but it’s not against the customer. A business doesn't give a 10% discount to avoid paying a 1-2% fee. They do it because they are not reporting (some of) their cash sales to the tax authorities and are therefore saving the 25% VAT and 18% company tax.</p>


Tags: european-union, payment, credit-card


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: Can I ask potential jurors in a prima facie state if speeding is legal?

Question Body: <p>In some jurisdictions, e.g., Texas, driving faster than the posted speed limit is only the prima facie evidence of an unreasonable speed, where, if charged with a violation, one could still argue in the court of law, in front of a jury of one's peers, that the speed was nonetheless safe, reasonable and prudent.</p>

<p>Some potential jurors may be too conservative to appreciate the intricacies of the law (especially if such ideas are very new to them), or hold a grunge against people going over the posted speed limit.</p>

<p>What would be the best way to determine such bias during Jury Selection (Voir Dire)?</p>

<p>Can you ask potential jurors simple questions like:</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>What would be the best way to determine such bias during Jury Selection (Voir Dire)?</p>

<p>Can you ask potential jurors simple questions like:</p>

<ul>
<li>"Do you think exceeding the posted speed limit is illegal?"</li>
<li>"Do you think that the posted speed limits should never be exceeded?"</li>
<li>"Do you think that people exceeding the posted speed limit are guilty, and should pay a fine?"</li>
</ul>


Answer 1: <p>It is the job of the judge to instruct the jury about the law. If Texas had pattern instructions I'd look up what the instruction is for this matter, but you don't, so I don't know what the judge would say. But it is the judge's sole prerogative to instruct the jury in the law.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>If the question is a "commitment question", then it is an improper question and should be disallowed, see <a href="http://caselaw.findlaw.com/tx-court-of-criminal-appeals/1483493.html" rel="noreferrer">Stendefer v. State</a>. The question "Would you presume someone guilty if he or she refused a breath test on their refusal alone?" is such a commitment question, and is disallowed. Similarly, "If the evidence, in a hypothetical case, showed that a person was arrested and they had a crack pipe in their pocket, and they had a residue amount in it, and it could be measured, and it could be seen, is there anyone who could not convict a person, based on that" (<a href="https://casetext.com/case/atkins-v-state-11" rel="noreferrer">Atkins v. State, 951 S.W.2d 787</a>). An improper commitment question could be of the type "could you refrain...":</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<blockquote>
  <p>Let us assume that you are considering in the penalty phase of any
  capital murder case, okay?   And some of the evidence that has come in
  shows that the victim's family was greatly impacted and terribly
  grieved and greatly harmed by the facts․Can you assure us that the
  knowledge of those facts would not prevent you or substantially impair
  you in considering a life sentence in such a case</p>
</blockquote>

<p>(<a href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2372264/penry-v-state/" rel="noreferrer">Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715</a>).</p>

<p>One way in which a commitment question can be legal is if it asks basically "can you uphold the law?", for example "can you consider probation in a murder case?", or "are you willing to consider mitigating circumstances". The wrong answer to those questions will lead to a for-cause dismissal.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>The third question is flagrantly improper, the first is rather improper, and the second probably is. If the question can be framed in terms of a candidate's willingness to follow the law, then it should be legal.</p>


Answer 2: <p>Questions of law aren't proper in jury <em>voire dire</em>.</p>
<p>You could ask <em>voire dire</em> questions intended to get at the same point. But you can't ask them what the law actually says.</p>
<p>Also, jury trials for speeding offenses are rare, although some states allow them. I don't know if Texas is among them.</p>


Tags: texas, jury, speeding, voir-dire, prima-facie-speed-limits


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: What happens to an AST tenant when their landlord defaults on his mortgage?

Question Body: <p>Larry buys a property on a mortgage and then lets it to Tim on a AST. Larry then defaults on his mortgage and the bank proceeds to repossess the property that is housing Tim. What is the process and timeframes for this? Is there any reason why the bank would or could not repossess the property with Tim residing as a sitting tenant? In short, what happens to Tim’s AST?</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <p>See Brindley Twist Tafft &amp; James LLP, &quot;<a href="https://www.bttj.com/2012/02/17/focus-mortgage-repossession-protection-tenants-act-etc-2010/" rel="noreferrer">Focus on the Mortgage Repossession (Protection of Tenants Act etc.) 2010</a> [<em>sic</em>]&quot;.</p>
<p>If the tenancy was an authorized tenancy under the terms of the mortgage:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The Bank may still take possession of the property but they may have to do so subject to your occupation. The practical effect of this is that you would be allowed to remain living in the property subject to the terms of your tenancy agreement but you would see a change in the identity of the Landlord. It is possible for the tenancy to be brought to an end but in accordance with the terms of the tenancy agreement.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>If the tenancy was not authorized:</p>
<blockquote>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
</blockquote>
<p>If the tenancy was not authorized:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Under the <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/19/enacted" rel="noreferrer">Mortgage Repossession (Protection of Tenants Act etc) 2010</a> [<em>sic</em>] (the “Act”) an unauthorised residential tenant is however entitled to request that possession be delayed for up to two months during which time they should try to find alternative accommodation.</p>
</blockquote>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: How do laws against computer intrusion handle the modern situation of devices routinely being under the de facto control of non-owners?


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Body: <p>Current versions of Microsoft Windows will automatically update themselves.</p>
<p>That's usually great, but they also are designed to update themselves even if the owner of the device wants them to not do that. I could send them a certified letter revoking their authorization to install and run new software on my computer, and turn off all available update settings, and if I don't go turn the computer off it will still get updated when a new update comes out.</p>
<p>Why, legally, can Microsoft (or any other device manufacturer or application developer) control my computer in excess of what I have authorized, but when I do it to their computer, that is &quot;hacking&quot; and I go to &quot;jail&quot;?</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p><a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/questions/9724/">Is Microsoft breaking any laws by forcing upgrades to windows 10?</a> asks about Microsoft's Windows 10 rollout specifically, but I am more broadly asking about the standard Windows updates, and about updates or other remote control functions for other devices that do not have a technical mechanism allowing the owner to disable them.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <p>You ask:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Why, legally, can Microsoft (or any other device manufacturer or application developer) control my computer in excess of what I have authorized... ?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It cannot.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/Useterms/Retail/Windows/10/UseTerms_Retail_Windows_10_English.htm" rel="noreferrer">Windows licence</a> says:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>By accepting this agreement <strong>or using</strong> the software, you agree to all of these terms</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Even if your letter revoking authorization were effective, as soon as you <em>use</em> the Windows software again, you are again deemed to have agreed to all of the terms of the licence.</p>
<p>One of the terms is:</p>
<blockquote>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>One of the terms is:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The software periodically checks for system and app updates, and downloads and installs them for you. You may obtain updates only from Microsoft or authorized sources, and Microsoft may need to update your system to provide you with those updates. <strong>By accepting this agreement, you agree to receive these types of automatic updates without any additional notice.</strong></p>
</blockquote>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 2: <p>You own the computer but do not own Windows. Microsoft owns Windows and it is not for sale to anybody, so you never purchased it. What you have purchased is a permission to use it (a license) subject to terms and conditions. If you do not agree to them you have no right use Windows.</p>
<p>You can use your computer <em>without</em> using Windows by using some other operating system, but in that case you would have to</p>
<ol>
<li>get a different operating system that works with your hardware and</li>
<li>abide by the terms of use of those that wrote it.</li>
</ol>
<p>Specific software that you want to use might only have been developed for Windows, meaning you'd have to find an alternative to those as well.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
</ol>
<p>Specific software that you want to use might only have been developed for Windows, meaning you'd have to find an alternative to those as well.</p>
<p><strong>Aside 1:</strong> While there are concrete alternative options for actual computers (notably Linux, whose authors chose not to ask to abide by any terms and conditions for its use) the same is not true for other devices such as cellphones or smart TVs where there often is no choice other than the operating system/firmware that was preinstalled.</p>
<p><strong>Aside 2:</strong> A few years ago you could even get a refund on the cost of the Windows license if you clicked on &quot;disagree&quot; when you first powered up the computer. I don't know if that is feasible anymore but now it is easier to get a computer that does not have Windows installed by the manufacturer in the first place.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: Burden of Proof for Reprinting a Book

Question Body: <p>You republish a book from 1923 without asking anyone.</p>
<p>The original publisher (or its successor) sues you.</p>
<p>Do you need to proof that the author is 70 years dead already, or lies the burden of proof on the publisher?</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <p><strong>Short answer</strong>:
§§ 64 ff. UrhG is not a defense (<em>Einwendung</em>) but an integral/constitutional component of copyright.
Accordingly the party favoring the fact that a work is (still) copyrighted has the burden of proof.</p>
<hr />
<p><strong>Long answer</strong>:
Copyright cases are divided into four steps:</p>
<ol>
<li>Copyrightable work? (<em>Urheberrechtlich geschütztes Werk?</em>)</li>
<li>Applicable exploitation rights? (<em>Tangierte Nutzungsrechte?</em>)</li>
<li>Exceptions? (<em>Schrankenregelungen?</em>)</li>
<li>Damages. (<em>Schadensersatz</em>)</li>
</ol>
<p>In a civil action suit parties need to present facts, § 282 ZPO (<em>Beibringungsgrundsatz</em>).
The court/state does not investigate anything.
That means the plaintiff contending that he has a claim for damages needs to demonstrate that it’s a copyrightable work, they are the copyright holder, and you infringed their rights.


key: chroma:document
string_value:
That means the plaintiff contending that he has a claim for damages needs to demonstrate that it’s a copyrightable work, they are the copyright holder, and you infringed their rights.
For the last item you may face an obligation to disclose certain evidence as per §§ 101 ff. UrhG.</p>
<p>The plaintiff can actually simply claim anything; until you dispute their claims it is believed to be true, § 138 Ⅲ, 288 ZPO.
Yet still, <em>lying</em> about hard facts is forbidden, § 138 Ⅰ ZPO (<em>Wahrheitspflicht</em>).
Claiming the work’s creator was alive in 1952 even though they very well <em>know</em> he was not is illegal.</p>
<p>On the other hand since you are relying on §§ 64/65 Ⅰ, 129 Ⅰ 1 UrhG, that is the circumstance copyright has expired 70 complete calendar years after the (last co)author’s death, § 69 UrhG, you will need to <em>contest</em> any claim copyright did not expire (<em>subjektive Behauptungslast</em>).
No copyright protection → no damages.


key: chroma:document
string_value:
No copyright protection → no damages.
Otherwise it is believed there was no issue about this.</p>
<p>The plaintiff will then again need to produce evidence that copyright has not expired.
It is the plaintiff who seeks damages under § 97 Ⅱ 1 UrhG so they have the burden of proof regarding <em>all requirements</em> of this legal basis.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 2: <h2>It depends on the argument</h2>
<p>The person suing (Plaintiff) needs to make a case that is <em>prima facie</em> reasonable and contains all needed details. This includes showing that they own a valid copyright/exclusive usage license - which is established by showing the trail of holders of the right from the work's creation to now. Because copyrights expire after the death of the author, a valid copyright upon which a descendent could sue would require showing that less than 70 years after the author's death have passed. They could show so trivially by showing the death certificate of the author, proving that the author died at most 70 years ago.</p>
<p>If the defendant tries to claim that the copyright is expired, it is upon the defendant to prove this. It would be upon the defendant to prove that the work was made by someone that passed more than 70 years ago at the time of the alleged copyright violation.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>In general, in a civil claim, it is upon the moving party to offer up facts that support their claim.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Body: <h2>Florida Statues Provides</h2>
<blockquote>
<p>A person who has a privilege against the disclosure of a confidential
matter or communication waives the privilege if the person, or the
person's predecessor while holder of the privilege, <strong>voluntarily</strong>
<strong>discloses or makes the communication when he or she does not have a</strong>
<strong>reasonable expectation of privacy, or consents to disclosure of, any</strong>
<strong>significant part of the matter or communication.</strong>  This section is not
applicable when the disclosure is itself a privileged communication.</p>
</blockquote>
<p><a href="https://codes.findlaw.com/fl/title-vii-evidence/fl-st-sect-90-507.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://codes.findlaw.com/fl/title-vii-evidence/fl-st-sect-90-507.html</a></p>
<h2>Context</h2>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<h2>Context</h2>
<p>A judge orders the defendant to provide evidence in Florida Nonbinding arbitration.     The Defendant's administrative-contractor has provided Defense counsel with several emails as evidence.    Defense attorneys submit pdf evidence: <strong>partially</strong> redacted email communication to the Arbiter and plaintiff.  Said email starts with the partially redacted message, followed by the plaintiff's email.  Evidence was published to a file sharing website for plaintiffs, to fulfill Florida procedural requirements.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p><em><strong>Prima facie</strong></em> review of the redaction includes some clearly visible sentences.   Stakeholders are able to deduce the sender, at least one named recipient, and the nature of the request: the Defendant's administrative contractor requested counsel from a third-attorney, seeking advice as to how to proceed with undertaking a contested action, under the guise of pretextual claims set forth by the administrative-contractor.  The sender is not an employee of the defendent, however, they are contracted to execute the Defendent's decisions.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>Despite the redaction failures, counsel attempted to redact the contractor's message.  Plaintiff's attorney argued that based on what is visible, it is necessary to see the remainder of the message as &quot;best evidence&quot;.   Defense Counsel has vigorously asserted that the judge should not consider any of the information that is intended to be redacted under attorney-client privilege.   The judge asked the defense if he should consider what is clearly already visible.</p>
<p>Analysis of the evidence clearly revealed the fully unredacted message.  Said analysis includes: Plaintiffs were able to &quot;cut and paste&quot; the partially redacted email to a basic text editor to reveal the complete message, without redactions.  The message is an attempt to request counsel as to how to undertake the contested action and provides false information to counsel.   The message is damaging to the Defense's case as the contractor admits plaintiff's claim.</p>
<p>The unredacted message:</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>The unredacted message:</p>
<ol>
<li><p>provides a pretextual basis to the third-attorney, for which counsel provide an opinion-letter regarding why the defendant is able to undertake the its disputed action.  The opinion letter is the foundation which the Defendent relies upon for the Business-Judgement rule.</p>
</li>
<li><p>The unredacted message shows that Defendent's contractor admitting the absence of the defense claimed by Defendents.</p>
</li>
</ol>
<h1>QUESTIONS</h1>
<p>I would be interested in hearing arguments for AND against admitting the plaintiff's version of the unredacted version of evidence and why you think the judge will / will not admit the unredacted version.</p>
<p>I would like to understand (preferably with Florida case law examples): Is the disclosure of the evidence &quot;as-is and subject to plaintiff &quot;cut and paste&quot; analysis?</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <h2>The evidence would (normally) be inadmissible</h2>
<p><a href="/questions/tagged/australia" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;" rel="tag">australia</a></p>
<p>The authority is <a href="https://www.claytonutz.com/knowledge/2014/april/expense-reduction-analysts-group-v-armstrong-strategic-management-what-happens-when-privileged-documents-are-discovered-by-mistake" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Reduction Analyst Group Pty Ltd &amp; Ors v Armstrong Strategic Management &amp; Ors</a> (2013) 303 ALR 199.</p>
<blockquote>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<blockquote>
<p>The High Court concluded that where a privileged document has been inadvertently produced during a court-ordered discovery, the court should ordinarily permit that mistake to be corrected and order the document’s return. However, relief may not be granted if (i) a party fails to act promptly or (ii) the party to whom the documents have been disclosed has been placed in a position, due to the disclosure, where it would be unfair to order the return of the documents.</p>
<p>Their Honours concluded that to establish an intention to claim privilege, it was sufficient to prove that the ERA Parties intended to claim privilege and that the reviewers were carrying out the ERA Parties’ instructions.</p>
</blockquote>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
</blockquote>
<p>In your case, the defendant has clearly indicated an intention to claim privilege by attempting to redact parts of the documents. That the redaction was ineffective was clearly a mistake. Unless the exemption quoted above applies, the court should order the return of the documents and should not take them into evidence.</p>
<p>Further, the solicitor who received the documents and reasonably concluded they were received in error was ethically bound to immediately raise this with the sender. This would have led to their return without involving the court. Forensically examining the documents, if done by the plaintiffs lawyers is nudging professional misconduct and censure.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Body: <p>This question arose after a recent revelation from the San Francisco DA, who said that DNA of rape victims that were gathered when performing a rape kit test<sup>1</sup> was used to identify a criminal suspect through a match in the database.</p>
<p>Does this practice</p>
<ul>
<li>contravene any state statute(s) or rule(s) of evidence?</li>
<li>contravene any federal statute(s) or rule(s) of evidence?</li>
<li>violate any state constitutions or the US constituiton?</li>
</ul>
<p>When I say ‘state’ in this question, I'm not just referring to California: it could be any state in the US or DC.</p>
<p>I'm also curious as to whether it is a legal practice in England and Wales.</p>
<h3>sources</h3>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>I'm also curious as to whether it is a legal practice in England and Wales.</p>
<h3>sources</h3>
<p>Articles on this story appeared in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/feb/14/san-francisco-police-woman-crime-dna-rape-kit" rel="noreferrer">the guardian</a>, <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/crime/police-san-francisco-rape-kit-b2015187.html" rel="noreferrer">the independent</a> and <a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10513221/DA-San-Francisco-police-used-rape-kit-DNA-arrest-victim.html" rel="noreferrer">daily mail</a></p>
<hr />
<p><sup>1 - A rape kit usually takes several samples of possible perpetrator DNA and a sample of the victim's DNA to separate their DNA from the perpetrator.</sup></p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <blockquote>
<p>Does this practice contravene any state statute(s) or rule(s) of
evidence?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Generally not. States could adopt a statute that says otherwise, but I'm not aware of states that do. States often have regulations limiting police use of biometric data for general, non-probable cause based searches for criminal suspects.</p>
<p>For example, many states don't make fingerprints obtained for professional licensing background checks available for searched by law enforcement without a warrant and probable cause.</p>
<p>I suspect that states may start to do so with rape kit DNA, but it hasn't previously been identified as an issue, so there aren't statutes that prohibit this in most cases (e.g. victim's rights bills have not thought to address the issue).</p>
<p>The reason for concern that could lead to future statutes is two fold.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>The reason for concern that could lead to future statutes is two fold.</p>
<p>First, including rape kit DNA in searches discourages people from reporting crimes because it might put them at a disadvantage in an unrelated criminal proceeding.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>First, including rape kit DNA in searches discourages people from reporting crimes because it might put them at a disadvantage in an unrelated criminal proceeding.</p>
<p>Second, the risk of false positives is vastly higher in a random search of biometric data from people with no articulated connection to the crime than it is when isolated individual suspects who there is probable cause to believe committed a crime are investigated. The chance of a false positive for someone in a database with millions of people is non-negligible even if the risk of a false positive in any one isolated comparison is tiny. Even a 1 in 10,000,000 chance of a false positive in a database of 40 million people will routinely produce false positives in random searches. And, while DNA evidence is very accurate, partial forensic DNA samples aren't absolutely incapable of producing false matches to nearly the same extent as a comparison of two complete whole genome samples.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>So, states may adopt such statutes in the future now that the issue is in the spotlight.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>contravene any federal statute(s) or rule(s) of evidence?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>No.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>violate any state constitutions or the US constitution?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>No. At least under current jurisprudence. The relevant provisions are vague legal standards that are applied with great discretion by courts. Evolving understandings of the situation could change that view in the future.</p>
<p><strong>Footnote: Does doctor-patient privilege or HIPPA control?</strong></p>
<p>There is a doctor-patient privilege recognized in every U.S. state and in the federal courts.</p>
<p>Forensic DNA obtained from a rape kit from a potential suspect isn't protected by the privilege since the suspect isn't a patient of the medical provider in that medical procedure.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>Forensic DNA obtained from a rape kit from a potential suspect isn't protected by the privilege since the suspect isn't a patient of the medical provider in that medical procedure.</p>
<p>There is an arguable case that the rape victim is a patient of the medical provider who gathers the DNA, including the rape victim's DNA for the rape kit, and that the patient has not waived the doctor-patient privilege merely by permitting the medical professional to use the rape victim's DNA profile to distinguish between sample material in the rape kit that is her own from material from a suspect. Moreover, such a waiver of doctor-patient privilege would probably not be legally valid unless the rape victim provided informed consent to that release.</p>
<p>The rape victim might also have federal HIPPA protections for the privacy of her DNA profile collected as part of her medical records under a similar theory.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>The rape victim might also have federal HIPPA protections for the privacy of her DNA profile collected as part of her medical records under a similar theory.</p>
<p>Mostly, this hinges on how the relationship of the rape victim to the person administering the rape kit is characterized, and in particular, if gathering evidence in a rape kit is &quot;medical treatment&quot; that is privileged.</p>
<p>To the best of my knowledge, there is no case law interpreting either the doctor-patient privilege or HIPPA in a rape kit DNA fact pattern.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>To the best of my knowledge, there is no case law interpreting either the doctor-patient privilege or HIPPA in a rape kit DNA fact pattern.</p>
<p>If it is considered to be a doctor-patient relationship for medical treatment within the meaning of the evidentiary privilege and HIPPA, and the DNA was shared on a database which law enforcement has access to without a warrant without the victim's informed consent, this evidence and all &quot;fruit of the poisonous tree&quot; derived from it, could probably be suppressed in a criminal proceeding against the rape victim, even if the evidence conclusively linked the rape victim to the crime.</p>
<p>Under the circumstances, and given the policy considerations and the lack of other controlling law, this would be an attractive interpretation of the existing law for a court to adopt.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>Under the circumstances, and given the policy considerations and the lack of other controlling law, this would be an attractive interpretation of the existing law for a court to adopt.</p>
<p>If evidence completely independent of the blind database match provided probable cause that the rape victim committed a crime, and the crime was one in which there was forensic DNA evidence, law enforcement could probably get a search warrant to take a legally untainted DNA sample from the rape victim to compare to the forensically collected DNA evidence, however, just as it could with any other suspect.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 2: <p><strong>Can a rape victim's DNA be used against them in criminal proceedings?</strong></p>
<p><a href="/questions/tagged/england-and-wales" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-england-and-wales-tooltip-container">england-and-wales</a></p>
<p><strong>Yes</strong></p>
<p><strong>But</strong>... A victim's DNA is not routinely recorded on, or searched across, the DNA database.</p>
<p>The process, in simple terms, is:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>A medical practitioner takes samples of biological material from the victim (using what some colloquially refer to as a rape kit).</p>
</li>
<li><p>As those samples potentially contain a mixed profile, control samples are also taken from the victim - usually by drawing blood and plucking hair to avoid the potential for cross contamination.</p>
</li>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
</li>
<li><p>When both sets of samples are analysed, the control is used to isolate any unknown profile(s).</p>
</li>
<li><p>Any unknown profiles are then available for recording on, or searching across, the database if the investigation warrants it - which is not always the case.</p>
</li>
<li><p>The victim's control samples are not put on, or through, the database unless there is a specific and proportionate necessity to do so.  (And I cannot recall any cases that I have been involved in, or heard about, where this has actually happened.)</p>
</li>
</ul>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
</li>
</ul>
<p>If, for whatever reason, the victim's samples <em>are</em> used in this way and they get linked to an unrelated crime scene, it would depend on the circumstances and proportionately as to whether the prosecution of a(n alleged) victim of a serious assault would follow.  If it did, then the DNA evidence is prima facie admissible in the interests of justice, unless the defence successfully argue for its exclusion under <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/78?timeline=false" rel="nofollow noreferrer">s.78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984</a></p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 3: <blockquote>
<p>I'm also curious as to whether it is a legal practice in England and Wales.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>If the sample is legally retained then it can be used. The rules in the <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2012/9/contents" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 Part 1 chapter 1</a>, which modify the <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/contents" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984</a>, provide that a DNA profile must be destroyed unless it is specifically authorized to be retained under one of the enumerated powers (see PACE 63D(3)). The relevant ones here are:</p>
<ul>
<li>63E: retain until the investigation or subsequent criminal proceedings have concluded</li>
<li>63N: retain material given voluntarily until it has fulfilled the purpose for which it was taken</li>
<li>63O: retain so long as the person consents in writing</li>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<li>63N: retain material given voluntarily until it has fulfilled the purpose for which it was taken</li>
<li>63O: retain so long as the person consents in writing</li>
<li>63P: if the person is charged with a different offence, retain under the applicable power</li>
</ul>
<p>So long as the profile is in the National DNA Database, it's available for use for the investigation of crime. The original sample from which the profile was derived may be destroyed or retained, depending on circumstances; see 63R. Therefore, a victim of crime may find their DNA still in the database, if any of the conditions above apply. And 63P specifically means that 63E will apply in relation to the <em>new</em> investigation, even if the victim withdraws consent under 63O. If the original investigation were closed and the victim had asked for her profile to be removed from the database, then it would not be available in that way.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>Note that law enforcement is <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2018/12/schedule/2/enacted" rel="nofollow noreferrer">an exception to the GDPR</a>, which would otherwise entitle the victim to certain rights over her personal data held by the police.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: Downloading solution manual of books

Question Body: <p>For many textbooks solution manuals are available online. Is it copyright violation to download these manuals for studying?</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <p>It is copyright infringement unless the author of the solution manual gives permission. The author of the textbook has no say in the matter. A solution manual might happen to infringe the textbook's copyright, e.g is the manual included the question along with the solution, provided that the question itself is protected by copyright.</p>
<p>If the author puts his manual of solutions out in the open on his web page, he would not succeed in suing you for downloading the book, since by putting the work out in the open, he has invited the compelling conclusion that you are permitted to see what he has shown (otherwise, one could never legally look at a web site). However, a work pirated by a third party and displayed on a pirate site like libgen conveys no implicit license from the author, which is why I framed this in terms of the manual author's own web page.</p>


Tags: copyright


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: Is the executive branch obligated to enforce the Supreme Court&#39;s decision on affirmative action?

Question Body: <p>The Supreme Court ruled, on June 29, 2023, that under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, universities are obligated to treat all applicants fairly and not discriminate on the basis of race. Does this compel the executive branch to actually implement the ruling in practice? I.e. could the Biden administration declare that they’ll ignore all affirmative action related violations and not take away funding from any institutions that engage in such practices?</p>
<p>As a related example, marijuana is illegal in the US but this doesn’t mean that the government is forced to prosecute anyone for selling weed. Could a similar policy apply to colleges?</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <p>The judgment in <em>Students for Fair Admissions Inc. v. President and Fellow of Harvard College</em>, <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/20-1199_hgdj.pdf" rel="noreferrer">600 U.S. ___ (2023)</a> was in relation to relief sought by the plaintiffs against Harvard and University of North Carolina.</p>
<p>This is more apparent by reading the judgments below. See e.g. <a href="https://casetext.com/case/students-for-fair-admissions-v-president-of-harvard-coll" rel="noreferrer">397 F. Supp. 3d 126 (D. Mass. 2019)</a>. SFFA seeks &quot;declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, attorneys' fees, and costs&quot; against the defendant &quot;President and Fellows of Harvard College (Harvard Corporation).&quot; SFFA sought the same remedies against University of North Carolina: <a href="https://casetext.com/case/students-for-fair-admissions-inc-v-university-of-north-carolina" rel="noreferrer">567 F. Supp. 3d 580 (M.D.N.C. 2021)</a>.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>Thus, there is no order against the federal executive. The federal executive can continue providing funding. It is Harvard and U.N.C. that are enjoined.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 2: <p>There is a private cause of action to enforce Title VI which is how the cases in question came up in the first place. It isn't enforced solely, or even primarily, by the executive branch.</p>


Tags: united-states


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Body: <p>I am reading a legal document related stock option agreement here <a href="https://media.orrick.com/Media%20Library/public/files/o/option-agreement.docx" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://media.orrick.com/Media%20Library/public/files/o/option-agreement.docx</a>. One section reads like</p>
<blockquote>
<p><strong>Termination upon Disability of Optionee.</strong>  In the event of termination of Optionee’s Continuous Service Status as a result of Optionee’s Disability, Optionee may, but only within 12 month(s) following the Termination Date, exercise this Option to the extent Optionee is vested in the Optioned Stock.</p>
</blockquote>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
</blockquote>
<p>I could not understand what is the meaning of &quot;<code>Optionee is vested in the Optioned Stock</code>&quot;? An option is granted against some exercise price, based on some schedule, not the underlying stock, right? Therefore, as I understand, the holder is holding the option not the underlying stock itself, right? Therefore, should not be the right statement would be &quot;<code>Optionee is vested in the granted option</code>&quot;?</p>
<p>Additionally, the vesting schedule looks like</p>
<p>&quot;<code>&lt;x%&gt; of the Total Number of Shares shall vest and become exercisable..</code>&quot;</p>
<p>How exactly underlying shares will become exercisable? Should not this statement read as &quot;<code>&lt;x%&gt; of the Total granted options shall vest and become exercisable..</code>&quot;</p>
<p>I am not particularly from a legal background, so it is a bit difficult to understand above statement. Any insight will be very helpful</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <p>Typically, an employee stock option plan will come with a vesting schedule.</p>
<p>The employee gets new stock options each year, but only really gets to own those stock options gradually over a period that is typically two to five years. This provides an incentive for an employee who receives stock options to stay with the company in order to obtain this form of deferred compensation. It is a type of &quot;golden handcuffs&quot; arrangement.</p>
<p>Say that the company has a five year vesting period and the employee has worked there for six years.</p>
<p>The employee's stock options from years one will be 100% vested and available to exercise. The employee's stock options from year two will be 80% vested. The employee's stock options from year three will be 60% vested. The employee's stock options from year four will be 40% vested. The employee's stock options from year five will be 20% vested. The employee's stock options from year six will not be vested at all.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>Usually, the higher up you are in the company, the more seniority you have, or the higher your base salary, the more initial pre-vesting grants of stock options you get in a year. So, if you are moving up the corporate ladder, this number will gradually increase. Maybe you got 100 options in year one, 200 in year two, etc.</p>
<p>So, you do the math and that's how many stock options you can exercise.</p>
<p>Year - Option Grants - Vesting Percentage - Vested Shares</p>
<p>1- 100 - 100% - 100</p>
<p>2- 200 - 80% - 160</p>
<p>3- 300 - 60% - 180</p>
<p>4- 400 - 40% -160</p>
<p>5- 500 - 20% -100</p>
<p>6- 600 - 0% - 0</p>
<p>Total Granted Share Options 2100 - Total Vested Share Options 700</p>
<p>It's really more complicated than this because the exercise price is probably different each year. The option price is probably lower in the earlier years and higher in the later years.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>It's really more complicated than this because the exercise price is probably different each year. The option price is probably lower in the earlier years and higher in the later years.</p>
<p>Under this provision, if you are disabled, your stock options cease to continue to vest. But, the stock options which are not vested are forfeited if your employment is terminated by disability. The company does this since the company no longer needs to use unvested stock options as an incentive to keep you working for them.</p>
<p>For some tax preferred <a href="https://www.nerdwallet.com/article/investing/isos" rel="nofollow noreferrer">incentive stock options</a>, the delayed vesting is mandatory (at least if the tax benefit is to be realized) in order to create an incentive that Congress deemed desirable when writing the tax code to think about the long term, rather than the short term, as a result of receiving option grants.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: Grounds For Divorce in Massachusetts

Question Body: <p>If my wife wants to divorce me, does she need my consent? Does she need grounds - like I cheated (which I didn't and would never do).</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <p>The State of Massachusetts has &quot;no fault divorce&quot; as does every other U.S. state. Either spouse may unilaterally petition for divorce without grounds for divorce that have to be proven with evidence in court. A statement of a spouse under oath that there are irreconcilable differences in the marriage conclusively establishes a right to file for divorce.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>What if my spouse wants a divorce but I don’t?</p>
<p>It is nearly impossible to contest a divorce. Since this state allows
divorce due to “irreconcilable differences” all your spouse needs to
prove is that they cannot live with you or no longer love you. For
many people, this is a sign that it is time to move on since courts
are not in the business of forcing an unhappy individual to remain
married.</p>
<p>If your spouse files a divorce based on fault, you can dispute the
reasons you are at fault. But this will likely convert your divorce to


key: chroma:document
string_value:
married.</p>
<p>If your spouse files a divorce based on fault, you can dispute the
reasons you are at fault. But this will likely convert your divorce to
a “no fault” divorce rather than stop it completely.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>(<a href="https://www.infinlaw.com/faq/50-questions-massachusetts-divorce/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Source</a>)</p>
<p>Marital fault is not considered on the merits of child custody, property division, or alimony in Massachusetts.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Body: <p>It’s fairly common when looking for real estate to see “adults only,” “seniors only,” or “55+” restrictions for strata/condominium properties. I would expect this to be a cut and dried case of discrimination – one can imagine a “whites-only” townhouse complex (rightfully) going down like a lead balloon.</p>
<p>In BC, this discrimination is explicitly allowed in the <a href="https://www.bclaws.gov.bc.ca/civix/document/id/complete/statreg/98043_07#section123.1" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>Strata Property Act</em></a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The strata corporation may pass a bylaw that requires one or more persons residing in a strata lot to have reached a specified age that is not less than 55 years.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Has this kind of discrimination been tested in court or by a human rights tribunal before? Is it likely any such challenge would succeed?</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
</blockquote>
<p>Has this kind of discrimination been tested in court or by a human rights tribunal before? Is it likely any such challenge would succeed?</p>
<p>(I’m specifically thinking about British Columbia but I expect any Canadian jurisdiction would be similar.)</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <p>The B.C. Human Rights Code exempts age restrictions for 55+ in relation to tenancy. See <a href="https://www.bclaws.gov.bc.ca/civix/document/id/complete/statreg/00_96210_01" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Human Rights Code</a>, s. 10. The subsection prohibiting discrimination in tenancy on the basis of age &quot;does not apply&quot;:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>if the space is a rental unit in residential premises in which every rental unit is reserved for rental to a person who has reached 55 years of age or to 2 or more persons, at least one of whom has reached 55 years of age</p>
</blockquote>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
</blockquote>
<p>Further, as to condominium bylaws, in 2022, the Province enacted <a href="https://www.leg.bc.ca/parliamentary-business/legislation-debates-proceedings/42nd-parliament/3rd-session/bills/third-reading/gov44-3" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Bill 44, the <em>Building and Strata Statutes Amendment Act</em></a>, which makes any strata age restriction below the age of 55 <strong>invalid</strong> (which you have quoted a portion of).</p>
<h3>Human Rights Tribunal</h3>
<p>The Human Rights Tribunal can only provide remedies for claims arising under the Human Rights Code. Given that the Human Rights Code does not provide a basis for discrimination claims in tenancy when the age of distinction is 55+, any valid strata by-law relating to age of residents will by definition fall outside of the scope of a Human Rights Code complaint.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>And even when the <em>Strata Property Act</em> allowed all sorts of age restrictions, the BC Human Rights Code does not provide a remedy when the distinction is authorized by another act (see s. 41(2); <em>Hallonquist v. Strata Plan NW307 and another</em>, <a href="https://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bchrt/doc/2014/2014bchrt117/2014bchrt117.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">2014 BCHRT 117</a>):</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Nothing in this Code prohibits a distinction on the basis of age if that distinction is permitted or required by any Act or regulation.</p>
</blockquote>
<h3>Constitutional challenge in a court</h3>
<p>You also ask about a challenge in a court. I assume you consider that the challenge would be based on s. 15(1) of the <em>Charter</em> (equality rights).</p>
<p>There are three potential targets of the challenge:</p>
<ol>
<li>the strata by-law that restricts residency to people aged 55+;</li>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>There are three potential targets of the challenge:</p>
<ol>
<li>the strata by-law that restricts residency to people aged 55+;</li>
<li>the provincial statute prohibiting strata by-laws from imposing any age restriction unless it is an age restriction based on an age not less than 55 years;</li>
<li>the carve-out in the Human Rights Code for tenancy restrictions for ages 55+</li>
</ol>
<p>The <em>Charter</em> challenge to the strata by-law itself would face the barrier that a British Columbia court has held that stratas are not &quot;government&quot; for the purpose of the <em>Charter</em>, so are not subject to <em>Charter</em> challenges: <a href="https://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcsc/doc/2015/2015bcsc1487/2015bcsc1487.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>Strata Plan NW 499 v. Kirk</em>, 2015 BCSC 1487</a>.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p><sup>I have quickly added this final portion in response to a clarification of the question, but there is more to say. I will return to explain the law relating to partially ameliorative legislation.</sup></p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: Can Meta create a Twitter clone?

