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<p>The Supremacy Clause is only violated when a state law violates or contradicts a federal law, which is not what happens in this case. The federal government can and has set up a system for determining whether the federal or state tax collection rights have priority in the same asset, which mostly flows from the timing of the recording of a tax lien by the relevant bodies.</p>


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Question Title: Are Technological Standards bodies required to be approved by the government?

Question Body: <p>In the interest of cross vendor compatibility, the method by which different technologies interoperate is often standardized. This means that a non binding agreement is made between multiple parties to abide by rules set forth in a documented standard.</p>
<p>Examples of this include The USB Device Working Group, Jedec, The C++ Standards Committee, and PCI-SIG.</p>
<p>While presumably in the public's interest, these groups appear to be a fragrant violation of antitrust laws. Do they require a special license to operate?</p>
<p>If so, what would such a license look like and what agency would issue it?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>Standards-setting by industry groups is not inherently anti-competitive and these groups do not require a licence from the government to operate. They are a prototypical example of &quot;private ordering&quot; (see David J. Teece &amp; Edward F. Sherry, &quot;Standards Setting and Antitrust&quot; (2003) <a href="https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/217211884.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">87 Minn. L.R. 1913</a>, p. 1987).</p>
<p>What can be anti-competitive is when a corporation advocates for an element to be included in a standard for reasons other than technical considerations. See e.g. the International Standards Organization's &quot;<a href="https://www.iso.org/files/live/sites/isoorg/files/developing_standards/docs/en/competition_law_guidelines.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Competition Law Guidelines</a>.&quot;</p>


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<p>An example violation is <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2007/02/ftc-issues-final-opinion-order-rambus-matter" rel="nofollow noreferrer">the behaviour of Rambus, Inc.</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>According to the FTC complaint, Rambus nonetheless participated in JEDEC’s DRAM standard-setting activities for more than four years without disclosing to JEDEC or its members that it was actively working to develop, and possessed, a patent and several pending patent applications that involved specific technologies ultimately adopted in the standards.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>In its liability opinion dated July 31, 2006, the Commission found that, “Rambus engaged in exclusionary conduct that significantly contributed to its acquisition of monopoly power in four related markets.”</p>
</blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p>In <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/speeches/antitrust-intellectual-property-law-adversaries-partners#a.%20Complaint%20allegations" rel="nofollow noreferrer">another example</a>, Dell Computer Corporation was alleged to have</p>
<blockquote>
<p>voted to approve the VL-bus standard and certified that the standard did not infringe its intellectual property. After the standard became very successful, Dell asserted an earlier-issued patent against several computer manufacturers using the standard.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The FTC entered a consent agreement with Dell:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>prohibiting Dell from enforcing its patent against those who wanted to use the VL-bus standard. The FTC's order also prohibited Dell from enforcing patent rights in the future when it intentionally failed to disclose those rights upon request of a standards-setting organization.</p>
</blockquote>


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Question Title: Can privacy regulations prevent my alma mater from sharing the fact that I graduated there?


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Question Body: <p>I graduated from some private high school a long time ago. During my years there, I have experienced and witnessed a variety of dubious practices that violate students' rights. I always wanted to leave but never had the necessary resources nor support to execute my plan. Due to this I never associate myself with my school, not even in my resumés.</p>
<p>Recently I received an honorable mention in an invention competition. I was so proud of myself until I searched the name of the competition on Google. On page 1 a familiar name popped up. It was my school's name. When I clicked on it, I saw my name in a school blog post.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>John Doe's remarkable feat in Blah Blah Invention Competition</p>
<p>John Doe, Class of 2000 has won an honorable mention in ...</p>
</blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p>John Doe's remarkable feat in Blah Blah Invention Competition</p>
<p>John Doe, Class of 2000 has won an honorable mention in ...</p>
</blockquote>
<p>I was so surprised that they heard the news in the first place, considering the fact that I cut off all contact with the school admin and peers after I became an adult. I didn't want my name on that page, especially given the fact that some alumni have started to come out about what they suffered in school in recent years. Can I prevent them from using the fact that I graduated their school on their website by citing the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act(FERPA) or others? Or is this fair game per first amendment grounds and am I out of luck?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>The privacy rule is spelled out <a href="https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-34/subtitle-A/part-99" rel="nofollow noreferrer">here</a>. Subpart D addresses disclosure of personally identifiable information from education records, saying when consent is required vs. not required (there being 16 conditions under which consent is not required). Mostly this refers to &quot;required by law&quot; exceptions, or &quot;for school-internal use&quot;, but also includes &quot;directory information&quot;. Information may be disclosed if the student (as an adult) or a parent (of a minor) has consented to disclosure.</p>


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<p>Under the legal definition of &quot;record&quot;, that simply means &quot;tangible information&quot; (not &quot;conversations&quot;). An education record is one that is &quot;directly related to a student; and maintained by an educational agency or institution or by a party acting for the agency or institution&quot;, possibly including the information that you cite – providing that the information is maintained and disclosed by the school. In addition, though, certain information can be freely disclosed, namely &quot;directory information&quot; which is:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Directory information includes, but is not limited to, the student's
name; address; telephone listing; electronic mail address; photograph;
date and place of birth; major field of study; grade level; enrollment
status (e.g., undergraduate or graduate, full-time or part-time);
dates of attendance; participation in officially recognized activities


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status (e.g., undergraduate or graduate, full-time or part-time);
dates of attendance; participation in officially recognized activities
and sports; weight and height of members of athletic teams; degrees,
honors, and awards received; and the most recent educational agency or
institution attended.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The regulation explains that this is information that &quot;would not generally be considered harmful or an invasion of privacy if disclosed&quot;. Privacy standards have changed since the law was passed – but it is allowed by the existing law.</p>


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Question Title: What legal designation status does the Ukrainian flag possess, and what recent changes has it had to its status?

Question Body: <p>Under the town and country planning act, flags have three possible designations.</p>
<p>What is the designation of the Ukrainian flag, and what has been its most recent changes of status?</p>


Answer 1: <p>The flag of Ukraine is a &quot;Class H&quot; advertisement under Schedule 1 of the <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2007/783" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>The Town and Country Planning (Control of Advertisements) (England) Regulations 2007</em></a>, secondary to the Town and Country Planning Act.</p>
<p>Schedule 1 of the regulation lists under Class H</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Any country’s national flag</p>
</blockquote>
<p>and it has included this since <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2007/783/made" rel="nofollow noreferrer">its inception in 2007</a>.</p>


Tags: england-and-wales, flag


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Question Title: Which law rules polygraphs inadmissible in UK?

Question Body: <p>Where does it say that polygraph tests (lie detector tests) are inadmissible under law in England and Wales?</p>
<p>I am mostly interested in their usage being disallowed for criminal (both Magistrates' Court and Crown Court) and civil matters. However, if they were allowed elsewhere, such as for employment tribunals, that would be useful knowledge.</p>


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Answer 1: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/canada" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-canada-tooltip-container">canada</a></p>
<p>See <em>R. v. Béland</em>, <a href="https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1987/1987canlii27/1987canlii27.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">[1987] 2 S.C.R. 398</a>:</p>
<blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p>It is therefore my opinion that evidence of the results of a polygraph examination would clearly offend the rule against the admission of past or out‑of‑court statements by a witness. All of the considerations upon which the rule is based are as applicable to polygraph evidence as to other statements. The repetition of statements by another witness adds nothing to their weight and reliability. The ultimate decision as to the truth or falsity of the evidence of a witness must rest upon the exercise of the judgment of the trier of fact. This is as true of evidence of polygraph tests as of any other evidence. In the last analysis, the trier of fact must reach its conclusion on the basis of the evidence given by a human being in court. The evidence of the polygraph operator if heard by the trier of fact adds nothing to the earlier statement of the witness which is sought to be supported.</p>
<p>...</p>


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<p>...</p>
<p>It was also argued that the polygraph evidence was receivable as expert evidence. The polygraph operator, as an expert, was trained and qualified to give his opinion as to the veracity of the witness, based solely on his interpretation of the significance of the responses made by the witness to the questions put on the examination.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>Here, the sole issue upon which the polygraph evidence is adduced is the credibility of the accused, an issue well within the experience of judges and juries and one in which no expert evidence is required. It is a basic tenet of our legal system that judges and juries are capable of assessing credibility and reliability of evidence.</p>
</blockquote>
<p><a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/a/94502/46948">Another answer</a> says:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The real problem with polygrapher's opinions however (like policeman's opinions), is that they simply aren't reliable enough.</p>
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<blockquote>
<p>The real problem with polygrapher's opinions however (like policeman's opinions), is that they simply aren't reliable enough.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But lack of reliability was not part of the Supreme Court's legal reasoning for rejecting the use of polygraph evidence in court.</p>


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Answer 2: <p>What I say during a lie detector test might be considered a valid testimony. But the point of a lie detector test is to identify lies and state that my testimony is not true. &quot;I didn't kill my wife&quot; is valid testimony. That <em>might</em> be considered in court unless it is considered hearsay. The lie detector test saying &quot;he lied, therefore he killed his wife&quot; is not valid testimony. I never said &quot;I killed my wife&quot;, so it's not valid testimony.</p>
<p>You would <em>at least</em> have to have an expert witness who is willing to testify that this machine can beyond a reasonable doubt detect that I am lying, and you won't find that expert witness.</p>


Tags: united-kingdom, criminal-law, england-and-wales, civil-law, common-law


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Question Title: whether entitled to reward or not

Question Body: <p>Tam lost his wireless airpods in the campus. He advertised online and near the campus, a reward of $50 to who returns the lost earphones.</p>
<p>Sania found them and went to return it. But next day she saw the advertisement and claim the reward. Advise Tam.</p>


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Answer 1: <h2>Sania is entitled to a reward of 7,50€.</h2>
<p><a href="/questions/tagged/germany" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-germany-tooltip-container">germany</a></p>
<p>In Germany, to reward honest finders, the finder of an item is entitled to 5% of a lost item's value of up to 500€ under <a href="https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bgb/__971.html" rel="noreferrer">§ 971 BGB</a>. Airpods cost about 150 €, so Sania is entitled to a Fider's reward of 7,50 €. Anything more would be at the discretion of Tam, accepting less is at Sania's discretion.</p>
<p>Do note, that denial of the finder's reward at the moment that Sania hands over the item means, that they also deny their entitlement to the reward. In fact, it is upon Sania to demand the reward, and unless they do so, it is presumed that they do not want a finder's reward.</p>


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<p><strong>However</strong> in making her entitlement to the reward known, Sania may not cross the line into coercion or blackmail (§§ 240, 253 StGB). Should Sania say, without explanation &quot;I demand a payment of 100 € for the airpods&quot;, that could be coercion, as she is not entitled to that. If she however says &quot;I am entitled to finder's reward of 7,50 €, and had expenses of 2.50 € to get the phone to you, therefore you owe me 10 €&quot; the picture is different - that is <em>exactly</em> the amount that the law says she would be owed. This is because atop the actual reward Sania can reclaim reasonable fees, such as the bus fare to get the phone to Tam under <a href="https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bgb/__970.html" rel="noreferrer">§ 970 BGB</a>. Under § 972 BGB, Sania does not have to relinquish the item till the reward and expenses have been paid but also does not become the owner of the item.</p>
<h4>The Fundbüro</h4>


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<h4>The Fundbüro</h4>
<p>To evade a possible claim for &quot;Unterschlagung von Fundsachen&quot; (~conversion by not reporting a found item), the Fundbüro (Found item's office) exists when the owner can't be made out rapidly. Not only does it calculate the required finder's reward, but also handing it over to the office fulfills the requirement to report a found item that is worth more than 10 € under <a href="https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bgb/__965.html" rel="noreferrer">§ 965 BGB</a>. It is customary to store the lost items at the Fundbüro, but that is not required.</p>
<p>To gain the item from the Fundbüro, Tam will have to pay any required handling fees to the office but also gets notice of how much he should pay to Sania as well as her contact details. Sania will get contact details of Tam in return, together with a notice that she has a claim to a reward of such value. Should Sania not have given her details, it is presumed that she did not want the finder's reward.</p>


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<p>If Sania retained the item, the Fundbüro will inform Tam of the estimated finder's reward and contact details for Sania, so Tam can reclaim the item.</p>


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Answer 2: <h2>Sania is not entitled to the reward</h2>
<p>This is very much contract law 101.</p>
<p>Tam made an offer to the world that was acceptable by performance: return my airpods and we have a contract.</p>
<p>However, Sania did not see the ad and was therefore not returning the AirPods in response to the offer. Acceptance of an offer requires knowledge of the offer. Therefore, there is no contact and Tam is under no obligation to provide Sania with anything, not even a thank you.</p>


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Answer 3: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/england-and-wales" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-england-and-wales-tooltip-container">england-and-wales</a> <a href="/questions/tagged/canada" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-canada-tooltip-container">canada</a></p>
<p>See <em>Williams v Carwardine</em> (1833), <a href="http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/KB/1833/J44.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">5 Car &amp; P 566, 172 ER 1101</a>, aff'd 4 B &amp; Ad 621, 110 ER 590 (KB).</p>
<ul>
<li>Police were investigating a suspected murder and the brother of the deceased publicly distributed a notice offering £20 for &quot;such information as may lead to a discovery of the murder of the said Walter Carwardine.&quot;</li>


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<li>Mary Williams gave a statement to police that led to the eventual conviction of William Williams for the murder.</li>
<li>However, the <em>reason</em> Mary gave the statement was because William severely beat her and &quot;being apprehensive of death, she made a disclosure.&quot; The common assumption is that William suspected that Mary knew something of the murder, because she had been deposed for an unsuccessful first prosecution against some other suspects.</li>
</ul>
<p>The defendant in the contract suit did not want to pay the £20. He argued that Mary did not make the disclosure because of the reward. The trial judge put it to the jury whether Mary was induced by the handbill. They found that &quot;she did not give that information for the sake of the £20 reward, nor in consequence of the handbill, but from stings of conscience.&quot; The judge still ordered the £20 to be paid.</p>


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<p>On application for a new trial ((1833) 4 B &amp; Ad 621, 110 ER 590 (KB)) the judges noted the finding from the lower court that the plaintiff &quot;was not induced by the offer of the reward, but by other motives.&quot; Denman C.J. asked &quot;Was any doubt suggested as to whether the plaintiff knew of the handbill at the time of her making the disclosure?&quot; The answer: &quot;She must have known of it, as it was placarded all over Hereford, the place at which she lived&quot;: (1833) 5 C &amp; P.</p>
<p>The judges agreed with the trial judge ((1833) 4 B &amp; Ad 621, 110 ER 590 (KB)):</p>
<ul>
<li>Denman C.J.: &quot;The plaintiff, by having given information which led to the conviction of the murderer ... has brought herself within the terms of the advertisement, and therefore is entitled to recover.&quot;</li>


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<li>Littledale  J.: &quot;The advertisement amounts to a general promise, to give a sum of money to any person who shall give information which might lead to the discovery of the offender. The plaintiff gave that information.&quot;</li>
<li>Parke J.: &quot;There was a contract with any person who performed the condition mentioned in the advertisement.&quot;</li>
<li>Patteson J.: &quot;I am of the same opinion. We cannot go into the plaintiff's motives.&quot;</li>
</ul>
<p>Acceptance <em>does not require subjective knowledge of the offer</em>. <a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/questions/90788/does-contract-formation-require-subjective-meeting-of-the-minds">&quot;Meeting of the minds&quot; is an <em>objective standard</em></a>.</p>


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Question Title: If for some reason the Canadian Parliament had the idea to impeach and convict someone, what would be the legal implications of that?


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Question Body: <p>I am 100% aware of what a no confidence motion is. This is emphatically not what I am referring to.</p>
<p>Impeachment is an unambiguous right of the Parliament of the United Kingdom to have, having been used for centuries even though nobody has been convicted in the last 200, starting in the Good Parliament of 1376 with the impeachment of Baron Latimer. The Commons can impeach and the Lords can convict anyone except the King of anything which is illegal under the laws. The King can pardon fines and imprisonment but cannot pardon the bar from office if the Lords applies such a thing as per the 1701 Act of Settlement.</p>
<p>Nobody has ever been impeached before in Canada.</p>


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<p>Nobody has ever been impeached before in Canada.</p>
<p>Canada clearly has words in the Constitution to make its own similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and impeachment was attempted only 19 years before confederation in 1848. The accused survived a Commons vote, but nobody doubted the legal authority of the Commons was still valid.</p>
<p>Assume that the speaker either goes along with it, or else is sacked by the Commons and a pro impeachment speaker put in their place, or the Commons resolves to amend the rules letting them bypass a speaker who is an opponent of impeachment.</p>
<p>Then what?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>Section 18 of the Constitution Act  1867 states:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The privileges, immunities, and powers to be held, enjoyed, and
exercised by the Senate and by the House of Commons, and by the
members thereof respectively, shall be such as are from time to time
defined by Act of the Parliament of Canada, but so that any Act of the
Parliament of Canada defining such privileges, immunities, and powers
shall not confer any privileges, immunities, or powers exceeding those
at the passing of such Act held, enjoyed, and exercised by the Commons
House of Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Ireland, and by the members thereof.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Note that the Parliament of Canada is responsible for defining the privileges of its houses, and there is no default fallback. The <a href="https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/p-1/page-1.html#h-389926" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Parliament of Canada Act 1985</a> define the privileges in section 4 as</p>


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<blockquote>
<p>The Senate and the House of Commons, respectively, and the members thereof hold, enjoy and exercise:<br />
(a) such and the like privileges, immunities and powers as, at the time of the passing of the Constitution Act, 1867, were held, enjoyed and exercised by the Commons House of Parliament of the United Kingdom and by the members thereof, in so far as is consistent with that Act; and<br />
(b) such privileges, immunities and powers as are defined by Act of the Parliament of Canada, not exceeding those, at the time of the passing of the Act, held, enjoyed and exercised by the Commons House of Parliament of the United Kingdom and by the members thereof.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>So in theory, the Canadian House of Commons could impeach someone right now, as an inherited power from the UK HoC, but if this was tried the Commons could fall foul of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and the Senate would be under pressure not to try the individual impreached.</p>


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Answer 2: <h2>The Canadian Parliament cannot “impeach” someone</h2>
<p><strong>They can, however, punish them for <a href="https://www.ourcommons.ca/procedure-book-livre/en/document?sbdid=abbc077a-6dd8-4fbe-a29a-3f73554e63aa&amp;sbpid=9686d5b2-9075-4451-8082-1446f8be3c5e" rel="nofollow noreferrer">breach of privilege or contempt</a></strong></p>
<blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p>Any disregard of or attack on the rights, powers and immunities of the House and its Members, either by an outside person or body, or by a Member of the House, is referred to as a “breach of privilege” and is punishable by the House.[116] There are, however, other affronts against the dignity and authority of Parliament which may not fall within one of the specifically defined privileges. Thus, the House also claims the right to punish, as a contempt, any action which, though not a breach of a specific privilege, tends to obstruct or impede the House in the performance of its functions; obstructs or impedes any Member or officer of the House in the discharge of their duties; or is an offence against the authority or dignity of the House, such as disobedience of its legitimate commands or libels upon itself, its Members, or its officers.</p>
</blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p>The last time this occurred was against a RCMP officer in 2008. The punishment imposed was simply the fact that they had been found in contempt.</p>


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Question Body: <p>My high school life was subpar at the very least. I was constantly bullied and never received the necessary protection from school staff. This coupled with dwindling grades created a negative feedback loop. My health was degrading both mentally and physically so I consulted the school counselor. She was unwilling to provide any help let alone documents needed for a transfer. My custodial parent wasn't any more supportive either, so I gave up on the idea and kept going to school, barely meeting the requirements for graduation.</p>
<p>It's been almost two decades since I graduated and left NYC, but bad memories still haunt me to this day. From time to time I wonder whether I might have been able to switch schools without the school's nor my custodial parent's consent, had I known better.</p>
<p>Can students struggling like me submit transfer applications on their own to move to another school unsponsored? Does the availability of such choices vary by state?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>The primary question is whether the target school can/must accept you. A private school is not compelled to accept you, a public school might be. Because of the law compelling you (as a minor) to go to school, some public school will have to accept you as a student. However, as a minor, your preference is low on the list of legal priorities. The primary controlling factor is the school district where you live, and their policy. They may demand that you attend the school &quot;in the area where you live&quot;, or it can be an urging of various strengths. It is conceivable that you can attend school in an entirely different district (we have some cross-district migration possibilities, but that is rare).</p>


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<p>If district policy allows for a student to go to a school outside their home zone, then the question of discretion comes up: it is highly unlikely that a district would allow a problem student to &quot;impose&quot; himself on a foreign school, so the school intended to receive the student probably has some say in the matter. Parental consent will be essential, so if the parent(s) oppose moving the student, the district is unlikely to allow the transfer. The student might also be consulted. In other words, no, student desire alone will not enable the student to transfer schools. The school that you are assigned to by default has even less direct say in the matter, but indirectly it could influence the recipient school's willingness to allow the transfer.</p>


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<p>For NYC, <a href="https://www.schools.nyc.gov/enrollment/enrollment-help/transfers" rel="nofollow noreferrer">here</a> is a preliminary page regarding transfers. Safety and accessibility concerns are easy, also moving within the city etc. but academic and social concerns are &quot;a possibility&quot;, one to be determined on a case by case basis.</p>


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Question Body: <p>On the 10th of July the EU Commission adopted a new adequacy decision, as a successor to the failed Safe Harbour and Privacy Shield agreements, to allow data transfers from the EU to the USA. The two areas this covers are legal redress if data is wrongly handled, and the question if the surveillance laws that allow the US government to collect data are &quot;necessary and proportionate&quot;.</p>


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<p>As a citizen of a EU member state I am happy that these questions are addressed. What I do wonder is if we (as in &quot;we, the EU&quot;) ask more from others than we are prepared to deliver ourselves, because of course every EU member state has their own surveillance laws and agencies, and constitutional protections only apply to their own nationals, and the GDPR applies only to EU residents. It does not seem like we offer any protection e.g. to the data of US nationals that is processed in the EU (I might be wrong here, but such laws are certainly not broadly discussed if they exist).</p>


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<p>I am also not sure if national laws are always particularly proportional - e.g. in my native Germany, the Bundesnachrichtendienst has a right by law to listen in to telecommunication world wide; while it says that complete surveillance is unlawful, the constraint is that they have to restrict themselves to not tap into more than 30% of global telecommunication networks at the same time. If your constraint exceeds your actual capabilities, then for practical purposes you do not have a constraint at all.</p>
<p>So, would surveillance in the EU pass muster under the GDPR, or does the EU ask for protections for its citizens that it is not willing to grant to foreigners?</p>
<p>I am not asking for a line-by-line discussion of specific laws, that would be impractical, but I am curious if if this has been discussed as a part of the process that resulted in the GDPR or the adequacy decisions, and if so, if the discussion had any influence on the proceedings.</p>


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Answer 1: <h2>These are only tangentially related to the GDPR</h2>
<p>A government entity processing data in accordance with a member state law is <em>ipso facto</em> in compliance with the GDPR.</p>
<p>That’s because lawful government data processing is a legitimate reason for processing data under the GDPR. If Germany, for example, passes a law saying German police can record every phone call in Germany, then that would be a lawful basis for processing under the GDPR. There may be  constitutional  or other legal limitations on such a law but as far as the GDPR is concerned, they’re fine.</p>


Tags: gdpr, surveillance


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Question Title: Citizenship of a US State (or German Land, or Canadian province, or US/Canadian territory)

Question Body: <p>Does any of the US states or aforementioned entities maintain a legal status comparable to that of citizenship/nationality, specific to people who are for example born in that state or have acquired that citizenship by rules fixed by the state?</p>
<p>Something like that would include, for example, specific protection abroad (= out of the state, incl in another US state) by the state's government, additional rights within the state as opposed to those only having the federal citizenship, or the state for example trying to impede or decide how is conducted a federal suit within its boundaries on people having their citizenship...</p>
<p>I think this is somewhat the case for Indian reservations, which are more independant with the federal government than the states are.</p>


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Answer 1: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/germany" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-germany-tooltip-container">germany</a></p>
<p>German Länder do not provide any citizenship-like benefits.</p>
<p>You are a resident and that determines your administrative duties like where you register your car, which public school you can go to, where and which taxes you have to pay etc.</p>
<p>Some places in Germany differentiate their services between &quot;locals&quot; and &quot;others&quot;, for example beach access in tourist cities is sometimes locked behind a fee to non-locals (aka tourists). But that never depends on federal state, but on way smaller units. Residents of one beach town might be &quot;tourists&quot; 20km down the road at the next city's beach. It is more of a &quot;the people whose taxes allow us to maintain this, go for free&quot; approach.</p>


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<p>Outside of badly translated internet forms originally made for the US, I have never been asked for my Bundesland. The Bundesland is not printed on our national ID cards. Although anybody with a little knowledge of geography (or access to Google) can find out your Bundesland by just looking up the actual address that is printed on the ID card, the information of which Bundesland this is is really not important outside of government bureaucracy.</p>


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Answer 2: <p>US states establish <em>residency</em>, used for access to services (like public libraries), things like in-state public university tuition, and paying taxes.  Generally this is less of a service to the residents than a revenue source by the state (new car registration, for example).</p>
<p>Residency is established solely by where you physically live (there are weird exceptions for people living RV-life type existences, but many will find this fringe existence difficult).  There is no application for change of residency, no restrictions exist on what state you can live in.  If you move there, you will be a resident there.</p>
<p>US states don't do anything for a resident who is in another state.  They have no effect whatsoever on federal courts inside their borders except for passing state laws that federal courts may use.</p>


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<p>Quasi-citizenship does exist for states.  The 14th Amendment states that &quot;All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside.&quot;  It specifies US citizenship and thus invalidated previous theories that US citizenship required some type of state citizenship.  I can find exactly zero methods to acquire citizenship in a state, certainly not in the last two I've lived in, other than residing in one.</p>


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Answer 3: <p>Under the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, a U.S. citizen is also a citizen of the state in which the citizen resides, a term usually interpreted to match the common law concept of domicile.</p>
<p>There are two privileges and immunities clauses in the U.S. Constitution. One protects the privileges and immunities that U.S. citizens hold in every state which generally speaking has been narrowly interpreted to protect only rights that flow from the federal government. The other entitles a citizen of one U.S. state to the privileges and immunities of citizens of another state where the person may be present, facially seeming to prohibit discrimination based upon state citizenship.</p>


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<p>A state may insist that you are a citizen of a U.S. state to vote in that state's elections. It may also prefer state citizens in matters of hunting and fishing licenses and tuition at public educational institutions. But, a state may not limit occupational licenses in the state to state citizens.</p>


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Answer 4: <p>Switzerland is another example of different countries doing things differently. You become a citizen of Switzerland by becoming a citizen of a municipality. Different cantons have different laws regulating the granting of citizenship by municipalities.</p>


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Answer 5: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/germany" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-germany-tooltip-container">germany</a>
<a href="/questions/tagged/historical" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;historical&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;historical&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-historical-tooltip-container">historical</a></p>
<p>For 2023, the answer by @nvoigt is correct. However, prior to the german re-unification, West Berlin did have special status. While being a Bundesland (county) of West Germany, it was in parts governed by allied laws back from post-WW2 occupation times. The most famous effect being that residents of West Germany were exempt from compulsory military service. This made Berlin universities popular among parts of the young male population who saw studying in Berlin a way to get out of that.</p>


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<p>Also, the people of West Berlin did not have the same passport as other western Germans, but were issued a &quot;provisional passport&quot;. Here is a rare picture of one in item #5: <a href="https://www.t-online.de/region/berlin/news/id_90751288/berlin-vor-der-wende-10-dinge-die-nur-west-berliner-miterlebt-haben.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://www.t-online.de/region/berlin/news/id_90751288/berlin-vor-der-wende-10-dinge-die-nur-west-berliner-miterlebt-haben.html</a></p>


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Answer 6: <h2>Citizenship is a national concept</h2>
<p><a href="/questions/tagged/australia" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-australia-tooltip-container">australia</a></p>
<p>Australian states, territories, and local governments can and do have the concept of residency which may or may not be tied with citizenship.</p>
<p>For example, if you are a citizen, your place of residence as recorded on the Australian Electoral Roll determines which state/territory and local government elections you vote in.</p>
<p>Where you employ people determines in which state/territory you are liable for payroll tax and worker’s compensation insurance. Where you live determines which state/territory you must get your driver’s license etc.</p>


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Answer 7: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/canada" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-canada-tooltip-container">canada</a></p>
<p>&quot;Naturalization and Aliens&quot; fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government in Canada, as outlined in section 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867 (originally enacted as the British North America Act 1867 by the Parliament of the United Kingdom). Although Canadian citizenship as a separate legal status was not established until 1947, the Parliament of Canada previously regulated the process of naturalizing aliens into British subjects in Canada, subject to the limits imposed by the British Empire.</p>


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<p>However, the law does not prevent provinces from granting certain benefits to certain classes of citizens or residents in general. Notably, it is a constitutional right to move to and take up residece in any province and to pursue the gaining of a livelihood in any province, but other areas are not regulated.</p>


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<p>For example, everyone who was born in Quebec, or who was selected by Quebec as immigrants, may benefit from resident tuition rates, even if they move away from Quebec immediately after their birth or landing. Resident tuition rates also exist in some other provinces (Ontario and Newfoundland and Labrador), although the place of birth has no effect on the qualification there. Quebec is in many aspects a special case, as there is a strong sovereigntist movement and it runs its own immigration system (all provinces have the shared power over immigration, but Quebec is the only one exercising that power). So there was a reason to make some nationality-like thing. Nonetheless, the resident tuitition rates qualification is a really limited application and the status could not really be called as nationality or citizenship.</p>


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Answer 8: <p>Indigenous nations have their own citizenship/membership requirements (the terminology and conception can vary from people to people).</p>
<p>For an example within <a href="/questions/tagged/canada" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-canada-tooltip-container">canada</a>, see the <a href="https://www.nisgaanation.ca/sites/default/files/legislation/Constitution%20of%20the%20Nisga%27a%20Nation%20-%201998-10-01.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">The Constitution of the Nisga’a Nation</a>, s. 8:</p>
<blockquote>
<ol start="8">
<li><strong>Citizenship</strong></li>
</ol>
<p>(1) Every Nisga’a participant who is a Canadian citizen or permanent resident of Canada
is entitled to be a Nisga’a citizen</p>
<p>(2) A person who is not a Nisga’a participant and who is a Canadian citizen or
permanent resident of Canada may become a Nisga’a citizen if permitted by, and in


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<p>(2) A person who is not a Nisga’a participant and who is a Canadian citizen or
permanent resident of Canada may become a Nisga’a citizen if permitted by, and in
accordance with, Nisga’a law.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The consequences of Nisga'a citizenship are outlined in the constitution.</p>
<p>The membership in <a href="https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/i-5/FullText.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>Indian Act</em></a> &quot;bands&quot; is recorded on a &quot;Band List&quot; that may be controlled by the band:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>A band may assume control of its own membership if it establishes membership rules for itself in writing in accordance with this section and if, after the band has given appropriate notice of its intention to assume control of its own membership, a majority of the electors of the band gives its consent to the band’s control of its own membership.</p>
</blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p>The consequences of band membership are presented in this Q&amp;A: <a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/questions/94457/what-are-the-consequences-of-band-membership-under-canadas-indian-act/94458#94458">What are the consequences of &quot;band&quot; membership under Canada's Indian Act?</a></p>


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Answer 9: <blockquote>
<p>additional rights within the state as opposed to those only having the federal citizenship</p>
</blockquote>
<h2><strong>Hunting.</strong></h2>
<p>There are many such rules around hunting. In Ontario, <a href="/questions/tagged/canada" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-canada-tooltip-container">canada</a>, for example, <a href="https://www.ontario.ca/page/hunting-licence-non-residents-ontario#section-5" rel="nofollow noreferrer">All non-residents wishing to hunt black bear must contract the services of an operator licensed to provide bear hunting services.</a> Only Ontario residents are allowed to go hunting black bear on their own in Ontario. There is a similar rule for moose, with the exception that an Ontario resident who holds a valid moose tag can bring along a non-resident on the hunt if they are an immediate relative.</p>


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Question Title: Does the right to a speedy trial extend to the prosecution?

