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consent. Disputed permission is no match for the Fourth Amendment
central value of “respect for the privacy of the home”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Until permission is explicitly (unequivocally) withdrawn, permission to enter entails permission to walk around and see. Since the contraband was in plain sight, there was no need for additional consent to see the drugs in resident 1's room. Note that the 4th Amendment frames the matter in terms of searches, not &quot;entries or searches&quot; suggesting that you could consent to one but not to the other.</p>


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Question Title: Release my children from my debts at the time of my death

Question Body: <p>Upon my death how do I physically write the actual release of debt without an attorney, so my children are not held responsible for my debts.</p>


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Answer 1: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/united-states" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-united-states-tooltip-container">united-states</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>Upon my death how do I physically write the actual release of debt
without an attorney, so my children are not held responsible for my
debts.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>You should hire an attorney for a few hundred dollars, so the job is done right.</p>
<p>Even if you do nothing and your children do nothing, your children are not obligated to pay your debts out of anything other than your own assets at death, unless they have personally guaranteed those debts. And, if they have personally guaranteed those debts, you can't release them, only the creditor can do that.</p>


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<p>If your children owe debts to you, you can release them from those debts. But, you should hire an attorney to do so in order to avoid ambiguity. The biggest question would normally be whether or not the discharge of debts owed by your children to you should count in the process of dividing up the assets you have left after the debts you owe to third-parties at death, or not.</p>


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Answer 2: <h2>Not possible in <a href="/questions/tagged/germany" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-germany-tooltip-container">germany</a></h2>
<p>To not inherit a debt in Germany, the <strong>heir</strong> has to declare to the state that they don't want to inherit this inheritance. This also excludes them from inheriting anything else though.</p>


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Answer 3: <p>In the <a href="/questions/tagged/united-states" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-united-states-tooltip-container">united-states</a> this happens automatically.</p>
<p>Heirs are not responsible for the &quot;debts of the father&quot;, unless they willingly co-signed or something really weird is going on. They just aren't.  You don't need to do anything special here.</p>
<p>However -- when a person dies, it forms an <strong>estate</strong> which contains the assets <strong>and debts</strong> of the person who died.  That estate is a legal entity, is treated by the law much like a person, <strong>and it still owes the debt</strong>.  Get it? The estate still owes the debt.</p>


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<p>Someone would be assigned as an &quot;executor&quot; of the estate, and they would be responsible for continuing to manage the estate's assets - e.g. cancel cable TV at the deceased's home, make sure the electric and heating bill continues to be paid so the pipes don't freeze (to preserve value in that home), and part of that duty is to settle that debt.  The executor should be making a searching inventory of the estate's assets, using probate or (if trust documents were prepared in advance) those trust documents to get control of assets, figuring out the value of those assets and liquidating (selling) them or making other arrangements.</p>
<p>The executor does not need to use &quot;their own money&quot; to do any of those things, but I could see an executor lending the estate money short-term while the executor gets access to bank accounts etc.</p>


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<p><strong>The debts must be paid by the estate</strong> and the executor must see to that. If the estate has cash lying around, they should simply contact the lender and offer to settle the debts using the estate's money. (not their own). Otherwise, the executor will need to liquidate (sell off) assets to raise money to pay off the debts.</p>
<p>It would be wise to be sensible about this; if a descendant absolutely has their heart set on a Hummel vase, and the will grants them that vase, the executor make every effort to satisfy the debts by selling <em>other stuff than that</em> - and likewise for anything an heir very much wants or is of sentimental value. That's just &quot;being a decent human being&quot; (and is independent from the question of whether the heir is; don't sink to their level).</p>


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<p>Note that the executor is responsible for keeping the estate from being looted via self-service from heirs.  If someone takes home the deceased's new $1000 iPhone that should be sold/returned to settled debts, that's on the executor to retrieve it.</p>
<p>And this is where the weird can happen.  Anyone who &quot;self-help collects&quot; assets like that phone or that vase before the estate is settled - they are stepping in front of another creditor &quot;out of turn&quot;, and they become personally liable for the estate's debts, at least up to the value of what they improperly took (and the legal fees of going after them).  The more they take, e.g. if they choose to move into and live in a house with a mortgage, the weirder it gets.  They can easily find &quot;their&quot; car repo'd and stuck with a bunch of costs. Etc.</p>


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<p>With that warning given, it is certainly possible for the estate to sell any sentimental item to an heir <em>at bona-fide market value</em> as established in a manner likely to be acceptable to a judge (i.e. such that a creditor will give up and say &quot;yeah, that's pretty close to market value&quot;.  For instance, eBay &quot;completed items&quot; might be a valid way; a reasonably advertised auction would be; an &quot;auction&quot; that was advertised to no one but family would not.</p>


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Answer 4: <p>The heirs must use the proper way in <a href="/questions/tagged/spain" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;spain&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;spain&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-spain-tooltip-container">spain</a>.</p>
<p>As in (almost?) everywhere else, debts are part of the estate and your heirs cannot accept your assets without accepting your debts.</p>
<p>But they can accept the inheritance &quot;a beneficio de inventario&quot;(*). This means that if there are debts, they are liable only to the extent of the assets received.</p>
<p>For example, you leave them a $100,000 bank account. If they accept &quot;a beneficio de inventario&quot; and then someone claims your $1,000,000 debt, they will be forced to pay your creditor $100,000.</p>
<p>If they accept the inheritance without using that formula, they might be forced to pay the full debt.</p>


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<p>If they accept the inheritance without using that formula, they might be forced to pay the full debt.</p>
<p>And of course, heirs may refuse the inheritance. Which, even with this formula, makes sense if they are sure that there will be no surplus (if you know that the $100,000 assets come with $1,000,000 debt, there is nothing for the heir by accepting the state other than the work of dealing with the debtors, paperwork...).</p>
<p>(*) The literal translation of the expression does make not sense, I would translate it as &quot;for what is worth&quot;.</p>


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Answer 5: <p>There is an easy way to do this - get yourself life insurance for the amount you owe. When you die it is used to pay off your debt.</p>
<p>This does not work if the OP is likely to die  as the premiums would be excessive.</p>


Answer 6: <p>In Japan, the heirs get the debts along with the assets, but they can opt out of getting both if they want.</p>
<p>Once the choice is made, it cannot be changed later even if new assets or debts are discovered.</p>
<p>Details may be found in the Japanese Civil Code, <a href="https://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/en/laws/view/2058/en#je_pt2ch4" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Chapter IV - Acceptance and Renunciation of Inheritance</a></p>


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Answer 7: <p>You need to specify your country.</p>
<p>I doubt there is any place in the world where <em>you</em> can get rid of the debt on your death other than by buying life insurance.</p>
<p>Your potential heirs will either inherit everything, including the debt, or in most countries they can refuse to take your inheritance and get nothing.</p>
<p>If you give a country, someone will likely tell you what your kids need to do to refuse your inheritance. And of course if you have more property than debt then they will take the inheritance and have to pay off your debt. Say you have a house worth a million and owe 100,000 to the bank, there is no way for me to get the house without having to pay back the 100,000.</p>


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Answer 8: <p>I think you are getting confused with your estate.  When you die, your estate inherits the debts, not your children.  And you cant sign yourself out of that.  The trustee then has the responsibility of paying off the debts if they are able to.</p>
<p>In India, traditionally, the eldest son inherits the debt of their father.  But this is not legal, its in the ethical, cultural and religious sense now.</p>


Tags: family-law, wills, debt, probate


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Question Title: Revenue share contract w merged company

Question Body: <p>Company A developed Product A and has a revenue sharing agreement with Partner A (who sold Product A) to Client A. The revenue sharing agreement is open ended, i.e. does not expire.</p>
<p>Enters Company B with Product B. Product A and Product B are essentially the same with  Product B being a newer version of Product A.</p>
<p>Company B acquires Company A who agrees to merge with Company B, with Company B being the surviving company. Company B intends to kill Product A and offer Product B instead to Client A.</p>
<p>Question -  what happens to the revenue share agreement with Partner A - does Partner A have the right to continue to invoice Company B for its revenue share... given that Product A was discontinued?</p>


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Answer 1: <h2>It depends on the contracts</h2>
<p><strong>The &quot;merger&quot;</strong></p>
<p>Partner A has no contract with Company B, only with Company A. Therefore, Company B has no rights or obligations towards Partner A unless they are part of the merger or acquisition of Company A. So, there are two contracts that need to be considered, the original one between Partner A and Company A and the merger contract between Company B and Company A.</p>
<p>If the merger contract does not assign or novate the original contract from Company A to Company B, then Company B has no contract with Partner A. They can safely ignore Partner A.</p>


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<p>If the merger contract does not assign or novate the original contract from Company A to Company B, then Company B has no contract with Partner A. They can safely ignore Partner A.</p>
<p>If the original contract is <a href="https://feldman.law/news/what-happens-to-contracts-after-business-is-sold/#:%7E:text=When%20a%20transaction%20closes%2C%20the,process%20for%20each%20existing%20agreement." rel="nofollow noreferrer">assignable</a> (the default position) and the merger contract makes that assignment (either with reference to the particular contract or in general with all ongoing contracts), then Company B has assumed the rights and obligations of the contract with Person A as a successor-in-interest. At the same time, Company A remains liable for the obligations under the contract if Company B defaults. That is, if Person A is wronged under the contract, they can sue Company A or Company B, or both.</p>


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<p>If the contract is not assignable, it must be novated. this substitutes Company B for Company A as if they had always been a party to the contract. However, Person A has to agree to the novation. Such an agreement may already be in the original contract.</p>
<p>There are some contracts, notably personal services contracts, that are neither assignable nor novatable. In this case, a new contract would need to be negotiated.</p>
<p>Whatever happens, the merger will not end the contract - Person A will still have a contract with Company A <em>or</em> Company B. If it is an actual merger rather than an acquisition, there will be a new Company C that might hold the contract. Notwithstanding, there is still a contract between someone and Person A.</p>
<p><strong>The original contract</strong></p>
<blockquote>


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<p><strong>The original contract</strong></p>
<blockquote>
<p>Question - what happens to the revenue share agreement with Partner A - does Partner A have the right to continue to invoice Company B for its revenue share... given that Product A was discontinued?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Depends on what the contract says about discontinuing Product A.</p>
<p>While the contract, as described, is indefinite, I doubt very much if it is perpetual. Hopefully, the people who drafted the original contract dealt with the very realistic contingency that Company A (or whoever now holds the contract) might want to stop selling Product A. After all, no product keeps being sold forever. If so, then do what the contract says.</p>
<p>If it doesn't, then Company A (or whoever) is probably under no obligation to a) continue to sell Product A and b) pay Person A if they aren't.</p>


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Question Title: Is it illegal for an American to go to North Korea?

Question Body: <p>Is it illegal for US citizens to travel to North Korea?</p>
<p>It may currently be impossible and probably a very bad idea, but is it actually illegal?</p>


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Answer 1: <h3>Short Answer</h3>
<blockquote>
<p>Is it illegal for US citizens to travel to North Korea?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Yes (but see the &quot;fine print&quot; below).</p>
<h3>Long Answer</h3>
<p><a href="https://digitalemigre.com/relocation/countries-americans-cant-travel-to/" rel="noreferrer">There is</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>a US travel ban to North Korea for American citizens, as of July 2017.</p>
<p>Now, Americans wishing to travel to North Korea must obtain a Special
Validation Passport from the US Department of State, only issued under
very specific circumstances, such as for journalists covering the
region or for humanitarian aid workers.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The Biden administration <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/news/2021/09/01/travel-ban-extended-us-passport-north-korea/5685081001/" rel="noreferrer">extended the ban</a>, initially established by the Trump administration, on traveling to North Korea on a U.S. passport absent special approval:</p>


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<blockquote>
<p>The ban makes it illegal to use a U.S. passport for travel to, from or
through North Korea, also known as the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea, or the DPRK, unless the document has been specially validated.
Such validations are granted by the State Department only in the case
of compelling national interest.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The U.S. State Department <a href="https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/traveladvisories/traveladvisories/north-korea-travel-advisory.html" rel="noreferrer">confirms that this ban is still in place</a>. It <a href="https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/passports/how-apply/passport-for-travel-to-north-korea.html" rel="noreferrer">states that</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Travel to, in, or through North Korea <strong>on a U.S. passport</strong> without this
special validation may justify revocation of your passport for misuse
under 22 C.F.R. § 51.62(a)(3) and may subject you to felony


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special validation may justify revocation of your passport for misuse
under 22 C.F.R. § 51.62(a)(3) and may subject you to felony
prosecution under <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1544" rel="noreferrer">18 U.S.C. § 1544</a> or other applicable laws.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The maximum criminal penalty if you use a U.S. passport to go to North Korea and then return and a charged with a crime under 18 U.S.C. § 1544 are quite serious. You could be sent to prison for up to ten years for a first or second offense, or up to fifteen years if you have two prior convictions under this statute, and/or fined, even if you weren't a terrorist or drug dealer, although the actual sentence would probably be milder, if you were charged with a crime at all.</p>
<p>The criminal statute reads as follows (with the pertinent parts in bold):</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Whoever willfully and knowingly uses, or attempts to use, any passport
issued or designed for the use of another; or</p>


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<blockquote>
<p>Whoever willfully and knowingly uses, or attempts to use, any passport
issued or designed for the use of another; or</p>
<p><strong>Whoever willfully and knowingly uses or attempts to use any passport in violation of the conditions or restrictions therein contained, or
of the rules prescribed pursuant to the laws regulating the issuance
of passports; or</strong></p>
<p>Whoever willfully and knowingly furnishes, disposes of, or delivers a
passport to any person, for use by another than the person for whose
use it was originally issued and designed—</p>
<p><strong>Shall be fined under this title</strong>, <strong>imprisoned not more than</strong> 25 years (if
the offense was committed to facilitate an act of international
terrorism (as defined in section 2331 of this title)), 20 years (if
the offense was committed to facilitate a drug trafficking crime (as
defined in section 929(a) of this title)), <strong>10 years (in the case of


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the offense was committed to facilitate a drug trafficking crime (as
defined in section 929(a) of this title)), <strong>10 years (in the case of
the first or second such offense, if the offense was not committed to
facilitate such an act of international terrorism or a drug
trafficking crime), or 15 years (in the case of any other offense), or
both.</strong></p>
</blockquote>


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facilitate such an act of international terrorism or a drug
trafficking crime), or 15 years (in the case of any other offense), or
both.</strong></p>
</blockquote>
<p>There are also <a href="https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/north-korea-sanctions" rel="noreferrer">many other North Korean sanctions</a> (and keep in mind that North Korea is legally an &quot;enemy&quot; of the United States with which the U.S. is officially still at war and does not have diplomatic relations). The most recent of those, <a href="https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/7676/download?inline" rel="noreferrer">from 2017</a>, prohibits ships and aircraft owned by a &quot;foreign person&quot; which have been in North Korean in the last 180 days from entering the United States.</p>


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<p>The ban does not prohibit a dual citizen from traveling to North Korea on a passport from the person's other country of citizenship, nor does it prohibit U.S. citizens from entering North Korea without using a passport (although entering North Korea without a passport or visa probably violates North Korean law).</p>
<p>Of course, North Korea also regulates entry of people into North Korea under North Korean immigration laws. I do not know whether or not it is legal under North Korean law for people to enter it with a U.S. passport. But, given that the only U.S. citizen to enter North Korea without a special U.S. visa authorizing the trip in the last seven years was <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-66233797" rel="noreferrer">arrested immediately after crossing into North Korea this week</a>, it would appear that this is illegal under North Korean law as well.</p>


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Question Body: <p>I'm asking specifically about the validity of a conviction based on an allegation of &quot;failure to appear&quot; for a traffic camera violation.</p>
<p>Let's say that &quot;Lizzie&quot; receives a citation via USPS First Class mail for a traffic camera infraction.  She responds in a timely manner by signing and submitting the &quot;certificate of innocence&quot; that was included with the citation.  The form is returned via USPS First Class mail, the same method used by the court, within the 30 days required by the statute.</p>
<p>§ <a href="https://oregon.public.law/statutes/ors_810.436" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>ORS 810.436</em></a> (7)(a) states:</p>
<blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p>A registered owner of a vehicle may respond by mail to a citation issued under subsection (1) of this section by submitting, within 30 days from the mailing of the citation, a certificate of innocence swearing or affirming that the owner was not the driver of the vehicle and by providing a photocopy of the owner’s driver license. <em>A jurisdiction that receives a certificate of innocence under this paragraph <strong>shall dismiss the citation</strong> without requiring a court appearance by the registered owner or any other information from the registered owner other than the swearing or affirmation and the photocopy.</em> The citation may be reissued only once, only to the registered owner and only if the jurisdiction verifies that the registered owner appears to have been the driver at the time of the violation. A registered owner may not submit a certificate of innocence in response to a reissued citation.</p>
</blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p>Let's say that over a year later Lizzie receives, (again via USPS...) a notification of conviction and default judgement against her for failure to appear. There is no specific reason given for the allegation, only a list of possibilities:</p>
<blockquote>
<ol>
<li>You did not file a response to your citation.</li>
<li>You filed a response, but your response was missing information and could not be processed.</li>
<li>You did not appear at the court hearing you requested.</li>
</ol>
</blockquote>
<p>Each one of these is rebuttable. (<em>even if proof of delivery is absent, a sworn statement of fact ought to override an unspecified, unsubstantiated, and anonymous allegation from the boilerplate language of a form letter, right?</em>)</p>


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<p>Is there a requirement for the court to state the specific reason for a conviction <strong>in order for the conviction to be valid</strong>?  How can one appeal if the basis of the conviction is unknown, with only suggested or possible reasons presented in multiple choice format?</p>


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Answer 1: <blockquote>
<p>How can one appeal if the basis of the conviction is unknown, with only suggested or possible reasons presented in multiple choice format?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>You just appeal by rebutting <em>all</em> those possible reasons, and concluding that there was no reason for the conviction whatsoever.</p>


Tags: united-states, traffic, oregon


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Question Title: Do labor laws in the US forbid firing striking union members and hiring strikebreakers?

Question Body: <p>I'm particularly interested in the context of current WGA/SAG-AFTRA strike in the US, but this is a general question. If some business amid a union strike would terminate its agreement with a union, can it lay off the striking union members and hire non-union workers in their place? Are there any legal reasons they can't do that?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>It depends on the <a href="https://www.nlrb.gov/about-nlrb/rights-we-protect/the-law/employees/right-to-strike-and-picket" rel="nofollow noreferrer">nature of the strike</a>. If a strike is &quot;protected&quot; (allowed under the NLRA), you cannot be fired but if the strike is illegal, you can be. If the strike is legal and was at least in part over an unfair labor practice, you must be immediately reinstated after the strike ends. If the strike is over economic issues, you might have been replaced with a permanent employee so you are placed on a preferential hiring list. However this right to reinstatement can be lost if you engage in serious misconduct in connection with the strike or picketing.</p>


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Answer 2: <p>A business cannot unilaterally terminate a collective bargaining agreement (the &quot;Contract&quot;), nor terminate a union's representation of its members.</p>
<p>A business may hire non-union employees to work during a work stoppage (&quot;strike&quot;), or may have exempt (management) employees perform the duties of the striking employees.  The union employees must be re-hired after a legal strike is over.  Caterpillar famously employed these tactics during a 17 month strike in the 1990s that was disastrous to the striking workers, who were forced to agree to significant concessions to end the strike.</p>


Tags: united-states, labor-law


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Question Title: Is there a copyright issue for TikTok or YouTube users who upload a short film on the app?

Question Body: <p>Uploading an entire movie without permission from the copyright holder is definitely an issue.</p>
<p>Since everyone is doing it and nobody gets sued, can we assume it is <strong>not</strong> a copyright violation? (Not necessarily, right?)</p>
<p>There should be more detail and complex lines over here. Please help me understand better.</p>


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Answer 1: <p>No, one cannot safely assume that because some people have done a thing without being sued, that it is OK to do a similar thing and no suit is possible.</p>
<p>It is possible that people who upload a video, or a section of it, have permission. It is perhaps more likely that the copyright owner does not choose to sue, for whatever reason. But a different owner of a different video might make a different choice.</p>
<p>Uploading a video, or even a section of a video, without permission, will be copyright infringement, unless an <em><strong>exception to copyright</strong></em> such as <em><strong>fair use</strong></em> or <em><strong>fair dealing</strong></em> applies. Such an infringement gives the copyright owner valid grounds to bring a suit. But the owner can choose whether or not to sue.  An owner can sue in one case of infringement but not in another, for any reason or none.</p>


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<p>If the expected damages are small, it many not be worth the time, trouble, and costs to sue. In the US, one must register a copyright before bringing suit for infringement of that copyright, and there is a fee for registration. Some owners feel strongly about the use of their work, and will sue on any pretext. Some may prefer to tacitly support uses that they approve of by not bringing suit. One cannot tell the attitude of a particular owner unless that owner has stated what his or her view is.</p>
<p>Short films are just as protected as full-length feature films, and suit can be filed for infringing the copyright on a short film. But the more expensive a film was to make, and the more money the owner expects it to earn, the more likely it is that the owner will choose to sue.</p>


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<p>Many people infringe by uploading short films or videos, gambling that the copyright owners will never learn of this, or will not trouble to sue. Sometimes such infringers are correct, and sometimes they get sued.</p>
<p>I do not understand what the OP means by the part of the question that reads &quot;<em>There should be more detail and complex lines over here</em>&quot; What additional detail is wanted? Who does the OP expect to provide it? What sort of &quot;lines&quot; does this refer to?</p>


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Question Title: Took a picture of a bus stop showing a poster of a well known soccer player

Question Body: <p>Is it OK to post a picture I took of a bus stop I saw displaying a poster of a well known soccer player? Since then, I've seen it in many bus stops throughout the city.
Want to post it on my website. Can I do it without having to ask for permission to show it? Do I then have the ownership rights to the picture?</p>


Answer 1: <h2>Is your picture of the bus stop or the poster?</h2>
<p><a href="/questions/tagged/australia" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-australia-tooltip-container">australia</a></p>
<p>It is not a breach of copyright to <em>incidentally</em> capture copyright material in a photograph. It is a breach to substantially reproduce that copyrighted material.</p>


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Answer 2: <p><strong>Details of copyright law depend on the country.</strong></p>
<p>Imagine Alice goes to a museum and takes a photo of a work of art. In many countries, she could not use that photo without the permission of the artist and/or the museum.</p>
<p>Alice now goes outside the museum and takes a photo of the building. Possibly the same here, the architecture is protected just like the artwork inside.</p>
<p>Now Bob visits the same country. Bob takes a selfie in front of the skyline of the city, showing the museum and other parts of the scenery. In some countries, it would be recognized that Bob's main intent is to take a picture of himself, with the architecture in the background. So that is different from Alice's case.</p>
<p>Charlie takes the picture at the bus stop you mention. There are now two or three things to consider:</p>
<ul>
<li>Who holds the copyright of the poster? Possibly a photographer or an advertising agency.</li>


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<ul>
<li>Who holds the copyright of the poster? Possibly a photographer or an advertising agency.</li>
<li>Does the sports star have any rights regarding his likeness? Here the rules depend on the country. It might matter how much the star is a public figure, and if the image does constitute a 'legitimate' news event.<br />
<strong>Possibly the star has signed a 'model release' for a very specific scope and payment. This release could not be circumvented by taking a picture of the picture.</strong></li>
<li>Could Charlie's picture be called a <em>reproduction</em> of the original poster, or is the poster clearly in the background.</li>
</ul>


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Answer 3: <h2>An advertisement on the street is part of Panoramafreiheit in <a href="/questions/tagged/germany" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-germany-tooltip-container">germany</a></h2>
<p>German courts had to decide, if the decor of a ship, which moves around, is an exception to copyright - and that even ads on a bus fall under this. As a result, ads on a bus stop <em>also</em> qualify for the exception. <a href="http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgi-bin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bgh&amp;Art=en&amp;Datum=Aktuell&amp;nr=78115&amp;linked=pm" rel="nofollow noreferrer">In the judgment of the 27. April 2017 &quot;I ZR 247/15 - AIDA Kussmund&quot; the highest german court decided:</a></p>
<blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p>Der u.a. für das Urheberrecht zuständige I. Zivilsenat des Bundesgerichtshofs hat heute entschieden, dass sich die sogenannte Panoramafreiheit auf Kunstwerke erstreckt, die nicht ortsfest sind.</p>
<p>Ein Werk befindet sich im Sinne dieser Vorschrift [<a href="https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/urhg/__59.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">§ 59 Abs. 1 Satz 1 UrhG</a>] an öffentlichen Wegen, Straßen oder Plätzen, wenn es von Orten aus, die unter freiem Himmel liegen und für jedermann frei zugänglich sind, wahrgenommen werden kann. Diese Voraussetzung ist auch dann erfüllt, wenn ein Werk nicht ortsfest ist und sich nacheinander an verschiedenen öffentlichen Orten befindet. <strong>Ein Werk befindet sich bleibend an solchen Orten, wenn es aus Sicht der Allgemeinheit dazu bestimmt ist, für längere Dauer dort zu sein.</strong></p>


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<p>Die Panoramafreiheit erfasst daher beispielsweise Werke an Fahrzeugen, die bestimmungsgemäß im öffentlichen Straßenverkehr eingesetzt werden. Dabei kann es sich etwa um Werbung auf Omnibussen oder Straßenbahnen handeln, die den Anforderungen an Werke der angewandten Kunst genügt. Das Fotografieren und Filmen im öffentlichen Raum würde zu weitgehend eingeschränkt, wenn die Aufnahme solcher Fahrzeuge urheberrechtliche Ansprüche auslösen könnte. Künstler, die Werke für einen solchen Verwendungszweck schaffen, müssen es daher hinnehmen, dass ihre Werke an diesen öffentlichen Orten ohne ihre Einwilligung fotografiert oder gefilmt werden.</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>The I. Civil Senate of the Federal Court of Justice, which is responsible for copyright law, has today ruled that the so-called freedom of panorama extends to works of art that are not fixed in place.</p>
<p>[...]</p>


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<p>[...]</p>
<p>According to [the relevant] provision, a work is considered to be located in public paths, streets, or squares if it can be perceived from places that are outdoors and freely accessible to everyone. This condition is also fulfilled if a work is not fixed in place and is located successively in different public locations. <strong>A work is considered to be permanently located at such places if, from the perspective of the public, it is intended to be there for an extended period.</strong></p>


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<p>Therefore, the freedom of panorama also applies to works, for example, on vehicles that are intended for use in public road traffic. This could include advertisements on buses or trams that meet the requirements of works of applied art. If the photographing and filming of such vehicles could trigger copyright claims, it would overly restrict photography and filming in public spaces. Artists who create works for such purposes must, therefore, accept that their works may be photographed or filmed at these public places without their consent.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The ship's exterior was deemed to be under Panoramafreiheit, and thus an exception to copyright, just as much as any other building facade, the decor of vehicles and rolling as well as standing pieces of advertisement.</p>
<p>under German law, you can have exploitation and copyrights in <strong>your</strong> picture, but you do not gain any in the underlying work that you depicted in your picture.</p>


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Question Body: <p>With the current big tech firing frenzy I'd like to know if a US company must prefer the US citizens over working visa holders during mass lay offs?</p>
<p>Let's say if there are 2 software developers but one is an immigrant, a working visa holder and the second is a citizen. They are both at the same level, professionally.</p>
<p>Must the American companies prioritize citizens in keeping them hired and let the foreign nationals go?</p>
<p>I know when a company sponsoring working visas they must prove the need and show they aren't able to source workers inside the US prior to getting the visas for the foreign candidates. So logically, it might follow that they should also priorities the citizens in case of mass lay offs. Can a company be sued by a citizen for keeping the foreign national if he can prove the wrong doing?</p>
<p>Is there any reference in working visas(i.e.H1B) application saying something that in case of mass lay offs these conditions can happen?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>There is no law in the US that mandates hiring preference for US citizens over others. Such a preference would be <a href="https://www.eeoc.gov/national-origin-discrimination" rel="nofollow noreferrer">&quot;national origin discrimination&quot;</a>, which</p>
<blockquote>
<p>involves treating people (applicants or employees) unfavorably because
they are from a particular country or part of the world, because of
ethnicity or accent, or because they appear to be of a certain ethnic
background (even if they are not).</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Preferring US citizens entails dispreferring others, such as some of those who come from another country. The <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/99th-congress/senate-bill/1200/text" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986</a> makes it illegal for an employer to discriminate with respect to hiring, firing, or recruitment based upon an individual's citizenship or immigration status.</p>


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<p>An employer is however allowed, indeed required, to obey any overriding federal law, for example they can refuse to hire a person who has no legal right be being employed because their visa does not allow employment.</p>


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Question Title: Ex bank account

Question Body: <p>My boyfriend at the time wanted me to go to town and get some money from his account. We live an hour from town so he gave me his card like always before. I had this check from a ad company that was in my car, at the time I didn't have a account so I got his money out of the atm.</p>
<p>Then I proceeded to deposit my check like I have down before, they said it takes 24 to 48 hrs like always. Monday morning comes around and the bank called him and said they were closing his account for fraudulent check. All the bank did was close his account no charges.</p>
<p>But today because we are not together he thinks he can press charges on me can he?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>It will depend a lot on how you endorsed the check.  You should have signed the check over to your ex, and put &quot;For Deposit Only&quot; in ex's account.  I bet you didn't do anything like that, because that's fairly obscure banking stuff they don't teach in school anymore.</p>
<p>But yes, taking money out of an account not yours, without permission and without replacing that money, will put you in legal jeopardy <strong>because you did not promptly replace the money</strong> /cover it / make it good.  The substance of the crime is in not replacing the money promptly.</p>
<p>I mean it's technically a crime if you do replace the money, but there is no <em>mens rea</em> or &quot;guilty mind&quot;, which is an essential element of a crime.  For instance, I one pumped gas and drove off. I got a phone call from a police detective, and I immediately high-tailed it back to the gas station and paid my bill with a hearty apology.  <em>Nothing more was made of it</em>.</p>


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<p>Since your boyfriend now seems to be hostile, I would advise re-paying your boyfriend using a payment method which is tracked and leaves a paper trail - like a cashier's check from a bank where you have a relationship.  If you pay the boyfriend cash, nothing proves you paid it!</p>
<p>You might even consider opening your own account at the bank involved in this crisis.  Then you can say &quot;look, that wasn't a fraudulent check at all, I just used bad judgment sharing an ATM, and I'd like to deposit that check into my own account here&quot;.  The banker may be able to do that relatively efficiently, since they will have the check (or a Check21 compliant certified copy).  Expect that money to have a long hold on it.</p>


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Question Title: Suppose I incorporate in Delaware. If I sell online services to ppl anywhere in the US, do I need to register as foreign in every state?

Question Body: <p>Suppose I incorporate in Delaware, with an agent that has a physical address there to represent the company in Delaware, and I live in California building an online service from home.</p>
<p>First do I need to register as a foreign company in California just because I live there?</p>
<p>If people from anywhere in the US pay for the online service, do I need to register as foreign corporation in every state where my users are located?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>An entity is usually required to have a foreign corporation registration in as state when it &quot;does business&quot; in the state, although ultimately, this is mostly a matter of state law.</p>
<p>The place where the work is done by its officers, employees, and agents would be one place where the company &quot;does business&quot;, in this case California. California is the state which is the single most likely to aggressively enforce that requirement because it ties into its Franchise Tax Board tax collection agency's functions.</p>


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<p>Usually, it would be optional to register in a state where one sends goods or data via third-party instrumentalities of interstate commerce (e.g. telephones, the Internet, U.S. mail, FedEx), without having an office or employee or agent for the conduct of business there (following the now overruled standard of <em>International Shoe</em> related to general jurisdiction over corporations or other non-residents of a state and the now overruled <em>Quill</em> case regarding sales taxing jurisdiction). This is probably still good law in most cases, although the inquiry would be fact specific and would also depend upon the requirements of state law.</p>
<p>The nature of the services provided over the Internet would also matter.</p>


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<p>The nature of the services provided over the Internet would also matter.</p>
<p>For example, if you provided advice on Iowa law as a lawyer, from an office in California, to Iowa clients with no connection to California, you would probably be &quot;doing business&quot; in Iowa. But, if you simply allowed people to access your non-Iowa specific data base from Iowa that was maintained in California, you are probably not doing business in Iowa, even if you charge a fee for doing so.</p>


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Question Title: How far do terms and conditions go to prevent sale of 3D printed models

Question Body: <p>It has already been made well clear that <a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/questions/7336/does-a-3d-print-of-a-cad-file-constitute-a-derivative-work">a 3D print is a derivative work</a> and thus subject to any license it is obtained under. However, many designers include rules, such as you not being able to give away any 3D prints of their models, even as gifts. However, were I to unexpectedly die and not have informed any of my kin, and one of them took these models, would the same terms apply to them? Would they be able to sell them at, for example, a rummage sale?</p>
<p>Similarly, many designers offer a commercial tier giving you permission to sell their models, however, in that case, would the buyer then have the right to sell the model by right of first sale?</p>


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Answer 1: <h2><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First-sale_doctrine" rel="nofollow noreferrer">First Sale Doctrine</a></h2>
<p>One of the rights a copyright holder has is an exclusive right &quot;to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending&quot;. 17 U.S.C. 106(3). This is distinct from the reproduction right they have to make copies or derivative works.</p>
<p>So, absent a licence, you can neither make the model nor distribute the model.</p>
<p>If you are operating under a licence, that is a legally binding contract between you and the copyright holder. If it says that you cannot give away models, then doing so is a breach of that contract and a breach of copyright for which you could be sued.</p>


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<p>However, if you did sell or give away the model to a third party, that would be a lawful transfer of title in the object itself, even though it is a breach of contract. An innocent third party (i.e. one who has no knowledge of the breach) would be a lawful owner and could do what they liked with the object and, under the first-sale doctrine, is not bound by the licence.</p>
<p>If you were to die, the executor or administrator of your estate would be bound by the terms of the licence (whether they knew about them or not), and if they breached them, they would be liable for that breach. If done in good faith, they could seek indemnity from the estate, but if the estate has insufficient funds or has been finalised, they would be personally liable. This is largely theoretical as the copyright owner would have to pursue their claim so promptly that unless they were actively monitoring the death notices for anyone who ever downloaded their model, they would miss their chance.</p>


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<p>A third party who received the physical model from the estate, either by buying it or being given it as a beneficiary, would own it and have first-sale doctrine rights.</p>
<p>Although originally a US concept (<em>Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus</em> 1908), it is my understanding that the first-sale doctrine has since spread to all common-law countries. The last was Australia in <em>Calidad v Seiko Epson</em> [2020] HCA 41.</p>
<h2>... the public ...</h2>
<p>The above analysis presumes that the people you are gifting the models to are &quot;the public&quot;. This may not be the case where the models are distributed to a small circle of people like family and friends.</p>


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<p>In that case, there is no general right of distribution, and the copyright owner would need to rely on their right of reproduction. That is, in <em>making</em> the copy in order to give the object away, you breached the licence. This becomes problematic when your decision to give away the object happens later, possibly years later, possibly after you're dead.</p>
<p>So, it might not be a problem for the executor or administrator to distribute the object to a beneficiary, but it might be a problem to sell it at a deceased-estate auction. The former is not distribution to &quot;the public&quot;; the latter is.</p>


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Question Title: What is the smallest audience for a communication that has been deemed capable of defamation?