Question Body: <p>Meta is about to release an app called Threads that has been labeled by news sources as a Twitter rival or Twitter clone.</p>
<p>I don't know how similar Threads actually is to Twitter, but hypothetically if it were almost identical, would that be legal? More generally, can anyone just copy an existing website (without copying the code or images)? Could I make a website that lets people post pictures like Instagram but call it MyPics? How similar do two websites or apps have to be before there's a legal/copyright issue?</p>


Answer 1: <blockquote>
<p>More generally, can anyone just copy an existing website (without
copying the code or images)?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Yes.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Could I make a website that lets people post pictures like Instagram
but call it MyPics?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Yes.</p>
<p>In general, copyright protects particular expressions of ideas, not higher level ideas or concepts.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 2: <p>Copyright applies to creative expressions, not abstract ideas. Copying the general  functionality of an application is not a copyright violation. Only copying the code, art assets etc. is.</p>
<p>However, under some circumstances, an idea can be <em>patented</em>. That is if that idea is a new &quot;invention&quot;. It is possible for companies like Twitter or Instagram to protect certain features of their websites they invented using patents. In fact, <a href="https://patents.justia.com/company/twitter" rel="noreferrer">Twitter does that</a>. But patents have some limitations:</p>
<ul>
<li>They can only protect what's actually new. When someone did something like that before, then that is called &quot;prior art&quot; and it invalidates the patent. For example, you could not patent &quot;A website that allows users to upload images&quot; today, because websites that allow users to upload images have already been invented and exist for ages.</li>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<li>And because you can't patent something that already exists, you have to be really specific in your patent description. Which means people can get around it by doing things slightly different than claimed in the patent. For example, if your patent says &quot;Uploaded images are displayed on the left side of the screen&quot;, then someone could avoid infringing it by displaying uploaded images on the <em>right</em> side of the screen.</li>
<li>Patents have a rather short expiration time. How long exactly depends on the country and the type of patent, but they are generally not longer than 20 years.</li>
</ul>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: Could you be charged with manslaughter for obstructing an ambulance?

Question Body: <p>There was a recent incident in London that has been all over the news where protesters blocked a road and eventually ended up blocking an ambulance. It was stated that they were aware of the ambulance yet still refused to move. Assume a hypothetical scenario where this ambulance was responding to a time sensitive incident, i.e, a stabbing victim, who was therefore suffering from blood loss, and it could be conclusively proven that the delays caused by these protesters were the sole reason that this victim ended up dying from a survivable injury. Could the protesters be charged with manslaughter, assuming it was evident they were aware of the ambulance's presence?</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <h2>Charged? Of course, the police can charge you with anything at any time</h2>
<p><strong>Could you be convicted?</strong></p>
<p><a href="https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manslaughter_in_English_law" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Maybe</a>.</p>
<p>Their best shot is charging you with “Manslaughter by an unlawful and dangerous act” also called constructive manslaughter.</p>
<p>The Crown must prove your act:</p>
<ol>
<li>was intentional,</li>
<li>was unlawful,</li>
<li>leads the reasonable person to realise that some other person is at risk of physical harm, and</li>
<li>caused the death.</li>
</ol>
<p>The first two are uncontestable: the protesters are deliberately engaging in an illegal act. No 3 would be up to the jury. No 4 is also up to the jury and would turn on the evidence that the delay to the ambulance caused the death.</p>


Tags: united-kingdom, manslaughter, protest, wrongful-death


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: What is the legal significance of explicitly designating an ingredient as a fruit oil?

Question Body: <p>A South African food item lists an ingredient as olive (fruit) oil.</p>
<p>Another South African food item lists an ingredient as non-hydrogenated palm (fruit) oil.</p>
<p>I’ve never seen such designations on ingredient listings and assume that it has some legal significance to specify that it is a fruit oil (as in an oil of the olive fruit, rather than the seed) in South African law.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <p>This may be historical with a quasi-legal underpinning. Apparently, regulations that might have banned palm kernel oil were repealed, but they would not have banned palm fruit oil. It is most likely there to inform consumers that these are the fruit oils, and not palm kernel or olive seed oil (the latter would not be generally used in food, the former is almost universally what people outside Africa mean when they speak of &quot;palm oil&quot;). Palm kernel oil is regulated in the US in a way that palm fruit oil is not, and I can't find any evidence that olive seed oil is legal in food, in the US.</p>


Tags: food, south-africa, food-processing


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: Different notice periods for employer and employee

Question Body: <p>On another site, someone was asking because it seems his employer doesn't need to give any notice during the three month probation period, while the employee has to give three months notice. Apart from being obviously most unfair, is that legal at all in the UK? (And information about other countries would likely be of interest to other people as well)</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <p>Referring to the UK company <a href="https://www.citation.co.uk/news/hr-and-employment-law/much-notice-given-probation-periods/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Citation Ltd</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><strong>How much notice has to be given during probation periods?</strong></p>
<p>If an employee’s in their probation period and chooses to leave before it’s over, if you don’t have a set term in your contracts of employment, they must give the statutory minimum notice period – which is one week.</p>
<p>However, you can set your own notice period specifically for probation periods in your contracts of employment.</p>
<p>So, for example, if an employee’s notice period would ordinarily be four weeks outside of probationary periods, you can set it at two weeks during their probation period, providing it’s in writing in their contract of employment.</p>
<p><strong>Letting go of an employee during their probation period</strong></p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p><strong>Letting go of an employee during their probation period</strong></p>
<p>. . . it’s good practice to try to make it work by clearly setting out what’s expected of them, and holding regular reviews to monitor performance and further reiterate your expectations – particularly as you’ll have no doubt spent time and money during the recruitment and training process already.</p>
<p>If, despite your efforts, things still aren’t working out, you’d be within your rights to dismiss the employee. Remember though, even in their probation period, employees still have certain rights – like the right to be accompanied by a work colleague or an accredited trade union official.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It seems quite bizarre to expect 3 months notice from an employee who is on 3 months probation. That would be on the first day, and isn't legal unless agreed in the contract – in which case the employee has until the last day to withdraw their notice.</p>
<p><strong>Edit</strong></p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p><strong>Edit</strong></p>
<p>If the three months notice is contractual, it reminds me of UK (real) estate agents' T&amp;C for sole agency vendor agreements, that the apparently fixed period agreement does not terminate unless the client provides the required notice. So in this case, if the probationer has not given the 3 months contractual notice, they cannot legally leave at the end of the probation period, unless they are dismissed.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: Could cases regarding violations of the ECHR be heard before UK courts prior to the Human Rights Act 1998?


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Body: <p><a href="https://ukandeu.ac.uk/explainers/the-european-convention-on-human-rights/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://ukandeu.ac.uk/explainers/the-european-convention-on-human-rights/</a></p>
<p>The above article that I have been reading suggests that an application to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg should only be made if domestic routes have been 'exhausted', seeming to imply that domestic courts had jurisdiction to hear cases regarding violations of the ECHR (see the section under 'How is it enforced?').</p>
<p>However, the article goes on to state that the HRA was introduced to 'bring rights home' and enable people to protect their rights in domestic courts, suggesting that this was not the case prior to the act.</p>
<p>These two suggestions seem somewhat contradictory to me. Is there something that I have misunderstood?</p>
<p>Thanks!</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <p>Before the <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/contents" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Human Rights Act 1998</a>, you could not complain on European Convention on Human Rights grounds to domestic courts.</p>
<p>The UK as a state was signatory to and therefore bound by the Convention. However, public authorities in the UK were not required by domestic law to comply with the Convention. In some circumstances domestic courts could take into account the Convention but nevertheless they were not bound by it.</p>
<p>The fact that (generally) before making an application to the European Court of Human Rights you had to exhaust all available domestic processes just means that the state was entitled to the opportunity to make things right, there was some political leeway afforded to it, and the practical matter of cutting down the sheer number of cases to be heard by the European Court.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>It is a bit like having to exhaust a regulated company's complaints process before complaining to the regulator. The regulator will tend to reject the complaint if the complainant hasn't been through the company's (reasonable) steps.</p>
<p>Among other things the Human Rights Act 1998 gave effect to the European Convention in Human Rights law. Now public authorities including the courts were bound by the Convention and complaints could be made domestically on Convention rights grounds.</p>
<p>Chapter 1 of the White Paper for the-then Human Rights Bill may be of interest:</p>
<p><a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/263526/rights.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/263526/rights.pdf</a></p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>Alternatively paragraphs 10-17 of The Government's Independent Review of the Human Rights Act <a href="https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt5802/jtselect/jtrights/89/8905.htm" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt5802/jtselect/jtrights/89/8905.htm</a>.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: How do war survivors claim damages?

Question Body: <p>A Modern Example:</p>
<p>Numerous Ukrainians survivors have had their homes destroyed by Russian missiles.  If the Russian prevail in this conflict, then I would think that said survivors can not claim damages against the victor.  On the other hand for the purposes of the question, let us assume that the Ukrainians prevail in this conflict.</p>
<p>How &amp; in what forum would a Ukrainian survivor claim / recover damages from Russia for the destruction of his / her home?</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <h2>Currently, there is no recourse</h2>
<p>The Russian state is sovereign. This means the Russian government has to tell the Russian courts that they allow people to sue Russia for specific, enumerated things. If the Kremlin has not done so, then Russia has total, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sovereign_immunity" rel="nofollow noreferrer">sovereign immunity</a> from such claims.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>In the <a href="/questions/tagged/united-states" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-united-states-tooltip-container">united-states</a>, the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Tort_Claims_Act" rel="nofollow noreferrer">FTCA</a> regulates how and when you can sue the USA or federal institutions for torts, while <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_Sovereign_Immunities_Act" rel="nofollow noreferrer">FSIA</a> regulates how or when you can sue other countries in the USA.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>In <a href="/questions/tagged/russia" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;russia&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;russia&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-russia-tooltip-container">russia</a>, the <em><a href="https://base.garant.ru/71237734/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Federal Law No. 297-FZ of November 3, 2015 &quot;On Jurisdictional Immunities of a Foreign State and Property of a Foreign State in the Russian Federation&quot;</a></em> seems to be a very similar law to FSIA. I could not determine <strong>if</strong> an equivalent to the FTCA exists.</p>
<h2>Reparations would be handled by a peace treaty with Ukraine</h2>
<p>Besides a law that allows claims against Russia, a Ukrainian-Russian peace treaty might contain a passus about reparations.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<h2>Reparations would be handled by a peace treaty with Ukraine</h2>
<p>Besides a law that allows claims against Russia, a Ukrainian-Russian peace treaty might contain a passus about reparations.</p>
<p>There are three very traditional ways how such handle reparations: In one case, such a treaty could establish that Russia pays the reparations to Ukraine, and then claims against Russia are paid out by Ukraine. In the other case, the treaty provides a framework to sue Russia for compensation. And in the last variant, no compensation for civilians is agreed upon at all.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Body: <p>Chapter 2308 of Title 14 of the Texas Occupations Code deals with towing and booting by towing companies.</p>
<p>Section 2308.404(a)(2) reads  &quot;A towing company, booting company, or parking facility owner who violates this chapter is liable to the owner or operator of the vehicle that is the subject of the violation for ... towing, storage, or booting fees in connection with the vehicle's removal, storage or booting of the vehicle ...&quot;</p>
<p>But then 2308.404(b) reads &quot;A vehicle's owner or operator is not required to prove negligence of a parking facility owner, towing company, or booting company to recover under Subsection (a).&quot;</p>
<p>What does this mean?  If, for example, the owner claims that the towing company failed to observe the requirement that a towing company not tow a vehicle from a facility that fails to display proper signage (2308.301), is the burden of proof on the towing company and not the owner?</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <blockquote>
<p>What does this mean?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It means that proof of a violation of the statute is sufficient even if it wouldn't support a common law claim for negligence.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>If, for example, the owner claims that the towing company failed to
observe the requirement that a towing company not tow a
vehicle from a facility that fails to display proper signage
(2308.301), is the burden of proof on the towing company and not the
owner?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It does not shift the burden of proof. It changes what has to be proved. The owner can prove a violation of the statute rather than proving negligence. But the burden of proof remains on the owner.</p>


Tags: texas, negligence, parking, towing


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: Is illegal for a civilian to shine a light into police officer&#39;s car?

Question Body: <p>Police officers often shine a light into your car or even your eyes. I find this very annoying. Their reasons of using such light is to &quot;check if there is a hazard or any other safety issues in your car&quot;. I did some research and in general, there is no relevant clause prohibiting the usage a flashlight this way.</p>
<p>My question is, in US and Canada, is it illegal for a citizen do the <strong>exactly same thing</strong> to a police officer: shine a light back at them out of your car or shine a light into their car? The reason is simple: before the officer show the police ID I cannot be sure that it is actually the real police that has been stalking me. I have to use a flashlight to examine <strong>if there is any hazard associated</strong>. The reason is safety and self-protection.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <h2>The police will order you to stop and then you have to obey.</h2>
<p>The moment you annoy the police in a way that is hindering their work (such as blinding them with a flashlight), they can demand you to stop. if you don't comply, then you are committing a misdemeanor. For example, Virginia calls this <a href="https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/18.2-463/" rel="noreferrer">&quot;refusal to aid [an] officer in execution of his office&quot;</a> and it is worded so widely, that the officer asking you to shut up and you don't, then you are guilty. If the order is in any way justifiable, then you not following the order is... well, criminal.</p>
<p>Plus, if you did not comply and they pulled out their handcuffs and you <em>still</em> don't comply with their demand, you are now resisting arrest, which at least in Virginia is again, <a href="https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title18.2/chapter10/section18.2-460/#" rel="noreferrer">a misdemeanor.</a></p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Body: <p>Consider the following in the context UK contract law, insurance and consumer rights.</p>
<p>When you (a person or legal entity) buys insurance there is some expectation that you properly value the item or items insured.</p>
<p>If at the time of a claim, the valuation is found to be incorrect (too low = underinsured) the insurer may <em>avoid</em> the claim or apply an <em>averaging clause</em>, effectively meaning they pay less than they would if you had valued the item(s) correctly and paid a higher premium as a result.
This is I believe termed a <strong>qualifying misrepresentation</strong>.</p>
<p>However, there is also an expectation from the consumer that if they acted in <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/15/section/62/enacted" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><strong>good faith</strong></a> they should not be penalised.</p>
<p>Many complaints are made to the financial ombudsman and resolved by weighing these up.</p>
<p>See for example:</p>
<ul>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>Many complaints are made to the financial ombudsman and resolved by weighing these up.</p>
<p>See for example:</p>
<ul>
<li><a href="https://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/data-insight/insight/insight-in-depth-underinsurance-misrepresentation-non-disclosure" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/data-insight/insight/insight-in-depth-underinsurance-misrepresentation-non-disclosure</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/decisions-case-studies/ombudsman-decisions/search?Keyword=buildings+insurance+underinsurance+&amp;Sort=relevance" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/decisions-case-studies/ombudsman-decisions/search?Keyword=buildings+insurance+underinsurance+&amp;Sort=relevance</a></li>
</ul>
<p>How might this work in the context of changes to the insured value made over time?
Specifically, if you consider a claim on buildings insurance with:</p>
<ul>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
</ul>
<p>How might this work in the context of changes to the insured value made over time?
Specifically, if you consider a claim on buildings insurance with:</p>
<ul>
<li>A significant undervaluation is being made by the original managing agents.</li>
<li>Different managing agents involved over time.</li>
<li>Different insurance brokers used over time.</li>
<li>Different underwriters used over time.</li>
<li>The current managing agent claims that they acted in good faith to review the rebuild cost with various insurers.</li>
<li>Some records of increases in rebuild costs significantly beyond inflation levels
backing up the claim that this was discussed but nonetheless leaving the property undervalued.</li>
</ul>
<p>To my mind mistakes were made by multiple parties:</p>
<ul>
<li>Previous agents did not value the property correctly</li>
<li>Subsequent actors acted in good faith assuming the valuation to be correct</li>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<ul>
<li>Previous agents did not value the property correctly</li>
<li>Subsequent actors acted in good faith assuming the valuation to be correct</li>
<li>The client queried the valuation at least once and as a result the insured amount increased
(but there may be no record of these conservations)</li>
<li>However, no one made or asked for a proper valuation by the surveyor</li>
</ul>
<p>Has the client acted in &quot;good faith&quot; or made a &quot;qualifying misrepresentation&quot; and how could this be determined (by the ombudsman or anyone else)?</p>
<p>Does it make a significant difference if the managing agent (client) is a 'professional' property management company that might be expected to know these things vs a right to manage company or owners association?</p>
<p>Likewise would earlier claims made under a previous insurer where the under-insurance issue was not noted be factored in?


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>Likewise would earlier claims made under a previous insurer where the under-insurance issue was not noted be factored in?
(for example, if a loss adjustor visited in regards to say an escape of water claim would they be reasonably expected to note the under insurance issue at the time and would that even be relevant if it was for a different broker or underwriter).</p>
<p>It is also unclear (to me) who is responsible for the valuation with buildings insurance.
If you consider car insurance. The valuation of a car is typically determined by the insurer using a &quot;glass&quot; guide. A consumer might reasonably expect something similar to apply for building insurance based on property values.
For items like jewelry, it appears the person taking out the insurance is expected to get it professionally valued.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <blockquote>
<p>If at the time of a claim, the valuation is found to be incorrect (too low = underinsured) the insurer may avoid the claim or apply an averaging clause, effectively meaning they pay less than they would if you had valued the item(s) correctly and paid a higher premium as a result. This is I believe termed a qualifying misrepresentation.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>A qualifying misrepresentation is the consumer's &quot;misrepresentation for which the insurer has a remedy against the consumer&quot; (<a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2012/6/section/4" rel="nofollow noreferrer">s4 Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012</a>).</p>
<p>This is available when the consumer misrepresented a fact deliberately or recklessly, or carelessly (<a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2012/6/section/5" rel="nofollow noreferrer">s5 CIDRA</a>).</p>
<blockquote>
<p>s5 (4) It is for the insurer to show that a qualifying misrepresentation


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<blockquote>
<p>s5 (4) It is for the insurer to show that a qualifying misrepresentation
was deliberate or reckless.</p>
<p>(5) But it is to be presumed, unless the contrary is shown—</p>
<p>(a) that the consumer had the knowledge of a reasonable consumer, and</p>
<p>(b) that the consumer knew that a matter about which the insurer asked
a clear and specific question was relevant to the insurer.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>If a qualifying misrepresentation was deliberate or reckless, the remedy is that &quot;the insurer may avoid the contract and refuse all claims, and need not return any of the premiums paid, except to the extent (if any) that it would be unfair to the consumer to retain them.&quot; (<a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2012/6/schedule/1" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Schedule 1 CIDRA</a>).</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p><em>At the time of</em> application for or renewal or mid-term adjustment of a policy, the consumer must take reasonable care to answer the insurer's questions. Including what is the value at that time (not 15 years ago).</p>
<blockquote>
<p>s3 Reasonable care</p>
<p>(1)Whether or not a consumer has taken reasonable care not to make a
misrepresentation is to be determined in the light of all the relevant
circumstances.</p>
<p>(2)The following are examples of things which may need to be taken
into account in making a determination under subsection (1)—</p>
<p>(a)the type of consumer insurance contract in question, and its target
market,</p>
<p>(b)any relevant explanatory material or publicity produced or
authorised by the insurer,</p>
<p>(c)how clear, and how specific, the insurer's questions were,</p>
<p>(d)in the case of a failure to respond to the insurer's questions in
connection with the renewal or variation of a consumer insurance


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>(d)in the case of a failure to respond to the insurer's questions in
connection with the renewal or variation of a consumer insurance
contract, how clearly the insurer communicated the importance of
answering those questions (or the possible consequences of failing to
do so),</p>
<p>(e)whether or not an agent was acting for the consumer.</p>
<p>(3)The standard of care required is that of a reasonable consumer: but
this is subject to subsections (4) and (5).</p>
<p>(4)If the insurer was, or ought to have been, aware of any particular
characteristics or circumstances of the actual consumer, those are to
be taken into account.</p>
</blockquote>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>(4)If the insurer was, or ought to have been, aware of any particular
characteristics or circumstances of the actual consumer, those are to
be taken into account.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Necessarily the Financial Ombudsman makes its findings on a case-by-case basis. The Ombudsman corresponds with both parties about who said what when. If this case hinges on an insurer's question, the Ombudsman reads the question to determine if it was a clear question. The Ombudsman examines the evidence - letters, phone call recordings, emails, websites.</p>
<p>A few of the case studies at the link you supplied involve changes to property or policy over time.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/data-insight/insight/insight-in-depth-underinsurance-misrepresentation-non-disclosure" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/data-insight/insight/insight-in-depth-underinsurance-misrepresentation-non-disclosure</a></p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>Case study 3: 15 years ago the consumer got cover for a watch valued at the time at £1,500; when she was asked at renewal times if she wanted to make any changes to her claim limit she said she didn't (and presumably paid for the policy on that basis). Years later she lost the watch; at the time of her claim it was valued at £5,000 and the insurer refused to offer her more than £1,500. The consumer complained she should have been offered more - the Ombudsman disagreed.</p>
<p>Case study 5: there was no evidence to suggest the consumer knew that the previous owner of her car had added alloy wheels. The fact that the insurer's expert was able to spot the alloys was not a reasonable argument to &quot;avoid&quot; the policy on the grounds that the consumer claimed the car had not been modified in any way. The Ombudsman disagreed with the insurer's position that the consumer knew or didn't care that the information she provided was wrong.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>Case study 6: the consumer replaced his VW Polo with a VW Golf and contacted his insurer to make a mid-term adjustment. The insurer asked him if the VW Golf had been modified in any way from the manufacturer's original specification, for example with alloy or sports wheels. He said no, it hadn't been modified in any way at all. Subsequently he made a claim on the grounds his car was stolen; he told the insurer that the car had sports wheels fitted when he bought it that he thought added a minimum of £1,000 to its value. The insurer decided to &quot;avoid&quot; the policy because the consumer deliberately misrepresented the car had been modified. The Ombudsman agreed with the insurer that the policy could be &quot;avoided&quot;.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>Buildings, contents, vehicle and jewelry policies tend to be provided on an annual basis and (among other things) what it could cost to replace them at application or renewal time. What it was worth 15 years ago is irrelevant (and might well be too little or too much).</p>
<blockquote>
<p>It is also unclear (to me) who is responsible for the valuation with buildings insurance.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The consumer is responsible for taking &quot;reasonable care&quot; about it.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>If you consider car insurance. The valuation of a car is typically determined by the insurer using a &quot;glass&quot; guide. A consumer might reasonably expect something similar to apply for building insurance based on property values.</p>
</blockquote>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
</blockquote>
<p>Buildings insurance providers ask &quot;how much it would cost if you had to rebuild your home?&quot; They don't ask how much you could sell your home for. Some providers suggest you could hire a residential property surveyor or use their 'calculator' or 'comparison tool'.</p>
<p>Expensive jewelry: if you bought it recently then have you got a receipt? If you haven't got a receipt then get it professionally valued.</p>
<p>Car insurance: you answer the insurer's questions about your car, e.g. make, year of manufacture, transmission, modifications, the insurer puts your car into one of 50 insurance groups that are a factor insurers use to price your policy. Some providers go into much detail about this kind of thing.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: What does German law say about online threats using Social Media (Youtube)?

Question Body: <p>I was watching a Youtube Video where a man calls on other people to kill a woman who burned the Quran and filmed it.</p>

<p>I know it's not OK if you disrespect somone's religion, but no one has a right to kill you or call for other people to kill you just for burning a book, do they?</p>

<p>I reported the video to YouTube and got the following response:</p>

<p><a href="https://i.stack.imgur.com/QAA27.png" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><img src="https://i.stack.imgur.com/QAA27.png" alt="enter image description here"></a></p>

<p>Is this really accurate? Does this not constitute an illegal threat under German law?</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <p>YT has certain obligations under Germany’s hate speech law <a href="http://bundesrecht.juris.de/netzdg" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Rechtsdurchsetzung in sozialen Netzwerken</a>.
You can <a href="https://support.google.com/youtube/contact/netzdg" rel="nofollow noreferrer">file complaints with a dedicated form</a>.</p>
<p>Per se, you are correct:
The German penal code § 111 punishes <a href="https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html#p1234" rel="nofollow noreferrer">public incitement to commit offences</a>.
However, as a prerequisite to any crime, German penal law must be applicable in the first place.
Specifically, it is questionable whether the man (when shooting and/or uploading the video) is/was located in Germany at that time, <a href="https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html#p0024" rel="nofollow noreferrer">§ 3 StGB</a>.
Hence YT’s assessment <em>was</em> OK.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Hence YT’s assessment <em>was</em> OK.</p>
<p><strong>Since January 1, 2021</strong>, (cf. 2020 Federal Gazette Ⅰ p. 2600) posting the same kind of video could be a crime via <a href="https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html#p0028" rel="nofollow noreferrer">§ 5 No. 5a lit. a StGB</a> if</p>
<ul>
<li>the woman was at that time in Germany, or</li>
<li>the man is a German citizen or</li>
<li>the man usually resides in the FRG.</li>
</ul>
<p>In your particular case, though, it is irrelevant, because you’re judged by the criminal law that was in effect at that time, <a href="https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html#p0017" rel="nofollow noreferrer">§ 2 ⑴ StGB</a>.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: Why &#39;Solicitor General&#39;, and not &#39;Barrister General&#39;?

Question Body: <p>In countries with this dichotomy of the legal profession, mostly barristers argue in courts. In the UK, solicitors with Higher Rights of Audience can argue in lower courts.</p>

<p>However, if <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solicitor_General" rel="nofollow">Solicitors General</a> argue in courts, then ought they not be called 'Barristers General'? Does this nomenclature contradict the English definitions of 'barrister' vs 'solicitor'? </p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <p>The dichotomy between solicitors and barristers in the UK isn't one based on verbal definitions in the English language. In other words, the fact that barristers argue and solicitors don't isn't something that's inherent to the words, it's just how British law decided to divide it. Since those countries with solicitor generals don't have this dichotomy, they generally don't have anything actually called a barrister, and there's no reason why the solicitor general couldn't be called that, since solicitor doesn't require that he not argue in court.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 2: <p>The Solicitor General was the second <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_officers_of_the_Crown" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Law Officer of the Crown</a>, emerging during the reign of Edward IV (1461–1483). Over the centuries, the offices of Attorney and Solicitor General came to exercise a unique combination of political and legal functions, which evolved differently when adopted by other jurisdictions with different constitutions. The title predates the modern understanding of &quot;solicitor&quot; as a practising lawyer who is not a barrister.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>The critical feature of the office of Solicitor General is that it is junior to the Attorney General, not that it is occupied by a lawyer who would be qualified to practise as a solicitor. While the Attorney General exercises executive power directly and therefore holds a political office, the Solicitor General is more like an ordinary professional lawyer who deals with the government's biggest legal problems. This includes responsibility for advocacy in the highest courts. Therefore, in split profession jurisdictions, the Solicitor General looks more like a barrister than what is now understood by &quot;solicitor.&quot;</p>
<p>The historical background is traced in WS Holdsworth, <a href="https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/illlr13&amp;div=57&amp;g_sent=1" rel="nofollow noreferrer">The early history of the Attorney and Solicitor General</a> 🔒 (1918–1919) 13 <em>Illinois Law Review</em>
602:</p>
<blockquote>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
602:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>[T]he offices of attorney and solicitor general only began to assume their modern shape in the course of the sixteenth century; and it was not till the end of the seventeenth century that they in substance attained it. By that date they had become legal advisers of the crown …</p>
<p>How was it that the king came to appear in the courts, and to be advised on points of law by an attorney and a solicitor, at a time when the profession of attorney was becoming sharply divided from that of barrister, and at a time when a solicitor was approximating to an attorney, but was still regarded as inferior to him?</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>In order to solve this problem we must, in the first place, consider the very large differences between the development of the king's attorney and solicitor and the development of the ordinary attorney or solicitor; and, in the second place, the great increase both in the amount and the character of the demands made upon the king's legal advisers in the new age which opened in the sixteenth century …</p>
<p>We hear of a king's attorney in the thirteenth century, that is at a time when the legal profession had not yet taken its final form. Like the attorneys of other people, he is often only appointed for a particular court; like them he is sometimes formally admitted by the court; and like them he can both plead and take all the necessary steps in the action. But there are differences. The king could appoint an attorney general—an attorney to conduct any litigation that might arise—as he pleased, at a time when other persons could only do so by the express license of the king …</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>By the beginning of the seventeenth century this development was practically complete. Hudson tells us that it was resolved in 1604 that the king's serjeant [barrister] could not, like the king's attorney, proceed on his own motion by information in the Star Chamber. He could apparently only act if he were specially instructed. In other words, the attorney general was the only person who could take the initiative in legal proceedings on behalf of the crown. Why was it that he had thus been able to gain so decisive a superiority to the serjeants?</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>The order of the serjeants was essentially medieval; and the king's serjeants were medieval officials. Like many other medieval officials, they were obliged to give place to officials who had originally occupied a humbler position, because these officials were, for that very reason, more capable of adaptation to the needs of the modern state. Thus the rise of the king's attorney and solicitor, at the expense of the king's serjeants, is, in the legal sphere, a phenomenon of the same kind as the rise, in the political sphere, of the king's secretaries, at the expense of many older medieval functionaries.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Further reading on the history of the Law Officers can be found in:</p>
<ul>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
</blockquote>
<p>Further reading on the history of the Law Officers can be found in:</p>
<ul>
<li>JW Norton-Kyshe, <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books/about/The_Law_and_Privileges_Relating_to_the_A.html?id=5hlHAQAAMAAJ" rel="nofollow noreferrer">The law and privileges relating to the Attorney-General and Solicitor-General of England, with a history from the earliest periods, and a series of king's attorneys and attorneys and solicitors-general from the reign of Henry III to the 60th of Queen Victoria</a> (1897)</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>JLJ Edwards, <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books/about/The_Law_Officers_of_the_Crown.html?id=hIEjsmUE5d0C" rel="nofollow noreferrer">The law officers of the Crown; a study of the offices of Attorney-General and Solicitor-General of England, with an Account of the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions of England</a> 🔒 (1964)</li>
</ul>
<ul>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
</ul>
<ul>
<li>(United States) SP Waxman, <a href="https://www.justice.gov/osg/solicitor-general-historical-context" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Presenting the Case of the United States As It Should Be</a> (1998)</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>(Australia) G Appleby, <a href="https://www.booktopia.com.au/the-role-of-the-solicitor-general-gabrielle-appleby/book/9781509924721.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">The Role of the Solicitor-General Negotiating Law, Politics and the Public Interest</a> 🔒 (2018)</li>
</ul>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: Can a university continue with their affirmative action program by rejecting all government funding?

Question Body: <p>As per <a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/questions/93649/why-did-cj-roberts-apply-the-fourteenth-amendment-to-harvard-a-private-school">Why did CJ Roberts apply the Fourteenth Amendment to Harvard, a private school?</a>, the ban on affirmative action only applies to schools that receive federal funding. So... could a school continue with their affirmative action program if they just reject government funds? Or is there some sort of a 'gotcha' that prevents them from doing so in practice?</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <h3>Short Answer</h3>
<blockquote>
<p>Can a university continue with their affirmative action program by
rejecting all government funding?</p>
</blockquote>
<p><strong>Yes.</strong></p>
<h3>The Status Quo</h3>
<p>There are <a href="https://deanclancy.com/a-list-of-colleges-that-dont-take-federal-money/" rel="noreferrer">twenty-two higher educational institutions in the United States</a> that did this prior to the 2023 ruling (in all but one trivial case, in part, in order to affirmatively escape the requirements of Title VI, so that they could discriminate in furtherance of a religious mission). Most of the schools on the list refuse not only federal but also state and local government aid. Specifically, they are:</p>
<ol>
<li><p>Aletheia Christian College (Idaho)</p>
</li>
<li><p>Bethlehem College &amp; Seminary (Minnesota)</p>
</li>
<li><p>Boyce College (Kentucky)</p>
</li>
<li><p>Christendom College (Virginia)</p>
</li>
<li><p>Faith Bible College (Maine)</p>
</li>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<li><p>Bethlehem College &amp; Seminary (Minnesota)</p>
</li>
<li><p>Boyce College (Kentucky)</p>
</li>
<li><p>Christendom College (Virginia)</p>
</li>
<li><p>Faith Bible College (Maine)</p>
</li>
<li><p>Grove City College (Pennsylvania)</p>
</li>
<li><p>Gutenberg College (Oregon)</p>
</li>
<li><p>Hildegard College (California)</p>
</li>
<li><p>Hillsdale College (Michigan)</p>
</li>
<li><p>Mid-America Baptist Theological Seminary (Tennessee)</p>
</li>
<li><p>Monticello College (Utah)</p>
</li>
<li><p>Mount Liberty College (Utah)</p>
</li>
<li><p>New College Franklin (Tennessee)</p>
</li>
<li><p>New Saint Andrews College (Idaho)</p>
</li>
<li><p>Patrick Henry College (Virginia)</p>
</li>
<li><p>Pensacola Christian College (Florida)</p>
</li>
<li><p>Principia College (Illinois)</p>
</li>
<li><p>Sattler College (Massachusetts)</p>
</li>
<li><p>Southern Baptist Theological Seminary (Kentucky)</p>
</li>
<li><p>Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary (Texas)</p>
</li>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
</li>
<li><p>Sattler College (Massachusetts)</p>
</li>
<li><p>Southern Baptist Theological Seminary (Kentucky)</p>
</li>
<li><p>Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary (Texas)</p>
</li>
<li><p>Weimar University (California)</p>
</li>
<li><p>Wyoming Catholic College (Wyoming)</p>
</li>
</ol>
<p>There used to be more, but most of the hold outs eventually gave in, or ceased to be. Notably, the vast majority of parochial colleges and universities in the U.S. are subject to Title VI because they accept federal funds and federal financial aid.</p>
<p>All of them, except Monticello College in Utah, are non-profit colleges or universities with a religious affiliation or mission. Several are partially, or entirely, seminaries devoted to training future clergy.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>Monticello College has only four teaching faculty (including its President) and two administrators, has no more than 30 students at any one time, was apparently established in 2010, was &quot;for profit&quot; until at least 2019, and is unconventional to the point of barely being recognizable as a conventional institution of higher education, for example, including a substantial manual labor component and teaching courses in blocks of two days to three weeks. Monticello also voluntarily adheres to a non-discrimination policy comparable to the one that applies to Title VI institutions.</p>
<p>Only two of them, Grove City College and Hillsdale College, have 1,200 or more students.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>Only two of them, Grove City College and Hillsdale College, have 1,200 or more students.</p>
<p>By comparison, there are <a href="https://www.usnews.com/education/best-colleges/articles/how-many-universities-are-in-the-us-and-why-that-number-is-changing" rel="noreferrer">3,982 colleges and universities in the United States</a>, so this is less than 0.6% of U.S. colleges and universities, and a far smaller percentage of U.S. college students as all of these institutions are all small by college and university standards.</p>
<p>About half of private non-profit colleges and universities (about 800 of them) have 1,000 or fewer students, so about 2.5% of small private non-profit colleges do not receive federal funding, but only 0.25% of larger private non-profit colleges and universities do.</p>
<p>All &quot;for profit&quot; colleges or universities in the U.S. (almost 700 of them) rely upon federal financial aid and/or federal funding.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>All &quot;for profit&quot; colleges or universities in the U.S. (almost 700 of them) rely upon federal financial aid and/or federal funding.</p>
<p>As a practical matter, almost all of the 99.4% of colleges and universities in the U.S. that rely upon federal financial aid and/or federal funding could not sustainably continue to operate with anything close to their current business models without this federal support. They would either have to close, or would have to radically restructure themselves.</p>
<h3>Non-Title VI Considerations</h3>
<p>Also, while not quite as stringent as Title VI, the U.S. tax code also denies tax-exempt status to certain non-profits that discriminate based upon race. <em>See</em> <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/26/501" rel="noreferrer">26 U.S.C. § 501(i)</a> (social clubs).</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>Most higher educational institutions are not subject to this requirement directly, but for example, the Rotarians could not do charitable work for a college that discriminated based upon race as interpreted by the 2023 SCOTUS ruling.</p>
<h3>Additional Considerations Regarding Impact</h3>
<p>Few private colleges and universities have much of a reason to withdraw from federal funding to allow them to continue affirmative action programs based upon race because not all that many of them have admissions policies which are strongly affected by affirmative action based upon race.</p>
<p>Affirmative action really only has a big impact at colleges and universities that are highly selective, like Harvard and the University of North Carolina, whose admissions policies were litigated in the U.S. Supreme Court. But these universities are highly atypical.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>As noted in a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/07/03/opinion/for-most-college-students-affirmative-action-was-not-enough.html" rel="noreferrer">recent article in the New York Times</a>, while Harvard admits just 4% of applicants, and UNC admits 20%, just 6% of U.S. four year college students attend a college with an admissions rate of 25% or less (just 22 colleges and universities admit 10% or fewer of the prospective undergraduate students who apply). Another 10% of U.S. four year college students attend a college with an admissions rate of more than 25% but less than 50%. Meanwhile 56% of U.S. four year college students attend a college that admits at least 75% of its applicants.</p>
<p>While the impact of ending affirmative action at highly selective institutions is likely to be significant, this is the exception rather than the rule.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>While the impact of ending affirmative action at highly selective institutions is likely to be significant, this is the exception rather than the rule.</p>
<p>The impact of ending affirmative action based upon race in less selective institutions, while not zero, is barely noticeable. The effects of ending race based affirmative action at these school is also much more easily mitigated with race-neutral programs (like preferences for first generation college students, low income college students, or students with high class ranks in high school) with similar effects in student diversity, in less selective institutions, than it is at highly selective colleges and universities.</p>
<p>Also, less selective colleges and universities already have a disproportionate share of students who currently tend to benefit from affirmative action as show in the chart from the same New York Times story below:</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p><a href="https://i.stack.imgur.com/J6i5u.png" rel="noreferrer"><img src="https://i.stack.imgur.com/J6i5u.png" alt="enter image description here" /></a></p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: Why don&#39;t US courts use numbered paragraphs?