Question Body: <p>The Sixth Amendment to the US Constitution guarantees the defendant the right to a speedy trial.  In comments related to Donald Trump's latest arraignment, his lawyer suggested that Donald Trump doesn't want a speedy trial.</p>
<p>Has a ruling ever held that the right to a speedy trial extends to the prosecution, or that the defendant cannot waive this right?  The unlimited ability to delay the trial by the defendant would open the door to all sorts of abuses.</p>


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Answer 1: <p>The Sixth Amendment is very specific: &quot;[T]he accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy[...] trial.&quot; There is no such constitutional right given to the prosecution, and such a right would not serve the public interest. Defendants very often waive their right to a speedy trial in order to have more time to prepare a defense.</p>
<p>Conversely, however, the defendant does not have the right to draw out the proceedings indefinitely. When the right to a speedy trial is waived, it falls to the court (that is, the judge) to schedule the proceedings at its discretion. It may choose to take into account the wishes of the prosecution or the defense or both, but is not required to do so.</p>


Tags: united-states, sixth-amendment


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Question Title: Does the First Amendment shield the previous president from the August 2023 D.C. Indictments?

Question Body: <p>The former president is <a href="https://www.justice.gov/storage/US_v_Trump_23_cr_257.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">charged</a> with:</p>
<p>Count 1: 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Conspiracy to Defraud the United States)</p>
<p>Count 2: 18 U.S.C. § 1512(k) (Conspiracy to Obstruct an Official Proceeding)</p>
<p>Count 3: 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(c)(2), 2 (Obstruction of and Attempt to Obstruct an Official Proceeding)</p>
<p>Count 4: 18 U.S.C. § 241 (Conspiracy Against Rights)</p>
<p>As I understand it, the charges are based on what was said by Donald Trump.  Is there a standard / caselaw that provides a speech litmus test to determine whether any of said counts are violated?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>The constitutionality of each of the charges is well supported and there is no really viable First Amendment defense to any of them.</p>
<p>There is literally a <a href="https://www.justice.gov/criminal/file/1029066/download" rel="noreferrer">U.S. Justice Department handbook on how to prosecute attempts to undermine the integrity of elections</a> accumulating the wisdom its has gleaned from doing precisely what it is doing in this indictment, successfully, for generations.</p>
<p><strong>18 U.S.C. § 371 (Conspiracy to Defraud the United States)</strong></p>
<p>This statute states that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against
the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency
thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such
persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.</p>


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persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.</p>
<p>If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the
conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy
shall not exceed the maximum punishment provided for such misdemeanor.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Fraudulent statements which are protected by the First Amendment are the exception more than they are the rule. When fraudulent statements of presenting existing facts, or fraudulent concealment of presently existing facts, seek to impair someone's legal rights, it is generally constitutional to punish that conduct criminally.</p>
<p>At noted <a href="https://thefire.org/research-learn/unprotected-speech-synopsis" rel="noreferrer">here</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><strong>Fraud and Perjury</strong></p>
<p>While, again, the First Amendment makes no categorical exception for


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<blockquote>
<p><strong>Fraud and Perjury</strong></p>
<p>While, again, the First Amendment makes no categorical exception for
false or misleading speech, certain types of fraudulent statements
fall outside its protection. The government generally can impose
liability for false advertising or on speakers who knowingly make
factual misrepresentations to obtain money or some other material
benefit (such as employment). Prohibitions on perjury — knowingly
giving false testimony under oath — also are constitutional.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This statute requires proof of intentional fraud, and not just a good faith difference of opinion sincerely held by the defendant.</p>
<p>Probably the most on point precedent upholding the constitutionality of this statute in an analogous context is <em>United States v. Rafoi</em>, 60 F.4th 982 (5th Cir. 2023).</p>


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<p>This case held that the statute was constitutional where the charged conduct caused harm inside United States or to United States citizens or interests, that provided sufficient nexus, as required by due process, between United States and defendant's conduct in allegedly meeting with co-conspirators in Miami, Florida, where a noncitizen defendant, a citizen of Portugal and Switzerland who was employee of Swiss wealth-management firm, conspired to violate Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) as agent of a person while in United States, relating to alleged international bribery scheme between businesses based in United States and Venezuelan officials and the defendant has the intent or knowledge that the monies involved were proceeds of specified unlawful activity would be unlawfully transmitted from or through a place in United States to a place outside United States.</p>


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<p>The relevant holding in this case is that prosecuting violations of U.S. laws that exist for the purposes of insisting upon orderly and non-corrupt conduct of actions related to U.S. officials or U.S. persons through fraud under this statute, is constitutional. When it affects the conduct of U.S. government business, or of a U.S. business or person, the statute is actionable and constitutional.</p>
<p>Also pertinent is a <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/08/03/opinions/indictment-trump-history-legal-charges-avlon/index.html" rel="noreferrer">much older U.S. Supreme Court decision</a>, <em>Hammerschmidt v. United States</em>, 265 U.S. 182 (1924):</p>
<blockquote>
<p>[F]ormer President and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court William
Howard Taft explained in a landmark 1924 opinion, the full meaning of
the statute almost anticipates our current surreal scenario:  “It also
means to interfere with or obstruct one of its [the country’s] lawful


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the statute almost anticipates our current surreal scenario:  “It also
means to interfere with or obstruct one of its [the country’s] lawful
governmental functions by deceit, craft or trickery, or at least by
means that are dishonest.&quot;</p>
</blockquote>


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<p>In contrast, fraud in the course of a political campaign to persuade voters is protected by the First Amendment. <em>See United States v. Alvarez</em>, 567 U.S. 709 (2012) (holding that a law criminalizing false factual statements about military honors received in a political campaign called the &quot;Stolen Valor Act&quot; in the version then in force was unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds). But that isn't what this charged is seeking to prosecute. A <a href="https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol68/iss6/1/" rel="noreferrer">law review article from 2015</a> attempts to clarify the scope of <em>Alvarez</em>, distinguishing between completely unprotected lies, lies that are protected so as not to chill the expression of truthful statements, and &quot;lies that must be protected for their own sake&quot;. The citation to the article is Alan K. Chen and Justin Marceau, &quot;High Value Lies, Ugly Truths, and the First Amendment,&quot; 68 Vanderbilt Law Review 1435


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be protected for their own sake&quot;. The citation to the article is Alan K. Chen and Justin Marceau, &quot;High Value Lies, Ugly Truths, and the First Amendment,&quot; 68 Vanderbilt Law Review 1435 (2015).</p>


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<p>It is notable that in <em>Alvarez</em> every conservative justice on the Court at the time other than Chief Justice Roberts, voted to affirm the constitutionality of the &quot;Stolen Valor Act&quot;, over a mostly liberal majority that held that it was an unconstitutional violation of free speech rights. Now that there is a six justice conservative majority in the U.S. Supreme Court, if the positions of conservative justices on the issue was consistent, the U.S. Supreme Court would be even more likely to uphold the constitutionality of a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 371 than the U.S. Supreme Court would have been inclined to in 2012.</p>


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<p>It is unclear, however, how much this conservative ruling was dependent upon the fact that the statute prohibited lying about military honors rather than about other matters. Conservatives tend to hold honor, and in particular, military honors, in greater esteem than liberals. Also, conservative justice may have been more clear than the liberal justices in that case about just how open and shut these cases were, since the truth or falsity of the statement can be determined definitively, from a single official document, the veteran's Form <a href="https://www.archives.gov/personnel-records-center/dd-214" rel="noreferrer">DD214</a>, which there is a strong presumption that almost any veteran capable of running for political office would understand perfectly well.</p>


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<p>Another issue which influenced swing votes in the <em>Alvarez</em> case is that the statute that the U.S. Supreme Court considered at the time criminalized fraud regarding military honors even when it was arguably immaterial (e.g. in dinner table conservations with friends or family, as opposed to only in the context of an election campaign, or only in a request for economic benefits or legal privileges). This concern is not present in this particular prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 371, since Donald Trump would receive the legal benefit of being re-elected as President of the United States if his alleged election results related fraud conspiracy was successful.</p>


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<p>One critical distinction, previously noted by the Washington State Supreme Court its 2007 decision in the case of <em><a href="https://www.aclu-wa.org/docs/washington-state-supreme-court-opinion-en-banc-pdc-v-rickert" rel="noreferrer">Rickert v Washington</a></em>, is whether, in the context of the speech giving rise to the legal consequences, &quot;the government is capable of correctly and consistently negotiating the thin line between fact and opinion in political speech.&quot; This will generally be true in the case of factual statements related to election results and administration, but will generally not be true in wide ranging statements about policy issues in the course of a political campaign.</p>
<p>An <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12180" rel="noreferrer">August 1, 2022 report of the Congressional Research Service</a>, the non-partisan research arm of Congress, generally confirms the analysis above.</p>


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<p>This is the only D.C. grand jury indictment for which there is even a colorable free speech argument, but given the case law, it is a weak argument.</p>
<p><strong>18 U.S.C. §§ 1512 (Obstruction of and Attempt to Obstruct an Official Proceeding and Conspiracy To Do The Same)</strong></p>
<p>Obstruction of an official proceeding in action action with an intended effect and doesn't prevent people from expressing opinions in a way that does not obstruct official government functions, so again this isn't unconstitutional. The charge in this case charges the crime that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Whoever corruptly-- obstructs, influences, or impedes any official
proceeding, or attempts to do so</p>
</blockquote>
<p>is guilty of a felony punishable by up to twenty years in prison.</p>


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<p>Whoever corruptly-- obstructs, influences, or impedes any official
proceeding, or attempts to do so</p>
</blockquote>
<p>is guilty of a felony punishable by up to twenty years in prison.</p>
<p>There is already case law testing the constitutionality of this portion of this statute in the context of the same course of conduct related to the January 6, 2021 riot by a lower level minor from the D.C. Circuit whose rulings are binding precedents in this indictment. <em>United States v. Fischer</em>, 64 F.4th 329 (D.C. Cir. 2023).</p>
<p>The foundation for this ruling is <a href="https://nprotected-speech-synopsis" rel="noreferrer">longstanding</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><strong>Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct</strong></p>
<p>In <em>Giboney v. Empire Storage &amp; Ice Co.</em> (1949), the Supreme Court
held the First Amendment affords no protection to “speech or writing
used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal


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held the First Amendment affords no protection to “speech or writing
used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal
statute.” A robber’s demand at gunpoint that you hand over your money
is not protected speech. Nor is extortion, criminal conspiracy, or
solicitation to commit a specific crime. Abstract advocacy of
lawbreaking remains protected speech.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>There is no constitutional basis to distinguish a direct charge of obstruction with official business from a conspiracy charge to do the same.</p>
<p>In the case of the conspiracy to obstruct charge, the co-conspirators take actions that collectively seek to deprive people of their constitutional rights or obstruct an official proceeding, the statements made in furtherance of the group effort to achieve those ends are not legally protected speech. It is the action (either a verbal act or another kind of act) and not the expressive content of the speech that is implicated.</p>


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<p><strong>18 U.S.C. § 241 (Conspiracy Against Rights)</strong></p>
<p>A conspiracy to cause false election results to be certified to Congress to change the results of a Presidential election by two or more persons impairs the constitutional right to vote, and rights under Congressional adopted federal election laws.</p>
<p>Notably, a conspiracy to violate rights, which is a felony punishable by up to death if the conspiracy causes someone's death (as can be plausibly alleged in this case due to a death arising from the January 6, 2021 riot) provides that the felony has been committed:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or
intimidate any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth,
Possession, or District in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right
or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United
States, or because of his having so exercised the same.</p>
</blockquote>


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or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United
States, or because of his having so exercised the same.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The U.S. Supreme Court has previously held that prosecuting conspirators for tampering with the process of determining the correct result of the election is constitutional. <em>U.S. v. Saylor</em>, 322 U.S. 385 (1944).</p>
<p>This also comes within the &quot;Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct&quot; exception to the protections of the First Amendment that is discussed above.</p>
<p>FOOTNOTE: If the Justice Department sought the death penalty on this criminal charge the jury would have to be &quot;death qualified&quot; in the court of jury selection which tends to make the jury more conservative. But, there is no indication that the Justice Department intends to seek this relief in this particular prosecution of Donald Trump.</p>


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<p>As a practical matter, given Donald Trump's age, health, and the length of time necessary to fully appeal a death penalty conviction (which exceeds ten years in most cases), any criminal conviction with a sentences of ten or fifteen years or more would as a practical matter result in him dying in prison, and it is unlikely that appeals of a death sentence would be completed before he died of natural causes.</p>


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Question Title: Restriction of freedom of expression in the case of sympathy for terrorist organisations

Question Body: <p>There is a number of organisations which are listed by the US government as terrorist organisations - <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_designated_terrorist_groups" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Wikipedia</a></p>
<p>What are the legal implications of this in relation to the 1st Amendment? If, for example, there is somebody who is non-violently expressing sympathy for the goals of an organisation declared as terrorist by the US government, is that illegal in the US?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>The U.S. Department of State maintains the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) and along with other government departments are charged with the process of making said designations.   Under U.S. Law, it is illegal to provide material support to any FTO with Material support being defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b) as:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical assets except medicine or religious materials.</p>
</blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p>Note that the list exempts religious materials, such as holy books or documents speaking of ideology that may motivate the group.  This would serve to make clear that the law is not against expression of sympathy for the ideology, but is targeting the means by which the FTO can use violence in support of their belief.</p>
<p>It should also be noted that the law bars entry to the United States by aliens who are known members or representatives of an FTO, but this is a higher level of Material Support as it implies that such people are actively engaged in an FTO's activities.</p>
<p>Finally, the law states that financial institutions that operate in the U.S. that become aware of accounts belonging to FTOs should take control of the accounts and value within it and immediately report to the treasury.</p>


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<p>An FTO is by definition any organization that participates in activities that meet the legal definition of terrorism, which is neutral towards the beliefs motivating such activities and instead focuses on illegal actions.</p>


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Question Title: What is the judicial rationale for introducing the grainger test to qualify beliefs?

Question Body: <p><a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/section/10?timeline=false" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Section 10 Equality Act 2010</a> seems very clear that “belief means <em>any</em> religious or philosophical belief”. (Emphasis added)</p>
<p>Yet, the employment tribunal in <em>Grainger</em> set down a five limb test which functions to exclude certain philosophical beliefs from protection of the act.</p>
<p>But how can that be read to exclude “any” beliefs from protection, however frivolous, or however unsavourily transphobic or fascist they may be? More to the point, how did the tribunal account in this for the word “any”?</p>
<p>(Note: I am referring mainly to the judicially set down “grainger test”.)</p>


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Answer 1: <p>As revised, I think this question is really asking <em>why</em> the judge in <a href="https://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/2009/0219_09_0311.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>Grainger plc v Nicholson</em> [2009] UKEAT 0219_09_0311</a> laid down the test that he did, when the statutory provision at hand used more general words.</p>


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<p>In summary, the reason why the <em>Grainger</em> test does not protect every belief is that the European Convention on Human Rights doesn't either. The judge's conclusions on the ECHR's notion of &quot;belief&quot; are mainly taken from the analysis in a House of Lords case (<em>Williamson</em>, cited below), which is binding precedent on the tribunal on that point. The new thing was drawing the line between &quot;belief&quot; in ECHR jurisprudence, and &quot;belief&quot; in the employment equality regulations, which was justified for two reasons: one, that Parliament demonstrably was trying to make the alignment; and two, that it would be incoherent with the Convention obligations to do otherwise.</p>


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<p>Note that the definitions in the Equality Act 2010 are carried forward from the 2003 regulations which were at issue in <em>Grainger</em>, the <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2003/1660/contents/made" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003</a>, so we have to look at this text instead. In 2(1) it said, following amendments in 2006 not shown in the online text:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>In these Regulations –
<br>i. &quot;religion&quot; means any religion,
<br>ii. &quot;belief&quot; means any religious or philosophical belief,
<br>iii. a reference to religion includes a reference to lack of religion, and
<br>iv. a reference to belief includes a reference to lack of belief.</p>
</blockquote>


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<br>iii. a reference to religion includes a reference to lack of religion, and
<br>iv. a reference to belief includes a reference to lack of belief.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This regulation was introduced in order to bring <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32000L0078" rel="nofollow noreferrer">EU Directive 2000/78/EC</a> into UK law. Although the text in the 2010 Act is not identical, it does carry forward the same effect of the Directive, and so the decision still makes sense to apply. Also, Brexit has happened, but that does not displace the reasoning.</p>
<p>In interpreting the provision:</p>
<ol>
<li>Because it derives from EU law, which is meant to mean the same thing in other member states, the domestic regulation should be read consistently with the directive. The court can look to EU authorities to find out what the directive ought to mean, although there was not much to look at in this instance.</li>


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<li>The respondent said that &quot;belief&quot; should be read consistently with the language in the European Convention on Human Rights, concerning religion, belief and discrimination - principally Articles 9(1) and 14. The court was still bound to read the domestic legislation in a way that is at least <em>compatible</em> with the Convention rights, even if the scope of &quot;belief&quot; is not absolutely identical (see paragraph 19 of the judgement), but the most obvious way to make the ideas compatible is if they are the same.</li>
<li>The parliamentary history of the amending statute shows indications that it was made in awareness of ECHR case law about &quot;belief&quot;. Courts can sometimes use this kind of information to resolve genuine textual ambiguities.</li>
</ol>


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</ol>
<p>The judge looked to domestic precedent, in particular a decision of the House of Lords (<a href="https://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2005/15.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>R (Williamson) v Secretary of State for Education and Employment</em> [2005] UKHL 15</a>) which looked at the same provisions of the ECHR in the context of a claimed philosophical belief in favour of corporal punishment in schools. This in turn drew on extensive case law, including even an English ecclesiastical case from 1866, as well as many more recent sources from around the world. The thrust of all of this is that not every single possible propositional belief is protected by the ECHR; when it talks about belief it does <em>not</em> mean &quot;a statement which somebody somewhere believes to be true&quot;, but rather refers to certain kinds of philosophical conviction.</p>


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<p>The application of this idea to employment discrimination is new in <em>Grainger</em>, hence &quot;the <em>Grainger</em> test&quot;, but wrangling over the scope of &quot;belief&quot; is not new. The test itself, set out in paragraph 24, is really a collation of quotations from the various relevant past judgements. I won't try to figure out the exact provenance of all of the words since that is actually already set out in the judgement. But for example,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(iii) It must be a belief as to a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>comes from paragraph 36 of <em>Campbell and Cosans v UK</em> [1982] 4 EHRR 293,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>... the applicants' views relate to a <strong>weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour</strong> ...</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Similarly,</p>
<blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p>... the applicants' views relate to a <strong>weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour</strong> ...</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Similarly,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(v) It must be worthy of respect in a democratic society, be not incompatible with human dignity and not conflict with the fundamental rights of others</p>
</blockquote>
<p>is there because of Article 17 of the ECHR, as interpreted in <em>Campbell</em> (citations omitted in this quotation),</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the expression &quot;philosophical convictions&quot; in the present context denotes, in the Court's opinion, such convictions as are <strong>worthy of respect in a &quot;democratic society&quot; and are not incompatible with human dignity</strong>; in addition, they must <strong>not conflict with the fundamental right</strong> of the child to education, the whole of Article 2 (P1-2) being dominated by its first sentence</p>
</blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p>This of course raises the question of why the ECHR's scope is what it is. That is somewhat more of a policy question than a legal one, in that the treaty reflects what its parties felt comfortable with agreeing. What matters in legal terms is that the Convention <em>is</em> binding on the UK, and the words that it uses must be interpreted according to what Convention authority (the Strasbourg court) says that they mean.</p>


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Answer 2: <h2>It does mean any religious or philosophical belief</h2>
<p>The Grainger test is a test to determine what qualifies as a religious or philosophical belief as opposed to any sophistry a plaintiff might espouse.</p>
<p>The basis for this is that, under the UK constitution, the judiciary is responsible for interpreting what Acts of Parliament mean. Specifically, in this instance, what “any religious or philosophical belief” means.</p>


Tags: united-kingdom, interpretation, judiciary, equality-act-2010


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Question Title: What are the consequences of &quot;band&quot; membership under Canada&#39;s Indian Act?

Question Body: <p>Canada's <a href="https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/i-5/FullText.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>Indian Act</em>, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5</a> recognizes &quot;bands,&quot; &quot;members of a band,&quot; and &quot;Band Lists.&quot;</p>
<p>A band may control its own membership according to membership rules it creates for itself, and with the consent of the majority of the electors of the band.</p>
<p>What are the consequences of membership in an <em>Indian Act</em> band?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>The consequences of membership in a band include the following:</p>
<ul>
<li>this is one path to entitlement to be registered as an Indian in the Indian Register (see s. 6(1)(b)) and all the consequences of that registration;</li>
<li>eligibility for certificates of possession on the reserve lands of the band (see ss. 20, 24, 81(1)(i)), and when residing on the reserve, being subject to the by-laws created by the band (s. 81(1));</li>
<li>entitlement to a share of distribution of band money (s. 64);</li>
<li>eligibility to distribution of up to $3000 of band money for infant children (s. 52.1); and</li>
<li>entitlement to vote or run for councillor or chief (ss. 74-77).</li>
</ul>


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<li>eligibility to distribution of up to $3000 of band money for infant children (s. 52.1); and</li>
<li>entitlement to vote or run for councillor or chief (ss. 74-77).</li>
</ul>
<p>Note though that the <em>Indian Act</em> band structure is only one of several modes of Indigenous governance in Canada. See e.g. the <a href="https://www.nisgaanation.ca/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Nisga'a Nation</a> and the <a href="https://yukon.ca/en/agreements-first-nations" rel="nofollow noreferrer">many First Nations with self-government agreements in Yukon</a>.</p>


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Question Title: FOIA website - 90% of requests are &quot;Under Agency Review&quot;? What am I missing?

Question Body: <p><a href="https://foiaonline.gov/foiaonline/action/public/search/advancedSearch" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://foiaonline.gov/foiaonline/action/public/search/advancedSearch</a></p>
<p>The vast majority of entries on &quot;Under Agency Review&quot; with no details, requester names or requester organizations. Even requests submitted back in 2020. What am I missing? <strong>Does the FOIA just never get round to 90% of requests or is there something else?</strong></p>
<hr />
<p>ETA: My question is different than the one answered here: <a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/questions/65173/foia-request-takes-too-long">FOIA request takes too long</a></p>


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Answer 1: <p>Government compliance with FOIA is notoriously bad.  I found the following article in the Duke Law Journal illuminating: <a href="https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3846&amp;context=dlj" rel="nofollow noreferrer">FOIA, INC.</a>.  There are some eye-opening statistics in there, like p.1375:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>At the end of FY 2014, the oldest pending requests across the federal
government dated back to 1993.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>More details on the response times from several large federal agencies begins on p.1423.  (The article goes into detail to show how, in those agencies, commercial requesters have overwhelmed even well-funded FOIA offices.)</p>
<p>It seems that the largest issue in compliance is a lack of resources.  Apparently, &quot;We don't have funding to comply with the law&quot; is an acceptable response for the executive branch.</p>


Tags: united-states, foia


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Question Body: <p>I am speaking in the sense of employment contract, but I believe the same scenario is applicable to all kinds of contracts.</p>
<p>The employer exercises their power to terminate Alice, and pay in lieu of notice as required by law (and also contract). Employer and Employee signed a document stating the above.</p>
<p>However a few days later, the employer changed his mind and decided that it is a summary dismissal, and he will not pay in lieu of notice (as it is not required by law and employment contract).</p>
<p>Let's assume for academic purpose we can not argue from the point of waiver by election/waiver by estoppel, and the legality of summary dismissal itself.</p>
<p>What I want to ask is</p>
<ol>
<li><p>Can the employer switch from termination to summary dismissal? (which I believe is yes, as most  judgement I see only argues employer cannot go back in his word because of waiver)</p>
</li>


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<li><p>Can the employer switch from termination to summary dismissal? (which I believe is yes, as most  judgement I see only argues employer cannot go back in his word because of waiver)</p>
</li>
<li><p>Is the termination document a binding contract, especially considering</p>
<p>a. Does it have a consideration, i.e. can the termination itself be a consideration?</p>
<p>b. Does it constitute an agreement, as employee cannot actually refuse it?</p>
</li>
<li><p>My ultimate goal is actually only to get the payment in lieu of notice, are there any other way to do that, other than argue on the legality of summary dismissal / waiver?</p>
</li>
</ol>
<p>In general, is there any way to protect termination of contract, if termination itself is not binding? I am sure I miss something as I cannot believe the world works like that.</p>


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Answer 1: <h2>The signed document is almost certainly a contract</h2>
<p>See <a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/questions/6263/what-is-a-contract-and-what-is-required-for-them-to-be-valid">What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid?</a></p>
<p>It contains all the required elements:</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Intention to create legal relations.</strong> There is no doubt that the parties intended that this agreement would end their previous employment contract.</li>
<li><strong>Agreement.</strong> Obviously.</li>
<li><strong>Consideration.</strong> By making this particular agreement both parties are giving up rights that they had under the employment contract and at law, that is sufficuient consideration.</li>
<li><strong>Legal Capacity.</strong> Assuming they had capacity to enter the original employment contract they probably have it now. Unless one of them was drunk. Or insane.</li>


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<li><strong>Legal Capacity.</strong> Assuming they had capacity to enter the original employment contract they probably have it now. Unless one of them was drunk. Or insane.</li>
<li><strong>Genuine Consent.</strong> There is no information given that suggests this wasn’t a genuine agreement.</li>
<li><strong>Legality of Objects.</strong> It’s not illegal to terminate employment.</li>
</ul>


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Question Title: What is jury nullification?