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Question Body: <p>Descriptions of the criteria for defamation seem widely to describe any statement that is communicated to a third party as being defamatory if they are (broadly speaking) false and harmful.</p>
<p>This seems to allow for the possibility that relatively private communications can be deemed defamatory, even though most high-profile defamation cases involve public statements accessible to large if not unlimited audiences. Of course, the smaller the audience the more unusual it seems likely to be that such a communication could meet the <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/26/section/1" rel="noreferrer">serious harm test of the Defamation Act 2013</a>, yet it doesn't seem impossible that the right lie told to the right person could yet have serious enough consequences to be defamatory.</p>
<p>Are there examples of very small-scale communications that have been tested for their ability to defame?</p>


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<p>Are there examples of very small-scale communications that have been tested for their ability to defame?</p>
<p>Tagged <a href="/questions/tagged/england-and-wales" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-england-and-wales-tooltip-container">england-and-wales</a> since inspired by Nigel Farage's <a href="https://twitter.com/Nigel_Farage/status/1683140521064103942" rel="noreferrer">claim</a> that internal correspondence shared internally between employees of a bank were defamatory, but other jurisdictions welcome too.</p>


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Answer 1: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/canada" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-canada-tooltip-container">canada</a></p>
<p>Damages for libel have been awarded based on publication to a single individual.</p>
<p>The elements of defamation are (<em>Grant v. Torstar Corp.</em>, <a href="https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/7837/index.do" rel="noreferrer">2009 SCC 61</a>, para. 28):</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(1) that the impugned words were defamatory, in the sense that they would tend to lower the plaintiff’s reputation in the eyes of a reasonable person; (2) that the words in fact referred to the plaintiff; and (3) that the words were published, meaning that they were <strong>communicated to at least one person other than the plaintiff</strong>.</p>
</blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p>For an example, see <em>Faryna v. Chorny</em>, <a href="https://canlii.ca/t/gc4lv" rel="noreferrer">[1952] 2 D.L.R. 354</a> (B.C.C.A). A letter &quot;imputing unchastity&quot; of a housekeeper was sent to a single individual.</p>


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Answer 2: <h2>1</h2>
<p><a href="/questions/tagged/australia" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-australia-tooltip-container">australia</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>To be defamatory, the material has to be published (communicated by any means, including written, orally, pictorially) <strong>to at least one person</strong> other than the person making the claim.</p>
</blockquote>
<p><a href="https://www.artslaw.com.au/information-sheet/defamation-law/" rel="noreferrer">Arts Law Information Sheet</a></p>
<p>Whether disclosure to one person can cause real harm depends on what is told and to whom. A lie to a (prospective) employer, University admissions officer, or security service vetting agent could be very damaging.</p>


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Answer 3: <p>Consider the case of Oscar Wilde v the Marquess of Queensbury, which has become a text-book example.</p>
<p>Queensbury handed to a porter at Wilde's club a calling card on which he'd written something like 'To Oscar Wilde posing as a somdomite [sic].(accounts vary, but not relevantly.)</p>
<p>The people actually seeing the comment on the card might have included only the porter but a potentially much larger audience was undoubted.</p>
<p>The law being more stringent back in 1895, Queensbury was apparently arrested and criminally charged with libel.</p>
<p>As it happens, Wilde lost his case on the grounds that Queensbury's remark was not defamatory but rather, true but even that is not relevant.</p>
<p>What matters is that the card was left lying around the club and might have been seen by anyone picking it up and turning it over - or simply by the porter to whom it was actually given.</p>
<p>That is to say, the audience need be no larger than 'perhaps one or more'.</p>


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<p>That is to say, the audience need be no larger than 'perhaps one or more'.</p>
<p>Of course if it was established that the audience was in fact no more than one, damages would be correspondingly small and but the degree of defamation is not the point: libel did or dit not occur.</p>


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Question Title: I have mechanic licence from Turkey.Is there any way to easly get or change mechanic technician licenses in Alberta or Ontario

Question Body: <p>I am auto mechanic.  I came to Canada 5 years ago I wanna do my job here but almost all places saying you need 4 years and every year 1500 hours and 8 weeks school than you can get license.  Is there any way to avoid that time or make it Less with my turkish mechanic license and experience?  Thank you .</p>


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Answer 1: <p>In Ontario, you can apply for a <a href="https://www.skilledtradesontario.ca/experienced-workers/trade-equivalency-assessment/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Trade Equivalency Assessment.</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>Skilled Trades Ontario’s Trade Equivalency Assessment is the first step towards obtaining a Certificate of Qualification for experienced workers who have not completed an Ontario apprenticeship but who have equivalent skills and experience. The Trade Equivalency Assessment determines whether you can challenge the certifying exam for a trade. If successful in the exam, you would pay a fee to be issued a Certificate of Qualification in that trade.</p>
</blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p>In other words, this is a certification that you've gained practical skills and have enough work experience (which I would expect to be about <a href="https://www.skilledtradesontario.ca/trade-information/automotive-service-technician/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">four years</a>, since that's what's required for people starting from scratch via the Ontario  apprenticeship system.)  You then also have to take a certifying exam.</p>
<p>In Alberta, you can apply for the <a href="https://tradesecrets.alberta.ca/become-certified/qualify-based-on-work-experience/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Trades Qualifier - Work Experience</a> program.  For an <a href="https://tradesecrets.alberta.ca/trades-in-alberta/profiles/009/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Automotive Service Technician,</a> this requires:</p>
<blockquote>
<ul>
<li>A minimum of 72 months AND 9,360 hours of work experience.</li>
<li>A successful theory exam.</li>


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<blockquote>
<ul>
<li>A minimum of 72 months AND 9,360 hours of work experience.</li>
<li>A successful theory exam.</li>
<li>A Trades Competency Verification (TCV) <em>[a practical exam — ed.]</em></li>
</ul>
</blockquote>


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Question Title: Where in U.S. law is it officially argued that the U.S. criminal justice system presumes defendants commit crimes with free will?


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Question Body: <p>I've been studying the relation between free will and the U.S. criminal justice system, and it appears that there is the argument that whether or not a defendant had free will to commit a crime is a significant factor in determining whether or not the defendant is factually guilty of having committed a crime.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>A &quot;universal and persistent&quot; foundation stone in our system of law, and particularly in our approach to punishment, sentencing, and incarceration, is the &quot;belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil.&quot;</p>
</blockquote>
<ul>
<li><a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/438/41/" rel="noreferrer">United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978)</a></li>
</ul>
<p>From a website of Attorney John Guidry,</p>
<blockquote>


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</ul>
<p>From a website of Attorney John Guidry,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Free will creates the moral structure that provides the foundation for our criminal justice system. Without it, most punishments in place today must be eliminated completely.</p>
</blockquote>
<ul>
<li>&quot;<a href="https://www.jgcrimlaw.com/free-will-determinism-and-the-criminal-justice-system.html" rel="noreferrer">Free Will, Determinism, and the Criminal Justice System</a>&quot;</li>
</ul>
<p>However, it does not appear to be published much in legal literature of legal cases. From what I have studied, the legal system adheres to the philosophy that criminals commit crimes via compatibilist free will. This, however, is from what I have pieced together from legal literature that I have read over the past 10 years. It seems to be a tenet that comes from the neo-classical school of criminology.</p>


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<p>I have yet to read some kind of Federal or State source that argues that compatibilist free will is presumed to be had by anyone who commits a crime. For instance, I might construe the appeal of Grayson v. United States to not touch upon findings of guilt but instead punishment, sentencing, and incarceration (as if whether or not a defendant had free will influences those aspects of a criminal case rather than influences a finding of criminal guilt).</p>
<p>Where in U.S. law is it officially argued that the U.S. criminal justice system presumes defendants commit crimes with free will?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>It is an unquestioned pre-American axiom, expressed in Latin as <em>actus reus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea</em> (&quot;the act is not culpable unless the mind is guilty&quot;) which has been part of the Anglo-American legal system since at least the 17th century. It is thus presupposed in all criminal proceedings. It's not that a person only commits a crime with free will, it's that it is not deemed to be a crime if there is no free will. A person can be held at gunpoint and required to commit a criminal act: the person does indeed have free will to choose to be killed rather than commit the act, but the act is legally excused since dying is never held to be the only acceptable alternative to committing an otherwise-criminal act.</p>


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Answer 2: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/canada" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-canada-tooltip-container">canada</a></p>
<p>Conduct that is involuntary (in the sense of having no conscious control or awareness of one's actions) &quot;cannot be criminal&quot; (<em>R. v. Brown</em>, <a href="https://decisions.scc-csc.ca/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/19389/index.do" rel="noreferrer">2022 SCC 18</a>):</p>
<blockquote>
<p>To deprive a person of their liberty for that involuntary conduct committed in a state akin to automatism — conduct that cannot be criminal — violates the principles of fundamental justice in a system of criminal justice based on personal responsibility for one’s actions.</p>
</blockquote>


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Answer 3: <p>I don't see how any legal system, US,or otherwise, could work without the assumption of free will.</p>
<ul>
<li>Defendant: I don't have free will, so I can't be held responsible for my actions.</li>
<li>Judge: I don't have free will either, so I'm going to have to sentence you.</li>
</ul>


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Answer 4: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/wisconsin" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;wisconsin&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;wisconsin&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-wisconsin-tooltip-container">wisconsin</a></p>
<p>I found the following in <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6114749198337627541&amp;q=56%20Wis.%202d%20808&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=4,50&amp;as_vis=1" rel="noreferrer">State v. Vinson</a>, 269 Wis. 305 - Wis: Supreme Court 1955:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The instruction of which appellant complains does no more than inform the jury of the well-known rule that <strong>one is presumed to intend the natural and reasonable consequences of his acts but that the presumption may be rebutted.</strong><br />


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&quot;... there are certain presumptions which react against accused, such as the presumption of sanity, considered below in sec. 584, of knowledge of the law, see infra sec. 586, and that a person intends the natural and reasonable consequences of his acts, ...&quot; 22 C. J. S., Criminal Law, p. 893, sec. 579.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>I don't know that it's possible to intend to do something without free will, so I think these presumptions also imply a presumption of free will.</p>
<p>The citation to a law encyclopedia would seem to indicate that these presumptions come from common law, and not from any particular statute (if the presumptions came from statute, they'd cite the statute instead.)</p>


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Answer 5: <p>I may be wrong, but it sounds like the question is flawed in that it makes inaccurate assumptions... namely; our legal system specifically addresses free will. It does not.</p>
<p>To operate effectively we assume a person cannot be found guilty of committing a crime unless they did so with the ability to make a choice.</p>
<p>From a recent ruling:</p>
<h2>SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus KAHLER v. KANSAS CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF KANSAS No. 18–6135. Argued October 7, 2019—Decided March 23, 2020</h2>
<p><em>from page 3, paragraph 1</em></p>
<blockquote>
<p>Defining the precise relationship between criminal culpability and mental illness requires balancing complex considerations, among them the workings of the brain, the purposes of criminal law, and the ideas of free will and responsibility. This balance should remain open to revision as new medical knowledge emerges and societal norms evolve.</p>
</blockquote>


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Answer 6: <p>Even if we were like machines or primitive animals, just reacting to the input we get in a deterministic fashion, the justice system still makes sense.</p>
<p>It is clear that punishment has effect, and that people like to avoid punishment, no matter whether this a free choice or just wired into our brain.</p>
<p>So I see no reason why Free Will is a necessary assumption.</p>


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Answer 7: <p>After some reflection, I have theorized that where it is &quot;officially&quot; stated that the American criminal justice system presumes that defendants commit crimes with free will is found in the U.S. Constitution: To clarify, a necessary component of something being a crime (in the U.S.) is that the alleged crime was done with free will. More specifically, the official stating of such is found in the due process clauses of the U.S. Constitution, namely the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.</p>
<p>My reasoning for this is derived from the U.S. Constitution's Supremacy Clause:</p>
<p>&quot;This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.&quot;</p>


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<p>As such, if there is something to be learned about how the American legal system works, it should be able to be derived from the U.S. Constitution. Although the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments do not explicitly detail how free will is presumed to exist within those who have committed a crime in the land of the U.S., case law [such as United States v. Grayson 438 U.S. 41 (1978)] explicates this matter. Furthermore, common law tradition of free will being a component of a crime having been committed is codified in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments rather than explicitly argued.</p>
<p>So, two things:</p>
<ol>
<li>As part of guaranteeing due process, it's required that for something to qualify as a crime, it must have been committed via free will. (It's not fair to consider otherwise)</li>
<li>As part of due process, it is presumed that all persons have free will.</li>
</ol>
<p><strong>Answer: The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.</strong></p>


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Question Title: In California, simply spectating a &quot;sideshow&quot; is illegal (jailtime/fine). Is this constitutional?


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Question Body: <p>In the Bay Area, there is a problem called &quot;sideshows&quot;, where youths do dangerous stunts with cars (like donuts) on public streets, usually at an intersection <a href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/transcoded/7/7f/SanJoseSideshow-Americancarculture-2021-7-11.webm/SanJoseSideshow-Americancarculture-2021-7-11.webm.720p.vp9.webm" rel="noreferrer">(example video)</a>. California, wanting to crackdown on this, has put out increasingly harsh laws. But some of these laws seem to have gone over the line to me. For example, I heard on ABC news that it is now illegal to spectate or record a sideshow. It is punishable by up to 6 months in prison or a $1000 fine.</p>


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<p>But doesn't this violate the Constitution, or some personal freedom? If a random passerby happens to see cars doing donuts, and stops to rubberneck (just watch), or even record, can that really be made illegal? I'm no expert in law or the constitution, but it just seems like an overreach to me... Perhaps it violates the First Amendment, which includes the right to gather and disseminate information about matters of public interest, if I recall correctly.</p>
<p>Edit: link to <a href="https://www.kron4.com/news/bay-area/watching-a-sideshow-in-san-jose-is-now-a-crime/1969817695" rel="noreferrer">an article</a> about the law being passed on April 30, 2019</p>


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Answer 1: <p>The San Jose version of the ordinance is presumably <a href="https://library.municode.com/ca/san_jose/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=TIT10PUPEMOWE_CH10.50SPPRSTRAREDREX_10.50.020SPPRSTRAREDREX" rel="nofollow noreferrer">this</a>. The term &quot;spectator&quot; is defined as:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>any person who is present at a Street Race or Reckless Driving
Exhibition, or the site of the Preparations for either of these
activities, for the purpose of viewing, observing, watching, or
witnessing the event as it progresses. A &quot;Spectator&quot; includes any
person at the location of the event without regard to the means by
which the person arrived</p>
</blockquote>
<p>which rules out a person why &quot;just happens to be there&quot;, and it does include a person who was driving by and decided to watch.</p>


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which the person arrived</p>
</blockquote>
<p>which rules out a person why &quot;just happens to be there&quot;, and it does include a person who was driving by and decided to watch.</p>
<p>It is specifically limited to &quot;a Street Race conducted on a public street or highway&quot; or &quot;a Reckless Driving Exhibition conducted on a public street or highway or in an Offstreet Parking Facility&quot;. These terms are also defined – it does for example not include watching a street mime. The events being watch are violations of the state vehicle code (speeding, reckless driving). All of this would pass muster if constitutionally challenged – it is a narrowly-tailored restriction on the right to assembly that is necessary for a compelling government interest.</p>
<p>§10.50.025 also makes it</p>
<blockquote>
<p>unlawful for any person to knowingly encourage, promote, instigate,
assist, facilitate, aid, or abet</p>
</blockquote>


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<p>§10.50.025 also makes it</p>
<blockquote>
<p>unlawful for any person to knowingly encourage, promote, instigate,
assist, facilitate, aid, or abet</p>
</blockquote>
<p>said activities. The internet claims that this means you can't Tweet about one of these events, and this may be the ordinance you have in mind. This ordinance could easily be found to be unconstitutionally vague, because it may well be interpreted to mean &quot;comment on it on Twitter&quot;, which is a protected expression.</p>


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Answer 2: <p>No right is absolute, and all are held in balance with each other as well as the interests of the government (public order, public health and safety, etc.).</p>
<p>To make it short: rights to assembly and speech can usually be abridged in the interests of resolving an immediate public safety issue or other illegal act.  Which the events you describe certainly are on both counts—they endanger participants, spectators, bystanders, and public and private property alike, as well as creating a public nuisance (such as via noise ordinances) etc.—and spectating and recording them only contributes to and encourages the issue.</p>


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<p>The exact legal standards for when a right can be abridged depends on the right. For free speech issues it's usually &quot;narrowly tailored to suit a compelling government interest&quot; (but note &quot;narrowly tailored&quot; is more permissive than you might think), and there are <a href="https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1023/time-place-and-manner-restrictions" rel="nofollow noreferrer">time, place, and manner restrictions</a> the government can avail itself of. The behavior you indicate seems to fall well within these exceptions, and it's arguable in what sense there's meaningful &quot;speech&quot; going on here in the first place.  For right to assembly, in addition to time, place, and manner exceptions <a href="https://www.lawyers.com/legal-info/criminal/the-right-to-gather-has-some-restrictions.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">there's another, usually less restrictive (on the government), set of standards</a>, which includes threats to public health and safety.


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rel="nofollow noreferrer">there's another, usually less restrictive (on the government), set of standards</a>, which includes threats to public health and safety.  And street races and stunts are clear examples thereof, as the drivers can easily lose control or the cars otherwise veer into spectators and/or property (plus the damage they are likely inflicting to the public roadways themselves, above and beyond normal permitted use).  Furthermore, cities in California (and presumably elsewhere) have been dealing with this issue for years, and simply focusing on just the stunt performers and drivers has proven inadequate to address a compelling public safety issue.</p>


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<p>I had some initial difficulties finding explicit references to fines of spectators other than your own brief article.  <a href="https://www.greghillassociates.com/street-race-spectator-l-a-mc-47-15-reduced-to-infraction.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">But here's a whole case synopsis from LA</a>, specifically as an infraction of <a href="https://codelibrary.amlegal.com/codes/los_angeles/latest/lamc/0-0-0-133112" rel="nofollow noreferrer">LA MC 47.15</a>.  Notably, at no point is there any mention of trying to contest the validity of the law; only if the particular requirements (intent to spectate and proximity) were met and the difficulty in the ticketing officer to remember those things without it being easy for the defense to undercut this.  They negotiated a plea deal, ultimately, to avoid jail time. Now not everyone is willing and able to contest things all the way up the appellate chain; even those that contest and appeal sometimes stop before reaching SCOTUS, for any number


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to avoid jail time. Now not everyone is willing and able to contest things all the way up the appellate chain; even those that contest and appeal sometimes stop before reaching SCOTUS, for any number of reasons. But this seems suggestive nevertheless: a law office is putting forth a &quot;we negotiated this down&quot; rather than a &quot;we contested it's validity wholesale&quot; as an example of the kind of service and results you can get through them on this sort of issue.</p>


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<p>Combined, I would conclude that there is little reason to think a court would find the law unconstitutional.</p>


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Question Title: FOIA request takes too long

Question Body: <p>I submitted a FOIA request to State Dept. of the United States. The FOIA request was immediately acknowledged, assigned a number and I was notified that it is being processed. This was some 180 days ago. I queried several times on the status of FOIA and was replied that it is still in process and that it was in &quot;complex category&quot;.</p>
<p>I fully appreciate that pandemic context makes the work harder, but what I asked is a specific document some 30 years ago and, while probably not digitized, I did not expect FOIA to take half a year.</p>
<p>My questions are - is this normal to take FOIA this much time, even if it's in complex category. Secondly, what options do I have to press SD to produce the document or deny my request.</p>


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Answer 1: <p>The State Department has what I believe are deliberately awful FOIA processing guidelines, which categorize virtually every request as complex, unless all the requested documents are  &quot;<a href="https://foia.state.gov/Learn/Reports/Officer/2020.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">readily available for release</a>.&quot; Exactly what that means, I don't know, but I think it's safe to assume that they would not consider a 30-year-old document readily available.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, that designation does not, as I understand it, have any effect on the statutory deadline to respond to the request, which is 20 days, regardless of whether it's been designated standard or complex. <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/552" rel="nofollow noreferrer">5 U.S.C. 552(a)(6)(A)(i)</a>.</p>


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<p>Of course, all of this could vary somewhat depending on exactly what you've requested. If you've requested a press release from 1992, they should adhere to the 20-day deadline. But if you've requested a compendium of classified diplomatic cables, and they've decided to actually consider declassifying them, that might constitute the kind of &quot;unusual circumstances&quot; where the statute permits more than 20 days. Even then, though, the statute requires them to give you written notice of the circumstances, and the extension usually should not be more than another 10 days.</p>
<p>At this point, you have the option of continuing to wait, calling the FOIA office for some polite sabre-rattling, going through the <a href="https://www.archives.gov/ogis/mediation-program" rel="nofollow noreferrer">OGIS dispute-resolution program</a>, or treating the delay as a denial and filing an appeal. You cannot go into court until you have gone through the full administrative appeal process.</p>


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Question Title: What happens to one’s tenancy if one is evicted for a breach of it under section 8, Housing Act 1988?


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Question Body: <p>Suppose Bob enters a 12 month tenancy contract and would then like to move early, suppose after 5 months. Bob would remain liable for the remaining 7 months of rental payments, which liability his tenancy deposit would expectably be withheld toward the partial payment of.</p>


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<p>Suppose Alice also enters a 12 month tenancy contract but would like to be released from it early, which her landlord denies her permission for. So she finds a replacement for herself to take over the remaining 7 months of her tenancy liability, called Charlotte. Charlotte moves in as a subletter, but Alice’s landlord is upset when she discovers that Charlotte has been sublet to without permission. What can Alice’s landlord do about this situation, other than move to terminate Alice’s tenancy by evicting her under <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/50/section/8?timeline=false" rel="nofollow noreferrer">section 8</a> Housing Act 1988? Once Alice gets evicted under section 8, then hasn’t Alice gotten her way anyway, in being released from the remainder of her tenancy term rental payment liabilities?</p>
<p>And Alice’s landlord is now again on the hook for finding a new tenant to replace Alice some months earlier than planned.</p>


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<p>And Alice’s landlord is now again on the hook for finding a new tenant to replace Alice some months earlier than planned.</p>
<p>Perhaps one undesirable effect of this for Alice would be liability for her landlord’s section 8 proceeding legal costs, but suppose that these come to 35% of her tenancy deposit and her rental payments have otherwise all been punctually kept up to date.</p>
<p>Would Alice not still get to keep more of her tenancy deposit than Bob got to keep of his, not to mention the further 5-6 months of rental liability that Bob was hypothetically left with?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>Although Alice will mostly have achieved her aim in ending the tenancy early, there is one significant consequence of being evicted under section 8: a county court judgement (CCJ) against her.</p>
<p>A CCJ check is a standard part of the referencing check done by landlords when someone applies to be a tenant. Having a CCJ on record means that Alice may find it much harder to find somewhere to rent in the future.</p>
<p>So even if she's not out of pocket due to ending her tenancy early, she may end up with nowhere to live...or perhaps renting from a landlord who doesn't bother with CCJ checks, which may not be a good thing...</p>
<p><strong>EDIT:</strong> as pointed out in a comment, it looks like a CCJ would only apply if the tenant leaves while owing rent or other costs. If no money is due, then there will be no CCJ, even if the tenant is evicted under one of the other grounds of Section 8 (e.g. breach of contract).</p>
<hr />


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<hr />
<p>Realistically, there are up to three flaws with this scenario:</p>
<p>Achieving a section 8 eviction can take many, many months, so it's entirely possible that Alice's fixed term will have ended anyway by the time the case comes to court, making much of this moot.</p>
<p>My understanding is that eviction proceedings aren't cheap, so I'd be amazed if the costs only came to 35% of the deposit.</p>
<p>Having a subtenant creates further complications, as the subtenant has certain rights even if their tenancy is invalid. But that's out of scope for this question.</p>


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Question Title: Is there any sense in which the City of London Corporation is a corporation wherein other local authorities are not also?

Question Body: <p>The <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/City_of_London_Corporation" rel="nofollow noreferrer">City of London Corporation</a> includes the word &quot;corporation&quot; in its name. But in the operative sense, are not all other local authorities also such “corporations”?</p>


Tags: united-kingdom, legal-terms, incorporation, city-of-london


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Question Title: Gaslighting ; criminal or civil

Question Body: <p>Gaslighting can be extremely damaging. Like Gang-Stalking, it is near impossible to prove it executed correctly.
How can gaslighting be prosecuted as a crime?</p>


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Answer 1: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/england-and-wales" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-england-and-wales-tooltip-container">england-and-wales</a></p>
<p>There isn't a law that defines '<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaslighting" rel="noreferrer">gaslighting</a>' as an offence.</p>
<p><em>Generally</em> it isn't unlawful to mislead, deceive or lie - of course, there are exceptions such as <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/35/contents" rel="noreferrer">fraud</a>, <a href="https://www.gov.uk/marketing-advertising-law/regulations-that-affect-advertising" rel="noreferrer">misleading advertising</a>, <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Geo5/1-2/6" rel="noreferrer">perjury</a> and so on.</p>


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<p>So the answer to your question must depend on what is meant by 'gaslighting' and the circumstances in which it has been said to have occurred. It seems to me that people understand and use the word differently - for me it pertains to intimate or family relationships (as in its alleged origin, the film <em>Gaslight</em>), some people seem to use it for different serious behaviour and other people use it for relatively trivial behaviour.</p>
<p>In the intimate or family relationship context, gaslighting might be part or all of the behaviour alleged to be the controlling or coercive behaviour contrary to <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/9/section/76" rel="noreferrer">s76 Serious Crime Act 2015</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>76 Controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family
relationship</p>
<p>(1)A person (A) commits an offence if—</p>
<p>(a)A repeatedly or continuously engages in behaviour towards another
person (B) that is controlling or coercive,</p>


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relationship</p>
<p>(1)A person (A) commits an offence if—</p>
<p>(a)A repeatedly or continuously engages in behaviour towards another
person (B) that is controlling or coercive,</p>
<p>(b)at the time of the behaviour, A and B are personally connected,</p>
<p>(c)the behaviour has a serious effect on B, and</p>
<p>(d)A knows or ought to know that the behaviour will have a serious
effect on B.</p>
</blockquote>
<p><a href="https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/controlling-or-coercive-behaviour-intimate-or-family-relationship" rel="noreferrer">Here is the Crown Prosecution Service guidance for prosecuting s76 Serious Crime Act 2015</a>.</p>
<p>Simply lying about one's job or income to have a one-night stand would not constitute the s76 offence.</p>


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<p>Simply lying about one's job or income to have a one-night stand would not constitute the s76 offence.</p>
<p>Behaviour that causes psychological injury that amounts to recognisable psychiatric illness could be assault occasioning Actual Bodily Harm (ABH) contrary to s47 Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (<a href="https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/offences-against-person-incorporating-charging-standard" rel="noreferrer">see CPS Guidance for ABH</a>).</p>


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Question Title: Does the US have a duty to negotiate the release of detained US citizens in the DPRK?

Question Body: <p>Given that a troubled soldier has trespassed into he DPRK: <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/worry-price-soldier-travis-king-back-north-korea/story?id=101581768" rel="noreferrer">https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/worry-price-soldier-travis-king-back-north-korea/story?id=101581768</a></p>
<ol>
<li>Does the US or its military have a duty to negotiate a release for the detained soldier?</li>
<li>Does the US have the same duty to US citizens trespassing &amp; detained by the DPRK?</li>
</ol>


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Answer 1: <p>Any duty that exists is not legally enforceable in the courts in the U.S. (there are one or two cases in Canada imposing a similar duty in extraordinary rendition cases).</p>
<p>Also, the arguably legal duty to provide diplomatic assistance to one's citizens doesn't apply in countries like North Korea where the U.S. has no diplomats.</p>
<p>In practice, the U.S. government will do everything reasonably within its power to secure the release of a U.S. citizen held by a hostile foreign power (even a U.S. citizen who has behaved badly), because that's in the DNA of how the U.S. State Department always acts. But, at this point, short of an extreme Special Operations mission to abduct a prisoner that voluntarily defected from the U.S. while stationed in South Korea, there really isn't anything that the U.S. could do even if ordered to do so.</p>


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Answer 2: <p>There is no duty rescue, except if a party negligently places another in harm (this is a general principle of law, probably not imposed on a government). A duty to negotiate is even less likely. POTUS can decide to negotiate, but Congress has not mandated any duty to negotiate so the courts will not order POTUS to negotiate if he decides not to. POTUS has the exclusive power to negotiate treaties, and the Senate has the exclusive power to approve them, so there is no constitutional basis for a law forcing a president to negotiate especially with a nation that we have no diplomatic relations with.</p>


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Answer 3: <p>The <strong>Vienna Convention Consular Relations (1963-04-24)</strong> Article 5 (e) give a country the right to <em>help and assist</em> their nationals, either directly through their consulate (or through another consulate that represents their interests<sup>1</sup>).</p>
<p>This is more of a moral obligation to assist their citizens even if a crime has been committed by them (by assisting them the country does not admit/claim that the action of their citizen was right).</p>
<hr />
<p><sup>1</sup> Article 27 (1)(c) <em>the sending State may entrust the protection of its interests and those of its nationals to a third State acceptable to the receiving State</em>.</p>
<ul>
<li><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Embassy_of_Sweden,_Pyongyang" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Embassy of Sweden, Pyongyang - Wikipedia</a>:</li>
</ul>
<blockquote>


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<ul>
<li><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Embassy_of_Sweden,_Pyongyang" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Embassy of Sweden, Pyongyang - Wikipedia</a>:</li>
</ul>
<blockquote>
<p>The Swedish embassy serves as the protecting power for the United States and as consular representation for Australia, Canada, Italy, Finland, and Iceland.</p>
</blockquote>
<ul>
<li><a href="https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/resourcesold/csi/us-embassies/north-korea.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">U.S. Department of State - Swedish Embassy (U.S. Protecting Power)</a></li>
</ul>


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Answer 4: <p>There is a statutory duty imposed on the president by <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/22/1732" rel="nofollow noreferrer">22 USC 1732</a>:</p>
<blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p>Whenever it is made known to the President that any citizen of the United States has been unjustly deprived of his liberty by or under the authority of any foreign government, it shall be the duty of the President forthwith to demand of that government the reasons of such imprisonment; and if it appears to be wrongful and in violation of the rights of American citizenship, the President shall forthwith demand the release of such citizen, and if the release so demanded is unreasonably delayed or refused, the President shall use such means, not amounting to acts of war and not otherwise prohibited by law, as he may think necessary and proper to obtain or effectuate the release; and all the facts and proceedings relative thereto shall as soon as practicable be communicated by the President to Congress.</p>
</blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p>This obviously does not apply to people who are detained for good reason, so it arguably does not apply to someone detained for entering a country contrary to law until the detention becomes excessive.  Furthermore, because the duty is to &quot;demand the release&quot; of the detainee and to &quot;use such means ... as he may think necessary and proper,&quot; it doesn't necessarily require negotiation.</p>
<p>There is a similar statutory duty imposed on the secretary of state by <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/22/chapter-23/subchapter-II" rel="nofollow noreferrer">22 USC chapter 23, subchapter II (sections 1741 and following)</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(a) Review</p>
<p>The Secretary of State shall review, as expeditiously as possible, the cases of United States nationals detained abroad to determine if there is credible information that they are being detained unlawfully or wrongfully, based on criteria which may include whether—</p>
<p>...</p>


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<p>...</p>
<p>(b) Referrals to Special Envoy; notification to Congress</p>
<p>(1) In general</p>
<p>Upon a determination by the Secretary of State, based on the totality of the circumstances, that there is credible information that the detention of a United States national abroad is unlawful or wrongful, and regardless of whether the detention is by a foreign government or a nongovernmental actor, the Secretary shall—
(A)expeditiously transfer responsibility for such case from the Bureau of Consular Affairs of the Department of State to the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs; and ...</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This subchapter is a bit more vague, though, with requirements such as</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The Hostage Recovery Fusion Cell shall (1) coordinate efforts by participating agencies to ensure that all relevant information, expertise, and resources are brought to bear to secure the safe recovery of United States nationals held hostage abroad; ...</p>
</blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p>It is not clear from a brief reading whether any of this imposes a duty to negotiate anyone's release under any circumstances.</p>


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Answer 5: <p>No. It doesn't. While the US does generally try, it has no obligation to do so.</p>
<p>Here's a State Department web page discussing...</p>
<p><a href="https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/international-travel/emergencies/arrest-detention.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/international-travel/emergencies/arrest-detention.html</a></p>


Tags: north-korea


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Question Title: Legality of Housing Reparations

Question Body: <p>Evanston, IL is <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-63165668" rel="nofollow noreferrer">offering</a> $25,000 grants for housing costs to black residents who owned homes before 1969, but denies assistance to Asian, Hispanic, or white residents.</p>
<p>My impression is that the Civil Rights Act and the 14th amendment prohibit discrimination based on race, and yet this law explicitly only applies to black residents. Some laws target races by saying &quot;we will compensate for X past action&quot;, but then the law is for people who suffered from the action, like discriminatory housing policies, which Hispanic and other residents suffered from too.</p>
<p>Is it legal for Evanston to give grants to black residents and not, say, Asian residents?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>As a starting point, and because it is a common occurrence, we can conclude that the government <em>can</em> give a benefit to someone without having to give the same benefit to everyone. It is a political matter that a divorced spouse is entitled to Social Security benefits based on a marriage that lasted at least 10 years, and not 9 years. More such restrictions on benefits are listed <a href="https://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-10035.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">here</a>. Equal protection does not &quot;everybody gets the benefit&quot;.</p>


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<p>Second, the government can give benefits to people whom it has harmed, again a point that hopefully does not require extensive justification. Third, and this leads to a concrete example, under the Japanese-American Evacuation Claims Act of 1948, $37 million was paid by the federal government to 26,000 who were sent to the Japanese-American concentration camps during WWII, so there is an &quot;effects-based&quot; racial discrimination that this benefit was only given to a specific racial group, because the underlying wrong was also racially-based, and likewise Aleut residents of the Aleutian Islands and the Pribilof islands were likewise compensated for harm done to them by the government. A person is not barred from compensation by wrongful government action just because the persons and others who are compensated for governmental wrong were the victims of a racially discriminatory wrong (therefore there is a racal correlate to the class of victims).</p>


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<p>Victims of government harm can be conceptually divided into two groups: direct victims, and indirect victims. There is no controversy over the legality of the government compensating individuals for its wrongful actions. The only plausible point of legal objection would be over compensating people who descended from victims of government harm. There is a legal difference between lineage-based discrimination and race-based discrimination, simply because lineage-based discrimination is <em>not</em> racial discrimination, which is forbidden. There is a greater chance that lineage-based reparations could pass strict scrutiny, in that it more narrowly tailors the benefit to exactly reach the compelling government interest, as opposed to a policy that broadly gives a compensatory benefit to anyone who self-identifies as being of a particular race.</p>


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<p>Finally, the question might be asked whether a program of government compensation for wrongful acts can be selective, in which victims it identifies for compensation. Yes, it can, for example the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radiation_Exposure_Compensation_Act" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Radiation Exposure Compensation Act</a> for specific classes of persons harmed by government in connection with atmospheric A-bomb tests and uranium mining – it does not compensate <em>all</em> individuals who were harmed by government action. The question of which victims are compensated (by act of Congress) is not justiciable, it is a political question.</p>


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Answer 2: <p>Regardless of anything else, it is certainly possible for a city who feels a particular party might have the basis for a lawsuit against them, to reach out to that party <em>prior to lawsuit</em> and &quot;settle&quot; the matter.</p>
<p>While this might seem like a giveaway, it's not quite.  It is a fair exchange of a <em>known, fixed, small</em> amount of money, <strong>plus certainty</strong>, in exchange for <strong>uncertainty</strong> and a costly litigation involving a much larger amount of money.</p>
<p>The <strong>plaintiff is now barred from suing on that matter</strong>, so the city enjoys the certainty that no million dollar judgment is hanging over their head. That reduces their insurance premiums.</p>
<p>I cannot speculate about which developments in facts or law would lead Evanston to think they might have such legal exposure.</p>


Tags: united-states, fourteenth-amendment, civil-right-act


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Question Title: My lease agreement has a typo that changes the intended meaning

Question Body: <p>I'm in New York. I share this lease with a roommate who is also on the lease but is leaving a month after I am. Our lease that states &quot;After the initial term of this Agreement, or in case of a month-to-month tenancy, the TENANT may terminate the Lease with a minimum of calendar days written notice.&quot;</p>
<p>I assume here that the lease is just missing an exact number? But does this mean I don't have to give 30 days notice? It also states &quot;The TENANT shall vacate the premises upon termination of the Agreement, unless the LANDLORD accepts further rent from the TENANT (other than past due rent), in which case a month-to-month tenancy shall be created which either party may terminate by a thirty (30) day written notice.&quot;</p>
<p>Does the mention of 30 days here negate the other sentence?</p>


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Answer 1: <h2>The TENANT is both of you</h2>
<p>The TENANT (i.e. both of you) have to give 30 days notice. And the TENANT (again, both of you) must “ vacate the premises upon termination of the Agreement, unless …”.</p>


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Answer 2: <blockquote>
<p>does this mean I don't have to give 30 days notice?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>You and your roommate are renting the premises jointly.  You cannot terminate the agreement unilaterally.  You need the agreement of the other parties to modify the lease.</p>
<p>As far as the landlord is concerned, the two of you are jointly and severally liable for the rent through the end of the month in which he regains possession of the apartment, or the first month end that falls 30 days or more after he learns of your intention to relinquish possession, whichever is later.  So no, you don't have to give 30 days notice.  The 30 days notice of your roommate's departure is sufficient.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Does the mention of 30 days here negate the other sentence?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The other sentence doesn't specify a number of days, so this sentence isn't in conflict with it.  If the other sentence specified a different number of days, there would be a conflict.</p>


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<p>The other sentence doesn't specify a number of days, so this sentence isn't in conflict with it.  If the other sentence specified a different number of days, there would be a conflict.</p>
<p>If the lease didn't specify a number of days anywhere then the statutory notice period applying to month to month tenancies would apply, which is, if I recall correctly, 30 days.</p>


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Question Title: Do other countries have free speech protections similar to the First Amendment, and if so, how do those work?