Question Body: <p>Many, if not indeed most,  jurisdictions' (eg  Germany, the UK, Australia, Canada, the Court of Justice of the  European Union, and the European Court of Human Rights) courts make use of numbered paragraphs for easy citation across a variety of platforms.  This avoids issues with citation and allows for (on platforms such as BAILII or AustLII) HTML pinpoint linking to specific parts of judgments.  I know that US statutory provisions use paragraph numbering, and a google (I have no formal study of American law) seems to suggest that court papers such as written arguments often require numbered paragraphs.  Yet, the US supreme court and (again, from a quick web search) the US state courts do not seem to use this easy and extremely simple innovation to aid citation.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>Is there a reason why? Or is this one of those things like inches and Fahrenheit where it's just an American practice that doesn't have a reason?</p>


Answer 1: <p>Many U.S. state courts do use numbered paragraphs, including Colorado. But the practice is fairly new and page numbers in privately published reporters was the historically established method of pinpoint citation. Most or all federal courts, and California appellate courts, for example, do not.</p>
<p>The matter is not uniform because the stylistic aspects of appellate court opinion writing is not unified. Each court makes its own rules in that regard. For example, there are even different style rules between different circuits of the U.S. Courts of Appeal, and the U.S. Supreme Court, in turn, also <a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/questions/93507/is-the-supreme-courts-in-house-citation-style-manual-publicly-available">has its own style manual</a> for drafting opinions.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: Are wills that easily contested?

Question Body: <p>I've seen multiple situations in TV shows, fictional and nonfictional, where wills or other expressions of post-mortem wishes have been contested for reasons that seemed trivial.</p>
<p>One was a man who named his friends, a successful married couple, who loved and were loved by this child, and who he believed would be better guardians than his parents (the child's grandparents) to be his daughter's guardians, but once he died there was a legal battle over custody as this man's parent, the child's grandparents, thought they could provide a slightly &quot;better&quot; life due to being more wealthy.</p>
<p>Is this enough of an argument? Is a person's dying will not the final say unless extenuating circumstances are proven?</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <p>A child is not property, therefore a (deceased) parent cannot transfer ownership. In case the sole custodial parent dies, the court will appoint a guardian for a minor child, and will take into consideration the wishes of the deceased parent, however their primary duty is to protect the interest of the child. It follows from this that objections to nomination of Smith as guardian are more easily sustained, since the requirements for being a guardian (e.g. <a href="https://app.leg.wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx?cite=11.130&amp;full=true" rel="nofollow noreferrer">in Washington</a>) are stricter than the requirements for receiving $100,000. RCW 11.130.090 excludes any guardian who has been &quot;convicted of a crime involving dishonesty, neglect, or use of physical force or other crime relevant to the functions the individual would assume as guardian&quot;, but such a person is not barred from inheriting property.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>There are limited formal grounds for contesting a will: testator mentally incompetence, formal failure of the document, (the laws surrounding signatures and witnesses), no clear indication that the document is intended to be a will, forgery or fraud, undue influence (such as a gun to the head), or mistake (for example, mistakenly believing that their child was dead therefore leaving it all to a neighbor). So it is possible, but not so easy, to contest a will.</p>
<p>Organ donation takes place under separate laws: you can't wait for the probate process to get finished in three months before donating organs.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: Car Debt and the IRS

Question Body: <p>A certain tax payer is on a payment plan to the IRS. The tax payer owes $10,000. The tax payer has missed several payments and now the IRS is going to take away the tax payer's car. The car is worth about $11,000 however there is an outstanding loan on the car of about $4,000. Assuming the IRS takes the car for non-payment of taxes, who pays off the car loan? Does the lender get stuck?</p>
<p>Note: Assume the person is in the United States.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/australia" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-australia-tooltip-container">australia</a></p>
<h2>The lender is paid first</h2>
<p>Assuming the lender has properly registered a lien under the <em>Personal Property Securities Act</em> then they have first right to the proceeds of the disposal of the vehicle. Assuming it realises $11,000 (i.e. after the costs of seizure and sale), the lender gets $4,000, the Australian Tax Office (ATO) gets $7,000 and the taxpayer still owes $3,000 to the ATO.</p>
<p>If the lender has (foolishly) not registered their interest then the ATO gets $10,000, the taxpayer gets $1,000 and still owes the lender $4,000.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 2: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/united-states" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-united-states-tooltip-container">united-states</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>Assuming the IRS takes the car for non-payment of taxes, who pays off
the car loan? Does the lender get stuck?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The lender does not get stuck.</p>
<p>The U.S. Treasury takes the car subject to the car loan. It then sells the car at auction and keeps as a credit against the taxpayer's tax liability, the money that is left over from the auction sale price after the costs of sale and the payoff of the lender (including any penalties, attorney fees, and default interest accrued).</p>
<p>Usually, the auction price is much less than the fair market value of the car sold by a used car dealer in the ordinary course.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>Usually, the auction price is much less than the fair market value of the car sold by a used car dealer in the ordinary course.</p>
<p>In the facts as given, a sales prices of $7,000-$8,000 might be typical, with costs of sale on the order of $1,000, and a payment $5,000 to the lender once penalties for having the car foreclosed upon are considered, resulting in a net credit against tax liability of $1,000-$2,000.</p>
<p><strong>What If The Auction Sale Price Less Costs Of Sale Doesn't Cover The Entire Car Loan?</strong></p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p><strong>What If The Auction Sale Price Less Costs Of Sale Doesn't Cover The Entire Car Loan?</strong></p>
<p>If the sale price were insufficient to pay the car loan with all penalties and interest and the costs of sale, the U.S. Treasury would get nothing, and the car loan lender could sue you for the balance which still remains unpaid after the auction, which is called a &quot;deficiency judgment.&quot; This would be an open and shut lawsuit, since having the car seized is an event of default and any fault in how the sale was conducted couldn't be attributed to the bank. If the deficiency is small (e.g. $100-$500), the lender might send collection letters, or file a claim in a bankruptcy if there is one, but not bother to sue.</p>
<p><strong>What If The Lender's Lien Wasn't Filed With The DMV?</strong></p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p><strong>What If The Lender's Lien Wasn't Filed With The DMV?</strong></p>
<p>All of this assumes that the car loan was property documented with a state Department of Motor Vehicles filing. If the loan wasn't properly documented on the certificate of title (or a certificate of title whose issuance is pending), the entire sales price, after the costs of sale, is a credit against taxes owed (probably $6,000-$7,000 in this example). In that case, the foreclosure is still an event of default under the car loan, and the car lender can sue the borrower for the entire amount of the loan plus interest, penalties, and usually attorney fees (probably $6,000  to $7,000 in all in this fact pattern, because a lawsuit has to be begun rather than relying on the IRS to do some of that work).</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>Also, if that happens, the car lender fires its attorneys and sues them for malpractice if it can't collect the balance it is owed on its car loan. I'm familiar with a case where that happened in a $10 million transaction, for property much more valuable than a used car, and the lender prevailed.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Body: <p>In Justice Roberts's ruling in <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/20-1199_hgdj.pdf" rel="noreferrer">Students for Fair Admissions v.
Harvard College</a> overturning affirmative action in the United States, he holds that &quot;Harvard’s and UNC’s admissions programs violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.&quot;</p>
<p>Later, he writes (all emphases added):</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The conclusion reached by the Brown Court was unmistakably clear: the right to a <em>public</em> education 'must be made available to all on equal terms'.&quot;</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>Brown’s “fundamental principle that racial discrimination in <em>public</em> education is unconstitutional.”</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>For the reasons provided above, the <em>Harvard</em> and UNC admissions programs cannot be reconciled with the guarantees of the <em>Equal Protection Clause</em>.</p>
</blockquote>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<blockquote>
<p>For the reasons provided above, the <em>Harvard</em> and UNC admissions programs cannot be reconciled with the guarantees of the <em>Equal Protection Clause</em>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Why would the Equal Protection Clause apply to private universities? The EPC restricts certain <em>state</em> actions. And <a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/questions/63912/do-students-have-first-amendment-rights-at-a-private-university">other Constitutional amendments do not apply to private universities</a>.</p>
<p>The only opinion in this decision I could find that addressed this issue at all was Justice Gorsuch's concurrence in section II.B:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Title VI says: “No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial


key: chroma:document
string_value:
assistance.” The Equal Protection Clause reads: “No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” ...</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>The Equal Protection Clause operates on States. It does not purport to regulate the conduct of private parties. By contrast, Title VI applies to recipients of federal funds—covering not just many state actors, but many private actors too. In this way, Title VI reaches entities and organizations that the Equal Protection Clause does not. ... Title VI bears independent force beyond the Equal Protection Clause.</p>
</blockquote>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
</blockquote>
<p>While Gorsuch is not explicitly clear on this point, I read this as saying that he believes that Harvard's policies are illegal, but under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S. Code § 2000d), <em>not</em> under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. But this seems like a pretty major departure from Roberts' position (which I don't understand) that the EPC applies to both Harvard and UNC.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <p>Justice Gorsuch attempts to explain (at p. 20 of his concurrence):</p>
<blockquote>
<p>In the years following <em>Bakke</em>, this Court hewed to Justice Powell's and Justice Brennan's shared premise that Title VI and the Equal Protection Clause mean the same thing. ... As a result, for over four decades, every case about racial preferences in school admissions under Title VI has turned into a case about the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>A <a href="https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/02/affirmative-action-at-harvard-border-searches-and-pedestrian-safety/" rel="noreferrer">journalist's account on scotusblog</a> also notes that the tests under Title VI and under the 14th amendment have been understood as identical:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Private universities like Harvard are not subject to the 14th Amendment, but Title VI applies the same test to private universities that receive federal funds, as Harvard does.</p>
</blockquote>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>Private universities like Harvard are not subject to the 14th Amendment, but Title VI applies the same test to private universities that receive federal funds, as Harvard does.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>See also <a href="https://www.constangy.com/newsroom-newsletters-1178" rel="noreferrer">commentary from a law firm blog</a> in 2022:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Harvard, as a private university, is not explicitly regulated by the Fourteenth Amendment. Instead, the case against Harvard relies on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits any entity receiving federal financial assistance – as Harvard does – from discriminating on the basis of “race, color, or national origin.” The Supreme Court has held that Title VI’s protections match those of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, and thus, the analyses are essentially identical.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>I read the majority reasons to be a continuance of this conflated meaning.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
</blockquote>
<p>I read the majority reasons to be a continuance of this conflated meaning.</p>
<p>In footnote 2, Chief Justice Roberts is careful to say that the Court is evaluating Harvard's admissions program &quot;under the <em>standards</em> of the Equal Protection Clause&quot; (emphasis mine), rather than stating that the Equal Protection Clause <em>applies</em> against Harvard. Later, he does slip back into language that could be read as suggesting the Equal Protection Clause is being applied directly: &quot;For the reasons provided above, the Harvard and UNC
admissions programs cannot be reconciled with the guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause,&quot; but a better reading is that he is merely recognizing that Title VI imports the same <em>guarantees</em> of the Equal Protection Clause.</p>
<p>Justice Gorsuch would prefer to re-introduce the analytical clarity about the source of the constraints.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 2: <p><strong>TL;DNR: You are right. Roberts says Harvard should lose because it violates the 14th Amendment. But he does not say the 14th Amendment applies directly to Harvard. He says Title VI and the 14th Amendment impose the same requirements, so that the 14th Amendment's <em>standards</em> effectively apply to Harvard <em>via Title VI</em>.</strong></p>
<p>Justice Roberts explains the link between Harvard and the 14th Amendment clearly <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/20-1199_hgdj.pdf#page=14" rel="noreferrer">on page six</a> of his opinion. In the body of the text, he points out that the two suits are based on different laws: The suit against UNC is based on the 14th Amendment, while the suit against Harvard is based on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>Then, in footnote 2 on that same page, he cites <a href="https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep539/usrep539244/usrep539244.pdf#page=33" rel="noreferrer">footnote 23 in Gratz</a> to show that Title VI and the 14th Amendment impose the same requirements. Because the two laws impose the same requirements, he can &quot;evaluate Harvard’s admissions program under the standards of the Equal Protection Clause itself.&quot;</p>
<p>In other words, when Roberts says <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/20-1199_hgdj.pdf#page=47" rel="noreferrer">at the end of his opinion</a> that, &quot;the Harvard and UNC admissions programs cannot be reconciled with the guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause,&quot; he is leaving it to the reader to add, &quot;<em>and thus the Harvard admissions program violates Title VI.</em>&quot;</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 3: <p>Harvard university receives substantial money from the federal government. There is a federal law prohibiting racial discrimination in education, <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/2000d" rel="noreferrer">42 USC 2000d</a>, which says</p>
<blockquote>
<p>No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or
national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>A purely private educational institution that received no federal money (including processing federal student aid) is not subject to this restriction (though it would be subject to state analogs). See p. 6 of the opinion. Beyond that, I'm not sure what is unclear. The former policies plainly did discriminate by not protecting some people just as much as other people.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: Inheritance tax on foreign gifts

Question Body: <p>Suppose that I as a UK citizen living in the UK am given money by an American who then dies. Do I have to pay inheritance tax to either the UK or US governments?</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/united-kingdom" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;united-kingdom&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;united-kingdom&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-united-kingdom-tooltip-container">united-kingdom</a></p>
<p>To extend on @ohwilleke's answer about US inheritance tax, I can answer the UK side of things.</p>
<p>UK inheritance tax does not apply to inheritances from abroad, unless that person was domiciled in the UK or some of their assets were in the UK.</p>
<p>If you are not a UK resident for tax purposes (which, from the context of your question is unlikely), then you wouldn't even have to pay tax on the interest you earned from depositing the inheritance.</p>
<p>If the deceased were taxed for being domiciled in the UK, and the US taxed your inheritance, you'd actually qualify for tax relief from HMRC based on what you'd already paid the IRS.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>If the deceased were taxed for being domiciled in the UK, and the US taxed your inheritance, you'd actually qualify for tax relief from HMRC based on what you'd already paid the IRS.</p>
<p>If you are not domiciled in the UK for tax purposes, and neither was the decedent you would owe precisely zero to HMRC in the UK.</p>
<p>More info can be found here:
<a href="https://www.taxoo.co.uk/uk-resident-receiving-inheritance-from-abroad/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://www.taxoo.co.uk/uk-resident-receiving-inheritance-from-abroad/</a></p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 2: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/united-states" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-united-states-tooltip-container">united-states</a></p>
<p>I can only answer half of the question.</p>
<p>The U.S. has an estate tax that applies to U.S. citizens and U.S. residents who die on the property that they own at their death. So, if a U.S. citizen leaves an inheritance to a U.K. citizen, any death taxes are paid by the U.S. citizen's estate (and very few people pay it because the cutoff exceeds $12 million of taxable gifts made by the decedent during life plus the fair market value of the decedent's assets at death).</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>Since this involves a gift made before death, the U.S. gift tax applies, rather than the U.S. estate tax, but the U.S. gift tax is imposed on donors, not recipients, and also has an annual exemption of $17,000 per person per year ($34,000 per person per year from a married couple).</p>
<p>I do not know how the U.K. would tax receipt of a gift before death from a U.S. person.</p>
<p>I suspect that, since this is a lifetime gift rather than an inheritance, that the only tax that would apply is a tax on gifts, not a tax on inheritances, since a lifetime gift isn't an inheritance.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 3: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/united-kingdom" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;united-kingdom&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;united-kingdom&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-united-kingdom-tooltip-container">united-kingdom</a></p>
<p>I think you have misunderstood the requirements to pay inheritance tax, as it is...</p>
<blockquote>
<p>...a tax on the estate (the property, money and possessions) of <strong>someone who’s died.</strong></p>
<p><a href="https://www.gov.uk/inheritance-tax" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Source: Gov.uk</a></p>
</blockquote>
<p>You, apparently, have not died.  Instead, you are the beneficiary of a &quot;cash gift from overseas&quot; and as such...</p>
<blockquote>
<p>You won't have to pay Income Tax on cash gifts.</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p><a href="https://community.hmrc.gov.uk/customerforums/pt/8d15fffc-4393-eb11-8ced-00155d9c86c6" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Source: HMRC</a></p>
</blockquote>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p><a href="https://community.hmrc.gov.uk/customerforums/pt/8d15fffc-4393-eb11-8ced-00155d9c86c6" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Source: HMRC</a></p>
</blockquote>
<p>But... any profit it generates (e.g. from investing it, or interest gained from a bank account) <em>may</em> be taxable depending on your particular circumstances.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Body: <p>I live in Pennsylvania. Recently, the counties of Lancaster, Dauphin, and I believe Schuylkill and Cumberland have expressed that they are going to violate the state supreme court and governor by moving to the next level of re-opening despite COVID-19 (i.e., transitioning from red to yellow).</p>
<p>Is this legal? What are the repercussions of doing so?</p>
<p>I've seen some cite the &quot;doctrine of lesser magistrates&quot; as a defense for this. The only information I could find about this practice was from Wikipedia. According to the wiki page this movement originated as a way for a lesser magistrate to overturn the decision of a higher court. It appeared that the direct reference was to something akin to feudalism. I read elsewhere (I forget where exactly) that this practice used to be use in times of violence and war, often citing tyranny as the reason for doing so.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>To me, this all sounds like the vote of &quot;no confidence&quot; in Chancellor Valorum from Star Wars Episode I.</p>
<p>Thoughts? I'm not a lawyer but merely a legal enthusiast. Thanks!</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <h2>Sending a letter to the Governor is legal</h2>

<p>You can do it, I can do it and the elected officials of Lancaster County can do it. Thanks to the first amendment, that letter can say pretty much anything you like subject to limits that themselves are subject to strict scrutiny - things like threats and defamation. Outlining a course of action that you propose to take is legal even if that course of action is itself illegal.</p>

<p>I will also point out that people - sometimes even politicians - have been known to say things they don't mean.</p>

<p>However, that just begs the question ...</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>I will also point out that people - sometimes even politicians - have been known to say things they don't mean.</p>

<p>However, that just begs the question ...</p>

<p>This <a href="https://www.pennlive.com/news/2020/05/lancaster-county-joins-growing-list-intending-to-start-reopening-after-coronavirus-with-or-without-governors-ok.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">article</a> explains what's going on and, more importantly, the actual letter is <a href="https://www.facebook.com/senatoraument/posts/2805859869539385" rel="nofollow noreferrer">here</a>.</p>

<p>I've read it. Twice. I can't see where the county proposes to do anything concrete that might be considered illegal.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>I've read it. Twice. I can't see where the county proposes to do anything concrete that might be considered illegal.</p>

<p>Apart from the first paragraph, the entire letter appears to be a case for why the county should be permitted to move from red to yellow on May 15 and they are asking for the Governor's support. Even the first paragraph is ambiguous; while it asks the Governor to move the county from "red" to "yellow" and states that they "intend to move forward with a plan" it is by no means clear that that plan is moving from "red" to "yellow" even though you could get that impression on a casual reading.</p>

<p>Basically, what they intend to do is so vague that it's impossible to tell if it's legal or not.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>Basically, what they intend to do is so vague that it's impossible to tell if it's legal or not.</p>

<p>Of course, just because something is illegal doesn't mean it can't be done. The USA is a free country and the fundamental freedom is to reap the consequences of your actions. If the county does something<sup>1</sup> then the state can take them to court - the court will decide if it's legal or not.</p>

<p><sup>1</sup> Or threatens to do something sufficiently concrete that an injunction against it could be issued.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 2: <p>The doctrine of lesser magistrates has not been part of US law since we declared independence from the king of England. Whether or not the actions of some public official are legal depends on what that action is, and what the legality of the prohibition of that action is. I have seen that a group of officials in Lancaster county have written a letter dated May 9 to the governor, and that is entirely legal (protected by the First Amendment). On May 15, some official proclamation might be issued, and it is pointless to imagine all of the possible things that might be in such a proclamation. But for the sake of argument, assume that the county makes a declaration that essentially replicates the so-called <a href="https://www.governor.pa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/20200507-TWW-Yellow-Phase-Order.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">yellow phase proclamation</a>, applied to Lancaster county. It is legal to issue such a proclamation. That does not mean the proclamation would have


key: chroma:document
string_value:
rel="nofollow noreferrer">yellow phase proclamation</a>, applied to Lancaster county. It is legal to issue such a proclamation. That does not mean the proclamation would have legal force.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>Then the matter would have to be decided in court (unless it's decided politically). On both sides, the central question is whether the executive has the power under state law to tell people what to do. <a href="https://www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/LI/CT/HTM/35/00.073..HTM" rel="nofollow noreferrer">There is a statute</a> that gives the governor broad emergency powers. There does not appear to be any provision of state law that allows a county official to declare a gubernatorial order null and void. Even if a law exists allowing county officials to issue legally-enforceable orders, county law is subordinate to state law, so individuals who open for business are not immune from legal action by the state. </p>


Tags: united-states


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: How does licensing software not imply ownership? Don&#39;t I own a Windows operating system once I pay for it?


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Body: <h3>Background</h3>
<p>I've been through the <a href="https://download.microsoft.com/Documents/UseTerms/Windows_8.1%20Pro_English_2e388b0d-3b05-4312-a480-be210adcf487.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Windows 8.1 EULA</a> and the <a href="https://download.microsoft.com/Documents/UseTerms/Windows_8.1%20Pro_English_fe385e06-51e5-45eb-92a9-aaa3c23a9d6d.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">EULA for computer manufacturers</a>. I've also seen <a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/questions/60888/is-it-illegal-to-resell-software-licenses">this question</a> where an answer says that Windows is sold as a software service.</p>
<p><strong>The EULA states this about ownership:</strong> <em>&quot;How can I use the software? The software is licensed, not sold. Under this agreement, we grant you the right to install and run one copy on the computer on which you acquired the software (the licensed computer), for use by one person at a time&quot;</em></p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p><strong>The EULA states this about transfer:</strong> <em>&quot;Can I transfer the software to another user? You may transfer the software directly to another user, only with the licensed computer. The transfer must include the software, proof of purchase, and, if provided with the computer, an authentic Windows label including the product key.&quot;</em></p>
<p><strong>My question spans three scenarios:</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><p><strong>Scenario 1:</strong> I have a desktop computer on which I've installed only Linux. I purchased a new laptop for price <code>P</code>. It cost me <code>P</code>
because it had Windows 8.1 pre-installed and I could register Windows
online. There are other laptops that cost less than <code>P</code>, because they
are sold without any operating system. Windows EULA allows me to take a
backup of the operating system onto a pen drive. I registered Windows
and took a backup on a pen drive. Now within a few days, if the


key: chroma:document
string_value:
backup of the operating system onto a pen drive. I registered Windows
and took a backup on a pen drive. Now within a few days, if the
laptop gets crushed under a truck, I've lost function of the
hardware, but I still have a backup of the software. Since I paid for
the software, can't I install it on my desktop PC, register it online
and use it?</p>
</li>
<li><p><strong>Scenario 2:</strong> The laptop does not get crushed under a truck. After a few years of using the laptop, I choose to sell the laptop to a
company that purchases old devices to recycle them. The company only
cares about the hardware. They are going to pull apart the entire
laptop and send the parts for recycling. Can I delete everything on
the hard disk, hand over the laptop to the company and use the
Windows backup to install it on my desktop PC?</p>
</li>
<li><p><strong>Scenario 3:</strong> I sell the laptop to someone who dislikes Windows. They'd rather use Linux. So I install only Linux on the laptop and


key: chroma:document
string_value:
</li>
<li><p><strong>Scenario 3:</strong> I sell the laptop to someone who dislikes Windows. They'd rather use Linux. So I install only Linux on the laptop and
explicitly tell the person that although this laptop came bundled
with Windows, I'm going to use Windows for myself on my desktop PC,
and he'd have to only use Linux on the laptop.</p>
</li>
</ul>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
explicitly tell the person that although this laptop came bundled
with Windows, I'm going to use Windows for myself on my desktop PC,
and he'd have to only use Linux on the laptop.</p>
</li>
</ul>
<p>This is for a situation where Windows installed on the desktop would be used solely for personal use. No commercial use at all. If I wanted, I could take some of the RAM or some other hardware from the laptop and use it with any other laptop, because I purchased the hardware and I own it. So given that I have also purchased a license to the software, if the laptop gets destroyed, shouldn't I have the right to utilize the fact that I paid for the software, and be able to use the software as a single installation on my desktop? This is by nature of the software being safe from physical destruction, and the fact that I'm not misusing the software.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <h2>General</h2>
<p>The legal discussion hinges on the question whether the concept of <a href="https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=29f0d605-aae8-4163-966b-3d2acb0ba3a3" rel="nofollow noreferrer">copyright exhaustion</a> applies to software. (The linked article also discusses the Court of Justice of the European Union ruling mentioned below in the EU part of this answer.)</p>
<p>Copyright exhaustion, in simple terms, allows certain uses (like the ones in your scenarios)  of copyrighted (books) or patented (e.g. devices) items for which the copyright or patent holder has the <em>right to first sale</em>. If and when that principle applies, the original seller cannot control further sales or other uses of that particular specimen. Their <em>copyright is &quot;exhausted&quot;</em> with the first sale.</p>
<h2>Situation in India</h2>
<p>I want to emphasize that I have exactly zero experience regarding India in any way. All I did was that I went to the google.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<h2>Situation in India</h2>
<p>I want to emphasize that I have exactly zero experience regarding India in any way. All I did was that I went to the google.</p>
<p>It appears that the Indian Supreme Court recently ruled in <a href="https://www.livelaw.in/pdf_upload/foreign-software-no-royalty-tds-sc-ll-124-389949.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>Engineering Analysis Centre for Excellence Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT</em></a> that the typical EULAs are valid. In particular, copyright exhaustion does not apply and the EULA can restrict re-selling and similar actions.</p>
<p>The case is discussed in <a href="https://spicyip.com/2021/03/supreme-court-recognises-doctrine-of-copyright-exhaustion-in-softwares-and-its-subservience-to-eulas.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">this article</a>, including relevant quotes.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p><strong>This would make everything illegal which is forbidden by an EULA.</strong> As I read the EULA, creating a backup copy is allowed, as is restoring Windows from it, obviously; whether that has to happen on the same computer is unclear to me and may depend on the license type (OEM vs. standalone), although I have two remarks:</p>
<ol>
<li>Microsoft is the copyright owner; if they provide you with a license (for example because you called them after you re-installed Windows from a backup copy, and the internet license process didn't work) without you making false claims it is their prerogative. You are good.</li>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<li>What constitutes a different computer? The SSD? The case? The mouse? We do have a case of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ship_of_Theseus" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Ship of Theseus</a>, or <a href="https://youtu.be/n6mbW-jMtrY?t=116" rel="nofollow noreferrer">here</a> for a funnier take: How much can you change before it becomes a different machine? The answer: Call Microsoft and find out.</li>
</ol>
<h2>Situation in the EU</h2>
<p>The situation in the EU is fundamentally different from the one depicted with a misguided metaphor in the <a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/a/78727/3312">accepted answer</a>.</p>
<p><strong>In Europe, all of your scenarios are legal.</strong></p>
<p>In July 2012, the European Court of Justice ruled in favor of the company <a href="https://www.usedsoft.com" rel="nofollow noreferrer">usedSoft</a> who is a license reseller.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>In July 2012, the European Court of Justice ruled in favor of the company <a href="https://www.usedsoft.com" rel="nofollow noreferrer">usedSoft</a> who is a license reseller.</p>
<p>(I'm writing this text on a machine with a Windows license that cost me, together with a Microsoft Office Professional license, 30 Euros, from <a href="https://softwareking24.de/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">this store</a>.)</p>
<p>The title of the Court's <a href="https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2012-07/cp120094en.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">press release</a> couldn't be clearer:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><strong>An author of software cannot oppose the resale of his ‘used’ licences allowing the
use of his programs downloaded from the internet</strong></p>
</blockquote>
<p>Not only can you re-install the software, provided it is the only installation, on the same or a different computer; you can even sell it. You can even sell OEM and bulk licenses.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>Not only can you re-install the software, provided it is the only installation, on the same or a different computer; you can even sell it. You can even sell OEM and bulk licenses.</p>
<p>The full text of the decision can be found <a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=C2EDB2324663FDB1E3E7EE99D1B1770C?text=&amp;docid=124564&amp;pageIndex=0&amp;doclang=EN&amp;mode=lst&amp;dir=&amp;occ=first&amp;part=1&amp;cid=2913025" rel="nofollow noreferrer">here</a>. The court stressed that it doesn't make a difference whether the software was originally provided on a physical carrier like a DVD or as a download. Crucially, the seller is <strong>obligated to continue providing downloads and updates</strong> for the re-sold licensed software as if it were still owned by the first buyer. There is no legal difference between software provided on a physical medium or as a download. To quote the decision:</p>
<blockquote>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<blockquote>
<p>80       Since the <strong>copyright holder cannot object to the resale</strong> of a copy of a computer program for which that rightholder’s distribution right is exhausted under Article 4(2) of Directive 2009/24, it must be concluded that a second acquirer of that copy and any subsequent acquirer are <strong>‘lawful acquirers’</strong> of it within the meaning of Article 5(1) of Directive 2009/24.</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>81      Consequently, in the event of a resale of the copy of the computer program by the first acquirer, <strong>the new acquirer will be able</strong>, in accordance with Article 5(1) of Directive 2009/24, <strong>to download onto his computer the copy</strong> sold to him by the first acquirer. Such a download must be regarded as a reproduction of a computer program that is necessary to enable the new acquirer to use the program in accordance with its intended purpose.</p>
</blockquote>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
</blockquote>
<p>The court also examines the problem of how to prevent abuse of this permission for online copies (as opposed to physical media) and finds no substantial obstacles here.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>&quot;79      As Oracle rightly observes, ascertaining whether such a copy has been made unusable may prove difficult. However, a copyright holder who distributes copies of a computer program on a material medium such as a CD‑ROM or DVD is faced with the same problem, since it is only with great difficulty that he can make sure that the original acquirer has not made copies of the program which he will continue to use after selling his material medium. To solve that problem, it is permissible for the distributor — whether ‘classic’ or ‘digital’ — to make use of technical protective measures such as product keys.</p>
</blockquote>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
</blockquote>
<p>It seems noteworthy to me that the <em>general question</em> of how to prevent illegal copies is only loosely related to the question of reselling anyway. Even if it were illegal to resell, the seller's problem with illegal copies would not disappear. (It might be somewhat easier to enforce by &quot;dongling&quot; it to a specific hardware and not allow any re-installation whatsoever, but mainstream software producers don't appear to do that, generally.)</p>
<p>Lastly it is noteworthy that the original seller may <a href="https://youtu.be/seQgP2qyMk4" rel="nofollow noreferrer">strong-arm the original buyer into signing an EULA</a> that expressly forbids reselling; those restrictions are simply null and void in the EU.<sup>1</sup></p>
<hr />