Question Body: <p>What is jury nullification and what are its origins and history? What actions by a juror would be considered nullification?</p>


Answer 1: <p>Quoting from <a href="http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/zenger/nullification.html">here</a>,</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>Jury nullification occurs when a jury returns a verdict of "Not Guilty" despite its belief that the defendant is guilty of the violation charged.  The jury in effect nullifies a law that it believes is either immoral or wrongly applied to the defendant whose fate they are charged with deciding.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>In essence, a jury decides that a law should not be legal in the situation, and as such the charge is unwarranted.</p>


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<p>In essence, a jury decides that a law should not be legal in the situation, and as such the charge is unwarranted.</p>

<p>One of the first cases was in the trial of John Peter Zenger, in 1735, where a law against libels was used against him, and subsequently nullified by a jury. It was subsequently used against the famous Alien and Sedition Acts, as well as The Fugitive Slave Laws.</p>

<p>Zenger was the first case in America; <a href="http://www.personal.psu.edu/jph13/JuryNullification.html">in 1670</a>, it was used in the case of William Penn and William Mead, who were acquitted of "illegal assembly" as Quakers. In an interesting twist, the jurors were imprisoned, as jury nullification was not explicitly legal, but they were later released.</p>

<p>Interestingly enough, according to <em><a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/21/opinion/jurors-can-say-no.html?_r=0">The New York Times</a></em></p>


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<p>Interestingly enough, according to <em><a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/21/opinion/jurors-can-say-no.html?_r=0">The New York Times</a></em></p>

<blockquote>
  <p>In 1895, the Supreme Court ruled that jurors had no right, during trials, to be told about nullification. The court did not say that jurors didn’t have the power, or that they couldn’t be told about it, but only that judges were not required to instruct them on it during a trial.</p>
</blockquote>

<p><em>The Times</em> also wrote that nullification had been used against laws against alcohol and gay marriage, though it did not cite specific cases.</p>


Answer 2: <p>A jury is charged with finding <em>fact</em>, and is supposed to take the law as given to them by a judge.</p>


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Answer 2: <p>A jury is charged with finding <em>fact</em>, and is supposed to take the law as given to them by a judge.</p>

<p>"Jury nullification" occurs when a jury bends the law to produce a desired result. This was made possible by English common law, which gave juries great latitude in determining what they would rule on. The underlying power may go all the way back to the Magna Carta of 1215.</p>

<p>One example occurred in "Dickensian" England where theft of an item value at one shilling (twelve pence) or greater carried the death penalty. In order to spare a young defendant this fate, the jury valued a diamond necklace at only 11 pence.</p>


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Answer 3: <p>It has been accepted under English Common Law for centuries, (jury trial began around 1215), that jurors have an absolute right to bring in any verdict, and are not answerable for their decision to any court of law. I believe this is also the case in other English-speaking jurisdictions such as the United States, which adopted trial-by-jury.</p>
<p>In the United Kingdom there has been a fairly recent case involving members of the campaign group Extinction Rebellion, where the jurors did acquit the defendants out of sympathy for their motives. There are other similar cases pending I understand.</p>
<p>This <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/apr/23/jury-acquits-extinction-rebellion-protesters-despite-no-defence-in-law" rel="nofollow noreferrer">report in The Guardian newspaper 23 April 2021</a> tells you all about it.</p>


Tags: legal-history, jury-nullification


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Question Title: Property and Intestacy when married

Question Body: <p>What happens to property without a will while it is in probate?</p>
<p>An <a href="https://www.irs.gov/retirement-plans/individual-retirement-arrangements-iras" rel="nofollow noreferrer">IRA</a> with a named beneficiary is exempt from probate.
A house in joint tenancy does not pass through probate.
However, say a car is titled in only one spouse's name.</p>
<p>What would actually happen with the registration, title, etc?</p>
<p>The car can not be used by the living spouse?</p>
<p>The auto itself goes into probate?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>Any property of a decedent which does not evade probate because of a transfer on death deed is subject to probate. It turns out that this probate avoidance in New York <em>can</em> include one automobile within a family, <a href="https://dmv.ny.gov/forms/mv843.pdf" rel="noreferrer">here</a> is the main form and a <a href="https://dmv.ny.gov/files/mv3491pdf" rel="noreferrer">companion form</a>. But let's say that the car is worth more than the limit (and you don't want to pay the estate the excess), then it might have to go through the longer process. That does not mean that the spouse cannot use the vehicle, as long as the spouse takes reasonable action to transfer the vehicle (waiting 5 years is not reasonable).</p>


Tags: new-york-state, wills, probate


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Question Title: Conditions of a signed lease

Question Body: <p>I've been renting a house for about 7 years now. For the first year we had a signed lease. After that, its never been renewed. I just pay rent every month. No problems.
My question ... do the condition of that signed lease apply now?
For example, the lease contained a late fee of $50 if the rent was more than 4 days late.
Would that still apply?</p>


Answer 1: <p>You are likely now a holdover tenant, as you have stated that you continue to pay your original monthly rental payments. Check original lease and investigate what happens at end of lease.</p>
<p>P.S. As your original question does not state a rent increase, may want to pay the $50.</p>


Tags: tenant, residential-lease, new-mexico


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Question Body: <p>Based on a true story:  Bob's car is parked in the street.  Ted is driving down the street recklessly with Alan as a passenger.  Ted sideswipes Bob's car doing quite a lot of damage, but takes off.</p>
<p>Next day, Alan shows up at Bob's doorstep saying, &quot;You wanna get the guy who sideswiped your car last night?  I was the passenger in that car and I was scared witless and I banged my head hard when he hit your car.&quot;   Bob says, &quot;Heck yes&quot; and Alan takes him to Ted's house where Ted's vehicle is parked.  Bob gets pictures of Ted's vehicle showing the damage and paint scrapings from Bob's car.  He's got this evidence plus Alan as a witness.</p>


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<p>Bob calls the Austin Police Department and after a couple minutes the cop says, &quot;You know, we're not going to do anything about this.&quot;  &quot;Why not?&quot; &quot;Because we're losing 40 cops per month, and we can't hire more.  We have only 3 cops for all of downtown Austin just not.  Our response time for an active shooter is 18 minutes.  We don't have the manpower for this.&quot;</p>
<p>Bob is lamenting about this to one of his friends.  The friend says, &quot;Why don't you engage The Hammer?&quot; (The Hammer is a personal injury lawyer who has billboards all over Austin and commercials that run every 2 minutes on daytime TV.)  He goes on:  &quot;Give the The Hammer all your evidence and let him treat it as a civil case.  He can get to the court system, sue the pants off of Ted and you don't have to go through the police.&quot;</p>


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<p>So my question is:  Is Bob's friend on to something?  If cops won't act in a criminal case, is possible and sensible to hire The Hammer to get restitution?</p>
<p>Additional information: Bob's car was a project car, and wasn't registered, licensed, or insured at the time.</p>


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Answer 1: <p>Bob can certainly &quot;engage&quot; a personal injury lawyer, but it is highly unlikely that they would take the case...</p>
<p>Let's take a look at the facts...</p>
<p>In Texas, you are required to register every vehicle unless it is damaged beyond repair or destroyed (it's intended to be scrapped). <strong>Bob did not do this</strong></p>
<p>In Texas, every registered vehicle must be insured, at a minimum, for liability insurance. <strong>Bob did not do this</strong></p>
<p>But, because of the insurance requirement you can get the information from TxDOT about the other vehicle's registration and insurance. It's more likely than not that the other vehicle is also uninsured, but if it is, Bob should contact Ted's insurance company.</p>


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<p>Because Bob did not register or insure the car that was parked on the street, Bob assumed liability that the insurance company would typically cover. If Bob had properly insured the vehicle, including uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage (which must be declined <em>in writing</em> in Texas), Bob would be whole (minus the deductible). Bob's total liability <em>should be</em> the deductible on the vehicle.</p>
<p>Another not-small contributing factor is that this is a self-proclaimed &quot;project vehicle&quot;, meaning it has low current value despite a possible high future value. Without insurance, the entire liability would amount to the actual <em>current</em> value of the vehicle, the amount it would take to buy another in exactly the same condition.</p>


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<p>Now back to the PI lawyer, they make money by suing insurance companies for personal injury (damage to your car is not a &quot;personal injury&quot;) because they have the ability to pay. Private individuals, especially those without insurance, typically do not have the ability to pay. The PI can typically recover all the attorneys fees + up to half the judgement. So even if the PI agreed to take the case, and they won some amount (let's say $50,000 which includes attorneys fees and judgement), Ted would probably not be able to pay for this. The PI goes back to the client for the fees and now Bob is in even worse condition, since a majority of the $50,000 judgement would be attorneys fees.</p>
<p>Really the best remedy Bob has in this case is to sue Ted in small claims for the value of the vehicle up to the maximum of the court (in Texas, this is a generous $20,000). Small claims courts have a lower burden of proof and Bob can use Alan as a witness.</p>


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Answer 3: <p>You don't ask about this, but there is a third option in some jurisdictions: to bring a private criminal prosecution against Ted.  In my home jurisdiction of England and Wales, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Private_prosecution#England_and_Wales" rel="nofollow noreferrer">private prosecutions are allowed</a>, though not common.  The Crown Prosecution Service may at its discretion take over a private prosecution at any stage, either to continue it to its conclusion, or to discontinue it; but anyone can start one.</p>


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<p>In England and Wales if you are involved in a collision which causes damage to property you must stop and give your details to anyone reasonably requiring them, and if nobody does, you must report it to the police &quot;as soon as is reasonably practicable&quot;, and in any case within 24 hours (s170, Road Traffic Act 1988).  Ted's failure to do so constitutes an offence, so a private prosecution could be brought if the police wouldn't investigate, or the CPS declined to proceed.</p>
<p>I note you don't specify the jurisdiction you're asking about, though I infer it's Texas, USA; but I thought it worth noting the option exists in some places, and may exist for Bob.</p>


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Question Title: Is it legal for a train company to create an art gallery using photographs of the graffiti on their locomotives and train cars?


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Question Body: <p>I have been wondering that since a train company owns its locomotives and train cars, then I am assuming that this means that they own any graffiti that has been painted on their locomotives and train cars.</p>
<p>I have recently read that it is illegal for someone to put graffiti on any train company equipment, since it is an act of vandalism, so this makes me think that that any graffiti artist(s) who created graffiti on train equipment cannot get a copyright(s) on the graffiti that they put on train equipment.</p>
<p>If the graffiti thus belongs to the train company, then I am assuming that this means that the train company automatically owns the copyright(s) to this graffiti, and they would thus be free to take photographs of this graffiti and could display and/or sell these photographs to the general public, if they wanted to do so.</p>


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<p>Is it legal for a train company to create an art gallery using photographs of the graffiti on their locomotives and train cars?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>Copyright law doesn't say the art isn't copyrighted if it was made unlawfully.</p>
<p>It seems the art can be copyrighted and the act of making it can be a criminal offence.</p>
<p>I'm not aware of any such copyright cases that have gone to trial.</p>
<p>A fairly well known case that settled out of court is that of Jason “Revok” Williams and H&amp;M.</p>
<p>Williams noticed his art in a photograph used in an H&amp;M marketing campaign. His lawyer sent a cease-and-desist letter to H&amp;M.</p>
<p>In response, H&amp;M applied for a court order stating that the product of an unlawful act could not be copyrighted.</p>
<p>Following some bad publicity H&amp;M relented and settled with Williams. H&amp;M stopped using the photograph and withdrew the application for the court order. (<a href="https://www.seattletimes.com/business/hms-battle-over-graffiti-fuels-debate-over-street-artists-copyright-privileges/" rel="noreferrer">News source</a>)</p>
<blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p>... The debate over street artists’ copyright privileges has entered courtrooms quite a bit over the past few years, according to Philippa Loengard, deputy director of Columbia Law School’s Kernochan Center for Law, Media and the Arts. ...</p>
<p>The [H&amp;M] claim wasn’t surprising, Loengard said, but it also doesn’t hold up. At its core, a copyright requires only two things: that the work is original and that it is a tangible medium of expression.</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>[Loengard said,] “ … Copyright is not a legal or illegal sanction of the activity that was done to produce the work. Copyright is a separate entity.”</p>
</blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>[Loengard said,] “ … Copyright is not a legal or illegal sanction of the activity that was done to produce the work. Copyright is a separate entity.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Another case settled out of court is that of Joseph &quot;Rime&quot; Tierney and Moschino. Tierney sued Moschino for using his art on its designs. One day before the court was notified of the intention to settle, Moschino sought to have the case dismissed on the grounds that unlawfully made art could not be copyrighted. (<a href="https://www.theartnewspaper.com/2016/04/22/graffiti-artist-to-settle-legal-case-against-moschino" rel="noreferrer">News source</a>)</p>
<blockquote>
<p>&quot;As a matter of public policy and basic logic, it would make no sense to grant legal protection to work that is created entirely illegally.&quot;</p>
</blockquote>


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Answer 2: <h2>No</h2>
<p>You are conflating two different ownership concepts: the art in which the copyright exists, and the artwork that is the expression of the art (my terminology).</p>
<p><strong>The artist owns the art, the train company owns the artwork.</strong></p>
<p>Copyright exists in an artistic or literary work as soon as it is fixed in a tangible form and the author is the owner of that copyright. The owner of the artwork is the person who owns the substrate that the expression is made on. So if I write a novel on your paper or computer, then I own the copyright in the novel, you own the physical paper or Word document.</p>


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<p>It doesn’t matter if I have your permission to use those things or not. If I don’t have your permission then what I did might be illegal and lead to my arrest or you seeing me for damages but I still own the copyright. It would be an interesting question to consider if the State could seize my copyright under proceeds of crime legislation but that’s beyond the scope of this question.</p>
<p>So, no, the train company cannot take photographs of the art and publicly display it. They can take photographs of their trains, which would incidentally contain the art, and display those. There’s a line there that a court would have to find should it ever come up.</p>
<p>They can display the trains as an art display because they own the artwork. They could even cut the vandalised parts off the train and display those. What they can’t do is copy the art.</p>


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Answer 3: <blockquote>
<p>I have been wondering that since a train company owns its locomotives and train cars, then I am assuming that this means that they own any graffiti that has been painted on their locomotives and train cars.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Correct.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>If the graffiti thus belongs to the train company, then I am assuming that this means that the train company automatically owns the copyright(s) to this graffiti[.]</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Not correct.  If you buy a copyright-protected painting, you own the painting, but you do not own the copyright in the painting.  Similarly, if an artist creates a work on an object you own, you own the work, but the artist owns the copyright.  Because the train company owns the work, it can do certain things with the work including destroying it or selling it to someone else, but they cannot sell copies of the work without permission.</p>


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Answer 4: <p>Maybe kind of (Speculative), but probably not, but it probably makes no difference.</p>
<p>If the fact that it is on the train forms part of the artwork, rather than being merely a canvas, the whole piece (graffiti plus train) might be argued to be a derivative work of the train livery, which if it has distinct visual elements such as logos or other artwork, will certainly be protected under its own copyright.</p>
<p><strong>If</strong> that's the case, the graffiti may not be protected by copyright as an unauthorized derivative work. While this doesn't mean the proprietor of the train livery owns the copyright to the graffiti, it might mean the graffiti artist cannot claim copyright, or if he can, is subject to a counter-claim for copyright violation themselves.</p>
<p>This would protect the train company from a copyright claim, but wouldn't mean they owned the copyright themselves.</p>


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<p>This would protect the train company from a copyright claim, but wouldn't mean they owned the copyright themselves.</p>
<p>This is very speculative, it is probably more likely that a court would not find a derivative work, but this would depend on the facts of the particular graffiti, and whether and how it incorporated elements of the train livery into the overall piece.</p>
<p><strong>Consequences for the train company</strong></p>
<p>The train company is basically safe here. Copyright violation is a civil offence, and remedies would likely be limited to financial loss and an order to stop making copies.</p>
<p>However in order to assert his rights, the graffiti artist would have to reveal himself, which would subject him to criminal penalties for vandalism, and a civil claim for the costs of cleaning or repainting the train.</p>


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<p>If the train company are also able to claim for &quot;unjust enrichment&quot; (depending on local law) then they might be able to take the whole value of the copyright, or even the copyright itself.</p>
<p>The &quot;artist&quot; is unlikely to come out ahead.</p>
<p><strong>Disclaimer:</strong> I am not a copyright lawyer, or a lawyer.</p>


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Answer 5: <p>It's an occasion where the train company could claim &quot;fair use&quot; in the USA. Or say that it is criticism etc.</p>
<p>Now if there was graffiti on some part of a train, and the train company removed that part, replaced it with a clean part, and put the part with the graffiti into an exhibition, then they wouldn't have copied anything, so copyright is irrelevant.</p>


Tags: united-states, copyright, intellectual-property, business, property


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Question Title: In an opposite-sex sexual assault case, is &quot;I&#39;m homosexual&quot; a valid defense?

Question Body: <p>Let's say Alice is sexually assaulted by a man, and circumstantial evidence pinpoints Bob as the attacker. Can Bob claim that, because he is homosexual/asexual, he does not find Alice sexually desirable and so cannot be the attacker?</p>
<p>I'm unable to find anything on this via Google. The closest is the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gay_panic_defense" rel="nofollow noreferrer">gay panic defense</a> which is still not what this question is about.</p>


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Answer 1: <p>This is not a true defense. It would only go to the credibility of the defendant's account claiming that he was not the perpetrator.</p>
<p>Nothing prevents someone who is homosexual or asexual from sexually assaulting someone of the opposite sex within the meaning of the law. Sexual assault is often motivated by reasons other than sexual attraction in any case. Also, some people who publicly hold themselves out as being homosexual are actually bisexual.</p>
<p>It is probably relevant evidence, but ultimately, it is up to the jury to decide who to believe and what happened based upon all of the facts and circumstances.</p>


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Answer 2: <p>Bob's argument that you describe is simply an evidentiary argument about identity. If identity and the elements of sexual assault are proved beyond a reasonable doubt, Bob's argument is no defence.</p>
<p><a href="/questions/tagged/canada" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-canada-tooltip-container">canada</a></p>
<p>In Canada, one of the elements of sexual assault is that the touching be of a sexual nature. This is an <em>objective</em> test (see <em>R. v. Chase</em>, <a href="https://canlii.ca/t/1ftlr#par11" rel="nofollow noreferrer">[1987] 2 SCR 293, at para 11</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The test to be applied in determining whether the impugned conduct has the requisite sexual nature is an objective one: &quot;Viewed in the light of all the circumstances, is the sexual or carnal context of the assault visible to a reasonable observer.&quot;</p>
</blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p>Touching with the motivation of punishment or humiliation can meet this test, regardless of the lack of sexual motivation of the accused. See e.g. <em>R. v. S. (V. C. A.)</em>, <a href="https://www.canlii.org/en/mb/mbca/doc/2001/2001mbca85/2001mbca85.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">2001 MBCA 85</a>.</p>
<p>Depending on the circumstances, this could even render Bob's argument wholly irrelevant.</p>


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Question Title: Full text of Act of Settlement, 1781 - during the early company rule in India

Question Body: <p>Can someone please tell me where I can find the full text of the Act of Settlement, 1781 passed by the British Raj in India?</p>
<p>I tried finding it on the internet but couldn't find it.</p>
<p>Thank you!</p>


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Answer 1: <p>I believe you will find it on page 210 of <a href="https://books.google.ch/books?id=r4RaAAAAYAAJ&amp;pg=PA210" rel="nofollow noreferrer">this volume of the <em>Statutes at Large</em> in Google books</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>An Act to explain and amend so much of an Act, made in the thirteenth Year of the Reign of his present Majesty, intituled, An Act for establishing certain Regulations for the better Management of the Affairs of the East India Company, as well in India as in Europe, as relates to the Administration of Justice in Bengal; and for the Relief of certain Persons imprisoned at Calcutta in Bengal, under a Judgement of the Supreme Court of Judicature; and also for indemnifying the Governor General and Council of Bengal, and all Officers who have acted under their Orders or Authority, in the undue Resistance made to the Process of the Supreme Court</p>
</blockquote>


Tags: legal-history, indian-constitutional-law


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Question Title: Can Musk threaten X11?

Question Body: <p>Twitter, recently changed hands and became owned by Elon Musk, who decided to change its name to &quot;X&quot;.</p>
<p>There's the FOSS X11 desktop environment being developed for various Unix and Unix-like systems, and is hosted at <code>x.org</code>. Many operating systems provide X11 GUI packages under the &quot;umbrella&quot; name of <code>xorg</code> (which means installing this package will automatically install other dependencies on those systems)</p>
<p><strong>Q</strong>: Is it possible, that some kind of trademark dispute can lead to X11 losing its <code>x.org</code> domain name, and/or other formed/formless assets?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>This is unlikely to be a problem. There are <em>many</em> companies that have already registered software-related trademarks prominently involving an <code>X</code> or the name <code>Xcom</code>. That Twitter has changed to <code>X</code> branding does not substantially change this general situation.</p>
<p>With trademarks, the general question is whether similar branding causes confusion. It is unlikely that someone would confuse the X display server / X.Org project / X.Org Foundation with the social media service now being branded as <code>X</code> or <code>x.com</code>.</p>
<p>Of course, anyone can sue anyone, the real question is whether that's possible successfully. Here, I have my doubts that <code>x.com</code> could successfully demonstrate confusion in its favour.</p>


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<p>It is worth noting that the X.Org Foundation does not seem to hold any relevant trademark registrations at all. This is not unusual for Open Source software projects and doesn't mean that X.Org has no rights, but does make a defense a bit more difficult. However, there also doesn't seem to be a relevant registration by the ex-Twitter company or by the X Corp.</p>


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<p>The <code>x.org</code> domain name is unlikely to be threatened. If the <code>x.org</code> domain name was being used in bad faith it could maybe be seized, but the X.Org Foundation has a pretty strong claim on this name. For historical context, both <code>x.com</code> and <code>x.org</code> were among the six <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Single-letter_second-level_domain" rel="noreferrer">single-letter .org/.net/.com domain names</a> when such registrations were stopped in 1993. But while <code>x.com</code> has been pretty much dormant since that company was renamed to PayPal, <code>x.org</code> has (I think) always been associated with the display server software, and has been used continuously by the X.Org Foundation since its establishment in 2004.</p>


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Answer 2: <p>Trademark rights go to the first one who uses them in commerce, or who registered them with the intention to use them in commerce. So if anything, the X.Org Foundation could be a legal threat to <s>Twitter</s> X , claiming that the rebranding of Twitter infringes <em>their</em> trademark which they have already been using in commerce for decades. Not the other way around.</p>


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<p>However, a possible response of a large company discovering that they inadvertently infringed on the trademark rights of a much smaller company and now facing a legal dispute with them, is to look for a small <em>third</em> company that used a similar trademark even <em>before</em> that to obtain those <em>even earlier</em> trademark rights. I remember that mobile game developer Zynga once pulled that maneuver in a trademark dispute with another developer. But unfortunately I can't find details about that case, because thanks to the countless trademark lawsuits Zynga was involved in, this became ungoogleable. But a comment by <a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/users/17112/user71659">user71659</a> on this question mentions <a href="https://itlaw.fandom.com/wiki/Planetary_Motion_v._Techplosion" rel="nofollow noreferrer">a legal dispute between two email providers</a> where this maneuver was used successfully.</p>


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<p>So what <s>Twitter</s> X could now do is try to find some tech company that used the X brand for a software product even before X.Org and then buy them. But considering that the X Window System was already published in the 80s, that might be quite challenging.</p>


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Question Title: Under what legislation has former U.S. President Trump been indicted for &quot;conspiracy to defraud the US&quot;?

Question Body: <p>It's reported by <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/live/world-us-canada-66248859" rel="nofollow noreferrer">BBC News</a> that Mr Trump is charged with four counts, including:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>conspiracy to defraud the US</p>
</li>
<li><p>tampering with a witness</p>
</li>
<li><p>conspiracy against the rights of citizens</p>
</li>
</ul>
<p>Focusing on the first bullet point to avoid asking multiple questions<sup>1</sup>:</p>
<p><strong>What legislation introduces and/or covers the offence of defrauding the US?</strong></p>
<hr />
<p><sub><sup>1</sup>Although I would be interested in knowing more on the underlying legislation for a charge of conspiracy against the rights of citizens which I might post as a follow-up question</sub></p>


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Answer 1: <p>Count 1: 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Conspiracy to Defraud United States)</p>
<p>Here the indictment's introduction alleges that Trump perpetrated:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>A conspiracy to to defraud the United States by using dishonesty,
fraud, and deceit to impair, obstruct, and defeat the lawful federal
government function by which the results of the presidential election
are collected, counted, and certified by the federal government, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>temporary link to indictment pdf pending finding a better version: <a href="https://d3i6fh83elv35t.cloudfront.net/static/2023/08/trump-indictment.pdf" rel="noreferrer">https://d3i6fh83elv35t.cloudfront.net/static/2023/08/trump-indictment.pdf</a></p>
<p><a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/371" rel="noreferrer">18 U.S.C. § 371 (Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute)</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against


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<blockquote>
<p>If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against
the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency
thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such
persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.</p>
<p>If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the
conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy
shall not exceed the maximum punishment provided for such misdemeanor.</p>
</blockquote>


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Question Title: If my product (open source or proprietary) requires Oracle GraalVM to work and bundles Oracle GraalVM, can I charge money for my product?