Question Body: <p>A friend claimed the First Amendment was unnecessary, and mentioned that other countries tended to get along well without it.</p>
<p>I realized I didn't actually know much about how freedom of speech or expression worked in other countries, and figured I'd ask some people here who were a little more knowledgeable.</p>
<p>Do other countries have any free speech protections similar to the First Amendment, and if so, how do they work? If not, how are free speech cases handled?</p>


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Answer 1: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/germany" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;" rel="tag">germany</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p><a href="https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0034" rel="noreferrer">Article 5 [Freedom of expression, arts and sciences]</a></p>
<p>(1) Every person shall have the right freely to express and disseminate his opinions in speech, writing and pictures and to inform himself without hindrance from generally accessible sources. Freedom of the press and freedom of reporting by means of broadcasts and films shall be guaranteed. There shall be no censorship.</p>
<p>(2) These rights shall find their limits in the provisions of general laws, in provisions for the protection of young persons and in the right to personal honour.</p>
<p>(3) Arts and sciences, research and teaching shall be free. The freedom of teaching shall not release any person from allegiance to the constitution.</p>
</blockquote>
<hr />


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<p>(3) Arts and sciences, research and teaching shall be free. The freedom of teaching shall not release any person from allegiance to the constitution.</p>
</blockquote>
<hr />
<p><strong>Sources</strong>:</p>
<ul>
<li><a href="https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/index.html" rel="noreferrer">Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany</a>
<ul>
<li><a href="https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0023" rel="noreferrer">Article 2 [Personal freedoms]</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0034" rel="noreferrer">Article 5 [Freedom of expression, arts and sciences]</a></li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>


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Answer 2: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/england-and-wales" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;" rel="tag">england-and-wales</a> and <a href="/questions/tagged/northern-ireland" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;northern-ireland&#39;" rel="tag">northern-ireland</a></p>
<p>It's called the <em>Article 10 Right to Freedom of Expression</em> and can be found at <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/schedule/1/part/I/chapter/9?timeline=false" rel="noreferrer">Schedule 1, Part 1</a> of the Human Rights Act 1998:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>1 Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.</p>


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<p>2 The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Note that paragraph 2 makes this a <em>qualified right</em>. These are rights:</p>
<blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p>Note that paragraph 2 makes this a <em>qualified right</em>. These are rights:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>...that permit interferences subject to various conditions. For example, the right to respect for private and family life (Art. 8 of the ECHR) and the right to freedom of expression (Art. 10 of the ECHR) allow interference, but such interferences must be in accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic state for the requirements of public order, public health or morals, national security or public safety. <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/pages/glossary/fundamental-rights_en" rel="noreferrer"><em>Source</em></a></p>
</blockquote>


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Answer 3: <p>For example, the <a href="/questions/tagged/eritrea" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;eritrea&#39;" rel="tag">eritrea</a> <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Eritrea_1997.pdf?lang=en" rel="noreferrer">Eritrean constitution, Art. 19</a> guarantees</p>
<blockquote>
<ol>
<li>Every person shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and belief.</li>
<li>Every person shall have the freedom of speech and expression, including freedom of the press and other media.</li>
<li>Every citizen shall have the right of access to information.</li>
</ol>
</blockquote>
<p>and 6 other rights. As long as you have a license to publish and get prior approval from the government for your publication, you are alright.</p>


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</ol>
</blockquote>
<p>and 6 other rights. As long as you have a license to publish and get prior approval from the government for your publication, you are alright.</p>
<p>Article 67 of the <a href="/questions/tagged/dprk" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;dprk&#39;" rel="tag">dprk</a> <a href="http://www.naenara.com.kp/index.php/Main/index/en/politics?arg_val=constitution" rel="noreferrer">Democratic People's Republic of Korea</a> says that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Citizens are guaranteed freedom of speech, the press, assembly,
demonstration and association. The State shall guarantee the
conditions for the free activities of democratic political parties and
social organizations</p>
</blockquote>


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demonstration and association. The State shall guarantee the
conditions for the free activities of democratic political parties and
social organizations</p>
</blockquote>
<p><a href="/questions/tagged/sweden" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;sweden&#39;" rel="tag">sweden</a> has a <a href="https://www.riksdagen.se/globalassets/07.-dokument--lagar/the-fundamental-law-on-freedom-of-expression-2015.pdf" rel="noreferrer">&quot;Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression&quot;</a>, which is quite lengthy and specific. It is, however, a crime to publicly express disrespect for an group regarding race, color, national / ethnic origin, faith or sexual orientation. In Norway, <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Norway_2014#s300" rel="noreferrer">Art. 100</a> of the constitution says that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>No person may be held liable in law for having imparted or received
information, ideas or messages unless this can be justified in


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<blockquote>
<p>No person may be held liable in law for having imparted or received
information, ideas or messages unless this can be justified in
relation to the grounds for freedom of expression, which are the
seeking of truth, the promotion of democracy and the individual's
freedom to form opinions. Such legal liability shall be prescribed by
law.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>(etc.), and likewise criminalizes hate speech.</p>
<p>Libel, fraud and death threats are communicative acts that are universally banned, and child pornography is almost universally illegal, so no country is anarchic in terms of expression. Every nation has limits on expression, which are generally taken to be implicitly justified exceptions to existing guarantees of freedom of expression. In some countries, the exceptions are named in detail in the constitution, in some (North Korea, Eritrea) the constitution is simply ignored.</p>


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Answer 4: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/australia" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;" rel="tag">australia</a></p>
<h2>Yes and No</h2>
<p><strong>Comprehensive rights protections</strong></p>
<p>Australia is unique among liberal western democracies in that it does not have an enumerated Bill of Rights; neither in its Constitution nor as an enacted piece of legislation. With the exception of the ACT and Victoria, the states and territories don't have one either.</p>


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<p>Before Federation, the Constitutional Convention considered and rejected (19 votes to 23) including protections similar to those in the US Constitution. It failed largely because it was feared that due process protections would interfere with the racially discriminatory policies against aboriginal Australians and people of Chinese descent which all the colonies enthusiastically pursued. Australia in the late nineteenth and early to mid-twentieth centuries was breathtakingly and unashamedly racist. Today, racism is largely personal rather than institutionalised.</p>


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<p>Proposals for a Constitutional Bill of Rights were considered in 1929 and 1959 but neither progressed to a referendum. In 1942, a referendum was held on expanding Federal powers over post-war construction counterbalanced by Constitutional limitation on Parliament regulating freedom of expression and extending freedom of religion to the states: it was rejected at the referendum. A charter of human rights went to referendum in 1988: it was overwhelmingly rejected with no state reaching 30% approval.</p>
<p>Several attempts to legislate a comprehensive Bill of Rights have also failed to go anywhere. However, individual pieces of legislation have created rights in specific areas.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.lawfoundation.net.au/ljf/app/A60DA51D4C6B0A51CA2571A7002069A0.html" rel="noreferrer">Reference</a></p>
<p><strong>Constitutional rights</strong></p>
<p>That said, the Constitution gives the following express rights:</p>
<ul>
<li>freedom of religion</li>


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<p><strong>Constitutional rights</strong></p>
<p>That said, the Constitution gives the following express rights:</p>
<ul>
<li>freedom of religion</li>
<li>freedom against discrimination between the states</li>
<li>the right ofAustralian Citizens to trial by jury. That said, all judicial systems treat non-citizens the same as citizens but Parliament could legislate to change this.</li>
<li>the right of free trade among the states</li>
<li>The right to acquire and hold property</li>
</ul>
<p>The courts have also found implied rights that are necessary to give effect to the democracy spelled out in the constitution:</p>
<ul>
<li>the right to vote, and</li>
<li>the right of freedom of political communication.</li>
</ul>
<p>The High Court has also indicated that the classes of implied rights are not necessarily closed.</p>


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<li>the right to vote, and</li>
<li>the right of freedom of political communication.</li>
</ul>
<p>The High Court has also indicated that the classes of implied rights are not necessarily closed.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.australianconstitutioncentre.org.au/rights.html#:%7E:text=%E2%80%8BThe%20Constitution%20defines%20and,and%20the%20acquisition%20of%20property." rel="noreferrer">Reference</a></p>
<p><strong>Non-constitutional rights</strong></p>
<p>Australia inherited the common law rights of England and, subject to subsequent statutory and judicial amendments, these are still in force. This means that freedom of expression is the default assumption baring any specific laws proscribing it.</p>


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<p>Australia is also a party to seven core international human rights treaties. The right to freedom of opinion and expression is contained in articles 19 and 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Also relevant are articles 4 and 5 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), articles 12 and 13 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), and article 21 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).</p>
<p>In addition, specific legislation such as the Sex Discrimination Act and the Racial Discrimination Act provide both rights and restrictions on free speech within their particular sphere. Most such legislation is replicated at a state and territory level.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.ag.gov.au/rights-and-protections/human-rights-and-anti-discrimination/human-rights-scrutiny/public-sector-guidance-sheets/right-freedom-opinion-and-expression" rel="noreferrer">Reference</a></p>


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<p><strong>Permissable restrictions</strong></p>
<p><em>Derogation</em></p>
<blockquote>
<p>Under article 4 of the ICCPR, countries may take measures derogating from certain of their obligations under the Covenant, including the right to freedom of opinion and expression 'in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed'.</p>
</blockquote>
<p><em>Limitation</em></p>
<blockquote>
<p>[U]nder article 19(3) freedom of expression may be limited as provided for by law and when necessary to protect the rights or reputations of others, national security, public order, or public health or morals. Limitations must be prescribed by legislation necessary to achieve the desired purpose and proportionate to the need on which the limitation is predicated.</p>
</blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p><a href="https://www.ag.gov.au/rights-and-protections/human-rights-and-anti-discrimination/human-rights-scrutiny/public-sector-guidance-sheets/right-freedom-opinion-and-expression" rel="noreferrer">Reference</a></p>


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Answer 5: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/france" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;france&#39;" rel="tag">france</a></p>
<h3>Yes, but</h3>
<p>The <a href="https://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/en/constitution-of-4-october-1958" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>Constitution du 4 octobre 1958</em></a> doesn't enumerate such rights, it describes how the Fifth Republic functions, powers, or checks and balances, and although it has been amended 24 times, there is no mention of freedom of speech in the text.</p>
<p>The preamble of the Constitution outlines something important for this question however:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The French people solemnly proclaim their attachment to the Rights of Man and the principles of national sovereignty as defined by the Declaration of 1789, confirmed and complemented by the Preamble to the Constitution of 1946.</p>
</blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p>(<em>The preamble was amended to include the Charter for the Environment of 2004, the <a href="https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/loda/id/LEGIARTI000006527446/1958-10-05/#LEGIARTI000006527446" rel="nofollow noreferrer">original 1958 preamble</a> obviously doesn't mention it, thus it has been left out here.</em>)</p>
<p>A 1971 decision of the <em>Conseil Constitutionnel</em> struck down a law as anticonstitutional arguing the 1789 <a href="https://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/en/declaration-of-human-and-civic-rights-of-26-august-1789" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen</em></a> had full constitutional force because it is mentioned in the preamble of the Constitution. The <em>Déclaration</em> is thus part of the <em>bloc de constitutionnalité</em>.</p>
<p>The <em>Déclaration</em> has one article relevant to freedom of speech, and two about limits to freedoms:</p>
<blockquote>


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<p>The <em>Déclaration</em> has one article relevant to freedom of speech, and two about limits to freedoms:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Article 11 - The free communication of ideas and of opinions is one of the most precious rights of man. Any citizen may therefore speak, write and publish freely, except what is tantamount to the abuse of this liberty in the cases determined by Law.</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>Article 4 - Liberty consists in being able to do anything that does not harm others: thus, the exercise of the natural rights of every man has no bounds other than those that ensure to the other members of society the enjoyment of these same rights. These bounds may be determined only by Law.</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>Article 5 - The Law has the right to forbid only those actions that are injurious to society. Nothing that is not forbidden by Law may be hindered, and no one may be compelled to do what the Law does not ordain.</p>
</blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p><strong>Freedom of speech is a constitutional one</strong>, however it also <em><strong>can be limited by law</strong></em>, if the law aims to protect society from harm or protect other people's rights. The Constitutional Council has the power and responsibility to strike down laws that overreach and needlessly restrict freedom of speech, or any other freedom (as outlined in articles 61, 61-1, 62 of the Constitution).</p>
<p>As for forms of speech restricted by law, they include defamation and copyright infringement (or perhaps more accurately authors' rights infringement), this much is common to the United States.</p>
<p>A difference however is that hate speech, Holocaust-denial, or the use of Nazi symbols for their political value is considered harmful to society or infringes on other citizens' freedoms, as the law does explicitly forbid such forms of expression.</p>


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<p>Similarly to defamation, what constitutes hate speech is ultimately to be adjudicated by the courts.</p>


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Answer 6: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/canada" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-canada-tooltip-container">canada</a></p>
<p>In Canada, the right to freedom of expression is an explicit right, as described in Section 2 of the <a href="https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/const/page-12.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<h3>Fundamental Freedoms</h3>
<ol start="2">
<li>Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:</li>
</ol>
<p>(a) freedom of conscience and religion;</p>
<p>(b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication;</p>
<p>(c) freedom of peaceful assembly; and</p>
<p>(d) freedom of association.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>However, Section 1 of the Charter also notes that</p>
<blockquote>
<ol>


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<p>(c) freedom of peaceful assembly; and</p>
<p>(d) freedom of association.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>However, Section 1 of the Charter also notes that</p>
<blockquote>
<ol>
<li>The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.</li>
</ol>
</blockquote>
<p>In other wise, limits on free speech may be imposed if they can be &quot;demonstrably justified.&quot;</p>
<p>Whether the government can justify a law that infringes upon a Charter right is currently determined by the <a href="https://www.constitutionalstudies.ca/2019/07/oakes-test/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Oakes test</a>, which requires that when a law is challenged on Charter grounds, the government must establish:</p>
<ol>
<li>that the law in question has a &quot;pressing and substantial&quot; purpose;</li>


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<ol>
<li>that the law in question has a &quot;pressing and substantial&quot; purpose;</li>
<li>that the provision in question is &quot;rationally connected&quot; to the law's purpose;</li>
<li>that the provision &quot;minimally impairs&quot; the Charter right in question (i.e., it's not broader than it needs to be); and</li>
<li>that the law's restriction of Charter rights is not disproportionate large compared to the positive effects of the law.</li>
</ol>
<p>Under this test, the Supreme Court of Canada has found that Section 1 allows for limits on various types of speech:</p>
<ul>
<li>speech that promotes hatred (<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/R_v_Keegstra" rel="nofollow noreferrer">R v Keegstra</a> and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/R_v_Andrews" rel="nofollow noreferrer">R v Andrews</a>)</li>


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<li>speech that is libelous (<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hill_v_Church_of_Scientology_of_Toronto" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Hill v Church of Scientology of Toronto</a> and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/R_v_Lucas" rel="nofollow noreferrer">R v Lucas</a>)</li>
<li>speech that is obscene (<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/R_v_Butler" rel="nofollow noreferrer">R v Butler</a> but also <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/R_v_Glad_Day_Bookshops_Inc" rel="nofollow noreferrer">R v Glad Day Bookshops</a>)</li>
<li>solicitation of prostitution (<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/R_v_Skinner" rel="nofollow noreferrer">R v Skinner</a>)</li>
<li>publication of election results before polls close (<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/R_v_Bryan" rel="nofollow noreferrer">R v Bryan</a>)</li>


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<li>publication of election results before polls close (<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/R_v_Bryan" rel="nofollow noreferrer">R v Bryan</a>)</li>
<li>publication of news about ongoing criminal trials, in certain cases (<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dagenais_v_Canadian_Broadcasting_Corp" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Dagenais v CBC</a> and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/R_v_Mentuck" rel="nofollow noreferrer">R v Mentuck</a> but also <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edmonton_Journal_v_Alberta_(AG)" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Edmonton Journal v Alberta (AG)</a>)</li>
<li>advertising directed at children (<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Irwin_Toy_Ltd_v_Quebec_(AG)" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Irwin Toy v Quebec (AG)</a>)</li>
<li>noise pollution (<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Montr%C3%A9al_(City_of)_v_2952-1366_Qu%C3%A9bec_Inc" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Montréal v. 2952-1366 Québec Inc.</a>)</li>
</ul>


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<li>noise pollution (<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Montr%C3%A9al_(City_of)_v_2952-1366_Qu%C3%A9bec_Inc" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Montréal v. 2952-1366 Québec Inc.</a>)</li>
</ul>
<p>Finally, in the context of comparing Canada's speech laws with those of other countries, it is also important to note <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/R_v_Zundel" rel="nofollow noreferrer">R v Zündel</a>, a 1992 decision concerning a Holocaust denier.  Zündel was prosecuted under a broad law against knowingly publishing false statements; but the Supreme Court found that the particular law did not have a pressing purpose, nor were its impairments of charter rights minimal, and so it struck down the law.  More recently, in June 2022 <a href="https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-46/section-319.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Canada enacted an antisemitism law</a> prohibiting Holocaust denial.  The constitutionality of this law has, to the best of my knowledge, not yet been tested.</p>


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Answer 7: <p>The <a href="https://ru.wikisource.org/wiki/%D0%9A%D0%BE%D0%BD%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B8%D1%82%D1%83%D1%86%D0%B8%D1%8F_%D0%A1%D0%A1%D0%A1%D0%A0_(1977)/%D0%A0%D0%B5%D0%B4%D0%B0%D0%BA%D1%86%D0%B8%D1%8F_07.10.1977" rel="nofollow noreferrer">1977 Constitution</a> of the USSR (in force until 1991) states:</p>
<p>Article 50:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>В соответствии с интересами народа и в целях укрепления и развития социалистического строя гражданам СССР гарантируются свободы: слова, печати, собраний, митингов, уличных шествий и демонстраций.</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>Осуществление этих политических свобод обеспечивается предоставлением трудящимся и их организациям общественных зданий, улиц и площадей, широким распространением информации, возможностью использования печати, телевидения и радио.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>( DeepL translation:</p>
<blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p>( DeepL translation:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>In accordance with the interests of the people and with a view to strengthening and developing the socialist system, the citizens of the USSR are guaranteed the freedoms of: speech, the press, meetings, rallies, street marches and demonstrations.</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>The exercise of these political freedoms is ensured by the provision of public buildings, streets and squares for workers and their organisations, by the wide dissemination of information, and by the possibility of using the press, television and radio.
)</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Article 57:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Уважение личности, охрана прав и свобод граждан — обязанность всех государственных органов, общественных организаций и должностных лиц.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>(DeepL translation:</p>
<blockquote>


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<p>Уважение личности, охрана прав и свобод граждан — обязанность всех государственных органов, общественных организаций и должностных лиц.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>(DeepL translation:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Respect for the individual and the protection of the rights and freedoms of citizens are the responsibility of all state bodies, public organisations and officials.
)</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This is pretty much explicit. <em>However</em>, Article 59 also says:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Осуществление прав и свобод неотделимо от исполнения гражданином своих обязанностей. Гражданин СССР обязан соблюдать Конституцию СССР и советские законы, уважать правила социалистического общежития, с достоинством нести высокое звание гражданина СССР.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>(DeepL translation:</p>
<blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p>(DeepL translation:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The exercise of rights and freedoms is inseparable from the fulfilment of a citizen's duties. A citizen of the USSR must observe the USSR Constitution and Soviet laws, respect the rules of socialist society, and carry with dignity the high title of a citizen of the USSR. )</p>
</blockquote>
<p>So the freedom of speech <em>was</em> conditional, the state was supposed to guarantee the constitutional rights, but the citizens were supposed to abide by the Constitution. I guess this makes it a bit less &quot;free&quot; than the USA variant (and note that &quot;suppose&quot; is the key word here).</p>


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Answer 8: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/netherlands" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;netherlands&#39;" rel="tag">netherlands</a></p>
<p>Freedom of speech in the Netherlands is guaranteed by article 7 of the <a href="https://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0001840/2018-12-21" rel="nofollow noreferrer">constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands</a>: <em>Grondwet voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden</em> or <em>grondwet</em> (ground/base law) for short. The article is comprised of the following four clauses:</p>
<blockquote>
<ol>
<li>Niemand heeft voorafgaand verlof nodig om door de drukpers gedachten of gevoelens te openbaren, behoudens ieders verantwoordelijkheid volgens de wet.</li>
<li>De wet stelt regels omtrent radio en televisie. Er is geen voorafgaand toezicht op de inhoud van een radio- of televisieuitzending.</li>


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<li>De wet stelt regels omtrent radio en televisie. Er is geen voorafgaand toezicht op de inhoud van een radio- of televisieuitzending.</li>
<li>Voor het openbaren van gedachten of gevoelens door andere dan in de voorgaande leden genoemde middelen heeft niemand voorafgaand verlof nodig wegens de inhoud daarvan, behoudens ieders verantwoordelijkheid volgens de wet. De wet kan het geven van vertoningen toegankelijk voor personen jonger dan zestien jaar regelen ter bescherming van de goede zeden.</li>
<li>De voorgaande leden zijn niet van toepassing op het maken van handelsreclame.</li>
</ol>
</blockquote>
<p>This can be translated as</p>
<blockquote>
<ol>
<li>Nobody needs prior permission to publish in print thoughts or feelings, under condition of everyone's responsibility by law.</li>
<li>The law sets rules for radio and television. No prior supervision is performed on the contents of a radio or television broadcast.</li>


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<li>The law sets rules for radio and television. No prior supervision is performed on the contents of a radio or television broadcast.</li>
<li>To publish thoughts or feelings through means other than those mentioned in the previous clauses, nobody needs prior permission for the contents thereof, under condition of everyone's responsibility by law. The law may regulate viewings accessible to persons younger than sixteen years to protect decency.</li>
<li>The prior clauses are not applicable to trade advertisements.</li>
</ol>
</blockquote>
<p>While this law is somewhat archaically formulated, in practice it appears largely applied in spirit, meaning that its application is not limited to the specific media mentioned in the law.</p>


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<p>While this law is somewhat archaically formulated, in practice it appears largely applied in spirit, meaning that its application is not limited to the specific media mentioned in the law.</p>
<p>Additionally there is the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Convention_on_Human_Rights" rel="nofollow noreferrer">European Convention on Human Rights</a> which also guarantees free speech, and which the European Union requires all members and candidate members to be signatories of.</p>
<p>Another thing of interest may be to learn that the USA is built on common law (focus on precedent), whereas the Netherlands, and in fact the majority of Europe is built on civil law (focus on written law), which may impact through which (combination of) means a country protects certain rights.</p>


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Answer 9: <p>The Danish constitution article 77 says</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Grundloven § 77</p>
<p>§ 77 Enhver er berettiget til på tryk, i skrift og tale at offentliggøre sine tanker, dog under ansvar for domstolene. Censur og andre forebyggende forholdsregler kan ingensinde påny indføres.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This can be translated as</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The constitution § 77</p>
<p>§77 Everyone is entitled to in print, in writing and speech, to publish their thoughts, under penalty of the courts. Censorhip and other preventative measures and rules cannot be reintroduced.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This article is being violated by hate-speech laws (being a preventative measure) and was nearly totally abolished when a law nearly passed that would force &quot;social media&quot; companies to unrank dissenting views. Fortunately, the EU stopped it, because it wanted to introduce the same law itself.</p>


Tags: constitutional-law, freedom-of-speech, first-amendment


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Question Body: <p>Famously, although O.J. Simpson was acquitted of the murders of Nicole Brown and Ron Goldman, he was later sued by their families and found to be <a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/questions/23030/what-does-it-mean-for-o-j-simpson-to-be-found-liable-for-their-deaths">liable</a> for the deaths in a civil court. The difference being the standard of proof required in either situation, i.e. &quot;...beyond reasonable doubt&quot; vs &quot;... on preponderance of evidence&quot; or &quot;... on the balance of probabilities&quot;.</p>
<p>So it would seem that if a victim is worried that the suspect will get off, or even if they were already acquitted, the victim always has the option of suing the suspect and be more sure of a favourable result. (It also seems to add a &quot;double jeopardy&quot; element for the defendant, even if the second jeopardy is just reputational damage and having to pay money rather than jail time.)</p>


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<p>So my question is, why don't victims do this all the time? Obviously we can't look into the minds of every victim to understand the reasons, but are there other challenges that make this impractical despite it looking like a fairly obvious option available to them to get restitution / justice?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>Most criminals aren't rich...</p>
<p>Suing someone who has nothing, won't get you anything... Sure they can be held liable for millions of dollars. But that doesn't make the money magically appear.</p>
<p>A million dollars from someone who has no money and a dollar will get you a soda.</p>
<p>TLDR: Suing the perpetrator of a crime is a waste of time/money if they don't have any.</p>


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Answer 2: <blockquote>
<p>It also seems to add a &quot;double jeopardy&quot; element for the defendant,
even if the second jeopardy is just reputational damage and having to
pay money rather than jail time.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It doesn't. Double jeopardy only applies to two criminal prosecutions for the same conduct by the same sovereign. Civil lawsuits don't constitute double jeopardy.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>So my question is, why don't victims do this all the time? Obviously
we can't look into the minds of every victim to understand the
reasons, but are there other challenges that make this impractical
despite it looking like a fairly obvious option available to them to
get restitution / justice?</p>
</blockquote>
<p><strong>First</strong> Restitution is routinely awarded as part of the sentence following a criminal conviction.</p>


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get restitution / justice?</p>
</blockquote>
<p><strong>First</strong> Restitution is routinely awarded as part of the sentence following a criminal conviction.</p>
<p>Restitution doesn't compensate everything that a civil judgment does. For example, it doesn't cover non-economic damages for pain and suffering or some more remote economic losses. But often, it covers the core economic losses from a crime.</p>
<p><strong>Second</strong> The vast majority of convicted criminals are indigent and judgment proof or can only pay a little in excess of restitution.</p>
<p>Even <a href="https://journalistsresource.org/criminal-justice/criminal-restitution-debt-victims/" rel="noreferrer">an ability to pay restitution is rare</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Judges ordered 15 percent of federal offenders to pay restitution.
Offenses for which courts ordered restitution most often were fraud,
embezzlement, arson, auto theft, tax-related crimes, robbery, burglary


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Offenses for which courts ordered restitution most often were fraud,
embezzlement, arson, auto theft, tax-related crimes, robbery, burglary
and larceny. Thirty percent of offenders convicted of murder were
ordered to compensate victims. The amount of restitution ordered
between 2014 and 2016 totaled $33.9 billion.</p>
<p>Between 2014 and 2016, U.S. Attorney’s Offices collected a total of
$2.95 billion. Half of that came from debts imposed between fiscal
years 1988 and 2014.</p>
<p>As of the end of fiscal year 2016, $110 billion in restitution debt
was outstanding. The federal government has deemed $100 billion of
that to be “uncollectible” based on the offender’s ability to pay.
<strong>Almost all — 95 percent — of offenders ordered to pay restitution received a waiver allowing them to forgo payment because they had no
ability to pay.</strong></p>
</blockquote>


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<strong>Almost all — 95 percent — of offenders ordered to pay restitution received a waiver allowing them to forgo payment because they had no
ability to pay.</strong></p>
</blockquote>
<p>State offenders have less of an ability to pay restitution, on average, than federal ones, who are often white collar criminals or immigration offenders.</p>
<p>All criminal defendants with public defenders are by definition indigent. And <a href="https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/dccc.pdf" rel="noreferrer">according to the U.S. Department of Justice</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>approximately 66% of felony Federal defendants and 82% of felony
defendants in large State courts were represented by public defenders.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Going to jail or prison deprives criminal defendants of a meaningful income while incarcerated and dramatically reduces their ability to earn income when they are released, again reducing their ability to pay a civil judgment.</p>


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<p>Even when a defendant does have assets and some actual ability to pay, those assets may be protected from civil lawsuit judgments, for example, by a homestead exemption for an owned personal residence, or an exemption from creditors for pensions and IRAs. Also assets of a criminal defendant that aren't exempt from creditors are often seized by creditors of the criminal defendant due to inability to pay monthly payments during a criminal prosecution due to loss of income and employment, or collapse of a self-employed business, or use of available funds to pay a private criminal defense lawyer.</p>


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<p><strong>Third</strong> Lawyers won't file a civil suit against a criminal defendant, even knowing that liability is basically automatic and effortless in the case of a criminal conviction where all appeals have been exhausted, unless there is a realistic possibility of recovering enough from the defendant in the civil suit beyond any restitution award to justify the legal work involved within a reasonable time.</p>
<p><strong>Fourth</strong> If a criminal defendant is acquitted at trial or the prosecutor declines to press charges, while this doesn't legally prevent a victim from bringing a civil lawsuit, as the O.J. Simpson case illustrated, it make it much less attractive for a lawyer in a civil case to take on and the risk that there will be no judgment or favorable settlement reached is great. It will probably be expensive to prove the case and the case will be hard fought.</p>


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<p><strong>Fifth</strong> The statute of limitations for a civil lawsuit in tort for damages associated with a crime often runs before the criminal proceeding is concluded if there is not a plea bargain, this makes the legal work in the civil lawsuit more expensive and often crime victims don't think about the possibility of a civil suit until the dust has settled in the criminal case and they realize that the restitution award received does not fully compensate them for their losses.</p>
<p>Keep in mind that crime victims usually don't hire lawyers because the prosecution is handled by state and local government paid lawyers, but victims aren't the clients of prosecutors and prosecutors usually don't advise victims on the possibility of bringing a civil lawsuit.</p>


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Question Title: Does a registered trademark end if the owner throws it away?

Question Body: <p>If somebody registers a trademark for their company name and the name of its flagship product, and uses this names for a while, but then one day decides to stop using it and publicly announce they will never use the old name again, is the trademark still theirs, or is it automatically terminated?</p>
<p>If not immediately, is it terminated after some period of time where the owner does not use it?</p>
<p>Does it matter that the owner publicly proclaimed they'd never use it again?</p>


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Answer 1: <h2>A trademark must be used</h2>
<p><a href="/questions/tagged/australia" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-australia-tooltip-container">australia</a></p>
<p>Use is inherent in the <a href="https://manuals.ipaustralia.gov.au/trademark/1.-what-if-a-trade-mark-is-not-used-" rel="nofollow noreferrer">definition</a> of a trademark: “the owner intends, and does, use the trade mark to distinguish its goods or services from goods or services dealt with or provided by others.”</p>
<p>Anyone can apply to have a disused trademark deregistered. The application can be opposed by the owner who bears the onus of proving it is still in use.</p>
<p>An owner who made a public announcement that they would no longer use it would have a hard time proving they still were. Also, they might be estopped from opposing the application at all.</p>


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Answer 2: <p>Well, a registered trademark is a <em>registered</em> trademark because it's <em>registered</em>. So to make it available again, that registration would need to be deleted. A simple announcement that it will no longer be used is not sufficient. Of course, the company could refrain from suing anybody for using the trademark, but that's a bit a risky path for anyone to rely on.</p>
<p><a href="/questions/tagged/switzerland" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;switzerland&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;switzerland&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-switzerland-tooltip-container">switzerland</a> (and probably many European countries)</p>


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<p>There's a rule that a trademark is only valid as long as it's in use. If, for more than 5 years, the registered owner appears to be no longer using it, anyone can request its deletion for a small fee and some evidence that the trademark is not being used. If the trademark belongs to a company that no longer exists, that is a strong indication that it is no longer used. <a href="https://blumgrob.ch/update/neues-verfahren-zur-loeschung-von-nicht-gebrauchten-marken-ab-1-januar-2017/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Source</a></p>


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Answer 3: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/united-states" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-united-states-tooltip-container">united-states</a></p>
<p>In the U.S., a registered trademark has to be periodically renewed with a statement stating that it continues to be used in interstate or international commerce, and if this ceases to happen, it lapses by operation of law.</p>
<p>In the fact pattern of the question, announcing it will no longer be used would probably be a good defense to a trademark infringement suit from the registered trademark owner, at a minimum, as a common law estoppel or waiver, and as a defense to the affirmative case on the ground that there are no damages and that there is no possibility of confusion.</p>


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<p>On the other hand, it someone tried to mislead the public into thinking the the no longer used trademark that they were now using was still being used by a successor to the original owner, that could be grounds for a suit to enjoin the use to defraud the public if it harmed the registered owner of the trademark that had not yet lapsed by operation of law.</p>
<p>It is possible to file a form with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) prospectively cancelling a registered trademark. Often this would be done as part of a settlement of a litigation dispute involving the trademark.</p>


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Question Title: Do any USA states require accepting US cash for payment of goods or services?

Question Body: <p>According to the United States Federal Reserve:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>There is no federal statute mandating that a private business, a person, or an organization must accept currency or coins as payment for goods or services. Private businesses are free to develop their own policies on whether to accept cash unless there is a state law that says otherwise.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Source: <a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/currency_12772.htm" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/currency_12772.htm</a></p>
<p>Are there any states, districts, regions, or territories within the USA that mandate that a private business, a person, or an organization must accept US currency or coins as payment for goods or services?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>Not at the level of the state, but businesses subject to King County (WA) jurisdiction will, effective Jan. 1 2025, have to accept cash (within limits: not larger than $20 bill, not more that $200) for in-person transactions. Ad hoc exemptions are allowed in case of significant theft history, business operated at home, or with only one on-site employee.</p>


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Answer 2: <p>Yes. In <a href="/questions/tagged/massachusetts" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;massachusetts&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;massachusetts&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-massachusetts-tooltip-container">massachusetts</a>, the <a href="https://malegislature.gov/Laws/GeneralLaws/PartIII/TitleIV/Chapter255D/Section10A" rel="nofollow noreferrer">General Law, chapter 255D, section 10A</a> outlaws discrimination against cash buyers by retail (as opposed to wholesale) businesses. The section reads, in full:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Section 10A. No retail establishment offering goods and services for sale shall discriminate against a cash buyer by requiring the use of credit by a buyer in order to purchase such goods and services. All such retail establishments must accept legal tender when offered as payment by the buyer.</p>
</blockquote>


Tags: united-states, business, currency, payment, us-states


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Question Title: To what extent does financial interest in vicarious liability in copyright law extend?