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<hr />
<p><sub><sup>1 </sup> The <a href="https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/UseTerms/Retail/Windows/10/UseTerms_Retail_Windows_10_GermanGermany.htm" rel="nofollow noreferrer">German EULA of Microsoft Windows</a> does not forbid reselling. The <a href="https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/Useterms/Retail/Office/2019Professional/Useterms_Retail_Office_2019Professional_German.htm" rel="nofollow noreferrer">EULA for MS Office</a> has restrictions concerning transfer to third parties in point 3 but notes that those are not applicable if the software was bought in the EU or EFTA and the transfer is inside that region.</sub></p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 2: <blockquote>
<p>How does licensing a software not imply ownership?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Because it doesn’t.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Don't I own a Windows operating system once I pay for it?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>No</p>
<p>Scenarios 1 - 3: each and every one of these is a breach of the license and unlawful.</p>
<p><strong>A license is different from ownership</strong></p>
<p>Perhaps the most understandable analogy is a theme park.</p>
<p>The theme park is owned by someone, let’s call them D.</p>
<p>They sell you a day-ticket which is a <em>license</em> to access their property subject to certain conditions: access at certain times, to certain areas/rides and with restrictions on certain kinds of behavior.</p>
<p>You can do only what D allows and nothing else. You certainly don’t own the theme park.</p>
<p>Now, replace D with Microsoft and theme park with Windows and you have the same situation.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 3: <p>Under standard contract law, all the negative replies listed here would be correct. HOWEVER- having in the past contacted Microsoft service about OS transfer under MS licensing, so long as the license is a full license, and not an OEM license (equipment manufacturers license is MUCH more restricted than full license, that's why it doesn't add as much cost to new hardware as a full version does), you can extract the license code from the registration, make your backup install copy, wipe the original HDD, restore the hardware chipset to factory wipe (there are instructions online, Microsoft will help find them) to remove any POST key, and at that point there is no active version of the OS.
You can then install and activate the OS on another system, but you will likely have to contact MS service directly to clear the license for full Windows activation. Once done, that copy is exclusive to the now active system, and should be fine.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 4: <p>Software is not a physical thing. It is not possible to &quot;own&quot; it, you can only own rights to it. You can own a <em>copyright</em> to the software, or you can own a <em>license</em> to the software. Obviously, when you &quot;buy&quot; software, you're not buying the copyright outright, you're buying a license. &quot;License&quot; is a synonym for &quot;permission&quot;. You are buying a permission to use the software. And that permission is subject to the conditions that come with it.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 5: <p>The license is very clear. If you buy for example a Dell PC with a Windows license, what will happen is that Dell bought say a million OEM licenses from Microsoft at a very good price, and Dell has therefore a license to install Windows on one million computers that are sold to end users or companies. The licenses that Dell installs are <em>specific</em> to both Dell, and to that particular Dell computer.</p>
<p>So if you sell the computer or give it away as a present, you sell it or give it away together with the license, so the next person can use Windows on the same computer. <strong>The license does <em>not</em> allow you to install the Windows software on a different computer.</strong> And that's about it.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>Now if we go through your three different scenarios... In scenario 1, your computer was crushed, very bad luck... You are actually allowed to make a backup copy of the license in US law - but you are not allowed to install that backup on any other computer, only on the one that the Windows license belonged to. <strong>The license does <em>not</em> allow you to install the Windows software on a different computer.</strong> On the positive side, if you are insured, the insurance company has to pay for your loss, which is one PC and one license.</p>
<p>In the second case, where you sell your PC to a recycler, if the recycler takes it just for the parts and not to make a working computer, the license has lost its value. <strong>The license does <em>not</em> allow you to install the Windows software on a different computer.</strong></p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>In scenario 3, if the buyer isn't interested in Windows, the license doesn't force him to install it or keep it installed anywhere. However, you can't install the software on another computer. <strong>The license does <em>not</em> allow you to install the Windows software on a different computer.</strong></p>
<p>That's the point in the end: The license allows you to use Windows on ONE particular computer. Not on any other computer. No argument of yours can get around that.</p>
<p>You can buy Windows with a different license, that gives you more freedom what you can and can't do it. Windows with such a license is a lot more expensive. You got a license at the lowest possible price, which gives you fewer rights.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Body: <p>When evacuating a vehicle or a building in distress, the evacuees are normally supposed to leave their belongings behind. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-34191035" rel="noreferrer">This doesn't always happen</a>.</p>
<p>Technically, if actual harm comes to others through such action, it could count as endangerment or similar crimes of negligence. Of course, going after people who have been through an accident is unlikely to be a law enforcement priority, so has it ever happened?</p>
<p>I'm aware of cases against building owners, operators, or staff, which have impeded or obstructed an evacuation, but all of them have a duty of care.</p>
<p>Has a civilian not under the duty of care, such as a passenger, ever been criminally charged for obstructing an evacuation, in which they had been an evacuee?</p>
<p>I'm interested in any jurisdictions, and particularly in the strongest charges that have been brought in such a case.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <h2>In <a href="/questions/tagged/germany" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-germany-tooltip-container">germany</a>, you are likely charged if you actively interfere.</h2>
<p>Let's preface this with the fact, that in Germany, people have a duty to aid in case of accidents, <strong>as long as you don't endanger yourself</strong>. The absolute minimum is to call the emergency service and not obstruct those that render aid. However, just not rendering aid is rarely charged.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>However, since a few years, people that slow down to make videos of crash sites or who stop to look at an accident, and in doing so block emergency helpers, are now almost routinely charged with obstruction of emergency workers, together with possibly other charges like assault and insult. <a href="https://www.spiegel.de/panorama/justiz/bremervoerde-haft-und-geldstrafen-in-gaffer-prozess-a-1145060.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">One of the most prominent cases was in 2017</a>, where the person attacked emergency workers and police. He was sentenced to 4 months for the various assaults and bodily injury.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>Based on this case (where the person was just sentenced for resisting police and assault), it ultimately lead to a new law. <a href="https://www.faz.net/aktuell/gesellschaft/kriminalitaet/bewaehrungsstrafe-fuer-behinderung-von-rettungskraeften-18614665.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">One of many cases that started in 2023 had a similar pattern</a> but the charge is based on the new law: <a href="https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgb/__323c.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">§ 323 c Abs. 2 StGB</a> - not delivering aid and obstruction of aiding persons. This law allows up to one year of prison time for hindering any person rendering aid.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>Also, <a href="https://www.ruv.de/kfz-versicherung/magazin/rund-ums-fahren/gesetz-gegen-gaffer" rel="nofollow noreferrer">creating pictures at accident sites that depict people or corpses and sharing them in a manner that is humiliating to the victims</a> in itself can be a breach of <a href="https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgb/__201a.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">§ 201 a StGB</a> - injury of privacy by means of photography. This can get a sentence of up to two years, and would most likely be joined by a charge of not delivering aid and obstructing helpers. Do note that this is <strong>not</strong> covering photos that were made for example as evidence of the situation or not shared with third parties.</p>
<h2>Being in peril yourself...</h2>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<h2>Being in peril yourself...</h2>
<p>When you technically are in peril yourself, you don't have to render aid. Being stupid like grabbing your carry-on luggage isn't technically covered by the law, and because the person is in danger themselves, it will be very hard for the prosecution to decide if they want to prosecute.</p>
<p>If Alice just grabs her carry-on in panic and nothing happens as she evacuates, charging will be extremely unlikely, as in, the chance is nigh nonexistent.</p>
<p>Bob, who steps out of the way of others while he calmly takes his things is not interfering with the rescue, and thus charging him is most likely not going to happen.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>Bob, who steps out of the way of others while he calmly takes his things is not interfering with the rescue, and thus charging him is most likely not going to happen.</p>
<p>But Charly, who blocks the path of everybody because he wants to go to the other end of the plane to get his luggage and does not let anybody pass and thus increasing the danger of the situation (or even cause death) might break the threshold that the prosecution is willing to prosecute to make an example out of him. The more egregious his behavior was, the more they might look into if other charges can become applicable.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>However, those other charges are usually not from the blocking or inaction, but from an action against someone that is in the same peril as the actor. If Dora during the building fire grabbed a fire axe and smacked it over someone's head while he was trying to evacuate her, so she could get her items from another room, that would be dangerous mayhem <a href="https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgb/__224.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">(§ 224 StGB, Gefährliche Körperverletzung</a>).</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 2: <h2>It’s unlikely that there is any criminality here</h2>
<p><a href="/questions/tagged/australia" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-australia-tooltip-container">australia</a></p>
<p>Failing to comply with the lawful order of police or emergency services allows the use of force to ensure compliance but is not itself an <a href="https://australianemergencylaw.com/2014/01/10/legality-of-forced-evacuations-during-nsw-bushfires/" rel="noreferrer">offence</a>.</p>
<p>Obstructing the Minister or a person acting under the authority of the Minister during a declared State of Emergency is an offence but taking things you are told not to take is <em>not</em> obstruction. Legally, obstruction requires wilful interference, not just making things harder than they might otherwise have been.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>It’s possible that failing to follow well defined and practiced emergency procedures might violate Work Health and Safety laws but that would only be for people who held a duty under them. Technically, this includes workers but their duty is slight and broad allowances are made - the assumption being that if a worker screws up this is due to inadequate training or supervision by the employer. Typically, for a worker to be charged, reckless disregard or wilfulness needs to be proved.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: Are there any offences for which one does not have any right to elect a jury trial?

Question Body: <p>Certain offences are indictable only, some triable either way. Are there any that are considered so trivial as to be unworthy of the crown court’s resources?</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/england-and-wales" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-england-and-wales-tooltip-container">england-and-wales</a></p>
<p>In the UK, these are known as <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Summary_offence#United_Kingdom" rel="nofollow noreferrer">summary offences</a>. In England &amp; Wales, they are heard only in the magistrate's court, and <a href="https://www.draycottbrowne.co.uk/investigations/types-criminal-offence" rel="nofollow noreferrer">they include</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<ul>
<li>low level motoring offences</li>
<li>minor criminal damage</li>
<li>common assault</li>
<li>being drunk and disorderly</li>
<li>taking a motor vehicle without consent</li>
</ul>
</blockquote>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<li>low level motoring offences</li>
<li>minor criminal damage</li>
<li>common assault</li>
<li>being drunk and disorderly</li>
<li>taking a motor vehicle without consent</li>
</ul>
</blockquote>
<p>The Government <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=i&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=0CAIQw7AJahcKEwjo5L39sPL_AhUAAAAAHQAAAAAQAw&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fassets.publishing.service.gov.uk%2Fgovernment%2Fuploads%2Fsystem%2Fuploads%2Fattachment_data%2Ffile%2F428953%2Foffence-group-classification.xls&amp;psig=AOvVaw3M5ENBIZNOenH8RoGPzFtb&amp;ust=1688468213746136&amp;opi=89978449" rel="nofollow noreferrer">maintains a spreadsheet</a> with a detailed list of offences, which classifies them as indictable only, either way, summary non-motoring, and summary motoring. Of the summary non-motoring kind, the spreadsheet has 108 entries, though it appears that some of these entries cover multiple offences.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 2: <h2>All of them in <a href="/questions/tagged/germany" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-germany-tooltip-container">germany</a></h2>
<p>There are no juries in Germany, there's no right to a jury trial, and as a result, no case is heard in front of a jury in the common law sense since 1924.</p>
<h3>many offenses are without Schöffen</h3>
<p>If you stretch the definition of a jury to include <a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/a/92696/10334">Schöffen, sometimes called &quot;lay judges&quot;</a>, then there is a bright cutoff line:</p>
<p>In the lower courts, as long as the typical punishment (not the sentencing range!) is less than 2 years, the case is in front of a single judge. If 2 to 4 years are typical for a case, Schöffen are required.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>Cases that require a punishment of above 4 years need to be handled in the upper courts, and Schöffen do play a role there too.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 3: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/canada" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-canada-tooltip-container">canada</a></p>
<p>For summary offences, and for hybrid offences where the Crown decides to proceed summarily, the offence is tried in a <em>summary conviction court</em>. This involves a judge sitting without a jury. See Part XXVII of the <em>Criminal Code</em>.</p>
<p>There is also a list of offences that, even if charged as an indictable offence, must be heard by a provincial court judge, sitting without a jury. These are listed at <a href="https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-46/page-89.html#h-127582" rel="nofollow noreferrer">s. 553</a> of the <em>Criminal Code</em>.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 4: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/australia" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-australia-tooltip-container">australia</a></p>
<h2>s80 of the Constitution requires a jury for indictable offences</h2>
<blockquote>
<p>The trial on indictment of any offence against any law of the Commonwealth shall be by jury, and every such trial shall be held in the State where the offence was committed, and if the offence was not committed within any State the trial shall be held at such place or places as the Parliament prescribes.</p>
</blockquote>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
</blockquote>
<p>Australian law recognises three types of offences: indictable (requiring arraignment and a jury), summary (requiring a charge and a judge), and misdemeanour (a breach of law for which no specific penalty is set, requiring a charge and a judge). There is no right to a jury in civil trials and, while they are allowed, they are relatively uncommon.</p>
<p>One of the fathers of Federation, Issac Issacs, pointed out:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>It is within the powers of the Parliament to say what shall be an indictable offence and what shall not. The Parliament could, if it chose, say that murder was not an indictable offence, and therefore the right to try a person accused of murder would not necessarily be by jury.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Well, yes. However, more than 120 years later, Parliament has been reasonably well-behaved about this.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: Is a company obligated to pay out vacation time lost due to a use-it-or-lose-it vacation policy?


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Body: <p>Let's assume an employer has a use-it-or-lose-it vacation policy that allows employees to carry over 40 hours of vacation time from one year to the next. An employee ends the year with 60 hours of accrued vacation, and thus loses 20 of those hours. Given that <a href="https://malegislature.gov/Laws/GeneralLaws/PartI/TitleXXI/Chapter149/Section148" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Massachusetts law considers vacation time wages</a>, and other circumstances require paying out those hours as if they were time worked (for example, on <a href="https://malegislature.gov/Laws/GeneralLaws/PartI/TitleVII/Chapter41/Section111E" rel="nofollow noreferrer">termination of employment</a>), is the company obligated to pay out the hours lost to the use-it-or-lose-it policy?</p>
<p>Assume the employee in question was not prevented from taking vacation; they could have, but chose not to.</p>
<p>(reposted here as requested from workplace.stackexchange)</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <p><a href="https://www.mass.gov/doc/attorney-generals-advisory-on-vacation-policies/download" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Here</a> is an extract about &quot;use-it-or-lose-it&quot; vacation policies from the Massachusetts Attorney General's Fair Labor division (Link goes to a Word document):</p>
<blockquote>
<p>An acceptable variation of an accrual cap is the vacation policy known
as “use it or lose it.” Under this policy, employees must use all of
their accumulated vacation time by a certain period of time or lose
all or part of it. Some policies allow the employees to “carry over” a
certain number of hours of vacation after the expiration of the
designated time period. The “use it or lose it” policy effectuates a
cap on accrual by limiting the total amount of vacation time that an
employee may accrue during the term of their employment. Under such
policies, the employer must provide adequate prior notice of the


key: chroma:document
string_value:
employee may accrue during the term of their employment. Under such
policies, the employer must provide adequate prior notice of the
policy to employees and must ensure that employees have a reasonable
opportunity to use the accumulated vacation time within the time
limits established by the employer. Otherwise, a cap on accrual or a
“use it or lose it” policy may result in an illegal forfeiture of
earned wages.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Accrual cap is explained earlier in the document. To paraphrase, a company could set max accrual of vacation at 3 weeks. Once you accrue 3 weeks, you will not accrue any more until you use some of the time.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: Privileges of states &quot;now existing&quot; in contrast to other states, in importation of slaves

Question Body: <p>Article I, Section 9, Clause 1 of the Constitution of the United States says:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>My question is about the implications of the phrase &quot;now existing.&quot;</p>
<p>Would that mean that before the year 1808, Congress could forbid importation of slaves into states other than the 13 that existed when this was written? Did they?</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <p>This clause was included in order to attract the Southern states to join the union. For general context, see <a href="https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/text-41-50#s-lg-box-wrapper-25493406" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>Federalist 42</em></a>,<sup>1</sup> <a href="https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/text-31-40#s-lg-box-wrapper-25493393" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>Federalist 38</em></a>,<sup>2</sup> and Paul Finkelman, &quot;<a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2243060" rel="nofollow noreferrer">How the Proslavery Constitution Led to the Civil War</a>&quot; (2013) 43:3 Rutgers Law Journal 405.<sup>3</sup> It originally appeared as if the &quot;now existing caveat... empowered Congress to block slave traffic to and from any newly formed states&quot; (James Pfander &amp; Elena Joffroy, &quot;<a href="https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5844&amp;context=flr" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Equal Footing and the States


key: chroma:document
string_value:
states&quot; (James Pfander &amp; Elena Joffroy, &quot;<a href="https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5844&amp;context=flr" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Equal Footing and the States 'Now Existing' Slavery and State Equality Over Time</a>&quot; (2021) 89:5 Fordham Law Review).</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>In 1819, <a href="https://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_9_1s19.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">John Jay wrote a letter</a> saying:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I understand the sense and meaning of this clause to be, that the power of the Congress, although competent to prohibit such migration and importation, was not to be exercised with respect to the <em>then existing</em> States (and only them) until the year 1808; but that Congress were at liberty to make such prohibition as to any new State, which might, in the <em>mean</em> time, be established, and further, that from <em>that period</em>, they were authorized to make such prohibition, as to all the States, whether new or old.</p>
</blockquote>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
</blockquote>
<p>However, in <em>Dred Scott v. Sandford</em> (1857), Chief Justice Roger Taney interpreted the clause such that it required new states to be admitted on &quot;equal footing with the other states&quot; (p. 447) thus rejecting the interpretation I presented above. He also discreted the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northwest_Ordinance" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Northwest Ordinance</a> as being beyond the power of Congress (pp. 435-38, 490-91).</p>
<p>Four states joined the union between the ratification of the Constitution in 1790 and 1808: Vermont (1791), Kentucky (1792), Tennessee (1796), and Ohio (1803).</p>
<ul>
<li>Vermont had already outlawed slavery before joining the union.</li>
<li>Ohio was only allowed to join the union on the conditions established in the <a href="https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/northwest-ordinance" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Northwest Ordinance</a>, one of which was to prohibit slavery.</li>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<li>Slavery and slave trade was allowed to continue in <a href="https://tennesseeencyclopedia.net/entries/slavery/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Tennessee</a> and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_slavery_in_Kentucky" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Kentucky</a> after joining the union.</li>
</ul>
<hr />


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p><sup>1. Note: the numbering on these has varied between the <a href="https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Federalist_(Dawson)" rel="nofollow noreferrer">&quot;Dawson&quot; edition</a> of the Federalist Papers and the now accepted numbering. In the Dawson edition, these were numbered 41 and 37. <strong>Federalist 42</strong>: &quot;It were doubtless to be wished, that the power of prohibiting the importation of slaves had not been postponed until the year 1808, or rather that it had been suffered to have immediate operation. But it is not difficult to account, either for this restriction on the general government, or for the manner in which the whole clause is expressed. It ought to be considered as a great point gained in favor of humanity, that a period of twenty years may terminate forever, within these States, a traffic which has so long and so loudly upbraided the barbarism of modern policy; that within that period, it will receive a considerable discouragement from the federal


key: chroma:document
string_value:
within these States, a traffic which has so long and so loudly upbraided the barbarism of modern policy; that within that period, it will receive a considerable discouragement from the federal government, and may be totally abolished, by a concurrence of the few States which continue the unnatural traffic, in the prohibitory example which has been given by so great a majority of the Union. Happy would it be for the unfortunate Africans, if an equal prospect lay before them of being redeemed from the oppressions of their European brethren! Attempts have been made to pervert this clause into an objection against the Constitution, by representing it on one side as a criminal toleration of an illicit practice, and on another as calculated to prevent voluntary and beneficial emigrations from Europe to America. I mention these misconstructions, not with a view to give them an answer, for they deserve none, but as specimens of the manner and spirit in which some have thought fit to conduct


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Europe to America. I mention these misconstructions, not with a view to give them an answer, for they deserve none, but as specimens of the manner and spirit in which some have thought fit to conduct their opposition to the proposed government.&quot;</sup></p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p><sup>2. <strong>Federalist 38</strong>: &quot;It is a matter, both of wonder and regret, that those who raise so many objections against the new Constitution should never call to mind the defects of that which is to be exchanged for it. It is not necessary that the former should be perfect: it is sufficient that the latter is more imperfect. ... Is the importation of Slaves permitted by the new Constitution for twenty years? By the old it is permitted forever.&quot;</sup></p>
<p><sup>3. &quot;Given its economic importance and its vulnerabilities, it is not surprising that the Southerners at the Constitutional Convention demanded, and won, huge concessions to protect their 'peculiar institution,' as even they were beginning to call it. ... The clauses that Pinckney and other Southerners worked hard to create set the stage for a government that both protected slavery and was deeply influenced by it. ...  In supporting a specific clause in the Constitution to


key: chroma:document
string_value:
prevent Congress from ending the African slave trade until 1800 (it was later amended to 1808), Sherman asserted that 'the public good did not require' an end to the trade.&quot;</sup></p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 2: <h2>No</h2>
<p>It was accepted by the early 19th century that a state was a state was a state. That is, there was legally no difference between original and subsequent states and that Congress could not make laws that (directly) discriminated on the states.</p>
<p>What this clause is saying, is that the Federal government would not have a role in immigration until after 1808.</p>
<p>In 1808, the only state still permitting international trade in slaves was South Carolina and the Federal government ended that as soon as it was able to.</p>
<p>Smuggling through Spanish Florida remained a problem until it was acquired by the US in 1821. After that, smuggling continued on a smaller scale until the Civil War. Of course, smuggling slaves, then and now, is illegal. Modern slavery is still a problem.</p>


Tags: us-constitution, slavery


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: Citing whole mailing list messages on the web

Question Body: <p>When I cite a complete message from a mailing list, omitting all personal information, if any, that is relatively concise (“Hi”, definition of problem, question, “Thank You”), can I cite the message publicly on a website?</p>
<p>The message is a question related to computing and I cite the it because I answer it in the page.</p>
<p>The mailing list has publicly available archives.</p>
<p>Do I need consent of the original author to cite the message? Can I infringe copyright by embedding the whole message text on the page? (Assuming that the person did not give me any kind of permission explicitly.)</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <p>First, copyright means that permission from the author is generally required. The courts find three sorts of such permission: direct author-to-recipient explicit licensing (typical in the case of a book author to publisher relation), indirect licensing arising from platform usage (in using Stackexchange, you probably unknowingly click-agreed to allow me and everybody else to copy and redistribute your creations), and implicit licensing – where permission to use is reasonably inferrable, though not explicitly stated. Since the latter doesn't involve written-out statements of the conditions under which you are licensed to copy text, the courts don't rely heavily on implicit licensing. But implicit licensing is what makes it possible to legally read a web page without first signing an agreement. If we assume in your scenario that the author is fully aware that their responses are automatically distributed to various servers, then even in lieu of a platform license, an


key: chroma:document
string_value:
signing an agreement. If we assume in your scenario that the author is fully aware that their responses are automatically distributed to various servers, then even in lieu of a platform license, an implicit license can be found.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>Second, irrespective of the desideratum of having permission, one is in the US allowed to copy without permission, for certain purposes known as <a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/tags/fair-use/info">&quot;fair use&quot;</a>. This is a complicated area of legal analysis, where one has to weigh factors such as whether the content is artistic vs. factual, whether your use simply re-propagates vs. makes a comment, whether the use is for profit vs. free and educational, and whether the use has a negative effect on the market for the original work.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 2: <h2>You can't delete all personal information</h2>
<p>Take this answer for example. If you were to copy just the text omitting my user ID, your user ID and the dates etc. <strong>it's still personal information!</strong> A simple Google search will bring you back here and voila - you will have my user ID. Personal information is <em>any</em> information that can be linked to a particular person. So the text of this answer is irrevokably PII of both you and me, just like the text of Harry Potter and the Chamber of Secrets is PII of J. K. Rowling.</p>
<p>So, if you do this where PII is subject to privacy laws, you have to comply with those laws.</p>
<h2>Copyright</h2>
<p>You don't own the copyright in what you are copying, therefore you need permission or a fair use/dealing defence.</p>
<p>For this answer, you have a <a href="https://stackoverflow.com/legal/terms-of-service#licensing">licence</a> for personal but not commercial use:</p>
<blockquote>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>For this answer, you have a <a href="https://stackoverflow.com/legal/terms-of-service#licensing">licence</a> for personal but not commercial use:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>You may download or copy the public Network Content, and other items displayed on the public Network for download or personal use provided that you maintain all copyright and other notices contained in such Public Content.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>While the licence requires you to include all copyright information, it does not require you to cite or otherwise acknowledge the author.</p>
<p>Other sites will have other rules.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: Is the Supreme Court&#39;s in-house citation style manual publicly available?

Question Body: <p>SCOTUS uses a distinct in-house citation style which, although it has a lot in common with the <em>Bluebook</em>, is not the same (differing in key places) and is as far as I know unique.</p>
<p>Is the citation style manual used in house for SCOTUS publicly available? Either because the Court has published it, or via FOI requests? It is probably possible to reverse engineer the citation rules from the Opinions of the Court, but do we have the guide for it?</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <p>A version republishing the Reporter's style guide is <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2758862" rel="noreferrer">available on SSRN</a> and for purchase on Amazon.</p>
<p>It was edited in 2016, <a href="https://www.nelsonmullins.com/idea_exchange/insights/the-scrivener-is-your-writing-good-enough-for-the-supreme-court-u-s-supreme-court-style-guide" rel="noreferrer">purportedly based on a 2013 copy of the Court's private style guide that the editor (Jack Metzler) somehow obtained</a>.</p>
<p>The Court's internal style guide may have evolved since then.</p>


Answer 2: <p>The Reporter of Decisions' style guide is available <a href="https://rads.stackoverflow.com/amzn/click/com/099111633X" rel="nofollow noreferrer" rel="nofollow noreferrer">on Amazon</a>.</p>


Tags: us-supreme-court, legal-writing, legal-citation


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: Finding citations

Question Body: <p>I’ve occasionally asked questions (<a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/questions/92547/equal-protection-discrimination-and-real-estate">example</a>) that could be easily answered by Shepard’s Citations—if I still had access.  <strong>How should I search for citations of a statute or case without paying Lexis or traveling to some place that has the print edition?</strong></p>
<p>I can search the <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Cornell LII</a> for a particular citation, but if it has spaces, I get all the hits for any part.  But when I tried to get &quot;exact phrase&quot; by quoting <em>311 U.S. 32</em>, there were zero results, which I know is not correct.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <blockquote>
<p>How should I search for citations of a statute or case without paying
Lexis or traveling to some place that has the print edition?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>There are no good free sources for this at this time for U.S. law. Essentially, this service is what legal publishers are now all relying upon to make money.</p>


Tags: united-states, legal-research, legal-citation


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Body: <p>HOA in Georgia. I have applied a removable sticker that said &quot;this is not an HOA sponsored event&quot;  on a fundraising poster that was placed on the Common Property by another resident. Our HOA requires such disclaimer and this poster did not have it. Next thing I know , I received $600 citation from the Board for vandalism. I checked our By-Laws and CC&amp;Rs and there is absolutely no regulation that addresses vandalism, the citation did not include which regulation was violated ( as required by our governing documents), it just said for vandalism. When I had a meeting with the Board about it and HOA attorney was present, he quoted some chapter from state law about vandalism. First of all, I did not damage anything because the sticker was removable and the poster was plastic, but most importantly : can HOA use state law or federal law instead of governing documents to give members citations?</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <p>State law may provide for criminal prosecution for vandalism, which could result in a fine or even imprisonment. The state can prosecute you, private individuals cannot. Fines imposed by a private organization are only enforceable through contracts, where damages could be recovered, but penalties cannot be assessed. (&quot;Late fees&quot; are in the class of &quot;liquidated damages&quot;, where the agreement says what the late fee is – they don't just make up a number). <a href="https://law.justia.com/codes/georgia/2010/title-44/chapter-3/article-6/44-3-223" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Ga. Code § 44-3-223</a> does require you to &quot;comply with all lawful provisions of the property owners' association instrument&quot;, but if it isn't in the instrument, you do not have to comply.</p>


Tags: hoa, vandalism


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: What is meant by &quot;through YYYY Leg Sess&quot; in universal citations of statutes/laws?


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Body: <p><strong>Question</strong></p>
<p>Let &quot;YYYY&quot; represent a variable for a given year, what does &quot;through YYYY Leg Sess&quot; at the end of a legal citation mean or signify?</p>
<p><strong>Background and Due Diligence</strong></p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p><strong>Background and Due Diligence</strong></p>
<p>In various legal documents, such as <a href="https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/policy/annual-2021/609-annual-2021.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">this one</a>, there are citations that contain &quot;Leg Sess&quot; which I'm guessing is short for &quot;<em>Legislative Session</em>&quot; or &quot;<em>Legislature Session</em>&quot; but aside from probably being wrong, what I'm hoping to understand is what it means and what impact it has when it's used as a <em>Universal Citation</em> as reference on Justia such as <a href="https://law.justia.com/codes/california/2015/code-com/division-14/section-14103" rel="nofollow noreferrer">here</a> and <a href="https://law.justia.com/codes/california/2011/civ/division-3/1738/1738" rel="nofollow noreferrer">here</a> referenced below:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Universal Citation: CA Com Code § 14103 through (2015) Leg Sess</p>
</blockquote>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<blockquote>
<p>Universal Citation: CA Com Code § 14103 through (2015) Leg Sess</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In reading the Code being cited (14103) there are plenty of dates being mentioned but none that seem to correlate with 2015 so I'm having trouble understanding if it might mean something significant to its usage whereby, for example, it doesn't apply after 2015 or if another statute is being inferred to take its place.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Universal Citation: CA Civ Code § 1738 (through 2012 Leg Sess)</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In reading the Civil Code mentioned above, it's noted that the parenthesis encloses the entire phrase &quot;through 2012 Leg Sess&quot; as opposed to previously where it was only the (assumed to be year) &quot;2015&quot; that was in parenthesis. Whereas in this case, it was amended in 1994 and has an effective date of January 1, 1995 so I'm uncertain of what the 2021 is supposed to reference when included in the citation.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>Any attempt to search the meaning on Google results in pages and pages of other documents using the same citation and I had trouble finding a page that might simply explain what is meant by &quot;Leg. Sess.&quot;</p>
<p><strong>The Problem at Hand</strong></p>
<p>The question originally being asked is to determine whether or not using any particular code cited in this way would be erroneous when attempting to present what code would be violated in present day.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <p>It means the <em>entire code compilation</em> has been updated to include all legislative revisions to the code that occurred in the XXXX legislative session (and obviously earlier ones too).</p>
<p>Of course, not every section of the code is amended every legislative session, but the compilation will still report that it is accurate through to the end of XXXX legislative session.</p>
<p>This method of reporting currency isn't a good match for online compilations or compilations that receive updates multiple times per year, so you may see variants, like &quot;through 2012 portion of 2011-2012 Reg. Sess.&quot; (however the publisher itself reports its currency information).</p>
<p>The Bluebook citation standard had traditionally required this currency information to be cited for all statutes, but in the latest version, that requirement has essentially been removed for federal statutes.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>What Justia is calling a &quot;<a href="https://law.justia.com/citations.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Universal Citation</a>&quot; is probably better called a &quot;media-neutral&quot; citation, following the format of the AALL Universal Citation Guide. However, it's a bit of a misnomer because no entity has a monopoly on citation style, although the Bluebook has a big influence. Justia even mentions, &quot;this universal citation is not necessarily the official citation, the latter which should be used when citing to primary and secondary legal materials in court filings, scholarly publications, etc.&quot;</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: Referencing books or researches in a medium article for a potential profit

Question Body: <p>So, I'm writing an article for Medium and I need to back up my words with some proofs. I found the researches all publicly available, via Google Search, some just PDF's from, some are leading to jstor.org.</p>
<p>And my work of course is not a standalone resource, but just a review of closely related topics and results we are having up to this day. Part of the topics are common engineering knowledge, some is more specific.</p>
<p>Is it legal to do such referencing (in any form, but with acknowledgment to origin of some data or facts I'm using) in my Medium article, if I can enable partner program and get money for that?</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <p>It is legsl to include references showing readers where facts you include in your article were derived, or where they can be supported. Indeed academic ethics generally require doing so, although there is (in most cases) no legal requirement to do so. Listing the title, author, and publication information  of a source is not an infringement of copyright. That J. Jones published an article on &quot;How to Find the Purple Moth&quot; [<em>imaginary example</em>] in volume 28 of the <em>Journal of Moth Science</em> is a fact.Facts are never protected by copyright. Indeed in US law <a href="https://www.copyright.gov/title17/92chap1.html#102" rel="nofollow noreferrer">17 USC 102(b)</a> provides that:</p>
<blockquote>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<blockquote>
<p>b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The laws of other countries are similar on this point. Indeed I do not know of any country in which facts are protected by copyright.</p>
<p>So, including such references is fully legal, and no permission from the sources being cited is required. This is true whatever form the reference takes. In particular, if an online address for the content is included, this is still true.</p>
<p>I do not know whether Medium, or any other specific publishing platform, will pat fees to authors based on clik-thru from such citations. That depends on their particular policies, which might be found in their Terms of Service or other policy document.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 2: <p>David Siegel’s answer that it is legal is substantially correct, but there are some edge case scenarios. Whether you are paid for your work is irrelevant for almost all of them.</p>
<h2>Substantial copying and copyright violation</h2>
<p>Your work can use previous works as sources of information/knowledge, including with short citations. However, if you use large amount of the original work with no modifications or only minor ones, it potentially becomes a copyright violation of the original work.</p>
<p>If the original work was published with an sufficiently permissive license, you may still do it as long as you comply with the license. For instance, Wikipedia uses the CC-BY-SA license, which means you can publish books made entirely of copy-pasted Wikipedia articles <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Republishers" rel="nofollow noreferrer">(some people have done that)</a>, legally (as long as you put the appropriate license information).</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>That is the only case where the fact that you are paid may matter, for two possible reasons:</p>
<ul>
<li>some licenses allow reuse only for non-commercial purposes (e.g. CC-BY-NC), which makes reusing material in a commercial context a copyright violation.</li>
<li>in the US, reusing copyrighted content is allowed if one meets the condition of fair use; <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fair_use#1._Purpose_and_character_of_the_use" rel="nofollow noreferrer">one part of the test</a> is &quot;the purpose and character of the use, <strong>including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes</strong>&quot; (emphasis added). Other jurisdictions may employ similar tests.</li>
</ul>
<h2>Trade secrets and other insider information</h2>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
</ul>
<h2>Trade secrets and other insider information</h2>
<p>An employer or former employer may restrict your ability to disclose information that you obtain in the course of your job. Similarly, you (or your company on your behalf) may have signed non-disclosure agreements with other parties. The details of what restrictions are allowed varies considerably across jurisdictions, though the general principle is the same.</p>
<p>Citing an internal report of a company you worked for without their permission is asking for trouble - it will be pretty strong evidence that you got internal information from that report, even if the same information would be available from public sources.</p>
<h2>Classified information</h2>
<p>Virtually all countries deem certain information to be state secrets, and disclosing said information bring harsh penalties to people who are supposed to keep it secret (military staff, defense contractors etc.).</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>Some countries prohibit the publication of classified information by anyone under their jurisdiction. Such restrictions are regularly challenged on freedom-of-speech grounds with more or less success.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Body: <p>I am writing a service agreement, how do I cite a legal code in the agreement? As a company, I need to state what we will do and what the law requires us to do This is the law: <a href="https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?sectionNum=22658&amp;highlight=true&amp;lawCode=VEH&amp;keyword=notify" rel="nofollow noreferrer">cvc 22658</a></p>
<p>(m) (1) A towing company that removes a vehicle from private property under this section shall notify the local law enforcement agency of that tow after the vehicle is removed from the private property and is in transit.</p>
<p>(2) A towing company is guilty of a misdemeanour if the towing company fails to provide the notification required under paragraph (1) within 60 minutes after the vehicle is removed from the private property and is in transit or 15 minutes after arriving at the storage facility, whichever time is less.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <blockquote>
<p>how do I cite a legal code in the agreement?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Saying &quot;<em>section 22658 of the California Vehicle Code</em>&quot; or &quot;<em>Vehicle Code section 22658</em>&quot; would work. See, for instance, <a href="https://www.leagle.com/decision/incaco20150406019" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>Coffey v. Shiomoto</em>, 60 Cal.4th 1198 (2015)</a> (&quot;<em>pursuant to Vehicle Code section 13382</em>&quot;).</p>


Tags: contract-law, california, towing, legal-citation


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: Do I have any recourse outside of the third party that processes red light camera violations in Illinois?