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Question Body: <p>If my product (no matter open source or proprietary) requires Oracle GraalVM to work and bundles Oracle GraalVM, can I charge money for my product?</p>
<p>According to the link of GraalVM Free Terms and Conditions (GFTC) including License for Early Adopter Versions:
<a href="https://www.oracle.com/downloads/licenses/graal-free-license.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://www.oracle.com/downloads/licenses/graal-free-license.html</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>(b) redistribute the unmodified Program and Program Documentation, under the terms of this License, provided that You do not charge Your licensees any fees associated with such distribution or use of the Program, including, without limitation, fees for products that include or are bundled with a copy of the Program or for services that involve the use of the distributed Program.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>If I charge users a fee, how do I define whether the fee is associated with my product or Oracle GraalVM?</p>


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Answer 1: <blockquote>
<p>If I charge users a fee, how do I define whether the fee is associated with my product or Oracle GraalVM?</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>provided that You do not charge [...] including, without limitation, fees for products <strong>that include</strong> or <strong>are bundled</strong> with a copy of the Program or for services that <strong>involve the use</strong> of the distributed Program.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Your program does envision to bundle the program and the service does involve the use of the distributed Program, so you can't charge anything full stop.</p>


Tags: licensing


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Question Body: <p><strong>A church records their service on audio</strong>. The service, open to the public but behind the closed doors of their building, is performed before a live audience who voluntarily attend. The church then sends out a copy of the recording to paying subscribers around the world.</p>
<p>The recording includes announcements, speeches, prayers, musical and theatrical entertainment, and a sermon all of which I would assume are copyrighted by the church entity since it is their employees and volunteers who made and produced it. Likely everyone who contributed gave consent to record their work, except perhaps members of the audience who were distinctly asked to pray out loud for the group's benefit.</p>
<p><strong>Also included is the singing of gospel songs by the audience</strong>. The audience is prompted and led by a song leader who is possibly accompanied by a piano player on some or all of the songs. Assume the piano player is a paid employee.</p>


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<p>My question is: <strong>Is the singing by the audience copyrighted as part of the larger or complete work?</strong></p>
<p>Probably in the same category: Are the prayers solicited from the audience also copyrighted?</p>
<p>The question seems unclear in this regard: It is highly unlikely that the church asked any member of the audience for their permission to record their singing much less to distribute it. Assume they did not. No audience member signed a waiver granting the church copyright permission over their vocals, foot-stomping, or hand-clapping.</p>
<p>To further muddy the waters, some of the songs sung by the audience may be copyrighted while others are in the public domain. I assume the audience's singing is about common for a diverse group - so not necessarily &quot;original&quot; or &quot;creative&quot;.</p>


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Answer 1: <h2>There is copyright in the recording (probably)</h2>
<p>The person who first fixed the material in a tangible form owns the copyright. Presumably, whatever legal entity the church is, as it was made by a volunteer as a work-for-hire. That is because they were the ones who fixed it in tangible form. This is why journalists own the copyright in interviews they make with subjects.</p>
<p>The copyright in the performance is a separate copyright from any that might exist in the composition. If the recording violates the composer’s copyright (e.g. the church did not pay the required statutory royalties to perform the songs), then there is no copyright in the recording, and the composer can sue the church for making it. There is no copyright in works that violate another's copyright.</p>
<h2>Making an audio recording without permission is a crime</h2>


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<h2>Making an audio recording without permission is a crime</h2>
<p>This is totally unrelated to copyright, but in most jurisdictions, you need the speaker’s permission before recording their voice. If the recording is obvious (e.g. a microphone in your face or a big sign saying services will be recorded), then permission can be implied - by knowingly speaking while you are aware you are being recorded, you have consented to the recording.</p>


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Answer 2: <p>Assume first that the composition is still protected by copyright. Only the author can authorize public performance of the work. Everybody is an infringer if they don't have a license to perform the work. Now assume that the music director secured a performance license. Then you look at the terms of the license to see whether it is allowed to record the performance; and if it is allowed, it is allowed without restriction, or only for non-commercial purposes. If the composition is not protected by copyright anymore, then it can be recorded. The person who creates the recording (putting it in fixed form) hold the copyright to that particular work (the recording).


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Copyright law relies on the undefined concept of &quot;author&quot;, which <a href="https://www.ce9.uscourts.gov/jury-instructions/node/264" rel="nofollow noreferrer">as the courts say</a> is a &quot;question of fact&quot;. An author originates or &quot;masterminds&quot; the original work, controlling the whole work’s creation and causing it to come into being, which is not the case with a member of the choir. More likely, the music director and sound engineer create and hold copyright in a joint work.</p>
<p>We might assume that some of the sermon was written down in advance, which is to say that it has a fixed form, but that's far from assured; at any rate, the preacher can also conspire with the engineer and music director to create a joint work, where the engineer's contribution is putting the work into fixed form.</p>


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<p>So the transitory singing of the choir is not protected by copyright (it literally can't be copied), but the recording of a choir and sermon is protected by copyright, and the copyright is owned by the people who originated or masterminded the recording. Probably not the choir.</p>


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Question Title: Would making a non-profit TV show about Ronald Mcdonald be legal?

Question Body: <p>Ok, this is going to sound weird, but I didn't have any better forum to ask this on. Me and a friend are working on a sort of Horror/Comedy.</p>
<p>A basic plot rundown: Ronald Mcdonald is a crazy lunatic who acts as the guardian of McDonalds, and will protect it at all costs. Yes, he tries to kill the Main Character.</p>
<p>We plan for this to be posted on YouTube, with credit to Mcdonalds in the credits, and in the video description. It will be free to watch, and we won't make any profit from it at all. Is it legal to do this, or is it an infringement on copyright?</p>


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Answer 1: <h2>Not the show you describe</h2>
<p>Ronald McDonald is a trademark, and his appearance is copyright owned by the McDonalds corporation. That means that subject to an exemption, only McDonalds can decide what happens with Ronald McDonald.</p>
<p>As described, you are going to use <em>Ronald McDonald</em>, not a generic clown that evokes Ronald McDonald in a comedy/horror. The most relevant exception that springs to mind is the trademark <a href="https://www.lottfischer.com/blog/trademark-parody/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Parody</a> exemption (and a similar exemption that exists for copyright fair use).</p>


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<p>Your movie doesn't appear to be a parody - the idea of a murderous clown protecting a burger chain is not, on its face, a parody of McDonalds. That is, it might be funny (or not) on its own terms, but it is not obviously poking fun <em>at</em> McDonalds which is the essence of parody. Obviously, your plot outline is brief and perhaps the full script is an incisive commentary on the way McDonalds is doing ... something.</p>
<p>Further, famous marks have extra protection - works that tarnish the mark are more likely to be considered infringing. Tarnishment happens when a distinctive mark is depicted in a context of sexual activity, obscenity or illegal activity. You know, like a crazy lunatic murderer.</p>
<p>Compare and contrast with this parody:</p>
<p><a href="https://i.stack.imgur.com/jQZJX.jpg" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><img src="https://i.stack.imgur.com/jQZJX.jpg" alt="Krusty Burger" /></a></p>


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<p>Compare and contrast with this parody:</p>
<p><a href="https://i.stack.imgur.com/jQZJX.jpg" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><img src="https://i.stack.imgur.com/jQZJX.jpg" alt="Krusty Burger" /></a></p>
<p>This evokes McDonalds but it doesn't use any of their trademarks or copyrighted material <em>and</em> it also evokes other fast-food restaurants. The parody elements are clear: it clearly <em>isn't</em> McDonalds; it only uses as much material as necessary to get the audience to make the link; the joke is <em>about</em> fast-food restaurants: their sameness, teen-worker-exploitation, promotions, crap food etc.</p>
<p>When they do <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XD7uKwtc_FU&amp;ab_channel=superchundable" rel="nofollow noreferrer">explicitly</a> compare Krusty Burger with McDonalds the joke is <em>about</em> <a href="https://simpsons.fandom.com/wiki/22_Short_Films_About_Springfield/Quotes" rel="nofollow noreferrer">McDonalds</a>:</p>
<blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p><strong>Lou:</strong> Y'know, I went to the McDonald's in, uh, Shelbyville on Friday night.</p>
<p><strong>Chief Wiggum:</strong> The McWhat?</p>
<p><strong>Lou:</strong> Uh, the McDonald's restaurant. I never heard of it either, but they have over 2,000 locations in this state alone.</p>
<p><strong>Eddie:</strong> Hmm. Must have sprung up overnight.</p>
<p><strong>Lou:</strong> You know the funniest thing though? It's the little differences.</p>
<p><strong>Chief Wiggum:</strong> Example.</p>
<p><strong>Lou:</strong> Well, at McDonald's you can buy a Krusty Burger with cheese, right? But they don't call it a Krusty Burger with cheese.</p>
<p><strong>Chief Wiggum:</strong> Get out… well what do they call it?</p>
<p><strong>Lou:</strong> A Quarter Pounder with cheese.</p>
<p><strong>Chief Wiggum:</strong> A Quarter Pounder with cheese? Well I can picture the cheese, but… uh. Do they have Krusty Partially Gelatinated Non-Dairy Gum Based Beverages?</p>


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<p><strong>Chief Wiggum:</strong> A Quarter Pounder with cheese? Well I can picture the cheese, but… uh. Do they have Krusty Partially Gelatinated Non-Dairy Gum Based Beverages?</p>
<p><strong>Lou:</strong> Mmm hmm, they call 'em Shakes.</p>
<p><strong>Eddie:</strong> Huh, shakes. You don't know what you're gettin'.</p>
</blockquote>


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Answer 2: <p>Ronald McDonald is not a copyrighted work, it is a <a href="https://trademarks.justia.com/722/79/ronald-mcdonald-72279671.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">trademark</a>. Possibly, the clown outfit is an artistic work which could be protected by copyright. If your chosen outfit looks too much like the real clown suit, you might get sued for artistic infringement, in which case you could avail yourself of a fair use defense, pointing to the social commentary nature of your use.</p>


Tags: copyright, is-x-legal


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Question Title: Can somebody be charged for having another person physically assault someone for them?

Question Body: <p>For example, if a friend asked her father to physically assault me, and her father did it, can the friend who asked her father to assault me also be charged with assault?</p>


Answer 1: <p>Yes.</p>
<p>The charge in that case is solicitation of assault. Usually, solicitation of a crime carries the same punishment as the underlying crime.</p>
<p>On the other hand, if a daughter tells her father what you did to her and he unilaterally decides to assault you, out of defense of his family's honor and outrage, the daughter has not committed a crime.</p>


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Answer 2: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/germany" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-germany-tooltip-container">germany</a></p>
<p>Solicitation of a crime is a crime in itself, and will be punished in the same way as the actual crime.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Als Anstifter wird gleich einem Täter bestraft, wer vorsätzlich einen
anderen zu dessen vorsätzlich begangener rechtswidriger Tat bestimmt
hat.</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p><em>Who intenitionally affects someone to intentionally commit an ulawful act, is punished as an instigator to the same extent as the perpetrator.</em></p>
</blockquote>
<p><a href="https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgb/__26.html" rel="noreferrer">§ 26 Anstiftung StGB</a> (StGB = Strafgesetzbuch, the German penal code).</p>


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</blockquote>
<p><a href="https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgb/__26.html" rel="noreferrer">§ 26 Anstiftung StGB</a> (StGB = Strafgesetzbuch, the German penal code).</p>
<p>However you will probably not charged with conspiracy. § 277 StGB makes the preparation of certain crimes a punishable offense (even if the actual crime is not executed), but is pretty much limited to human trafficking, some drug related offenses, causing nuclear accidents and wielding weapons of mass destruction. Assault is not in there.</p>
<p>If you order people to commit assault on a regular basis and the group includes at least three people, you might be charged according to <a href="https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgb/__129.html" rel="noreferrer">§ 26


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StGB</a> with &quot;Bildung einer kriminellen Vereinigung&quot; (&quot;kriminellen Vereinigung&quot; - &quot;association of criminals&quot; being defined as a group of people who meet with the purpose of committing crimes). That also does not seem applicable to the question,</p>


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Answer 3: <p>In Australia this could fall under common purpose or commission by proxy. From the Criminal Code 1995:</p>
<blockquote>
<h3>11.2  Complicity and common purpose</h3>
<p><strong>(1)  A person who aids, abets, counsels or procures the commission of an offence by another person is taken to have committed that
offence and is punishable accordingly.</strong></p>
<p>(2)  For the person to be guilty:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(a)  the person’s conduct must have in fact aided, abetted,
counselled or procured the commission of the offence by the other
person; and</p>
<p>(b)  the offence must have been committed by the other person.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>(3)  For the person to be guilty, the person must have intended that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(a)  his or her conduct would aid, abet, counsel or procure the
commission of any offence (including its fault elements) of the type
the other person committed; or</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>


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<p>(a)  his or her conduct would aid, abet, counsel or procure the
commission of any offence (including its fault elements) of the type
the other person committed; or</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>(b)  his or her conduct would aid, abet, counsel or procure the
commission of an offence and have been reckless about the commission
of the offence (including its fault elements) that the other person in
fact committed.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>(3A)  Subsection (3) has effect subject to subsection (6).</p>
<p>(4)  A person cannot be found guilty of aiding, abetting, counselling
or procuring the commission of an offence if, before the offence was
committed, the person:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(a)  terminated his or her involvement; and</p>
<p>(b)  took all reasonable steps to prevent the commission of the
offence.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>(5)  A person may be found guilty of aiding, abetting, counselling or
procuring the commission of an offence even if the other person has


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offence.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>(5)  A person may be found guilty of aiding, abetting, counselling or
procuring the commission of an offence even if the other person has
not been prosecuted or has not been found guilty.</p>
<p>(6)  Any special liability provisions that apply to an offence apply
also for the purposes of determining whether a person is guilty of
that offence because of the operation of subsection (1).</p>
<p>(7)  If the trier of fact is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that a
person either:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(a)  is guilty of a particular offence otherwise than because of the
operation of subsection (1); or</p>
<p>(b)  is guilty of that offence because of the operation of subsection (1);</p>
</blockquote>
<p>but is not able to determine which, the trier of fact may nonetheless
find the person guilty of that offence.</p>
<p>...</p>
<h3>11.3  Commission by proxy</h3>
<p><strong>A person who:</strong></p>
<blockquote>


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find the person guilty of that offence.</p>
<p>...</p>
<h3>11.3  Commission by proxy</h3>
<p><strong>A person who:</strong></p>
<blockquote>
<p><strong>(a)  has, in relation to each physical element of an offence, a fault element applicable to that physical element; and</strong></p>
<p><strong>(b)  procures conduct of another person that (whether or not together with conduct of the procurer) would have constituted an offence on the part of the procurer if the procurer had engaged in it;</strong></p>
</blockquote>
<p><strong>is taken to have committed that offence and is punishable accordingly.</strong></p>
</blockquote>


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Question Title: In the US, if I chose to let someone die purely because I have the right to use my body however I choose, would I be charged with murder?

Question Body: <p>I'll elaborate on the title:</p>

<p>Someone asked me the question: </p>

<blockquote>
  <p>Do you believe people should be forced to allow the use of their organs without consent?</p>
</blockquote>

<p>And in order to respond, I wondered what a court of law in the US would rule in the following scenario: </p>


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<blockquote>
  <p>One day I find myself in the theoretical situation where someone is
  hanging off the edge of a building and wants to live, and I know with
  99.9% surety (lets assume this number is accurate and I admit that I somehow knew this beyond a doubt, for the sake of the theoretical
  scenario) that if I hold onto them until help arrives, my life won't
  be at risk, I'll simply have to strain my muscles for an hour until
  help arrives and they're safe. But I choose to let the person fall to
  their death, purely and solely because I believe I have the right to decline to use my
  body in any way I choose not to use it. I do not fear that saving the person puts me in any danger, and I admit this on record - furthermore it's reasonable to believe that that risk assessment is accurate. Also, it would likely be very painful for me to hold onto the person for the hour until help arrives. </p>
</blockquote>

<p>Now, in the eyes of a US court, am I a murderer? </p>


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<p>Now, in the eyes of a US court, am I a murderer? </p>

<p>Furthermore, if the answer is that I would be considered a murder in the eye of the law, what if we change one detail of the premise: Rather than knowing I have a 99.9% chance of saving the person's life while avoiding any physical or mental damage, that number becomes 90%. Or 80%. Is there any language within the law that specifically defines a threshold beyond which it's reasonable to fear for my health and allow the person to die in order to protect my health? </p>

<p>I realize the answer could vary from state to state, and if you need to use an example state, let's randomly say I'm in California. </p>


Answer 1: <p>You have no reponsibility to save someone (unless you put them in that position / were responsible for his safety, this is called owing a &quot;duty of care&quot;, e.g doctor to patient, road user to road user etc)</p>
<p>Legally you are not a murderer. But morally, your actions are reprehensible.</p>


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Answer 2: <p><b>In no US jurisdiction does a failure to rescue someone constitute murder.</b> Nor is there generally a common law duty to rescue. In California, there is a statutory duty to rescue, but this falls outside its scope. However, certain other states impose a greater duty to rescue; for instance, under Vermont law:</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>A person who knows that another is exposed to grave
  physical harm shall... give reasonable
  assistance to the exposed person</p>
</blockquote>


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<blockquote>
  <p>A person who knows that another is exposed to grave
  physical harm shall... give reasonable
  assistance to the exposed person</p>
</blockquote>

<p>(This duty has certain exceptions - like when rendering assistance would put your hypothetical scumbag in danger - which, so far as you've said, do not apply here. Penalties for violating laws like this are generally small. See <a href="http://law.justia.com/codes/vermont/2012/title12/chapter23/section519" rel="noreferrer">http://law.justia.com/codes/vermont/2012/title12/chapter23/section519</a>,  <a href="http://volokh.com/2009/11/03/duty-to-rescuereport-statutes/" rel="noreferrer">http://volokh.com/2009/11/03/duty-to-rescuereport-statutes/</a> and <a href="http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2168&amp;context=wmlr" rel="noreferrer">http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2168&amp;context=wmlr</a>)</p>


Tags: united-states, murder, duty-of-care


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Question Title: Hypothetical POTUS divorce

Question Body: <p>If the spouse of the President of the United States filed for divorce, would</p>
<ol>
<li><p>the President have any claim of immunity from any litigation that followed (e.g. the division of assets in the matrimonial pot, child custody, etc.),</p>
</li>
<li><p>would all the proceedings be fully held in private,</p>
</li>
<li><p>could the President be compelled to take the stand and</p>
</li>
<li><p>what would happen if the President refused to do so?</p>
</li>
</ol>


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Answer 1: <blockquote>
<p>If the spouse of the US president filed for divorce, would</p>
<p>a) the President have any claim of immunity from any litigation that
followed (e.g. the division of assets in the matrimonial pot, child
custody etc.),</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The President could claim it, but the President wouldn't win.</p>
<p>Notably, a number of state governors and mayors have divorced while in office, and other foreign heads of state have been divorced while in office.</p>
<p>For example, a U.K. court recently handled the divorce of a UAE monarch (over his objections to jurisdiction on sovereign immunity grounds), applying the same common law principles of head of state and sovereign immunities that exist in U.S. law and concluded that it had the authority to move forward with the case.</p>


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<p>Also, any Presidential divorce would take place in state court, not in federal court. Federal courts do not have subject-matter jurisdiction over divorce and custody cases (under the &quot;domestic relations exception&quot; to federal jurisdiction), so the civil action could not be removed to federal court, unlike federal criminal cases involving the official duties of the President and unlike civil cases over which the federal courts have jurisdiction.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>b) would all the proceedings be fully held in private,</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This would be in the reasonable discretion of the judge. It would not be a matter of right, but it is quite plausible that a judge might close the proceedings, especially if minor children were involved.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>c) could the President themselves be compelled to take the stand and</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Yes.</p>


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<blockquote>
<p>c) could the President themselves be compelled to take the stand and</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Yes.</p>
<p>A party to a lawsuit may always be compelled to take the stand, at least if no other person can provide a full substitute for the party's testimony.</p>
<p>In ordinary civil lawsuits against the President, a President is usually compelled to testify only if an underling involved in the same matter cannot provide equivalent testimony. In many civil cases naming the President in his official capacity, the President has no personal knowledge of the facts and so can't be compelled to testify. But that would rarely be true in a divorce case, and would never be true in a divorce case where custody was an issue.</p>


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<p>This said, a state divorce court judge would almost certainly be very deferential to the scheduling concerns of the President for that testimony, and might allow that testimony to be provided remotely via videoconference so as to minimize the interruption this would pose to affairs of state and to address the security concerns of the Secret Service (i.e. the President's official bodyguards).</p>
<blockquote>
<p>d) what would happen if the President refused to do so?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The judge could hold the President in contempt of court, which is punishable by fines and/or incarceration.</p>


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<p>d) what would happen if the President refused to do so?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The judge could hold the President in contempt of court, which is punishable by fines and/or incarceration.</p>
<p>But a more likely outcome, tailored to minimize interference with government business, is that the Court would sanction a President who defied an order to testify by assuming as a matter of law that any testimony from the President would have been unfavorable to the President and make a conclusive adverse inference on the evidentiary issues about which the President was asked to testify against the President.</p>


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Question Title: Equal Protection and Samoan Credit Law

Question Body: <p>In American Samoa, a person of Samoan descent and a person of other descent are treated differently under bankruptcy law. Per A.S.C.A. § 43.1528(a):</p>
<blockquote>
<p>No real property of a Samoan may be subject to sale under a writ of a court to satisfy any judgment other than a judgment foreclosing a valid mortgage. “Samoan” includes American Samoans of at least one-half Samoan blood and persons born on other islands in the Pacific Ocean who are of at least one-half Polynesian, Melanesian or Micronesian blood and who reside in American Samoa.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It was my understanding that the 14th amendment provided equal protection of the law, and that laws with an explicit race test have been deemed unconstitutional. What exception allows this law to be considered constitutional?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>This is a <a href="https://asbar.org/code-annotated/43-1528-real-property-of-samoans-not-subject-to-execution-exception/" rel="noreferrer">law of American Samoa</a>. American Samoa is not a state of the US. American Samoans are not automatic citizens under the 14th Amendment. The 14th Amendment says &quot;No <strong>State</strong> shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws&quot;.</p>


Tags: united-states, fourteenth-amendment


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Question Title: Is it possible for a witness to backtrack and claim that their previous statements were wrong because they misremembered?


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Question Body: <p>One of the Youtube channels I'm following is running a series of videos about an ongoing lawsuit (within reason, of course). The <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9umbsmrFk08" rel="noreferrer">latest video</a> has an interesting point that got me wondering.</p>
<p>Suppose the lawsuit is about events that took place about a long time ago (in the case above it's in 1999, that's over 23 years now). The lawyers of one side are questioning a witness from the other side. The questions are carefully crafted, but in the end they manage to get a statement of the witness that they are sure of some fact X. They even ask them several times, just to be sure.</p>
<p>Then the questioning lawyer produces a photo that clearly shows fact X to be wrong.</p>


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<p>Then the questioning lawyer produces a photo that clearly shows fact X to be wrong.</p>
<p>Is the witness now allowed to say something along the lines: &quot;Huh. That's odd. I clearly remember it differently. But it's such a small detail and it was so long ago...&quot;? Or is it now considered a deliberate lie?</p>
<p>As for jurisdiction: the above case is in the USA, but since I'm myself from Latvia, I'm interested in generic answers for various jurisdictions (or maybe it's the same everywhere?)</p>


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Answer 1: <blockquote>
<p>Is it possible for a witness to backtrack and claim that their previous statements were wrong because they misremembered? ... Is the witness now allowed to say something along the lines: &quot;Huh. That's odd. I clearly remember it differently. But it's such a small detail and it was so long ago...&quot;?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Yes.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Or is it now considered a deliberate lie?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>A judge's assessment of a witness's credibility and reliability is much more nuanced. See <a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/a/85119/46948">&quot;How is a judge to evaluate a witness's credibility?&quot;</a></p>


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Answer 2: <p>Witnesses are allowed to change or correct their testimony, especially for events that happened long ago. Memories are fallible and details fade over time.</p>
<p>As long as the change seems genuine and in good faith, not deliberately false, courts understand witnesses can make honest mistakes. The key is whether the revised testimony seems credible. The court considers:</p>
<ul>
<li>How long ago the events occurred</li>
<li>What prompted the change</li>
<li>Was it an objective fact like a photo that showed the witness's initial memory was wrong?</li>
</ul>
<p>If so, a genuine correction is not viewed as perjury. The witness likely just misremembered details due to the passage of time. Deliberate lies to mislead the court are viewed differently. But honest mistakes and corrections based on new information are typically allowed.</p>


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Answer 3: <p>A trier of fact can make determinations about the credibility of a witness for pretty much any reason that they want. They can decide a witness is lying because they contradicted their previous testimony, or because they aren't making eye contact, or they're making too much eye contact, etc.</p>


Tags: trial, witnesses


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Question Title: What constitutes entrapment?

Question Body: <p>I was just remembering a movie scene where 2 undercover cops knock on a man's door asking to buy drugs and and he sells it to them. In the end he is arrested and convicted. I'm no expert but I thought entrapment usually occurred when the illegal activity it pushed or initiated by the law enforcement offer so would this situation be entrapment?
On a broader note, I know the often fine line between entrapment and a legal sting operations is widely debated to what, fundamentally, distinguishes a legitimate sting from unfair entrapment?</p>


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Answer 1: <p><strong>Short Answer</strong></p>
<p>Entrapment is law enforcement tricking someone into committing a crime they were not already willing to do. It has two parts: 1) police inducement and 2) lack of predisposition.</p>
<p><strong>Long Answer</strong></p>
<p>There are two key elements:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Government inducement - Police must have persuaded, pressured, or lured the defendant into the crime through more than just providing an opportunity. Repeated requests, appeals to sympathy, or large financial rewards can count as inducement. Simply asking to buy drugs likely does not qualify.</p>
</li>
<li><p>Lack of predisposition - The defendant must not have been willing or planning to commit the crime prior to the police inducement. If the defendant already intended to commit the crime, entrapment likely does not apply.</p>
</li>
</ul>


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</li>
</ul>
<p>The difference between a legal sting and entrapment depends on facts of each case. In a legal sting, police provide an opportunity for someone already willing to commit a crime. In entrapment, police pressure an unwilling person into a crime they otherwise would not commit.</p>
<p>The scenario you described could potentially be entrapment based on the level of inducement and the defendant's lack of predisposition. However, more details would be needed to determine for sure. Undercover cops simply asking to buy drugs is likely not sufficient inducement to constitute entrapment.</p>


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Question Title: What would you be charged with for covering up a rightful death?