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Question Body: <p>I've just learned about <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contributory_copyright_infringement#Difference_from_vicarious_liability" rel="nofollow noreferrer">vicarious liability</a>. It appears that it means that if you have a right to stop a copyright infringement and you're directly profiting from the fact that the infringement is occurring, you can be held liable for some of the damages.</p>
<p>I was wondering how far the implication of direct financial interest can be stretched. The most concerning example would be ISPs or VPN providers potentially being held liable. After all, ISP or VPN company can block IP addresses which means they could easily make many forms of infringement much more difficult and they do make money off people using their services.</p>


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<p>You could say that ISP makes the money anyway, whether you're downloading movies legally or legitimately. However say all but one ISP blocked IP addresses of most torrent trackers, making it impossible for peers to connect with one another. The one remaining ISP that does not block them, despite their right to do so stands to gain by continuing to not block any content as that would bring them more clients.</p>
<p>This could be extended to other things - for example software that can be used to extract content from a computer game. The company that makes it could place measures in it to prevent infringing use, but if they not people might buy the software specifically to steal content of games for example.</p>
<p>So I was wondering how far can this liability be stretched regarding the direct financial gain condition.</p>


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Answer 1: <h2>ISPs and VPNs have “safe harbour” protections</h2>
<p>Just like the Post Office, FedEx and other “common carriers” who might be transporting illegal material.</p>
<p>Basically the way it works is that if they don’t know, and stop when they are told about it, they can’t be held liable.</p>


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Answer 2: <p>The concept of a “financial interest” affecting <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vicarious_liability" rel="nofollow noreferrer">vicarious liability</a> for copyright infringement is derived from United States case law. In <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MGM_Studios,_Inc._v._Grokster,_Ltd." rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.</em></a>, <a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/545/913/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">545 U.S. 913</a> (2005), the Supreme Court described it in these terms:</p>
<blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p>One infringes contributorily by intentionally inducing or encouraging direct infringement, and <strong>infringes vicariously by profiting from direct infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it</strong>.⁹ Although “[t]he Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable for infringement committed by another,” these doctrines of secondary liability emerged from common law principles and are well established in the law.</p>
<p>⁹ We stated in <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sony_Corp._of_America_v._Universal_City_Studios,_Inc." rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.</em></a> that “the lines between direct infringement, contributory infringement and vicarious liability are not clearly drawn” …</p>
</blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p>The words used in the question, “direct financial interest,” come from <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shapiro,_Bernstein_and_Co._v._H.L._Green_Co." rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>Shapiro, Bernstein &amp; Co. v. H. L. Green Co.</em></a>, <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/316/304/187299/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">316 F.2d 304</a> (CA2 1963). That case was about whether a department store was liable for the sales of a <a href="https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/concessionaire" rel="nofollow noreferrer">concessionaire</a> who sold infringing <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phonograph_record" rel="nofollow noreferrer">records</a> in the department store, under a profit sharing agreement with the department store. The court held that this relationship resulted in secondary liability:</p>
<blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p>Section 101(e) of the Copyright Act makes unlawful the “unauthorized manufacture, use, or sale” of phonograph records. Because of the open-ended terminology of the section, and the related section 1(e), courts have had to trace, case by case, a pattern of business relationships which would render one person liable for the infringing conduct of another. It is quite clear, for example, that the normal agency rule of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Respondeat_superior" rel="nofollow noreferrer">respondeat superior</a> applies to copyright infringement by a servant within the scope of his employment.</p>


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<p>Realistically, the courts have not drawn a rigid line between the strict cases of agency, and those of independent contract, license, and lease. Many of the elements which have given rise to the doctrine of respondeat superior, may also be evident in factual settings other than that of a technical employer-employee relationship. <strong>When the right and ability to supervise coalesce with an obvious and direct financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted materials</strong> — even in the absence of actual knowledge that the copyright monopoly is being impaired — the purposes of copyright law may be best effectuated by the imposition of liability upon the beneficiary of that exploitation …</p>
</blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p>The Supreme Court found that such liability did <em>not</em> exist in the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sony_Corp._of_America_v._Universal_City_Studios,_Inc." rel="nofollow noreferrer">Betamax case</a>, <a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/464/417/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">464 U.S. 417</a> (1984). While Sony had a financial interest in selling a product which was used to infringe copyright, it did not have enough control over its customers’ actions to be liable for their infringement:</p>
<blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p>In [other] cases, as in other situations in which the imposition of vicarious liability is manifestly just, <strong>the “contributory” infringer was in a position to control the use of copyrighted works by others</strong> and had authorized the use without permission from the copyright owner. This case, however, plainly does not fall in that category. The only contact between Sony and the users of the Betamax that is disclosed by this record occurred at the moment of sale. The District Court expressly found that “no employee of Sony, Sonam or DDBI had either direct involvement with the allegedly infringing activity or direct contact with purchasers of Betamax who recorded copyrighted works off the air.”</p>
</blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p>But in <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MGM_Studios,_Inc._v._Grokster,_Ltd." rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.</em></a>, <a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/545/913/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">545 U.S. 913</a> (2005), the Supreme Court found Grokster liable for copyright infringement by the users of their peer-to-peer file sharing software. While the software had substantial non-infringing uses, the Supreme Court upheld MGM’s claim on an “inducement theory” because there was evidence that Grokster actively encouraged copyright infringement:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><em>Sony</em>’s rule limits imputing culpable intent as a matter of law from the characteristics or uses of a distributed product. But nothing in <em>Sony</em> requires courts to ignore evidence of intent if there is such evidence, and the case was never meant to foreclose rules of fault-based liability derived from the common law …</p>


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<p>The classic case of direct evidence of unlawful purpose occurs when one <strong>induces commission of infringement by another, or “entic[es] or persuad[es] another” to infringe, as by advertising</strong>. Thus at common law a copyright or patent defendant who “not only expected but invoked [infringing use] by advertisement” was liable for infringement “on principles recognized in every part of the law” …</p>
<p>The rule on inducement of infringement as developed in the early cases is no different today. Evidence of “active steps ... taken to encourage direct infringement,” such as advertising an infringing use or instructing how to engage in an infringing use, show an affirmative intent that the product be used to infringe, and a showing that infringement was encouraged overcomes the law’s reluctance to find liability when a defendant merely
sells a commercial product suitable for some lawful use.</p>
</blockquote>


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sells a commercial product suitable for some lawful use.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Whether an internet or VPN provider is liable for its users’ copyright infringement would depend on the specific evidence produced to the court. The court would need to interpret the above principles and consider other relevant case law. Proof of a “direct financial interest” in the infringement would be relevant, but not necessary or sufficient, to establish liability.</p>


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<p>The <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Online_Copyright_Infringement_Liability_Limitation_Act" rel="nofollow noreferrer">DMCA safe harbour provisions</a>, <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/17/512" rel="nofollow noreferrer">17 U.S.C. § 512</a>, may also apply, as compliance with these provisions could exclude any liability which the copyright holder was otherwise able to establish. However, “this is irrelevant unless [the defendant] is contributing to infringement; a noninfringer doesn’t need a safe harbor”: <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flava_Works_Inc._v._Gunter" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>Flava Works Inc. v. Gunter</em></a>, <a href="https://casetext.com/case/flava-works-inc-v-gunter" rel="nofollow noreferrer">689 F.3d 754</a> (CA7 2012).</p>


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Question Title: Can I opt out of UK Working Time Regulations daily breaks?

Question Body: <p>The <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1998/1833/regulation/10/made" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Working Time Regulations 1998, PART II, Regulation 10</a> says</p>
<blockquote>
<p><strong>Daily rest</strong></p>
<p>10.—(1) An adult worker is entitled to a rest period of not less than eleven consecutive hours in each 24-hour period during which he works
for his employer.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Entitled is the key word here. I know that I can opt out of the 48hrs per week limited as per <a href="https://www.gov.uk/maximum-weekly-working-hours/weekly-maximum-working-hours-and-opting-out" rel="nofollow noreferrer">this page</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>You can opt out for a certain period or indefinitely. It must be voluntary and in writing.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>but I can't find anything whether it's fine to do it on daily rest.</p>


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Answer 1: <p>Yes</p>
<p>If you look at the law pertaining to the work week and opting out of the maximum, which is also in The Working Time Regulations 1998 (with my emphasis in bold):</p>
<blockquote>
<p><a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1998/1833/regulation/4/made" rel="noreferrer">4</a>.—(1) Subject to regulation 5, a worker’s working time,
including overtime, in any reference period which is applicable in his
case shall not exceed an average of 48 hours for each seven days.  ...
(3) Subject to paragraphs (4) and (5) <strong>and any agreement under
regulation 23(b)</strong>, the reference periods which apply in the case of a
worker are ...</p>
</blockquote>
<p>So if we go to <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1998/1833/regulation/23/made" rel="noreferrer">23(b)</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<ol start="23">
<li>A collective agreement or a workforce agreement may—</li>
</ol>
<p>(a)modify or exclude the application of regulations 6(1) to (3) and


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<blockquote>
<ol start="23">
<li>A collective agreement or a workforce agreement may—</li>
</ol>
<p>(a)modify or exclude the application of regulations 6(1) to (3) and
(7), <strong>10(1)</strong>, 11(1) and (2) and 12(1), and</p>
<p>(b)for objective or technical reasons or reasons concerning the
organization of work, modify the application of regulation 4(3) and
(4) by the substitution, for each reference to 17 weeks, of a
different period, being a period not exceeding 52 weeks, in relation
to particular workers or groups of workers.</p>
</blockquote>


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Question Title: Deceased spouse still on bank account

Question Body: <p>If one leaves deceased spouse on joint bank account, what happens?
If one leaves deceased spouse on home deed, what happens?</p>
<p>Note, Soc Sec has been provided with copy of death certificate.
Accounts with beneficiaries have been dispersed.</p>


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Answer 1: <p>There are multiple kinds of joint ownership, centered around the question of survivorship. One possible outcome is that the deceased willed their property to some other person Smith, therefore Smith will not have A's interest in the account. Let's assume that the accounts and house are both joint tenants with right of survivorship. Then the survivor simply is the only person who has the right to access the account. However, the account probably cannot be closed, because as far as the bank knows, the deceased spouse still has an interest in the account, and will require the spouse to sign the paperwork. Therefore the surviving spouse will have to bring in paperwork to establish that the deceased spouse is deceased.</p>


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<p>Similarly, a deceased spouse can remain on the deed, but when it comes time to sell the house, it will be necessary to legally &quot;extinguish&quot; the deceased spouse's interest in the house. It can also complicate mortgage-refinancing or using the house as security for a loan to leave the paperwork unresolved.</p>


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Question Title: What is acceptable use of security deposits?

Question Body: <p><strong>Context:</strong> Non-residential Florida Office Space Lease</p>
<p><a href="https://www.akerman.com/a/web/65420/Security-Deposit-Laws-Commercial-Lease-State-Comparison-Chart.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Akerman indicates</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Landlords routinely require security deposits from their tenants
before entering into a lease for commercial property. Security
deposits are intended to provide the landlord with protection against
damage to the leased premises and security for the tenant’s payment
obligations under the lease.</p>
</blockquote>
<p><strong>Question:</strong> What, if any, bright lines exist regarding whether a repair is reasonable after the tenant moves out?</p>
<p>In particular: repairs to surfaces such as ceilings, floors, walls, bathroom fixtures.</p>
<p>Is there a general rule of thumb as to what is / is not reasonable?</p>


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Answer 1: <h2>What does the lease say?</h2>
<p>The deposit was collected for a reason, what was it?</p>
<p>Whether it can be used to effect repairs and to what extent should be spelled out in the lease.</p>


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Answer 2: <blockquote>
<p>Question: What, if any, bright lines exist regarding whether a repair
is reasonable after the tenant moves out?</p>
<p>In particular: repairs to surfaces such as ceilings, floors, walls,
bathroom fixtures.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Unless the lease specifically says so, no, there are no bright line rules. This said, usually non-residential leases spell out standards related to this issue at considerable length. It would be the rare exception for a lease to be silent on the subject unless the premises were extremely primitive and low in value (e.g. vacant land or a parking lot in a rural area).</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Is there a general rule of thumb as to what is / is not reasonable?</p>
</blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p>Is there a general rule of thumb as to what is / is not reasonable?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The general rule of thumb is that damage in excess of reasonable wear and tear, and substantial changes to the premises that were not authorized by the lease, are damages that the landlord can recover from the tenant and can use as a basis to make deduction from the security deposit.</p>
<p>This is not a bright line rule and is instead, a general &quot;standard&quot;.</p>


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Question Title: Can I make an auto shop pay for oil damage from a defective oil filter?

Question Body: <p>About ten days ago I had a flat tired replaced at a local shop and added an oil change to the work order. A day later I notice a huge oil stain (about 3 ft x 10 ft) that flowed over the pavers on my driveway. I went back to the car shop for an evaluation and was informed that the oil filter was defective. They replaced it and went on my way. I can’t get the oil off the driveway after multiple attempts with multiple suggestions. In California do I have legal recourse for repair or replacing the affected pavers?<br />
<a href="https://i.stack.imgur.com/EwG1F.jpg" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><img src="https://i.stack.imgur.com/EwG1F.jpg" alt="1" /></a></p>


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Answer 1: <p>You can sue the shop for defective installation, or you can sue the manufacturer for a defective part. You will have to prove that it is the fault of the person that you are suing, so the shop will probably argue that it was a defective part that they couldn't have known about, and the manufacturer will probably argue that it was due to defective installation. If you have competent third-party testimony that proves that the part itself was defective, you may prevail, though if you can get them to write up a technical report that supports your contention, the manufacturer may simplify things by compensating you, if you waive your right to sue for damages. However, this may not be an option unless the shop retained the filter and can point to a specific manufacturing defect.</p>


Tags: california, property, civil-damages


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Question Title: When is cursing illegal in the U.S.?

Question Body: <p>For example, I've heard before that it's actually illegal to swear at a police officer (I've also heard that's true in the U.K. as well, although that's not my question).</p>

<p>However, what counts as "swearing" is a very subjective thing, and clearly there are plenty of contexts where no word is off-limits (because, thankfully, free speech is a thing here), so it seems like a difficult thing to enforce. I've also never heard of anyone actually being prosecuted for this.</p>

<p>So, the three parts of my question are:</p>

<ul>
<li>When is it illegal to swear, if ever (I'm guessing this probably varies a lot by state, so I'd be okay with just a federal law answer)?</li>
<li>What actually counts as swearing (under each law / circumstance)?</li>
<li>What penalties would I be facing (under each law / circumstance)?</li>
</ul>


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Answer 1: <p><a href="http://blogs.denverpost.com/crime/2011/06/13/the-f-bomb-isnt-polite-or-illegal/48/" rel="noreferrer">Denver lawyer David Lane has said</a>, “The First Amendment lives in a rough neighborhood and if you can’t stand the neighborhood move to China … or somewhere the First Amendment does not exist.”</p>

<p>"One man's vulgarity is another's lyric." <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7398433541275578772&amp;q=Cohen%20v.%20Cali&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=6,37#p25" rel="noreferrer"><em>Cohen v. Cali.</em> 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971)</a></p>

<p>At this point, we need to define illegal as used in your question. For instance, do you mean "you can face any form of punishment"? If so, this question is extremely broad and governed by multiple sets of laws. </p>


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<p>Additionally, one should note that this is a Federal Question. The First Amendment, through the Due Process clause applies to states as well. Therefore, there will be extremely little discrepancy (if any - first impression issues being the main differences probably) between the States,.</p>

<p><a href="https://www.fcc.gov/guides/obscenity-indecency-profanity-faq" rel="noreferrer">The FCC can limit profanity on air.</a> Additionally,  <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1464" rel="noreferrer">Title 18 of the United States Code, Section 1464,</a> (Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
) prohibits the utterance of any obscene, indecent or profane language by means of radio communication. </p>


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<p>The <a href="http://uspto.gov" rel="noreferrer">USPTO</a> can <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6965806919388894539&amp;q=702%20F.3d%20633&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=6,37" rel="noreferrer">limit Trademarks with "vulgar" meaning</a>. (See EDIT below for update.)</p>

<p>In School:
High school student's First Amendment rights were not violated in suspension for uttering obscenity, regardless of whether she was merely repeating and returning words originally directed at her, particularly where words were clearly disruptive as they were heard by 90 students in cafeteria and, in opinion of assistant principal, were “fighting words.” <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6623327496247022767&amp;q=%20928%20F.Supp.%20789&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=6,37" rel="noreferrer">Heller v. Hodgin, S.D.Ind.1996, 928 F.Supp. 789.</a></p>

<p>Fighting Words: These seem to be words that would invoke, or are likely to invoke a fight.</p>


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<p>Fighting Words: These seem to be words that would invoke, or are likely to invoke a fight.</p>

<p><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11156615267000448814&amp;q=897%20F.Supp.%20649&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=6,37" rel="noreferrer">Fighting words claim upheld</a>:
Arrestee's speech when crowd gathered near fallen tree that had blocked traffic constituted unprotected fighting words, so that his arrest under city disorderly conduct ordinance did not violate his First Amendment free speech rights; arrestee's repeated use of the word “bitch,” his accusation of matricide directed toward his sister, his use of the phrase “<a href="http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnnnext/dam/assets/150626213815-rainbow-white-house-exlarge-169.jpg" rel="noreferrer">fucking queer</a>,” his pushing of third party and his raised voice all tended to show that his conduct, under the circumstances, had tendency to provoke physical altercation.</p>


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<p><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2219668728892189742&amp;q=332%20F.3d%20199&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=6,37" rel="noreferrer">Fighting words claim not upheld</a>:
Detainee's profane words to police officer as officer conducted Terry stop, “son of a bitch,” while unpleasant and insulting, were not “fighting words,” given officer's confirmation of fact that words did not cause anyone to fight or become angry; thus, words could not constitute violation of disorderly conduct statute and in turn could not supply probable cause for disorderly conduct arrest.</p>

<p>In addition to fighting words, true threats and incitement to imminent lawless action are not protected under the First Amendment.</p>

<p>Additionally, the government can regulate free speech in public schools (hence <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_speech_zone" rel="noreferrer">Free Speech Zones</a>) and while in their employ (no yelling at your boss if you want to keep your job). </p>

<hr>


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<hr>

<p>It is not part of the main question, but free speech inside the court room. Well, the Judge is pretty much king in a courtroom. What he says goes. (more or less, like nothing toooooo crazy). In a courtroom, if you do something a Judge doesn't like, he can hold you in <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contempt_of_court" rel="noreferrer">contempt of court</a>. (<a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10826199069820673678&amp;q=376%20U.S.%20681&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=6,37" rel="noreferrer">You get no jury for contempt cases.</a>)</p>

<hr>

<p>EDIT: Since I wrote this answer, new law came out from the Supreme Court in 
<a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/15-1293_1o13.pdf" rel="noreferrer">Matel v. Tam, 582 U.S. ___ (2017)</a>. The Supreme Court affirmed the finding of the Federal Circuit that the disparagement clause [is] facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause.</p>


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<blockquote>
  <p>Simon Tam, lead singer of the rock group “The Slants,” chose this moniker in order to “reclaim” the term and drain its denigrating force as a derogatory term for Asian persons. Tam sought federal registration of the mark “THE SLANTS.” The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) denied the application under a Lanham Act provision prohibiting the registration of trademarks that may “disparage . . . or bring . . . into contemp[t] or disrepute” any “persons, living or dead.” 15
  U. S. C. §1052(a). Tam contested the denial of registration through the administrative appeals process, to no avail. He then took the case to federal court, where the en banc Federal Circuit ultimately found the disparagement clause facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. </p>
</blockquote>


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<p>The decision aptly concludes with: "If affixing the commercial label permits the suppression of any speech that may lead to political or social “volatility,” free speech would be endangered."</p>


Answer 2: <p>A recent state supreme court case spoke directly to this issue. <em>Ruling date: June 25, 2015.</em></p>

<hr>

<h2>The U.S. Constitution protects your right to curse at the police.</h2>

<p><a href="http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/crime/court-first-amendment-protects-profanity-against-police/" rel="noreferrer">The Seattle Times reports here</a> that the <a href="http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/886946.pdf" rel="noreferrer">Washington State Supreme Court has ruled in the case of State of Washington v. E.J.J.</a>:</p>


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<blockquote>
  <p>"<em>First Amendment protects profanity against police</em>"</p>
  
  <p>A teenage boy convicted of obstruction after yelling and cursing at three Seattle police officers while they were investigating a disturbance at his house had a First Amendment right to behave the way he did, the Washington Supreme Court said in an opinion Thursday.</p>
  
  <p>Citizens who curse at police and call them abusive names while they’re investigating a crime are protected from arrest by the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech, the state Supreme Court ruled Thursday in a case out of Seattle.</p>
</blockquote>


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Answer 3: <p>Although <a href="http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/can-i-arrested-yelling-swearing-cop.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">swearing at a police officer in itself is not illegal</a>, the police are very likely to try to find something else to charge you with – along the lines of &quot;<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contempt_of_cop" rel="nofollow noreferrer">contempt of cop</a>.&quot; The law is very nuanced, one cannot say that anything is blanket legal or illegal.</p>


Answer 4: <p>You're asking about an exception to the right to free speech, and it turns out <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_free_speech_exceptions" rel="nofollow">there's a good page on that question on Wikipedia</a>.  I was amused to discover that, among the exceptions recognized by the Supreme Court, are "fighting words" and "offensive speech," which I believe would be the closest proscriptions on "cursing."  ("Threats of violence" are also generally not protected.)</p>


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<p>I expect there is a good deal of variation in how U.S. jurisdictions have chosen to regulate and control unprotected speech.  I would also be interested to see examples.</p>

<p>One recent case that directly addresses your question is <em>Washington v. E.J.J.</em>, in which <a href="http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2015/jun/25/first-amendment-protects-profanity-against-police/" rel="nofollow">the Washington Supreme Court confirmed that the First Amendment protects the right to curse at police</a>.</p>


Tags: united-states, criminal-law, freedom-of-speech


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Question Title: Does GDPR apply when PII is already publicly available?

Question Body: <p>Pretend there is a website, it might be free to access, or be a paid per search service, where the users get access to summarised information on the people that they search for.</p>
<p>All of the information this website displays has been taken from public sources, such as news papers, personal profiles on company websites, LinkedIn, Facebook, other websites etc... Nothing has been copied from these sources, aside from the person's full name and position (such as secretary).</p>
<p>The people have never consented to having their data published onto this website, it was mined manually by employees.</p>
<p>Would the people be allowed to request their data be removed? I am interested in how GDPR or the Data Protection Act would apply when this information is already publicly available.</p>


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Answer 1: <p>The site would combine the data in novel ways, which is <em>processing</em> the data. Processing personal data which is publicly available is still processing personal data.</p>
<p>You would have to take GDPR into account. That does not mean the processing is forbidden, but you need a legal basis for doing it. In many ways, having the informed consent is the easiest legal basis, but there are others. The data subject would have the right to demand information about the data you hold, and to demand the correction of wrong data. There is not <em>necessarily</em> a right to demand deletion, but if consent is withdrawn and you have <em>no other</em> basis for data processing, you have to delete.</p>
<p>Note also that the consent basis would mean you have to <em>actively</em> contact the people whose consent you seek before the processing starts, and document how you do it. That makes pay-per-request models difficult.</p>


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<p>But consider that the news media can process <em>some</em> data about <em>some</em> people without the consent of the subjects of their activities. They just need to balance privacy and other legitimate interests all the time.</p>


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Question Title: is it illegal for a minor to contact a minor if the second minor&#39;s parents have instructed them not to do so?

Question Body: <p>I am 16 yrs old and my boyfriend's parents have told my boyfriend not to contact me (and have told me not to contact him) because they disapprove, and believe I am not a real person since they have never actually met me.</p>
<p>My boyfriend however has met me before he moved.  We mainly talk online now, and they say I may be predator or something malicious, which is not true.</p>
<p>They told him not to contact me, but I reached out to him and his best friend online to let him know that I would be willing to have a phone call with them so they could talk to me and get to know me and realize I'm a real person.</p>
<p>Thus: is it illegal for me to contact him if  his parents told him not to, even though I initiated the contact and he was really just talking to me because he cares to try to fix it between us?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>If, so far, you only had contact trough phone or internet, it is somewhat understandable that parents are afraid that their son/daughter falls for some internet-rip-off or some pervert with a fake profile.</p>
<p>It may upset your or his parents, but continued contact is not in itself illegal (illegal as in &quot;you could be sent to jail for it&quot;), just because they say so. The parents could in theory get a restraining order or inform the youth safety agency (or however that is called in your place), but to do that, they would need to provide some rationale as to why they think that you (or your boyfriend) are an impostor.</p>
<p>I think, this should really be solved on the social level, and your best option would really be to physically meet your boyfriend, maybe even when your or his parents are around.</p>
<p>After all, Romeo and Julia didn't stop meeting just because they weren't allowed to...</p>


Tags: is-x-legal, minor


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Question Body: <p>I am having an issue with my downstairs neighbor. The neighbor has a damaged leaking ceiling with brownish color (which might be an issue for a long time) and is saying that the wet ceiling was observed just a few days ago.</p>
<p>We have had heavy rain pouring over the past few days. The neighbor continues insisting that it is my fault even though I do not have a leak on my end. I contacted the property management right away and called a plumber.</p>
<p>He came in and inspected my 2 bathrooms and found NO leak. He suggested it might be an issue with the roof or the ventilation but I still provided my insurance to the neighbor. I communicated this to the association but now he doesn’t believe my plumber’s inspection and he personally is making an accusation that this issue is from my unit. I find this unacceptable because the property manager is not a plumber but he has these demands and tells me that the plumber needs to remove my toilet and take a look.</p>


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<p>Why would they come in and mess with my toilet if it turns out it is not actually the toilet but the roof instead? Let me know what you think but I believe they should cut into my neighbor's ceiling and figure out the source of the leak and if it is my toilet okay go ahead and fix it. Especially when I already provided my insurance details.</p>


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Answer 1: <p>From the legal perspective, nobody has to do anything until the court orders somebody to do something. The most likely order from a court would be &quot;compensate X for your actions or inactions&quot;. Barring some peculiar circumstance, either you or the HOA would be liable to the downstairs person. You can look at the CCRs to see who is responsible for what, which mainly involves finding boundaries (where is the unit, and where are the common areas?). At some point, someone has to figure out what caused the damage. It is possible that via negligence, you caused damage (maybe the plumber was simply wrong); or maybe this is about rain, the ventilation system, and the common areas where the HOA is responsible. Whatever the case may be, the person below would sue to recover his cost of fixing the problem.</p>


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<p>Property owners often have insurance that insures against damage to their property – it sounds like you have such insurance, and the guy below has insurance. It's also possible that the HOA has insurance. Each insurer has a duty to their client, so the company of the guy below has a duty to him (they protect his interest), your insurer protects your interest, etc.</p>
<p>The guy below is not required to figure out what the problem is and who to sue, he just has to notify his insurance company of the problem, and start the process of making a claim. That company naturally wants to limit their losses and collect from whoever is ultimately legally liable. You are under no legal obligation to respond to a neighbor's accusation, until the issue is formally escalated (the threat of a lawsuit, directly filed by him or by his insurance company). You don't have to accept or reject his beliefs.</p>


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<p>If there are no insurance companies involved, and if you are certain that this is the responsibility of the HOA, then you would probably not consider taking on unnecessary expenses to diagnose the problem. The guy below would have to shoulder the burden of proving that it is either you or the HOA that is liable.</p>


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Question Title: Why does Double Jeopardy apply if you confess?

Question Body: <p>If you were tried for murder and acquitted - then you go out and publicly admit that they were wrong, you did actually murder that person. Where is the <em>justice</em> in not being able to be tried again in those circumstances? There is now no doubt that you were in fact guilty - why tie the court/police's hands?</p>
<p>For example, the case of Emmett Till, where the murderers freely admitted that they did it after the fact, and could not be tried again.</p>


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Answer 1: <p>In the United States, <a href="https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/amdt5-3-1/ALDE_00000858/" rel="noreferrer">prohibition against double jeopardy is a <em>constitutional</em> protection</a>. As long as one was actually at jeopardy for an offence by a particular sovereign, that sovereign may not subsequently prosecute the accused for the same wrong. In other jurisdictions, such as the U.K., it has <a href="https://www.hse.gov.uk/enforce/enforcementguide/court/abuse-double.htm" rel="noreferrer">a less strict form</a>, even though generally, special pleas of <em>autrefois acquit</em> would be available.</p>
<p>It is also not the case that after an apparent &quot;confession&quot; in public that there is &quot;no doubt&quot; about a person's guilt. No evidence is &quot;certain&quot; in law without being tested in court.</p>
<p>Also, you propose:</p>
<blockquote>


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<p>Also, you propose:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>you were tried for murder and acquitted - then you go out and publicly admit that they were wrong, you did actually murder that person</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This does not put the acquittal into question. The prosecution failed to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. This means at law that one is deemed to be not guilty. Your scenario does not show that the trier of fact was &quot;wrong&quot; about the prosecution failing to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. This is not an avenue by which the prosecution can challenge an acquittal. If a properly instructed trier of fact finds that that the prosecution did not prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, this conclusion is unassailable.</p>


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<p>You ask &quot;where is the justice?&quot; The justice of a system is assessed by its application across the totality of cases. Given that a system of prosecuting and judging that is run through humans will inevitably produce errors, the law has developed to promote a measure of &quot;justice&quot; across the entirety of the cases that are disposed of by the court rather than to futilely attempt to ensure the &quot;correct&quot; result in every particular case.</p>
<p>The rule against double jeopardy has arisen out of this systemic concern for justice. It does not purport to secure the &quot;correct&quot; result in every case.</p>


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Answer 2: <h2>Just because I believe I’m guilty doesn’t mean I am</h2>
<p>All crimes contain elements, each of which must be true for someone to be guilty. Yes, I shot the victim, yes, I intended to kill him, yes, he’s now dead, yes, I believe I’m guilty. But if he died in his sleep just before I pulled the trigger, I’m not.</p>
<h2>Confessions can be lies</h2>
<p>I know it might shock you, but people are not always telling the truth when they confess to a crime. There are various reasons why someone might do this: mistaken belief, protecting someone else, status etc. Grotesque as it is, in the Emmett Till case, the acquitted men would have received a great deal of status in their community if they had committed the crime - that could be enough incentive for them to falsely confess.</p>
<h2>Conflicting objects of the legal system</h2>
<p>Justice is only <em>one</em> of the purposes of our legal system. Others include efficiency and finality.</p>


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<h2>Conflicting objects of the legal system</h2>
<p>Justice is only <em>one</em> of the purposes of our legal system. Others include efficiency and finality.</p>
<p>Society can have only as much justice as it can afford - in both time and treasure. Yes, it would be more just if every case reached the correct result but it’s just too damn expensive.</p>
<p>Similarly, the legal process must come to a final and definitive end. It is neither efficient nor just for the process to be never ending.</p>
<p>Finally, in a criminal matter, compared to any given individual, the state has near limitless resources. It’s important not to allow the justice system to become a tool of persecution. You can’t allow the state to keep feeding coins into the slot machine until they hit the jackpot of a jury that agrees with them.</p>
<h2>Some jurisdictions do allow retrials in certain situations</h2>


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<h2>Some jurisdictions do allow retrials in certain situations</h2>
<p>The rule against double jeopardy in the USA is a constitutional protection and, unless that changes, it is absolutely prohibited.</p>
<p>Other common law jurisdictions such as the UK and some Australian states allow the rule to be broken for serious crimes (like murder) where there is “fresh and compelling evidence”. An unsworn confession by the accused isn’t very compelling.</p>


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Answer 3: <p>In the U.S., the bar against double jeopardy exists because court cases cost money both to the defendant and the tax payer.  Since it is the state that can bring criminal cases and the state that has superior resources in evidence gathering, the law was implemented to prevent the state from ruining an innocent person by repeatedly trying them in court at the tax payer's expense.  Additionally, it is to prevent the state, having once failed to convince the jury, to retry with another jury and continue to do so until they get a verdict they like.</p>


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<p>While there are occasions where Double Jeopardy does not attach, these are exceedingly rare (one of the few times it was done without declaring a mistrial was in a case where the judge in a bench trial was bribed to return a not guilty verdict.  Because the defendant was never in a legal jeopardy situation, it was ruled he could be tried again for the same criminal event).   Additionally, the State and Federal Government are separate sovereigns for the purposes of Double Jeopardy, and while the Federal Government does not normally try someone who is tried by the state regardless of outcome, it is certainly possible for them to do so as the rules preventing them are policy, not law.</p>


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Answer 4: <p>Another advantage of double jeopardy protection, beyond what has been mentioned already, is that it helps the truth to come out after the trial is over. For example, the murderers of Emmett Till would likely not have freely admitted to the crime had the possibility of criminal penalties still existed. There are several cases where this provides historians information that otherwise would have remained hidden.</p>


Tags: united-states, rules-of-court, double-jeopardy, prosecution, immunity


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Question Title: Is operating a part-time beacon in the 10-metre band permitted?

Question Body: <p>Consider the text of <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/47/97.203" rel="nofollow noreferrer">47 CFR § 97.203 - Beacon station</a>, with the following scenario:</p>
<p>Sally is a radio operator turning her station into a part-time beacon. She is class Extra and is allowed in all of the portions of each of the bands. Sally places her beacon in the middle of the ten meter band.</p>
<p>Is Sally in violation of this regulation, subsection (d) in particular?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>The key part of (e) is the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_National_Radio_Quiet_Zone" rel="noreferrer">National Radio Quiet Zone</a> that covers parts of east-central West Virginia and west-central Virginia. Because of radio telescopes and military intelligence equipment in the area, there are restrictions (increasingly strict as you get closer) on potential radio interference. A radio source that would be no problem in most of the world can be a major problem when you are trying to pick up a radio signal from a few billion light-years away.</p>
<p>So if Sally is in the National Radio Quiet Zone, she has to notify the National Radio Astronomy Observatory who will consider the power, location, etc. of the proposed beacon, and determine if it will potentially interfere with the radio telescopes before granting permission. If they grant permission, Sally is fine. Otherwise the FCC will decide what Sally can do.</p>


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<p>If Sally is outside the National Radio Quiet Zone, then (e) doesn't apply.</p>
<p>So more information is needed before we can know if Sally is legal or not, but as a general rule: Outside the National Radio Quiet Zone, probably ok, inside it, will have to ask for permission.</p>


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Answer 2: <p>Looking at another paragraph in <a href="https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-47/chapter-I/subchapter-D/part-97" rel="nofollow noreferrer">47 CFR Part 97</a> we find <a href="https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-47/chapter-I/subchapter-D/part-97/subpart-B/section-97.101" rel="nofollow noreferrer">§ 97.101</a> which states</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(a) In all respects not specifically covered by FCC Rules each amateur
station must be operated in accordance with good engineering and good
amateur practice.</p>
</blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p>(a) In all respects not specifically covered by FCC Rules each amateur
station must be operated in accordance with good engineering and good
amateur practice.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The principal organization for US amateurs is the American Radio Relay League, and they publish a <a href="http://www.arrl.org/band-plan" rel="nofollow noreferrer">band plan</a> which calls for beacons in the 10 meter band be in the range 28.200-28.300 MHz, which is not the &quot;middle&quot; of the 10 meter band. If Alice were to establish a beacon in a way not in accord with the band plan, it's possible that the FCC Regional Director might exercise the authority under 97.203 (f) and order Alice to cease operating the beacon.</p>


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Answer 3: <p>97.203(d) works together with 97.109(b) through (d):</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(b) When a station is being locally controlled, the control operator must be at the control point. Any station may be locally controlled.</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>(c) When a station is being remotely controlled, the control operator must be at the control point. Any station may be remotely controlled.</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>(d) When a station is being automatically controlled, the control operator need not be at the control point. Only stations specifically designated elsewhere in this part may be automatically controlled.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>If Sally is operating a beacon outside of the frequencies designated in 97.203(d), 97.203(d) doesn't authorize automatic control.</p>


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</blockquote>
<p>If Sally is operating a beacon outside of the frequencies designated in 97.203(d), 97.203(d) doesn't authorize automatic control.</p>
<p>Given that none of the other provisions for automatic control apply (97.201(d), 97.205(d), and 97.221 don't seem like they apply in your scenario), the station must be locally or remotely controlled. Sally (or another licensed operator designated by Sally) needs to be present and monitoring the station while it transmits. Walking out of the room and leaving the radio alone would be a violation.</p>
<p>Given that a control operator <em>is</em> present then it would seem that this section is satisfied even while beaconing outside of the beacon subbands, however 97.101(a) and 97.101(b) could certainly be an issue <a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/a/93826/3379">as pointed out by Gerard Ashton</a>.</p>


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Question Title: Would it by libel if I told someone one of their friends is a thief?