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Body: <p>I received a letter in the mail yesterday from payonlineticket-dot-com with a &quot;Final determination of violation liability&quot; for supposedly violating some red light law. The video on the site shows that I stopped before the white line, and then proceeded to turn right on red after checking traffic, which as far as I know is not a violation of Illinois law. There was nothing in the letter about contesting the citation, so I called the phone number and was told that the letter I received yesterday was the second of its kind and that I had missed my opportunity to contest. I explained that I had not received any other letter and wanted to contest but was not given the opportunity to do so. A supervisor who had not watched the video advised me to work directly with the police department which is out of state but only about an hour from me. She also said if I don't pay, then the $200 fine (which supposedly was $100 when the first letter was sent) then an


key: chroma:document
string_value:
with the police department which is out of state but only about an hour from me. She also said if I don't pay, then the $200 fine (which supposedly was $100 when the first letter was sent) then an additional $70 gets tacked on for the collection agency. Is there a way to contest such a citation?</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <p>The procedure for contesting such tickets varies by the municipality where the alleged violation occurred. Chicago, in particular, has its own specific procedures. There is often a strict deadline for the challenge process, and fines do escalate significantly if they go unpaid for even a short time.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>One who wants to challenge such a ticket would do well to find the name and address of the court where the ticket is returnable. This may be on the ticket, or a google or other online  search may reveal it. Having found the address, send a letter explaining why you think the ticket is in error. Be clear and polite but concise, and include the ticket number and other inditing details. Include copies of the letter and anything that came with it. Send this by certified mail, return receipt. (One may wish to send a second copy, clearly marked &quot;second copy&quot; by regular mail.) The letter should specifically request an in-person hearing if the count does not drop the ticket.</p>
<p>One may wish to engage a lawyer,  preferably one who has has some experience with traffic camera tickets, and who has an office somewhat near the relevant court.. Whether this is worth while depends on the situation, including the possible fine or other penalty involved.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>A telephone call to the police station may help, but the police usually do not have authority to cancel tickets once they have been subm,itted for central processing. The court does.</p>
<p>[<em>I intend to add to this answer, including addign sourcves, in a few hours.</em>]</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 2: <p><a href="https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/fulltext.asp?DocName=062500050K11-208.6" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Illinois law</a> allows automated traffic law enforcement systems which detect running a red light. Under that law, notice is to be given to the vehicle owner listing various things such as name, address, registration number, the charge including date, time and location, copy of the images, the fine and related impositions (traffic education program), warnings about non-compliance, and:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(10) a statement that the person may elect to proceed by: (A) paying
the fine, completing a required traffic education program, or both; or
(B) challenging the charge in court, by mail, or by administrative
hearing; and (11) a website address, accessible through the Internet,
where the person may view the recorded images of the violation.</p>
</blockquote>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
hearing; and (11) a website address, accessible through the Internet,
where the person may view the recorded images of the violation.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>There is no legal requirement that they describe the procedure for contesting the charge. For that you would have to identify the relevant court. for example if it was in Chicago, read <a href="https://www.chicago.gov/city/en/depts/fin/supp_info/revenue/challenging_tickets.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">this page</a> for your options.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>The notice does not comply with state law if it really says nothing about contesting the fine. However, if this is a second notice and you did not receive the first notice, then there is no requirement to notify you about contesting the fine. Presumably, they will claim that they mailed the first notice, and for some reason you didn't get it. That does not mean that you can't contest the disposition of your case, but you will have to allege that the company failed to comply with the requirement to mail a notice to you, and they can just respond &quot;Our records show that we mailed it on such-and-such date&quot;. In that case, you would be well advised to hire an attorney.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: Citing an employment contract using APA style

Question Body: <p>I am not sure if this is the right community for what I'm looking for, but here goes.</p>
<p>I would like to make an APA style citation of an employment contract using LaTeX document generator for personal use.</p>
<p>I have found some resources in the <a href="https://owl.purdue.edu/owl/research_and_citation/apa_style/apa_formatting_and_style_guide/apa_legal%20references%20.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Purdue website</a> regarding how to make APA citations of international treaties or other major legal agreements. However I'm not sure if the same is applicable for a simply employment contract between employer and employee.</p>
<p>Has anyone ever had to make a proper citation of an employment contract using APA style? If so please let me know what is the proper way of doing it.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <h2 id="there-is-no-worldwide-standard-for-legal-citation-bzky">There is no worldwide standard for legal citation</h2>
<p>Each nation uses its own style and citation guide. Most of these will indicate how to reference contracts. However, in most cases they will simply be an ad hoc method of unambiguously identifying the contract “The contract between X and Y for Z entered into on 12 Sometime 1666” or of identifying the documents that evidence the contract.</p>
<p>However, none of them use APA. APA is the American Psychological Association style and is used in medical and allied health and is an Author, Year in-line style. Legal citation is universally footnote style. If you want to use APA, a contract would be cited like any other unpublished document.</p>


Tags: contract-law, legal-citation


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: How to cite a court case found online

Question Body: <p>I need to cite one court case for a project I am researching. The <em>Chicago Manual of Style</em> says to use Bluebook citation for legal materials. I have a link to the document that I am using, but I am not sure how to cite it.
This is the link to the case: <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/USCOURTS-nyed-1_11-cr-00623/summary" rel="nofollow noreferrer">link here</a>.</p>
<p>I think my citation should look something like this:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><em>USA vs. Hasbajrami</em> _____ (E.D.N.Y. 2016)</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Since I found it online, I'm not sure how to mark the &quot;reporter&quot; field, which I believe should be in the empty space I marked.</p>
<p>How should I cite this? I apologize, I have no experience with law, and despite about an hour of trying to figure out this one citation, I don't think I'm searching for the right things because I can't find anything.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <p>This is an unreported case, so there is no &quot;reporter&quot; designation. You can cite like this: <a href="https://casetext.com/case/united-states-v-hasbajrami" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>United States v. Hasbajrami</em>, No. 11-CR-623 (JG), 2016 WL 1029500, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2016)</a>.</p>


Tags: legal-citation


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: Can a police car follow you to increase citations and fines?

Question Body: <p>Let's say you are traveling on city streets.</p>
<p>A police cruiser notices you are speeding and starts following you from an inconspicuous distance.  During the time he follows you, he sees more violations.</p>
<p>Is it legal for a police cruiser to keep following you, and tallying additional citations and fines?</p>
<p>I am wondering specifically whether they could follow you to see if your excess in speed lasts for a distance / time, and further penalize you, but am also interested to learn whether they would tally several distinct citations by following you for a long time.</p>
<p>I am asking specifically of United States law.  I am unsure if it would be different for state police and local police.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <p>In general, yes, police <strong>could</strong> do this. I am not aware of any US state or locality which <strong>requires</strong> an officer to execute a stop as soon as a traffic violation is observed. Whether the police <strong>would</strong> act in such a way is another question, but in some areas maximizing citation revenue is a high priority, so police in such areas might act in such a way.</p>
<p>If police think a person's actions are &quot;suspicious&quot; and think that the person might be involved in some crime more serious than a traffic violation, it would be common procedure to follow without making a stop or arrest to get a better idea of what the person was doing.</p>
<p>Many police I have encountered seem seriously concerned to stop someone driving in what they consider an unsafe way as quickly as possible, and so stop violators promptly, but I don't say that motivates all police all the time.</p>


Tags: united-states, police, traffic


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: Is it legal to download and host your own copy of a PDF (or any file) that you didn&#39;t originally author?


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Body: <p>New York state (US) here. I am putting together a presentation for my company and found a PDF online that I would like to provide a link to, so that anyone reviewing my presentation after the fact can click, download and read.</p>
<p>I am not the author of the PDF nor do I have any association with the author or the company for whom the work was published. Its subject material is simply relevant to my presentation.</p>
<p>Because I need a reliable link to this PDF, and because I don't have any control over its online hosting, I would like to download this PDF, store it on a company drive, and then provide links to it (as its stored on the drive) from my presentation.</p>
<p>That way, if someone views my presentation, say, 5 years from now, they'll still have access to it because the PDF is hosted from our own infrastructure.</p>
<p><strong>Is it legal to do this?</strong> That is, can I:</p>
<ol>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p><strong>Is it legal to do this?</strong> That is, can I:</p>
<ol>
<li>download the PDF from the <strong>external</strong> website where its hosted</li>
<li>save it on our drive</li>
<li>reference it (as its hosted from our drive) in my presentation</li>
<li>all without the express consent of the PDF author or the organization for whom the PDF is hosted by</li>
</ol>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <h2>No, that would infringe copyright.</h2>
<p>Unless the copyright holder has released the PDF under a free license, or in some way granted permission to make copies of it, making such a copy and hosting it on your company server would infringe the holder's copyright. <a href="https://www.copyright.gov/title17/92chap1.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">17 USC</a> sec 106 says that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do
and to authorize any of the following:</p>
<p>(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to
the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental,
lease, or lending;</p>
</blockquote>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>...</p>
<p>(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to
the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental,
lease, or lending;</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Making a copy in his way would clearly cio0late 17 USC 106 (1) and possibly 17 USC 106 (3), as posting to the web is a form of distribution.  Note that it is likely thst the copyright is held by the author's employer, not by the author, although either is possible.</p>
<p>If you do this, the holder could sue for damages. If there is no economic impact, the chance of a suit is not large, although a DMCA takedown notice is more likely. But the holder <strong>could</strong> sue if it chooses to.</p>
<p>Why do you not want to ask for permission? It might well be granted.</p>
<p>Alternatively, a copy might have been archived with the Internet Archive or another archive site, which would be a stable location that y0u could freely link to.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: How to cite an Act of Parliament that varies by jurisdiction?

Question Body: <p>By way of example, the following is a citation using the <a href="https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/oxlaw/oscola_4th_edn_hart_2012.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">OSCOLA</a> style:</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>Companies Act 2006, s 162(7)</p>
</blockquote>

<p>However, that provision contains different text depending on whether the jurisdiction is Scotland (which relies on the original text of the Act) or England and Wales (which relies on amended text). I couldn't find anything in OSCOLA which deals with this situation.</p>

<p>My proposed solution is to write it as above for the case of Scotland, and for the case of England and Wales to write it with reference to the instrument which amended the text:</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>My proposed solution is to write it as above for the case of Scotland, and for the case of England and Wales to write it with reference to the instrument which amended the text:</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>Companies Act 2006, s 162(7) as amended by Legal Aid, Sentencing and
  Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (Fines on Summary Conviction)
  Regulations 2015, sch 3 pt 1 para 9(5)</p>
</blockquote>

<p>Does anyone know if my approach is correct? Answers don't have to be specific to OSCOLA; it's the general approach I am interested in rather than the specific citation style.</p>


Answer 1: <p>I would cite it as:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Companies Act 2006, s 162(7) as amended by Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (Fines on Summary Conviction) Regulations 2015, sch 3 pt 1 para 9(5)</p>
</blockquote>
<p>if doing so is necessary to establish the relevant context for the reader.</p>


Tags: united-kingdom, legal-citation


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: Interim Charging Order on Property was never changed to a Final Charging Order

Question Body: <p>If an Interim Charging Order on a property was never updated to a Final Charging Order can I get it removed? It has been over 13 years.</p>
<p>Edit to add more detail.</p>
<p>The creditor managed to sneak the interim charging order in the day before my bankruptcy hearing. So literally the very next day I was declared bankrupt. This was back in October 2009 and I am in England &amp; Wales. I have not heard from the creditor since 2009, the debt has not been paid off, and as I say the interim charge was never made in to a final charge on the property title.</p>
<p>Thanks for the help!</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <p>I suspect what has happened is the court has set aside, or refused to enter, a Final Charging Order because you were made bankrupt before the Final Charging Order could be issued.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2009/811.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Nationwide Building Society v Wright [2009] EWCA Civ 811</a> the Court of Appeal held that bankruptcy was a barrier to a Final Charging Order being issued if the bankruptcy commenced before the Final Charging Order could be issued. On the facts in your question, it is clear that no such Final Charging Order was issued before the bankruptcy commenced.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>An Interim Charging Order will by necessity end unless a Final Charging Order is made. Since no such Order was made, it would seem that the Interim Charging Order has ended: the interim order is designed to stop someone from disposing of assets until the court can decide whether a final order is necessary. If no final order is made, the interim order dies with it.</p>
<p>A check on the Land Registry against the property would be needed to ensure that any notices or restrictions have been removed. If they are still present against the property's entry, an application to have them removed will have to be filed.</p>
<p>Furthermore, the Limitation Act 1980 provides a time limit of six or twelve years (cause of action dependent) for the creditor to take action to enforce their rights.</p>
<ul>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>Furthermore, the Limitation Act 1980 provides a time limit of six or twelve years (cause of action dependent) for the creditor to take action to enforce their rights.</p>
<ul>
<li><p>In relation to enforcing judgments, the creditor has six years from the date of judgment to enforce it (<a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1980/58/section/24" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Section 24 of the Limitation Act 1980</a>)</p>
</li>
<li><p>In relation to recovering money secured by a charge or to recover the proceeds relating to a sale of land, the creditor has twelve years from the date that their right to receive the money started (<a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1980/58/section/20" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Section 20 of the Limitation Act 1980</a>)</p>
</li>
</ul>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
</li>
</ul>
<p>In either case, even if a Final Charging Order were able to be made in these circumstances, it is possible to argue that the relevant sections of the Limitation Act 1980 prevent the creditor from pursuing any right of action and so the debt (and any enforcement action) is statute-barred.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: How to accomplish a court hearing after arrest without being stuck in prison cell for more than 4 years like Assange?


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Body: <p><strong>TLDR / UPDATE / SUMMARY:</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>Police: I'm arresting you.</li>
<li>Me: You are breaking the law, what I do is minor.</li>
<li>Police: No, I'm arresting you, what you do is more than minor.</li>
<li>Arrested.</li>
</ul>
<p>Now the question is: how quickly can I land in court to dispute the arrest?</p>
<p>Me discussing with the police: it is on the level &quot;he said&quot; / &quot;she said&quot; but they have monopoly on using force and it is only them who can arrest me (I cannot arrest them).</p>
<hr />
<p>I have never been arrested, I do not know how long it takes to land in court after the arrest.</p>
<p>I would like to know how to professionally challenge authority and their interpretation of &quot;anything more than minor&quot;</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>I would like to know how to professionally challenge authority and their interpretation of &quot;anything more than minor&quot;</p>
<p>Since &quot;anything more than minor&quot; is not strictly defined, due to Climate Emergency, the threshold has been moved, therefore burden of proof is now on law enforcement. How long before we can cross-examine each other in the court of law? Sitting in a cell while waiting for a trial - <strong>MEH</strong>. Going to a court to have a debate with law enforcement - <strong>HELL YEAH</strong>.</p>
<p>The reason why I can be inclined to do it:</p>
<ul>
<li>Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 (protest illegal)</li>
<li>Public Order Act 2023 (intention of protest illegal)</li>
<li>Secondary legislation through a back door (&quot;anything more than minor&quot;)</li>
<li>Judge Silas Reid putting people to jail for telling the truth</li>
<li>More people arrested for sitting on a pavement and holding a sign</li>
</ul>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<li>Judge Silas Reid putting people to jail for telling the truth</li>
<li>More people arrested for sitting on a pavement and holding a sign</li>
</ul>
<p>Please allow me to quote: <a href="https://www.churchtimes.co.uk/articles/2023/9-june/news/uk/retired-priest-among-protesters-referred-to-attorney-general" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://www.churchtimes.co.uk/articles/2023/9-june/news/uk/retired-priest-among-protesters-referred-to-attorney-general</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>“When you take the stand, you take an oath to speak the ‘whole truth’. Our motivation is a crucial part of why we are there. I’m not a hoodlum sitting in the road for the fun of it. By not being allowed to speak about our motivation for taking action, we are being asked to break that oath by the judge.”</p>
</blockquote>
<hr />
<p>Some reading on &quot;more than minor&quot;:</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
</blockquote>
<hr />
<p>Some reading on &quot;more than minor&quot;:</p>
<p>Policing Insight: <a href="https://policinginsight.com/features/opinion/the-end-of-protest-service-values-and-public-trust-are-more-important-than-assessing-more-than-minor-hinderance/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://policinginsight.com/features/opinion/the-end-of-protest-service-values-and-public-trust-are-more-important-than-assessing-more-than-minor-hinderance/</a></p>
<p>openDemocracy: <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/police-powers-ban-protest-laws-suella-braverman/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/police-powers-ban-protest-laws-suella-braverman/</a></p>
<p>EDIT / UPDATE:</p>
<p>More resources, just search this phrase, use the quotes for more precise results:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>&quot;more than minor&quot; protest</p>
</blockquote>
<p>That's why was repeating &quot;more than minor&quot;</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<blockquote>
<p>&quot;more than minor&quot; protest</p>
</blockquote>
<p>That's why was repeating &quot;more than minor&quot;</p>
<p>Legal challenge by Liberty: <a href="https://www.libertyhumanrights.org.uk/issue/liberty-launches-legal-action-against-home-secretary-for-overriding-parliament-on-protest-powers/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://www.libertyhumanrights.org.uk/issue/liberty-launches-legal-action-against-home-secretary-for-overriding-parliament-on-protest-powers/</a></p>
<p>The Justice Gap: <a href="https://www.thejusticegap.com/liberty-launches-legal-action-against-home-secretary-for-breaching-constitutional-principles/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://www.thejusticegap.com/liberty-launches-legal-action-against-home-secretary-for-breaching-constitutional-principles/</a></p>
<blockquote>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<blockquote>
<p>The Home Secretary has now altered the law, constituting anything causing “minor disruption” to being “serious disruption” and worthy of police action. According to a cross party parliamentary committee, this is the first time the government has turned to secondary legislation to make changes to a law already rejected in primary legislation by parliament.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Amnesty International: <a href="https://www.amnesty.org.uk/files/2023-06/Amnesty%20International%20UK%20-%20%20Briefing%20on%20Revised%20Protest%20Regulations.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://www.amnesty.org.uk/files/2023-06/Amnesty%20International%20UK%20-%20%20Briefing%20on%20Revised%20Protest%20Regulations.pdf</a></p>
<hr />
<p>You can definitely dig deeper into protesting / intention of protest, but in the meantime please advise how to quickly and efficiently land in court after a potential arrest?</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/canada" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-canada-tooltip-container">canada</a></p>
<p>There is a presumptive ceiling on the allowable time between charge and trial: 18 months for offences to be tried in provincial court, and 30 months for cases to be tried in the superior court (<em>R. v Jordan</em>, 2016 SCC 27).</p>
<p>Delays that are longer are presumptive infringements of an accused's right to a trial within a reasonable time protected by s. 11(b) of the <em>Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms</em>.</p>
<p>If the delay (excluding delay attributable to the defence) exceeds the presumptive ceilings, and if the Crown cannot establish the presence of exceptional circumstances, the court will stay (terminate) the proceedings.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 2: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/united-kingdom" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;united-kingdom&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;united-kingdom&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-united-kingdom-tooltip-container">united-kingdom</a></p>
<p>The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed in <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/schedule/1/part/I/chapter/5" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Article 6 of the Human Rights Act</a> (bolding mine).</p>
<blockquote>
<p>In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing <strong>within a reasonable time</strong> by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.</p>
</blockquote>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
</blockquote>
<p>That said, I can't find any indication that there is a legal time requirement, so it will depend on the case, and you more or less need to make a legal appeal on your case to get things sped up if you feel the government is dragging their feet.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.stuartmillersolicitors.co.uk/how-long-after-being-charged-take-court/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Average times</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>According to government statistics, it took an average of 357 days for a case to get all the way to the Crown Court, and an average of 178 days in court to get to an outcome. The data can be further broken down by charging stage:</p>
<ul>
<li>Time between the offence being committed and being charged: 323 days</li>
<li>Time between being charged and the first hearing: 34 days</li>
<li>Time between the first hearing and completion at the magistrates’: 9 days</li>
<li>Time between the sending of the case to Crown Court to the start of trial: 119 days</li>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<li>Time between the first hearing and completion at the magistrates’: 9 days</li>
<li>Time between the sending of the case to Crown Court to the start of trial: 119 days</li>
<li>Time between the start of the trial and the completion of the trial: 50 days</li>
</ul>
<p>Remember, however, that these figures are only averages. The more serious and complex the offence, the longer it takes for each stage to be completed.</p>
</blockquote>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 3: <h2>Don’t flee to the Ecuadorian embassy</h2>
<p>Mr Assange is in gaol because his <a href="https://www.gov.uk/charged-crime/bail" rel="nofollow noreferrer">bail</a> was revoked because he decided to become a fugitive. If he had waited for his extra hearing, he could have lived in the <a href="https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/bail#:%7E:text=dealt%20with%20effectively.-,The%20Right%20to%20Bail,the%20exceptions%20to%20bail%20apply." rel="nofollow noreferrer">community</a> while this happened.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Under section 4 Bail Act 1976, on each occasion that a person is brought before a court accused of an offence, or remanded after conviction for enquiries or a report, he must be granted bail without condition, if none of the exceptions to bail apply.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>Conditions of bail may only be imposed where necessary to ensure that the exceptions to bail are addressed. Only where conditions are not sufficient to address the exceptions to bail should a remand in custody be sought.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>As someone with no previous conviction charged with illegal protesting, you should be able to wait for your day in court from the comfort of your own home.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 4: <blockquote>
<p>Going to a court to have a debate with law enforcement - HELL YEAH.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>That's not how court works.  Your premise seems to be incorrect and it seems there is a very large knowledge gap on how courtrooms work.  There is not a thing where you get to gleefully cross-examine anyone in the fashion you hope.  Cross-examination doesn't even mean that.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, television doesn't give you much of an education. The sad fact is, actual court proceedings are deadly dull - too dull to make drama out of. That crowning moment of verbal glory is unlikely to <em>ever</em> happen, and even if it does, blink and you'll miss it.</p>
<p>And if you think you're going to represent <em>yourself</em> as an amateur barrister, you will only be frustrated, and your moment of glory will never come.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>And if you think you're going to represent <em>yourself</em> as an amateur barrister, you will only be frustrated, and your moment of glory will never come.</p>
<p>If you're doing some sort of organized protest that is organized by someone other than asshats, there'll be a legal team that will have every angle worked out, and will be doing the arguing to maximum effect.</p>
<p>If you want to be one of those persons, then get onto a pre-law track in school and become a lawyer yourself.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Body: <p>It's my understanding, depending on the state, a renter could take steps to procure the property through being clever* and living there a long time, while taking additional steps to gain a legal claim. Either they have to pay certain bills, improve the property, or get involved in the home owners association. Are there any situations where they can claim the property outside of convincing the landlord to let them pay the property taxes? What about states that allow withholding of rent until the landlord repairs the unity?</p>
<p>I'm specifically looking for edge cases where a dispute could arise between a landlord and tenant that gets dragged out for years. It would be clearly be much easier to just find property no one owns as a result of something like the 2008 financial crisis, where the home owner goes bankrupt and the mortgage company.</p>
<p>*such as, the landlord violating some clause in the lease, and him starting legal proceedings over that.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <h2>No</h2>
<p>The criteria for adverse possession is that you have to be in possession <strong>without permission</strong>. A tenant, even one that pays no rent (or stops paying rent), has permission.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 2: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/canada" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-canada-tooltip-container">canada</a></p>
<p>Several provinces have abolished adverse possession law (see e.g. British Columbia's <em>Limitations Act</em>, s. 28; Alberta's <em>Property Rights Statutes Amendment Act, 2022</em>; and New Brunswick's <em>Land Title Act</em>, s. 17).</p>
<p>In provinces where adverse possession is still a viable claim, its requirements depend on the English law that was imported into the province and any statutory or common law developments since (see <em>Nelson (City) v. Nelson</em>, 2017 SCC 8, para. 17). A similar concept, <em>acquisitive prescription</em>, applies in Québec under the Civil Code (see arts. 992, 2910; <em>Ostiguy v. Allie</em>, 2017 SCC 22).</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>Generally, the elements of adverse possession (which, when present, start the clock on the limitation period against the true owner) are that the possession must be:</p>
<ul>
<li>open;</li>
<li>notorious;</li>
<li><strong>adverse</strong>;</li>
<li>exclusive;</li>
<li>peaceful (not by force);</li>
<li>actual; and</li>
<li>continuous.</li>
</ul>
<p>Some provinces also have the requirement that the use be &quot;inconsistent&quot; with the true owner's intended use (e.g. Ontario, Nova Scotia).</p>
<p>In any case, the possession must be <em>adverse</em>. This means that there is no claim to adverse possession where the claimant has the consent or permission of the true owner (<em>Re Koziey Estate</em>, 2019 ABCA 43, para. 44).</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: Is attempted manslaughter a real crime?

Question Body: <p>Is there such thing as being charged with attempted manslaughter? During a scene of a movie where they're reading out another character's rap sheet they mention 'attempted manslaughter'. As I understand it manslaughter is the unlawful but unintentional killing of another person through some sort of criminal negligence. Calling it <strong>attempted</strong> manslaughter, in my eyes, implies some sort of intent thus <em>attempted</em> and <em>manslaughter</em> seem to contradict each other. I'm just wondering is this some sort of technical mistake in the movie or is there such a crime as attempted manslaughter?</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <h2>Yes</h2>
<p>For example, <a href="http://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/sa/consol_act/clca1935262/s270ab.html" rel="noreferrer">s270AB</a> of the <a href="/questions/tagged/south-australia" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;south-australia&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;south-australia&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-south-australia-tooltip-container">south-australia</a> <em>Criminal Law Consolidation Act</em> 1935 says:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(1)         Where—</p>
<p>(a)         a person attempts to kill another or is a party to an attempt to kill another; and</p>
<p>(b)         he would, if the attempt had been successfully carried to completion, have been guilty of manslaughter rather than murder,</p>
<p>he shall be guilty of attempted manslaughter.</p>
</blockquote>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>he shall be guilty of attempted manslaughter.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Relevantly in SA, voluntary manslaughter occurs when a victim dies as the result of an offence that would otherwise amount to murder, but the defendant’s liability is reduced because of the presence of mitigating circumstances, such as provocation.</p>
<p>So, in circumstances of provocation (say) where the accused shoots at the victim but misses, attempted manslaughter is a possible charge. Most likely this would be charged as attempted murder but downgraded where the defence of provocation was made out.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 2: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/canada" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-canada-tooltip-container">canada</a></p>
<h3>Case law is limited, but has taken the view that attempted manslaughter is not possible</h3>
<p>This has not been decided by the Supreme Court of Canada, but a court of appeal has said it is not possible. See <a href="https://www.canlii.org/en/qc/qcca/doc/1960/1960canlii494/1960canlii494.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>R. v. Menard</em> (1960), 130 C.C.C. 242 (Q.C.C.A.)</a>, leave to appeal to Supreme Court of Canada refused:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I find it impossible to conceive of attempted manslaughter; the French translation expresses my idea even better: how can one suppose that a person can mean to commit involuntary homicide?</p>
</blockquote>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
</blockquote>
<p>While the <em>Criminal Code</em> allows for a provocation defence to reduce an offence of murder to one of manslaughter, one court has said it does not operate to reduce a charge of <em>attempted</em> murder to one of <em>attempted</em> manslaughter (<a href="https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/1977/1977canlii1191/1977canlii1191.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>R. v. Campbell</em> (1977), 38 C.C.C. (2d) 6 (Ont. C.A.)</a>).</p>
<p><a href="/questions/tagged/new-york" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;new-york&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;new-york&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-new-york-tooltip-container">new-york</a></p>
<p>The Court of Appeals of the State of New York has also accepted that:</p>
<blockquote>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>The Court of Appeals of the State of New York has also accepted that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>An attempt to commit manslaughter is apparently a contradiction because the specific crime of manslaughter involves no intent and accordingly, an intention to commit a crime whose distinguishing element is lack of intent is logically repugnant.</p>
<p><em>People v. Foster</em>, <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-foster-106" rel="nofollow noreferrer">19 N.Y.2d 150 (N.Y. 1967)</a>, quoting from <em>People v. Brown</em>, <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-brown-460" rel="nofollow noreferrer">21 A.D.2d 738 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964)</a></p>
</blockquote>
<p>However, in <em>Foster</em>, the Court allowed a <em>plea</em> to attempted manslaughter to stand, in the circumstance where the <em>charge</em> was for attempted murder.</p>
<blockquote>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>However, in <em>Foster</em>, the Court allowed a <em>plea</em> to attempted manslaughter to stand, in the circumstance where the <em>charge</em> was for attempted murder.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>While there may be question whether a plea to attempted manslaughter is technically and logically consistent, such a plea should be sustained on the ground that it was sought by defendant and freely taken as part of a bargain which was struck for the defendant's benefit.</p>
</blockquote>
<h3>The logic</h3>
<p>In these jurisdictions, an attempt requires intention to complete the entire <em>actus reus</em> of the offence. One of the elements of manslaughter's <em>actus reus</em> is the death of the victim. An attempted manslaughter therefore would require an intent to cause the death of the victim. But of course this intention to cause the death makes the crime no longer manslaughter in these jurisdictions, so therein lies the logical contradiction.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 3: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/germany" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-germany-tooltip-container">germany</a></p>
<ul>
<li><em>Mord</em> (murder) is a homicide with any one enumerated aggravating circumstance.</li>
<li><em>Totschlag</em> (manslaughter) is a homicide without any of those enumerated circumstances.</li>
</ul>
<p>In both of these, the perpetrator wanted a death to happen.</p>
<ul>
<li><em>Fahrlässige Tötung</em> (negligent killing) is a homicide with culpable negligence or recklessness, but no intent.</li>
<li><em>Vorsätzliche Körperverletzung mit Todesfolge</em> (intentional battery with lethal results) is an intentional, unlawful injury which causes unintentional death.</li>
</ul>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<li><em>Vorsätzliche Körperverletzung mit Todesfolge</em> (intentional battery with lethal results) is an intentional, unlawful injury which causes unintentional death.</li>
</ul>
<p>So attempted <em>Totschlag</em> is possible (and actually a significant proportion of homicide-type cases), but the definion you gave sounds more like <em>vorsätzliche Körperverletzung mit Todesfolge</em>, where an attempt would be an attempted <em>vorsätzliche Körperverletzung</em> without the lethal results.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 4: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/germany" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-germany-tooltip-container">germany</a></p>
<p><strong>Yes</strong>, but attempted manslaughter/murder (Versuchte Totschlag) is not defined in the German Criminal Code (StGB).</p>
<p>Since <strong>Totschlag</strong> or a <strong>less serious case of murder</strong> is a <strong>Serious criminal offence</strong> (Verbrechen), the attempt always entails a criminal liability and therefore does not need to be expressly stated, because StGB §23 (1) applies.</p>
<p>For <strong>Less serious criminal offences</strong> (Vergehen),  the attempt must be expressly stated to entail criminal liability.</p>
<hr />
<p><strong>Sources</strong>:</p>
<ul>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>For <strong>Less serious criminal offences</strong> (Vergehen),  the attempt must be expressly stated to entail criminal liability.</p>
<hr />
<p><strong>Sources</strong>:</p>
<ul>
<li><a href="https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html#p0116" rel="noreferrer">§12 - Serious (Verbrechen) and less serious (Vergehen) criminal offences</a>
<ul>
<li>(1) Serious criminal offences (Verbrechen) are unlawful acts which are punishable by a <strong>minimum term of imprisonment of one year</strong>.</li>
<li>(2) Less serious criminal offences (Vergehen) are unlawful acts which are punishable by a lesser minimum term of imprisonment or by a fine.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><a href="https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html#p0160" rel="noreferrer">§23 - Criminal liability for attempt</a>
<ul>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
</ul>
</li>
<li><a href="https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html#p0160" rel="noreferrer">§23 - Criminal liability for attempt</a>
<ul>
<li>(1) An attempt to commit a serious criminal offence (Verbrechen) always entails criminal liability, an attempt to commit a less serious criminal offence (Vergehen) only if expressly so provided by law.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><a href="https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html#p2027" rel="noreferrer">§212 - Murder (Totschlag)</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html#p2030" rel="noreferrer">§213 - Less serious case of murder</a>
<blockquote>
<p>... the penalty is imprisonment for a term of between one year and 10 years.</p>
</blockquote>
</li>
</ul>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 5: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/finland" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;finland&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;finland&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-finland-tooltip-container">finland</a></p>
<p>As the other answers have pointed out, many jurisdictions have a crime in the books for actively killing a person, and an aggravated version translated as &quot;murder&quot;. I'll just add the Finnish law's view on the matter.</p>
<p>Finnish criminal law has a crime called &quot;tappo&quot;, literally &quot;killing&quot; but translated as manslaughter. The definition of the crime is simply &quot;Whoever kills another person.&quot; Murder is defined by premeditation or the presence of aggravating factors. As with other severe crimes, the sections end with &quot;An attempt is punishable&quot;. (Rikoslaki chapter 21, §1 and §2)</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>For an example, the Supreme Court's resolution 1999:20 was on a case where a person claimed that they simply meant to cut the victim without an intent to kill, and should be sentenced for aggravated assault. The court held that the cut only nearly missed major arteries and therefore was an attempted manslaughter.</p>
<p>There is a fourth crime, &quot;kuolemantuottamus&quot; or &quot;causing death by negligence&quot;, which governs situations where neither intent nor a direct harmful act was present. This covers everything from a boss neglecting workplace safety to accidentally running over a pedestrian with your car.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 6: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/united-states" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-united-states-tooltip-container">united-states</a> <a href="/questions/tagged/minnesota" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;minnesota&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;minnesota&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-minnesota-tooltip-container">minnesota</a></p>
<p>It looks like there's a path to this in Minnesota.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/cite/609.17" rel="nofollow noreferrer">MN 609.17</a>: &quot;Attempts&quot; says that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Whoever, with intent to commit a crime, does an act which is a substantial step toward, and more than preparation for, the commission of the crime is guilty of an attempt to commit that crime</p>
</blockquote>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
</blockquote>
<p><a href="https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/cite/609.20" rel="nofollow noreferrer">MN 609.20</a>: Manslaughter in the first degree, P3 provides that someone is guilty of manslaughter who</p>
<blockquote>
<p>intentionally causes the death of another person because the actor is coerced by threats made by someone other than the actor's coconspirator and which cause the actor reasonably to believe that the act performed by the actor is the only means of preventing imminent death to the actor or another</p>
</blockquote>
<p>So, there's at least an argument to be made that someone who is being &quot;coerced by threats&quot; into killing someone else an &quot;does an act which is a substantial step toward&quot; that goal could be guilty of attempted manslaughter. That is, to my reading: if Alice puts a gun to my head and says &quot;shoot Bob dead or I shoot you&quot; and I pick up the gun on the table, that action could plausibly be charged as attempted manslaughter.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>There's probably a parallel argument to 609.20P1:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>intentionally causes the death of another person in the heat of passion provoked by such words or acts of another as would provoke a person of ordinary self-control under like circumstances, provided that the crying of a child does not constitute provocation</p>
</blockquote>
<p>... but I strongly suspect that it'd be harder to prove the facts in that case.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: How to decode a citation to a case reporter

Question Body: <p>Citations to cases are often in the form <em>Style of cause</em> (year, if not reflected in the citation), <code>[citation]</code>.</p>
<p>The <code>[citation]</code> element generally will include an abbreviated form of the reporter (e.g., S.C.R., All E.R., Sask. R., P.), or a neutral citation of the Court (e.g. SCC, UKSC, ABPC, etc.)</p>
<p>How can one determine what these abbreviations mean?</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/commonwealth" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;commonwealth&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;commonwealth&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-commonwealth-tooltip-container">commonwealth</a><a href="/questions/tagged/united-states" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-united-states-tooltip-container">united-states</a></p>
<p>The most comprehensive source of reporter abbreviation in the commonwealth and United States is found in the <em><a href="https://www.sweetandmaxwell.co.uk/Product/Reference/Index-to-Legal-Citations-and-Abbreviations/Hardback/30798157" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Index to Legal Citations and Abbreviations</a></em>, which should be available at any law library. For the United States, the Bluebook might be more comprehensive.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>Most law schools or libraries also publish their own abbreviation indices for common reporters. See e.g. The <a href="https://www.abdn.ac.uk/library/documents/guides/uglaw006.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">University of Aberdeen's</a>. Here is another from the <a href="https://www.mcgill.ca/library/files/library/Legal_Abbreviations.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">University of McGill</a>.</p>
<p>They all show, for example, that &quot;All E.R.&quot; is an abbreviation for &quot;All England Law Reports.&quot;</p>
<p>Some databases create their own citation formats that look like neutral citations: see e.g. <a href="https://www.bailii.org/bailii/citation.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://www.bailii.org/bailii/citation.html</a></p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 2: <p>For those not familiar with it, a &quot;reporter&quot; is a periodical publication that prints of full text of published decisions of the courts covered by the reporter (historically, a task mostly done by commercial publishing firms such as the firm branded as &quot;West&quot; which hasn't been anything more than a brand since it was acquired by another firm, for a long time).</p>
<p>This would be done in encyclopedia sized bound volumes, often numbering in the hundreds, and the citation was to volume X on page Y of the reporter.</p>
<p>So, if something were in volume 348 of the Pacific Reporter on starting on page 24, the case number would be 348 P. 24.</p>
<p>In this system if you want to refer to a specific quotation or point within a case, you add a &quot;pinpoint citation&quot; to the page upon which what you are referring to is located, so for example, a full citation with pinpoint citation might read:</p>
<blockquote>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<blockquote>
<p>The court of appeals found that the issue of estoppel was not
preserved in the trial court. <em>Jones v. Doe</em>, 348 P. 24, 33 (Colo.
App. 1984).</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This full citation contains the surnames of first parties in the case as Plaintiff and Defendant (preferably underlined or in italics), followed by the case citation, followed by the pinpoint citation followed by a parenthetical with the abbreviation of the court and the year decided). The point referenced is on page 33 of volume 348 of the Pacific reporter as part of a case which starts at page 24 of the same volume.</p>
<p><a href="https://i.stack.imgur.com/zC4Av.png" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><img src="https://i.stack.imgur.com/zC4Av.png" alt="enter image description here" /></a></p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p><a href="https://i.stack.imgur.com/zC4Av.png" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><img src="https://i.stack.imgur.com/zC4Av.png" alt="enter image description here" /></a></p>
<p>The courts in recent years became concerned about becoming too reliant upon commercial case reporters run by private businesses for official governmental court business, so they created a &quot;neutral&quot; a.k.a. &quot;public domain&quot; citation system. This also reflected the concern that dead tree book reporters might cease to exist entirely so that the citation system should not be wedded to them.</p>
<p>In this system the format is YEAR abbreviation for the court SEQUENTIAL NUMBER OF CASE IN COURT IN THAT YEAR.</p>
<p>So, for example, 2020 CO 57 is the 57th published cases decided by the Colorado Supreme Court in the year 2020.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>So, for example, 2020 CO 57 is the 57th published cases decided by the Colorado Supreme Court in the year 2020.</p>
<p>In this system if you want to refer to a specific quotation or point within a case, you add a &quot;pinpoint citation&quot; to the paragraph number in which what you are referring to is located, so for example, a full citation with pinpoint citation might read:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The court of appeals found that the issue of estoppel was not
preserved in the trial court. <em>Martin v. Nelson</em>, 2020 CO 57, ¶ 22.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This form of full citation starts with the surnames of first parties listed as plaintiff and defendant in the case, followed by the case citation, followed by the pinpoint citation. The parenthetical found in a reporter based citation is omitted as redundant.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>For many years now, however, almost no one has used the physical dead tree bound volumes to research law (a transition that has occurred during my career with the transition taking place around 2005 +/- a few years for the most part), although the volumes and page numbers in physical volumes are still used as one method to identify published decisions in court cases. Neutral citation forms are somewhat more recent than that for the most part.</p>
<p>A quite complete list of abbreviations used in legal citations can be found <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/citation/4-100" rel="nofollow noreferrer">here</a>. The sidebar at the link further decodes citation practices.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: Why do court opinions list multiple layers of citations?