Question Body: <p>I'm referring to a specific situation that occurred in the TV show 24.</p>
<p>Due to previous complex circumstances, a man (call him &quot;Bob&quot;) destroys a van that is the scene of a murder and hides 2 bodies. Initially Bob had committed no crime; victim 1 was stabbed by victim 2, victim 2 was then shot by Bob in self-defense.</p>
<p>I'm wondering what, if anything, could Bob be guilty of for not reporting the deaths?</p>
<p>Edit: I'm just curious about the legality and consequences of covering up the deaths so just assume that there is evidence the shooting was in self defence.</p>


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Answer 1: <p>Probably murder.</p>
<p>Because &quot;<em>victim 2 was then shot by this man in <strong>self defense</strong>&quot;</em> hasn't been determined by a neutral third party investigation or jury - it is just his own rationale for shooting.</p>
<p>He may not be charged, or he may be tried and acquitted on the basis of self defense, but he isn't in a position of authority to simply make a &quot;rightful death&quot; call on his own, (<em>is there such a thing?</em>) and dispose of all the evidence.</p>
<p>Obstruction of justice would probably be the minimum charge for covering up evidence of the murder of Victim #1.</p>
<p>There is really no valid reason for covering up a double homicide, and his actions could easily result in a double murder charge.</p>


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Answer 2: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/england-and-wales" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-england-and-wales-tooltip-container">england-and-wales</a></p>
<p>Depending on the circumstances, hiding the bodies would be either <a href="https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/public-justice-offences-incorporating-charging-standard#_Toc536105693" rel="noreferrer"><em>Obstructing a Coroner</em> or <em>Preventing the Burial of a Body</em></a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Any disposal of a corpse with intent to obstruct or prevent a coroner's inquest, when there is a duty to hold one, is an offence. The offence is a common law offence, triable only on indictment and carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment and/or a fine.</p>


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<p>The offence of preventing the burial of a body (indictable only, unlimited imprisonment) is an alternative charge. Proof of this offence does not require proof of the specific intent required for obstructing a coroner.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Destroying the van could be either <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1971/48/section/1?timeline=false" rel="noreferrer"><em>Criminal Damage</em></a> or <a href="https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/public-justice-offences-incorporating-charging-standard#_Toc536105663" rel="noreferrer"><em>perverting the course of justice</em></a>, again depending on the circumstances.  The latter is committed when an accused:</p>
<blockquote>
<ul>
<li><p>does an act or series of acts;</p>
</li>
<li><p>which has or have a tendency to pervert; and</p>
</li>
<li><p>which is or are intended to pervert;</p>
</li>
<li><p>the course of public justice.</p>
</li>
</ul>


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</li>
<li><p>which has or have a tendency to pervert; and</p>
</li>
<li><p>which is or are intended to pervert;</p>
</li>
<li><p>the course of public justice.</p>
</li>
</ul>
<p>The offence is contrary to common law and triable only on indictment. It carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment and/or a fine. The course of justice must be in existence at the time of the act(s). The course of justice starts when:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>an event has occurred, from which it can reasonably be expected that an investigation will follow; or</p>
</li>
<li><p>investigations which could/might bring proceedings have actually started; or </p>
</li>
<li><p>proceedings have started or are about to start.</p>
</li>
</ul>
</blockquote>
<p><sub>Answer based on the assumption that as per hypothetical legal / law school questions in the UK: the facts are as stated i.e. there is no need for me to consider whether the killing of Victim 2 is self defence or not.</sub></p>


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Answer 3: <h2><a href="/questions/tagged/sweden" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;sweden&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;sweden&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-sweden-tooltip-container">sweden</a> An Offence against the peace of the grave</h2>
<p>Gravfridsbrott<br />
<em>Brottsbalken 16 kap. 10 §</em></p>
<blockquote>
<p>A person who, without authorisation, moves, damages or treats with disrespect the corpse or ashes of a deceased person is guilty of an offence against the peace of the grave and is sentenced to a fine or imprisonment for at most two
years.</p>
<p>If the offence is gross, the person is guilty of a gross offence
against the peace of the grave and is sentenced to imprisonment
for at least six months and at most four years.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This law is used in Sweden for things like moving or trying to destroying the body of a murder victim.</p>


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Answer 4: <h2>Charged?</h2>
<p><a href="/questions/tagged/new-south-wales" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;new-south-wales&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;new-south-wales&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-new-south-wales-tooltip-container">new-south-wales</a></p>
<p><a href="http://www5.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/ca190082/" rel="noreferrer">Crimes Act 1900</a></p>
<p><strong>Murder or manslaughter</strong> s18</p>
<p>An assertion of self-defence would not necessarily be agreed with by the prosecutor. Especially in circumstances where it seems the accused took steps to conceal or destroy evidence and the accused is the only witness.</p>
<p>There may be sufficient evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused did <em>not</em> act in self-defence and that the killing was unlawful. If the Crown can also prove intent, then that’s murder, if they can’t it’s manslaughter.</p>


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<p><strong>Destroying or damaging property</strong> s195</p>
<p><strong>Bushfires</strong> s203E I haven't seen it but its possible that the accused intentionally started a fire with reckless disregard if it might spread to vegetation.</p>
<p><strong>Hindering investigation etc</strong> s315</p>
<p><strong>Concealing a serious indictable offence</strong> s316</p>
<p><strong>Tampering etc with evidence</strong> s317</p>
<p><strong>General offence of perverting the course of justice</strong> s319</p>
<p><strong>Accessory after the fact to the first murder</strong> s349</p>
<p>Quite likely, setting fire to a van will also be an offence under environmental law.</p>


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Answer 5: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/westvirginia" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;westvirginia&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;westvirginia&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-westvirginia-tooltip-container">westvirginia</a></p>
<p>The person may face felony charges leading up to 1-5 years in jail and a fine for each count. Even if the self-defense argument prevails and no other charges are pressed against them, they are still guilty of concealing the stabbing victim's body. Also assuming the self-defense claim for the second death is valid, the second body would not fall under this statute as the death was not result of criminal activity.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>WV Code § 61-2-5a</p>
<p>(a) Any person who, by any means, knowingly and willfully conceals, attempts to conceal or who otherwise aids and abets any person to conceal a deceased human body where death occurred as a result of criminal activity is guilty of a felony</p>
</blockquote>


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Answer 6: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/nebraska" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;nebraska&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;nebraska&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-nebraska-tooltip-container">nebraska</a></p>
<p>While this isn't a great match for your case it does give some insight into what could happen.</p>
<p>In the case I am using most of the charges center around damaging the human remains as well as abandoning/concealing them. There are also issues around not reporting the death in the first place and actions taken to try and hide it.</p>
<p><a href="https://apnews.com/article/abortion-charges-nebraska-f330455d60aa3c01534bcb74216f8404" rel="nofollow noreferrer">18-year-old Nebraska woman sentenced to 90 days in jail for burning fetus after abortion</a></p>
<blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p>An 18-year-old northeastern Nebraska woman was sentenced Thursday to 90 days in jail and two years of probation for burning and burying a fetus she aborted with her mother’s help in a case watched by advocates as a slew of states move to restrict abortion access.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Here the charges include damage to the corpse from burying it as well as burying it.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Celeste Burgess, of Norfolk, was sentenced in Madison County after pleading guilty earlier this year to concealing or abandoning a dead body. Two other misdemeanor charges of false reporting and concealing the death of another person were dropped, in an agreement with prosecutors.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Here show that charges include abandoning/concealing the corpse as well as issues around reporting the death</p>
<blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p>Here show that charges include abandoning/concealing the corpse as well as issues around reporting the death</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Jessica Burgess pleaded guilty earlier this month to providing an illegal abortion, false reporting and tampering with human skeletal remains. In exchange for her plea, charges of concealing the death of another person and abortion by someone other than a licensed physician were dismissed. She faces sentencing on Sept. 22.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This shows charges around tampering with human remains.</p>


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Question Title: What does it take to be sentenced to a medium-security prison (US)?

Question Body: <p>It is a trope that when powerful/rich people are sentenced, they are sent to cushy, low-security prisons (think <em>The Wolf of Wall Street</em>).</p>
<p>However, in my book, I'd like a certain character to be sent to a medium-security prison. The only problem is, they're the kind of person that the aforementioned trope applies to. They're a wealthy politician with a lot of influence, and they would certainly do everything in their power to rather wind up in a low-security prison.</p>
<p>That gives the context for my question; what circumstances could lead to a powerful person not being able to weasel their way into a low-security prison?</p>


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Answer 1: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/united-states" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-united-states-tooltip-container">united-states</a></p>
<h3>Short Answer</h3>
<blockquote>
<p>They're a wealthy politician with a lot of influence, and they would
certainly do everything in their power to rather wind up in a
low-security prison.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The easiest way to do it would be to have a sentence of more than twenty but less than thirty years imposed because of a very large dollar amount fraud involving a great many victims (e.g. a large Ponzi scheme). Espionage is another plausible charge that could have the same sort of sentence length.</p>


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<p>This would send them to a medium-security prison despite a lack of &quot;points&quot; from offense severity, a prior criminal record, or a history of violence, lack of gang involvement, or an absence of a prior escape attempt.</p>
<h3>Long answer</h3>
<p>Each U.S. state has its own system.</p>
<p>In the U.S. federal criminal justice system, a convicted felon's assignment to a particular prison is a decision made by the Federal Bureau of Prisons, after the defendant has been sentenced by a federal judge for a particular sentence length for a particular crime. The FBP <a href="https://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5100_008cn.pdf" rel="noreferrer">states</a> that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The Bureau of Prisons shall designate the place of the prisoner's
imprisonment, and shall, subject to bed availability, the prisoner's
security designation, the prisoner's programmatic needs, the
prisoner's mental and medical health needs, any request made by the


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imprisonment, and shall, subject to bed availability, the prisoner's
security designation, the prisoner's programmatic needs, the
prisoner's mental and medical health needs, any request made by the
prisoner related to faith- based needs, recommendations of the
sentencing court, and other security concerns of the Bureau of
Prisons, place the prisoner in a facility as close as practicable to
the prisoner's primary residence, and to the extent practicable, in a
facility within 500 driving miles of that residence.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It is quite an involved process and set of rules. And, there is necessarily flexibility in the system to reflect the availability of prison space at the time of assignment.</p>


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</blockquote>
<p>It is quite an involved process and set of rules. And, there is necessarily flexibility in the system to reflect the availability of prison space at the time of assignment.</p>
<p>The overall context is as follows, according to <a href="https://prisonprofessors.com/security-designation-custody-classification/" rel="noreferrer">a source writing as of November 2017</a> (the same source has at times had an online calculator helping people to predict an assignment):</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The Federal Bureau of Prisons confines 184,855 people. About 83% of
those people, or 154,844 inmates, serve their time inside Bureau of
Prisons facilities. The other people serve their time in privately
managed prisons or other types of facilities. Males make up more than
93% of the federal prison population. Those people serve sentences in
the following types of security levels:</p>
<p>Minimum-security Federal Prison Camps: 32,189 people, or about 17% of
the population</p>


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the following types of security levels:</p>
<p>Minimum-security Federal Prison Camps: 32,189 people, or about 17% of
the population</p>
<p>Low-security Federal Correctional Institutions: 69,437 people, or
about 37% of the population</p>
<p>Medium-security Federal Correctional Institutions: 55,377 or about 30%
of the population</p>
<p>High-security United States Penitentiaries: 21,524 people, or about
12% of the population</p>
<p>Unclassified: 6,980 people, or about 4% of the population</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The full federal BOP policy is <a href="https://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5100_008.pdf" rel="noreferrer">here</a> which notes that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The review process to assign a custody level based on an inmate’s
criminal history, instant offense, and institutional adjustment.  A
custody level (i.e., COMMUNITY, OUT, IN, and MAXIMUM) dictates the
degree of staff supervision required for an individual inmate.</p>
</blockquote>


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custody level (i.e., COMMUNITY, OUT, IN, and MAXIMUM) dictates the
degree of staff supervision required for an individual inmate.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The key table in the rules is below. It is somewhat hard to interpret without the larger context, but is the closest thing to an overall assignment key that exists in the rules. Basically, the left column lists a point score, which provides a default assignment, and each box has exceptions to the usual point score rules:</p>
<p><a href="https://i.stack.imgur.com/GZn7G.png" rel="noreferrer"><img src="https://i.stack.imgur.com/GZn7G.png" alt="enter image description here" /></a></p>


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<p><a href="https://i.stack.imgur.com/GZn7G.png" rel="noreferrer"><img src="https://i.stack.imgur.com/GZn7G.png" alt="enter image description here" /></a></p>
<p>Medium security inmates either have 0-15 points with a prior serious escape attempt or a sentence of 20 years or more remaining, or 16-23 points. But they have less than 24 points, less than 30 years of their sentence remaining, are not part of a disruptive group (read hard core gang member) and have not been involved in a prison disturbance. The circumstances that gets someone to 16-23 points are not simple to describe succinctly.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.frostbussert.com/files/cj_v31n01_sp16_folder_vasquezbussert.pdf" rel="noreferrer">Another source</a> explains the factors involved (PSR is the pre-sentencing report presented to the judge before ruling on a sentence in the case):</p>
<blockquote>
<ol>


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<blockquote>
<ol>
<li><p>Voluntary surrender to custody. Where a court permits a defendant to voluntarily surrender to BOP custody for service of an initial term
of confinement (not supervised release violation), three points are
subtracted from the security point total.</p>
</li>
<li><p>Severity of current offense. Appendix A to Program Statement 5100.08 contains a scale of various offense behaviors, and the Designation Manual provides a corresponding point assignment for
assessed severity. When evaluating offense severity, staff consider
the most severe documented behavior, as set forth in the PSR, not
necessarily the offense of conviction.</p>
</li>
</ol>
</blockquote>
<p>This ranges from 0-7. The key for assigning this score starts at page 97 of the pdf linked.</p>
<blockquote>
<ol start="3">
<li>Criminal history score. Points are assigned based on an offender’s criminal history points, taken from the judgment’s statement of


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<blockquote>
<ol start="3">
<li>Criminal history score. Points are assigned based on an offender’s criminal history points, taken from the judgment’s statement of
reasons or, if not found there, from the PSR. Scoring does not factor
in whether the court found a defendant’s points over – or
underrepresent criminal history.</li>
</ol>
</blockquote>
<p>This ranges from 0-10 based upon the criminal history score assigned at sentencing. If it is absent the BOP will (per the rule linked above):</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(a)Add 3 points for each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one
year and one month;</p>
<p>(b)Add 2 points for each prior sentence of imprisonment of at least
sixty days not counted in (a);</p>
<p>(c)Add 1 point for each prior conviction not counted in (a) or (b), up
to a total of 4 points for this item; and,</p>
<p>(d)Add 2 points if the instant offense is a revocation accompanied by
a new state or federal conviction, or if the instant offense occurred


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to a total of 4 points for this item; and,</p>
<p>(d)Add 2 points if the instant offense is a revocation accompanied by
a new state or federal conviction, or if the instant offense occurred
while under federal supervision including incarceration, probation,
parole or supervised release.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This together with the severity of the crime are major factors.</p>
<blockquote>
<ol start="4">
<li>History of violence. In assessing the violent nature of prior documented findings of guilt (convictions and supervised release
violations), policy distinguishes between “serious” and “minor”
incidents as well as time relative to when the case is being reviewed.
This category does not factor in the instant offense and can change
over time based on an offender’s institutional adjustment (i.e.,
violence in the BOP can result in assignment of points).</li>
</ol>
</blockquote>
<p>The rule provides with regard to this factor:</p>


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over time based on an offender’s institutional adjustment (i.e.,
violence in the BOP can result in assignment of points).</li>
</ol>
</blockquote>
<p>The rule provides with regard to this factor:</p>
<p><a href="https://i.stack.imgur.com/QyLLd.png" rel="noreferrer"><img src="https://i.stack.imgur.com/QyLLd.png" alt="enter image description here" /></a></p>
<blockquote>
<ol start="5">
<li><p>History of escape or attempts. Acts for which there are documented findings of guilt, including absconding from community supervision or
failing to appear for a criminal case, will be scored.</p>
</li>
<li><p>Detainers. Points are scored for detainers, including both those actually lodged and where law enforcement indicates a firm intent to
lodge one. Immigration and Customs Enforcement detainers are not
scored. Age. Given the correlation between age (youth) and negative
institutional adjustment, points are assigned, with inmates under 24


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scored. Age. Given the correlation between age (youth) and negative
institutional adjustment, points are assigned, with inmates under 24
years old receiving eight points and inmates over 55 receiving none.</p>
</li>
<li><p>Education level. Where the PSR verifies a high school degree or GED, no points are assigned. Where neither is verified, two points are
assessed.</p>
</li>
<li><p>Drug/alcohol abuse. Where the PSR documents a defendant’s drug or alcohol abuse within the past five years, one point is assessed. If
there is no known abuse or abuse more than five years old, no points
are added.</p>
</li>
</ol>
<p>An inmate’s security point total corresponds  to a security level from
which staff determine facility placement. However, security point
total is  not dispositive. The application of a public safety factor
(PSF) or a management variable can impact the placement decision. The
application of a PSF, which is not confined to evidence of


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total is  not dispositive. The application of a public safety factor
(PSF) or a management variable can impact the placement decision. The
application of a PSF, which is not confined to evidence of
convictions, is intended to address information suggesting a need for
greater security precautions. Examples include sentence length,
removable alien status, sex offender status, and threat to a
government official. Management variables are grounded in the
“professional judgment of bureau staff” and are used to effectuate an
inmate’s placement at a facility inconsistent with the inmate’s scored
security level. This most commonly occurs when  an inmate poses either
a greater or lesser security risk than his or her assigned security
level denotes or to facilitate program participation (e.g., permit
completion of residential drug treatment despite a drop in security
level).</p>
</blockquote>


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level denotes or to facilitate program participation (e.g., permit
completion of residential drug treatment despite a drop in security
level).</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It is also worth noting that the federal criminal justice system, generally speaking, deals disproportionately with lower risk felons committing white collar crimes and immigration offenses, while state criminal justice systems generally deals with higher risk felons who have mostly committed &quot;blue collar&quot; crimes, often violent ones.</p>


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Answer 2: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/england-and-wales" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-england-and-wales-tooltip-container">england-and-wales</a></p>
<p>Prisoner placements are risk-managed by the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/hm-prison-service" rel="nofollow noreferrer">HM Prison Service</a> (<em>i.e. not the court or police etc</em>) according to the:</p>
<blockquote>
<ul>
<li><p>risk of escape</p>
</li>
<li><p>harm to the public, if they were to escape</p>
</li>
<li><p>threat to the control and stability of a prison</p>
</li>
</ul>
<p><a href="https://prisonjobs.blog.gov.uk/your-a-d-guide-on-prison-categories/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Source: Your A-D guide on prison categories</a></p>
</blockquote>


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</li>
</ul>
<p><a href="https://prisonjobs.blog.gov.uk/your-a-d-guide-on-prison-categories/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Source: Your A-D guide on prison categories</a></p>
</blockquote>
<p>Setting aside bribery, corruption and undue influences the obvious way to prevent your character from weaseling out of being placed at a lower category prison is to prevent them from manipulating the risk assessment - for example, they could try to get downgraded by:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>feigning being an exemplary model prisoner demonstrating good behaviour</p>
</li>
<li><p>making a show of passing on their financial/legal (or even political?) knowledge and skills by actively educating other inmates</p>
</li>
</ul>
<p>One option to counter these weasel-tactics would be to introduce a sceptical character, potentially with inside information, intent on scuppering their plans. But I digress towards being off-topic.</p>
<hr />


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<hr />
<p><sub>Although tagged <a href="/questions/tagged/united-states" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-united-states-tooltip-container">united-states</a>, I have answered according to the <a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/help/on-topic">LawSE Help Centre</a>: &quot;<em>we expect and encourage answers dealing with other jurisdictions ... please tag your answer using the tag markdown: [tag: some-tag]</em>&quot;</sub></p>


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Question Body: <p><em>Part I: <a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/questions/93508/can-you-legally-have-an-unloaded-black-powder-revolver-in-your-carry-on-luggag">Can you legally have an (unloaded) black powder revolver in your carry-on luggage?</a></em></p>
<p>Say that a hypothetical person (&quot;Juan Morales&quot;) has a large clear plastic bag of talcum powder in his checked luggage. Within the talcum powder is several thousands of dollars' worth of delicate jewelry, which it is cushioning and protecting from moisture. Due to a set of bizarre coincidences, the bag of mysterious white powder has been:</p>
<ul>
<li>In front of a (legal) machine gun during a lengthy range day</li>
<li>Liberally misted with Lanacane</li>
<li>On a dying nursing home patient's nightstand while she took nebulized morphine</li>
<li>In a friend's bathroom while he (the friend) was hotboxing marijuana in a state where it's legal</li>


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<li>On a dying nursing home patient's nightstand while she took nebulized morphine</li>
<li>In a friend's bathroom while he (the friend) was hotboxing marijuana in a state where it's legal</li>
<li>In the same bathroom while a recently imprisoned former friend was hotboxing crack cocaine (Mr. Morales did not participate)</li>
</ul>
<p>As a result, it sets off every alarm possible, causing the TSA to arrest him and confiscate his stuff.</p>
<p>Can Mr. Morales sue them for anything? After all, he was arrested despite technically not doing anything wrong, and has lost the legally-owned jewelry that the talcum powder was keeping dry and protected.</p>
<p>EDIT: I forgot to mention that the reason he was going on the flight was to deliver the jewelry to a client (he's a jeweler). As a result of the delay, he lost the client's business.</p>


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<p>EDIT: I forgot to mention that the reason he was going on the flight was to deliver the jewelry to a client (he's a jeweler). As a result of the delay, he lost the client's business.</p>
<p><em>Note: If any of the bizarre coincidences are illegal, ignore them. My point is that there's a false-positive for contraband that causes the TSA to wrongfully arrest him and confiscate $K of his property</em></p>
<p><strong>DISCLAIMER:</strong> In case you didn't figure it out already from the ridiculousness of the scenario, I have absolutely no intention of ever doing this. This is purely a hypothetical &quot;what-if&quot; question.</p>


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Answer 1: <blockquote>
<p>he was arrested despite technically not doing anything wrong</p>
</blockquote>
<p>He was arrested because there was probable cause to believe that he was involved in the commission of a felony.  The arrest was legal even if he was innocent.  He has no basis for a successful lawsuit.</p>


Tags: united-states, air-travel


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Question Title: Can you make the police department pay for damage done to your property if you get swatted?


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Question Body: <p>For purposes of conjecture, say some nameless online troll decides that they hate you. Perhaps you said you don't worship the members of a K-Pop band they like. As a result, they do some research and find your address. They then proceed to call your local police department, reporting a (fictional) hostage situation / homicide in progress / etc. at your address. The police department's SWAT team busts down your door and trashes your house. This is a &quot;prank&quot; called <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swatting" rel="nofollow noreferrer">swatting</a>. As is the troll's intention, it causes a lot of damage to your property, damage you can't afford to get repaired.</p>
<p>Is there any way to get the police department to pay for the damage? After all, they <em>did</em> just come and trash your house despite you having done nothing wrong (besides the horrendous crime of not worshiping the troll's favorite band).</p>


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Answer 1: <p>There is a police power exception to the 5th and 14th Amendment rights to not taking property without due process of law and just compensation.</p>
<p>In a <a href="https://www.denverpost.com/2020/03/11/colorado-swat-house-destroyed-supreme-court/" rel="noreferrer">similar case arising in Greenwood Village, Colorado</a>, an innocent homeowner was denied any relief at trial in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, or on appeal to the 10th Circuit, after his house was trashed by SWAT teams trying to catch a guy accused of mere theft and fleeing police officers. (The U.S. Supreme Court declined to review the case sometime after the linked article was written.)</p>


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<p>But, there does appear to be a circuit split on the issue. The U.S. Court of Appeals for <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230325054103/https://www.wfaa.com/article/news/local/investigates/police-did-tens-thousands-dollars-damage-mckinney-womans-house-she-got-them-pay-eminent-domain/287-89f20e5b-84a1-47f0-9251-02eade1f99d3" rel="noreferrer">the 5th Circuit in a case appealed from a U.S. District Court decision in Texas</a> reached a contrary conclusion in a case between Vicki Baker and the City of McKinney, Texas decided earlier this month in March of 2023 in which it affirmed a U.S. District Court ruling in favor of the homewoner.</p>


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<p>The fact that there is now a circuit split on the issue increases the likelihood that the U.S. Supreme Court would consider a Petition for Certiorari from the 5th Circuit decision in the Texas case, although it is far from a sure thing as <a href="https://libguides.law.umich.edu/scotus" rel="noreferrer">only about 1%</a> of Petitions for Certiorari presented to the U.S. Supreme Court (about 80 out of 7,000 to 8,000 per year) are granted.</p>


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<p>The key issue distinguishing these two rulings is the question of whether the police power exception to the eminent domain obligation of a government applies to cases in which the person whose property is taken is innocent of any wrongdoing and any legally relevant connection to a wrongdoer. Both circuits would agree that a government does not have eminent domain liability under the constitution if, for example, the property destroyed belongs to someone who committed a crime and has their house destroyed in the process of trying to arrest the criminal.</p>


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<p>Also, neither of the decisions disputes that police may, under the police power exception, destroy property in connection with efforts to apprehend a criminal or to prevent a crime, without seeking court approval in the usual situation where there are exigent circumstances that can't wait for the slow process of conducting a court hearing on the question. The question, instead, is whether an innocent property owner has a right to bring an &quot;<a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/inverse_condemnation" rel="noreferrer">inverse condemnation</a>&quot; lawsuit to remedy the damage that the innocent property owner has experienced.</p>


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Answer 2: <p>If the police received a 911 call which was designed to make it appear as if there was a huge danger at your home, and the police act accordingly, that’s bad luck. You should get compensation from the troll if they can be found, but not from the police.</p>
<p>If “trashing your house” was done deliberately to cause damage, and not because police expected a dangerous situation. Then you will have a hard time proving it.</p>
<p>I suspect your home insurance might have to pay for the damage, at least it would be worth checking. They are more likely to pay than the police.</p>


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Answer 3: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/texas" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;texas&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;texas&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-texas-tooltip-container">texas</a></p>
<p>In one particular recent (at the time of this posting) case <a href="https://www.wfaa.com/article/news/local/investigates/police-did-tens-thousands-dollars-damage-mckinney-womans-house-she-got-them-pay-eminent-domain/287-89f20e5b-84a1-47f0-9251-02eade1f99d3" rel="noreferrer">[ref1]</a> <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/nicksibilla/2022/07/11/after-texas-city-refused-to-pay-for-destroying-her-home-woman-wins-nearly-60000/" rel="noreferrer">[ref2]</a> <a href="https://ij.org/press-release/victory-jury-rules-texas-woman-is-entitled-to-59656-after-swat-team-destroyed-her-home-while-pursuing-fugitive/" rel="noreferrer">[ref3]</a>, the homeowner sued not for damages but under 5th amendment's Eminent Domain doctrine.</p>


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<p>The Federal Judge ruled that <em>“the destruction to [Plaintiff]’s home was intentional and foreseeable.”</em></p>
<p>In this case, a fugitive was sheltered inside the plaintiff's house and had no hostage. The plaintiff claimed the defendants (law enforcement) seized the plaintiff's house to capture the fugitive.</p>
<p>The homeowner legal counsel, in a statement, declared it doesn't matter <em>&quot;whether the government official destroying your home has a business card from the Roads Department or the Police Department.&quot;</em></p>
<p>While the damage was caused by the SWAT pursuing a fugitive and not from a prank phone call, it still bears enough similarities.</p>
<p>The case could still go on appeal and be reversed, though.</p>


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Question Title: Can you legally have an (unloaded) black powder revolver in your carry-on luggage?

Question Body: <p><em>Part I of &quot;Annoying the TSA&quot;</em></p>
<p>For good reason, U.S. law forbids people from carrying firearms on planes. However, last I checked, black powder &quot;antique weapons&quot; (such as cap-and-ball revolvers) aren't considered firearms.</p>
<p>With that in mind, would it be legal to carry an unloaded (since you aren't allowed to have black powder or primers) cap-and-ball revolver on a plane?</p>
<p><sup>Note: I'm not asking for legal advice, nor do I plan to actually do so if it's legal; this is just a random &quot;what-if&quot; thought that's been bugging me for the last few months.</sup></p>


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Answer 1: <p>The relevant regulations in <a href="https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-49/subtitle-B/chapter-XII/subchapter-C/part-1540" rel="noreferrer">49 CFR 1540</a> refer to weapons, not firearms, and unless you are specifically permitted, you cannot carry a weapon in your carry-on luggage. The interpretation of &quot;weapon&quot; is given <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2003-02-14/pdf/03-3736.pdf" rel="noreferrer">here</a>, which says</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Weapons are objects that may be used to attack another. TSA considers
an item to be a weapon under 49 CFR 1540.111 if it is created for use
as a weapon or is so similar to an item created as a weapon that it
appears to be, or is easily used as, a weapon.</p>
<p>Weapons include
firearms, as well as realistic replicas of firearms that may
reasonably be thought to be actual weapons. Such realistic replicas
are prohibited because their similarity in appearance to real weapons


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firearms, as well as realistic replicas of firearms that may
reasonably be thought to be actual weapons. Such realistic replicas
are prohibited because their similarity in appearance to real weapons
may allow them to be used to intimidate passengers and flight crew.
The screener has the discretion to determine when a replica is so
realistic that it should be prohibited. Other toy weapons will be
allowed in the sterile areas and cabin.</p>
<p>Partial weapons and parts of weapons also are prohibited because they
may be carried separately by collaborators for assembly subsequent to
entry or boarding. In addition, partial weapons may appear to be
operative and could be used to intimidate passengers and flight crew.</p>
</blockquote>


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Answer 2: <h2>TSA considers Antique Firearms the same as <a href="https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-49/subtitle-B/chapter-XII/subchapter-C/part-1540" rel="noreferrer">any other Weapon</a>, even unloaded ones.</h2>
<blockquote>
<p>CFR 49 § 1540.111 Carriage of weapons, explosives, and incendiaries by individuals.</p>
<p>(a) On an individual's person or accessible property—prohibitions.  Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, <strong>an individual may not have a weapon</strong>, explosive, or incendiary, on or about the individual's person or accessible property—</p>
<p>(2) When the individua<strong>l is entering or in a sterile area</strong>; or</p>
<p>(3) When the individual is attempting to board or onboard an aircraft for which screening is conducted under §§ 1544.201, 1546.201, or 1562.23 of this chapter.</p>
</blockquote>


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<p>(3) When the individual is attempting to board or onboard an aircraft for which screening is conducted under §§ 1544.201, 1546.201, or 1562.23 of this chapter.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Firearms in the relevant law only appear for law enforcement during duties (§ 1540.111 (b)) and the transport in checked luggage. (§ 1540.111 (c)). The Sterile area is past the TSA checkpoint.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.tsa.gov/news/press/releases/2021/08/23/hawaii-man-stopped-after-tsa-catches-him-antique-gun-newark-liberty" rel="noreferrer">In 2021, TSA stopped a person in Newark for trying to fly with an unloaded antique revolver.</a> They could not fly with the gun in their carry-on bag, he was allowed to deposit the gun somewhere off premises, but it is not known if they returned in time to catch their flight.</p>


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Answer 3: <p>Black powder guns are considered firearms, they are just treated differently than modern cartridge fed weapons under the sub-set &quot;antique firearms&quot;.  This category changes how the ATF regulates them, specifically with regard to dealer licensing requirements, shipping, logging sales, performing background checks, etc.</p>
<p>However, the TSA is not part of the ATF, and considering the extensive list of things banned from the passenger cabin of airliners, (<a href="https://www.tsa.gov/travel/security-screening/whatcanibring/firearms" rel="nofollow noreferrer">including BB guns, which are not firearms</a>) it would be illogical to presume that antique status of a weapon might make it acceptable to carry one onto an airplane.</p>


Tags: united-states, is-x-legal, air-travel


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Question Title: Does an illegal mode of creation or fixation remove a work from copyrightability?