Question Body: <p>Considering US law in general -</p>
<p>An associate (call him Patrick) stole a fair bit of money over several years.  I eventually severed all business relations and blocked Patrick on all platforms.  I have no wish to spend my valuable life pursuing him in courts.</p>
<p>I keep getting invitations on LinkedIn *as an example) from people whose first few contacts are Patrick. It may be that Patrick is using fake accounts to try and associate with me. But even if these are genuine profiles, would it be libel if I just told them that 'I dont want to associate with friends of a thief'.</p>
<p>I won't be identifying who that person is.  But if they know Patrick well enough they will know who I mean.</p>


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Answer 1: <p>If your statement is true, it is not libel. But if it is false, it is libel. It does not matter if you directly name him, what matters is if he can be specifically identified by others. Not <em>all</em> others, but at least <em>some</em> others.</p>


Tags: united-states, libel


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Question Title: Legal status of animals in Germany

Question Body: <p>How has Germany has dealt with the legal status of animals? What, if any, transition has taken place from a thing to a creature in a legal context?</p>

<p>This question is prompted by a sentence found in the BBC article <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-48528968" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Cat declawing: Should it be banned, and why does it happen in the US?</a> </p>

<blockquote>
  <p>For Americans, it's a matter of <strong>freedom and convenience</strong> – the right to the freedom to make decisions in terms of how you raise your cat, and convenience, because once you remove the claws, you don't ever have to worry about you or the furniture getting scratched.</p>
</blockquote>


Answer 1: <p>Section 20a of the German Constitution added in 2002 states:</p>


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Answer 1: <p>Section 20a of the German Constitution added in 2002 states:</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>Article 20a [Protection of the natural foundations of life and
  animals]</p>
  
  <p>Mindful also of its responsibility towards future generations, the
  state shall protect the natural foundations of life and animals by
  legislation and, in accordance with law and justice, by executive and
  judicial action, all within the framework of the constitutional order.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>This adopts what American environmentalists would call a "conservationist" stance (i.e. that the environment including animals should be preserved for the benefit of people in the future) as opposed to an "environmentalist" stance (i.e. that the environment is intrinsically something entitled to protection in its own right and not just because of its future value to human beings).</p>


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<p>The German Civil Code (BGB) § 90a, adopted in 1990 (or 1998, it isn't entirely clear from my sources), states (in <a href="https://germanlawarchive.iuscomp.org/?p=615" rel="nofollow noreferrer">the definitional introductory part of the Code (in English translation)</a>). This appears in a larger context as follows:</p>


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<blockquote>
  <p>Division 2 Things and animals</p>
  
  <p>Section 90 Concept of the thing</p>
  
  <p>Only corporeal objects are things as defined by law.</p>
  
  <p><strong>Section 90a Animals</strong></p>
  
  <p><strong>Animals are not things. They are protected by special statutes. They
  are governed by the provisions that apply to things, with the
  necessary modifications, except insofar as otherwise provided.</strong></p>
  
  <p>Section 91 Fungible things</p>
  
  <p>Fungible things as defined by law are movable things that in business
  dealings are customarily specified by number, measure or weight.</p>
  
  <p>Section 92 Consumable things</p>
  
  <p>(1)Consumable things as defined by law are movable things whose
  intended use consists in consumption or in disposal.</p>
  
  <p>(2)Movable things are also regarded as consumable if they are part of
  a warehouse store or another aggregate of things whose intended use is
  the disposal of the individual things.</p>


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<p>(2)Movable things are also regarded as consumable if they are part of
  a warehouse store or another aggregate of things whose intended use is
  the disposal of the individual things.</p>
  
  <p>Section 93 Essential parts of a thing</p>
  
  <p>Parts of a thing that cannot be separated without one or the other
  being destroyed or undergoing a change of nature (essential parts)
  cannot be the subject of separate rights.</p>
  
  <p>Section 94 Essential parts of a plot of land or a building</p>
  
  <p>(1)The essential parts of a plot of land include the things firmly
  attached to the land, in particular buildings, and the produce of the
  plot of land, as long as it is connected with the land. Seed becomes
  an essential part of the plot of land when it is sown, and a plant
  when it is planted.</p>
  
  <p>(2)The essential parts of a building include the things inserted in
  order to construct the building.</p>
  
  <p>Section 95 Merely temporary purpose</p>


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when it is planted.</p>
  
  <p>(2)The essential parts of a building include the things inserted in
  order to construct the building.</p>
  
  <p>Section 95 Merely temporary purpose</p>
  
  <p>(1)The parts of a plot of land do not include things that are
  connected with the land only for a temporary purpose. The same applies
  to a building or other structure that is connected with a plot of land
  belonging to another by a person exercising a right over that land.</p>
  
  <p>(2)Things that are inserted into a building for a temporary purpose
  are not parts of the building.</p>
  
  <p>Section 96 Rights as parts of a plot of land</p>
  
  <p>Rights that are connected with the ownership of a plot of land are
  regarded as parts of the plot of land.</p>
  
  <p>Section 97 Accessories</p>
  
  <p>(1)Accessories are movable things that, without being parts of the
  main thing, are intended to serve the economic purpose of the main


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<p>Section 97 Accessories</p>
  
  <p>(1)Accessories are movable things that, without being parts of the
  main thing, are intended to serve the economic purpose of the main
  thing and are in a spatial relationship to it that corresponds to this
  intention. A thing is not an accessory if it is not regarded as an
  accessory in business dealings.</p>
  
  <p>(2)The temporary use of a thing for the economic purpose of another
  thing does not give it the quality of an accessory. The temporary
  separation of an accessory from the main thing does not deprive it of
  the quality of an accessory.</p>
  
  <p>Section 98 Commercial and agricultural inventory</p>
  
  <p>The following are intended to serve the economic purpose of the main
  thing:</p>
  
  <ol>
  <li><p>in the case of a building that is permanently equipped for commercial operations, in particular a mill, a smithy, a brewery or a
  factory, the machinery and other equipment intended for the business,</p></li>


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factory, the machinery and other equipment intended for the business,</p></li>
  <li><p>in the case of a farm, the equipment and livestock intended for the commercial operations, the agricultural produce, to the extent that it
  is necessary to continue the farming until the time when it is
  expected that the same or similar produce will be obtained, and manure
  produced on the farm.</p></li>
  </ol>
  
  <p>Section 99 Fruits</p>
  
  <p>(1)Fruits of a thing are the products of the thing and the other yield
  obtained from the thing in accordance with its intended use.</p>
  
  <p>(2)Fruits of a right are the proceeds that the right produces in
  accordance with its intended use, in particular, in the case of a
  right to extract component parts of the soil, the parts extracted.</p>
  
  <p>(3)Fruits are also the proceeds supplied by a thing or a right by
  virtue of a legal relationship.</p>
  
  <p>Section 100 Emoluments</p>


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<p>(3)Fruits are also the proceeds supplied by a thing or a right by
  virtue of a legal relationship.</p>
  
  <p>Section 100 Emoluments</p>
  
  <p>Emoluments are the fruits of a thing or of a right and the benefits
  that the use of the thing or the right affords.</p>
  
  <p>Section 101 Division of fruits</p>
  
  <p>If a person is entitled to receive the fruits of a thing or of a right
  until a particular time or from a particular time on, he is entitled
  to the following, unless otherwise provided:</p>
  
  <ol>
  <li><p>the products and parts stated in section 99 (1), even if he is to receive them as the fruits of a right, to the extent that they are
  separated from the thing during the period of entitlement,</p></li>
  <li><p>other fruits to the extent that they are due during the period of entitlement; however, if the fruits consist in remuneration for
  permission of use or of enjoyment of fruits and benefits, in interest,


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permission of use or of enjoyment of fruits and benefits, in interest,
  in profit shares or other periodically paid income, the person
  entitled has a right to a share corresponding to the duration of his
  entitlement.</p></li>
  </ol>
  
  <p>Section 102 Reimbursement of costs of production</p>
  
  <p>A person who has a duty to hand over fruits may claim reimbursement of
  the costs of producing the fruits to the extent that they reflect
  proper business practices and do not exceed the value of the fruits.</p>
  
  <p>Section 103 Allocation of charges</p>
  
  <p>A person who has a duty to bear the charges on a thing or a right
  until a specified time or from a specified time on must, unless
  otherwise provided, bear the periodically recurring charges in the
  proportion of the period of time of his duty, and bear other charges
  to the extent that they are payable during the period of time in which
  he has the duty.</p>
</blockquote>


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<p>Some of the word choices are not the most idiomatic ways to translate into American legal English.</p>

<p>A better translation for "things" would be "tangible property". A more natural translation of Section 90a in American Legal English would be:</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>Animals are not property. They are protected by special statutes. They
  are governed by the provisions that apply to tangible personal
  property, with the necessary modifications, except insofar as
  otherwise provided.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>Similarly, the word "fruits" while understandable, would more often be translated into American Legal English as "proceeds", and American law wouldn't really make the distinction between "Fruits" in Section 99, and "Enoluments" in Section 100, at all.</p>


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<p>Also, most American jurisdictions would, unlike Article 90a, usually focus on the distinction between "pets" or "companion animals" and property, while not doing so for livestock in most circumstances, as the German civil code does.</p>

<p>One of the classic trick questions on the American bar exam is to set up a criminal law question involving what would an an assault or a murder, but to substitute a dog or a cat for a person, which transforms the crime into theft or vandalism, since in the criminal law, animals are generally treated as property subject to some specific exceptions for animal cruelty and blackmail.</p>

<p>German law addresses to some extent that sense that trips up American law students each year, that this absolute treatment of animals as having merely property status, derived from English common law, is unduly harsh.</p>

<p>Two recent law review articles explain what these recent changes in the legal status of animals in Germany mean.</p>


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<p>Two recent law review articles explain what these recent changes in the legal status of animals in Germany mean.</p>

<p>A <a href="https://www.animallaw.info/sites/default/files/vol10_p283.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">law review article from 2004</a> explores the important changes in the legal status of animals in Germany that occurred in 2002. The abstract of the article explains:</p>


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<blockquote>
  <p>In the summer of 2002, Germany welcomed animals into the folds of
  constitutional protection. With the addition of the words “and the
  animals,” Germany became the first country in the European Union
  (“E.U.”), and the second on the European continent,1 to guarantee the
  highest level of federal legal protection to its nonhuman animals.
  Though a welcomed development in the eyes of most Germans, this
  groundbreaking event received very little attention on the world
  stage. Common misconceptions about the ramifications of the
  constitutional amendment resulted in limited to no accurate
  representation in worldwide media. Likewise, international
  policymakers and animal protectionists have shown little awareness of
  this development and its potential implications. In addition to
  possible legal effects, the social implications of such an occurrence
  in a major western country are vast. International leaders will


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possible legal effects, the social implications of such an occurrence
  in a major western country are vast. International leaders will
  certainly take note as the effects of this change begin to take place
  in Germany’s laws and, increasingly, in its international policies.</p>
  
  <p>More importantly, the global animal protection community should take
  note of what is possible, and what can be learned from the
  achievements of Germany’s animal protection community. This study
  traces the legal and social developments leading to Germany’s
  constitutional amendment which provides protection to animals, showing
  how this legal highpoint was achieved. </p>
  
  <p>Multiple sources are used, including congressional, judicial, and
  party documents, press releases, international media reports, personal
  communication with leaders in four major German animal protection
  organizations, interviews with a key Ministry official, and published
  materials. </p>


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communication with leaders in four major German animal protection
  organizations, interviews with a key Ministry official, and published
  materials. </p>
  
  <p>This study will also critically assess the claims of the animal
  protection and opposition communities in order to predict where German
  animal law is going and what effects this change will have on the
  treatment of animals both within Germany and internationally.
  Concluding thoughts will address how the international animal
  protection community can understand this legal victory in a
  constructive context.</p>
</blockquote>


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<p>Footnote 1 in the abstract states: </p>

<blockquote>
  <p>BV 1992 § 24 (in 1992, Switzerland recognized the inherent worth of
  animals (die W¨urde der Lebewesen) in its constitution). Federal laws
  of a similar manner exist in Germany (Animal Protection Law
  implemented Sept. 1, 1990, art. 90a Tierschutzgesetz in der Fassung
  der Bekantuachung (Tierschutzgesetz), v. March 25, 1998 (BGB 1 I 1094)
  [hereinafter Tierschutzgesetz], and Austria (Art. 285 ABGB implemented
  July 1, 1988), but Switzerland was the first country to acknowledge
  the interests of animals within its national constitution. This
  development had virtually no international impact, however, and
  receives little attention outside of Switzerland.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>The abstract of <a href="https://www.animallaw.info/sites/default/files/lralvol16_2_p213.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">a 2010 law review article</a> on the topic further explains:</p>


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<blockquote>
  <p>In 2002, an animal protection clause was added to Article 20a of the
  German Constitution. Designed as a state objective, the nature of the
  animal protection clause decidedly influences its application. As a
  state objective, it is directed at all three branches of government,
  and each branch must ensure within its sphere of competence the
  realization of the stated goal. </p>
  
  <p>The Federal Constitutional Court has yet to address the precise scope
  of the provision. This Article examines the likely future effects of
  the animal protection clause. With respect to the legislative branch,
  this Article addresses the question of whether the state objective
  demands that a standing provision be created for animal protection
  groups. With respect to the judicial and executive branches, this
  Article focuses on three fundamental rights that are most likely to
  come into conflict with animal protection: freedom of religion;


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Article focuses on three fundamental rights that are most likely to
  come into conflict with animal protection: freedom of religion;
  freedom of teaching, science, and research; and freedom of artistic
  expression. Seismic shifts in constitutional adjudication are not
  likely to be expected.</p>
  
  <p><strong>The provision does not give rights to animals. However, at a minimum,
  it prohibits circumventing the Animal Protection Act by construing
  that statute in light of the Constitution. The animal protection
  clause removed the disproportionality between certain fundamental
  rights and the interest in animal protection. It mandates a balancing
  of constitutional interests and eliminates doubts regarding the
  constitutionality of the Animal Protection Act, especially with
  respect to the fundamental rights discussed.</strong></p>
</blockquote>


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Question Title: What is the legal case for someone getting arrested publicizing information about nuclear weapons deduced from public knowledge

Question Body: <p>I have a vague memory of a court case involving a man being prosecuted for publicizing information about nuclear weapons. He obtained that information by logic deduction and probably calculations from all the public knowledge (newspapers, tv, etc). I have not been able to find that case. Does anyone know which is?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>You are likely thinking of <em>United States v. The Progressive, Inc.</em>, <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp/467/990/1376343/" rel="noreferrer">467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979)</a> and the related injunction against a letter by Charles R. Hansen. However, these were not prosecutions; they were applications by the United States for injunctions to prevent the publication of the material.</p>
<p>The allegation relating to <em>The Progressive</em> was that an article due to be published would be in violation of the &quot;born secret&quot; clause of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atomic_Energy_Act_of_1954" rel="noreferrer">Atomic Energy Act of 1954</a> (codified at 42 U.S.C. 2011 and following). The author was journalist Howard Morland.</p>
<p>That act declares as <em>restricted</em> (see <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/2014" rel="noreferrer">42 U.S.C. 2014</a>):</p>
<blockquote>


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<p>That act declares as <em>restricted</em> (see <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/2014" rel="noreferrer">42 U.S.C. 2014</a>):</p>
<blockquote>
<p>all data concerning (1) design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons; (2) the production of special nuclear material; or (3) the use of special nuclear material in the production of energy, but shall not include data declassified or removed from the Restricted Data category pursuant to section 2162 of this title.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The U.S. argued:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>that its national security interest also permits it to impress classification and censorship upon information originating in the public domain, if when drawn together, synthesized and collated, such information acquires the character of presenting immediate, direct and irreparable harm to the interests of the United States.</p>
</blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p>It is not universally accepted that the information was actually gleaned wholly from public knowledge, but that would not have made a difference to the government's position on the injunction.</p>
<p>There was a related letter by Charles R. Hansen, containing instructions for a hydrogen bomb, that was also enjoined by the United States against being published in the <em>Daily Californian</em>. This was eventually the one actually first published, and is known colloquially as &quot;the Hansen Letter.&quot;</p>


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<p>Ultimately, after the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1979/09/17/paper-prints-h-bomb-letter-barred-by-us/daf6fe68-baed-4ed1-b0a6-156dbce370ee/" rel="noreferrer">Hansen letter was published in <em>The Press Connection</em></a> and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1979/09/19/second-paper-publishes-details-on-h-bomb/876f56d3-e2cb-4343-bc05-e1cafde209f4/" rel="noreferrer">the Chicago Tribune</a> (two publications not enjoined by court order), the government withdrew its request to prevent the publication, and the other publications went forward.</p>


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Answer 2: <p>As Jen said, there were no prosecutions but during the Manhattan Project, there were several investigations of possible leaks that discussed things remotely close to the actual work being conducted.  One notable incident a cartoonist named Alvin Schwartz came under investigation of having received nuclear secrets from the Manhattan project employees after he penned and published a Superman story for the daily newspaper strip that use of the term &quot;cyclotron.&quot;  At the time, cyclotrons were real devices that were used (and still used) to separate fissile material from non-fissile material.  The investigation was halted after Shwartz explained that he first read the term in a &quot;Popular Mechanics&quot; article that was published over a decade prior to his own use of the term.</p>


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<p>It's important to note that any time classified tech is described accurately in fiction or public articles, the authors are typically investigated to identify the leaker who gave them the secrets.  Tom Clancy was once investigated for describing near perfectly the working mechanics of some tech that allowed U.S. Submarines to run quietly.   Turns out no one told Clancy, he had just read publicly available info and made an educated guess about what was going on and turned out to be incredibly accurate.  In training to handle classified material, this is something that those holding a clearance of any type are trained to be aware of.  Two documents that are not classified may, in combination, reveal classified info.  For example, one document that reveals Mr. James Bond is an employee at MI6, another document might reveal that Mr. Bond filed for travel expenses to Moscow on February 14th, and a third document that confirms that Agent 007 arrived in Moscow alive and well on the 15th


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MI6, another document might reveal that Mr. Bond filed for travel expenses to Moscow on February 14th, and a third document that confirms that Agent 007 arrived in Moscow alive and well on the 15th of February.   Separately, they might not reveal much, but combined, it can be deduce that Agent 007 and James Bond are one and the same, which could prove bad for Mr. Bond, now that it's open knowledge it's assumed that Russia knows who he is.  If he's still in Russia, this could get him arrested or killed.  Let's hope Q doesn't leave his schematics lying around.</p>


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<p>It should also be noted that, in the U.S. at least, a journalist or other civilian with no access to classified documents is rarely prosecuted for publishing classified info but may be put under intense scrutiny as the assumption is that they are working with an insider to expose secrets.   The investigation is usually looking for the source of the leak.  In the case of someone who deduced it from publicly available info, this might be useful in determining how to write stuff for the public consumption to prevent it.  In the case of an actual source feeding them something they should not know, it could be met with disciplinary action (At the very least, it's a good way to get yourself fired.  At the worst, it's a jail sentence.).</p>


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<p>While Prior Restraint (Government action that prohibits speech or expression prior to it being made) is allowed in the U.S., it is under very limited circumstances that the publication of such information would &quot;would cause inevitable, direct, and immediate danger to the United States.&quot; (<a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/prior_restraint" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Source</a>) As such, it's very rarely granted or enforced in modern U.S. Law.</p>


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Question Body: <p>The image below is generated in real time by a Generative Adversarial Network trained on existing works of art (try reloading the page).  The process is <a href="https://arxiv.org/pdf/1706.07068.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">described in their paper</a> which also demonstrates that it is indistinguishable by humans from art generated by contemporary artists and shown in top art fairs.  They make no claim of copyright, freely provide the code that produces it and similar techniques have been used to produce <a href="https://thisxdoesnotexist.com/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">many forms of work</a> that would be copyrightable if produced by a human.</p>


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<p>Can we say if it would be possible to successfully claim/defend copyright on such work in any way?  Has anyone actually managed to defend such a claim?  I am aware of the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-58668534" rel="nofollow noreferrer">different</a> <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/jul/30/im-sorry-dave-im-afraid-i-invented-that-australian-court-finds-ai-systems-can-be-recognised-under-patent-law" rel="nofollow noreferrer">decisions</a> that have been made around AI as an inventor in patent law, but copyright seems very different.  This question is somewhat prompted by <a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/a/77356/41938">this answer</a>, but the question is different.  Any jurisdiction would be interesting.</p>
<p><a href="https://thisartworkdoesnotexist.com/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Click to see: Generative Adversarial Network produced work of art</a></p>


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Answer 1: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/germany" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;" rel="tag">germany</a>
I am reasonably sure that works like this would be Public Domain, i.e. not copyrighted in the first place. In Germany, copyright (or more precisely, <em>Author's Right</em>) can only be held by a <em>natural person</em>, which is a legal term of art that essentially means &quot;human being&quot;. There are two groups of natural persons involved here: the programmers and the creators of the works which are part of the training set. However, I can't see how either group could have a reasonable claim of copyright.</p>


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<p>Note: there have been similar discussions about GitHub Copilot, an AI that writes code for you. It is my understanding that the process used by GitHub Copilot is roughly comparable to the process used here. With GitHub Copilot, there have been instances where significant snippets which are part of the training set have appeared in the output with only minor alterations. In this case, it is likely that the original author will have copyright over that portion of the output.</p>
<p>However, <em>IFF</em> a human being were actually involved in <em>selecting</em> specific works, then there is probably a copyright based on the creative decision of selecting <em>this particular</em> work and rejecting all the others. This is similar to the classic textbook example of a driftwood sculpture: the creative process here is not creating the sculpture but choosing to pick up <em>this particular</em> piece of driftwood instead of the hundreds of others on the beach.</p>


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<p>So, if you simply generate these works and publish <em>all of them</em>, there is no copyright. If you generate a large batch and then <em>select</em> a certain number, then the person who made the selection might hold a copyright.</p>


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Answer 2: <h2>The work is public domain</h2>
<p><a href="/questions/tagged/australia" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-australia-tooltip-container">australia</a></p>
<p>To have original copyright a work must have a <a href="http://www8.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca1968133/s32.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">qualified person</a> as author: “qualified person means an Australian citizen or a person resident in Australia.”</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/F2023C00068" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Regulations</a> extend coverage to works published in international jurisdictions “as if the foreign work or subject‑matter were made or first published in Australia.” So, the still require a “qualified person” but the definition would be changed to substitute the foreign nationality/residence.</p>


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<p>Australian courts have held that AI can be listed as inventors (but not owners) of patents, the Patents Act does not require an inventor to be a person the way the Copyright Act does for an author. Current <a href="https://www.maddocks.com.au/insights/whos-work-copyright-in-ai-generated-artwork" rel="nofollow noreferrer">case law</a>, <em>Telstra Corp Ltd v Phone Directories Co Pty Ltd</em> [2010] FCAFC 149, found that a predominantly computer created telephone directory was not subject to copyright due to the absence of an author.</p>


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Answer 3: <h2>Nobody has a copyright</h2>
<p><a href="/questions/tagged/united-states" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-united-states-tooltip-container">united-states</a></p>
<p>A few years ago, there was a discussion <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monkey_selfie_copyright_dispute" rel="nofollow noreferrer">if a monkey can have copyright</a>, but the case settled. Now, USPTO enacted a rule together with the library of congress on 16th march 2023, that <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/03/16/2023-05321/copyright-registration-guidance-works-containing-material-generated-by-artificial-intelligence" rel="nofollow noreferrer">only a human can create a copyright interest.</a> See their rule (emphasis mine):</p>
<blockquote>
<p>II. The Human Authorship Requirement</p>


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<blockquote>
<p>II. The Human Authorship Requirement</p>
<p>In the [Copyright] Office's view, it is well-established that copyright can protect only material that is the product of human creativity. Most fundamentally, the term “author,” which is used in both the Constitution and the Copyright Act, <strong>excludes non-humans</strong>. The Office's registration policies and regulations reflect statutory and judicial guidance on this issue.</p>
<p>[...]</p>
<p>III. The Office's Application of the Human Authorship Requirement</p>
<p>[...]</p>
<p><strong>When an AI technology determines the expressive elements of its output, the generated material is not the product of human authorship.[31] As a result, that material is not protected by copyright and must be disclaimed in a registration application.[32]</strong></p>
</blockquote>


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Answer 4: <p>Since the &quot;contemporary artists&quot; have not been dead for 70 years, their works are copyrighted and may be used as training data only with an appropriate license, which should specify terms under which derived works can be produced and whether royalties must be paid in return.</p>
<p>For practical purposes, that means it makes no real difference if the trainer, operator or prompt gives acquire partial copyright, their contribution is dwarfed by that of the artists that produced the original works.</p>


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Answer 5: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/united-kingdom" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;united-kingdom&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;united-kingdom&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-united-kingdom-tooltip-container">united-kingdom</a></p>
<p><a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/48/contents" rel="nofollow noreferrer">U.K. legislation</a> allows for computer-generated work to be the subject of copyright. A work is computer generated when the work is &quot;generated by computer in circumstances such that there is no human author of the work.&quot;</p>
<p>Further,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>In the case of a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work which is computer-generated, the author shall be taken to be the person by whom the arrangements necessary for the creation of the work are undertaken.</p>
</blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p>However, it is <a href="https://www.shoosmiths.com/insights/articles/who-owns-the-ipr-in-ai-generated-artwork" rel="nofollow noreferrer">widely recognized that this leaves ambiguity about who this would be in any given instance</a>.</p>


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Question Title: Fake video from saab

Question Body: <p><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230715091936/https://forums.flightsimulator.com/t/fake-gripen-video/599765" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://web.archive.org/web/20230715091936/https://forums.flightsimulator.com/t/fake-gripen-video/599765</a></p>
<p>See above. Saab released a video falsely claiming the gripen turned 9g. It was actually a 4g turn.</p>
<p>Do the customers of the gripen have the right to sue the company for false advertising?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>No.</p>
<p>There is no reason for anyone to believe that a country's Air Force would purchase a military jet fighter in reliance upon a comment made by the company  in a promotional video intended for the general public. And, even if it did, generally &quot;buyer beware&quot; applies to international purchases of military equipment. It would not be reasonable for the UAE to rely on the video in question as authoritative. And, I very much doubt that the specifications of the jet fighter provided by the seller to the UAE military said the same thing.</p>


Tags: false-advertising, uae, government-contracts


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Question Body: <p>Recently, Park Hotels &amp; Resorts has pulled out of the San Francisco market, but - assuming I've understood correctly - instead of selling their properties there for pennies and taking the loss on the mortgages(?) on them, they have chosen to default on the debt and leave it to the lender.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“This past week we made the very difficult, but necessary decision to stop debt service payments on our San Francisco CMBS loan,”</p>


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<blockquote>
<p>“This past week we made the very difficult, but necessary decision to stop debt service payments on our San Francisco CMBS loan,”</p>
<p>June 05, 2023 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) -- Park Hotels &amp; Resorts Inc. (“Park” or the “Company”) (NYSE:PK) today announced that, starting in June, it ceased making payments toward the $725 million non-recourse CMBS loan which is scheduled to mature in November 2023, and is secured by two of its San Francisco hotels—the 1,921-room Hilton San Francisco Union Square and the 1,024-room Parc 55 San Francisco. The Company intends to work in good faith with the loan’s servicers to determine the most effective path forward, which is expected to result in ultimate removal of these hotels from its portfolio.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>-- Globe Newswire - <a href="https://archive.ph/M4yl6" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://archive.ph/M4yl6</a></p>
<p>In a discussion on social media which I won't source for reasons of good taste, I read the following:</p>


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<p>In a discussion on social media which I won't source for reasons of good taste, I read the following:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I'm pretty sure the bank could go after the owner for any difference between the unpaid loan balance and what they're able to sell it for. The question is, would something like this force them to write down on their GAAP financials the value of any other loans they've extended. Meaning maybe they won't.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>I don't know what the second and third sentences mean, but the first one gave me the title question - in the case where a loan is taken out like a mortgage, whereby the collateral is the property, and there are big red letters on the offer contract stating &quot;your home may be repossessed if you fail to make payments&quot;, can the lender upon selling the repossessed property at a loss still hold that debt against you and get the money off you somehow?</p>


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<p>My initial thoughts are &quot;no, they can't, the reason for the loan being collateralised was specifically to cover delinquency, it's their dang fault for making a bad bet on the market,&quot; but that's directly contravened by the above social media post.</p>
<p>Upon reading <a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/a/67040/33864">this</a> answer, it appears the terms I'm looking for are &quot;recourse&quot; and &quot;non-recourse&quot;, but I'm still unclear:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The default rule is that security interests in assets <strong>other than real property</strong> is a recourse debt</p>
<p>[...]</p>


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<blockquote>
<p>The default rule is that security interests in assets <strong>other than real property</strong> is a recourse debt</p>
<p>[...]</p>
<p>In the case of secured debts in real property, most states mirror the personal property rule (which is very close to Uniform since every state, territory and district in the U.S. had adopted Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code governing security interests in property other than real estate). But in a few states (including California), security interests in owner occupied residential real estate (a.k.a. mortgages, liens, encumbrances, or deeds of trust) are truly, or in practice are, effectively non-recourse.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Which I may be misreading, but it sounds like California (of interest here) would be expected to be a special case for some reason.</p>
<p>EDIT:  I read the social media thread further and found the following from the same poster:</p>
<blockquote>


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<p>EDIT:  I read the social media thread further and found the following from the same poster:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I was wrong. Virtually all big commercial loans of the scale we're talking here are &quot;nonrecourse,&quot; meaning the lender takes the building but has no further right of action action against the borrower. <strong>This is unlike home mortgages</strong>, or even most small business loans.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>From this it sounds like the poster is mistaken, as home mortgages are also non-recourse according to the above linked LSE post...  But maybe I'm getting confused with jurisdictions and it's different because Park are headquartered in Washington DC...</p>
<hr />


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<hr />
<p>This exact situation involves a large corporation headquartered in Washington DC, a lender headquartered in Florida, property in California, and the question is being asked by some dingus in England with nothing more than a passing interest in America and no line of credit larger than a small house in the countryside, so answers relating to all jurisdictions would be fascinating, especially those of England.</p>


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Answer 1: <blockquote>
<p>I'm pretty sure the bank could go after the owner for any difference
between the unpaid loan balance and what they're able to sell it for.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Incorrect. The news report states &quot;it ceased making payments toward the $725 million <strong>non-recourse</strong> CMBS loan&quot;.</p>
<p>The term &quot;non-recourse&quot; means that the bank can't go after the owner and is limited to recovering its debt from the collateral.</p>
<p>The term &quot;recourse&quot; means that the bank can go after the owner in a lawsuit for amounts still owed after the collateral is applied to the debt.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The question is, would something like this force them to write down on
their GAAP financials the value of any other loans they've extended.</p>
</blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p>The question is, would something like this force them to write down on
their GAAP financials the value of any other loans they've extended.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The bank extended the loan, so if the real property is worth less than the amount of the debt, the bank has to write off the balance of the debt on this secured loan. If the bank writes off the loan, it gets a tax deduction in the amount of the write off, however. The written off debt is also taxable income to Park Hotels &amp; Resorts Inc. to the extent that the company as a whole is not insolvent.</p>
<p>In California, the &quot;default rule&quot; is that the owner occupied residential mortgages are non-recourse loans, but that loans secured by personal property and other mortgages are recourse loans. Unlike California and about four other states, owner occupied residential mortgages in other U.S. states are also recourse by default.</p>


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<p>A non-recourse loan on a mortgage of a hotel is not the default rule (even in California) and is contrary to usual commercial practice. Park Hotels &amp; Resorts Inc., in this case, obtained an extraordinarily favorable deal with CMBS (normally it would be a recourse loan with personal guarantees from all related companies and from multiple top executives and investors of the borrower), perhaps in exchange for a higher interest rate than it might otherwise have secured.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>answers relating to all jurisdictions would be fascinating, especially
those of England.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The way that real estate in financed in England is so profoundly different from U.S. practice that it isn't really possible to even analogize to this situation in California.</p>


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</blockquote>
<p>The way that real estate in financed in England is so profoundly different from U.S. practice that it isn't really possible to even analogize to this situation in California.</p>
<p>For reasons related to tax laws, the structure of English mortgage laws, English insolvency laws, and the way that customary commercial real estate financial deals have evolved over time in England, the kind of deal that was struck between Park Hotels &amp; Resorts Inc. and CMBS in this case would have been structured completely differently if it had been done in England. It might be legal to do the same deal in England, but that isn't what firms trying to achieve the same objectives would actually have done.</p>


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<p>I know only enough about how real estate finance in handled in England in deals like this to know that it is completely different from how it is handled in the U.S. I am not familiar enough with real estate finance practices there to know how it would actually be done there.</p>


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Question Title: Can one be bound by a rental contract even if one finds a replacement to take it over?

Question Body: <p>Bob rents a property from Alfred, signs a contract of one year. Perhaps the contract allows Bob to be released early if he is able to find a replacement for himself. Or perhaps the contract explicitly prohibits this, or it stays silent on the matter.</p>
<p>Let us suppose that the contract is one of the latter two scenarios.</p>
<p>What is the position of the contract is silent?</p>
<p>And, if the contract specifically precludes such, is that type of provision in the contract enforceable?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>See Shelter, &quot;<a href="https://england.shelter.org.uk/professional_resources/legal/renting/assignment/assignment_of_assured_and_assured_shorthold_tenancies" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Assignment of assured and assured shorthold tenancies</a>&quot;:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><strong>Periodic assured and assured shorthold tenants</strong></p>
<p>Periodic assured and assured shorthold tenants whose tenancy agreement says nothing about assignment cannot assign their tenancies unless their landlord consents. In this case, landlords may withhold consent for any reason, whether reasonable or not.</p>
<p>A tenant who assigns the tenancy without consent leaves the assignee in a vulnerable position as this is a breach of a term of the tenancy and is a discretionary ground for possession. The exception to this is where a premium has been paid for the grant of tenancy, for example a tenancy deposit that is greater than one-sixth of the annual rent is a premium.</p>


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<p>Otherwise, where the tenancy agreement:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>allows assignment freely and without consent, assignment is allowed</p>
</li>
<li><p>expressly makes provision for the tenant to assign with the landlord's consent, the tenant will be able to assign with consent and
such consent cannot be unreasonably withheld</p>
</li>
<li><p>forbids assignment, an assignment would be a breach of the tenancy agreement and could be subject to possession action</p>
</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Fixed-term tenants</strong></p>
<p>The rights of assured and assured shorthold tenants with fixed-term tenancies to assign their tenancies are governed by their tenancy agreements.</p>
</blockquote>


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Question Title: Are there any legal provisions that concern males entering various types of business establishments without a shirt?

Question Body: <p>Bob entered a grocery store without a shirt. Charles entered a restaurant.</p>
<p>Are there any laws that make either of these either absolutely or conditionally a problem?</p>


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Answer 1: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/england-and-wales" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-england-and-wales-tooltip-container">england-and-wales</a></p>
<p>There's no law specifying that shirts must be worn by people visiting shops or restaurants.</p>
<p>As the owner or tenant of the property the business can set the rules for who is allowed entry and service, provided it does not discriminate based on a '<a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/part/2/chapter/1" rel="noreferrer">protected characteristic</a>' in the Equality Act.</p>
<p>The business can set a 'dress code' and refuse entry to people who are not dressed to code.</p>


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<p>The business can set a 'dress code' and refuse entry to people who are not dressed to code.</p>
<p>If a rule says &quot;no topless people&quot; that's OK. If a rule says &quot;men must not be topless&quot; then on the face of it that's unlawful discrimination. If a rule requires smart footwear that's OK. If a rule says &quot;women must wear high heels&quot; then  on the face of it that's unlawful discrimination.</p>
<p>Generally the business can refuse to serve a person and require the person to leave the premises. If the person refuses to leave then they commit the civil tort of trespass. If the person then obstructs the lawful activity of the business or damages its property then they commit the criminal offence of aggravated trespass.</p>


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Answer 2: <p>In the U.S. there is frequent signage on store and restaurant fronts that amounts to a &quot;No shirt, no shoes, no service&quot; message.   This would likely fall under a pre-emptive &quot;Trespass&quot; warning as the store owner can refuse to allow a sale transaction to go through and ask the offender to leave if they do not comply.  At this point, if the offender refuses to comply and leave, they could be charged with trespassing.</p>


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Answer 3: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/spain" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;spain&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;spain&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-spain-tooltip-container">spain</a></p>
<p>This has been in the <a href="https://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/world-news/latest-spain-tourist-rules-including-27355209" rel="noreferrer">UK news</a> (WalesOnline, which is where I happened to read it) recently - in some areas of Spain there are laws, and not just about inside certain establishments:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>In hotspots such as Barcelona and Majorca, topless men and women wearing bikinis face fines of up to €300 (£253) if they’re spotted walking around away from the beach. This can also include adjacent streets - so keep your shirts and cover-ups on until you hit the sand.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Or in the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/spain/safety-and-security" rel="noreferrer">words of the UK Foreign Office</a></p>


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</blockquote>
<p>Or in the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/spain/safety-and-security" rel="noreferrer">words of the UK Foreign Office</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>In some parts of Spain it’s against the law to be in the street wearing only a bikini or swimming shorts. Being bare-chested is also illegal in some areas in Spain. You may be fined if you’re caught wearing swimwear on the seafront promenade or adjacent streets.</p>
</blockquote>


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Question Title: What if someone serving time in prison gets elected president?

Question Body: <p>What if someone serving time in a <em>state</em> prison gets elected president? Can he order himself to be released (be it via a pardon or on the grounds of national security)?</p>
<p>Assuming he could not do this, would his vice president take over for the duration of the term, or while the president is incarcerated?</p>
<p>Would the answer be different if it's a federal prison?</p>


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Answer 1: <h2>A Presidential Pardon does not affect the States at all</h2>
<p>A president clearly can not pardon himself for a state crime, because the president does not have that as an enumerated power. Presidential pardons are limited in the Constitution, Article II Section 2 Clause 1.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The President... shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for <strong>Offenses against the United States</strong>, except in Cases of Impeachment.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>A person convicted of a state crime is not convicted of an offense against the United States, and thus, the conviction does not become moot by a presidential pardon. He stays incarcerated, as he is still convicted in the state prison and not pardoned of the state crime.</p>
<p>It takes a pardon from the state's governor to pardon a crime on the state level.</p>


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<p>It takes a pardon from the state's governor to pardon a crime on the state level.</p>
<h2><a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/questions/22562/can-president-of-the-united-states-pardon-himself-if-convicted-of-treason-or-som">It's unclear if a president can pardon themselves</a></h2>
<p><a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/a/22571/10334">Ohwilleke's excellent answer</a> covers the problem of a person being president trying to pardon themselves of a federal crime.</p>


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Question Title: Details despite NDA for selling company (California)

Question Body: <p><a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/a/94070/51266">This question</a> says that it may be possible that an NDA can exist such that if someone were to sell their company, can they can have an NDA that prevents them from speaking about their company name, the buying company's name, and details about what their company does. Would it be possible to find out any of these details as a third party despite the NDA? For example, I've heard that one can look up if an LLC existed for 3 years beyond the LLC's closure.</p>


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Answer 1: <p>If the seller of a company signed an NDA, that NDA would make it illegal <em>for them</em> to tell you whatever the NDA covers (except there may be legal requirements that would override an NDA).</p>
<p>That doesn't mean you cannot find out in any other legal way. For example, the company's accountant most likely knows a lot of things, and if they didn't sign an NDA, they may be free to tell you. Obviously the government will know things, as you said, the company had to be registered, the sale had to be registered, and you can't just close a company down and make it disappear. Especially since any obligations of the company will continue to exist for many years.</p>
<p>Say the company in question bought office furniture from you and was supposed to pay in 60 monthly installments. Selling the company doesn't stop that, closing the company down won't stop that, signing an NDA won't stop that. You will still be able to find the company and make them pay.</p>


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Question Title: If you are holding a mobile phone while driving and you are not looking at it nor are you texting are you still deemed as using it?


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Question Body: <p>The concept of dualism which exists throughout the universe. Every word, phrase, object and thing in the universe there is a positive and a negative state. For example - up/down, in/out, black/white, left/right, holding/not holding, using/not using. Now, in the case of holding a mobile phone; the holder decides if they are using it or not. The observer, on the other hand, does not have the right to say that the holder is using it or not using it. The observer can only observe that the holder is holding the phone and can't determine if they are using it or not. This is my opinion of the matter. Thus, in a democratic society, the holder of a phone decides if he/she is using it or not. In a dictatorship, on the other hand, the rights of the individual are negated and the dictator determines that dualism doesn't exist and that the holder <strong>must</strong> be using the phone, just because they are <strong>holding</strong> it. Thus, the dictator has negated logic, laws


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determines that dualism doesn't exist and that the holder <strong>must</strong> be using the phone, just because they are <strong>holding</strong> it. Thus, the dictator has negated logic, laws of physics, rules of grammar in order to justify an enforced and language limiting opinion/law.