Question Body: <p>It is common in for courts to cite case law.  But why do they cite or note what their citations cite?  Here's an example I just came across:</p>
<ul>
<li><em>National Business Services, Inc. v. Wright</em>, 2 F. Supp. 2d 701 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (citing <em>Albert E. Price, Inc. v. Metzner</em>, 574 F. Supp. 281, 289 (E.D. Pa.1983))</li>
</ul>
<p>The first citation is to a specific page in a 1998 order from a U.S. District Court.  Why parenthetically note how that in turn cites an earlier 1983 order <em>from the same court</em>?  It's not like it lends more authority to the primary citation.  (Or if it does, then why stop at the second layer of citation?  If the 1983 order cited something earlier should it be listed as well?)</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <p>This practice varies depending on the court and/or judge's own style preferences and is often a judgment call based on what the author is trying to communicate with a citation.</p>
<p>I'll give a few reasons why a judgment might provide multiple layers of citations:</p>
<ul>
<li>because the &quot;deeper&quot; source is a well-used precedent for a particular point, so it is meaningful for readers to know that the shallower source cited the well-accepted leading case on an issue</li>
<li>to show that a particular proposition has been long-accepted in a jurisdiction (your example might show that whatever proposition that is being cited has been used in this district over a 25-year period)</li>
<li>to show that a decision from a lower-level court is consistent with historical jurisprudence or with higher-level jurisprudence</li>
</ul>
<p><a href="https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fct/doc/2021/2021fc270/2021fc270.html" rel="noreferrer">One example</a>:</p>
<blockquote>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
</ul>
<p><a href="https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fct/doc/2021/2021fc270/2021fc270.html" rel="noreferrer">One example</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>[12] It is common ground between the parties that reasonableness is the applicable standard of review for the Independent Chairperson’s decision. I agree (<em>Perron v Canada (Attorney General)</em>, 2020 FC 741 (&quot;<em>Perron</em>&quot;) at para 45, citing <em>Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov</em>, 2019 SCC 65 (&quot;<em>Vavilov</em>&quot;) at para 23; see also <em>Schmit v Canada (Attorney General)</em>, 2016 FC 1293 at paras 19-20, and the cases cited therein).</p>
</blockquote>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
</blockquote>
<p>Here, the author is trying to say this point is well settled. What is the standard of review for decisions of the Independent Chairperson? It is &quot;reasonableness.&quot; This was stated in <em>Perron</em>, which itself cited <em>Vavilov</em>, Canada's leading case (since 2019) on how to select the standard of review. It is important to know that <em>Perron</em> relied on <em>Vavilov</em> rather than an obsolete framework for selecting the standard of review.</p>
<p>In your particular example, it seems that <em>Albert E. Price, Inc. v. Metzner</em> is or was a leading case in the 3rd Circuit on what constitues irreparable harm when seeking a preliminary injunction in copyright infringment cases (based on my very brief skim of how other judgments tend to use it). By noting that a judgment cited <em>Metzner</em>, this is a form of shorthand that is quite meaningful to practitioners in this area of law.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 2: <p>There can be several reasons for this practice.
Often it is because the words quoted, or the key section of the quote, came originally from the other case, so the opinion gives credit there, but also acknowledge that this court got it from the newer case. So it may be a matter of credit.</p>
<p>It is often to show that a doctrine or test has remained steady across  <em>series of cases</em> over time, which may well grant more authority than any one case does.</p>
<p>It can be to show the different contexts in which the same wording has been used, to show the breadth of the rule.</p>
<p>It allows one to trace a relevant <strong>line</strong> of cases, which can be more important than any one case.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 3: <p>The <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp2/2/701/2486529/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">primary citation from 1998</a> states in the language cited:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Harm is irreparable when it cannot be adequately compensated in
damages, either because of the nature of the right that is injured, or
because there exists no certain pecuniary standards for the
measurement of damages. Albert E. Price, Inc. v. Metzner, 574 F. Supp.
281, 289 (E.D.Pa.1983).</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp/574/281/1867325/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">secondary citation from 1983</a> states in the language cited by the primary court.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>As heretofore noted, the party seeking a preliminary injunction bears
the burden of showing that it will be irreparably harmed pendente lite
if an injunction is *289 not issued. See Continental Group, Inc. v.


key: chroma:document
string_value:
the burden of showing that it will be irreparably harmed pendente lite
if an injunction is *289 not issued. See Continental Group, Inc. v.
Amoco Chemical Corp., 614 F.2d 351, 359 (3d Cir.1980); Oburn v. Shapp,
521 F.2d 142, 151 (3d Cir.1975). The general rule in equity is that
harm is &quot;irreparable&quot; when it cannot be adequately compensated in
damages because of the nature of the injury itself or because of the
nature of the right or property that is injured or because there
exists no certain pecuniary standard for measurement of damages. See
Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. Norton, 21 F. Supp. 707 (E.D.Pa.1937). Courts
have also described irreparable injury as &quot;substantial injury to a
material degree coupled with the inadequacy of money damages.&quot; Tully
v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 834, 850 (D.N.J.1972), accord
Judice's Sunshine Pontiac, Inc. v. General Motors, 418 F. Supp. 1212
(D.N.J.1976). Future injury of uncertain date and incalculable


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Judice's Sunshine Pontiac, Inc. v. General Motors, 418 F. Supp. 1212
(D.N.J.1976). Future injury of uncertain date and incalculable
magnitude is &quot;irreparable harm&quot; and protection from such an injury is
a legitimate end of injunctive relief. See Phillips v. Crown Central
Petroleum Corp., 602 F.2d 616 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074,
100 S. Ct. 1021, 62 L. Ed. 2d 756 (1979). Based on the evidence
presented at the hearing, this Court has determined that Price has
shown that it will be irreparably harmed if an injunction is not
entered. This irreparable harm would result from the serious,
long-lasting, and incalculable harm to Price's competitive position
vis-a-vis the defendants if the defendants were allowed to continue
marketing their infringing duck card boxes.</p>
</blockquote>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
long-lasting, and incalculable harm to Price's competitive position
vis-a-vis the defendants if the defendants were allowed to continue
marketing their infringing duck card boxes.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The secondary citation is to provide the source with the best overall legal analysis summarizing the case law in this area. The primary citation is to show that the older trial court opinion is still good law.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 4: <p>I've also seen this style of multiple-citation (though don't have an example handy) when a case has been going on for many years, possibly with one or more trips to an appeals court then back to the lower court in order to show that a particular bit of information was injected into the case during the first round through the lower court but that it has remained stable since. The current opinion (of the lower court) cites the appeals panel which cited the original lower court opinion. Or even a second round through the appeals panel citing the lower court citing the appeals panel citing the lower court.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 5: <p>One possible reason is for convenience, but that isn't the most compelling reason by itself because one can always look up the cited argument to see what it cites.</p>
<p>When used as a tool for argumentation, it is evidently because precedent by itself is insufficient as a basis to make an argument authoritative. This fact can be highlighted for example when contrasting or dissenting opinions can be shown to exist--therefore even when considered in terms of precedent alone, it becomes necessary to show why one opinion might be regarded as &quot;more authoritative&quot; than another.</p>
<p>If an opinion cites another opinion, then at least there is some evidence of consensus of opinions, which adds to the appearance of weight beyond citing an opinion that does not cite another opinion (never mind that the judgment being actively rendered is creating more of the same, by passing an opinion upon an opinion).</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>Why stop at just two opinions deep rather than citing a third opinion on which the second is based? It may be assumed that a secondary opinion is sufficient to justify the strength of the argument and so further opinions are regarded as <em>more redundant</em>, or it may be that an earlier opinion is deliberately omitted because it might distract from or weaken the point that the current opinion is trying to make. It should be noted that there may be different cases cited in the primary opinion even as it pertains to the specific topic and so there may be even further discretion in choosing which opinion(s) to include in a nested citation.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: Does USA have Neutral Citations like those of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and UK?


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Body: <p><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CANZUK" rel="nofollow noreferrer">CANZUK</a>'s Neutral Citations all utilize the same formula — does  USA have anything alike? I cannot remember who, but some professor wrote that American citations are more baffling than CANZUK's Neutral Citations.</p>
<p><a href="https://canlii.ca/t/frpws#par391" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>Gonzales v. Oregon</em>, 546 U.S. 243 (2006)</a> doesn't <a href="https://libguides.library.qut.edu.au/c.php?g=458197&amp;p=3131805" rel="nofollow noreferrer">abbreviate the court</a> — SCOTUS in this case.<br />
<a href="https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2007/2007scc41/2007scc41.html?searchUrlHash=AAAAAQAZImNhc3RsZSByb2NrIHYuIGdvbnphbGVzIgAAAAAB&amp;resultIndex=1#document" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>Castle Rock v. Gonzales</em>, 125 S.Ct. 2796 (2005)</a> doesn't <a href="https://libguides.library.qut.edu.au/c.php?g=458197&amp;p=3131805" rel="nofollow noreferrer">number the judgment</a>.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>But CANZUK Neutral Citations bear <a href="https://studyguides.lib.uts.edu.au/caselaw/citations" rel="nofollow noreferrer">the Judgment Year + Court Identifier + Judgment Number</a>.</p>
<blockquote>
<h4>United Kingdom</h4>
<p>ACG Acquisition XX LLC v Olympic Airlines SA (in
liquidation) [2013] EWCA Civ 369 [. . .]<br />
ACG Acquisition XX LLC v Olympic Airlines   SA (in
liquidation) [2012] EWHC 1070 (Comm) [. . .]<br />
Actionstrength Ltd v International Glass Engineering
SpA [2003] UKHL 17</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Severine Saintier, <em>Poole's Textbook on Contract Law</em> (2021 15th edn), page xv.</p>
<blockquote>
<h4>Australia</h4>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Karam [2005] NSWCA 344</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Glengallen Investments Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 55</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Neil Andrews, <em>Contract Law in Practice</em> (2021), page lvii.</p>
<blockquote>
<h4>Canada</h4>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
</blockquote>
<p>Neil Andrews, <em>Contract Law in Practice</em> (2021), page lvii.</p>
<blockquote>
<h4>Canada</h4>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>0856464 BC Ltd v Timber West Forest Corp (2014) BCSC 2433</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>Westpoint Management Ltd v Chocolate Factory Apartments Ltd [2007] NSWCA 253</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>Whiten v Pilot Insurance Co [2002] SCC 18</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<h4>New Zealand</h4>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>Bahramitash v Kumar [2005] NZSC 39</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Fletcher Challenge Ltd [2001] NZCA 289</p>
</blockquote>
<p><em>Ibid</em>, page lviii.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <h3>Your examples are not neutral citations</h3>
<p><em>Gonzales v. Oregon</em>, <a href="https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep546/usrep546243/usrep546243.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">546 U.S. 243</a> (2006) and
<em>Castle Rock v. Gonzales</em>, 125 S.Ct. 2796 (2005) are not neutral citations because elements depend on the particular reporter series, rather than being neutral as to who has published.</p>
<p>These are citations to:</p>
<ul>
<li>The case found at <a href="https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep545/usrep545748/usrep545748.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">page 243 of volume 546</a> of the <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/USReports.aspx" rel="nofollow noreferrer">U.S. Reports</a> (the Court's official reporter), decided in 2006</li>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<li>The case found at page 2796 of Volume 125 of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Reporter_System" rel="nofollow noreferrer">West Publishing's Supreme Court Reporter</a>, decided in 2005 (and this decision is <em>also</em> reported in the U.S. Reports at <a href="https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep545/usrep545748/usrep545748.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">545 U.S. 748</a>)</li>
</ul>
<p>The court name is not separately mentioned because it is readily inferred from the reporters.</p>
<h3>Some courts <em>have</em> enabled / prescribed some form of neutral citation</h3>
<p>Federal and state courts in the U.S. do not uniformly provide their decisions with vendor-neutral citations, but many do provide and/or prescribe some method of citation that does not rely on proprietary reporters.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>The Illinois state court system has directed parties to cite Illinois state court decisions by <a href="https://ilcourtsaudio.blob.core.windows.net/antilles-resources/resources/2374deda-2eed-448e-8b4b-24a22a348f28/Rule%206.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">reference to the year, court level, and docket number</a>.</p>
<p>Several other states have adopted a more typical neutral citation system, using the year, court, and sequence number. This conforms with the approach <a href="https://www.aallnet.org/resources-publications/publications/universal-citation-guide/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">recommended by the American Association of Law Libraries</a> and is consistent with Canadian, N.Z., and U.K. practice. E.g. <a href="https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1110&amp;context=law-lib_borgeson" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Oklahoma and North Dakota</a>:</p>
<ul>
<li>1995 OK 11</li>
<li>1997 ND 15</li>
</ul>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 2: <p>American courts do not have any officially prescribed standard for citing cases.</p>
<p>The citations we use don't usually include a judgment number, but I'd say they're still pretty straightforward in most cases. Generally, most citations will be laid out to include the following information:</p>
<ul>
<li>The name of the case (usually as <em>Plaintiff v. Defendant</em>),</li>
<li>A reference to the volume and page of the reporter publishing the decision,</li>
<li>The court issuing the decision (if necessary),</li>
<li>The year of the decision.</li>
</ul>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<li>A reference to the volume and page of the reporter publishing the decision,</li>
<li>The court issuing the decision (if necessary),</li>
<li>The year of the decision.</li>
</ul>
<p>Looking at <a href="https://casetext.com/case/gonzales-v-oregon-4" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>Gonzales v. Oregon</em>, 546 U.S. 243 (2006)</a>, for instance, the citation doesn't <em>say</em> that it's a SCOTUS decision, but it also doesn't need to because it's a citation to Volume 546, Page 243 of the U.S. Reports, which publishes decisions exclusively from the U.S. Supreme Court. But decisions from the circuit courts of appeals don't have their own individual reporters, so you would need to identify which court issued the decision when citing the case that <em>Gonzales</em> affirmed, e.g., <a href="https://casetext.com/case/oregon-v-ashcroft" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>Oregon v. Ashcroft</em>, 368 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2004)</a></p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>The most widely accepted standard for citations -- whether to court decisions or previous court filings or external sources -- is the <a href="https://www.legalbluebook.com/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Bluebook</a>, and &quot;baffling&quot; would be a generally accepted description of that standard. I imagine you've heard of the criticisms from <a href="https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/want_to_even_out_lawyer_quality_and_end_contingent_fees_adopt_a_uniform_pay" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Judge Posner</a>, who has written repeatedly on this topic.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: Does a real estate buyer have recourse to recover fees related to an offer due to seller not disclosing probate period?


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Body: <p>I live in the state of Massachusetts and recently put in an offer for a home.
The seller is actually 4 owners for which one passed recently (last year).<br />
During title search, it was found that there was a probate period with unknown period of time to clear. In fact, my attorney brought it up to the Seller team and apparently they had not even submitted a &quot;S petition&quot; to amend the title yet. This probate period was not disclosed to us in writing and in fact, we agreed to a closing date within the normal ~1.5 months from initial offer.</p>
<p>From the buyer perspective, I would have not put in an offer had I known this could potentially drag on.  I already accrued fees for attorney, appraisal and inspection. If I walk away from the deal, those are lost.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>For now, we are looking to salvage the situation by giving them 6 months to clear probate. Clearly, this ties my deposit and I cannot put an offer for other potential houses. But should the worst situation arise (where I have to pull out of the deal), my direct question is whether I have enough standing to pursue them for the expense I incurred due to their error and actually win?</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <p>There is no general duty to disclose in real estate sales, except as statutorily mandated. The burden is on the buyer to ask the relevant questions, and not over-interpret what was said. In Massachusetts, there is actually a law stating that non-disclosure is legally irrelevant <a href="https://malegislature.gov/Laws/GeneralLaws/PartI/TitleXV/Chapter93/Section114" rel="nofollow noreferrer">in certain cases</a> (e.g. &quot;was the site of a felony or suicide&quot;). There are statutes requiring a person to disclose known lead paint and septic systems, otherwise there is no duty on the seller to disclose, instead the law follows the doctrine <em>caveat emptor</em>. Therefore, you must first ask, and not assume anything about the property or the title.</p>


Tags: contract-law, real-estate, probate, homeownership


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: GDPR: Can a city request deletion of all personal data that uses a certain domain for logins?


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Body: <p>A <strong>city</strong> in Finland asked me to delete <strong>all</strong> data for <strong>everyone</strong> whose login uses a certain domain. The domain contains &quot;edu&quot; in it and &quot;oppilas&quot; (which translates to &quot;student&quot;), and my website doesn't have data that anyone is going to mind losing, so I have already deleted that data, however, I have some concerns about what to do in the future if the decision is less easy:</p>
<ul>
<li>I'm a little worried that I shouldn't allow certain domains to be used as logins in the first place, especially ones that might be school related</li>
<li>I'd like to have some idea for future reference if there's any case where the GDPR would require me to comply with such a request</li>
<li>I want to figure out the right way to reply to emails like this one</li>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<li>I want to figure out the right way to reply to emails like this one</li>
<li>Is deleting the data actually more of a legal liability than not deleting it in some cases? (People shouldn't be able to delete other people's accounts.)</li>
</ul>
<p>I searched quite a bit but couldn't find anyone discussing the possibility of any of these things:</p>
<ul>
<li>an organization asking for the deletion of personal data</li>
<li>requests to delete data for more than one person</li>
<li>the GDPR saying anything about school-related domain names</li>
</ul>
<p>What makes this request seem wrong is probably pretty obvious, judging from the very straightforward wording of the GDPR:</p>
<ul>
<li>an individual can ask for deletion of their own data, and a guardian acting on a specific child's behalf can ask for data deletion, but there is no mention of any other situation</li>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<ul>
<li>an individual can ask for deletion of their own data, and a guardian acting on a specific child's behalf can ask for data deletion, but there is no mention of any other situation</li>
<li>you can (should?) ask for a reasonable amount of identification for the individuals, but in a case like this, it would require the city to identify all logins and prove that they are acting on behalf of all these people, which would, itself seem like a breach of privacy (unless they have a specific list for the ones visiting my website)</li>
</ul>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
</ul>
<p>This seems like a pretty blatant misuse of the GDPR even if it is well-intentioned, and I'm wondering if I should notify some authority about it. I wouldn't bother if it were a teacher or some other small group, but it's the government of a city with a population of tens of thousands of people, and it seems like they're just blasting this request out to every website that has been visited by their users, without even providing a way for anyone to verify that they are, in fact, government officials.</p>
<p>I should note that I'm a US citizen living in the US and I'm the sole proprietor of the website, and the website doesn't pertain to the EU specifically in any way, which, as far as I understand it, means the GDPR doesn't require me to do anything about deleting private data, even by their own standards. However, I'd still <strong>prefer</strong> to comply with it even if I don't really have to.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <blockquote>
<p>Can a city request deletion of all personal data that uses a certain domain for logins?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Well, they <em>can</em>, but they have no legal backing to make it happen. Their chances of succeeding are about as good as me requesting a Ferrari, a Yacht and a Mansion. I can make that request. People will laugh. I will not get it.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I'm a little worried that I shouldn't allow certain domains to be used as logins in the first place, especially ones that might be school related</p>
</blockquote>
<p>You have no way to know who owns what email address. And it's none of your business. Your only interest should be in whether the address is owned by the person that is creating the account. You probably already do that by sending a confirmation link to the email address when people sign up.</p>
<blockquote>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<blockquote>
<p>I'd like to have some idea for future reference if there's any case where the GDPR would require me to comply with such a request</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The only way you have to comply with such a request is if the owner can prove their identity. As far as I understood, the &quot;Finnish city&quot; was three degrees away from that. They could not provide any proof they are who they said they are, they could not provide a finite list of accounts they claimed to own and they could not even provide proof they own those accounts. They literally just wrote an email with zero legal meaning.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I want to figure out the right way to reply to emails like this one</p>
</blockquote>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<blockquote>
<p>I want to figure out the right way to reply to emails like this one</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The correct way to handle this is have a feature on your website where the account owner can delete their own account. GDPR compliant. Then you make a text template explaining how to use that feature and reply with that template to every request, no matter how stupid (like this case) they are.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>If they cannot identify themselves to you by proving they have access to their &quot;own&quot; email, they have no business wasting your time. Legally, they <em>could</em> provide you with a different method of identification. In case of a Finnish school, that would probably need to be power of attorney from all children's legal guardians and a specific way to identify the accounts that is consistent with the data given (for example if they entered their full name and address on your website). You would probably in your rights to demand a certified translation if it's all in Finnish. Apart from the fact that you as a private US citizen have no real means to check the validity of all that paperwork, personally, if I saw hundreds of pages of certified translated paperwork, I would probably just comply. Not sure it it were actually enough, but it certainly gets an A+ for effort to delete data from a private website. But a real lawyer might give better advice with a real case on their


key: chroma:document
string_value:
just comply. Not sure it it were actually enough, but it certainly gets an A+ for effort to delete data from a private website. But a real lawyer might give better advice with a real case on their hands.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<blockquote>
<p>Is deleting the data actually more of a legal liability than not deleting it in some cases? (People shouldn't be able to delete other people's accounts.)</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Indeed. You should not delete people's data because a random punk on the internet sent you an email. You need to identify who the request is from and if they are allowed to make such a request.</p>
<p>Whether you have a legal duty to actually <em>keep</em> data, is up to you or your lawyer to find out. It depends on your data and laws. It is perfectly legal to make a website with a textfield that deletes any data you enter after a second. Destruction of data you own is only a problem if you break other laws with it. For example the IRS might not be amused if you destroyed invoices and other proof of taxable income.   &quot;Some dude claimed I must in an email&quot; is <em>not</em> going to fly with them.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>That said, again, please, <em>identify</em> who you deal with, find out if their claim is <em>valid</em>. Don't do stuff because random internet punks write you an email. Because the next mail you get, will be from a Nigerian Prince. Please wisen up before opening that one. People on the internet, through stupidity or malice, might not have your best interests at heart. Don't believe random emails.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 2: <h2>A school may be a legal guardian</h2>
<p>At common law (so not necessarily Finnish law), a school stands <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/In_loco_parentis" rel="nofollow noreferrer">in loco parentis</a> - “in the place of the parent”. That gives them the legal authority, in some circumstances, to act as a legal guardian of their students. Probably including declining with what is done with a school issued email. I don’t know of any case law on this point.</p>
<p>However, this just moves the goalposts because it is likely that staff emails are indistinguishable from student emails and the school’s authority to act as guardian only extends to the students, not the staff.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>As others have said, the GDPR only <em>requires</em> you to honour data deletion requests in certain circumstances, including that you have identified that the person requesting the deletion is who they say they are and has the authority to make the request. While you have identified an issue with this specific request, it appears that you have not addressed this for <em>any</em> request - you need to fix that.</p>
<p>When you can delete data <em>without</em> such a request will depend on the terms of service you have with your customers. The GDPR requires that you only keep data as long as necessary so you should have a data retention policy and procedures to purge no longer needed data anyway.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>The GDPR almost surely applies to you. It only doesn’t if you are conducting a hobby (which doesn’t seem to be the case), or your operations do not include Europe. “[T]he website doesn't pertain to the EU specifically in any way” is not enough - it needs to be specifically targeted at somewhere not in the EU. A worldwide operation is covered by the GDPR if part of it is available in the EU. For example, Amazon has an EU based subsidiary, partly for tax reasons but also so Amazon US is not operating the EU; Amazon Europe has to comply with the GDPR, Amazon US does not keep PII of people in Europe nor sell into Europe so it doesn’t have to comply.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 3: <p>Probably a complicated situation, which may also depend on where in Europe that school is.</p>
<p>First assumption, all the email accounts in question are actually administered by the school and belong to students. Assuming the city &quot;owns&quot; the domain, that's probably the case.</p>
<p>When a school or a teacher <em>instruct</em> a student to go to your site, they should probably have a data processing agreement with you before they do, which would spell out that the school does own the data (and that the school admin can order the deletion). Since you were surprised, I'll assume that no such agreement exists.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>So now you are holding PII which is associated with a number of data subjects (the students) who used their school accounts to log in, but who may or may not have been using them for educational purposes only. If the data subjects are minors, you would have to deal with their legal representatives, which could (for these purposes) either be the parents or the school officials.</p>
<p>So you probably need a specialist lawyer to find out. (I also agree with <a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/questions/93586/gdpr-can-a-city-request-deletion-of-all-personal-data-that-uses-a-certain-domai/93591#93591">nvoigt</a> that you need to authenticate who asks what, but I'm less dismissive of the possibility that you <em>do</em> have to do as they ask. After you ascertain that the mail accounts are administered by the school, and what Finland has to say about students' rights to their own data.)</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 4: <p>That could be a false flag - the writer may not even be from that city, and may have gotten everyone's data deleted as a prank.  So this could be a social hack by malicious actors.</p>
<p>I would give the email writer the following instructions:</p>
<ol>
<li>Lock the account holder out of their email address.</li>
<li>When that is done, let me know and I will send a message to each email address with an authorization code.  (just basically rand().)</li>
<li>Open those emails with your administrative powers, and send me back the authorization codes I emailed to those addresses.</li>
</ol>
<p>If they quarrel with it, say &quot;Sorry, due to GPDR I can't help you.&quot;</p>
<p>That would prove they own the email address.  It's hardly a perfect solution - really, you should provide a &quot;GPDR Delete&quot; function for the end user... and make the city log into each student email, take control of the account using &quot;Forgot Password&quot; and then do the delete.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: What are the consequences of evicting a licensee without giving them “reasonable notice”?

Question Body: <p>Bob is a licensee (ie non-tenant occupier). Because he isn’t a tenant, a possession order is not legally required to evict him.</p>
<p>Instead, he may be peaceably evicted upon “reasonable notice.” Reasonable notice depends on the circumstances of each case, but often equates to a single rental period.</p>
<p>Suppose he is evicted without any notice, for example comes home one day to find someone else living in his place, without any notice or explanation.</p>
<p>If he was a tenant, he would have a host of civil remedies available to him in this situation, but does the situation differ since he is not? And, if so, how?</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <p>As this is a residential licence, Bob is protected by <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1977/43/section/1?timeline=false" rel="nofollow noreferrer">section 1</a> Protection from Eviction Act 1977:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(2) If any person unlawfully deprives the residential occupier of any premises of his occupation of the premises or any part thereof, or attempts to do so, he shall be guilty of an offence unless he proves that he believed, and had reasonable cause to believe, that the residential occupier had ceased to reside in the premises.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>For clarity:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>A license agreement provides a person to use or occupy property without acquiring the rights of a tenant. Because of this, granting a license rather than a tenancy may seem appealing to landlords, however, simply labelling an agreement as a license does not make it a license.</p>
<p>...</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>...</p>
<p>A license agreement can be terminated by the serving of a notice to quit which in most cases must provide no less than 28 days notice<sup>1</sup>. However, where there is a breach of the agreement by the licensee, the agreement may provide for less than 28 days notice to be given.</p>
<p><sup>1</sup><a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1977/43/section/5?timeline=false" rel="nofollow noreferrer">section 5(1A)</a></p>
<p><a href="https://landlordadvice.co.uk/helpful-information/eviction/license-agreement/" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>Source</em></a></p>
</blockquote>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: How can sound assets be &quot;license and royalty free&quot; but also &quot;non-commercial use only&quot;?

Question Body: <p>MAGIX likes to sell sound packages that they proclaim as &quot;license-free and royalty free content for non-commercial use only&quot; (e.g <a href="https://www.cloudswave.com/creative-tools/s/magix-soundpool-dvd-collection-20/compare/magix-video-slideshow-sound-archive-8/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://www.cloudswave.com/creative-tools/s/magix-soundpool-dvd-collection-20/compare/magix-video-slideshow-sound-archive-8/</a> ). Sometimes they offer products that they advertise as &quot;completely license and royalty free&quot; but if you inquire they still tell you they are for non-commercial use only. I would have thought that prohibiting commercial use inherently requires a license, and that &quot;license-free&quot; inherently meant that the content could be used commercially. Is my assumption incorrect?</p>


Answer 1: <p>They can't.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <p>They can't.</p>

<p>It seems that what is going on here is that someone doesn't actually understand what "license" means.</p>


Answer 2: <p>If it's license free, that means you can do exactly what copyright law allows, and nothing else. Which in practice means not much. If you want to use these sounds on your non-commercial website for example, then you need a license that allows you use your non-commercial website.</p>
<p>Now their website might contain a promise that they will never, ever sue you for copyright infringement for non-commercial use, and that they will never ask you for royalties for such use, and that might be enough in court to stop them from getting any damages for copyright infringement.</p>
<p>And prohibiting commercial use doesn't require a license. Allowing non-commercial use <em>requires</em> a license.</p>


Tags: licensing


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: May my business notify Christians that we won&#39;t serve them?

Question Body: <p>Hypothetically, suppose that I own and operate a small business in Colorado which expresses artwork for clients and that I do not want to express Christian concepts because I am a Satanist. Might it be lawful to make a public notice that I will not offer business to folks who want me to express Christian concepts? Is it any better/worse if I note that I will accept Christian clients as long as they don't ask for anything Christian to be expressed in the product?</p>
<p>For context, I'm attempting to understand the conjunction of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Masterpiece_Cakeshop_v._Colorado_Civil_Rights_Commission" rel="noreferrer"><em>Masterpiece</em></a> and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/303_Creative_LLC_v._Elenis" rel="noreferrer"><em>303 Creative</em></a>.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <p>Probably not. The impediment is the claim that you have a genuinely held religious belief. Changing the context a tiny bit, your employer is statutorily required to make an accommodation for the requirements of your religion, therefore they cannot fire you for refusing to work on the Sabbath, unless it would impose an unreasonable burden on them. If they fire you, you complain to the EOC and the EOC sanctions them. The employer's defense would be that you did not request a reasonable religion-based accommodation (you failed to explain that this was about Sabbath). The employer does not scrutinize the validity of your claim (does not demand proof of what your religion requires).</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>In your planned announcement, you are not requesting a statutory accommodation from the government, analogous to requesting an accommodation from an employer, you are offering a defense in the case the government takes action against you for violating the law. There is a statutory exception to the prohibition against employment discrimination based on religion, that (roughly speaking) a church is not required to hire a rabbi instead of a mullah to deliver sermons. There is no statutory exception w.r.t. public accommodations and religious discrimination.
Therefore, to implement your plan, you would have to have the law or the EOC's interpretation of it overturned as unconstitutional.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Therefore, to implement your plan, you would have to have the law or the EOC's interpretation of it overturned as unconstitutional.</p>
<p>To succeed in your argument, you would have to show that the law unconstitutionally restricts your free exercise of your religion. One part would be a demonstration that your religion prohibits... The least likely scenario is that your religion prohibits doing business with a person outside of your religion. I don't of any religion that maintains a requirement of absolute religious segregation, but that is hypothetically a path to argue – that you will burn in hell forever if you do business with a Christian, or a Muslim. I am maximally skeptical that the courts would ever take such a claim seriously.</p>
<p>A more likely possibility would involve &quot;compelled speech&quot; as well, where you are forced under the law to express a viewpoint that contradicts your fundamental religious beliefs. You cannot be compelled by law to express a viewpoint.


key: chroma:document
string_value:
What is less clear is what constitutes expressing a viewpoint, see <a href="http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/compelledspeech.htm" rel="noreferrer">this</a>. For example, there is a federal law withholding federal funds from schools which discriminate against military recruiters. Some law schools argued in  <a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/547/47/" rel="noreferrer">Rumsfield v Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights</a> that allowing military recruiters amounts to forcing the schools to express a viewpoint, but the court held that &quot;the Solomon Amendment regulates conduct, not speech&quot;.</p>
<p>The upshot of <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/21-476_c185.pdf" rel="noreferrer">303 Creative LLC v. Elenis</a> is that


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>The upshot of <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/21-476_c185.pdf" rel="noreferrer">303 Creative LLC v. Elenis</a> is that
&quot;The First Amendment prohibits Colorado from forcing a website designer to create expressive designs speaking messages with which the designer disagrees&quot;. A proposal to refuse to service Christians plainly does not fall within the penumbra of that ruling. Nor does a refusal to print books containing religious material (which you already created). You have to cater to Christians, but you do not have to create Christian messages. You could draw a line between a simple ISP who you pay to make available your religious website (you create it), versus hiring a company to <em>design</em> the website, which clearly involves &quot;expression&quot;.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>The issue is simplified if you don't make a  claim based on a specific belief system, instead rely on simple &quot;compelled speech&quot; doctrine. General beliefs do not enjoy the same &quot;Free Exercise&quot; protections that religions enjoy. What matters is what you are &quot;expressing&quot;, not what you are doing (like, printing).</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: Does PHI need to contain health information PLUS one of the 18 identifiers?