Question Body: <p>Does an illegal mode of creation or fixation (such as vandalism by graffiti) mean that the work is not the subject of copyright?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>The <em>Copyright Act</em> provides that (17 U.S.C. <a href="https://www.copyright.gov/title17/92chap1.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">§ 102</a>):</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed<sup>1</sup> in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It also says:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>There is no explicit requirement that the work be legally produced, and there is no exception for copyright protection if the work is illegally produced.</p>


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</blockquote>
<p>There is no explicit requirement that the work be legally produced, and there is no exception for copyright protection if the work is illegally produced.</p>
<p>See also Celia Lerman, &quot;<a href="https://jipel.law.nyu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/NYU_JIPEL_Vol-2-No-2_2_Lerman_Protecting_Artistic_Vandalism.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Protecting Artistic Vandalism: Graffiti and Copyright Law</a>&quot; (2013) 2 N.Y.U. J. Intellectual Property and Entertainment Law 295:</p>
<blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p>there are several examples outside of graffiti where copyright protects right-infringing works. Copyright still attaches to photographs taken that violate privacy rights: a paparazzi photographer has obtained copyright protection over a picture that he took of a celebrity while violating her rights to privacy, and a camp counsellor obtained copyright over a picture of a minor, taken without her parent's permission. A journalist has received copyright protection over an article that reveals state secrets. A student may obtain copyright protection for a painting of a minor killing a policeman, even though the work could constitute an illegal threat under criminal law.</p>
<p>Copyright protection is denied to a work only if the work itself violates copyright. ...</p>


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<p>Copyright protection is denied to a work only if the work itself violates copyright. ...</p>
<p>If U.S. copyright law included a general &quot;illegality clause,&quot; then copyright would not protect works that offend any other body of law. Such clauses are contained in other copyright and trademark laws around the world. U.S. copyright law does not include such a provision. ...</p>
<p>[a vandal's] work can still be protected under copyright, because vandalism does not preclude copyright protection.</p>
</blockquote>
<hr />
<p><sup>1. § 101: &quot;A work is 'fixed' in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.&quot;</sup></p>


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Question Body: <p>A friend said to me the other day that she was worried that she had supported the the &quot;<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Last_Generation_(climate_movement)" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Last Generation</a>&quot; (&quot;Letzte Generation&quot;) organization financially. The Last Generation often blocks the streets of Berlin and other large cities in Germany to encourage politicians to focus more on climate change.</p>
<p>In the past, it has been possible to support the organization through donations to help them afford the legal costs they face after their actions. The background to this is that in Germany the Last Generation organization as a criminal organization because of its activities. As a criminal organization because of its activities. Now my friend is of the opinion that if that were to happen, she would have committed a retroactive offence.  Because supporting a criminal organization in Germany is a punishable offence.</p>


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<p>According to my legal understanding, I would say that an
organization that has been retroactively classified as a criminal organisation does not does not mean that it has committed a criminal offence. So that it has nothing to fear here. Am I right?</p>


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Answer 1: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/england-and-wales" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-england-and-wales-tooltip-container">england-and-wales</a></p>
<p>Short Answer:</p>
<p>Paying legal fees for a criminal organisation is not (by my reading of the law) an offence.  But if it is, retrospective legislation is prohibited in all but a few situations.</p>
<p>Long Answer:</p>
<p>There are two issues here:</p>
<ol>
<li><strong>Support for an organised crime group</strong></li>
</ol>
<p>This is an offence contrary to <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/9/section/45?timeline=false" rel="nofollow noreferrer">section 45</a> Serious Crime Act 2015:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(1) A person who participates in the criminal activities of an organised crime group commits an offence.</p>


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<blockquote>
<p>(1) A person who participates in the criminal activities of an organised crime group commits an offence.</p>
<p>(2) For this purpose, a person participates in the criminal activities of an organised crime group if the person takes part in any activities that the person knows or reasonably suspects—</p>
<ul>
<li><p>(a) are criminal activities of an organised crime group, or</p>
</li>
<li><p>(b) <strong>will help an organised crime group to carry on criminal activities</strong></p>
</li>
</ul>
</blockquote>
<p><strong>HOWEVER</strong> it seems unlikely that &quot;<em>donations to help them afford the legal costs they face after their actions</em>&quot; would meet the emboldened requirements at subsection 2(b) as it does not appear to be supporting &quot;criminal activities.&quot; That said, each case will be considered on its own merits.</p>
<ol start="2">
<li><strong>Retrospective legislation</strong></li>
</ol>


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<ol start="2">
<li><strong>Retrospective legislation</strong></li>
</ol>
<p>Generally, this is prohibited under the European Convention on Human Rights, enacted under <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/schedule/1/part/I/chapter/6?timeline=false" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Article 7</a> Human Rights Act 1988:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>No punishment without law</p>
<p>1 No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed.</p>
<p>2 This Article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations.</p>
</blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p>However, paragraph 2 does allow for retrospective legislation if the need arises. For example the <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1991/13/contents" rel="nofollow noreferrer">War Crimes Act 1991</a> retrospectively criminalises murder etc committed in Germany or its occupied territories during the second world war.</p>
<hr />
<p><sub>Although tagged <a href="/questions/tagged/germany" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-germany-tooltip-container">germany</a>, I have answered according to the <a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/help/on-topic">LawSE Help Centre</a>: &quot;<em>we expect and encourage answers dealing with other jurisdictions ... please tag your answer using the tag markdown: [tag: some-tag]</em>&quot;</sub></p>


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Question Title: Artist liability for illegal art?

Question Body: <p>Have any graffiti artists, in the process of asserting their copyright claim in court over illegally placed works of art, and in doing to by proving themselves to the the creator of the works, been subsequently found financially liable for the cost of removing or painting over their own work?  (either as part of the proceedings, or in a later counter-suit?)</p>
<p>And/or have are there cases where revenue from the copyright infringer's use of the art was funneled towards cleanup costs instead of the artist?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>Graffiti artists are routinely found financially liable for their work, but assertions of copyright infringement by graffiti artists are vanishingly rare, so I don't know if that has ever happened in that context.</p>
<p>In many jurisdictions, filing a lawsuit against someone waives any statute of limitations defense you may have against counterclaims filed by the person you are suing in any related matter. So, if that rule applies, a counterclaim for financial loss from graffiti could be brought in a copyright infringement lawsuit, even though the statute of limitations on the damages claim would otherwise have run. But, I don't know if such a rule applies to copyright infringement claims filed in federal court.</p>


Tags: united-states, copyright, liability


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Question Body: <p>I had a &quot;Property (Contracting Out) Agreement&quot; (Prenup)   drawn about the time I got married many years ago.</p>
<p>Recent life events require that I revisit my financial affairs (not related to my Marriage), and my Lawyer advised that a Prenup is a  &quot;Living Document&quot; and should be reviewed.  He persisted with this view - possibly for reasons I don't grasp - even when I advised him I really do not want to review the Prenup &quot;and that it is what it is&quot; (because it will put unnecessary stress on my relationship, and because I can't see what revisiting it achieves and it would be a point of pain in my relationship).</p>
<p>My lawyers advice about it being a living document sounds wrong and feels like the lawyer is just trying to up their billables at my expense without having my interests forefront - which would be a concerning development. <strong>Is his advice that a Prenup is a living document correct?</strong></p>


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Answer 1: <h2>Sounds like you aren't sharing the same definition of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Living_document" rel="nofollow noreferrer">living document</a></h2>
<p>A prenup is simply a contract, and most contracts are &quot;fixed&quot; at the time of their formation: the rights and obligations of each party are defined for all time (or for as long as the contract lasts). This is not what I and I suspect you, would understand to be a living document.</p>
<p>However, some contracts contain terms that allow their terms to be varied - either by agreement or unilaterally. That sort of contract would be a living document.</p>
<p>Notwithstanding, any contract can be varied or replaced with a new contract until by agreement of all parties as long as the contract is still on foot. Your lawyer may be thinking of the prenup in this way, and, at a stretch, that would make it a living document.</p>


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<p>Your lawyer's advice is sound - your circumstances have changed, and you should at least look at the prenup to decide if you are still happy with its terms in light of your new circumstances. That's a review.</p>
<p>It most definitely &quot;is what it is&quot;, but if &quot;what it is&quot; doesn't suit your relationship's current status, you can, with the agreement of your partner, change &quot;what it is&quot;. Without reviewing it, you can't make an informed decision if the current agreement even makes sense in the light of the present. It may be that you're perfectly happy with &quot;what it is&quot;, or that you're unhappy but trying to change it would make you more unhappy, or that discussing it like adults with your partner and deciding to change or not change is a good or bad idea. But you can't know unless you do the review first.</p>


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Answer 2: <blockquote>
<p>Is his advice that a Prenup is a living document correct?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In a sense. It's a smart advice of a salesperson.</p>
<p>With or without a lawyer, you need to understand if the existing prenup still works for you.</p>
<p>Steps to get that understanding:</p>
<ol>
<li><p>Read the existing prenup, make sure you understand every fancy legal term used in it and how it applied to you at the time it was written.</p>
</li>
<li><p>Identify the differences in your current situation to what it was back then.</p>
</li>
<li><p>Figure if the prenup still works for you now. If not, figure how would you like to change it, and whether your partner would agree.</p>
</li>
</ol>
<p>You would need a lawyer only if:</p>
<ul>
<li>You can't do the above on your own; or</li>


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</li>
</ol>
<p>You would need a lawyer only if:</p>
<ul>
<li>You can't do the above on your own; or</li>
<li>You can, and you realise that you actually want to make changes to the prenup. These would need to comply with <a href="https://legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1976/0166/latest/DLM441396.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">s 21F of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976</a>.</li>
</ul>


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Question Title: Can an auto-reply be considered assent/agreement?

Question Body: <p>The CEO of a certain company set multiple important public email accounts to autoreply to all messages with the poop emoji. Importantly, there is no indication that it's an autoreply. Someone had the funny idea to send the account an email with a contract to sell the company for a small (but not unreasonable) amount along with &quot;If you agree, reply with the poop emoji&quot;. And the account replied as expected.</p>
<p>Practically, I'm sure this won't work. But, what is the legal explanation for why not? Why is this reply not considered an agreement to sell the company?</p>
<p>Fun follow-up: Could someone get out of a contract by proving that their email agreeing to it (e.g., &quot;Yes, I agree to the contract&quot;) was an autoreply?</p>
<p>(assuming US laws)</p>


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Answer 1: <blockquote>
<p>Why is this reply not considered an agreement to sell the company?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Because a sender's opportunism regarding the bizarre contents of the autoreply preclude a finding that there is a meeting of the minds.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Could someone get out of a contract by proving that their email agreeing to it (e.g., &quot;Yes, I agree to the contract&quot;) was an autoreply?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It mostly depends on the element of authorization to set up the autoreply that way.</p>
<p>If the person who wrote the autoreply was authorized by the user of the email account to set it up that way, the contract binds the user. This form of blind and reckless formation of contracts is an extreme scenario of <a href="http://www.oneclubofjusticides.com/p/restatement-second-contracts.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Restatement (Second) of Contracts</a> at §154(b).</p>


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<p>The contract might be null and void as unreasonable, contrary to public policy, and/or on other grounds. But a wide range of scenarios would fall short of warranting a nullification of the contract.</p>
<p>(Disclaimer: I am affiliated with the linked site.)</p>


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Answer 2: <p>The first and most important of the 3 conditions for a binding contract (mutual understanding and agreement to the terms, exchange of value, not criminal) prevents a binding contract from being forced on someone.</p>
<p>Signing and everything else is secondary, Mr Poop could sign a paper contract with the same terms, in front of the President, both Houses, and all 9 justices, and as long as it was clear that he didn’t mean it, all the paper would be is souvenir autograph, not a binding contract.</p>


Tags: united-states, contract-law


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Question Title: How to best approach dealing with a cybercriminal in a distant country harassing an entire internet community?


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Question Body: <p>For years now, one person has been persistently doing everything they could to make the lives of several administrators/moderators miserable and as a consequence directly and indirectly prevented the normal functioning of the whole internet community these people are responsible for. This person keeps changing usernames and IP addresses, uses VPNs whenever needed and is actively spending money to keep doing what they're doing so any attempt at getting rid of them is futile.</p>
<p>Here's what they have done over the span of a few years:</p>
<ul>
<li>DDoSing several different server whenever there's activity on them. They have already done hundreds of DDoS attacks and keep doing them several times a week.</li>
<li>general harassment of several different people</li>
<li>finding the family members of some of these people and harassing them as well</li>


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<li>general harassment of several different people</li>
<li>finding the family members of some of these people and harassing them as well</li>
<li>death threats (not ones that could be taken seriously but this is not necessarily clear to some of the people that received them)</li>
</ul>
<p>Police was contacted in the past but they didn't express much interest in taking any action. This person is located in a relatively faraway country and there's no core member of our community from the same geographical area.</p>
<p>One thing is clear. This person has no life and they get a kick out of what they're doing so they are not going to stop by themselves any time soon.
There's a good few people in our community that are sick of this person and willing to take whatever action is needed for them to stop.</p>


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There's a good few people in our community that are sick of this person and willing to take whatever action is needed for them to stop.</p>
<p>We know this person's full name, location, primary IP address and more, however, it would be difficult to actually prove their real identity to the authorities. It would be easy to retaliate in a similar manner to what we received but that's not what we want to do. We also don't want to flood police departments with complaints in hope that they will finally do something once they get annoyed enough. But if we can we want to use our numerical advantage and finally put a stop to this madness.</p>
<p>The offender is located in Turkey. The affected servers and people are located in several European countries and the USA.</p>
<p>What's the best course of action to take?</p>
<p>I apologize if this question is not fit for this site but I'll take any pointers I can get to help with this situation.</p>


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Answer 1: <ul>
<li>You <strong>believe</strong> you know the address.<br />
I write &quot;believe&quot; because this might be yet another level of misdirection or a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/08/10/lawsuit-how-a-quiet-kansas-home-wound-up-with-600-million-ip-addresses-and-a-world-of-trouble/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">systematic error in IP geolocation</a>. But assume that your information is true. There is a state where this happens, with law enforcement agencies.</li>
<li>Is the conduct <strong>criminal</strong> where the perpetrator lives?<br />
Countries interpret the freedom of speech in different ways. In many, it is no crime to use a VPN to disguise the own IP, or to use an alias on the web. But in many countries, the activities you describe would amount to stalking, which can be a crime.</li>
<li>You mention that the police takes little interest.<br />


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<li>You mention that the police takes little interest.<br />
In many countries, the police prioritize specific, real-world incidents (cars being stolen, drugs being sold) over having to resolve an IP and probably getting nowhere. But it is often possible for the victim to file first a criminal complaint, and then a complaint against the prosecution if the case is not charged.</li>
</ul>
<p>As long as you do not name countries, I cannot get more specific.</p>


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Question Title: What is the difference between trespass on a venue and theft of services?

Question Body: <p>Alice sneaks into a concert venue and enjoys the show.</p>
<p>Bob sneaks into a spa to enjoy a jacuzzi and steam bath.</p>
<p>Charlotte sneaks past the usher into a cinema and watches a film.</p>
<p>Have each of these committed theft of services or merely a civil trespass?</p>


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Answer 1: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/england-and-wales" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-england-and-wales-tooltip-container">england-and-wales</a></p>
<p>They each committed both the civil tort of trespass (<a href="https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trespass_in_English_law" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Wikipedia</a>) and the criminal offence of Making off without payment contrary to s3 Theft Act 1978 (<a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1978/31/section/3" rel="nofollow noreferrer">legislation</a>; <a href="https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/theft-act-offences#_Theft52" rel="nofollow noreferrer">CPS guidance</a>).</p>


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<p>A person might have explicit or implied permission to enter a cinema building, but the person doesn't have licence to do anything they want whatsoever in the building. When they enter an area without permission, or they exceed their licence, they commit trespass. If they watch a film and leave with no intention to pay, then they commit s3 Theft.</p>


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Question Title: Does distributing compiled code with &quot;no reverse engineering&quot; notice amount to pre-patent publication?


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Question Body: <p>If I made an invention of a patentable computer algorithm, and then implemented it, <em>compiled</em> and published a program online, while retaining the copyright notice like &quot;reverse engineering is strictly prohibited&quot; (which makes it protected from reverse engineering by law, at least European law afaik), would it amount to a pre-patent publication of the invention? Technically if nobody is legally allowed to study the program, they wouldn't have the means to derive at the invention? Of course they could study it &quot;quietly&quot; and possibly come up with their own algorithm, but my question is about whether the patent court would say that I've published it which makes it impossible for me to patent it (I do know about a 6-month post-publication period that still allows me to patent in some jurisdictions).</p>


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<p>As a follow-up question, would the same case of pre-patent publication of compiled code help me to claim the prior art if somebody else then went on to patent it themselves?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>This supposes that the patentable concept can’t be learned form the operation of the whole program and hiding the invention while making use of the invention in public is not a disclosure.</p>
<p>However, in the US there is a famous case</p>
<blockquote>
<p>In re Blaisdell, 242 F.2d 779, 783, 113 USPQ 289, 292 (CCPA 1957); Hall v. Macneale, 107 U.S. 90, 96-97 (1882); Ex parte Kuklo, 25 USPQ2d 1387, 1390 (Bd. Pat. App. &amp; Inter. 1992)</p>
</blockquote>
<p>that concluded a public demonstration that didn’t expose the inner workings did start the clock on a bar to patentability. See previous question <a href="https://patents.stackexchange.com/questions/20886/would-the-demonstration-of-an-invention-be-considered-public-disclosure">https://patents.stackexchange.com/questions/20886/would-the-demonstration-of-an-invention-be-considered-public-disclosure</a></p>


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<p>The answer (from me) has the caveat that this is a pre-AIA case and courts might come to a different answer under that current law.</p>
<p>The U.S. has viewed public use, especially commercial public use, as disqualifying (after a grace period) but the rest of the world puts its emphasis on actual disclosure of the inventive concept so this result might be different elsewhere.</p>
<p>One thought experiment would be to analogize with an article in a widely available journal with the words Don’t read the article that starts on page 19 on the cover. From a disclosure point of view I do not think that is different from it being possible, but illegal, to read.</p>


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Answer 2: <p>I don’t think anyone anticipated that the “prior art” could have been created by illegal means. Something simpler, you printed a description of your invention and locked it into a safe. I crack the safe and publish that description.</p>
<p>IF this counts as prior art (a big if), and you can’t get the patent, and you lose money due to my illegal actions, then you can sue me for the damages.</p>


Tags: patents


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Question Title: Is it legal to place difficult-to-remove deliberately-annoying alarms in a building without permission to do so?

Question Body: <p>In the UK, a group of unaffiliated people went to a banquet by Just Stop Oil, a climate change activist group, and released electronic alarms tied to balloons. The banquet took place in a building with high ceilings, so even with a ladder, no one could reach the balloons or alarms to disable them. Was placing the balloons illegal?</p>
<p>Although the banquet was secular, it took place in a church building. Does this make a difference?</p>
<p>Starting at 8:10: <a href="https://youtu.be/y6flblkVh1I" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://youtu.be/y6flblkVh1I</a></p>


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Answer 1: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/australia" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-australia-tooltip-container">australia</a></p>
<p>There are likely several offences under the <em>Inclosed Lands Protection Act</em> 1901.</p>
<p>Under <a href="http://www8.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/ilpa1901264/s4.html" rel="noreferrer">s4</a> it is unlawful to enter into inclosed lands (which includes all buildings) without the consent of the owner or controller. The balloon releasers did not have explicit permission and entering with the intent to disrupt means they cannot rely upon implied permission.</p>


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<p><a href="http://www8.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/ilpa1901264/s4b.html" rel="noreferrer">s4B</a> makes this an aggravated offence if the intention for entering is to disrupt any business or undertaking taking place on the inclosed lands. Because there were 3 or more people involved, the maximum penalty is 200 penalty units (currently $22,000) or 3 years.</p>
<p>In addition, the occupiers could seek damages under the torts of trespass or nuisance.</p>


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Answer 2: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/england-and-wales" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-england-and-wales-tooltip-container">england-and-wales</a></p>
<p>The more likely offence, if at all<sup>1</sup>, would be contrary to <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1986/64/section/4A?timeline=false" rel="nofollow noreferrer">section 4A</a> Public Order Act</p>
<blockquote>
<p>A person is guilty of an offence if, with intent to cause a person ... distress, he uses ... disorderly behaviour ... thereby causing that or another person distress.</p>
<p>An offence under this section may be committed in a public or a private place.</p>
<p>[<em>edited for ease of reading</em>]</p>
</blockquote>


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<p>An offence under this section may be committed in a public or a private place.</p>
<p>[<em>edited for ease of reading</em>]</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Whether behaviour can be properly categorised as disorderly is a question of fact. Disorderly behaviour does not require any element of violence, actual or threatened; and it includes conduct that is not necessarily threatening or abusive. <a href="https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/public-order-offences-incorporating-charging-standard" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Source: CPS, Public Order Offences</a></p>
<p><strong>FOR GENERAL INTEREST AND AWARENESS</strong>:</p>
<p>There are a number of <em>potentially</em> related offences that I have discounted for the reasons shown:</p>
<ul>


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<p><strong>FOR GENERAL INTEREST AND AWARENESS</strong>:</p>
<p>There are a number of <em>potentially</em> related offences that I have discounted for the reasons shown:</p>
<ul>
<li><p><strong>LOCKING ON</strong> contrary to <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2023/15/part/1/crossheading/offences-relating-to-locking-on?timeline=false" rel="nofollow noreferrer">sections 1 and 2</a> Public Order Act 2023 - fails to meet the definition of <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2023/15/section/34?timeline=false" rel="nofollow noreferrer">serious disruption</a></p>
</li>
<li><p><strong>TRESPASSORY ASSEMBLIES</strong> contrary to <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1986/64/section/14A?timeline=false" rel="nofollow noreferrer">section 14A</a> Public Order Act 1986 - can only be committed in the &quot;open air&quot;</p>
</li>


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</li>
<li><p><strong>BURGLARY</strong> contrary to <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1968/60/section/9?timeline=false" rel="nofollow noreferrer">section 9(1)(a)</a> Theft Act 1968 - hinges on the definition of &quot;criminal damage&quot; (very tenuous IMO)</p>
</li>
<li><p><strong>TRESPASS ON DESIGNATED SITE</strong> contrary to <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/15/part/4/crossheading/trespass-on-designated-site?timeline=false" rel="nofollow noreferrer">section 128</a> Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 - fails to meet the definitions of &quot;protected or designated site&quot;</p>
</li>
</ul>
<hr />
<p><sup>1</sup><sub>There is nothing on open source nor via mainstream media (that I can find) to say whether a complaint has been made to the police or a criminal investigation is underway so this may all be moot.</sub></p>


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Answer 3: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/england-and-wales" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-england-and-wales-tooltip-container">england-and-wales</a></p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1994/33/section/68" rel="nofollow noreferrer">offence of aggravated trespass, s68 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994</a>, seems to fit the circumstances on the face of them.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(1)A person commits the offence of aggravated trespass if he
trespasses on land and, in relation to any lawful activity which
persons are engaging in or are about to engage in on that or adjoining
land, does there anything which is intended by him to have the effect—</p>
<p>(a)of intimidating those persons or any of them so as to deter them or
any of them from engaging in that activity,</p>
<p>(b)of obstructing that activity, or</p>


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<p>(a)of intimidating those persons or any of them so as to deter them or
any of them from engaging in that activity,</p>
<p>(b)of obstructing that activity, or</p>
<p>(c)of disrupting that activity.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It doesn't provide for a defence or lawful excuse.*</p>
<p>&quot;Land&quot; includes buildings: <a href="https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2010/1814.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">DPP v Chivers [2010] EWHC 1814 (Admin)</a>.</p>
<p>My understanding is that the people who set the alarms were invited to the banquet. However, the fact of the invitation of the banquet did not give them licence to release electronic alarms tied to balloons at the banquet.</p>
<p>The act need not be illegal in itself. The necessary element is that the person carried out the act with the intention of intimidating, obstructing or disrupting. The people who released the balloons seem to openly admit to intention to disrupt the banquet.</p>


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<p>However, I doubt there will be any prosecutions in these particular circumstances. In which case the behaviour was legal.</p>
<p><sup>*In contrast, <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1980/66/section/137" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Penalty for wilful obstruction s137 Highways Act 1980</a> starts, &quot;If a person, without lawful authority or excuse&quot;. This is what Just Stop Oil rely on when they slow-walk along a road. They have the excuse of exercising the right to freedom of protest; they excercise their rights within the constraints so far tolerated by the authorities. Fewer people seem to be aware of the &quot;lawful authority or excuse&quot; than claim awareness of the Highways Act.</sup></p>


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Question Title: Could SCOTUS ban the pointing of guns at jurors?

Question Body: <p>With the Rittenhouse fiasco were a prosecutor pointed an assault rifle at jurors. Could SCOTUS give guidance as to how the issue of fire arms in the court room should be handled? And more specifically could SCOTUS regulate in what manner in which firearms are pointed. (Specifically not at jurors)</p>
<p>Would SCOTUS be able to govern such an issue or does that fall outside it's jurisdiction? I would be interested in what manner SCOTUS has influence on issues of a more practical nature in regards to lower courts.</p>


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Answer 1: <p>The U.S. Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to set everyday procedural rules in state court, although it can mandate processes that flow from the constitution. In criminal cases, this allows it to regulate courtroom conduct that is prejudicial to defendants. The U.S. Supreme Court, for example, has prohibited keeping criminal defendants facing trial in a cage in the courtroom as is common in many jurisdictions elsewhere in the world.</p>
<p>The Rittenhouse case took place in state court, over which the U.S. Supreme Court has limited authority in such matters.</p>
<p>On the other hand, the U.S. Supreme Court has broad authority to establish court rules in the federal courts and could adopt rules in those courts if it deemed fit, and if its proposed rules were not legislatively vetoed by Congress.</p>


Tags: jurisdiction, us-supreme-court


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Question Title: Can legal/ pre-action correspondence with a business be subject to a SAR?

Question Body: <p>Bob has been harmed by a business ACME inc. He sends them a letter before claiming damages as under the pre action protocol. They send him a reply.</p>
<p>Bob loses his copy of both of these articles of correspondence, but would like to refer back to them. Can he request them from ACME Inc. Under the DPA 2018?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>Maybe not. <a href="https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/uk-gdpr-guidance-and-resources/individual-rights/right-of-access/how-should-we-supply-information-to-the-requester/#format" rel="nofollow noreferrer">The ICO says</a> that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The right of access enables individuals to obtain their personal data rather than giving them a right to see copies of documents containing their personal data.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It might be valid to interpret the DPA / UKGDPR in a way that the relevant personal data undergoing processing in their system is the <em>existence</em> of the letters, but that you are not entitled to a <em>copy</em> of the letters. This is in line with the purpose of the right to access, that you can check what data they are processing about you and whether it is correct. If that argument holds and the data subject insists on receiving a copy of the letters, it might be legitimate to charge them a fee for these copies.</p>


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<p>But in practice:</p>
<ul>
<li>The data controller might not make this argument and just hand over the copies. It is worth a try.</li>
<li>A right to access founded in data protection might not be the only way to receive a copy of these materials. If the letters are relevant for legal proceedings, they could perhaps be requested during the disclosure process.</li>
</ul>


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Question Title: Can I legally give someone the right to cannibalize me?