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The law states in Australia - 2014 -reg 300
The driver of a vehicle must not use a mobile phone while vehicle is moving, or is stationary.
&quot;use&quot; in relation to mobile phone, includes any of the following actions by a driver, (a) holding the body of the phone in her or his hand (whether or not engaged in a phone call), except while in the process of giving the body of the phone to a passenger in a vehicle.
&quot;held&quot; includes held by, or resting on, any part of the driver's body. but does not include held in a pocket of the driver's clothing or in a pouch worn by the driver.</p>


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Answer 1: <h2>YES in <a href="/questions/tagged/germany" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-germany-tooltip-container">germany</a></h2>
<blockquote>
<p><a href="https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stvo_2013/__23.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">§23 StVO</a></p>
<p>(1a) Wer ein Fahrzeug führt, darf ein elektronisches Gerät, das der Kommunikation, Information oder Organisation dient oder zu dienen bestimmt ist, nur benutzen, wenn</p>
<ol>
<li>hierfür das Gerät weder aufgenommen noch gehalten wird und [...]</li>
</ol>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>(1a) Whoever is driving a vehicle may only use an electrical device that is serving communication, information, or organization or destined to be used for this if... 1. they don't pick the device up or hold it and [...]</p>
</blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p>That is <strong>plenty</strong> clear: holding the device is banned in any way, and implies using it under German legal precedent.</p>


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Answer 2: <blockquote>
<p><em>&quot;The observer can only observe that the holder is holding the phone and can't determine if they are using it or not. This is my opinion of the matter. Thus, in a democratic society, the holder of a phone decides if he/she is using it or not.&quot;</em></p>
</blockquote>
<p>Your opinion is irrelevant. It's why the <strong>United Kingdom</strong> has tightened up the law. Holding a phone while driving, even when stationary, is an offence except in a few limited circumstances.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://srb.co.uk/driving-whilst-holding-a-mobile-phone-is-now-illegal/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Solicitors Regulation Authority</a> says</p>
<blockquote>
<p><strong>Laws have changed for driving and using a mobile phone</strong></p>
<p>Driving whilst using a mobile phone for texting or calling has been illegal since 2003. However, the law did not cover holding a mobile phone which allowed using social media or playing a game.</p>


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<p>As of 2022, it is illegal to hold a mobile phone whilst driving. Breaking this law could lead to a £200 fine and 6 points on your licence.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Anyway, if you are holding a phone you are not in proper control of the vehicle. The UK's Highway Code <a href="https://www.gov.uk/guidance/the-highway-code/using-the-road-159-to-203" rel="nofollow noreferrer">rule 160</a> states</p>
<blockquote>
<ul>
<li>drive or ride with both hands on the wheel or handlebars where possible. This will help you to remain in full control of the vehicle at all times.</li>
</ul>
</blockquote>
<p>This means unless you are operating the gear lever, or auxiliary controls, with the other hand. You must be in proper control of the vehicle at all times.</p>


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Answer 3: <p>It depends on the statute being interpreted.</p>
<p>For example, in <a href="/questions/tagged/british-columbia" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;british-columbia&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;british-columbia&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-british-columbia-tooltip-container">british-columbia</a>, s. 214.2(1) of the <em>Motor Vehicle Act</em> prohibits &quot;holding [an electronic device] in a position in which it may be used.&quot;</p>
<p>Under such a statute, it doesn't matter whether it is actually in use, but only whether it <em>may</em> be used.</p>
<p>And in <em>R. v. Tannhauser</em>, <a href="https://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcca/doc/2020/2020bcca155/2020bcca155.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">2020 BCCA 155</a> the Court of Appeal held that even when the phone is turned off, it is still an &quot;electronic device&quot; within the meaning of the prohibition:</p>
<blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p>[52] ... a cellphone that is turned off can be turned on; a cellphone with a dead battery can be plugged in (see <em>R. v. Jahani</em>, <a href="https://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcsc/doc/2017/2017bcsc745/2017bcsc745.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">2017 BCSC 745</a>, where a ticket was upheld for a person who did just that); a cellphone with software limiting its functionality can, potentially, be used to disable that software.</p>
<p>[53] Importantly, the legislature’s intention to promote road safety supports this reading. All of the above actions have the potential to distract the driver. The purpose of public protection is served by understanding that this form of distracted behaviour is indeed prohibited.</p>
</blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p><a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/a/91411/46948">Statutes can redefine or deem words to have particular meanings</a>, including by deeming the word &quot;use&quot; to include things that would not be typically considered &quot;use.&quot; This is not an attempt to alter the metaphysical reality. It is simply constructing <em>legal</em> meaning.</p>


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Answer 4: <h2>why would that matter?</h2>
<p>Lawmakers are not stupid, that’s why in every jurisdiction I know of, the offence is <strong>holding</strong> the phone.</p>


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Question Body: <p>In 2021, the Biden administration created a loan forgiveness program that excluded white farmers, on the argument that Black people had suffered historical damages. It was ruled unconstitutional and a violation of equal protection. (Wynn v. Vilsack et al)</p>
<p>In 2023, Evanston, IL created a mortgage assistance program that excluded white, Asian, Hispanic, and other homeowners on the argument on the argument that Black homeowners had suffered historical damages. Notably, the program excludes not just Asian and Hispanic homeowners, but also LGBTQIA2S+, Catholic, Muslim, and many other people who were excluded based on the same housing policies.</p>
<p>What is the difference?</p>
<p>I'm only looking for a comparison of the laws. This is <em>not</em> a duplicate of a straightforward analysis because I'm not looking for a full constitutional analysis, only an explanation of difference.</p>


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<p>Helpful information: <a href="https://cityofevanston.civicweb.net/document/50624/Adoption%20of%20Resolution%2037-R-27,%20Authorizing%20the.pdf?handle=E11C7B73E1B6470DA42362AB80A50C46" rel="nofollow noreferrer">full text of decision</a>. I anticipated that the wording would include all racial groups that suffered discrimination, but I was surprised that the racial test is &quot;having origins in any of the Black racial and ethnic groups of Africa&quot;. (Page 2, &quot;Participant Eligibility&quot;)</p>


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Answer 1: <p>The situations cannot reasonably be compared legally. In <a href="https://casetext.com/case/wynn-v-vilsack" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Wynn v. Vilsack</a>, a motion for preliminary injunction was granted (and the program was <em>not</em> ruled unconstitutional). In the ruling, the court found that the evidence &quot;does not support a finding that USDA continues to be a participant, passive or active, in discrimination&quot;, and does find that there were past successful remediation efforts, thus &quot;the Court expresses serious concerns over whether the Government will be able to establish a strong basis in evidence warranting the implementation of Section 1005's race-based remedial action&quot;, moreover &quot;Plaintiff has convincingly shown that the relief provided by Section 1005 is not narrowly tailored to serve that interest&quot;. The court finds that there is a good-enough case that the law fails strict scrutiny. Incidentally, Congress repealed that law.</p>


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<p>On the other hand, in Evanston, we have no facts or concrete legal allegations (e.g. drafts of a legal complaint). The <a href="https://cityofevanston.civicweb.net/document/50624/Adoption%20of%20Resolution%2037-R-27,%20Authorizing%20the.pdf?handle=E11C7B73E1B6470DA42362AB80A50C46" rel="nofollow noreferrer">cited memorandum</a> is a recommendation, not a law. There does exist at least one available <a href="https://www.cityofevanston.org/home/showpublisheddocument/90573/638249272128130000" rel="nofollow noreferrer">council action from 2019</a> which says that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The Chief Financial Officer is hereby authorized to divert all adult
use cannabis funds received by the Illinois Department of Revenue for
sales of adult use cannabis to a separate fund in a City account for
local reparations. SECTION 3: The City may receive donations to this
fund from separate organizations, corporations, and individuals
established herein by the City Council.</p>
</blockquote>


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<p>The city also has <a href="https://www.cityofevanston.org/government/city-council/reparations" rel="nofollow noreferrer">a page</a> referring to Ordinance 102-O-20 (not available) indicating that &quot;The Committee will work with residents, City staff and experts to explore and identify programs and opportunities to be supported by the Reparations Fund&quot;. The <a href="https://www.cityofevanston.org/home/showpublisheddocument/66184/637677439011570000" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Program Guidelines</a> §3 indicates that a person may be eligible for money if they are an ancestor, direct descendant, or &quot;other&quot; who has suffered from a &quot;City ordinance, policy, or procedure that served to discriminate against the Applicant in the area of housing&quot;. It thus does not exclude Asian and Hispanic homeowners, LGBTQIA2S+, Catholic, Muslims or anyone else, except insofar as a Catholic was not demonstrably the victim of such discrimination. The city also provides an <a


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exclude Asian and Hispanic homeowners, LGBTQIA2S+, Catholic, Muslims or anyone else, except insofar as a Catholic was not demonstrably the victim of such discrimination. The city also provides an <a href="https://www.cityofevanston.org/home/showpublisheddocument/67191/637715545144570000" rel="nofollow noreferrer">extensive historical study</a> of past government discrimination in housing. You may be able to eke out more concrete information on what they have done <a href="https://www.cityofevanston.org/government/boards-commissions-and-committees/reparations-committee" rel="nofollow noreferrer">here</a>, at the reparations committee website.</p>


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<p>In terms of <em>potential</em> differentia between the USDA program and the Evanston program, the most obvious difference would be in terms of prior remediation efforts. If you sue Evanston for their program, they could defend the program as providing the remediation that justifies the program – which had already been provided in the USDA program.</p>


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Question Body: <p>I notice that in several criminal cases women who are clearly post-pubescent teenagers are being legally characterized as &quot;children&quot;, so I am wondering about the terminology here. For example, in one case I read of man being prosecuted for &quot;rape of a child&quot;, however the the alleged &quot;child&quot; was 16 years old: clearly past the age of puberty.</p>
<p>So, normally in the English language, a &quot;child&quot; is a pre-pubescent person--in other words someone not sexually capable of procreating, which would mean 13 years old at the latest. However, apparently in legal sphere and the press there is a tendency to describe teenagers who are clearly sexually capable as &quot;children&quot; and this is obviously being done to demonize those who commit sex crimes against teenagers and increase the severity of the crime.</p>


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<p>I searched for the legal definition of a &quot;child&quot; under Massachusetts law and could not find any definition. So, is it just ambiguous what the word &quot;child&quot; means in Massachusetts? What about US Federal law. Is there a legal standard of what constitutes a &quot;child&quot;?</p>


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Answer 1: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/canada" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-canada-tooltip-container">canada</a></p>
<p>The term &quot;child&quot; is expressly defined for various offences. For example, for <a href="https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-46/section-172-20190919.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">s. 172</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>child means a person who is or appears to be under the age of eighteen years.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The offence of &quot;<a href="https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-46/section-163.1.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">child pornography</a>&quot; is expressly defined to relate to &quot;a person who is or is depicted as being under the age of eighteen years.&quot;</p>


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<p>The offence of &quot;<a href="https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-46/section-172.1-20150717.html#wb-cont" rel="nofollow noreferrer">child luring</a>&quot; has several variants, for luring those who are or who the accused believes to be under the age of 18, 16, or 14. They are all called &quot;child luring.&quot;</p>
<p>Other sections criminalize conduct in relation to a child without defining the term. See e.g. <a href="https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-46/section-243.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">s. 243</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Every person who in any manner disposes of the dead body of a child, with intent to conceal the fact that its mother has been delivered of it, whether the child died before, during or after birth, is guilty...</p>
</blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p>For s. 243, courts had to conduct statutory interpretation in order to determine the meaning of the word &quot;child.&quot; The Supreme Court of Canada held that &quot;child&quot; in this offence includes children born alive and fetuses that were likely to have been born alive. See <em>R. v. Levkovic</em>, <a href="https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/13031/index.do" rel="nofollow noreferrer">2013 SCC 25</a>.</p>
<p>I know this is Canadian law, rather than Massachusetts law, but one thing you can take away from this is that terms can take on distinct legal meanings from one provision to another. And where a term is not expressly defined in statute, its meaning will be enunciated by a court. These meanings need not line up with the definitions you find in a dictionary.</p>
<p>But, for a general description from a specialized dictionary, see <em>Black's Law Dictionary</em>, 10th ed. (2014):</p>
<blockquote>


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<p>But, for a general description from a specialized dictionary, see <em>Black's Law Dictionary</em>, 10th ed. (2014):</p>
<blockquote>
<p><strong>child</strong>. <strong>1</strong>. An unemancipated person under the age of majority. <strong>2</strong>. <em>Hist</em>. At common law, a person who has not reached the age of 14. <strong>3</strong>. A boy or girl; a young person. <strong>4</strong>. A son or daughter. <strong>5</strong>. A baby or fetus.</p>
</blockquote>


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Answer 2: <p>&quot;Child&quot; in the US typically means a minor, someone who is not yet 18.  Someone would be either a child or an adult.  Your belief in coded language for some reason is not part of this legal definition.</p>
<p>Child can also mean offspring, say in the use of wills.</p>
<p>If different definitions are used, they would be defined in the applicable law.</p>
<p><a href="https://thelawdictionary.org/child/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Black's Legal dictionary</a></p>


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Answer 3: <p>In the case of Massachusetts (Mass.) the definition of &quot;child&quot; means different things depending on the laws in question.   Generally, a &quot;child&quot; for the purposes of the legal age of criminal prosecution is defined as any child younger than 12 years old at the time of the crime (Mass. has the highest age of criminal prosecution in the United States.)  Federally, this age is any child younger than 11 years of age.</p>
<p>In terms of Age of Consent (the legal age in which a person may give consent to a sexual relationship) is 16 years and over.  Federally, this is 18 years or older.</p>


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<p>In terms of Age of Consent (the legal age in which a person may give consent to a sexual relationship) is 16 years and over.  Federally, this is 18 years or older.</p>
<p>Legally speaking, 18 is the age at which a person is considered a legal adult (although I know few 18 year olds who have adult sensibilities... but I also know a few 60+ year olds who have no adult sensibilities... you're only young once but you can be immature forever as they say.).   This means that you can legally vote, smoke, screw (if you're one of the prudish states that has 18 as the age of legal consent... like California.), and die for your nation (but you can't drown your sorrows until you're 21.).   Additionally, unless you are legally emancipated, your rights can be restricted by a legal guardian (parents or other parental substitute).</p>


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<p>All people above the age of criminal liability but below the age of legal adulthood are also handled through a juvenile court system in the U.S. (I don't think this applies to federal courts as they don't have one, but they so rarely prosecute crimes compared to the state... let alone juvie crimes) although judges may grant exception for legal juviniles to be tried in adult court if the crime is serious enough (or they're close to legal adulthood either).  Juvie Courts are less open than adult court and any juvenile record is sealed after the offender turns 18 (meaning that if you were a 13-year-old busted for taking the neighbor's car on a joy ride, it won't follow you to adulthood in the legal system.  The public memory will not always forget).</p>


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<p>In your particular scenario, one of a few things could have happened.  Either she was 16 at the time of the rape and did not consent, OR she was 15 at the time of the rape (which even if she did give consent, it doesn't matter as the law says she's not able to give it no matter what.) and has since had a 16th birthday while the trial makes its way through the courts.  Another possibility is that the relationship involved someone who was traveling from out of state OR she traveled out of state to meet him, which makes this a crime that could involve the Federal Government, in which case, she is not yet 18 and thus it was a statutory rape (even if she was consenting to the encounter).</p>


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<p>Finally, the article or speaker who called her a child might not be using a legal sense of the word, but a more colloquial sense, in which case, the range is considerably broader (As a general rule, among the uninformed, child has a broad range.  While she is a teenager, she is still young enough that she would be living with her parents and not yet ready to &quot;leave the nest&quot; as an adult would.  Biologically speaking, humans have a long adolescent period compared to most animals, with a biological maturity taking as long as 25 years by some estimates.) and it's not uncommon for our language to reflect that.  As such, the claim might not be one of legal childhood, but a frame of reference to remind adults that she's still got a lot of growing up to do and the accused rapist ignored that when he had sex with her.  Remember, he's going to be judged by a jury of his peers... the prosecution wants them to use there vernacular understanding of her age, not their legal


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rapist ignored that when he had sex with her.  Remember, he's going to be judged by a jury of his peers... the prosecution wants them to use there vernacular understanding of her age, not their legal understanding.</p>


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Answer 4: <blockquote>
<p>I searched for the legal definition of a &quot;child&quot; under Massachusetts
law and could not find any definition.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The definitions are right there in the criminal statutes. The relevant MA statutes are quite clear and different ages apply to different offenses. <em>See, e.g.</em>, the following:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>§ 22A. Rape of child; punishment</p>
<p>Whoever has sexual intercourse or unnatural sexual intercourse with a
child under 16, and compels such child to submit by force and against
his will or compels such child to submit by threat of bodily injury,
shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life or for
any term of years. . . .</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 265, § 22A.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>§ 22B. Rape of a child during commission of certain offenses or by use
of force; penalties</p>
<p>Whoever has sexual intercourse or unnatural sexual intercourse with a


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<blockquote>
<p>§ 22B. Rape of a child during commission of certain offenses or by use
of force; penalties</p>
<p>Whoever has sexual intercourse or unnatural sexual intercourse with a
child under 16, and compels such child to submit by force and against
his will or compels such child to submit by threat of bodily injury
and: . . .</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 265, § 22B.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>§ 22C. Rape of a child through use of force by certain previously
convicted offenders; penalties</p>
<p>Whoever has sexual intercourse or unnatural sexual intercourse with a
child under 16, and compels such child to submit by force and against
his will or compels such child to submit by threat of bodily injury,
and has been previously convicted of or adjudicated delinquent or as a
youthful offender for: indecent assault and battery on a child under
14 as set forth in section 13B; aggravated indecent assault and
battery on a child under 14 as set forth in section 13B ½; indecent


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14 as set forth in section 13B; aggravated indecent assault and
battery on a child under 14 as set forth in section 13B ½; indecent
assault and battery on a person 14 or older as set forth in section
13H; assault of a child with intent to commit rape as set forth in
section 24B; rape of a child with force as set forth in section 22A;
aggravated rape of a child with force as set forth in section 22B;
rape and abuse of a child as set forth in section 23; aggravated rape
and abuse of a child as set forth in section 23A; rape as set forth in
section 22; or a like violation of the laws of another state, the
United States or a military, territorial or Indian tribal authority,
shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life or for
any term of years, but not less than 20 years. . . .</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 265, § 22C.</p>


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shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life or for
any term of years, but not less than 20 years. . . .</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 265, § 22C.</p>
<p><em>See generally</em> <a href="https://malegislature.gov/Laws/GeneralLaws/PartIV/TitleI/Chapter265" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 265,</a> §§ 13b to 27a.</p>


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Question Title: Does Missouri Revised Statute 578.018 imply that a law enforcement officer must get a warrant to enter private property to check on an animal?


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Question Body: <p><a href="https://revisor.mo.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=578.018" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Missouri Revised Statute 578.018</a> vaguely states that a law enforcement officer and other officials &quot;MAY&quot; seek a warrant to enter onto private property to check., inspect or impound an animal etc. and must be preceded by an affidavit of probable cause I believe per my recollection.</p>
<p>This is also stated by the fourth amendment concerning illegal search and seizure But of course with every Constitutional right and &quot;for the good of the people&quot; law, there are many loopholes used against the citizens such as, with reference to the 4th amendment, curtilage access, exigent circumstances, emergencies, protection of evidence,wellness checks to name a few.</p>


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<p>Section 578. Is an animal related statute rather than people. So is a public official required to have a warrant to enter posted private property for an animal neglect call when the property and animals are visible from the road or not? Additionally and specifically Barry county Missouri  has no animal control laws or leash laws and it is not illegal to cage dogs for example. The 578 statute has been challenged for being unconstitutionally vague and arbitrary which was overruled but that was serious abuse case.</p>
<p>The definition &quot;Adequate care&quot; is vague as well. So warrant needed or not? and if so, what legal action can be taken for trespass, rights violations under color of law etc. if any?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>The general rule is that a warrant is required to enter private property (absent constitutional case law exceptions to the warrant requirement such as exigent circumstances and consent), and that a warrant is available only when there is probable cause that a crime has been committed.</p>
<p>Whether the neglect or abuse of an animal constitutes a crime within the meaning of this 4th Amendment requirement could potentially be seen as a gray area, since historically, in the absence of statutory authority in early common law, an owner of an animal had absolute authority to deal with his or her property (the animal) as the owner of the animal saw fit.</p>
<p>The purpose of the statute is to clarify that this conduct by an animal owner constitutes a crime for 4th Amendment search and seizure purposes by making a state law determination that it is a crime, which states can do, even though they can't change the constitutional requirement under the 4th Amendment.</p>


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<p>Also, just because a state can authorize law enforcement to get a warrant for any search authorized by the U.S. Constitution, that doesn't mean it has to allow law enforcement to do so in every case where it is constitutional for the state to do so.</p>
<p>The duty to get a warrant for law enforcement to enter onto private property at all arises not only from other state statutes, but also from the 4th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (as incorporated to apply against state and local governments though the due process clause of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution).</p>
<p>But, the constitutional requirement has case law exceptions, so it isn't required in all circumstances. In particular, exigent circumstances, and the consent to entry exceptions, which are allowed by constitutional criminal procedure case law, could apply to the requirement to get a warrant in the first place.</p>


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<p>But, law enforcement needs to have the authority to search at all with a warrant under state law, for an exception to the warrant requirement to be relevant. This statute appears to carry out that purpose by authorizing searches for this particular purpose. For what it is worth, it is not the best drafted possible statute to achieve this objective, and it could have been written to be more clear, but it still gets the job done.</p>
<p>So, in answer to the top-line question, no, I wouldn't read this statute as requiring a warrant in every possible circumstance in order to go onto private property to check on an animal, although a warrant would be required in every case where an exception to the warrant requirement under 4th Amendment case law does not apply.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Section 578. Is an animal related statute rather than people.</p>
</blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p>Section 578. Is an animal related statute rather than people.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The people involved are the property owners. The property owner's rights in their real property are potentially infringed if there is a warrantless entry.</p>
<p>The human beings owning the animals are potentially violating a law which the State of Missouri wants law enforcement officers to be able to enforce (the relevant laws are <a href="https://revisor.mo.gov/main/OneChapterRng.aspx?tb1=578.005%20to%20578.023" rel="nofollow noreferrer">the state animal cruelty and agricultural laws expressly referenced in the statute</a>, so, it is irrelevant that &quot;Barry County Missouri has no animal control laws or leash laws&quot;).</p>


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<p>Among other things these statutes make it a crime if a person &quot;Has custody or ownership of an animal and fails to provide adequate care[.]&quot; As the question claims that: &quot;The definition &quot;Adequate care&quot; is vague as well.&quot; But the question also notes that: &quot;The 578 statute has been challenged for being unconstitutionally vague and arbitrary which was overruled but that was serious abuse case.&quot;</p>
<p>The state has a right to decide what is and is not illegal. It is not prohibited from banning treatment of animals that is not serious abuse. The state has every right to make it a crime to fail to provide adequate care for an animal, even if that failure to provide adequate car does not constitute severe abuse.</p>
<p>Also, keep in mind that a lawful search requires only probable cause to believe that a crime was committed and a good faith belief that an exception to the warrant requirement is present.</p>


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<p>Also, keep in mind that a lawful search requires only probable cause to believe that a crime was committed and a good faith belief that an exception to the warrant requirement is present.</p>
<p>If the law enforcement officer has a good faith belief that the animal will die or seriously suffer or be hidden by the owner in the time that the law enforcement officer reasonably thinks that it will take to get a warrant, the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applies.</p>
<p>The fact that the lawful search later reveals that a crime was no committed does not mean that the search was improper. A mere belief that an animal was abused or neglected and that exigent circumstance were present with a reasonable factual basis (e.g. a tip from a neighbor who seems credible and claims to have personal knowledge of the facts) will usually suffice to establish probable cause.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>So warrant needed or not? and if so, what legal action can be taken


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<blockquote>
<p>So warrant needed or not? and if so, what legal action can be taken
for trespass, rights violations under color of law etc. if any?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>If there is a search without a warrant or probable cause was not present, and an exception to the warrant requirement does not apply, and the property owner believes that their 4th Amendment rights were intentionally violated by law enforcement in the warrantless search in violation of clearly established law to the contrary, a civil lawsuit against the law enforcement officer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 can be brought in state or federal court.</p>


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<p>The employer of the law enforcement officer can be sued as well, under the same statute, if the warrantless search in violation of the clearly established constitutional right was made pursuant to an express policy of the law enforcement officer's employer. But the fact that the law enforcement officer violated someone's rights does not automatically make the law enforcement officer's employer civilly liable for the wrong.</p>
<p>In most U.S. states, law enforcement officers are protected by state law governmental immunity from common law trespass lawsuits for their conduct while carrying out their official duties, but I haven't checked specifically to see if that is the case in Missouri.</p>
<p>A claim of a 4th Amendment violation can also be a ground for suppressing evidence obtained with an unlawful search when defending a prosecution under some ordinance or statute that relies upon that evidence.</p>


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Question Title: What responsibility does a museum have to a protestor who glues themself to the wall

Question Body: <p>Can the museum leave the protestor glued there and leave for the night?</p>
<p>Edit: it appears that 4 days after I posted this questions, a Porsche showroom locked the protestors inside after turning off the lights for the evening.</p>


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Answer 1: <p>In the UK, in general, they would have to take reasonable steps to ensure their safety. A museum has to ensure the safety of legitimate visitors, and also trespassers if it can <a href="https://www.insolvencydirect.bis.gov.uk/freedomofinformationtechnical/technicalmanual/ch1-12/chapter8/part7/part_7.htm" rel="nofollow noreferrer">reasonably foresee a hazard</a> that a trespasser would encounter. However gluing oneself to a wall is not a normal hazard of museums, and anything that followed from that act (e.g. injuring yourself when you collapsed due to lack of sleep) would fall under the &quot;<a href="https://www.blytheliggins.co.uk/an-author-of-your-own-misfortune/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">author of own misfortune</a>&quot; doctrine.</p>


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<p>I'm not aware of any specific precedents on point, but the principles above would seem to suggest that once someone has done such a thing, leaving them there would be a legal course of action, although the museum couldn't let them suffer from hunger or thirst (e.g. by leaving them there over a day when the museum is closed, or by preventing friends from bringing food or drink). Also the museum would have to let them try to free themselves, and allow anyone who might help to do so. They would probably have to permit any necessary damage to the property the protester was glued to as well, on the grounds that the protester is more important than the property (although civil and possibly criminal liability for the damage would follow).</p>


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Question Body: <p>Can you help me understand which of these are legal and which are illegal in the U.S., and briefly why? (If the answers vary by state, assume state with &quot;medium strictness&quot;, or just answer for the state you are familiar with.)</p>
<p>(A) I write and publish a book called &quot;Cure your brain tumor by eating carrots!&quot; in which I explain in detail how you can (and should) cure your brain tumor with carrots. I state clearly at the start of the book that I have no medical training.</p>
<p>(B) I write and publish a book called &quot;Cure your depression by eating carrots!&quot; in which I explain in detail how you can (and should) cure your depression with carrots. I state clearly at the start of the book that I have no psychological training.</p>


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<p>(C) I meet with an individual who has a brain tumor and I advise them to eat carrots to cure it. I state clearly at the start of the session that I have no medical training. They pay me $100 for the session.</p>
<p>(D) I meet with an individual who has depression and I advise them to eat carrots to cure it. I state clearly at the start of the session that I have no psychological training. They pay me $100 for the session.</p>
<p>(E) I meet with an individual who has a brain tumor and I advise them to eat carrots to cure it. I state (truthfully) at the start of the session that I have an MD from an American institution, but that I am not a licensed physician in their state or in any state. They pay me $100 for the session.</p>


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<p>(F) I meet with an individual who has depression and I advise them to eat carrots to cure it. I state (truthfully) at the start of the session that I have a masters degree in psychology from an American institution, but that I am not a licensed mental health provider in their state or in any state. They pay me $100 for the session.</p>
<p>(G) I meet online with an individual who has a brain tumor and I advise them to eat carrots to cure it. I state (truthfully) at the start of the session that I have a medical degree from another country (from which I'm video calling) and am licensed to practice medicine in that country, but that I am not a licensed physician in the U.S., in their state or in any state. They pay me $100 for the session.</p>


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<p>(H) I meet online with an individual who has depression and I advise them to eat carrots to cure it. I state (truthfully) at the start of the session that I have a masters degree in psychology from another country (from which I'm video calling) and am licensed to practice as a therapist in that country, but that I am not a licensed mental health provider in the U.S., in their state or in any state. They pay me $100 for the session.</p>


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Answer 1: <p>The two primary factors that govern the outcome are laws on &quot;unapproved devices&quot; and &quot;practicing without a license&quot;. Carrots are only subject to ordinary food safety regulations in the US, and the outcome would not change by substituting broccoli, mustard, filet mignon, or &quot;lots of water&quot;. Drugs that are introduced on the market have to be approved by the FDA, but legacy foods do not. We are in the realm that requires no FDA approval of carrots. The line, for product-purveyors, is drawn by <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/21/321" rel="nofollow noreferrer">21 USC 321(g)(1)</a>, and <a href="https://www.fda.gov/inspections-compliance-enforcement-and-criminal-investigations/warning-letters/santhigram-kerala-ayurvedic-co-us-inc-625892-05192022" rel="nofollow noreferrer">here</a> is an FDA warning letter to an Ayurvedic medical treatment maker / seller.</p>


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<p>There are ample law concerning &quot;practice of medicine&quot;, and there is the First Amendment which erects a strong barrier against laws which aim to prohibit people from disseminating an officially-unapproved viewpoint (to simplify matters, I presume – contrary to fact – that no medical authority has endorsed the specific efficacy of carrots). The government cannot punish you for taking approach A or B.</p>
<p>If you have a license to practice medicine (of the relevant kind), you may be subject to state licensing-board sanctions for making unapproved claims (one of the factors that overrides the First Amendment). If you have no license, then the question is whether your activity falls within the realm of &quot;practicing medicine&quot; in the state. In Washington, the line is drawn via <a href="https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=18.71.011" rel="nofollow noreferrer">RCW 18.71.011</a></p>
<blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p>A person is practicing medicine if he or she does one or more of the
following: (1) Offers or undertakes to diagnose, cure, advise, or
prescribe for any human disease, ailment, injury, infirmity,
deformity, pain or other condition, physical or mental, real or
imaginary, by any means or instrumentality...</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Technically, you cannot advise a person to take an aspirin if they have a headache. However, this law is within the scope of business regulations, so part of the line not directly encoded in that definition (related to the requirement to have a license) is that you are doing this as a business.</p>


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<p>A person must have a state license in Washington to be a &quot;common school&quot; (K-12) teacher. Your gym teacher can tell you to eat carrots to cure your depression or whatever, and there is some (miniscule) chance that the teacher will get punished for giving such advice. A person does not have to have a license to be a university professor, therefore telling a student to eat carrots will lead to no government sanctions, though the employer may fire or reassign you, depending on circumstances. The crucial question is not whether you are advocating eating carrots, but what business you are engaged in, whereby in the course of that business you give advice. A person with a medical degree and license who is a greeter at Walmart is not subject to government sanctions for advising &quot;Eat carrots to cure your tumor / depression&quot;.</p>


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Question Title: Purchased merchandise stolen from customer before taken off retailer’s premises

Question Body: <p>Bob purchases an item from ACME stores Ltd but it was stolen from him before he left the store. Bob would like to request a replacement or refund. Whose loss is this? Whose property was stolen (presumably by another visitor to the shop), and if Bob’s, is ACME liable due to it taking place on their property?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>When Bob buys a thing, it becomes his, and it ceases to be the property of the seller. By &quot;buy&quot;, we understand that to mean &quot;pays for and receives physical control of&quot;. At that point, Bob is responsible to control of his new property. His ownership of the property is not contingent on him leaving the store.</p>
<p>You might assign blame to the shop if they were negligent in some way, for example if they hire a thief to do the exit-check and the door guard takes Bob's property. Obviously, the thief is ultimately liable, but the store might under special circumstances be liable if they indirectly caused his loss. A store does not have an obligation to guarantee that a customer immediately and securely exits the store after making a purchase, so they are not liable for failing to immediately eject him from the store after buying the goods.</p>


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Answer 2: <h2>Bob’s loss</h2>
<p>Unless there is a term in the contract where the seller maintains risk in the item until it leaves the premises. Such terms are not uncommon in contracts where a product is to be shipped but generally wouldn’t apply in a brick and mortar establishment.</p>
<p>There is a case on point in <a href="/questions/tagged/australia" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-australia-tooltip-container">australia</a> where a bank was not liable for money stolen from customers during a robbery in which the fly-up screens were activated - anything outside the screens, including a just made withdrawal that the customer had not touched was held to be at the customer’s risk. From memory, the bank may have covered the losses as a PR gesture even though they were not liable.</p>


Tags: england-and-wales, liability, theft, any-jurisdiction, private-property


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Question Title: What is meant by &quot;make declaration of brain stem death mandatory for every hospital&quot;?


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Question Body: <p>I am an activist working for organ donation popularization in India, a country with a dismally low rate (0.5 per million). Apart from working for deceased donation, I had also offered my own organs as a living donor, but the donation couldn't go through due to unfortunate legal hurdles in unrelated living donation in India.</p>
<p>While reading a <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12055-021-01170-9" rel="nofollow noreferrer">recent paper</a> on the challenges, I found the following:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Sensitization of doctors regarding brain stem death declaration is one
of the biggest challenges encountered by the transplant programme in
India.</p>
<p>A major change in the transplant laws can significantly increase the
deceased donor pool if declaration of brain stem death is made
mandatory for every hospital.</p>
</blockquote>


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India.</p>
<p>A major change in the transplant laws can significantly increase the
deceased donor pool if declaration of brain stem death is made
mandatory for every hospital.</p>
</blockquote>
<p><em>Could the experts here please elaborate, in some detail, what is meant here? How are the brain stem deaths dealt with now, in the absence of such a law? Is it not reported/communicated? Are only the authorities not informed? Or is the family also not informed? Why is a separate law needed? How is it legal to not inform a death?</em></p>
<p>In other words, my question is what exactly is lacking today and why?</p>
<p>Thank you so much for this community. Your answer will guide my activist group's efforts.</p>


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Answer 1: <h2>The law presently doesn't define “dead”</h2>
<p>Therefore each doctor must decide on the basis of their own knowledge and experience when someone is dead. In those circumstances, it is common for doctors to be unwilling to call a brain dead individual who still has respiratory and circulatory function “dead”, even if those functions require a machine.</p>
<p>Contrast this with <a href="/questions/tagged/new-south-wales" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;new-south-wales&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;new-south-wales&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-new-south-wales-tooltip-container">new-south-wales</a>, a jurisdiction where the type of law reform proposed has already happened: <em>Human Tissue Act</em> 1983 <a href="http://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/hta1983160/s33.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">s33</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><strong>33 When death occurs</strong></p>


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<blockquote>
<p><strong>33 When death occurs</strong></p>
<p>For the purposes of the law of New South Wales, a person has died when there has occurred--</p>
<p>(a) irreversible cessation of all function of the person's brain, or</p>
<p>(b) irreversible cessation of circulation of blood in the person's body.</p>
</blockquote>


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Answer 2: <p>The details are fleshed out in <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4166875/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">this article</a>. Outside of India, jurisdictions differ as to whether they accept whole-brain-death vs. brain-stem death as &quot;death&quot;. The article points out that there is not widespread awareness of the relevant medical concepts in India (which impacts the laws that are enacted). Brain-stem death was &quot;legalized&quot; by <a href="https://legislative.gov.in/sites/default/files/A1994-42.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">The Transplantation of Human Organs Act, 1994</a>. The act sort of defines the term:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“brain-stem death” means the stage at which all functions of the
brain-stem have permanently and irreversibly ceased and is so
certified under sub-section (6) of section 3</p>
</blockquote>


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<p>“brain-stem death” means the stage at which all functions of the
brain-stem have permanently and irreversibly ceased and is so
certified under sub-section (6) of section 3</p>
</blockquote>
<p>but this is, apparently, insufficiently clear to practicing physicians, and there are or have been doubts about the legal procedure of certifying brain-death. Under the act, it is allowed to take organs <em>if</em> &quot;it appears to be a case of brain-stem death, [and] that such death has been
certified under sub-section (6)&quot;. Sub-section (6) allows but does not require a certification of brain-stem death, though one state, Maharashtra, passed a resolution making such a declaration mandatory.</p>
<p>The article points out that there is little literature on the actual practices of brain-death determination, &quot;no sufficient evidence to determine the minimally acceptable observation period between clinical exams&quot;, and other medical issues which are discussed in the article.</p>


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<p>This means that physicians do face or have faced significant uncertainty as to when it is legal to remove organs for transplant. As a general rule, when there is considerable risk of personal liability associated with one's decisions and since great liability attaches to removing organs from a non-dead person, removing physician option (w.r.t. certification of brain-stem death) reduces physician probability of liability, therefore may increase the supply of available organs.</p>


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Question Title: What are the implications of requesting someone sign a document with false information?