Question Body: <p>I've worked for various healthcare companies and found there's a wide range of interpretation to what protected HIPAA data is. It should be more cut and dry, but in actual practice it seems to be a little confusing.</p>

<p>My questions:</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<ol>
<li><p>Can one of the 18 identifiers be PHI by itself, without having any medical information attached to it?   For example an first and last name from an EHR system.  I have always thought you need some sort of medical information attached with the 18 identifiers to make it PHI, otherwise without the health information, it's PII. So a first and last name with the diagnosis of diabetes is PHI, but my first and last name is not PHI, only PII.</p></li>
<li><p>Does it matter where the information originated from?  For example if a person inputs their health information into a healthcare website, say weight and medical condition, is that different from a doctor inputting that same data into their EHR? </p></li>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<li><p>The definition states that it's protected if the covered entity receives the information - but what if the patient gives health information (let's say weight and medical conditions) to a downstream business associate (with a signed BAA)? I thought HITECH extended liability to downstream associates as if they were the covered entity.</p></li>
</ol>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p><em>Under HIPAA, protected health information is considered to be individually identifiable information relating to the past, present, or future health status of an individual that is created, collected, or transmitted, or maintained by a HIPAA-covered entity in relation to the provision of healthcare, payment for healthcare services, or use in healthcare operations (PHI healthcare business uses).
Health information such as diagnoses, treatment information, medical test results, and prescription information are considered protected health information under HIPAA, as are national identification numbers and demographic information such as birth dates, gender, ethnicity, and contact and emergency contact information. PHI relates to physical records, while ePHI is any PHI that is created, stored, transmitted, or received electronically.


key: chroma:document
string_value:
PHI only relates to information on patients or health plan members. It does not include information contained in educational and employment records, that includes health information maintained by a HIPAA covered entity in its capacity as an employer.
PHI is only considered PHI when an individual could be identified from the information. If all identifiers are stripped from health data, it ceases to be protected health information and the HIPAA Privacy Rule’s restrictions on uses and disclosures no longer apply.</em></p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <p><strong>Response to point 1:</strong></p>

<ol>
<li>Yes, it’s true that for information to be classified as PHI, PII must be attached to the health information. If there is no health-related information that could be past, present or, future with the PII, it is only Personally Identifiable Information. E.g. if there is a web page with details like First Name, Last Name, Mobile No and health report attached, then the system is considered and PHI/ePHI. Secondly, all the health records have PII for traceability purposes.</li>
<li>Secondly, First and Last Name also does not qualify to be PII, as it’s generic information. I can’t identify an individual basis First Name and Last Name; a 3rd attribute will be required.</li>
</ol>

<p><strong>Response to point 2:-</strong> 
1.  Not at all.
2.  PHI is classified based on the kind of information irrespective of who is entering the data, whether its Data Subject, Covered Entity or Data Processor/Business Associate.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p><strong>Response to Point 3:-</strong> 
1.    Even if the PHI is being collected by the Business Associate or downstream actors, it will still be classified as PHI. It is Covered Entities' responsibility to sign a Business Associate Agreement (BAA) with the Business Associate. The agreement should have the definition of the PHI for the understanding of all the affected parties.</p>


Tags: hipaa


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Body: <p>Around 10pm, I see red and blue lights through my window. I look outside, and I see 7 cop cars (and a bike) in front of my house. There are 8 cops standing around in a circle, laughing -- I'm concerned because I bought this (my first) home only months ago.</p>
<p>I go out and from a distance have the following dialogue:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>me: &quot;Is everything okay?&quot;</p>
<p>cop1: &quot;It's okay, was just a shark attack.&quot;</p>
<p>me: &quot;What?&quot;</p>
<p>cop2: &quot;We caught the bad guy.&quot;</p>
</blockquote>
<p>And they turned back around to their group, barring me from further conversation.</p>
<p>Did I just have a run-in with an arrogant group of officers, or am I in the wrong here? Can I legally pursue the question of &quot;Hey, what's happening here?&quot; Are they not required to inform me if I ask?</p>
<p><strong>Edit: I live in west Florida, if that's relevant. I could see it possibly being based on local laws?</strong></p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <p>You are allowed to ask the police whatever questions you like. There is an upper limit that you can't refuse to obey a lawful order on the premise that you want to ask a bunch of questions, but they don't seem to have ordered you to do anything, so you can ask away. They have no obligation to tell you anything or to be truthful, except for certain questions like "am I free to go" when you want to leave and are testing whether you are under arrest. Even then they don't have to answer your questions right away. The police can therefore ignore you, especially if you are asking curiosity questions. It might be that they are restricted from giving information in certain circumstances (pertaining to the privacy of others).</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>If there is an issue of legitimate concern (e.g. Little Billy has been beating up on cats again) and you feel that you need to know this, then you can request the police record on the matter. Certain information will probably be redacted under state law, but you could get a report that states that some [redacted] juvenile was beating up on animals. The Florida records law is one of the first in he nation, dating back to 1909. You can read <a href="http://myfloridalegal.com/webfiles.nsf/WF/KGRG-7Q2JHD/$file/LEO.pdf" rel="noreferrer">this</a>, to see if you think the circumstances match one of the exemptions, though all you have to do is make the request and be told that the record is exempt, then you will have some idea what was going on.</p>


Tags: united-states, police, florida


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: Is it legal to bill a company that made contact for a business proposal, then withdrew based on their policies that existed when they made contact?


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Body: <p>Based on a <a href="https://twitter.com/MahDryBread/status/1674078434178285575" rel="noreferrer">Twitter thread</a> from a mid sized YouTube personality:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I have been emailed MORE THAN 10 TIMES by a service I'd like to be sponsored with that I will not name<br />
Every time they email me, I say I'd love to work with them, then the middle men come back to me and say they don't work with gaming channels<br />
THEN WHY DID YOU EMAIL ME</p>
</blockquote>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Every time they email me, I say I'd love to work with them, then the middle men come back to me and say they don't work with gaming channels<br />
THEN WHY DID YOU EMAIL ME</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Would it be legal for this creator, or another creator, to stipulate on their contact information page that contacting them for a sponsorship deal when the contacting entity has policies that would make a sponsorship arrangement not possible, and then withdrawing that sponsorship offer when the creator replies with interest, incurs an automatic administrative fees invoice for wasting the creator's time? And would the company be legally obligated to pay that invoice?? I think I've heard a couple of stories about people who put a clause like that on their contact page, sent the invoice and had the company pay the invoice. I'm interested in Canadian, USA and Belgian/EU laws on the subject.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <p>If you have an agreement with a company that specifies &quot;you agree to give me something of value, in case I give you something of value&quot;, you have a contract. In order for there to be a contract, there has to be actual acceptance of the offer. You can put out on a web page some contract stating those terms, and if you get positive acceptance of the contract (hence the standard click-through technology), then as long as you have done the thing promised, you can bill them for doing the thing promised.</p>
<p>It's not clear what thing of value you are offering on the web page, since it's not &quot;doing actual work&quot;. Them sending you an email isn't you doing something. One thing you could do is block all incoming emails, and for money you agree to unblock emails from registered subscribers.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>Just announcing that you will bill anyone for emailing you does not create a contract, because the emailer need not have even seen your announcement. This is why e-contracts need a click-through button. It's legal to request money, but there is no legal obligation for them to comply. That will be $10, please.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 2: <p>In theory it is possible to actually bill them. Whether you can get paid is the other matter, and whether you want to go to court is again something very different.</p>
<p>Most people consider legally binding &quot;contract&quot; to be a lenghty text on paper, signed and stamped by representatives of parties involved. This is not entirely true. Most of the daily activities that involve exchanging money are also contracts, although in different form.</p>
<p>For example, the combination of the offer and acceptance of the said offer constitutes a legally binding contract. So for example, when you see a person with a hot dog cart with the advertisement &quot;hot dogs, $10&quot;, that's an offer. When you approach the person manning the cart and say &quot;I will have one&quot;, that is your acceptance of the contract.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>If you find stone in the said hot dog and break your tooth, that is breach of the contract, because the offer &quot;hot dogs $10&quot; clearly stipulates edible hot dogs, and the seller did not deliver promised goods. If you get your hot dog and run without paying, that is breach of the contract.</p>
<p>All of these can be legally enforced through courts.</p>
<p>Back to your case. If you carefully document their persistent offers and make sure they are not pranks, that they are clearly made by people with authority to offer you something, and you accept it each time, then perhaps you could build a legal case that would have some chance of succeeding to enforce their payment (of course you NEED to supply the services as well).</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: Can a previously binding precedent be overturned based on its rationale being outdated?

Question Body: <p>Al loses a case at first instance and appeals to some very high court if not all the way to last resort. The ultimate decision is made based on some rationale that appeals to common sense or general social conditions like an observation of what is socially typical. Or alternatively perhaps it is literally a ruling based on a determination what a “reasonable person” in a given scenario might do. Anyway, this becomes the prevalent legal regime for a certain type of case for 50 years, during which time society and culture progress and develop.</p>
<p>60 years later Bob loses a case on the basis of this precedent from a superior court 50 years ago.</p>
<p>Is it generally possible to argue to the court in which Bob finds himself that the rationale for the prevailing regime, laid down 60 years ago, is now outdated and thus inapplicable?</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <h2>An &quot;outdated rationale&quot; is one factor to be considered when overruling precedent.</h2>
<p>Yes. Precedent relies on respect for the principle of <em>stare decisis</em>, the idea that courts should stand by what they have already decided, and thus enforce similar outcomes for similarly situated individuals.</p>
<p>In the United States, the U.S. Supreme Court has established a test for when to ignore <em>stare decisis</em> and overturn precedent:</p>
<ol>
<li>the quality of the precedent's reasoning</li>
<li>the workability of the rule it established</li>
<li>the precedent's consistency with other related decisions</li>
<li>developments since the decision was handed down; and</li>
<li>reliance on the decision</li>
</ol>
<p><a href="https://casetext.com/case/janus-v-am-fedn-of-state-cnty-mun-emps-council-2#p2478" rel="noreferrer"><em>Janus v. AFSCME</em>, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2478-79 (2018)</a>.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
</ol>
<p><a href="https://casetext.com/case/janus-v-am-fedn-of-state-cnty-mun-emps-council-2#p2478" rel="noreferrer"><em>Janus v. AFSCME</em>, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2478-79 (2018)</a>.</p>
<p>Your question seems to most squarely implicate factor 4, i.e., when the Court decided <em>United States v. Al</em>, the state of the universe required Rule <em>X</em>, but the universe has now changed such that Rule <em>Y</em> makes more sense in <em>United States v. Bob</em>.</p>
<p>Establishing that fact alone may not be enough to justify overruling a precedent, but that fact will often also support the other factors, as well. Perhaps the quality of the precedent's reasoning is low because it failed to account for the possibility of the changes Bob is relying on. Perhaps those changes are so prevalant that they have rendered the precedent's rule unworkable. Perhaps the precedent is inconsistent with related decisions that have relied on those changes to establish their rules.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<h2>An outdated rationale was key to the decision to overrule <em>Quill</em></h2>
<p>Many precedents have been overruled based -- at least in part -- on that scenario. Probably the best recent example is <a href="https://casetext.com/case/south-dakota-v-wayfair-inc-2" rel="noreferrer"><em>South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.</em>, 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018)</a>, which overruled <a href="https://casetext.com/case/quill-corporation-v-north-dakota-heitkamp" rel="noreferrer"><em>Quill Corp. v. North Dakota</em>, 504 U.S. 298 (1992)</a> and <a href="https://casetext.com/case/national-bellas-hess-incorporated-v-department-of-revenue-of-state-of-illinois" rel="noreferrer"><em>Nat. Bellas Hess v. Dept. of Revenue</em>, 386 U.S. 753, 87 S. Ct. 1389 (1967)</a>, which held that states may not impose sales-tax collection obligations on a business based on its sales into the state, unless the business had a &quot;physical presence,&quot; such as an office, warehouse, or sales agents, in the state.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p><em>Bellas Hess</em> reached that decision based in large part on the administrative burdens businesses would encounter in trying to discern the sales tax rates applicable to every sale across the country. Doing so would require the seller to (1) know not only what state all their buyers live in, but also whether they were also subject to sales tax based on the county, city, school district, water district, etc., in which each one lived; and if so (2) determine whether their product was within the definition of a taxable good or service in each of those jurisdictions; and if so (3) calculate tax based on the current rates of each of those jurisdictions; and then (4) comply with each jurisdiction's reporting and recordkeeping requirements. In 1967, there was no practical way for remote sellers to carry on their business without incurring massive compliance costs.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>But when the Court heard <em>Wayfair</em> 50 years later, the same was no longer true. Although other factors also counseled in favor of setting aside <em>stare decisis</em>, <em>Wayfair</em> focused most of its attention on the technological changes that demanded a new rule, noting that everything had changed since <em>Quill</em> was decided.</p>
<p>On one hand, the importance and impact of remote sales had grown wildly:</p>
<ul>
<li>Internet access had grown from 2 percent of America to 89 percent.</li>
<li>Remote sales had grown from $180 billion annually to more than half a trillion dollars annually, with Amazon and other e-commerce platforms supplanting Wal-Mart stores and other brick-and-mortar sellers.</li>
<li>The loss of tax revenue from remote sales had grown from $3 billion to $33 billion.</li>
</ul>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<li>The loss of tax revenue from remote sales had grown from $3 billion to $33 billion.</li>
</ul>
<p>But while the ease and impact of making remote sales had been increasing, the states had seriously ameliorated the burden of collecting taxes on those sales. Many states had spent the last 15 years on the <a href="https://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/about-us/about-sstgb" rel="noreferrer">Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement</a>, collaborating to bring uniformity to their sales tax definitions, administration, and collection. And technological developments from companies like <a href="https://www.avalara.com/us/en/products/calculations.html" rel="noreferrer">Avalara</a> -- subsidized by the states -- had greatly reduced the burden of calculating the tax due on purchases anywhere in the country.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>Therefore, given &quot;the present realities of the interstate marketplace,&quot; the Court concluded that it must overrule its holdings from <em>Quill</em> and <em>Bellas Hess</em>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The real world implementation of Commerce Clause doctrines now makes it manifest that the physical presence rule as defined by <em>Quill</em> must give way to the far-reaching systemic and structural changes in the economy and many other societal dimensions caused by the Cyber Age. Though <em>Quill</em> was wrong on its own terms when it was decided in 1992, since then the Internet revolution has made its earlier error all the more egregious and harmful.</p>
</blockquote>
<p><a href="https://casetext.com/case/south-dakota-v-wayfair-inc-2#2097" rel="noreferrer"><em>South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.</em>, 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2097 (2018)</a>.</p>
<h2>Other cases</h2>
<p>Of course, this was not the first or only case to find that the rationale for a precedent was outdated. Others include:</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<h2>Other cases</h2>
<p>Of course, this was not the first or only case to find that the rationale for a precedent was outdated. Others include:</p>
<ul>
<li>“The limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples may long have seemed natural and just, but its inconsistency with the central meaning of the fundamental right to marry is now manifest.” <a href="https://casetext.com/case/obergefell-v-hodges" rel="noreferrer"><em>Obergefell v. Hodges</em>, 576 U.S. 644, 670-71 (2015)</a>, overruling
<a href="https://casetext.com/case/baker-v-nelson-3" rel="noreferrer"><em>Baker v. Nelson</em>, 409 U.S. 810 (1972)</a></li>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<a href="https://casetext.com/case/baker-v-nelson-3" rel="noreferrer"><em>Baker v. Nelson</em>, 409 U.S. 810 (1972)</a></li>
<li>&quot;The deficiencies in <em>Bowers</em> became even more apparent in the years following its announcement. [Bowers relied on the prevalance of similar laws in other states as a basis for upholding Georgia's anti-sodomy law, but] the 25 States with laws prohibiting the relevant conduct referenced in the <em>Bowers</em> decision are reduced now to 13, of which 4 enforce their laws only against homosexual conduct. <a href="https://casetext.com/case/lawrence-v-texas-6" rel="noreferrer"><em>Lawrence v. Texas</em>, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003)</a>, overruling <a href="https://casetext.com/case/bowers-v-hardwick#p192" rel="noreferrer"><em>Bowers v. Hardwick</em>, 478 U.S. 186, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986)</a></li>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<li>&quot;Experience in applying the doctrine of <em>Swift v. Tyson</em>, had revealed its defects, political and social; and the benefits expected to flow from the rule did not accrue.&quot; <a href="https://casetext.com/case/erie-co-v-tompkins" rel="noreferrer"><em>Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins</em>, 304 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1938)</a>, overruling <a href="https://casetext.com/case/swift-v-tyson" rel="noreferrer"><em>Swift v. Tyson</em>, 41 U.S. 1 (1842)</a>.</li>
<li>&quot;It is untenable to suggest these days that it would be a special hardship for each and every woman to perform jury service or that society cannot spare any women from their present duties.&quot; <a href="https://casetext.com/case/taylor-v-louisiana-2" rel="noreferrer"><em>Taylor v. Louisiana</em>, 419 U.S. 522, 533-35 (1975)</a>, overruling <a href="https://casetext.com/case/hoyt-v-state-of-florida#p62" rel="noreferrer"><em>Hoyt v. Florida</em>, 368 U.S. 57 (1961)</a>.</li>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<li>&quot;<em>Austin</em> is undermined by experience since its announcement. ... Rapid changes in technology—and the creative dynamic inherent in the concept of free expression—counsel against upholding a law that restricts political speech in certain media or by certain speakers. Today, 30–second television ads may be the most effective way to convey a political message. Soon, however, it may be that Internet sources, such as blogs and social networking Web sites, will provide citizens with significant information about political candidates and issues.&quot; <a href="https://casetext.com/case/citizens-united-v-federal-election-comn" rel="noreferrer"><em>Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n</em>, 558 U.S. 310, 364-65 (2010)</a>, overruling <a href="https://casetext.com/case/austin-v-michigan-chamber-of-commerce" rel="noreferrer"><em>Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce</em>, 494 U.S. 652, 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990)</a>.</li>
</ul>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 2: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/canada" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-canada-tooltip-container">canada</a></p>
<h3>Vertical <em>stare decisis</em></h3>
<p>Trial courts are generally bound by existing precedent from higher in the appellate hierarchy. This is the principle of <em>vertical stare decisis</em>.</p>
<p>However,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>a trial judge can consider and decide arguments based on Charter provisions that were not raised in the earlier case; this constitutes a new legal issue. Similarly, <strong>the matter may be revisited if new legal issues are raised as a consequence of significant developments in the law, or if there is a change in the circumstances or evidence that fundamentally shifts the parameters of the debate</strong></p>
<p><em>Canada v. Bedford</em>, 2013 SCC 72, para. 44.</p>
</blockquote>
<h3>Horizontal <em>stare decisis</em></h3>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p><em>Canada v. Bedford</em>, 2013 SCC 72, para. 44.</p>
</blockquote>
<h3>Horizontal <em>stare decisis</em></h3>
<p>As for when an apex or appellate court can deviate from its own previous holdings, this has not been squarely addressed by a majority of the Supreme Court, but see the dissent in <em>R. v. Kirkpatrick</em>, 2022 SCC 33. It observes that it is proper for the Court to overturn its own precedent when:</p>
<ol>
<li>The previous decision failed to regard binding authority or a relevant statute;</li>
<li>The decision has proven unworkable; or</li>
<li>The decision's rationale has been eroded by significant societal or legal change.</li>
</ol>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 3: <p>Yes.</p>
<p>In the U.S., for example, while the Supreme Court precedent is binding on all lower courts, it is not necessarily binding on SCOTUS itself.  Perhaps famously, SCOTUS overruled its previous decision of Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) and the &quot;separate but equal&quot; doctrine in Brown v. Board of Ed, which abolished the decision.</p>
<p>In First Amendment Law, the Supreme Court thrice changed precedent with respect to what qualifies as unprotected speech and when the state may restrict speech and under what conditions.</p>
<p>Further, Constitutional Amendments or Amendments to Laws in question can overrule the Supreme Court as precedent is interpretation of statutory laws.  If the law changes and the change is valid, then the decision may no longer hold as it is no longer applicable.</p>


Tags: common-law, appeal, precedent, reasonableness


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: Final Income tax Return due to death

Question Body: <p>If a person dies in 2023 and he has significant income in 2023 he has to file an income tax return. Would that income tax return cover the entire year or would it just cover Jan 1 to the date of death? Could it be done either way?</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/united-states" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-united-states-tooltip-container">united-states</a></p>
<h3>Income Taxation At Death</h3>
<p><em>Final Income Tax Returns Of Decedents</em></p>
<p>The return covers income from the start of the tax year (usually, but not always the calendar year, other elections are possible) until the date of death for the decedent who is unmarried at the time of death or does not file a joint tax return in the final return at death. It is usually reported on IRS Form 1040 for the decedent and prepared by their executor or personal representative.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>When the final return is a joint income tax return filed, usually on IRS Form 1040, by a surviving widow or widower, it includes the decedent's income from the start of the tax year to the date of death, and the widow or widowers income for the entire year (assuming that the survivor lives through the end of the tax year, if not, it is filed by the surviving spouse's executor or personal representative and includes the income through date of death for each spouse).</p>
<p>Note that sometimes in addition to a final income tax return, income tax returns for years during which a decedent was alive the whole year have also not been filed on the date of death. In those cases, income tax returns for those years have to be filed as well as the income tax return for the year of death.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>For example, suppose that someone died on September 2023 after having received an extension of time until October to file their 2022 income tax return, and this person earned substantial income in 2022 and 2023. Then, the executor or personal representative or surviving spouse needs to file a final tax return for all of 2022 and another final tax return for the partial year of 2023.</p>
<p><em>Income Taxes On Estates</em></p>
<p>Income earned after the date of death from a decedent's assets or contract rights is reported on the estate tax return (IRS Form 1041).</p>
<p>These returns must be filed until the decedent ceases to earn income in the decedent's name or the name of the decedent's estate, possibly for decades in the case of estates where there is a large continuing royalty income that is not assigned to someone else, for example.</p>
<p><em>Income In Respect Of A Decedent</em></p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p><em>Income In Respect Of A Decedent</em></p>
<p>Income earned before the date of death but received after the date of death is called income in respect of a decedent and is reported on the income tax return of the first person to receive that income after the date of death.</p>
<p>Examples of income in respect of a decedent (IRD) include tax deferred retirement account income, and income from a job where the work is done before death and the payment arrives after death for some reason.</p>
<p><em>Capital Gains Taxation At Death</em></p>
<p>But, keep in mind that unrealized capital gains in property at death are not taxed even if the property is later sold at a price in excess of its pre-death basis for capital gains tax purposes (i.e. for more than its purchase price, less depreciation, plus capital improvements, plus certain other adjustments especially in pass though entity ownership interests).</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>Property sold after death is taxed at the sales prices less fair market value as of date of death plus or minus post-death adjustments to capital gains tax basis (with certain losses which would have been gains but for the death disallowed).</p>
<p><em>State and Local Income Taxes</em></p>
<p>Note that all of the above pertains to federal income taxes (often there would be final state and local income taxes as well).</p>
<h3>Footnote On Transfer Taxation</h3>
<p>There is a separate tax called the &quot;federal estate tax&quot; that is due on some high net worth people when they die based upon their net worth at death with various exemptions and adjustments that is filed on IRS Form 706 within nine months of the date of death unless an extension of time is obtained. For an individual who has made no gift taxable gifts prior to death, the first $12 million or so of net worth is exempt from estate taxation on Form 706.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>Federal estate taxation on Form 706 is completely different from Federal income taxation of estate on Form 1041, which is an income tax, just like Form 1040, but for dead people.</p>
<p>The Federal Estate Tax is part of a group of &quot;transfer taxes&quot; that also includes the Federal Gift Tax (on certain large gifts made during life) and the Federal Generation Skipping Transfer Tax (which imposes additional taxes in lieu of gift and estate taxes on transfers made to grandchildren or more remote descendants in an effort to reduce gift and estate taxes). Sometimes the death of a person will trigger a generation skipping transfer tax liability for a trust of which the decedent was a beneficiary prior to death under complicated rules beyond the scope of this answer.</p>
<p>State inheritance taxes used to be common in addition to the federal estate tax, but all or all but a handful of state have now abolished them.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: Asset protection trusts and death of the beneficiary

Question Body: <p>It is my understanding that an asset protection trust cannot allow the beneficiary to specify where the money goes after the beneficiary dies. That is, it cannot give the beneficiary a general power of appointment after the beneficiary dies. That is the trust must irrevocable specify where the money goes after the beneficiary dies. Am I right about this?</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <p>You are wrong about this.</p>
<p>An irrevocable asset protection trust can (and often does) contain a &quot;special power of appointment&quot; that a beneficiary can exercise.</p>
<p>A special power of appointment is a right to say who gets trust assets that forbids the person using it to distribute to themselves, their creditors, their estate, or the creditors of their estate.</p>
<p>In the real world, there must also be a showing that the special power of appointment can't be used (or at least, will not be used) in a way that circumvents these limitations as part of a larger plan (e.g. by making a distribution to a spouse who tacitly agrees to use the money to pay the power of appointment holder's creditors, or if two parallel beneficiaries use their powers of appointment to make parallel distributions to each other).</p>
<p>Some special powers of appointment are open ended, others have limitations.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>Some special powers of appointment are open ended, others have limitations.</p>
<p>For example, a power of appointment allowing someone to decide which charity trust assets go to at their death would be common.</p>
<p>Powers of appointment allowing the holder to decide who among the grantor/settlor's descendants gets the trust assets, in what amounts, on what terms, would also be common.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: Buying a house from a trust that you own

Question Body: <p>Suppose that person X is the beneficiary and the sole trustee of an irrevocable asset protection trust. He is not the grantor of the trust. The trust has stocks, bonds and an house in it. Person X has the right to take assets from the trust. That is, if he wanted to he could just transfer the house to himself. Can person X buy the house from the trust at fair market value?</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <p>The primary question is why the trustee is disposing of the asset at all. The trustee has a particular fiduciary duty (we haven't seen the document so we have no idea what that duty is). It could be justified because, for example, the grantor needs cash for a brain operation. Self-dealing (acting in one's own interest, which is a conflict of interest), is prohibited for a trustee. With real estate, &quot;fair market value&quot; is a fluid concept, but within limits one can determine that a sale (to self) at $900,000 undervalued the house and that a sale to another would have garnered $1,100,000, therefore this would be an illegal self-dealing. However, the simple act of a trustees purchasing an asset from a trust that he is the trustee of is not categorially prohibited.</p>


Tags: united-states, trusts-and-estates


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: If a court witness self-implicates are they automatically charged?

Question Body: <p>If a witness under oath in court gives evidence that reveals they have committed a previously unknown crime or offence, are they automatically charged or is there another process that may or may not be followed before they are charged? They don't have an explicit immunity agreement, they have just revealed evidence that implicates them. The crime or offence doesn't have to be the one before the court.</p>

<p>An example from TV: A man is asked how he was in a position to witness the assault. He says, "I was in my garden at the time ritually slaughtering a goat." He comes from a country where ritually slaughtering goats is done by civilised people and he genuinely doesn't realise that it's illegal in this country. Nobody could anticipate that he would say that in advance and warn him not to. Would he be automatically charged or would it be discretionary?</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>I am particularly interested in Australian courts.</p>


Answer 1: <p>In the US, they would <em>not</em> be automatically prosecuted.  The prosecutor would have to find out about the testimony, decide to prosecute, and go through all the normal processes they otherwise would, but they have an additional piece of evidence.  Per the 5th Amendment to the US Constitution, a witness cannot be forced to answer a question that would incriminate them.  If the question was objected to on this ground and the objection overruled, the witness' answer would not be admissible against that witness at trial, and the prosecutor would have to prove the case using other evidence. </p>


Answer 2: <p>It's <a href="http://www.judcom.nsw.gov.au/publications/benchbks/criminal/privilege_against_self-incrimination.html" rel="nofollow">complicated</a>.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 2: <p>It's <a href="http://www.judcom.nsw.gov.au/publications/benchbks/criminal/privilege_against_self-incrimination.html" rel="nofollow">complicated</a>.</p>

<p>In NSW, Part 3.10 Div 2 of the Evidence Act 1995 grants a privilege against self-incrimination on the ground that the evidence may tend to prove that the witness has committed an offence against, or arising under, an Australian law or a law of a foreign country, or is liable to a civil penalty. </p>

<p>Note that the privilege does not apply to protect you against civil claims by a third-party: you can't claim the privilege to protect yourself from being sued; it only serves to protect you from criminal charges or civil penalties by the state.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>Where it appears to the court that a question may lead to self-incrimination the judge should recuse the jury and advise you of your rights. If they don't do this then the testimony is inadmissible, however, if the court couldn't foresee the incrimination the testimony is admissible e.g. Q: "Where were you on August 12, 2014?" A: "I was murdering my wife."</p>

<p>So, now that you know your rights you can:</p>

<ul>
<li>Choose to answer without objection</li>
<li>Object, in which case the judge will decide if you have reasonable grounds

<ul>
<li>If the judge decides you don't not have reasonable grounds, you have to answer the question; the testimony can be used against you. Obviously, if you can't show reasonable grounds then it can't be too incriminating, can it?</li>
<li>If the judge decides you do have reasonable grounds, and the offence is under NSW, ACT or Commonwealth law (only):


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<ul>
<li>you can choose to answer it willingly and you will get a certificate which protects you from that testimony or any evidence directly or indirectly arising from it.</li>
<li>if the judge believes it is in the interests of justice that you answer, you can be forced to and you get the same certificate but if your evidence is false they will throw the book at you.</li>
</ul></li>
<li>If the judge decides you do have reasonable grounds, and the offence is under a jurisdiction other than NSW, ACT or Commonwealth law:

<ul>
<li>you may choose to answer and, if you do, the testimony can be used against you</li>
</ul></li>
</ul></li>
</ul>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 3: <p>No. In the common law world, conviction of a criminal offence can only occur after a judicial process which starts with a charge laid by the prosecution. The decision to lay a charge is never automatic and involves the exercise of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prosecutorial_discretion" rel="nofollow noreferrer">prosecutorial discretion</a>.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>The other answers have explained the privilege against <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-incrimination" rel="nofollow noreferrer">self-incrimination</a>. While this is an important privilege, it is not uncommon for witnesses to waive it and give incriminating evidence. For example, an accomplice may give evidence against a co-accused in the hope of receiving a lighter sentence, even if that evidence is not important enough for the authorities to induce it with an <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legal_immunity" rel="nofollow noreferrer">immunity from prosecution</a>. Or a defendant facing serious charges might explain apparently inculpatory evidence by admitting responsibility for a less serious offence which has not been charged and is not available as an <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lesser_included_offense" rel="nofollow noreferrer">alternative verdict</a>. As suggested in the question, the admission might also be incidental and not understood by the


key: chroma:document
string_value:
rel="nofollow noreferrer">alternative verdict</a>. As suggested in the question, the admission might also be incidental and not understood by the witness to be incriminating.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>If the authorities choose to prosecute the witness, what the witness said in the previous court proceedings is an <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Declaration_against_interest" rel="nofollow noreferrer">admission against interest</a>. It is admissible in the same way as a voluntary confession outside the courtroom. Although the fact that it was made on oath may mean that it carries more weight, it is not conclusive. The witness might choose to give different evidence in their defence – “I was lying then, but I’m telling the truth now.”</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>The exercise of prosecutorial discretion depends on the overall strength of the case against the witness, including the evidence of their previous admission. It would also depend on the seriousness of the admitted offence and any applicable statute of limitations. A less serious or historical offence is unlikely to be of interest to the parties in court and may never come to the attention of the prosecuting authorities. More serious offences are likely to be referred to the police for further investigation and prosecution.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 4: <p>Not sure about Australia, but protection against this is a constitutional right under the <em>Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms</em>. Most notably, §13:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Self-crimination</p>
<ol start="13">
<li>A witness who testifies in any proceedings has the right not to have any incriminating evidence so given used to incriminate that witness in any other proceedings, except in a prosecution for perjury or for the giving of contradictory evidence.</li>
</ol>
</blockquote>
<p>Unless you are charged with perjury, which can be summed up by intentionally lying to a court of law, the Crown can not charge you for a crime that you may give rise to, provided that the testimony is yours. It might raise an eyebrow among police services, but that testimony that you provide in someone else's trial cannot be used against you.</p>


Tags: criminal-law, evidence, rules-of-court, self-incrimination


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: Are there any non-conventional sources of law?