Question Body: <p>Let say I and a friend are stranded somewhere, starving, and confident rescue will not come until we both have starved.  Realizing that it makes more sense for one to live then both of us to starve we draw straws and I draw poorly.  I give my friend permission to both kill me and eat my body to survive.</p>
<p>I've agreed to this plan, perhaps we even record me on video giving him permission, saying I'm of sane mind and why I made the decision etc.</p>
<p>My friend gets home afterwards and tells everyone how great I tasted.  For some reason people get upset and call the police.</p>
<p>My question, is my friend guilty of a crime?  Has my permission, and the necessity of the situation, made his actions legal?</p>


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Answer 1: <h2><a href="/questions/tagged/germany" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-germany-tooltip-container">germany</a></h2>
<p>In Germany this is a solved matter:</p>
<ul>
<li>Killing on request is illegal.</li>
<li>Killing someone to consume them can be <em>Mord</em>.</li>
<li>Eating human remains is illegal, <strong>even</strong> with consent of the dead.</li>
</ul>


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<li>Killing on request is illegal.</li>
<li>Killing someone to consume them can be <em>Mord</em>.</li>
<li>Eating human remains is illegal, <strong>even</strong> with consent of the dead.</li>
</ul>
<p>Why do we know this? Because <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armin_Meiwes" rel="noreferrer">Armin Meiwes</a> did exactly that: he was involved in killing Bernd-Jürgen Armando Brandes, who wanted to die, and ate the remains of him. He currently is incarcerated for life due to the conviction of Mord. This is because he was found to have killed for his own sexual gratification - one of the factors that can turn an unlawful killing/<em>Totschlag</em> (<a href="https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgb/__212.html" rel="noreferrer">§ 212 StGB</a>) (~manslaughter) into Mord (<a href="https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgb/__211.html" rel="noreferrer">§ 211 StGB</a>) (~murder 1st degree) under german law.</p>


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<p>Consuming the remains of a human body is, as the courts found, <a href="https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/St%C3%B6rung_der_Totenruhe" rel="noreferrer"><em>Störung der Totenruhe</em></a> under <a href="https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgb/__168.html" rel="noreferrer">§ 168 StgB</a> (disturbing the rest of human remains). It is not possible to consent to being eaten, as you can not give your body to anything but research or medical education legally and you have to be buried in a designated graveyard.</p>


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Answer 2: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/canada" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-canada-tooltip-container">canada</a></p>
<p>If your friend has not guilty of an offence, it is not because of consent. Consent is vitiated when the accused intends and causes serious bodily harm to the other (<em>R. v. Paice</em>, <a href="https://canlii.ca/t/1k6m2#par18" rel="nofollow noreferrer">2005 SCC 22 at para. 18</a>).</p>
<p>However, the defence of necessity <em>may</em> be available, although the Supreme Court has never directly decided this issue. See <em>R. v. Latimer</em>, <a href="https://canlii.ca/t/523c#par40" rel="nofollow noreferrer">2001 SCC 1 at para. 40</a> (also surveying the law in other jurisdictions):</p>
<blockquote>


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<p>The third requirement for the necessity defence is proportionality; it requires the trial judge to consider, as a question of law rather than fact, whether the harm avoided was proportionate to the harm inflicted.  It is difficult, at the conceptual level, to imagine a circumstance in which the proportionality requirement could be met for a homicide.  <strong>We leave open, if and until it arises, the question of whether the proportionality requirement could be met in a homicide situation</strong>.  <strong>In England, the defence of necessity is probably not available for homicide</strong>:  <em>R. v. Howe</em>, [1987] 1 A.C. 417 (H.L.), at pp. 453 and 429; J. Smith, <em>Smith &amp; Hogan: Criminal Law</em> (9th ed. 1999), at pp. 249-51.  The famous case of <em>R. v. Dudley and Stephens</em> (1884), 14 Q.B.D. 273, involving cannibalism on the high seas, is often cited as establishing the unavailability of the defence of necessity for homicide, although the case is not conclusive:


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(1884), 14 Q.B.D. 273, involving cannibalism on the high seas, is often cited as establishing the unavailability of the defence of necessity for homicide, although the case is not conclusive:  see R. Card, Card Cross and Jones: Criminal Law (12th ed. 1992), at p. 532; <em>Smith &amp; Hogan: Criminal Law</em>, <em>supra</em>, at pp. 249 and 251.  The Law Reform Commission of Canada has suggested the defence should not be available for a person who intentionally kills or seriously harms another person:  <em>Report on Recodifying Criminal Law</em> (1987), at p. 36.   <strong>American jurisdictions are divided on this question, with a number of them denying the necessity defence for murder</strong>:  P. H. Robinson, <em>Criminal Law Defenses</em> (1984), vol. 2, at pp. 63-65; see also <em>United States v. Holmes</em>, 26 F. Cas. 360 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842) (No. 15,383).  The American <em>Model Penal Code</em> proposes that the defence of necessity would be available for homicide:  American


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States v. Holmes</em>, 26 F. Cas. 360 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842) (No. 15,383).  The American <em>Model Penal Code</em> proposes that the defence of necessity would be available for homicide:  American Law Institute, <em>Model Penal Code and Commentaries</em> (1985), Part I, vol. 2,  at § 3.02, pp. 14-15; see also W. R. LaFave and A. W. Scott, Jr., <em>Substantive Criminal Law</em> (1986), vol. 1, at p. 634.</p>


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Question Title: What is “private law”?

Question Body: <p><a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/section/156" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Section 156 of the Equality Act 2010</a> says:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>A failure in respect of a performance of a duty imposed by or under this Chapter does not confer a cause of action at private law.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>What does the phrase <em>at private law</em> mean?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>As @James K indicated in a comment:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Private law involves relationships between individuals, such as the law of contracts and torts, (as it is called in the common law), and the law of obligations (as it is called in civil legal systems). It is to be distinguished from public law, which deals with relationships between both natural and artificial persons (i.e., organizations) and the state, including regulatory statutes, penal law and other law that affects the public order. <strong>In general terms, private law involves interactions between private individuals</strong>, whereas public law involves interrelations between the state and the general population.</p>
<p><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Private_law" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Source: Wikipedia</a></p>
</blockquote>


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<p><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Private_law" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Source: Wikipedia</a></p>
</blockquote>
<p>The effect of section 156 is that anyone adversely affected by a public authority's failings under <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/part/11/chapter/1?timeline=false" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Part 11, Chapter 1</a> cannot sue: any redress is by way of judicial review.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/notes/division/3/11/1/8" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Explanatory Note</a> to section 156 offers this example:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>A local council fails to give due regard to the requirements of the public sector equality duty when deciding to stop funding a local women’s refuge. An individual would not be able to sue the local council as a result and claim compensation. She would need to consider whether to pursue judicial review proceedings.</p>
</blockquote>


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Question Title: Do schools have permission to use pictures containing my face taken inside school forever if I agreed to it?


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Question Body: <p>On day one of my first year in high school me and basically every other students were given a few documents to sign. One of them included a clause that allowed the school to publish pictures of us doing activities on the school website. Back then I was not that privacy-conscious and my homeroom teacher pressured us to quickly sign all of them so I did. I don't remember anyone questioning the reasoning behind the clause.</p>
<p>After more than a decade past graduation, the school website appeared in my search results so I took a look. I found some pictures of me and some of them were embarrassing and/or really cringe. I would rather have them removed so I contacted the school and politely asked for the removal of about a dozen photos. They declined, citing the document that everyone signs.</p>


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<p>Does the school really have rights to the photos for eternity? Does the CCPA or COPPA provide any protection for me in this case? Had I been an EU resident, could I have invoked GDPR and have the photos removed without hassle?</p>


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Answer 1: <h2>There are not enough facts to draw a conclusion</h2>
<p>First, it’s not clear that the document you signed amounts to a contract. For example, what consideration did the school give you in return for the permission you gave them? Providing you with an education doesn’t count - they were legally obliged to do that already.</p>
<p>If it is a contract then whether and how it can be revoked would depend on the terms of that contract witch I’m guessing you don’t have a copy of. Notwithstanding, as a minor, you have the right to void the contract until a reasonable time after you turn 18. Even if it is now many years since that happened, it might be reasonable since you only just discovered the website.</p>
<p>If it isn’t a contract, then it would be revocable at any time.</p>
<h2>Practicalities</h2>


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<p>If it isn’t a contract, then it would be revocable at any time.</p>
<h2>Practicalities</h2>
<p>Make a fuss and they may take the photos down even if they are not obliged to. They presumably have plenty of photos of kids who aren’t you and aren’t complaining and if you make it so it’s easier to change the website than to deal with you, thy’ll change the website.</p>
<p>I suspect their inertia is because they once paid a web developer to create the site, it has never since been updated, they don’t know how to do it, and they don’t want to have to pay someone to find out. Otherwise, why would they have photos of ex-students rather than current students? If so, an offer by you to cover the costs, might solve your problem.</p>


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Answer 2: <p>The first question is, is the school required to obtain your consent. The answer is highly jurisdiction-dependent. California is very protective of the individual's personality right and there are specific statutes that define this right. Alaska does not recognize &quot;right of publicity&quot; even on common law grounds, but Ohio does recognize a common law right of publicity. Idaho recognizes a general right of privacy, but no published ruling has recognized a right of publicity that would require consent to photograph a person in a public place.</p>


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<p><a href="https://apps.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=63.60&amp;full=true" rel="noreferrer">Washington</a> statutorily recognizes the right of publicity. That right is &quot;freely transferable, assignable, and licensable, in whole or in part, by contract or inter vivos transfer&quot;. However, permission is not required in case of &quot;matters of cultural, historical, political, religious, educational, newsworthy, or public interest, including, without limitation, comment, criticism, satire, and parody&quot;. Therefore defendants could argue that permission is not required. If we assume that there was contractual licencing of the right of publicity, the question is whether the contract can not be repudiated. <a href="https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=26.28.030" rel="noreferrer">RCW 26.28.030</a> says that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>A minor is bound, not only by contracts for necessaries, but also by
his or her other contracts, unless he or she disaffirms them within a


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<blockquote>
<p>A minor is bound, not only by contracts for necessaries, but also by
his or her other contracts, unless he or she disaffirms them within a
reasonable time after he or she attains his or her majority, and
restores to the other party all money and property received by him or
her by virtue of the contract, and remaining within his or her control
at any time after his or her attaining his or her majority.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>You could have repudiated that agreement some years ago, but that reasonable time has passed.</p>


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Answer 3: <p>Depending on jurisdiction, the right to any picture of you may be yours. Some countries allow taking and publishing pictures of you, as long as you are in public or on the picture taker's private property.</p>
<p>However, you explicitly gave them permission to take pictures and use your pictures.</p>
<p>Assuming they do indeed show you on school ground doing school activities, there is little you can do.</p>
<p>The only option you may have is your age when signing. You said it was in school, so if you were very young, you may have a case where your consent is actually not valid, because you were to young to realize what that specific thing you signed meant.</p>
<p>To find out whether this might be a loophole, contact a local lawyer that knows your jurisdiction's age restrictions on consenting to specific things and tell them the details including your age at the time this was signed.</p>


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<p>On the &quot;technically not about the law, but still a solution&quot; side, you can have that lawyer write the school a letter. Sometimes, a lawyer's letterhead on a real piece of paper does way more than any legal construct or email that may come in. They may not want to find out whether they are right, when avoiding legal problems can be as easy as removing a picture.</p>


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Answer 4: <blockquote>
<p>They declined, citing the document that everyone signs.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Ask to see their copy of the release that you signed.  Since this was some number of years ago, I'd wager that they don't actually have it.  If they don't have a signed release form, then they can't claim that as the basis to use your photo. &quot;Trust us, you signed a release at one point&quot; isn't a legally-valid argument.</p>
<p>If they <em>can</em> somehow produce the release form, it should have a date on it. You'll be able to calculate your exact age at that time and evaluate whether you were legally capable of entering into that sort of contract according to the laws of your particular locale (typically 18 in the US).</p>


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Answer 5: <p>At least in the United States, <em><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/False_light" rel="nofollow noreferrer">False Light</a></em> is a tort (claim) you can make.  Unlike defamation, the statements are factual, but portray a misleading impression of the person.</p>
<p>So if they are representing you in a cringe way, you could have a cause for action.</p>
<p>Note that they would have a defense if you are actually cringe. :)</p>


Tags: contract-law, gdpr, privacy, ccpa, coppa


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Question Title: How do you find what regulations have been made pursuant to a particular enabling legislation in the U.K.?

Question Body: <p>How do you find what regulations or other statutory instruments have been made pursuant to a particular enabling legislation in the U.K.?</p>


Answer 1: <p>The <a href="https://statutoryinstruments.parliament.uk" rel="nofollow noreferrer">statutory instrument search site</a> allows you to do an advanced search for all statutory instruments made under a particular enabling act.</p>
<p>For example, <a href="https://statutoryinstruments.parliament.uk/?SearchTerm=&amp;House=&amp;ActOfParliamentId=SmQ2LS8f&amp;LayingBodyId=&amp;Procedure=&amp;ParliamentaryProcess=&amp;RecommendedForProcedureChange=&amp;ConcernsRaisedByCommittee=&amp;MotionToStop=&amp;DebateScheduled=&amp;ShowAdvanced=true" rel="nofollow noreferrer">these are all the statutory instruments made or in process under the Equality Act 2010</a>.</p>


Tags: united-kingdom, legal-research


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Question Title: Where do lawyers keep themselves updated with some specific laws?

Question Body: <p>Laws don't update often, unlike software, but we do see some of them update for many reasons.
Let's say someone asked questions here, or someone visited this site, found a pretty good answers with certain laws cited. Now as someone who is not a lawyer, but would like to keep themselves updated with some specific laws. So they would be better informed with new laws in place. Is there some kinds of service where people can subscribe to for free? Thank you.</p>


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Answer 1: <p>Laws update, collectively, very frequently. Laws are embodied in statutes, regulations, and court rulings, statutes being the most stable of the three. In terms of what an individual lawyer would do, the most important is to focus on the relevant and ignore the irrelevant. If you mostly write wills and trusts, that defines a subset of issues that are important to you; if you are a tax attorney, that is another subset. If you ask a contract attorney about some highly speculative matter of constitutional law, the answer will most likely be &quot;That's outside my area of specialization&quot;.</p>
<p>The concepts of &quot;subscribe&quot; and &quot;free&quot; are mostly antithetical. If you want the really good stuff, you can subscribe to Westlaw or Lexis Nexis. If you want the really free stuff (as generally seen here), the simplest solution is to use Google which may direct you to Findlaw, Justia, Cornell, Avvo or Law SE (unabashed plug).</p>


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<p>New is not necessarily better, and frankly, new statutes are the least informative, because legislatures often say things that are less than clear on the face of it, and will need to await either administrative creation of a regulation that spells out what the law means, or a court ruling that does the same thing – maybe 10 years after the law was passed.</p>


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Answer 2: <blockquote>
<p>Laws don't update often</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Laws update more often than you think between new legislation, new regulations, and especially, new case law interpreting the statutes and the common law. As pertinent to any particular U.S. state, it probably updates at least several times a month, and often multiple times a week.</p>
<p>When I was a professional journalist covering a Colorado law beat (among others), some of my go to sources were for state law:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>The Colorado Supreme Court's <a href="https://www.courts.state.co.us/Courts/Supreme_Court/Case_Announcements/Index.cfm" rel="nofollow noreferrer">case announcements webpage</a> (it updates most Mondays, or on Tuesdays when the Monday is a holiday).</p>
</li>
<li><p>The Colorado Court of Appeals <a href="https://www.courts.state.co.us/Courts/Court_of_Appeals/Case_Announcements/Index.cfm" rel="nofollow noreferrer">case announcements webpage</a> (it updates most Thursdays).</p>
</li>


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</li>
<li><p>The Colorado General Assembly (i.e. state legislature's) <a href="http://leg.colorado.gov/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">webpage</a> (it updates every time new action is taken on a state legislative bill).</p>
</li>
</ul>
<p>Most U.S. states have similar online resources. In addition for federal law I reviewed:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals <a href="https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/clerk/opinions/daily" rel="nofollow noreferrer">case announcement webpage</a>.</p>
</li>
<li><p><a href="https://www.scotusblog.com/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">SCOTUS blog</a> which provides comprehensive coverage of the proceedings of the U.S. Supreme Court, and</p>
</li>
<li><p>The <a href="https://howappealing.abovethelaw.com/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">How Appealing blog</a> which aggregates news reports and scholarly work and original sources about appellate case law developments.</p>
</li>
</ul>


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</li>
</ul>
<p>I relied to a lesser extent <a href="https://www.govtrack.us/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Govtrac</a> which provides tracking of the status of bills in the U.S. Congress and mainstream news media sources such as the New York Times, Washington Post, and Denver Post, to alert me to new developments that I would then research and report upon myself from original sources.</p>


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<p>I also regularly skimmed posts on the <a href="http://www.lawprofessorblogs.com/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Law Professor's Blog network</a> and a few other prominent law blogs such as <a href="https://abovethelaw.com/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Above the Law</a>, <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Eric Goldman's Technology and Marketing Blog</a>, <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Lawfare</a> (on national security related law), the <a href="https://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Legal Theory Blog</a> (on recent law review articles), <a href="https://www.professorbainbridge.com/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Professor Bainbridge</a> (on the law of publicly held companies and securities law), and the <a href="https://reason.com/volokh/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Volokh Conspiracy</a> (an academically oriented law blog with a libertarian slant, including a <a


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companies and securities law), and the <a href="https://reason.com/volokh/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Volokh Conspiracy</a> (an academically oriented law blog with a libertarian slant, including a <a href="https://reason.com/volokh/2023/07/28/short-circuit-a-roundup-of-recent-federal-court-decisions-221/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">weekly roundup of notable federal appellate court decisions</a>).</p>


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<p>I also read the <em>Colorado Lawyer</em> magazine which is the monthly newsletter of the Colorado Bar Association and contains substantive posts about new developments pertinent to Colorado lawyers.</p>
<p>I also receive newsletters from various thinking tanks and interest groups, such as the Colorado Criminal Justice Reform Coalition. These newsletters track developments in the law in areas relevant to their subject-matter areas.</p>
<p>This strategy is all well and good when you have a position like the journalist's position that I had at the time, to follow literally everything that is going on in the law before deciding what to drill down and write about, but isn't a good strategy for keeping track of a specific field of law, for which paid services (for example, a subscription to the newsletters of the trade publication Law360) are more efficient.</p>


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<p>I usually subscribe to one of the two main paid tax services, RIA or CCH, which provide updates on the changes in federal tax laws on a regular basis and provides pamphlets summing up new tax legislation when it is enacted.</p>
<p>Frequently, practicing lawyers will only research legal issues as they come up, and then resort to paid sources such as Westlaw and Lexis/Nexis to check the state of the law updated to the minute, at the time that the research question comes up.</p>
<p>Most lawyers are also required to take continuing legal education (CLE) classes on a regular basis, which usually contain updates on the law of the subject-matter of the class (with the specific subjects, other than professional ethics, usually left up to the lawyer in question).</p>


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Question Title: Have any regulations been made under s22(2)(b) EA2010?

Question Body: <p><a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/section/22?timeline=false" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Section 22(2)(b)</a> of the Equality Act 2010 allows for certain regulations. Have any been made thereunder?</p>


Answer 1: <p>There are no regulations specifically made under s.22(2)(b).</p>
<p>Presumably that's because either &quot;provision, criterion or practice&quot; is too broad for the government to define with any precision, or they have decided to leave it up to the Employment Tribunal to assess each claim on its own particular set of circumstances as can be seen by my simplistic search returning <a href="https://www.gov.uk/employment-tribunal-decisions?keywords=%22Equality+act+2010%22+%22disability%22+%22pcp%22+%22provision,+criterion+or+practice%22+&amp;tribunal_decision_country%5B%5D=england-and-wales" rel="nofollow noreferrer">1,500+ potentially relevant hits</a>.</p>


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Question Title: Where can I find the tax waiver rules for New Jersey?

Question Body: <p>A person dies in the state of New Jersey. When do you have to file form L-4?</p>
<p>Note: It seems to me that if all the beneficiaries are class A then there is no real need to file form L-4 because there is no tax due. However, I do not know what the law says in this case.</p>


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Answer 1: <p><strong>When do you have to file form L-4?</strong></p>
<p>When one of the conditions for <a href="https://www.state.nj.us/treasury/taxation/pdf/other_forms/inheritance/itl4.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Form L-4</a> <em>Affidavit Requesting Preliminary Waivers: Resident Decedents</em> are met:</p>
<blockquote>
<ul>
<li><p>A complete Inheritance or Estate Tax return cannot be completed yet; or</p>
</li>
<li><p><strong>All beneficiaries are Class A, but estate does not qualify to use Form L-8</strong>; or</p>
</li>
<li><p>All beneficiaries are Class E, or Class E and Class A.</p>
</li>
</ul>
</blockquote>
<p>For awareness, Form <a href="https://www.state.nj.us/treasury/taxation/pdf/other_forms/inheritance/itl8.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">L-8</a> <em>Affidavit for Non-Real Estate Investments: Resident Decedents</em> is for the release of:</p>
<blockquote>
<ul>
<li><p>New Jersey bank accounts;</p>
</li>
<li><p>Stock in New Jersey corporations;</p>
</li>


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<blockquote>
<ul>
<li><p>New Jersey bank accounts;</p>
</li>
<li><p>Stock in New Jersey corporations;</p>
</li>
<li><p>Brokerage accounts; and</p>
</li>
<li><p>New Jersey investment bonds.</p>
</li>
</ul>
</blockquote>
<p>NB, L-8 cannot be used for real estate, which requires <a href="https://www.state.nj.us/treasury/taxation/pdf/other_forms/inheritance/itl9.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Form L-9</a> <em>Affidavit for Real Property Tax Waiver Resident Decedent</em></p>


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Question Body: <p>I purchased a typical mid-range laptop in late March this year. It came with Windows preinstalled. As soon as I unpacked the computer I removed Windows and installed Linux. I have been using it without any problems until two weeks ago. The system kept crashing whenever I was upgrading a dozen programs or more at once. I ran various diagnostic commands and concluded that the cooling system was failing.</p>


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<p>I visited the nearest offline customer service with my laptop and logs of the troubleshooters I ran. The technician quickly noticed that I was using a non-stock operating system. He claimed that the manufacturer does not guarantee the machine will run properly in any os other than the preinstalled one, and that my warranty had been invalidated by the swapping of the os. I argued that replacing the stock software with a verified alternative does not pose any danger to the underlying hardware and my warranty is still intact because I never tore the laptop open.</p>
<p>Then he said that it is my job to prove that there is a 0% chance Linux harmed the hardware in any way. I found this argument as absurd as his initial one but he didn't back down so I had to return home.</p>


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<p>Is the technician correct? Can warranties expire just by installing software even though hardware was left untouched? Or is he just trying to deny the defect in the laptop and deny the free repair I deserve? Is the burden of proof on the seller or the consumer that the warranty is valid/invalid?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>It depends on the warranty itself. <a href="https://download.lenovo.com/pccbbs/thinkcentre_pdf/l505-0010-03_en_update.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Here</a> is one warranty, which only protects against manufacturing defects and excludes any software issues (whether pre-installed or user-installed). I'm a little surprised that a manufacturer is willing to include someone else's software under their warranty. This also excludes</p>
<blockquote>
<p>failure or damage resulting from misuse, abuse, accident,
modification, unsuitable physical or operating environment, natural
disasters, power surges, improper maintenance, or use not in
accordance with product information materials</p>
<p>failure of, or damage caused by, any third party products, including
those that X may provide or integrate into the X product at your
request</p>
</blockquote>


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<p>failure of, or damage caused by, any third party products, including
those that X may provide or integrate into the X product at your
request</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This does not say &quot;If you change the OS, you void the warranty&quot;. But, if you change the OS and that causes hardware damage, that voids the warranty. The next question is, what evidence do you have that the problem is a manufacturing problem rather than a consequence of changing the OS. They would have to answer the same question in court.</p>
<p>It is legally absurd to claim that you have to prove that it is logically impossible that you contributed to the problem, you only have to prove by a preponderance of evidence, when you take them to court. The burden of proof rests on the person who makes a claim. You claim that the product was defective, now you must prove it. But you don't have to prove it to the standard of absolute ccertainty.</p>


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Answer 2: <h2>Consumer Guarantees</h2>
<p><a href="/questions/tagged/australia" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-australia-tooltip-container">australia</a></p>
<p>Irrespective of the existence of any warranty, there is a statutory <a href="https://www.accc.gov.au/consumers/buying-products-and-services/consumer-rights-and-guarantees" rel="nofollow noreferrer">guarantee</a> that goods sold to a consumer are, among other things, of acceptable quality and durability. That is, it must last for a reasonable time considering the nature of the good, the price of the good, statements made by the retailer or manufacturer, and any other circumstances.</p>
<p>For a “mid range laptop”, a reasonable time would be 2 or 3 years.</p>


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<p>For a “mid range laptop”, a reasonable time would be 2 or 3 years.</p>
<p>Now, if a good is used abnormally, then that may reduce what is a reasonable time. However, using a different operating system would not normally be abnormal use.</p>
<p>However, the operating system does tell the hardware what to do. It could, for example, disable a CPU fan and cook the CPU. That would be abnormal use. This is not the sort of thing an out-of-the-box Linux would do - the code’s author would have to make a deliberate choice to do things that risk damage to the hardware.</p>
<p>Where a consumer guarantee is breached, you have a right to a repair, replacement, or refund.</p>
<h2>Warranty</h2>
<p>A <a href="https://www.accc.gov.au/consumers/buying-products-and-services/warranties" rel="nofollow noreferrer">warranty</a> is an <em>extra</em> promise over and above the guarantees. A warranty can’t take away the guarantee or suggest in any way that the consumer is not entitled to the guarantee.</p>


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<p>Beyond that, a consumer must follow the terms of the warranty to have the benefit of it. If it says you can’t change the OS, then you can’t change the OS. If you do, you void the warranty but you still have the guarantee.</p>


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Question Title: Why was 36 Edward III c. 1 in French while 25 Edward I c. 1 was in Latin?

Question Body: <p>These laws were only passed about 65 years apart. Was there a shift from Latin into French during this period?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>According to <a href="http://blogs.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/lawbod/2018/05/31/law-french-when-law-and-language-collide/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">the Law Bod's Blog, Law French – When Law and Language Collide</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>... After 1066 French became the language of the elite. During the reign of Edward I the first statute was written in French and Law was professionalised<a href="http://blogs.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/lawbod/2018/05/31/law-french-when-law-and-language-collide/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">1</a>. This led to the development of a weird little dialect called law French.</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>As you can see from the image below law French is a bizarre mix of French, Latin, Anglo-Saxon and whatever other languages happened to be hanging around. ...</p>


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</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>As you can see from the image below law French is a bizarre mix of French, Latin, Anglo-Saxon and whatever other languages happened to be hanging around. ...</p>
<p>Continental French was originally being used in courts but during the reign of Henry III and Edward I Anglo-French was used to create an entirely new legal vocabulary ‘giving special meanings to ordinary words ...</p>
</blockquote>
<p><sup>Above from the second result returned from a web search for &quot;why was french used for English law&quot;. The first result, <a href="https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_French" rel="nofollow noreferrer">a Wikipedia article about law French</a>, is also informative.</sup></p>


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Question Title: Can a judge or prosecutor be compelled to testify in a criminal trial in which they officiated?