Question Body: <p>I have been asked by multiple different companies on different occasions to sign documents, with my signature certifying that all information in the document is true and correct.  These documents have had factual errors, and further, when I request a correction, the companies always insist that I sign the document anyway.</p>
<p>Is this inherently illegal, and if I were to sign as instructed, does their action affect the validity of contracts derived from this information or the validity of my signature, at all?</p>


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Answer 1: <h2>In general, signing means you cannot deny the accuracy of the information in the future</h2>
<p>In general, there is no prohibition on knowingly stating falsehoods under the law. That is, it is not illegal to lie.</p>
<p>Exceptions include when you are under penalty of perjury (e.g. on oath in court), when you are making certain declarations to government (e.g. your tax return), you are acting dishonestly to cause gain or harm others (e.g. fraud), etc.</p>
<p>However, by signing the document, you may create a legal fact that is independent of the real-world facts. For example, if you sign a receipt for $1,000 then you create a legal presumption that you received $1,000 even if there was actually only $500 in the envelope. You would need some pretty spectacular evidence to overcome that presumption.</p>
<p>Now, I don’t know what you are signing that has factual errors in it but, if they are material errors, don’t. Just don’t.</p>


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Answer 2: <p>Signing a document does not inherently mean anything, but it might commit you to something (a contract), or might constitute a sworn statement (an affidavit that you have never eaten pork). It is illegal (perjury) to knowingly make a false sworn statement, but it is not illegal to agree to something that you won't want to agree to (paying $100 per month rather than $10).</p>


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<p>If you e.g. affirm, as shown by your signature with an associated declaration that &quot;everything contained in this document is true to the best of my knowledge&quot;, that you intend to do X or that you have never done X but that is false, you can easily be sued, because you committed fraud. It could even be criminal perjury, in cases where the company asks questions that pertain to security clearances or things about bank accounts which often require swearing to facts, as required by law. It doesn't affect the validity of the contract, it bears on the punishment that you will receive for making false statements.</p>


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Question Title: Can the police tell you not to have house guests or you will be arrested?

Question Body: <p>My friend is being harassed by our local pd. They come to her house excessively and have even told her if she has house guests they will arrest her. Can they really do that?</p>


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Answer 1: <blockquote>
<p>They come to her house excessively and have even told her if she has
house guests they will arrest her. Can they really do that?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Absent special circumstances such as those discussed below, however, having house guests is not a crime, and some laws that purport to prohibit this are unconstitutional.</p>
<p>But, there are a variety of proper and improper reasons that this could be happening, as well as some that are in a legal gray area.</p>
<p>Clearly, the police are doing this for some reason, proper or improper, because it is a sustained pattern of conduct that seems to be singling out one person. But, without more of a factual context it is hard to tell what that reason is so that it is possible to determine whether or not their threat has a legal basis.</p>
<p>Like most legal questions, the answer cannot be provided in a vacuum and a full factual context is necessary to know if the police conduct is illegal or not.</p>


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<p>Like most legal questions, the answer cannot be provided in a vacuum and a full factual context is necessary to know if the police conduct is illegal or not.</p>
<p><strong>Valid Reasons</strong></p>
<p><em>Part of A Pattern Of Evidence Showing A Suspected Vice Offense</em></p>
<p>One possible subtext is that the police believe that the premises is a <em>de facto</em> house of prostitution, or that she is dealing drugs out of the house, even though they don't yet have the evidence to arrest her on those suspicions.</p>
<p>The police could be implying in their threat to arrest her that the presence of &quot;house guests&quot; would give them probable cause to arrest her on suspicion of a vice offense such as prostitution or drug dealing.</p>
<p><em>Municipal Ordinance Violations</em></p>


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<p><em>Municipal Ordinance Violations</em></p>
<p>Many valid reasons involve municipal ordinances, almost all of which can be punished by arrest and incarceration just like a misdemeanor criminal offense, even when the ordinance does not describe conduct that would usually be considered to be criminal in nature.</p>
<p>For example, municipal codes usually authorize law enforcement to arrest someone for a zoning violation, even though it would be very unusual to arrest someone for violating a zoning law.</p>
<p>There are often municipal ordinances which limit how many house guests you can have at any one time in a single family house or apartment, such as fire codes and laws designed to prevent loitering and gang activity, and there are often rules that prohibit certain kinds of activities like loud and disorderly parties (especially where alcohol is served or available). But, these ordinances almost never prohibit all house guests.</p>


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<p>The police could think that she is operating a short term leasing operation (i.e. Air B-n-B) or hotel, in a place where this use of the property is banned by municipal ordinance, and it appears that her &quot;house guests&quot; fit this description.</p>
<p>Many municipal ordinances impose curfews on minors, and someone could be arrested for having a party at which minor house guests are present after curfew under some of those municipal ordinances.</p>
<p>Some municipal ordinances (or even sometimes state laws), which are not always constitutional or valid under federal housing laws, prohibit unrelated people from cohabiting, either because the cohabitation amounts to <em>de facto</em> polygamy, or because zoning laws prohibit more than a certain number of unrelated people from living at a residence.</p>
<p><em>Valid Reasons Particular To Certain Individuals</em></p>


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<p><em>Valid Reasons Particular To Certain Individuals</em></p>
<p>If someone is on probation or parole or house arrest or out on bail pending criminal charges, the conditions of that criminal sentence or bail condition could also limit the ability of someone to have house guests.</p>
<p>For example, if someone had previously been convicted of disorderly conduct and noise violations and contributing to the delinquency of minors, with a wild party, a probation condition for that person might prohibit them from having house guests during the duration of the probation sentence.</p>
<p>Similarly, many probation, parole and bail conditions, prohibit the person released in the community from associating with known felons or gang members.</p>
<p>Civil or criminal protection orders can also prohibit particular people (e.g. ex-spouses) from being at a particular location.</p>
<p>Many states impose restrictions on where sex offenders can reside that could be implicated in this case.</p>


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<p>Many states impose restrictions on where sex offenders can reside that could be implicated in this case.</p>
<p>A few states also have a criminal sanction of &quot;exile&quot; on the books that prohibits certain people from being in certain jurisdictions following their conviction.</p>
<p><strong>Gray Area Reasons</strong></p>
<p>It is also entirely possible that the police are asserting rights to do things that they don't actually have the right to do. And, in most jurisdictions in the U.S., it is not categorically unconstitutional for law enforcement officers to lie to members of the public about their authority or other matters, in order to achieve a law enforcement purpose, even if they would be violating the law if they followed through on their lies about what they are permitted to do.</p>
<p><strong>Improper Reasons</strong></p>
<p>There could also be clearly improper reasons for this conduct. For example:</p>
<ul>


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<p><strong>Improper Reasons</strong></p>
<p>There could also be clearly improper reasons for this conduct. For example:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>perhaps a police officer wants men to say away from his ex-spouse or daughter, even though he has no right to do so and his colleagues are backing him up, or</p>
</li>
<li><p>perhaps the police think that her house guests are disreputable and are taking matters into their own hands without legal authority to keep &quot;bad people&quot; out of territory in their &quot;beat&quot;, or</p>
</li>
<li><p>perhaps they suspect but can't prove that she deals drugs or conducts some other sort of illegal activity at her residence, or</p>
</li>


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</li>
<li><p>perhaps they suspect but can't prove that she deals drugs or conducts some other sort of illegal activity at her residence, or</p>
</li>
<li><p>perhaps she is one of the few black residents of the neighborhood (or her house guests are black) and the police want to harass her to cause her to leave the neighborhood, and they don't think that she will be able to punish them for their misconduct effectively though legal channels before getting fed up and moving away. For example, if they make an arrest and can articulate some kind of alleged probable cause even if it doesn't hold up in court, they may be able to dramatically inconvenience this women with impunity, particularly if the local trial court judges that would consider the arrest decide to side with the police even when misconduct would be clear to a neutral observer.</p>
</li>
</ul>


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Answer 2: <p>The police legally cannot arrest a person for having guests. They can come to the house to talk to the owner, or others who are there. They can arrest a person if they have probable cause that a crime was committed or is being committed, such as murder or disturbing the peace. </p>

<p>Suppose that owner A habitually invites over guests who disturb the peace. Someone could file a complaint requesting that A be enjoined from having more that 3 guests, or something like that, aimed at stopping the noise that accompanies these visits. The court might then issue a temporary restraining order or a permanent injunction for some cause. Were there such an injunction, violating it is a crime, and A could be arrested. The police cannot, however, "take the law into their hands" and issue an injunction – that comes from a court.</p>


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<p>Supposing that there is no such court order, and supposing that the police simply have it in for A, A can try to sue the city for harassment, including a <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/1983" rel="nofollow noreferrer">federal civil rights lawsuit</a>. Whether or not A will succeed depends on what the actual facts are.</p>


Tags: criminal-law


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Question Title: Can a church legally initiate formal discipline against a member who has officially withdrawn/resigned from the church?

Question Body: <p>Suppose Jane is a member of a fundamentalist Evangelical church. She violates church doctrine and submits her resignation. At this point, church doctrine calls for her to be shunned by the church congregation and this indeed happens, but the worst thing to happen is that the congregation stops interacting with Jane.</p>
<p>Is this sufficient cause for a court to rule against Jane's former church?</p>


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Answer 1: <h2>You don't have to interact with people if you don't want to</h2>
<p>If you don't want to talk or otherwise interact with somebody in a personal capacity, you don't have to. Your reasons for doing so are your reasons.</p>
<p>Some of the congregation may have roles that require them to interact with Jane in what I will loosely call an &quot;official&quot; capacity. For example, if one of the congregants is a government employee and government business requires the interaction, they would have to do so.</p>


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<p>It gets a little tricky when there is not a clear legal duty to interact. For example, if a congregant is an employee of a company with which Jane has business and who would normally be the person to interact with Jane, they might reasonably claim that they have a religious belief that prevents them from doing so. Anti-discrimination law may require the employer to make reasonable accommodations for that belief, for example, by getting a different employee to interact with Jane.</p>


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Answer 2: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/canada" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-canada-tooltip-container">canada</a></p>
<p>See <em>Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church of Canada St. Mary Cathedral v. Aga</em>, <a href="https://decisions.scc-csc.ca/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/18895/index.do" rel="noreferrer">2021 SCC 22</a>.</p>
<p>In that case, two members of a religious organization were expelled. The Court held that any remedy would have to be found in legal rights such as &quot;rights in property, contract, tort or unjust enrichment ⸺ and statutory causes of action.&quot;</p>
<p>In many circumstances, &quot;there [is] no legal right attached to the plaintiff’s membership in his religious congregation&quot; and therefore the courts will have &quot;no jurisdiction to determine whether [they were] properly expelled.&quot;</p>
<blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p>In sum, courts can only intervene in the affairs of a voluntary association to vindicate a legal right, such as a right in property or contract. Membership in a voluntary association is not automatically contractual. Even a written constitution does not suffice. Membership is contractual only where the conditions for contract formation are met, including an objective intention to create legal relations. Such an intention is more likely to exist where property or employment are at stake. It is less likely to exist in religious contexts, where individuals may intend for their mutual obligations to be spiritually but not legally binding. A voluntary association will be constituted by a web of contracts among the members only where the conditions for contract formation are met.</p>
</blockquote>


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Answer 3: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/usa" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;usa&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;usa&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-usa-tooltip-container">usa</a></p>
<h1>You have a constitutional right to associate with whom you please</h1>
<p>The Supreme court has long held that the 1st amendment right to free speech, assembly, and petition also includes the freedom of association.</p>
<p>This right to association can be on cultural, religious and/or political grounds and the religious grounds are established.</p>
<p>This would ostensibly also include the right to not associate with people who have religious, political or cultural ideals you find abhorrent.</p>
<h2>How Free Speech Rights Protect the Freedom to Associate</h2>
Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation
<blockquote>
<p>It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the


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Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation
<blockquote>
<p>It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the
advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the
'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech. Of course, it is
immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by association
pertain to political, economic, religious or cultural matters, and
state action which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to
associate is subject to the closest scrutiny. It appears from the
Court's opinions that the right of association is derivative from the
First Amendment guarantees of speech, assembly, and petition, although
it has at times been referred to as an independent freedom protected
by the First Amendment. The doctrine is a fairly recent construction,
the problems associated with it having previously arisen primarily in


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by the First Amendment. The doctrine is a fairly recent construction,
the problems associated with it having previously arisen primarily in
the context of loyalty-security investigations of Communist Party
membership, and these cases having been resolved without giving rise
to any separate theory of association.</p>
</blockquote>
<p><a href="https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-supreme-court/377/288.html" rel="noreferrer">source - 1</a> <a href="https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-supreme-court/361/516.html" rel="noreferrer">source - 2</a></p>


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Answer 4: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/usa" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;usa&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;usa&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-usa-tooltip-container">usa</a></p>
<p>Any law enabling such a tort would violate at least 3 Constitutionally-protected rights in the U.S.</p>
<p>The government is explicitly forbidden by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution from &quot;prohibiting the free exercise&quot; of religion. The circumstances under which the government can prohibit either an individual person or a religious organization from exercising the tenets of their religion are quite narrow and this does not approach such a circumstance.</p>


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<p>Next up is freedom of expression. This emanates from the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. Expression also can only be limited by the government under exceptionally narrow circumstances. Even <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Socialist_Party_of_America_v._Village_of_Skokie" rel="noreferrer">holding an openly neo-Nazi demonstration through a heavily-Jewish town</a> is considered protected free speech. While there are a few exceptions (for example, slander or incitement,) a church expressing disagreement with a former member's actions by not associating with them doesn't come remotely close to any exception to freedom of expression.</p>


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<p>And that 'associating' part brings us to the third reason such a ruling could not be legal: freedom of association. While, unlike freedom of speech and freedom of religious practice, freedom of association isn't explicitly mentioned in the U.S. Constitution, courts have ruled that <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NAACP_v._Alabama" rel="noreferrer">the right to associate</a> or <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boy_Scouts_of_America_v._Dale" rel="noreferrer">to not associate</a> with others is protected by the U.S. Constitution, especially when that association (or non-association) is expressive in nature.</p>
<p>It's also worth noting that Jane herself is exercising exactly these three rights in deciding to cease certain religious practices, no longer associate with her former church, and express her disagreement with their views. She would literally be suing them for doing the same things that she herself is doing.</p>


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Question Title: NDA for selling company

Question Body: <p>Hypothetically, if someone were to say they sold their company, can they have an NDA that prevents them from speaking about their company name, the buying company's name, and details about what their company does or is this not possible?</p>


Answer 1: <p>An NDA is a contract between parties, hence the &quot;A&quot; which stands for &quot;agreement&quot;.</p>
<p>If the buyer asks for an NDA with those terms as a part of the deal and the seller agrees to it, then yes, it's possible.  If the seller does not agree to the NDA terms, then further negotiations may lead to an agreement.  Otherwise the buyer may choose to not complete the purchase.</p>


Tags: united-states, non-disclosure


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Question Title: Can a non-human legal entity own copyright?

Question Body: <p>Can non-human legal entities (for example, corporations) own copyright?</p>


Answer 1: <p>Yes. For example, corporations can own copyright.</p>
<p>They may own copyright after <a href="https://ised-isde.canada.ca/site/canadian-intellectual-property-office/en/copyright/transfer-ownership" rel="noreferrer">assignment</a> (this is true across much of the commonwealth and in the U.S.).</p>
<p>In some jurisdictions, <a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/a/87607/46948">when a work is made for hire, the employer may be deemed the author and initial owner (e.g. U.S.) or just the initial owner (e.g. Canada).</a></p>


Tags: copyright


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Question Title: If website uses cookies only after users login, can I ask for cookie consent during account creation instead of website launch?

Question Body: <p>I have a website that uses cookies only if the user logs in. Is it necessary to show a cookie popup banner at website launch or can I ask for consent when user is creating an account (the standard I agree to the website conditions checkbox)?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>Under European rules (GDPR, ePrivacy), you only need consent here if you both</p>
<ul>
<li>access or store information on the user's device (such as cookies), and</li>
<li>this access/storage is not strictly necessary for a service explicitly requested by the user.</li>
</ul>
<p>A session cookie is strictly necessary for providing a log-in functionality, so such cookies are unlikely to require consent. In contrast, cookies for measuring ad impressions are not strictly necessary for showing the website content. Necessity must always be thought from the user's perspective, not from the provider's economic needs.</p>
<p>If you use one cookie for multiple purposes, you should analyze each purpose separately. Maybe setting a cookie does not require consent under one purpose, but accessing the same information for a different purpose could require consent.</p>


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<p>If you have to ask for consent, this consent must be in line with the GDPR's requirements in Art 7. Consent must be freely given, i.e. there must actually be a way to decline the consent without suffering detriment. Consent must be informed, i.e. the user must be told directly for what consent is being sought, without having to click through to a long privacy policy. Consent must be specific, so it must be possible to consent for one purpose while declining consent for another.</p>
<p>An &quot;I agree to the terms of service and privacy policy&quot; checkbox cannot constitute valid GDPR consent because it fails all these criteria: I cannot use the service without agreeing, I'm not told essential information up front (you cannot expect users to actually read long privacy policies), and this is an all-or-nothing bundle that does not allow specific choices.</p>


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<p>If you do not have to ask for consent, you should still be transparent about your use of cookies, for example by providing a paragraph on this topic in your privacy notice. I think showing a cookie banner would be a bad idea in that scenario, since it could be confused with an invalid consent banner (no way to decline the cookies).</p>


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Question Body: <p>I was pulled over and the cop said that the reason was that when he ran the tags he couldn't find insurance on the car.</p>
<p>A former officer told me that, that is not a reason to pull someone over. He said if someone is speeding, ran a red light, made a wrong turn etc. those are reasons to pull someone over and THEN if it comes up that you don’t have insurance or they can’t find it I'm their system, that's when they can add that on as no proof of insurance. But he said simply pulling someone over because he doesn’t see insurance is an illegal stop.</p>


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<p>Was that a legal stop? Then he asked for drivers license and proof of insurance. The car was not mine so I told him I didn’t have proof of insurance and I didn’t have my license on me. So he gave me a pen and pad to write down the name. I write down my sisters name assuming because it's her car he’d be able to find it's registered to her and he'd find the insurance I didn't know it was my first time ever ever stopped. Another office came and he asked for MY name in specific so I gave it to him and he said is that the same name you gave to the other officer I said no I gave home my sisters name because that's who's car this is.</p>
<p>In the end the original cop told me to step out, he searched the car (didn't find anything) and then arrested me for failure to ID and false information.</p>


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<p>In the end the original cop told me to step out, he searched the car (didn't find anything) and then arrested me for failure to ID and false information.</p>
<p>Should I have been taken to jail if I didn’t intentionally give him a wrong name? I told him I didn't intentionally give him a wrong name and in the end he still had my full name, address and date of birth.</p>


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Answer 1: <p>The legality of the stop may be somewhat up in the air, but it would seem that the vehicle is not in the Texassure database, so it is reasonable to think that the person driving is not insured, and therefore is breaking the law. And that is all that is required: that the suspicion is reasonable. Until someone makes a sufficiently persuasive legal stink about this, it is probably a legal stop. <a href="http://allentexascriminallaw.com/2014/11/can-an-officer-stop-me-for-no-insurance/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">This article</a> gives some legal discussion. One applicable case is <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/16-40817/16-40817-2017-04-28.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">US v. Broca-Martinez</a>, a Texas case where a person was pulled over for being "unconfirmed" w.r.t. the insurance database: the court held that this was a reasonable suspicion.</p>


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<p>Thereafter, a charitable interpretation is that you misunderstood the request in providing your sister's information when he asked for your license and insurance: but you are expected to understand that when they request your license and proofs of insurance, they mean you the driver, and not the car owner. That they is even more suspicious, although I understand your confusion. At your hearing you cane explain why you didn't comply with the first officer's request, and the judge may they chalk this up to a simple misunderstanding rather than intentional deception. The problem is that you are expected to know – whether or not you've ever been pulled over before – that you have to provide license, registration, and proof of insurance. You will have a hard time making it believable that you didn't understand what the officer told you and what the law requires.</p>


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Answer 2: <p>The stop is legal. The plates are and are required to be publicly displayed and the police car’s computer is probably scanning all the plates around it and raising flags for things like no insurance or other reasons to stop a car.</p>

<p>Police officers make arrests when they have reason to believe the arrestee has committed an offence. They don’t have to be right – indeed they quite often aren’t. So, yes, your arrest was justifiable.</p>


Tags: united-states, texas, driving


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Question Title: Does implied consent protect an organization&#39;s ability to discipline former members?

Question Body: <p>Somewhat inspired by <a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/questions/94002/can-a-church-legally-initiate-formal-discipline-against-a-member-who-has-officia">this question</a>, I found <a href="https://www.9marks.org/article/informed-consent-biblical-and-legal-protection-church-discipline/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">this website</a>. To summarize, they imply that they would be legally protected from civil suits from former members who are being disciplined. Would this actually work? My first thought is that it doesn't make sense that a person who leaves cannot revoke their consent, especially since this wasn't a binding contract of any sort.</p>


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Answer 1: <p>In <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/oklahoma/supreme-court/1989/10494.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Guinn v. Church of Christ</a>, plaintiff withdrew from the church after an internal investigation of her conduct. The church apparently held as a matter of religious doctrine that she must repent of her sins, also that withdrawing from the church is doctrinally impossible. The transgressions were widely publicized within the church; a lawsuit over outrage and invasion of privacy ensued. The upshot of the appeal is that the church can be held liable for post-withdrawal actions, but before that, the church has a privilege to communicate such transgressions (the church is not subject to secular judicature of its actions w.r.t. its members).</p>


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<p>Contract law is not relevant here, what matters is that a person can knowingly and intelligently waive their right to litigate against a party, and while one is a member of the church which has such a waiver as part of their disciplinary doctrine, one cannot sue the church for its doctrinary actions as long as the actions do not constitute a threat to public safety which would justify state interference. Although the church argued that church membership is irrevocable, the court found that &quot;Just as freedom to worship is protected by the First Amendment, so also is the liberty to recede from one's religious allegiance&quot;. Given that plaintiff had withdrawn consent yet the church subsequently announced the transgressions without her consent, the church was thus found to be liable.</p>


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<p>In <a href="https://casetext.com/case/stepek-v-doe" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Stepek v. Doe</a>, the court similarly affirmed that a church enjoys a privilege against charges of defamation, when the plaintiff continues to operate within the church, not having left the church.</p>
<p>So it can &quot;work&quot;, to some extent. The person can always withdraw consent; the person has no legal recourse in case consent has not been withdrawn. The article is correct as far as it goes, which is not far enough: it errs in not stating what the legal consequences of of the transgressor leaving the church are.</p>


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Question Title: Is paying a police officer to do something legal that is in theory part of their job, but isn&#39;t being done, illegal?


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Question Body: <p>Let's say you live in a house and have a neighbor who is a nuisance. The neighbor does various illegal things on a regular basis (car is extremely noisy above and beyond what is allowed in the law, loud music in the middle of the night that can be heard from the inside of neighbors homes, pool on roof seemingly without sanitation controls, burning trash on the sidewalk, etc, etc).</p>
<p>Basically, a neighbor who all the other neighbors despise, but no one does anything because the nuisance neighbor would probably only increase his disrespectful behavior.</p>


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<p>Basically, a neighbor who all the other neighbors despise, but no one does anything because the nuisance neighbor would probably only increase his disrespectful behavior.</p>
<p>I was discussing the issue with a friend, and I suggested that since police enforcement is very weak in the neighborhood, if it would be a possibility to just put a price on the &quot;job of enforcing the law&quot;. Essentially, you walk up to a random police officer and say: &quot;I'll give you 10k USD to do your job. That is, to go to this particular place, and observe the infractions occurring due to this nuisance neighbor, and do whatever the law prescribes you to do when you catch someone doing something illegal&quot;.</p>
<p><strong>Is offering the officer 10k to &quot;do his job&quot; an illegal act?</strong></p>
<p><strong>Is this conceptually equivalent to offering an officer money to not do his job (a bribe)?</strong></p>


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<p><strong>Is this conceptually equivalent to offering an officer money to not do his job (a bribe)?</strong></p>
<p><strong>Is offering the officer the money to perform his job considered a bribe?</strong></p>
<p>As another example. If your house is being robbed this very instant, and you know it, is it illegal to go to a police officer and say: &quot;my house is being robbed, I'll pay you 10k USD to go to my house and do your job&quot;?</p>
<p><strong>Is it immoral or unethical from either party (the payer or the police officer taking the payment)?</strong></p>


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Answer 1: <p>It depends on the jurisdiction, and what you hire the officer to do. It is generally legal to hire an off-duty police officer, and <a href="https://www.seattle.gov/police-manual/title-5---employee-conduct/5120---off-duty-employment" rel="nofollow noreferrer">here</a> is what Seattle says about that. They are held to the same standards as when they are on duty; they have to be off duty (and not on sick leave). They do have to submit an approval form that describes what they will do. While in uniform, the work has to be of a law enforcement or traffic enforcement nature (thus not bill-collecting or vehicle repo), also you can't work in an alcohol or marijuana sales establishment. Some of your interests would probably not be covered, since zoning-type infractions (pool) are not within the purview of the police, but burning trash on the sidewalk would be. Because of the requirement for approval, you probably can't pay to get a response to a robbery (still takes 24 hours to


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within the purview of the police, but burning trash on the sidewalk would be. Because of the requirement for approval, you probably can't pay to get a response to a robbery (still takes 24 hours to get &quot;short notice&quot; approval).</p>


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<p>It is not clearly illegal to offer an officer money to &quot;do his job&quot;, but it is also not clearly legal. It is illegal (<a href="https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=9A.68.010" rel="nofollow noreferrer">bribery</a>), if you</p>
<blockquote>
<p>With the intent to secure a particular result in a particular matter
involving the exercise of the public servant's vote, opinion,
judgment, exercise of discretion, or other action in his or her
official capacity, he or she offers, confers, or agrees to confer any
pecuniary benefit upon such public servant</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It is not obvious whether a peace officer is a public servant, as defined under the law. A <a href="https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=9a.04.110" rel="nofollow noreferrer">&quot;public servant&quot;</a> is</p>
<blockquote>
<p>any person other than a witness who presently occupies the position of
or has been elected, appointed, or designated to become any officer or


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<blockquote>
<p>any person other than a witness who presently occupies the position of
or has been elected, appointed, or designated to become any officer or
employee of government, including a legislator, judge, judicial
officer, juror, and any person participating as an advisor,
consultant, or otherwise in performing a governmental function</p>
</blockquote>
<p>and a &quot;peace officer&quot; is</p>
<blockquote>
<p>a duly appointed city, county, or state law enforcement officer</p>
</blockquote>
<p>By statutory stipulation, a LEO is &quot;appointed&quot;, and they are an employee of the government. Then when you hire them to do something, do you do so &quot;with the intent to secure a particular result in a matter involving the exercise of the public servant's exercise of discretion in his or her
official capacity&quot;? If so, it is bribery (a crime).</p>


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official capacity&quot;? If so, it is bribery (a crime).</p>
<p>Since LEOs can legally be hired to enforce the law when off duty, the legality of that hiring must depend on the &quot;particularity&quot; of the job. If an officer has the discretion to arrest Smith for a criminal act, but declines to do so, then you cannot pay him to act otherwise. Officers generally have the discretion to arrest (or not) anyone committing a crime, so hiring an officer to &quot;control traffic&quot; or &quot;work security&quot; is not influencing the officer to exercise a <em>particular</em> form of discretion.</p>
<p>The crucial question would be, why <em>didn't</em> they enforce the law in the first place?</p>


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Answer 2: <h2>Yes, it’s the illegal act of corruption</h2>
<p><a href="/questions/tagged/new-south-wales" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;new-south-wales&#39;" rel="tag">new-south-wales</a></p>
<p><a href="http://www8.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/ca190082/s249b.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">s249B</a> of the <em>Crimes Act</em> criminalises an agent (the police officer in your case) from corruptly receiving an inducement or reward to do or not do something or to show favour or disfavour to a person. It’s also a crime to offer or make such an inducement or reward. Both punishable by 7 years.</p>


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Answer 3: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/england-and-wales" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;" rel="tag">england-and-wales</a></p>
<p>Payments to someone <em>to do a job that they're already obliged to do</em> are referred to as '<strong>Facilitation Payments</strong>' and are explicity illegal.</p>
<blockquote>
<p><strong>Facilitation    payments    are bribes</strong>    under   the Act
just  as  they    are under   the old law</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>Facilitation payments, which are <strong>payments to
induce officials to perform routine functions
they are otherwise obligated to perform,
are bribes.</strong> There was no exemption for such
payments under the previous law nor is there
under the Bribery Act.</p>
<p><Sub><Sup><a href="https://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/legislation/bribery-act-2010-quick-start-guide.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">The Bribery Act 2010 - A Quick Start Guide</a></Sub></Sup></p>
</blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p>Paying a policeman to investigate a criminal or arrest someone that was breaking the law would be almost the textbook example of this crime.</p>


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Answer 4: <p>Since there is no country... In Germany, it is legal to offer or give money to a police officer for having done his duty - let's say police officers return your kidnapped daughter unharmed, and you are very happy about it. It is <em>illegal</em> for the police officers to take the money, or to ask for the money. And it is obviously illegal to pay or to try to pay a police officer for not doing his duty, both for you and the police officer. (The rest of the answer would be quite irrelevant in the USA, because even this case where it is very understandable to offer money, it's illegal in the USA).</p>


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<p>But I have the impression you are not offering the money to do his duty - you are offering money for the police officer to act in a certain way. Let's say you suspect your neighbour to be a thief. The police officer has the same suspicion, but the evidence is just enough to make it a judgement call for the officer to pay your neighbour a visit or not. In this case, if the police officer acted because you paid him, I wouldn't say he is doing his duty. His duty is to think about the situation and do what he thinks is the most suitable action which <em>may or may not</em> result in him questioning your neighbour. His duty is <em>not</em> to question your neighbour. So even if paying a police officer to do his duty was legal for you (it's not legal even in Germany for the police officer), that's not what you would be doing.</p>


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Question Body: <p>I was researching how lawyers, courts distinguish cases and I came across this article: <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-reas-prec/index.html#PreLayDowRul" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-reas-prec/index.html#PreLayDowRul</a>. It says that cases can be distinguished by a later court based on the following constraints:</p>
<p>(1) in formulating the ratio of the later case, the factors in the ratio of the earlier case must be retained, and (2) the ruling in the later case must be such that it would still support the result reached in the precedent case.</p>
<p>It also says that cases can be distinguished &quot;even though those facts do not feature in the ratio of the earlier case.&quot;</p>


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<p>It also says that cases can be distinguished &quot;even though those facts do not feature in the ratio of the earlier case.&quot;</p>
<p>This article also points out that &quot;this power is not merely given to courts of the same level of authority as the one laying down the precedent (as is the case with overruling), but is given to every court lower in the judicial hierarchy.&quot;</p>
<p>Is this reasoning valid? Doesn't this go against the doctrine of stare decisis?</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Kmiec, Keenan. The Origin and Current Meanings of &quot;Judicial Activism&quot;, California Law Review (2004):


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<blockquote>
<p>Kmiec, Keenan. The Origin and Current Meanings of &quot;Judicial Activism&quot;, California Law Review (2004):
Some instances of disregarding precedent are almost universally considered inappropriate. For example, in a rare showing of unity in a Supreme Court opinion discussing judicial activism, Justice Stevens wrote that a circuit court &quot;engaged in an indefensible brand of judicial activism&quot; when it &quot;refused to follow&quot; a &quot;controlling precedent&quot; of the Supreme Court. The rule that lower courts should abide by controlling precedent, sometimes called &quot;vertical precedent,&quot; can safely be called settled law. It appears to be equally well accepted that the act of disregarding vertical precedent qualifies as one kind of judicial activism. &quot;Horizontal precedent,&quot; the doctrine requiring a court &quot;to follow its own prior decisions in similar cases,&quot; is a more complicated and debatable matter....</p>
</blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p>Does the below from the article:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>this power is not merely given to courts of the same level of authority as the one laying down the precedent (as is the case with overruling), but is given to every court lower in the judicial hierarchy.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>conflict with what stare decisis is?</p>
<p>How can lower courts avoid a controlling precedent and not follow settled law as pointed out by Justice Stevens? Am I interpreting what the author is saying correctly? Can the lower courts add factors to the ratio of the earlier decision such that the result would be the same as in the earlier case and then distinguish seemingly like cases?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>Distinguishing a case which was decided by a higher court does not violate the doctrine of <em>stare decisis</em>. If the case can be distinguished, then it is not a controlling precedent. The term &quot;controlling&quot; indicates not only that the decision is binding on lower courts, but also that it applies to (or cannot be distinguished from) the facts of the specific case in question.</p>
<p>Whether a precedent is &quot;controlling&quot; or not, in a particular case, could itself be a question for an appellate court. So if a lower court distinguishes a previous decision and therefore declines to follow it, the appellate court could say that was an error, and set aside the lower court's decision for not following a controlling precedent.</p>


Tags: common-law, precedent


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Question Body: <p>My understanding of Schrems II was that it essentially said the US did not provide adequate data protection because of the potential access intelligence agencies there have and the lack of legal recourse non-US citizens have, and consequently agreements such as Privacy Shield and Standard Contractual Clauses were invalid for making data transfers legal.</p>
<p>However, it seems multiple SaaS products still transfer data there under amended Standard Contractual Clauses, e.g:</p>
<p><a href="https://help.figma.com/hc/en-us/articles/360041060434-General-Data-Protection-Regulations-GDPR-" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Figma</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Figma relies on Standard Contractual Clauses for the transfer of personal data out of the EU and has implemented certain supplementary measures for EU to US data transfers based on the Schrems II decision</p>
</blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p>I'm confused as to what supplementary measures Figma has/could even have added to a contract to change that? Is this likely to hold up, or also probably invalid and just not enforced/tested in court yet? How is it possible for Contractual Clauses to mitigate privacy risks enshrined by law in the US?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>The <a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&amp;docid=228677&amp;doclang=EN" rel="noreferrer">Schrems II decision (C-311/18)</a> primarily discussed the &quot;Privacy Shield&quot; adequacy decision, but also covered SCCs. The CJEU confirmed that SCCs are generally valid. However, the CJEU also pointed out that the data exporter must first consider whether SCCs can actually be used in their specific context. From paragraph 141 of the judgment:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>It follows that Clause 4(a) and Clause 5(a) and (b) in that annex oblige the controller established in the European Union and the recipient of personal data to satisfy themselves that the legislation of the third country of destination enables the recipient to comply with the standard data protection clauses in the annex to the SCC Decision, before transferring personal data to that third country. […]</p>
</blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p>Translated to normal English: the SCC terms require the data exporter and data importer to check that the legal environment in the destination country actually allows the importer to comply with the terms of the SCCs. Since Schrems-II, it is common to prepare a &quot;transfer impact assessment (TIA)&quot; that contains such analysis.</p>
<h2>Options for valid SCC-based international transfers</h2>
<p>A Schrems-II compliant data transfer based on SCCs could work in the following scenarios:</p>
<ol>
<li>there are no problematic laws in the destination country</li>
<li>while there might be problematic laws, they do not apply to the data importer</li>
<li>even if the data importer is subject to problematic laws, supplemental safeguards such as end-to-end encryption prevent the personal data from falling into unauthorized hands</li>


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<li>even if the data importer is subject to problematic laws, supplemental safeguards such as end-to-end encryption prevent the personal data from falling into unauthorized hands</li>
<li>(unofficial theory:) even if the data importer is subject to problematic laws, the risk of these laws being invoked is negligible in practice</li>
</ol>
<p>Let's analyze these options for the case of EU to US transfers:</p>
<ol>
<li><p>The Schrems II case seems to deny the first option, since it explicitly found that the lack of legal redress means that the US do not provide an &quot;adequate&quot; level of data protection. After the judgment, some such as the US government argued that this was based on outdated laws (cases take a long long time), and that the current legal environment is perfectly fine. After additional changes to US government policy, the EU Commission later joined this argument and issued a new &quot;Data Privacy Framework&quot; adequacy decision in 2023.</p>
</li>


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</li>
<li><p>I occasionally saw US companies arguing that they are not subject to problematic laws like FISA 702 because they are not a communications provider. If true, that may have been a valid argument.</p>
</li>
<li><p>The <a href="https://edpb.europa.eu/our-work-tools/our-documents/recommendations/recommendations-012020-measures-supplement-transfer_en" rel="noreferrer">EDPB published recommendations on implementing supplemental measures</a> such as pseudonymization or encryption to protect the GDPR-covered personal data even when it is processed in the US. However, these supplemental measures have to operate with an extreme threat model: successfully defending against access by US government three-letter agencies (NSA, FBI, CIA).</p>


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<p>In practice, these recommendations ruled out any use of US-based cloud or SaaS services, and did not provide a reasonable option for continuing EU→US data transfers. But since claims about supplemental measures are easier to make than to verify (and since most data protection authorities did not actively seek out potential data transfer violations), this was a very common choice. Supervisory authorities note that details about the supplementary measures should be provided to data subjects on request, but this has been rare.</p>


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<p>Where I have seen details about such measures, they were usually techniques like transport encryption (like HTTPS) and encryption at rest, which fall clearly short of the EDPB recommendations. Sometimes, I've seen attempts at anonymization, but usually implemented for an US-centric view of &quot;PII&quot; that ignores the nuances of the GDPR's &quot;personal data&quot; concept. Techniques that could actually work – like homomorphic encryption – have been largely absent in this space, but that unsurprising given the novelty and overhead of such technologies.</p>
</li>
<li><p>The EU's CJEU did not permit a risk-based approach to TIAs, but it has found blessing in the UK, and it has been widely practiced by industry.</p>
</li>
</ol>
<h2>In B2B, the customers might be on the hook</h2>


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</li>
</ol>
<h2>In B2B, the customers might be on the hook</h2>
<p>In a B2B context, there is another aspect: Who is the data controller who is primarily responsible for GDPR compliance? Often, we have a US SaaS provider who offers a pre-formulated DPA/SCC, and an EU-based customer company. In many cases, the EU-based customer will be the data controller, and responsible for the international data transfer. The SaaS provider would typically be a &quot;data processor&quot;, who has no direct GDPR obligations and is only responsible for fulfilling their contract with their customers.</p>
<p>In such constellations, the US-based providers often advertise themselves as 100% GDPR-compliant, even though the real question is whether the customers can use that service in a GDPR-compliant manner.</p>
<h2>Figma's policies</h2>
<p>In the case of Figma, this means that most of the risk of having potentially invalid SCCs is not shouldered by Figma, but by their EU-based customers.</p>


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<p>FYI, the <a href="https://help.figma.com/hc/en-us/articles/360041060434-General-Data-Protection-Regulations-GDPR-" rel="noreferrer">Figma GDPR FAQ</a> you linked in turn links to <a href="https://static.figma.com/uploads/6b3f57508ca7aa8464ae2a83809c8362c4a9b535" rel="noreferrer">their full DPA</a> (<a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230719180626/https://static.figma.com/uploads/6b3f57508ca7aa8464ae2a83809c8362c4a9b535" rel="noreferrer">permalink</a>), which lists supposed supplementary measures in Exhibit C (in addition to the security measures in Exhibit B). These supplementary measures are of a solely organizational nature, such as consulting with expert legal counsel, nicely asking the government to contact the customer directly, and publishing an annual transparency report. The DPA also includes a transparency report, noting that between 1 July 2022 and 30 June 2022, zero US government requests were received, and that no court found Figma to be subject to FISA 702.</p>


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<p>While I have my doubts about the suitability of such measures to <em>prevent</em> government access, a transparency report is useful for making risk-based arguments. I tried looking for their updated report which should be due this month, but realized that &quot;Figma Transparency&quot; is impossible to search for online :)</p>


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Question Title: Is it legal to change user agent?