Question Body: <p>The usual sources of law are specific laws created through a legislature and the executive, but are there any sources of law that aren't dependent on an organization or polity?</p>
<p>For example, something like customary law, but broader.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <p>There is no one answer, but here are some examples.</p>
<p>India is famous for deriving general principles of more important constitutional law concepts that can be used to find constitutional amendments to be unconstitutional.</p>
<p>The U.S. has not gone to that extreme but does derive constitutional protections for the overall scheme of the constitution and from the legal context of the nation when constitutional provisions were enacted that don't obvious flow from the text of the legislation (e.g. the 11th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution) has been interpreted to establish state sovereign immunity that the text of that amendment does not expressly provide for).</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>Another somewhat weird source of law in the U.S. (constitutional at the federal level and usually common law at the state level) is that the 21st century right to a jury trial in a civil case depends upon whether the claim would have been litigated in England in 1789 in the courts of law or the courts of chancery in England.</p>
<p>Customary international law is a thing. It also often arises from international practices or diplomatic norms, rather than tribunal adjudications.</p>
<p>In the jurisprudence of the legislative process and some aspects of federalism, historical practices that have not been litigated are frequently resorted to as a source of law. For example, the question of whether a legislature is in recess has been resolved based upon historical practice.</p>
<p>Prior to the French Revolution, customary practice was an important source of law in France. Customary practice was an important source of the English common law.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>Prior to the French Revolution, customary practice was an important source of law in France. Customary practice was an important source of the English common law.</p>
<p>In many British colonies and former British colonies (e.g. South Africa and Kenya and Sudan), lower tribal or village courts were often expressly permitted to apply local custom in their decision making.</p>
<p>In the U.S., a collection of secondary authority texts compiled by the American Law Institute, an affiliate of the American Bar Association, called the Restatements, which summarize in codified form, various subjects in common law, are often used by courts as a source of law where there is no case law on point in a jurisdiction.</p>
<p>In civil law countries, the leading legal treatises of law professors are an important source of interpretive authority of the civil code and other major codification of the law.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>In civil law countries, the leading legal treatises of law professors are an important source of interpretive authority of the civil code and other major codification of the law.</p>
<p>Most Islamic countries provide in their constitutions that Islamic law is the highest authority and supersedes any secular law including other provisions of the constitution to the contrary.</p>
<p>In many parts of the United States, mostly in the west, but also in Florida and Louisiana, property rights arising under Spanish/Mexican law, or under Native American law continue in force even though they derived from legal systems other than U.S. statutes and common law. See, for example:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Tribe: We have &quot;aboriginal title&quot; to these lands in New Mexico because
we had exclusive occupation of them from around 1300 to 1650, and then
still used them a lot since then. Further, the &quot;sovereign&quot; (the U.S.)
has never properly taken them away, so they're still ours. District


key: chroma:document
string_value:
still used them a lot since then. Further, the &quot;sovereign&quot; (the U.S.)
has never properly taken them away, so they're still ours. District
court: No. Tribe on motion to reconsider: How about just these bits of
the lands? District court: Still no. <a href="https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/sites/ca10/files/opinions/010110830843.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Tenth Circuit</a>: There's still
a claim for one of the bits. Concurrence 1: No bits for you.
Concurrence 2: Two bits.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>(<a href="https://reason.com/volokh/2023/03/24/short-circuit-a-roundup-of-recent-federal-court-decisions-203/#more-8228302" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Source</a>)</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 2: <p>There is the concept of <strong><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natural_law" rel="noreferrer">natural law</a></strong>. The idea of natural law is that certain law can be derived solely from ethics and innate human intuition of &quot;right&quot; and &quot;wrong&quot;.</p>
<p>US law still has allusions for natural law. For example, the declaration of independence begins with &quot;We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights&quot;. The declaration doesn't give people unalienable rights, it merely affirms that people already have those rights due to natural law.</p>
<p>A practical legal concept based on natural law is that of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jury_nullification" rel="noreferrer">jury nullificaton</a> where a jury can decide to just ignore the written law when they believe it to be blatantly unjust in this particular case.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>Natural law was also used as legitimization for the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuremberg_trials" rel="noreferrer">Nuremberg Trials</a>. Although the Nazi leaders did not commit any crimes according to the written law of Germany (written by them), and international law like the universal declaration of human rights did not exist yet, they were still tried for committing &quot;crimes against humanity&quot;. Deeds so heinous that their injustice was self-evident and no legal code written by any legislative authority was required to punish them.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 3: <h1>In South Africa we also have Indigenous Laws</h1>
<p>I suspect that by all definitions of 'non-conventional' this would apply. The sources of South African law in descending order of authority are as follows...</p>
<ul>
<li><p><strong>The Constitution</strong> - the supreme law of the country (s 2 of the
Constitution) legislation (acts of the national and provincial
legislatures, and governmental regulations)</p>
</li>
<li><p><strong>Common Law</strong></p>
</li>
<li><p><strong>Judicial Precedent</strong></p>
</li>
<li><p><strong>Customary / Indigenous Law</strong></p>
</li>
</ul>
These being defined as follows.Indigenous law has been defined by the Constitutional Court of South Africa in as having three different forms: law practised in the community; law in statutes, case law or textbooks on official customary law; and academic law that is used for teaching purposes (Bhe v Magistrate Khayelitsha [2005] 1 SA 580 (CC) at [152]).</p>
 
<ul>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<ul>
<li><strong>Religious Personal Laws</strong></li>
<li><strong>International Law</strong></li>
<li><strong>The writings of authoritative publicists of the law.</strong></li>
</ul>
<p><a href="https://unimelb.libguides.com/c.php?g=929734&amp;p=6718215#:%7E:text=Indigenous%20law%20has%20been%20defined,580%20(CC)%20at%20%5B152" rel="noreferrer">SOURCE</a></p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 4: <p>In New Zealand we have <a href="https://www.data.govt.nz/toolkit/data-ethics/nga-tikanga-paihere/what-are-tikanga/" rel="noreferrer">https://www.data.govt.nz/toolkit/data-ethics/nga-tikanga-paihere/what-are-tikanga/</a>--&quot;appropriate customary practices or ‘layers of the culture’ developed by Māori communities and individuals and informed by common cultural values and concepts&quot;. Last year <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/on-the-inside/476286/peter-ellis-supreme-court-decision-reaffirms-tikanga-relevance-to-legal-framework" rel="noreferrer">our Supreme court allowed an appeal to proceed, <em>despite the death of the appellant,</em></a> on the grounds that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Under tikanga, Ellis would have a right to clear his name or re-establish his mana, even if dead. In Māoridom, mana and reputation carries on in whakapapa[lineage], rather than an individual's life.</p>
</blockquote>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
</blockquote>
<p>AFAIK the appellant was not a Maori, so there is a precedent that tikanga applies to everone in NZ.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 5: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/canada" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-canada-tooltip-container">canada</a></p>
<p>I will list various sources of law recognized in Canada. Whether you consider these sources &quot;unconventional&quot; depends on your perspective. To many people, these are very conventional and obvious sources of law, but I take it from your question you are asking for non-statutory sources.</p>
<ul>
<li>common law (including <a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/q/85675/46948">equity</a>), including private obligations such as contract</li>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<ul>
<li>common law (including <a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/q/85675/46948">equity</a>), including private obligations such as contract</li>
<li>the law of England, as it existed at a specified time near a colony's entrance into the Confederation, unless altered or otherwise inapplicable due to local circumstances (for example, see British Columbia's <a href="https://www.bclaws.gov.bc.ca/civix/document/id/complete/statreg/96253_01#section2" rel="noreferrer"><em>Law and Equity Act</em>, s. 2</a>)</li>
<li><a href="https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol23/iss4/2" rel="noreferrer">doctrine</a> (especially in the civil law tradition in Québec)</li>
<li>the Constitution, including <a href="https://www.scc-csc.ca/judges-juges/spe-dis/bm-2005-12-01-eng.aspx" rel="noreferrer">unwritten constitutional principles</a> and <a href="http://www.revparl.ca/english/issue.asp?param=168&amp;art=1143" rel="noreferrer">constitutional conventions</a></li>
<li>Indigenous law</li>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 6: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/england" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;england&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;england&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-england-tooltip-container">england</a></p>
<p>In England there is a recognised notion of &quot;Common Law&quot;, whereby certain rules/laws have been established via precedents set by judges.  A very simple example is use of force in self-defence, which is effectively formulated as</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Self-defence applies where the defendant uses necessary, reasonable and proportionate force to defend themselves or another from imminent attack</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The basic principles of self-defence are set out in <em>Palmer v R, [1971] AC 814</em>; approved in <em>R v McInnes, 55 Cr App R 551</em>:</p>
<blockquote>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
</blockquote>
<p>The basic principles of self-defence are set out in <em>Palmer v R, [1971] AC 814</em>; approved in <em>R v McInnes, 55 Cr App R 551</em>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>&quot;It is both good law and good sense that a man who is attacked may defend himself. It is both good law and good sense that he may do, but only do, what is reasonably necessary.&quot;</p>
</blockquote>
<p><sub>Reference: <a href="https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/self-defence-and-prevention-crime" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/self-defence-and-prevention-crime</a></sub></p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 7: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/germany" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-germany-tooltip-container">germany</a></p>
<p>While the typical role of the jurisdiction is to <em>interpret</em> the written law, <strong>court decisions</strong> can factually be an equivalent of legislation. In common law jurisdictions, this process is an important and integral part of the development of the law: This is called <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Case_law" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>case law</em></a>, as Aleks mentioned in his answer. In addition and beyond, and indeed <em>instead</em> of written laws, in common law jurisdictions like England court decisions are one important power developing the law by establishing precedence.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>But even in <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil_law_(legal_system)" rel="nofollow noreferrer">civil law</a> jurisdictions which depend much more on written law, for example continental Europe, court decisions can develop the law to an extent which is normally the prerogative of the legislature. A rather prominent example is a ruling of the German constitutional court which established a human right not mentioned at all in the constitution: The <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Informational_self-determination" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>right to informational self-determination</em></a>. The <a href="https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/DE/1983/12/rs19831215_1bvr020983.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">ruling</a> derived a protection against unreasonable data acquisition from the inviolable human dignity stated in the <a href="https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/gg/art_1.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">first sentence of the


key: chroma:document
string_value:
against unreasonable data acquisition from the inviolable human dignity stated in the <a href="https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/gg/art_1.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">first sentence of the constitution</a> and the right to &quot;free development of one's personality&quot; (<a href="https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/gg/art_2.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Art. 2 Abs. 1 GG</a>). Both would be compromised by unmitigated data collection through the authorities or other actors. For all intents and purposes, this human right now has the same status as the explicitly mentioned ones, like freedom of speech and religion, the inviolability of one's home etc.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>Interestingly a majority to explicitly codify this right in the constitution could not yet be found; one could argue that the court shaped the law in a way which would not find the necessary majority in the elected legislature. On the other hand the court decision made the need for an explicit constitutional law
less pressing and the effort to do so less adamant.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 8: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/germany" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-germany-tooltip-container">germany</a></p>
<p>In addition to the examples given by other answers, there is the interesting intersection of secular law and church law. The two major churches, Catholic and Lutheran, are major employers and they are allowed to apply some non-secular rules e.g. for employment matters. The origin of this is the <strong>gradual</strong> pushback against religious authority without a total break.</p>
<ul>
<li>Churches claim the right to offer 'asylum' on sacred grounds. This is no longer applied to criminal matters, but it is offered to some foreigners who are due to be <a href="https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kirchenasyl" rel="nofollow noreferrer">deported</a>. Secular authorities are simply hestiant to send cops into churches to deport people.</li>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<li>Churches claim the right to demand an 'ethical lifestyle' from their employees, even if those employees are working in places like a hospital or a daycare center.</li>
<li>Churches claim the right to investigate allegiations of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Catholic_Church_sexual_abuse_cases_in_Europe#Germany" rel="nofollow noreferrer">sexual abuse by their priests</a>, and to handle them e.g. by punitive reassignments. As with asylum, this is facilitated when the secular government fails to investigate properly.</li>
</ul>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: In order to get a refund, I lied about not getting pickles on my burger. Did I commit a crime?

Question Body: <p>I patronized the Krusty Krab once and ordered something very complex. My burger was supposed to contain pickles, which it did. However, I said there were no pickles and asked for (and received) a refund on that basis. Is that a crime?</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <p>If you were in <a href="/questions/tagged/washington" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;washington&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;washington&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="washington-container">washington</a> state, perhaps. It is not <a href="https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=9a.60&amp;full=true" rel="nofollow noreferrer">criminal fraud</a>, which is limited to impersonation, forgery and various acts related to &quot;instruments&quot;. It could be <a href="https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=9a.56&amp;full=true" rel="nofollow noreferrer">theft</a>, which (RCW 9A.56.020(1)(b)) is</p>
<blockquote>
<p>By color or aid of deception to obtain control over the property or
services of another or the value thereof, with intent to deprive him
or her of such property or services</p>
</blockquote>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>By color or aid of deception to obtain control over the property or
services of another or the value thereof, with intent to deprive him
or her of such property or services</p>
</blockquote>
<p>There has been a lawful transfer of property, then later you gain control over some of their property by aid of deception, and intend to keep the money. What remains to be determined is whether you gained control over their property by &quot;aid of deception&quot;, as defined in RCW 9A.56.010. This &quot;means that the deception operated to bring about the obtaining of the property or services; it is not necessary that deception be the sole means of obtaining the property or services&quot; (that much appears to be true), and</p>
<blockquote>
<p>&quot;Deception&quot; occurs when an actor <strong>knowingly</strong>: (a) Creates or
confirms another's false impression which the actor knows to be false;
or (b) Fails to correct another's impression which the actor


key: chroma:document
string_value:
confirms another's false impression which the actor knows to be false;
or (b) Fails to correct another's impression which the actor
previously has created or confirmed</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The prosecution would have to prove beyond reasonable doubt that when you made the statement, you did in fact know that the burger contained pickles.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 2: <h2>A straightforward <a href="https://legislation.nsw.gov.au/view/html/inforce/current/act-1900-040#sec.192E" rel="nofollow noreferrer">fraud</a></h2>

<blockquote>
<p>(1)  A person who, by any deception, dishonestly—</p>
<p>(a)  obtains property belonging to another, or</p>
<p>(b)  obtains any financial advantage or causes any financial disadvantage,</p>
<p>is guilty of the offence of fraud.</p>
<p>Maximum penalty—Imprisonment for 10 years.</p>
</blockquote>


Tags: united-states, criminal-law, california, fraud


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Body: <p>Pearl Davis opined, “okay we got a big super chat, ‘why is she awarded alimony and child support if she went to college and got ran through the whole premise of going to college is what if he leaves’— oh that’s a good point —-‘then why did you go to college if you’re just asking for his assets in a divorce. Just go get a job after the divorce”</p>
<p>Is there any legal merit in this argument?</p>
<p>The consideration seems to be that the rationale for alimony and child support is no longer applicable and true because women have no more legal and social barriers to entering the workforce and are often thought to be rather advantaged over men in the workplace and treated favourably.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>Presumably when the divorce regime of blanket 50/50 asset splits and even child support and alimony payments were laid down by the law it was rationalised by the fact that women made greater domestic contributions which should be accounted for against the men’s almost invariably greater financial contributions.</p>
<p>Where did this regime come from, and what if these social conditions seem no longer to be present, can the regime be argued to be obsolete?</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <p>It seems self-evident the spouse who gave up their career to keep the home and raise the children will not post-divorce be in an equivalent position employment-wise (A) as if they had <em>not</em> given up their career or (B) to the spouse who continued <em>their</em> career.</p>
<p><a href="/questions/tagged/england-and-wales" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-england-and-wales-tooltip-container">england-and-wales</a></p>
<p>The law doesn't mandate a 50-50 split although there is a widespread perception it does.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1973/18" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Matrimonial Causes Act 1973</a> (as amended) is current law. It says of a court making property orders, financial provision orders etc:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>s25 (1) It shall be the duty of the court in deciding whether to


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<blockquote>
<p>s25 (1) It shall be the duty of the court in deciding whether to
exercise its powers under section 23, 24 [F124, 24A [F125, 24B or
24E]] above and, if so, in what manner, to have regard to all the
circumstances of the case, first consideration being given to the
welfare while a minor of any child of the family who has not attained
the age of eighteen.</p>
<p>(2) As regards the exercise of the powers of the court under section
23(1)( a ), ( b ) or ( c ), 24 [F126 , 24A [F127, 24B or 24E]] above
in relation to a party to the marriage, the court shall in particular
have regard to the following matters—</p>
<p>(a)the income, earning capacity, property and other financial
resources which each of the parties to the marriage has or is likely
to have in the foreseeable future, including in the case of earning
capacity any increase in that capacity which it would in the opinion
of the court be reasonable to expect a party to the marriage to take
steps to acquire;</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
capacity any increase in that capacity which it would in the opinion
of the court be reasonable to expect a party to the marriage to take
steps to acquire;</p>
<p>(b)the financial needs, obligations and responsibilities which each of
the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the
foreseeable future;</p>
<p>(c)the standard of living enjoyed by the family before the breakdown
of the marriage;</p>
<p>(d)the age of each party to the marriage and the duration of the
marriage;</p>
<p>(e)any physical or mental disability of either of the parties to the
marriage;</p>
<p>(f)the contributions which each of the parties has made or is likely
in the foreseeable future to make to the welfare of the family,
including any contribution by looking after the home or caring for the
family;</p>
<p>(g)the conduct of each of the parties, if that conduct is such that it
would in the opinion of the court be inequitable to disregard it;</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
family;</p>
<p>(g)the conduct of each of the parties, if that conduct is such that it
would in the opinion of the court be inequitable to disregard it;</p>
<p>(h) in the case of proceedings for divorce or nullity of marriage, the
value to each of the parties to the marriage of any benefit F128 . . .
which, by reason of the dissolution or annulment of the marriage, that
party will lose the chance of acquiring.</p>
<p>(3) As regards the exercise of the powers of the court under section
23(1)( d ), ( e ) or ( f ), (2) or (4), 24 or 24A above in relation to
a child of the family, the court shall in particular have regard to
the following matters—</p>
<p>(a)the financial needs of the child;</p>
<p>(b)the income, earning capacity (if any), property and other financial
resources of the child;</p>
<p>(c)any physical or mental disability of the child;</p>
<p>(d)the manner in which he was being and in which the parties to the
marriage expected him to be educated or trained;</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>(c)any physical or mental disability of the child;</p>
<p>(d)the manner in which he was being and in which the parties to the
marriage expected him to be educated or trained;</p>
<p>(e) the considerations mentioned in relation to the parties to the
marriage in paragraphs ( a ), ( b ), ( c ) and ( e ) of subsection (2)
above.</p>
<p>(4) As regards the exercise of the powers of the court under section
23(1)( d ), ( e ) or ( f ), (2) or (4), 24 or 24A above against a
party to a marriage in favour of a child of the family who is not the
child of that party, the court shall also have regard—</p>
<p>(a)to whether that party assumed any responsibility for the child’s
maintenance, and, if so, to the extent to which, and the basis upon
which, that party assumed such responsibility and to the length of
time for which that party discharged such responsibility;</p>
<p>(b)to whether in assuming and discharging such responsibility that


key: chroma:document
string_value:
which, that party assumed such responsibility and to the length of
time for which that party discharged such responsibility;</p>
<p>(b)to whether in assuming and discharging such responsibility that
party did so knowing that the child was not his or her own;</p>
<p>(c)to the liability of any other person to maintain the child.]</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In short the division of the matrimonial assets must depend on the circumstances of the case.</p>
<p>The Lords in the House of Lords judgments <a href="https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199900/ldjudgmt/jd001026/white-1.htm" rel="nofollow noreferrer">White v White</a> and <a href="https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldjudgmt/jd060524/mill-1.htm" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Miller v Miller: McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24</a> supply some history, their observations of how divorce has changed over time, and of course their own rationales for their judgments.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>In <em>White</em> Lord Nicholls said there should be recognition of the non-financial contribution of the homemaker/child-raiser.</p>
<p>In <em>Miller</em>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>... to greater or lesser extent every relationship of marriage gives rise to a relationship of interdependence. The parties share the roles of money-earner, home-maker and child-carer. Mutual dependence begets mutual obligations of support. When the marriage ends fairness requires that the assets of the parties should be divided primarily so as to make provision for the parties' housing and financial needs, taking into account a wide range of matters such as the parties' ages, their future earning capacity, the family's standard of living, and any disability of either party.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The contemporary aim is fairness which is not necessarily the same as an equal share. There is a 'yardstick of equality' (from <em>White</em>) but it must be applied as an aid, not a rule.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>The contemporary aim is fairness which is not necessarily the same as an equal share. There is a 'yardstick of equality' (from <em>White</em>) but it must be applied as an aid, not a rule.</p>
<p><em>Miller v Miller</em> makes the point that people will have different views about fairness and that views may change over time:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Fairness is an elusive concept. It is an instinctive response to a given set of facts.</p>
<p>Ultimately it is grounded in social and moral values. These values, or
attitudes, can be stated. But they cannot be justified, or refuted, by
any objective process of logical reasoning. Moreover, they change from
one generation to the next. It is not surprising therefore that in the
present context there can be different views on the requirements of
fairness in any particular case.</p>
</blockquote>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: In the USA, is it legal for parents to take children to strip clubs?

Question Body: <p>I understand there are often different laws in different states, if this is the case with this question I would appreciate answers mentioning what differences are there between states.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <p>Findlaw has an article headlined <a href="https://www.findlaw.com/smallbusiness/business-laws-and-regulations/adult-entertainment-law-zoning-and-other-regulations.html" rel="noreferrer">Strip Club Laws and the Regulation of Sexually Oriented Business</a>.  Among othe things, it says</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Below are some of the more common types of adult entertainment and strip club laws affecting the &quot;manner&quot; in which sexually-oriented establishments may operate (in addition to alcohol, which is discussed above):</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Age Requirements - Most ordinances require patrons and employees to be 18 and older; 21 if alcohol is served</p>
</li>
<li><p>...</p>
</li>
</ul>
</blockquote>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<ul>
<li><p>Age Requirements - Most ordinances require patrons and employees to be 18 and older; 21 if alcohol is served</p>
</li>
<li><p>...</p>
</li>
</ul>
</blockquote>
<p>I'm not going to look for the exceptions implied by the word &quot;most,&quot; but I doubt any of them allow patrons under the age of 18.  Regardless, if the child has reached the prescribed minimum age then it is permissible under the laws regulating sexually oriented businesses for a parent to take the child to such a business.  If the child is still a minor, child protection laws may also have something to say on the matter.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 2: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/germany" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-germany-tooltip-container">germany</a></p>
<p>Since Germany was mentioned in the comments:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Jugendlichen darf der Aufenthalt in Nachtklubs und Nachtbars zu keiner
Zeit und auch nicht in Begleitung eines Erwachsenen gestattet werden.
Zu den Nachtklubs und Nachtbars zählen auch Angebote wie
Stripteasebars, Animierbetriebe, Swingerklubs oder Betriebe der
Prostitution.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Meaning, &quot;adolescents must at no time be allowed to spend time in night clubs, even when accompanied by adults. Nightclubs includes amongst others venues such as strip clubs and places of prostitution&quot; (or just put the paragaph above through Google translate).</p>
<p>Previous sections of the cited brochure make clear that adolescents in context also includes children.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>Previous sections of the cited brochure make clear that adolescents in context also includes children.</p>
<p>It is however correct that teenagers 14 years or older may drink beer or wine if their parents are present and give permission.</p>
<p>(German Source: <a href="https://www.bmfsfj.de/resource/blob/94070/ac4c6f22016c4ddc51b468cd2cb767bc/jugendschutz-verstaendlich-erklaert-broschuere-data.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth</a>)</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 3: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/new-south-wales" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;new-south-wales&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;new-south-wales&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-new-south-wales-tooltip-container">new-south-wales</a></p>
<p>It is not legal for minors to be on the premises of a declared sex club under <a href="https://legislation.nsw.gov.au/view/html/inforce/current/act-1988-025#sec.21D" rel="nofollow noreferrer">s21D</a> of the <em>Summary Offences Act</em> 1988. The offence is committed by the operator, not by any non-operator adult who may be accompanying the minor.</p>
<p>However, a parent who did this may well find themselves under investigation as to whether they are a fit and proper parent under Commonwealth family law.</p>
<p>     </p>


Tags: united-states, is-x-legal


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: Does RIPA 3000 require service providers to retain the contents rather than merely metadata of SMS communications?

Question Body: <p>The question is not deeper than what is articulated in its title</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <p>If you mean the <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/contents" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000</a> (aka RIPA), it doesn't provide for mandatory <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_retention" rel="nofollow noreferrer">retention</a> of communications data. Broadly speaking, RIPA is about <em>interception</em> as opposed to mass surveillance or retention just in case.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>The <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2009/859/contents/made" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Data Retention (EC Directive) Regulations 2009</a> obliged &quot;public communications providers&quot; to retain what is commonly known as 'metadata', i.e. information <em>about</em> the communication - the originating phone number, the receiving phone number, the date, time and duration (if relevant), the type of call or message - not the content of the communication. See <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2009/859/schedule/made" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Schedule 1</a>.</p>
<p>In April 2014, in the case known as <em><a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/documents.jsf?num=C-293/12" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Digital Rights Ireland</a></em> the Court of Justice of the European Union declared the EC Directive invalid.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>In response, the UK made the <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2014/27/contents" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014</a> (DRIPA) - sunsetted on 31 December 2016. This provided for the Secretary of State to issue a data retention notice to a communications services provider (CSP), requiring it to retain the data types set out in the Schedule to the 2009 Regulations. <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2014/27/notes/division/3/1" rel="nofollow noreferrer">DRIPA's Explanatory Notes</a> support my claims above with a summary of the history.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>This was replaced by the <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2016/25/contents/enacted" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Investigatory Powers Act 2016</a> (IPA), Part 4 of which deals with the <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2016/25/part/4/enacted" rel="nofollow noreferrer">retention of communications data</a>. Here too the retention is of the metadata not the content (see s11(87) and the <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2016/25/notes/division/6/index.htm" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Explanatory Notes</a>).</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: Damaged library books by accident

Question Body: <p>Bob borrowed a book from the library and months later, accidentally dropped his bag (with the book in it) in a river. He retrieves the bag, but the book is ruined, being all sandy and wet. What is the consequence of this accident legally speaking?</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <p>If this is a public library in England or Wales, then they are allowed to charge for lost or damaged items, at their discretion, even though there is a general duty for libraries to make their normal lending services available free of charge.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1991/2712/made" rel="noreferrer">The Library Charges (England and Wales) Regulations 1991</a>, a statutory instrument made under <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1964/75/section/8" rel="noreferrer">section 8 of the Public Libraries and Museums Act 1964</a> of says this in regulation 3(2)(e):</p>
<blockquote>
<p>A relevant authority may make a charge [...] in respect of library apparatus, library material and any other equipment or thing used in providing the library service which is lost, damaged or destroyed by, or whilst on loan to, the person paying the charge.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Similarly, they can charge for late return of items, and for various


key: chroma:document
string_value:
</blockquote>
<p>Similarly, they can charge for late return of items, and for various
special services. &quot;Library material&quot; includes &quot;words, figures, images, sounds or data recorded in or on any medium&quot;, which certainly covers books - even picture books. The library has broad discretion as to the amount and terms of any charge, but the replacement cost of the lost item is a typical starting point.</p>
<p>Whether it was Bob's fault that he dropped the book in the river is irrelevant. He is on the hook for the charge. Potentially, he could claim against somebody else if <em>they</em> had damaged the book and thus caused him to suffer a financial loss, but that does not affect the fact that Bob has to pay the library.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>While other libraries could make this part of their contractual terms for using the service, this specific regulatory provision is necessary because the default position for <em>public</em> libraries is that they cannot charge any fees to local residents for borrowing books; this aspect of their operations is a matter of public law, as opposed to a contract between the library and any given local resident.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 2: <p>As a condition of use of the library Bob will have agreed (A) to pay a fine for late returns and (B) to pay for replacing damaged books (either a flat rate or the specific cost, depending on the library).</p>


Tags: england-and-wales, accident, library


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: SARing received text messages from a lost phone

Question Body: <p>Al loses his phone and it runs out of battery. He then is sent 10 SMS from various people. He then recovers his phone and switched it on and the messages are all received.</p>
<p>Bob loses his phone but never recovers it yet would like to see any messages he may have been sent.</p>
<p>As evidenced above and under RIPA 2000, we know that his service provider has been storing all of his received messages even if he never gets back that particular SIM card.</p>
<p>Is Bob entitled to access the SMS that were sent to him?</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <p>The service provider has no obligation (unless by contract) to keep the <em>content</em> of SMS messages.</p>
<p>The service provider may keep content for a few hours or days, for circumstances such as unpowered phones. It will retain the <em>metadata</em> e.g. sender, recipient, date and time, and message type, for a longer period.</p>
<p>Bob should be able to obtain the metadata for his outgoing communications via SAR. But before resorting to a SAR, Bob should find out if his provider makes that information available via the customer support or customer account section of its website.</p>
<p>Bob will need a court order to obtain the metadata for his incoming communications.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>Bob will need a court order to obtain the metadata for his incoming communications.</p>
<p>The above is true for, at least, <a href="https://www.vodafone.co.uk/cs/groups/configfiles/documents/contentdocuments/vftst042750.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Vodafone</a>, <a href="https://www.o2.co.uk/help/safety-and-security/how-to-get-a-copy-of-the-information-we-store-about-you" rel="nofollow noreferrer">O2</a>, <a href="https://www.three.co.uk/termspdf/Right-of-Access-V5.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Three</a> and <a href="https://ee.co.uk/help/help-new/safety-and-security/protecting-your-information/how-can-i-request-my-personal-data" rel="nofollow noreferrer">EE</a>, each of which has published material specifically about this topic.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: Calling a judge as a witness in a case that the judge is presiding over?

Question Body: <p>I want to pose a question on the limits of a defendant's right to call people to testify at trial.</p>
<p>Let's assume that a judge is conducting a trial (the sort of trial is irrelevant - it could be criminal, civil, family or traffic court even), and the defendant calls the judge to the stand to testify - as a &quot;hostile&quot; witness if need be.</p>
<p>Does this action result in an automatic mistrial regardless of whether the judge accepted or refused to take the stand? Further, does a defendant have the right to subpoena and call <em>anyone</em> he wants to the stand, as a witness - even the president or the pope or a member of the jury? If the ridiculous witnesses he calls don't take the stand, is this also grounds for a mistrial since the witnesses he wanted were not heard in court?</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <p>Parties may only call witnesses for the purpose of adducing<sup>*</sup> <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Admissible_evidence" rel="nofollow noreferrer">admissible</a> evidence. Evidence is only admissible if it is <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relevance_(law)" rel="nofollow noreferrer">relevant</a>. If a witness cannot give any relevant evidence, then a party has no right to call them or invoke the court's power to <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subpoena_ad_testificandum" rel="nofollow noreferrer">compel them</a> to give evidence.</p>
<p>In practice, if there were any doubt about the witness's ability to give relevant evidence, it is likely that the court would allow the defendant to call the witness, if only for the purpose of a preliminary hearing where the parties can argue about whether the proposed evidence is actually admissible.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>If a judge or juror is able to give relevant evidence about a case, they should <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Judicial_disqualification" rel="nofollow noreferrer">recuse</a> themselves. If a judge does not recuse, or does not permit the defendant to call some other witness having decided that the witness could not give relevant evidence, these decisions can be reviewed on appeal.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>The standard required to overturn the judge's decision varies depending on the jurisdiction, but generally the defendant would have to show that the evidence they were not permitted to adduce was also <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Materiality_(law)" rel="nofollow noreferrer">material</a>. This might prevent a mistrial from occurring in cases where, for example, the defendant was not permitted to call the President to give evidence about something that occurred at a public event the President attended. The President's knowledge of the event might be technically admissible, but plainly not likely to advance either side of the case, given the other evidence available. Of course, if the President can give relevant, admissible and material evidence about a fact in issue then the defendant would be entitled to call them.</p>
<p><sup>*</sup>Adduce: cite as evidence.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 2: <h2>The judge on the stand?</h2>
<h3>Properly Done: A witness must be listed or motioned for, and witnesses can be denied</h3>
<p>Any party in a lawsuit needs to list <strong>all</strong> witnesses well in advance of the trial. Presenting the witness list is part of normal motion practice. The law is such that there should be no surprise witnesses because both parties need to be able to prepare for the witnesses.</p>
<p>If a new witness or evidence surfaces during the trial, there's a motion to present them. That motion can be oral, during the trial. But without such a motion, they can't be heard.</p>
<p>As such, the judge will review the request days to months in advance and deny the motion. The lawyer could try to appeal that, but unless he has <strong>extremely</strong> good reasons to get the judge into the witness stand, then the motion will be denied, because the judge is extremely rarely a relevant witness.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>When the lawyer actually <em>had</em> such good reasons, then the judge would have needed to recuse themselves in the first place, and can't preside over the case.</p>
<h3>In the heat of the moment</h3>
<p>If the lawyer has the <em>glorious idea</em> to request the judge to take the stand during the trial, the Judge can do a lot of things, starting with denying the motion. If the lawyer does not stop, then the judge can order the lawyer to shut up, then fine them for contempt of court, and finally <em>lock them up</em> for contempt of court.</p>
<p>The proper way to deal with the ad-hoc motion being denied is to appeal the decision, which does not lead to a mistrial and if the denial was proper, nothing at all.</p>
<h2>Who's a witness?</h2>
<p>Only <strong>relevant</strong> people may be called as witnesses. Relevant means, that their testimony will lead to helping the case to progress.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<h2>Who's a witness?</h2>
<p>Only <strong>relevant</strong> people may be called as witnesses. Relevant means, that their testimony will lead to helping the case to progress.</p>
<p>Unless the sweet old lady that has to tell lots of good things about the accused actually has something <em>case relevant</em> to say, she is not a witness that can be called for anything but a character witness.</p>
<p>The President and pope would almost never be relevant witnesses, and so is the judge.</p>
<p>The judge can smack down any nonrelevant witness, and deny that they can be heard at all. It is up to the person calling the witness to establish that and how they are relevant, when they provide their list of witnesses to the court.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 3: <p>If you had any issue with the judge being a neutral and uninvolved party, you needed to raise it pre-trial.</p>
<p>You are to share your witness list pre-trial (so opposing counsel can depose them). Having the judge on that list <em>is a prima-facie</em> claim that the judge is involved. Opposing counsel will jump all over that, and force you to raise the issue pre-trial.  Part of their job is to prevent anything which would give you a basis for an appeal.  The likely result is that the judge will be recused and you'll get another judge assigned.</p>
<p>To add the judge as a witness mid-trial, you'd need to show</p>
<ul>
<li>a legitimate reason to have failed to mention it pre-trial.</li>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p>To add the judge as a witness mid-trial, you'd need to show</p>
<ul>
<li>a legitimate reason to have failed to mention it pre-trial.</li>
<li>why you are <strong>not</strong> simply arguing for a mistrial due to judge disqualification (which ends the trial and moots the point). <em>Be very careful here:</em> you are implicitly claiming the judge remains qualified, and as such, <strong>forfeiting your right to claim otherwise later</strong>.</li>
<li>and lastly, why it's relevant.</li>
</ul>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Title: Lease signed before I’m fully approved, do I have a case to get out of the lease?

Question Body: <p>I signed a lease a few months ago and someone from the apartment signed it as well. The move in day is in august.  Now, they are saying that my lease is not “fully approved” and I can’t move in until I send in my proof of income. By saying I can’t move in, I feel as if they aren’t fulfilling their obligations of the signed lease. I would like to get out of the lease and I am wondering if it will be easier to do since at this point I am not fully approved.</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Answer 1: <p>A lease is a contract. A contract becomes binding once there is an offer and acceptance. Sometimes something smells like an offer, but it is really an &quot;invitation to treat&quot;, a sign that they are willing to negotiate. The clear sign that they did not make an offer (as required for there to be a contract) is that they do not consider themselves bound the minute you accept. The language of the document would include some provision like &quot;subject to approval of the application&quot;.</p>
<p>It is possible that you have &quot;made an offer&quot;, which they can accept thereby completing the offer-and-accept cycle, but until you do, you can revoke your offer, if you really want out. You do have to clearly and quickly communicate the revocation.</p>


Tags: residential-lease, lease, breaking-the-lease


key: chroma:document
string_value:
Question Body: <p>I'm having difficulty understanding this exchange between <a href="https://banco.net.au/news/robert-newlinds-sc-appointed-as-a-judge-of-the-district-court-of-new-south-wales" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Robert Newlinds SC</a>, the barrister representing the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Australian_Council_of_Trade_Unions" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Australian Council of Trade Unions</a>, and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dyson_Heydon" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Dyson Heydon KC</a>, the Commissioner of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Royal_Commission_into_Trade_Union_Governance_and_Corruption" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Royal Commission into Trade Union Governance and Corruption</a>, on 17 August 2015 (<a href="https://web.archive.org.au/awa/20180419135629mp_/https://www.tradeunionroyalcommission.gov.au/Hearings/Documents/2015/Evidence17August2015/Transcript-ACTU.PDF#page=17" rel="nofollow noreferrer">transcript</a>, <a


key: chroma:document
string_value:
rel="nofollow noreferrer">transcript</a>, <a href="https://youtu.be/A9zSbrLObMk?t=17" rel="nofollow noreferrer">video</a>):</p>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<blockquote>
<p>THE COMMISSIONER: From whom do you get your instructions, Mr Newlinds, if you don't mind telling me that?</p>
<p>MR NEWLINDS: Mr Gordon.</p>
<p>THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, but from whom do the lay
instructions come?</p>
<p>MR NEWLINDS: They pass through a Mr Oliver but I
understand they come from the constituent entity.</p>
<p>THE COMMISSIONER: Where is Mr Oliver?</p>
<p>MR NEWLINDS: He's here somewhere.</p>
<p>THE COMMISSIONER: Is he in the hearing room?</p>
<p>MR NEWLINDS: I believe so.</p>
<p>THE COMMISSIONER: Yes. That seems to remove one obstacle to getting instructions.</p>
<p>MR NEWLINDS: No, it doesn't.</p>
<p><strong>THE COMMISSIONER: You put that, of course, respectfully.</strong></p>
<p>MR NEWLINDS: I do.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Is Heydon accusing Newlinds of being disrespectful?</p>
<blockquote>


key: chroma:document
string_value:
<p><strong>THE COMMISSIONER: You put that, of course, respectfully.</strong></p>
<p>MR NEWLINDS: I do.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Is Heydon accusing Newlinds of being disrespectful?</p>
<blockquote>
<p>THE COMMISSIONER: <strong>I don't quite understand that point.</strong> If, for example, Mr Oliver had just gone into hospital and was under a general anaesthetic, then of course your position would be impeccable.</p>
<p>MR NEWLINDS: May I explain the point?</p>
<p>THE COMMISSIONER: Can I just conclude by saying this: that if Mr Oliver is here, it is possible to get
instructions from him. If he has difficulties in getting instructions from others, this is just a possible point of view I am putting to you, he should have come armed with them this morning to pass on to you.</p>
<p>MR NEWLINDS: You say that.</p>
<p>THE COMMISSIONER: I do say that. That is a possible
view, is it not?</p>
<p>MR NEWLINDS: I don't accept that's a reasonable view.</p>
</blockquote>