Question Body: <p>Assume (hypothetically), I'm using jsoup to download certain news website in my public android app. When I don't change user-agent in <code>jsoup</code> it redirects me to another website.</p>
<p>Is it legal to change the user agent of my public app, so the user of the app will get the correct news article? Does it matter that the website is scraped a little after downloading it?</p>


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Answer 1: <h2>Read the ToS of the website</h2>
<p>News websites implement such measures because unscrupulous people infringe on the copyright of their articles. Typically, such websites <strong>also</strong> have terms os service that explicitly makes usage of the website contingent on not scraping the website. For example, <a href="https://help.nytimes.com/hc/en-us/articles/115014893428-Terms-of-Service" rel="nofollow noreferrer">the New York Times</a> say:</p>
<blockquote>
<ol start="4">
<li>PROHIBITED USE OF THE SERVICES</li>
</ol>


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<blockquote>
<ol start="4">
<li>PROHIBITED USE OF THE SERVICES</li>
</ol>
<p>You may not access or use, or attempt to access or use, the Services to take any action that could harm us or a third party. You may not use the Services in violation of applicable laws or in violation of our or any third party’s intellectual property or other proprietary or legal rights. You further agree that you shall not attempt (or encourage or support anyone else's attempt) to circumvent, reverse engineer, decrypt, or otherwise alter or interfere with the Services, or any content thereof, or make any unauthorized use thereof. <strong>Without NYT’s prior written consent, you shall not:</strong></p>
<p>(i) access any part of the Services, Content, data or information you do not have permission or authorization to access or for which NYT has revoked your access;</p>


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<p>(i) access any part of the Services, Content, data or information you do not have permission or authorization to access or for which NYT has revoked your access;</p>
<p>(ii) use robots, spiders, scripts, service, <strong>software or any manual or automatic device, tool, or process designed to data mine or scrape the Content, data or information from the Services, or otherwise access or collect the Content, data or information from the Services using automated means;</strong></p>
</blockquote>
<p>Violating the Terms of Service means, you are in breach of contract and got no license to access any of the data. This allows claims starting with breach of contract and going up to intruding into the servers and violating various computer crime laws. However, do note that having a possible charge does not mean that it will result in a  trial or even conviction.</p>


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Answer 2: <p>It is hard to prove a negative (there is no comprehensive list of things that are legal). However a specific user agent name is not mandated by any law, so there can hardly be a law against changing it [*] (think of it this way, instead of using jsoup you could write your own crawler/parser - there is no government agency that would knock at your door and ask you to use a specific name for your software).</p>
<p>Here in <a href="/questions/tagged/germany" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-germany-tooltip-container">germany</a> there is a law against circumventing effective protective measures to get access to a computer system, but it is doubtful that a website would be considered a computer system in the meaning of the law, and relying on the user agent would not be effective protective measures.</p>


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<p>A site might try to ban scraping via their terms of service, but that would not always be enforceable, and would not depend on your user agent name. I still would not recommend to rely on data that a company does not want you to scrape, because even without legal measures they have ways to make this infeasible as a business model (and there might be legal issue such as copyright that still apply).</p>
<p>But as far as UA names go, knock yourself out.</p>
<p>[*] If it is a configurable property of your software. The software itself might have terms of service that prevent you from changing its properties, but I take it this is not what you are asking about.</p>


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Question Title: Why is a jury trial more often used in criminal, rather than civil trials, in many countries?

Question Body: <p>This is the case in most common law countries.</p>
<p>What is the commonly cited justification for this?  Are jury trials shown to be more accurate than bench trials (particularly for criminal cases)?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>Jury trials in common law jurisdictions are simply a fact, and don't need or get justification. Jury trials are ancient. In England the Scandinavians had an assembly, the  þing (&quot;thing&quot;) for deciding matters, such as guilt. Under Norman rule this became systematized, to the point that the Magna Carta Art. 39 states the law that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>No free man shall be captured, and or imprisoned, or disseised of his
freehold, and or of his liberties, or of his free customs, or be
outlawed, or exiled, or in any way destroyed, nor will we proceed
against him by force or proceed against him by arms, but by the lawful
judgment of his peers, and or by the law of the land</p>
</blockquote>


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against him by force or proceed against him by arms, but by the lawful
judgment of his peers, and or by the law of the land</p>
</blockquote>
<p>There was a period subsequently where the King gained more power and trials were more arbitrary and oppressive through the Star Chamber, leading to various reforms such as the birth of the US. The right to a jury trial is for reasons of historical precedent part of the US constitution.</p>


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<p>Because of the legal right to a jury (especially in criminal cases), the only question that can reasonably come up is for a defendant to ask if they will have better chances with a bench trial versus a jury trial. All it takes is one person on a jury to not be convinced to avoid a conviction, so superficially you'd think an accused person would prefer a jury trial to increase their odds of not being convicted. This is encouraged by a mind-set &quot;the state versus the citizen&quot;, where the prosecution and the judge are both agents of the government. On the other hand, the average citizen is more likely to misunderstand the import of evidence, and be less able to disregard statements made during the trial that were held inadmissible.</p>


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Answer 2: <p>Civil and criminal trials are fundamentally different, at least as far as the idealized versions go: in a <em>civil</em> trial, you have a disagreement between two &quot;regular citizens&quot; who are <em>equal</em>. There is no imbalance of power.</p>
<p>In a criminal trial, you have a regular citizen vs <em>the entire government and society as a whole</em>. There is a substantial imbalance of power, and almost all of the rules and procedures for criminal trials are there to make sure this imbalance of power cannot be abused or even accidentally disadvantage the defendant.</p>


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<p>The idea of &quot;a jury of your peers&quot; ties into that as well: its intent is to make sure that the people determining the defendant's guilt are &quot;regular citizens&quot; as well, that they have similar life experiences, similar education, similar background, etc. It could be argued, for example, that the subset of people who go to law school and become judges and prosecutors are not a representative sample of society, especially when you look at lower income neighborhoods. In the US, for example, the percentage of judges who are people of color is significantly lower than in the entire population, whereas the percentage of defendants of color is significantly higher.</p>


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<p>Of course, the <em>idealized versions</em> may not necessarily be congruent with reality. For example, civil suits between a consumer and a mega corporation are most definitely <em>not</em> a disagreement between equals, and when you look at a criminal trial against some well-connected billionaire with friends in very high places, you have to ask yourself which direction the imbalance of power is actually pointing in reality.</p>
<p>It also gets more complicated when the government is one of the two parties in a civil suit, or even different parts of the government are suing each other.</p>
<p>But at its core, these assumptions: &quot;a disagreement between equals&quot; vs. &quot;the entire society against one person&quot;, underly a lot of the differences between civil and criminal trials.</p>


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Answer 3: <p>The underlying <em>justification</em> for the jury trial is essentially to maintain the popular legitimacy of the justice system.</p>
<p>It should be noted that in its original incarnation, the jury were expected to know the defendant and the victim, so as to better judge their overall characters. In very early times, juries were also expected to do the legwork of investigation for themselves, rather than simply listening to evidence submitted in court under the supervision of a judge.</p>


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<p>In the case of aristocratic defendants tried by aristocratic peers, it is of course an obvious point that a jury of aristocrats would tend to know an aristocratic defendant. Defendants drawn from the common masses tended to be tried by a jury of reputable figures drawn from the local community - in that sense not necessarily what true criminals and vagabonds would consider their peers, but certainly the jury would be drawn from the lowest ranks of local people who would be regarded as having some stake in the social order and were embedded in local life.</p>


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<p>There are notorious examples in history of the judicial process being operated despotically, such as the Star Chamber, and of terrible consequences following indirectly for the despot (in that case, the beheading of Charles Stuart). Accumulated experience persuaded those at the highest levels that the principle of deferring to the judgment of the multitude on matters of justice, was the safest guarantee against tyrannies, and a guarantee against judicial proceedings triggering popular rebellions.</p>
<p>It is only later, perhaps as late as Victorian times (although I can't be sure offhand of the exact era), that juries were expected to be strangers to the defendant and victim, and to reach a verdict only on the evidence adduced in court. Investigation was increasingly handled by professional law officers and police forces.</p>


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<p>At least some of the impetus for this was because growing populations and migrations meant juries could not always be expected to know both defendant and victim, and because more cases occurred in which a jury knowing one or more of the parties would lead to bias.</p>
<p>So the &quot;accuracy&quot; of the jury system - in the technocratic sense of delivering verdicts that correctly apply the existing law to the facts - is of only secondary concern. A primary concern is that accountability for the verdict is passed to the jury, to redirect potential grievance away from the judiciary when correct verdicts cause grievance amongst at least some of the local populace.</p>


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<p>It also acts to relieve steam from the system when a judge may undoubtedly have convicted a defendant, but for whatever reason a jury (as representatives of broader community opinion) do not think a conviction is consistent with a just outcome, or have a different systematic perception of the evidence than a judge would.</p>
<p>Notably in recent times, when Kenny Noye was infamously acquitted in 1985 for stabbing a policeman to death, it acted as the strongest possible signal of the public's loss of trust and confidence in the police (in contrast to the professional judiciary who habitually took the word of the police as gospel), and confirmed the need for the police reforms (which were already underway at the time, but followed a period of significant lawlessness and corruption amongst police officers in the 1970s).</p>
<p>Noye was later jailed for an unconnected knife murder, if that bears on the likely &quot;accuracy&quot; of the jury's verdict on him in 1985.</p>


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<p>Noye was later jailed for an unconnected knife murder, if that bears on the likely &quot;accuracy&quot; of the jury's verdict on him in 1985.</p>
<p>But many serious convictions dating from the 1970s and 80s were later reversed following eventual acceptance amongst the judiciary that the police had often been liars, and jury cases like that of Noye essentially helped to shock the system non-destructively, and served to stem the further accumulation of miscarriages generally.</p>


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Answer 4: <p>This is more political than legal, but...</p>
<p>I believe the rationale is not “accuracy”, it is actually just reverse.  Jury trials, like <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blackstone%27s_ratio" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blackstone's_ratio</a> is all about the state proving that the accused is guilty, and not just executing someone because a single person said so, whether that person be a lord or a judge or whatever.</p>
<p>Jury trials ensure that guilty people go free.  They also reduce the chances of innocent people being punished, possibly fatally.  They also ensure that there <strong>are</strong> innocent people, because if nobody is ever found not guilty there’s no reason to bother, and the accused become guilty simply by being accused.</p>


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<p>Watch some of the 1st Amendment auditors on YouTube and see cops saying that people are engaged in suspicious behavior and need to show they evidence (typically in the form of a government issued I’d) that they are not engaged in criminal activity and if they don’t comply they will be arrested.  Sometimes they even are arrested and charged with hindering an investigation to determine what crimes they have committed.  Typically such arrest gets tossed out and occasionally result in law suits and settlements.  Imagine if they weren’t, if a cop just saying you didn’t help him determine what crimes you had committed was enough to get you years in jail?</p>
<p>Jury trials, and jury nullification, is one way society tries to reign in government overreach.</p>


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Question Body: <p>I want to market a little side hustle of mine and due to GDPR need to create some data privacy policy. Since as any reasonable developer I try to leverage the power of frameworks like Firebase, Stripe, DallE2, other Google Services etc it seems like at the free privacy policy generates are not applicable.
I checked and found IT lawyers to charge 200 - 450 EUR a single hour which is simple unreasonable and unacceptable.</p>
<p>I mean I really don't try to screw anyone but the hurdles I see here seem insane.</p>
<p>Options I see:</p>
<ul>
<li>hire someone from fiverr to create that for me that is not a lawyer but has good reviews? Not sure how much of a risk reduction that really is. Seems a bit like a gamble.</li>
<li>Alternatively I could create a 1 EUR company that in case of being sued I essentially close and have no liability with my private money</li>
<li>open the company remote in a coutnry that doesn't care about such in my eyes overkill nonsense</li>
</ul>


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<li>open the company remote in a coutnry that doesn't care about such in my eyes overkill nonsense</li>
</ul>
<p>I really wonder how to approach this without spending thousands of EUR on legal services or is that basically not possible in the EU anymore?</p>
<p>Cheers
Tom</p>


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Answer 1: <p>If you want some boilerplate text to just drop in and have done, you are going to be disappointed. But you don't need a lawyer either. Treat it as a coding job. First, list all the ways you are going to store and process identifiable user data. If someone is going to process it on your behalf, identify them too. Draw a chart showing the paths that user data is going to take. (Storage is a form of processing)</p>
<p>Then look at the 6 bases for processing user data and figure out which ones apply to each step. E.g. if the user asks you to do something then that is one basis under which you can process their data. See how much coverage you can get without asking for consent.</p>
<p>For each third party (e.g. Google) figure out what data is to be sent to them, and where they will be. Google has data centres in the EU specifically so you can get them to process user data without sending it outside the EU.</p>


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<p>Check the third party contracts for these services, including the confidentiality clauses. Link that to the processing they will do for you.</p>
<p>Finally, pull all this together into a single summary of what you are going to do with the data and the bases under which you will do it.</p>


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Answer 2: <h2>No one is forcing you to run a business</h2>
<p>If you <em>choose</em> to do so, you are <em>obliged</em> to comply with the law.</p>
<p>Complying with the GDPR (among many other things) is simply a cost of doing business. If that costs so much that the business is unviable, don’t run the business.</p>


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Answer 3: <p>I have seen many people on this platform, utterly clueless about the practical parts of the GDPR. I guess they deal in law theoretically, not in actually bringing an App to market. And that is fine, that is what this site is about.</p>
<p>So please, do not write that up yourself. Either get educated about the GDPR beforehand. Which you <em>should</em> already be, if you were an App developer through your day job. Because those trainings are mandatory, company wide, in many juristictions where it applies, how else would the company comply with laws? Or, get a lawyer. Serious companies do <em>both</em>.</p>


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<p>A lawyer is not as expensive as you think. Per hour, they don't cost much more than a senior developer. Just for starters, to comply with the GDPR you need to show terms of service, saving which version which user agreed to, showing and prompting for agreement if the latest hasn't been signed, allowing the user to self-delete their account allowing the user to know which data has been saved on them by you. All of this has to be automated, if you don't want to be hit by a lawsuit later. Because there are legal deadlines, and you don't want your side hustle to be something that you cannot leave unattended for a weekend.</p>
<p>So assuming a senior developer at roughly the same rate as a junior lawyer actually implements just the neccessary minimum, you are looking at 20, maybe 30 hours of work if done well. Obviously you can always do a shitty job in less, but lets assume you do it looking good in the UI, well tested and reasonably bug free and secure.</p>


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<p>After investing 30 hours just into the GDPRs practical implementation, hiring someone for a few more hours to write up the terms of service, seems pretty reasonable.</p>
<p>I <em>strongly</em> advise you to educate yourself on this topic. Because there are details that a lawyer <em>knows</em>, but since they don't code or look at your source, will never be able to warn you about properly.</p>


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<p>As an example, if you use Google fonts from a CDN, you have already breached the GDPR. And you have not even programmed the first screen yet. Obviously the fonts will be loaded from the CDN before the user can agree to any terms, displaying the text of the terms needs the font. So before the user has had even the chance to consent to anything, you have already leaked their IP address to a third party. Because that is what technically happens, the CDN gets to know the user's IP address, because your app made it available by calling it from the users device. To comply with the GDPR, the font has to be packaged with your app or loaded from your own backend server, not loaded from a CDN.</p>
<p>A lawyer could tell you that, if you ask them. But they cannot review your source code and tell you <em>that you did that</em>. That is not their job or expertise.</p>


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<p>A lawyer could tell you that, if you ask them. But they cannot review your source code and tell you <em>that you did that</em>. That is not their job or expertise.</p>
<p>So, you will need both, just like any other company: you need to educate yourself so you know to program in compliance with the law <em>and</em> you need a lawyer for that one page of paperwork.</p>


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Question Title: Why is the Crown Court called the Crown Court?

Question Body: <p>The Crown Court in England handles the graver charges known as indictments. Less severe criminal proceedings are heard in magistrates' court. Why is the Crown Court named Crown Court? Does it have some sort of closer association with the Crown than does a magistrates' court?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>Because prosecutions on indictment are commenced in the name of the Crown (“R”) in respect of crimes which were historically regarded as offences against the monarch. The law relating to these crimes is ancient and was described in works like Hale’s <em><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Historia_Placitorum_Coron%C3%A6" rel="noreferrer">Pleas of the Crown</a></em> (1736) and Foster’s <em><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foster%27s_Crown_Law" rel="noreferrer">Crown Law</a></em> (1762).</p>
<p>In contrast, summary criminal procedure is a more recent development which has its origin in civil proceedings between subjects. These prosecutions were commenced in the name of an individual police officer or other informant, in inferior courts which were subject to review by the “<a href="https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superior_court" rel="noreferrer">royal courts</a>.”</p>


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<p>Thus, when the assizes and quarter sessions were abolished and replaced with a single court which would hear all “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Court_for_Crown_Cases_Reserved" rel="noreferrer">Crown cases</a>” (and not summary prosecutions), it was natural to call it the Crown Court.</p>


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Answer 2: <h3>The legislative reason</h3>
<p>The Crown Court is a single, unified court, first established by the <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1971/23/enacted" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>Courts Act 1971</em></a>, s. 4:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>There shall be a Crown Court in England and Wales which shall be a superior court of record.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This has been superseded by the <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1981/54" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>Senior Courts Act 1981</em></a>, but the name remains the same.</p>
<h3>Historical context</h3>
<p>The Crown Court replaced the previous Courts of Quarter Session and Courts of Assize. There were also two experimental crown courts previously set up in Manchester and Liverpool in 1956 that had also fused the assize and quarter sessions jurisdiction.</p>
<h3>The Royal Commission's reasons for recommending this name</h3>


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<h3>The Royal Commission's reasons for recommending this name</h3>
<p>The Royal Commission on Assizes and Quarter Sessions (the Beeching Report) explains the choice of &quot;Crown Court&quot; as the name to be used (I would link, but I only found a print edition):</p>
<blockquote>


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<p>[W]e propose that the new court be called the Crown Court and, from now on, we refer to it as such. Not all of us feel that this name is ideal, and the lay members in particular would prefer one which gave a clear indication of the kind of business dealt with by the court. The logical answer would be to have a Civil High Court and a Criminal High Court, but the majority of us feel that it would be anomalous to have a High Court sitting at a number of centres which will normally be presided over by Circuit judges only. Also, only a small proportion of the work of the new court will in fact be dealt with by High Court judges. An alternative of &quot;the Criminal Court&quot;, when contrasted with the High Court dealing with civil work, seems to most of us to suggest a lower level of court for criminal cases than for civil. We are conscious that our own solution carries with it the anomaly that High Court judges who, with the nomenclature we propose, will take their title from a court


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for criminal cases than for civil. We are conscious that our own solution carries with it the anomaly that High Court judges who, with the nomenclature we propose, will take their title from a court with civil jurisdiction, will be sitting in a criminal court, but we see no way round this and in the end have decided to adopt the title of &quot;Crown Court&quot;, as representing the best solution.</p>


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Question Title: Can restaurants &quot;force&quot; a minimun 15% tip for delivery service in California?

Question Body: <p>Found that some restaurants promote &quot;free&quot; delivery when total over 60 dollars, as customers we can choose leave no tips, or any amount we want.  When the order total is 59.9, it charges 15% as tips as default, and we can increase it. Is that legal in California?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>By definition, a tip is at the discretion of the customer, so what you have is a service charge – a service charge is legal. It is legal to offer free delivery for orders over a stated amount, and to charge a percentage as delivery charge for lesser amounts. There is no specific law requiring a business to use the term &quot;service charge&quot; and no law forbidding them to separate the mandatory from the voluntary parts of the service charge / tip. However, if the amount charged is called a tip, it must go to the employee, whereas a &quot;service charge&quot; can go to the business. Therefore, it would be illegal to call it a tip but treat it as a service charge.</p>


Tags: california, restaurants


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Question Body: <p>I’ve recently purchased a part for my washing machine it did say product out of stock and usually takes up to 10 days but 16 days on still nothing go to tracking and it shows no info available. When I have contacted them I received the following response. What is an acceptable time to wait and can they give me an indefinite time scale?</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We are really sorry for the delay with your order.</p>
<p>The part you ordered is not currently in stock.    We are a company
who are very dependent on our suppliers, we would need to wait for new
stock to arrive until we're able to dispatch your order. We
understand you are dependent on us for this item, likewise as advised
above we are very dependent on our suppliers. However the estimated
delivery dates are subject to change depending on availability.</p>
<p>At this time they are unable to give an estimated delivery date for
your order.</p>


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delivery dates are subject to change depending on availability.</p>
<p>At this time they are unable to give an estimated delivery date for
your order.</p>
<p>Please be assured that as soon as your order becomes available it will
be dispatched to you as soon as possible to avoid any further
inconvenience.</p>
<p>Once again, we apologise for any inconvenience caused and thank you
for your patience.</p>
</blockquote>


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Answer 1: <p>Consumer goods are to be delivered in a reasonable time: 30 days. This assumes (as implied by the question) that the contract has no specific date of delivery. <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/15/section/28/enacted" rel="nofollow noreferrer">The law says</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>Unless there is an agreed time or period, the contract is to be
treated as including a term that the trader must deliver the goods—
(a)without undue delay, and (b)in any event, not more than 30 days
after the day on which the contract is entered into.</p>
</blockquote>


Tags: united-kingdom, consumer-protection


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Question Title: Mens rea in hypothetical &quot;illegal&quot; abortion

Question Body: <p>Consider the following hypothetical scenario. I recognise that it very likely to never occur, but I am interested more in the technical implications than in any actual possibility. Additionally, while the ethical questions involved are certainly interesting, I am specifically asking about the actual legal issues involved, not about the ethics of the situation (except so far as they might apply to the legal outcome).</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>A clause is added to the constitution declaring unambiguously that all
  unborn foetuses fitting a  certain set of criteria are human beings with all
  the attendant basic rights etc.</p>
  
  <p>A pregnant woman, whose unborn child matches the set of criteria
  exactly, but who <em>absolutely, unequivocally and unambiguously believes
  that her unborn foetus is</em> <strong><em>not</em></strong> <em>a human being</em>, procures an
  abortion.</p>
</blockquote>


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<p><strong>Is the woman legally guilty of murder (or, if not, any form of homicide)?</strong></p>

<p>I'm interested in any and all reasons for the answer being yes or no, but my main concern is the following:</p>

<p>The act of procuring an abortion, as I understand it, would satisfy the <em>actus reus</em> of murder, that is, the deliberate ending of a human life. However, if someone is genuinely convinced that they are <em>not</em> killing a human being (which includes the circumstance that what they <em>are</em> killing is not a human being), it would seem that they do not satisfy the requirement for <em>mens rea</em> for a murder conviction.</p>

<p>One might draw a parallel with a woman with postpartum psychosis who, while hallucinating that her six-month-old son is a monster, throws him from the balcony of an apartment building, killing him. In both cases, the woman involved causes the death of her child, but is totally convinced that she is not killing a human being.</p>


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Answer 1: <p><strong>Yes the woman is guilty of murder</strong> (under the law OP described)</p>
<p>The issue of common law mens rea (the guilty conscience) is moot as it is no longer a component of the crime, see <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mens_rea" rel="noreferrer">here</a>.</p>
<p>Almost all jurisdictions today have codified crimes so the common law mens rea is not relevant, for example, in Texas a person commits murder if they &quot;intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual&quot;; feeling guilty about it or knowing it was wrong is not an issue.</p>
<p>In the facts you describe the person &quot;intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual&quot;; the fact that she did not consider the victim to be a person is immaterial. As described, she would have a hard time with an insanity plea in the same way that a white supremacist murderer would for classifying members of other races as &quot;non-persons&quot;.</p>


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Answer 2: <blockquote>
<p>A clause is added to the constitution declaring unambiguously that all unborn foetuses fitting a certain set of criteria are human beings with all the attendant basic rights etc.<br />
A pregnant woman, whose unborn child matches the set of criteria exactly, but who absolutely, unequivocally and unambiguously believes that her unborn foetus is not a human being, procures an abortion.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Under those circumstances, the woman would be guilty. Although mistake of fact is a defense for most crimes, this is actually a mistake of <em>law</em>, which is not a defense.</p>


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</blockquote>
<p>Under those circumstances, the woman would be guilty. Although mistake of fact is a defense for most crimes, this is actually a mistake of <em>law</em>, which is not a defense.</p>
<p>There was a somewhat ridiculed <a href="https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/archive/C093542S.PDF" rel="nofollow noreferrer">case</a> in which a court decided that a bee was legally a fish for the purposes of a particular law. But the court wasn't wrong; the law literally defined invertebrates as fish. Honestly believing that bees are not fish would not save you if you violated such a law in regards to a bee. It doesn't even matter that you are <em>correct</em> that a bee is not really a fish; you're still guilty. The law is allowed to have ridiculous definitions, and you still have to abide by those definitions. The definition (from that case) in question reads:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“ ‘[f]ish’ means a wild fish, mollusk, crustacean, invertebrate,


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<blockquote>
<p>“ ‘[f]ish’ means a wild fish, mollusk, crustacean, invertebrate,
amphibian, or part, spawn, or ovum of any of those animals.” <a href="https://casetext.com/statute/california-codes/california-fish-and-game-code/division-05-general-provisions-and-definitions/chapter-1-general-definitions/section-45-fish" rel="nofollow noreferrer">(Stats. 2015, ch. 154, § 5.)</a></p>
</blockquote>
<p>So, it doesn't matter that the woman honestly believes that the unborn is not a human being. She knows (or should know) that the <em>law</em> unambiguously considers it to be a human being.</p>
<p>If the woman believed that what she was destroying was not only not a human being but <em>not an unborn foetus</em>, however, that would be a mistake of fact and she likely would not have the required intent. (For example, if the doctors lied and told her that it was a tumor, and she believed them, she wouldn't be criminally liable for having it removed.)</p>


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Question Title: What happens to an individual who is deported to a country of which they are not a citizen?

Question Body: <p>It seems that a person who is deported will normally be deported to the country of their citizenship, but this is not a requirement, particularly if the person is stateless. In such cases the person may be deported to a country of which they <em>used</em> to be a citizen. For example, according to <a href="http://travel.state.gov/content/travel/english/legal-considerations/us-citizenship-laws-policies/renunciation-of-citizenship.html">http://travel.state.gov/content/travel/english/legal-considerations/us-citizenship-laws-policies/renunciation-of-citizenship.html</a></p>


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<blockquote>
  <p>Persons intending to renounce U.S. citizenship should be aware that, unless they already possess a foreign nationality, they may be rendered stateless and, thus, lack the protection of any government. They may also have difficulty traveling as they may not be entitled to a passport from any country. Even if not stateless, former U.S. citizens would still be required to obtain a visa to travel to the United States, or show that they are eligible for admission pursuant to the terms of the Visa Waiver Pilot Program (VWPP).  Renunciation of U.S. citizenship may not prevent a foreign country from deporting that individual  to the United States in some non-citizen status.</p>
</blockquote>


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<p>What happens to such people after being deported, if their country of former citizenship does not automatically reinstate citizenship upon request? Are they typically admitted as temporary visitors or as permanent residents? Or, perhaps, in a legal status similar to that of an illegal immigrant, possibly unable to work or apply for most public assistance?</p>


Answer 1: <p><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Statelessness" rel="noreferrer">Statelessness</a> is a very serious condition.</p>

<p>It is quite likely that a person such as you describe may be required to board an aeroplane to that country but will not be permitted to pass through immigration on arrival - <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mehran_Karimi_Nasseri" rel="noreferrer">Mehran Karimi Nasseri</a> lived in Charles de Gaulle airport for 18 years in this condition.</p>


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<p>There are many people in the world who are stateless and this may or may not affect their lives. Citizenship is generally only an issue when crossing international borders or in employment situations, the latter is significant in advanced countries but less of an issue in countries with less-developed economies.</p>


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Answer 2: <h2>Generalities</h2>
<p>To determine whether it's possible to be deported in this situation, it would first be necessary to distinguish between various types of removals, e.g. removal at port when you have been denied entry right out of the plane/at the border, removal for some immigration violation, or deportation after a criminal conviction. Many other details can also matter.</p>
<p>Also, the exact procedure will vary somewhat from one country to the next, as it depends on local law. What you found is a generic warning from the perspective of the receiving country but it does not mean that most countries can or do deport stateless people. I think it's mostly intended to scare people off renouncing their citizenship, especially if they naively think this would be an easy way to avoid being removed from a country where they are staying illegally.</p>


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<p>But in any case, removing someone typically involves the country where you want to send them to, especially if the person to be removed has no valid travel document. Even if you are in fact a citizen, if you ditched your passport, the deporting state will contact the relevant consulate to obtain permission to deport you to that country. But the world is a vast place and there have been cases of countries taking some liberties with these principles or of consulates accepting people who had no link with them.</p>
<p>What happens after that will also vary. If you somehow managed to reach the territory of a country and are found to have no right to be there, you can typically be detained. If the country can't find a way to remove you, you could be detained indefinitely or simply released after some time. Being caught at the border or only later also makes a difference in terms of the applicable procedure.</p>
<h2>An example</h2>


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<h2>An example</h2>
<p>Now, to be a little more specific, I can tell you how it's supposed to work in France (I only chose France because that's the country I am most familiar with). If you land in France and you are refused entry, the carrier that brought you there generally has to bring you back to your point of departure, your country of citizenship or any place that will admit you (but this provision does not apply if you have been removed to France by another country, to avoid “bouncing” people back-and-forth between two countries).</p>


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<p>In the meantime, you can in any case be detained for up to four days, during which you can appeal the decision to refuse you entry, lodge an asylum application, ask your consulate or the person you wanted to visit to be informed of your situation or ask to see a lawyer or advisor (there are <em>pro bono</em> legal advisors employed by state-funded charities who work in those detention centres) or a medical doctor. You can also leave at any time if it's to go elsewhere than France. This 4-day delay can be extended several times by a judge, up to 20 days in total, if the authorities can prove they have a good chance to find a place to send you but need the extra delay.</p>


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<p>At the end of this period, if they haven't found any solution (and you haven't filed for asylum), you are released with an 8-day visa and officially “invited” to leave the country before the end of this period. Obviously, everybody knows that there is a great chance you will abscond and simply remain in the country illegally but that's the way used to deal with this in a legally plausible manner.</p>


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<p>After that, if you are still in France, you are in the same situation as thousands of undocumented migrants (or “<em>sans-papiers</em>”). If you get caught for some reason (random police check, raid on a place where you work illegally, etc.), the authorities can detain you again (for 5 days at first, extendable by a judge, now up to 90 days in total) and get a shot at deporting you. If they still cannot (no consulate will recognise you, you come from a dangerous country, etc.), you will be released again. In practice, the authorities (police, etc.) try to avoid wasting resources on people they will ultimately have to release so if they know you cannot be forcibly removed (because of your personal situation, because your country is at war, etc.), they will often simply let you go.</p>


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<p>The actual conditions are pretty harsh (and deteriorating) but legally, this detention is not a punishment and should only happen to the extent that it facilitates your removal. That's why people should in principle be released as soon as it becomes clear that timely removal will be impossible. I have heard before of people being released <em>en masse</em> following a coup in their country of origin, as judges would deem the situation too unstable to expect a removal in the next 90 days.</p>
<p>Depending on your personal situation, you might eventually find a way to qualify for some sort of residence permit (but having stayed illegally in the past basically disqualifies you for naturalisation, even decades down the line). Obviously you cannot work legally and if you are also stateless and have no ID, many other things are extremely complicated.</p>


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<p>Most of this should be pretty typical, at least for European countries, even if there are occasionally a few surprising differences. How long (or even whether) you can be detained varies a lot for example, all the way to indefinite or prison detention in some places.</p>


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Question Title: Can the people who let their animals roam on the road be punished?

Question Body: <p>The problem of stray animals roaming on the road in India is difficult to solve mainly due to religious and political reasons.</p>
<p>However, not all animals are claimed but animals such as goats are left to roam on the road during the day and kept inside the house/farm at night. It's a road safety issue as these animals often get hit by vehicles and the animal owners ask for the monetary compensation.</p>
<p>What are the laws to deal with the stray animals and can the animal owners be punished in the aforementioned condition?</p>


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Answer 1: <p><strike>There's nothing that I can find that specifically refers to any offence for allowing one's goats to roam free, but</strike> there are at least two national, and probably more at state / municipal level, laws that deal with obstructing the highway - therefore potentially making the goat owner liable for any injury or damage shown to be caused by their (in)action:</p>
<ul>
<li><a href="https://www.indiacode.nic.in/show-data?actid=AC_CEN_30_42_00002_195648_1517807321068&amp;sectionId=14500&amp;sectionno=8B&amp;orderno=20" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Section 8B</a>, National Highways Act:</li>
</ul>
<blockquote>
<p>Punishment for mischief by injury to national highway.--</p>


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</ul>
<blockquote>
<p>Punishment for mischief by injury to national highway.--</p>
<p>Whoever commits mischief by doing any act which renders or which he knows to be likely to render any national highway referred to in sub-section (1) of section 8A impassable or <strong>less safe for traveling</strong> or conveying property, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five years, or with a fine, or with both.</p>
</blockquote>
<ul>
<li><a href="https://www.indiacode.nic.in/show-data?actid=AC_CEN_5_23_00037_186045_1523266765688&amp;orderno=317" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Section 283</a>, Indian Penal Code (IPC):</li>
</ul>
<blockquote>
<p>Whoever, by doing any act, or by omitting to take order with any property in his possession or under his charge, causes <strong>danger, obstruction or injury to any person in any public way</strong> or public line of navigation, shall be punished, with fine which may extend to two hundred rupees.</p>