Question Body: <p>Without considering <em>why</em> a party in a criminal trial might want to do so, are there any obstacles to subpoenaing and examining any of the following people as witnesses during the trial?  ETA: Not as eye-witnesses to the alleged crime, but rather as witnesses to the criminal process.</p>
<ol>
<li><p>A judge who has acted in some capacity in the case on trial, <em>but who is not presiding</em>.  For example: (A) the judge who arraigned the defendant.  (B) a judge who recused himself from the case.</p>
</li>
<li><p>A lawyer working in the prosecutor's office that is prosecuting the defendant.</p>
</li>
</ol>
<p>If context is necessary, one reason I can imagine a defense might want to examine these people before the jury is to call into question the motives and methods driving the prosecution of the defendant.</p>


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Answer 1: <p>The answer to this question will be almost entirely informed by the <em>why</em> that you've asked us not to consider.</p>
<p>If the prosecutor or judge is a witness, the defendant should be able to call them, but that also means they would have to withdraw from the case under either <a href="https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/rule_3_7_lawyer_as_witness/" rel="noreferrer">Rule 3.7</a> or <a href="https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/code-conduct-united-states-judges#d" rel="noreferrer">Canon 3</a>.</p>
<p>If the defendant believes the prosecution is tainted by some improper motive, the defendant may raise that objection under <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcrmp/rule_12" rel="noreferrer">Crim. R. 12</a>, but he must do so pretrial. I can't think of any circumstances where the defendant could question the judge or prosecutor in the jury's presence.</p>


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Answer 2: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/england-and-wales" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-england-and-wales-tooltip-container">england-and-wales</a></p>
<p>In a similar vein to <a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/a/94268/35069">bdb848</a>'s answer...</p>
<p>Witnesses are called to either offer testimony concerning facts in issue relating to the indictment, or to give evidence on the defendant's good / bad character.</p>
<p>Enquiries in to the &quot;criminal process&quot; are dealt with independently and away from the jury.</p>
<p>For example:</p>
<p>Complaints against a judge are investigated by the Judicial Conduct Investigations Office, by virtue of the <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2014/1919/contents/made" rel="noreferrer">Judicial Discipline (Prescribed Procedures) Regulations 2014</a>.</p>


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<p>Allegations of prosecutoral failings or abuse of process are usually dealt with in a <em>voir dire</em> following a defence application under <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/78?timeline=false" rel="noreferrer">section 78</a>
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 or via the court's inherent powers.</p>
<p>There is also the possibility of a &quot;Misconduct in Public Office&quot; investigation if the alleged failings and / or abuse of process are severe enough.</p>
<p>So no: they can't be called unless they are a <em>bone fide</em> witness.</p>


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Answer 3: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/new-zealand" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;new-zealand&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;new-zealand&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-new-zealand-tooltip-container">new-zealand</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>defense might want to examine these people before the jury is to call into question the motives and methods driving the prosecution of the defendant.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>A prosecutor who is <em>also</em> already a witness for their case can be compelled to testify about the conduct of their prosecution.</p>


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</blockquote>
<p>A prosecutor who is <em>also</em> already a witness for their case can be compelled to testify about the conduct of their prosecution.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://duckfiles.nz/decided/2021.09.29%20%5BNZDC%2019459%5D%20acquittal%20judgment.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>Greendrake v McConnochie</em></a> I was on the witness stand in the role of a witness for the case I was prosecuting self-represented (private prosecution). However, the only questions the defence wanted to ask were pertaining to my roles of an investigator and prosecutor in the case, not a witness as to the elements of the charges in question.</p>
<p>I objected to those questions on the basis that I was only giving evidence in the role of a witness <em>for</em> the prosecution. To no avail: the judge overruled my objections and I had to give the answers.</p>


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<p>In theory, I could request an adjournment and appeal the decision to overrule my objection, but I did not as I had nothing to hide anyway. But the precedent now remains.</p>
<p>However, to be compelled to testify like that, a prosecutor (or a judge) must <em>already</em> be on the witness stand — on their own volition. There is no way to compel them to be there in the first place.</p>


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Answer 4: <p>In the Scopes trial, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scopes_trial#Examination_of_Bryan" rel="nofollow noreferrer">the defence called William Jennings Bryan, who was a counsel for the prosecution, as an expert witness</a>.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Stewart objected for the prosecution, demanding to know the legal purpose of Darrow's questioning. Bryan, gauging the effect the session was having, snapped that its purpose was &quot;to cast ridicule on everybody who believes in the Bible&quot;. Darrow, with equal vehemence, retorted &quot;We have the purpose of preventing bigots and ignoramuses from controlling the education of the United States.&quot;</p>
</blockquote>
<p>So I'd say yes for a prosecutor.</p>


Tags: united-states, criminal-law, judge, prosecution


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Question Title: Is “your honour” the proper address for all U.S. judges rather than just the more senior ones?

Question Body: <p>Is “your honour” the proper address for all U.S. judges rather than just the more senior ones?</p>
<p>In the UK this address is reserved for the more senior ones but it seems that in U.S. films and TV series judges are always called for honour in court. What judges are called this in the us and what other addresses are designated for judges?</p>


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Answer 1: <p><strong>Yes</strong></p>
<p>An American would spell it as “your honor,” but yes, this is how we refer to all judges.</p>
<p>This is simply a custom that shows respect. There is no law or concrete fact I could cite that requires this; it is more of a “tradition.” But I have seen plenty of court proceedings (mostly on TV), and I can confirm that all judges, ranging from small claims court to the Supreme Court, are called “Your honor.” (The chief justice of the Supreme Court is sometimes addressed as “Chief Justice.”) Googling articles about courtroom etiquette also mostly leads to people who agree with this.</p>


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<p>Apparently, there are some countries where it is customary to say “my honor,” or even something else altogether. Sometimes people from these countries immigrate to the US and continue using their local terminology in a US court. Although every judge is different, my perception is that most judges try to be inclusive of other cultures, and if whatever term they use is intended as a sign of respect, most judges will usually just interpret it as it was intended.</p>


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Answer 2: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/australia" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-australia-tooltip-container">australia</a></p>
<h2>“Your Honour” is acceptable except for those who should know better</h2>
<p>For most people in courts, calling the presiding officer “Your Honour” while it may not be strictly <a href="https://www.uts.edu.au/about/faculty-law/news/dummies-guide-addressing-judicial-officers" rel="nofollow noreferrer">correct</a> might be corrected but probably won’t be.</p>
<p>If you are a lawyer representing a client in court you should know the nuances:</p>
<ul>
<li>“Your Honour” is the default</li>
<li>The Chief Justice of a superior court should be addressed as “Chief Justice”</li>
<li>Except the President of the Court of Appeal or the Industrial Relations Commission who should be addressed as “President”</li>


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<li>Except the President of the Court of Appeal or the Industrial Relations Commission who should be addressed as “President”</li>
<li>Federal Court magistrates may be addressed as either “Your Honour” or “Federal Magistrate”</li>
<li>District Court Judges are properly addressed as”Your Honour Judge” but the Judge is often omitted after the first mention</li>
<li>An acting judge should be called “Judge” but yo are unlikely to be corrected in you use “Your Honour”</li>
</ul>
<p>Magistrates were formerly addressed as “Your Worship” but that’s now obsolete. Basically because no one dragged before a Local Court knew that and the law was changed to reflect the reality that most self-represented litigants used “Your Honour”.</p>


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Question Title: Indiana governor&#39;s pardon powers

Question Body: <p>Can the governor of Indiana issue preemptive pardons like the POTUS can?</p>
<p>If so,</p>
<ul>
<li>what is the source of law that expressly confirms this, or at least leaves little doubt that this is within the governor's authority (e.g. judicial
interpretation, statute, commentary etc.);</li>
<li>have there been any instances in the past of it happening; and</li>
<li>is the scope of such pardons limited in any way?</li>
</ul>
<p>Thanks in advance for any answers.</p>


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Answer 1: <p>The Indiana constitution is phrased differently to the US constitution in such a way to exclude pre-emptive pardons:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(Indiana) The Governor may grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, <strong>after conviction</strong>, for all offenses
except treason and cases of impeachment</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>(US constitution) he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>(my emphasis)</p>
<p>The Indiana constitution explicitly states that the Governor may grant pardons <em>after conviction</em> and does not give the Governor the power to grant pardons <em>before conviction</em>.</p>


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<p>The Indiana constitution explicitly states that the Governor may grant pardons <em>after conviction</em> and does not give the Governor the power to grant pardons <em>before conviction</em>.</p>
<p>By contrast, the Supreme court has judged that the President may issue pardons <em>after commission</em>, that is after the offence has been committed, and potentially before the arrest, trial, conviction or punishment. They can't issue pardons for crimes not yet committed.</p>
<p>The scope of pardons issued by the Governor is limited; this power is subject to regulation by law issued by the Legislature, and (if there is no regulation giving sole power of pardon to the president) the Legislature may form a council to review pardons. The council's advice and consent must be sought.  In fact, the Legislature appoints the Parole Board to this role. So the Parole Board gives advice and consent to pardons issued by the Governor.</p>


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<p>In practice, therefore, the Parole Board makes these decisions, as Governors rarely refuse pardons recommended by the Board. Generally, though, pardons are rare, Mike Pence granted only three during his tenure as Governor.</p>
<p>References:</p>
<ul>
<li><a href="https://s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/iga-publications/indiana_constitution/Archive%20Constitution%20(as%20amended%202018).pdf" rel="noreferrer">Constituion of Indiana</a></li>
<li><a href="https://ccresourcecenter.org/state-restoration-profiles/indiana-restoration-of-rights-pardon-expungement-sealing/" rel="noreferrer">Guide to pardons in Indiana</a></li>
</ul>


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Question Title: What are non-physiological aspects of sex?

Question Body: <p>Section 7(1) equality act 2010 refers to “physiological or other aspects of sex.”</p>
<p>What are these other aspects of sex? In other words, what does this “or other” clause refer to?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>The cited provision is:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>A person has the protected characteristic of gender reassignment if the person is proposing to undergo, is undergoing or has undergone a process (or part of a process) for the purpose of reassigning the person's sex by changing physiological or other attributes of sex.</p>
</blockquote>


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<p>This language originates in the <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1999/1102/made" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Sex Discrimination (Gender Reassignment) Regulations 1999</a>. This statutory instrument was made in response to a 1996 decision of the European Court of Justice (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A61994CJ0013" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>P v S and Cornwall County Council</em>, C-13/94</a>) that <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A31976L0207" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 </a>, regarding equal treatment of men and women, also covered discrimination on the grounds of gender reassignment. The regulations were made in order to bring domestic law up to date with the EU requirement, by amending the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. The definition at the time, found in the amended <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1975/65/section/82/1999-05-01"


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with the EU requirement, by amending the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. The definition at the time, found in the amended <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1975/65/section/82/1999-05-01" rel="nofollow noreferrer">section 82</a>, was:</p>


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<blockquote>
<p>&quot;gender reassignment&quot; means a process which is undertaken under medical supervision for the purpose of reassigning a person’s sex by changing physiological or other characteristics of sex, and includes any part of such a process</p>
</blockquote>
<p>So the idea of &quot;other characteristics&quot; or &quot;other attributes&quot; comes from the 1999 version of the law. I expect that the change to &quot;attributes&quot; is simply because the Equality Act 2010 uses the term &quot;characteristic&quot; to mean something else, as it consolidates many different regimes about discrimination on the basis of sex, race, disability, etc., all of which are called &quot;characteristics&quot;.</p>


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<p>The more recent text removes the part about &quot;medical supervision&quot;, and explicitly includes people at any stage of transition. <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/notes/division/3/2/1/4" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Explanatory Notes</a> to the 2010 Act give the example:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>A person who was born physically female decides to spend the rest of her life as a man. He starts and continues to live as a man. He decides not to seek medical advice as he successfully ‘passes’ as a man without the need for any medical intervention. He would have the protected characteristic of gender reassignment for the purposes of the Act.</p>
</blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p>(These notes are not binding in law but they do give a good idea of what the drafters meant to say. The concept of 'passes' is also not the most sensitive language to bring in, since trans people do not necessarily want to measure themselves by their ability to pass undetected, and may present differently in different contexts.)</p>


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<p>The example shows that someone can have the protected characteristic without having, or contemplating, any change to their body. So from this example, the other attributes of sex would include all those ways in which the man &quot;continues to live as a man&quot;. From general knowledge of trans men, that could include using a masculine name and pronouns; wearing traditionally-male clothes; wearing a binder, baggy clothing, padding in the crotch, or other ways to suggest a more masculine than feminine body; having a traditionally-male haircut; using traditionally-masculine body language; pitching the voice lower; and so on. The situation for trans women would be parallel. These things are all attributes of sex, in that our society abounds in stereotypes of what is a &quot;manly handshake&quot;, or a &quot;girly drink&quot;, or otherwise associated with a particular sex. They are to do with behaviour more than the body.</p>


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Question Title: What are (respectively) “Lords temporal and spiritual”?

Question Body: <p>In the opening clause of every parliamentary act seems to appear this phrase. What does each type of Lord refer to?</p>


Answer 1: <p>See UK Parliament Glossary, &quot;<a href="https://www.parliament.uk/site-information/glossary/lords-spiritual-and-temporal/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Lords Spiritual and Temporal</a>&quot;:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The Lords Spiritual are made up of the Archbishops of Canterbury and of York, the Bishops of London, Durham and Winchester as well as specific bishops of the Church of England.</p>
<p>The Lords Temporal are made up of  Life Peers, the Earl Marshal, Lord Great Chamberlain, Hereditary Peers elected under the Standing Orders.</p>
</blockquote>


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Answer 2: <p>The division between these categories of peers is of ancient origin. Ecclesiastical dignitaries, such as bishops, hold an office given to them by the Church; whereas noblemen, such as earls, hold titles given to them or an ancestor by the Crown. While the extent to which either system was really in charge was greatly contested historically (can kings choose or veto bishops? can the Pope get rid of a king? etc.), both groups were significant enough that they had to be represented in royal councils. Political theory of the Middle Ages, and earlier, had a great deal to say about the power and relationships of these authorities, but the main point is that &quot;church stuff&quot; and &quot;secular government stuff&quot; were seen as two separate things, albeit interconnected.</p>


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<p>These English words &quot;spiritual&quot; and &quot;temporal&quot; are direct translations of French words used in mediaeval legal language, which themselves come from Latin. &quot;Temporal&quot;, or &quot;existing in time&quot;, refers to things associated with this present world, in distinction to &quot;spiritual&quot; things which transcend it, i.e. relating to God and the Church. These are theologically loaded words because they come from Christian doctrine, in a strand of Western theology coming through Augustine to the mediaeval scholastics and therefore into political thought of the time.</p>
<p>Even before the present enacting formula was settled, statutes often included some sort of reference to the various people in Parliament who had given their assent. Without trying to list all the variations, a typical example is 36 Edward III c.1 (the Confirmation of Charters, etc. Act 1362), which has (in French; this and other quotations are followed by my translations):</p>


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<blockquote>
<p>p assent des Prelatz, Ducs, Countez, Barons et autres g<sup>a</sup>ntz</p>
<p> by assent of the prelates, dukes, earls, barons and other great men
</blockquote>
<p>or the Latin of 25 Edward I c.1 (the Restraint on Taxation, Purveyance, etc. Act 1297),</p>
<blockquote>
<p>assensu communi Archiepiscoporum, Episcoporum, Abbatum et aliorum Praelatorum, Comitum, Baronum, Militum, Burgensium, et aliorum liberorum hominum</p>
<p>the assent of all archbishops, bishops, abbots and other prelates, the earls, barons, knights, burgesses and other free men
</blockquote>


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<p>the assent of all archbishops, bishops, abbots and other prelates, the earls, barons, knights, burgesses and other free men
</blockquote>
<p>We see here the classic notion of the three estates of society (clergy, nobility, everyone else) by the ordering of the titles, even though they are not grouped in the classes of &quot;lords spiritual&quot;, &quot;lords temporal&quot;, and &quot;commons&quot;. Over time, the precise composition has varied. The 1297 Act does not mention dukes, because there weren't any in England at the time. It does call out abbots, who were only rarely summoned to parliament, and not at all after the dissolution of the monasteries under Henry VIII.</p>


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<p>The specific terms for &quot;lords spiritual&quot; and &quot;lords temporal&quot; were frequently used from the reign of Richard II. For example, the law 16 Ric II c.5, now called &quot;The Statute of Praemunire 1392&quot;, recites that the lords spiritual were examined in council on certain contentious examples of papal power:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>ce demandez estoit des ẜ<sup>r</sup>s esp̃uels [...] cestassavoir Ercevesq̃s Evesq̃s et aut<sup>ꝯ</sup>s p<sup>ꝯ</sup>lats [...]</p>
<p> It was demanded of the lords spiritual ... that is to say, the archbishops, bishops, and other prelates [....]
</blockquote>
<p>It also speaks about the lords temporal (seigneurs temporals) as a separate category.</p>


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<p>The clergy may also have &quot;temporalities&quot;, which are properties they hold according to the secular legal system. When a bishop is invested, by the nature of their appointment they immediately receive the &quot;spiritualities&quot; of the office, effectively the power to run the diocese, and <em>separately</em> are given the temporalities by order of the Crown. At various times, bishops have been required to declare that their temporalities came from the Crown as opposed to from the Pope, which is part of an attempt to draw the temporal-spiritual line in a certain place (and to deny the authority of a foreign power to overrule the king). It is also a bit muddy that bishops are nominally chosen by the dean and chapter of their see - but in fact they are required to choose the person named in the <em>congé d'élire</em> given to them by the King on the advice of ministers - but in fact the ministers are effectively bound to advise the King to name the person that the church


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person named in the <em>congé d'élire</em> given to them by the King on the advice of ministers - but in fact the ministers are effectively bound to advise the King to name the person that the church wants anyway. Notwithstanding all of this, the bishops in the House of Lords are still Lords Spiritual, because they sit there by virtue of their spiritual office.</p>


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Question Title: Is it the case that married and civilly-partnered people are protected under the equality act while single people are not?

Question Body: <p><a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/section/8?timeline=false" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Section 8 Equality Act 2010</a> seems to define the protected characteristic as solely applying to people who in fact are married or partnered, but my impression was that one could not be lawfully discriminated against either for being married or for being unmarried. Reading the provision makes me question this. Am I missing something? What gives?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>It is. <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/notes/division/3/2" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Part 2 Chapter 1 Section 8</a> specifically says &quot;People who are not married or civil partners do not have this characteristic.&quot;</p>


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<p>In practical terms, a claim for unlawful dismissal would not have to rely on this Act or this Characteristic. Many company handbooks refer to avoiding discrimination on &quot;marital status&quot;, so the claim could be made that the company had acted against policy. Not as strong as national law, but likely to succeed in absence of other factors. Single people who were expected to cover shifts that people with a family consistently avoided could argue <a href="https://www.acas.org.uk/dismissals/constructive-dismissal" rel="nofollow noreferrer">constructive dismissal</a> on &quot;making unreasonable changes to working patterns or place of work without agreement&quot; grounds. And cases of sexual harassment are as likely to refer to Sections 11 or 12 of the Act as to Section 8.</p>


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<p>There appears to be some interest in this - <a href="https://www.lawscot.org.uk/members/journal/issues/vol-66-issue-03/singled-out-discrimination-for-living-alone/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">north of the border if not in England and Wale</a>s - and perhaps less jurisdictionally in <a href="https://www.psychologytoday.com/gb/blog/living-single/201809/singlism-how-serious-is-it-really" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Bella De Paulo's article for Psychology Today</a>, which concludes &quot;All serious forms of prejudice and discrimination go through a similar process of going unrecognized, then getting dismissed and belittled once people start pointing them out, and in the best cases, eventually getting taken seriously. Ruth Bader Ginsburg noted that when she was first appointed to the Supreme Court, the other judges did not think gender discrimination existed. ...&quot;</p>


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Question Title: Does Brazil issue a document certifying that one has never been married?

Question Body: <p>Is there a certificate issued by the Government of Brazil to prove that an individual has never been married before? If so, how is it called?</p>
<p>Some countries call it <em>Certificate of No Marriage</em> and others <em>Single Status Certificate</em>.</p>


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Answer 1: <p>The only one I can find so far relates to a Brazilian citizen getting married abroad, called a:</p>
<ul>
<li><em>Consular Declaration of Civil Status</em></li>
</ul>
<p>These are issued by the Consular Authority to:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Brazilian citizens who intend to marry before a foreign authority within their jurisdiction.</p>
<p>The document is issued in English.</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p><a href="https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/embaixada-helsinque/servicos-consulares/declaracao-consular-de-estado-civil" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Source: gov.br</a></p>
</blockquote>
<p>(I have yet to find if a comparable certificate is available in-country, for marriage or otherwise, but none of the official guidance sites I have trawled though mention it)</p>


Tags: legal-terms, brazil


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Question Title: I need to know if I need a privacy policy for a computer app

Question Body: <p>make computer apps using Winforms and such the apps that i make are computer side only nothing gets stored off the computer nothing gets moved anywhere else lets say i have an app that needs your email and it just saves it inside the app itself after the user enters it without ever leaving or sending that information anywhere but in the computer itself would this require a privacy policy</p>


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Answer 1: <p>So your privacy rules are &quot;nothing ever leaves the computer, and the only private information stored is the user's email address which is stored inside the application&quot;. So that's what goes into your privacy policy.</p>
<p>Normally a privacy policy would be viewable on your website, but you can also just add a menu item &quot;View Privacy Policy&quot; into your application, where you display the privacy policy.</p>
<p>As others mentioned in comments, what exactly is going on with that email address? If it isn't used, why is it stored? So I suppose you use it somehow. Put that into your privacy policy. &quot;Your email address is recorded so you can receive an email when a new version of the application becomes available&quot;, just as an example what could go into your privacy policy. If that's your only use obviously.</p>


Tags: privacy, software, data-ownership


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Question Title: How long are UK Crown Court Hearing Recordings kept?

Question Body: <p>As the title suggests, I am wondering how long UK Crown Court Hearing Recordings and transcripts are kept because in order for court transcripts to be requested, the recordings need to be still available.</p>
<p>The government's guidance on how to <a href="https://www.gov.uk/apply-transcript-court-tribunal-hearing" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Apply for a transcript of a court or tribunal hearing</a> does not stipulate this information.</p>


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Answer 1: <p>Seven years.</p>
<p>See the paragraph 13 of the <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/911194/crown-court-rrds.docx" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Crown Court Records Retention and Disposition Schedule</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>13 Recordings of trials -- Keep for <strong>7 years</strong> and then destroy</p>
</blockquote>
<p>For awareness, and completeness, the list of retention schedules for other courts and tribunals may be found <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/record-retention-and-disposition-schedules" rel="nofollow noreferrer">here</a>.</p>


Tags: united-kingdom, recording, court-records, crown-court


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Question Title: Legality of stealing news

Question Body: <p>Say I read in the newspaper that a kangaroo shot a man on highway 45.</p>
<p>If I put this information on my homepage, and don't copy the exact wording of the newspaper, this is probably ok and not a violation of copyright or any other law.</p>
<p>But what if I read the newspaper every day, summarize facts from it, and sell this information?</p>
<p>It does not sound legal to me, but I would not know which law I am violating.</p>


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Answer 1: <h2><a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/a/53525/10334">Facts are not copyrightable</a> <a href="/questions/tagged/united-states" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-united-states-tooltip-container">united-states</a></h2>
<p>Facts are not copyrightable since at least <strong>Feist</strong> Publications, Inc., v. Rural Telephone Service Co., <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/499/340" rel="noreferrer">499 U.S. 340 (1991)</a>.</p>
<p>IF you take <strong>only</strong> the facts and not the expression, then the news site can do nothing: you do not violate copyright by taking <strong>only</strong> the facts. Or as Scotus said in Feist:</p>
<blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p>As a statutory matter, <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/17/101" rel="noreferrer">17 U.S.C. § 101</a> does not afford protection from copying to a collection of facts that are selected, coordinated, and arranged in a way that utterly lacks originality.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>News contain more than facts.</h2>
<p>However, do note that news are not mere facts - like a phonebook as the Feist case was - but have their facts intricately entwined with expression. That's why press agencies like Reuters work: They get informed of facts, write an article and news sites buy that article's expression to refine it into their style. Most newspapers buy these articles, which leads to the appearance of nigh simultaneously reporting on the same event.</p>


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<p>To understand where the line is between fact and expression, compare the following headlines from <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enabling_Act_of_1933" rel="noreferrer">24th March 1933</a>, all regarding the same event:</p>
<ul>
<li><a href="https://dfg-viewer.de/show/?set%5Bmets%5D=https://content.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/zefys/SNP2719372X-19330324-0-0-0-0.xml" rel="noreferrer">Berliner Morgenpost</a> titled their front page: Ermächtigungsgesetz mit 441 gegen 94 Stimmen angenommen (Enabeling Act approved with 441 to 94 votes) - That is merely reporting facts.</li>
<li><a href="https://dfg-viewer.de/show/?set%5Bmets%5D=https://content.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/zefys/SNP24329435-19330324-0-0-0-0.xml" rel="noreferrer">Deutch Chinesische Nachrichten</a> titled the front page: Ein Neues Zeitalter (A new Age) - This is an expression of opinion - and thus protected.</li>


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<li>New York Times titled, deep inside, in the category <em>Special Cable</em>: <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1933/03/24/archives/speech-of-hitler-in-reichstag-on-his-policies-for-germany.html" rel="noreferrer">Speech of Hitler in Reichstag on His Policies for Germany</a> - That is a fact.</li>
</ul>


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Answer 2: <p>In <a href="/questions/tagged/germany" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-germany-tooltip-container">germany</a>, you have to consider the ancillary copyright for press publishers (Leistungsschutzrecht für Presseverleger), specified in §§ 87f to 87h UrhG.</p>
<p>The publisher has the exclusive right to publish their news publication online. However, they explicitly cannot prevent you from</p>
<ul>
<li>using facts from the news publication</li>
<li>linking to the news publication</li>
<li>using individual words or very short snippets from the news publication</li>
</ul>
<p>So yes, it would probably be possible to create, publish, and sell such a news digest, as long as you avoid lifting quotes from the news publication. You should write everything in your own words.</p>


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<p>In this context, you should review the history of the Leistungsschutzrecht, and in particular the role of Google Search and Google News. Many publishers that had advocated for this Leistungsschutzrecht ended up giving Google gratis licenses so that snippets/teasers could be shown in Google services. You would not benefit from such a license, and would have to be more careful.</p>


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<p>Compared to the <a href="/questions/tagged/united-states" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-united-states-tooltip-container">united-states</a>, Germany and Europe has more complicated copyright rules, with lots of ancillary rights that make a simple statement like &quot;facts are not copyrightable&quot; slightly incorrect. For example, facts are not copyrightable, but databases as collections of facts are. There's also a very low threshold of originality, so that even short text snippets must be assumed to be covered by copyright.</p>
<p>As to why copying news doesn't seem to be a common business model: it is reasonably common to report on something that was originally reported by another newspaper. However, there are practical downsides:</p>
<ul>
<li>the news would be delayed</li>


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<ul>
<li>the news would be delayed</li>
<li>summarizing stuff in your own words is still a lot of work (though automation is arriving)</li>
<li>legal risks if you include snippets of the original</li>
<li>why would people read your summary if they can read the original?</li>
</ul>
<p>At least for newspapers and similar press products, it is rare for journalists to write their own stories. Instead, a lot of news is licensed from news agencies, e.g. Reuters, Associated Press, or dpa. This syndication is cost-effective and avoids legal problems. The main value of a publication in that workflow is to select relevant stories and to maybe provide a bit of context for the audience. Reporting on others' stories is more common in areas that are more online and informal, for example tech news.</p>


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Answer 3: <p>In the United States, this would be a form of unfair competition. The law treats things that behave like property as if they were property. Early knowledge of news, gathered at great effort and expense, behaves like property and so courts treat it like property. If you use the property of another to harm them, courts may fashion equitable remedies.</p>
<p>See the Supreme Court's ruling in International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) for a case of precisely this:</p>


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<p>&quot;<em>The contention that the news is abandoned to the public for all purposes when published in the first newspaper is untenable.</em> Abandonment is a question of intent, and the entire organization of the Associated Press negatives such a purpose. The cost of the service would be prohibitive if the reward were to be so limited. No single newspaper, no small group of newspapers, could sustain the expenditure. Indeed, it is one of the most obvious results of defendant's theory that, <em>by permitting indiscriminate publication by anybody and everybody for purposes of profit in competition with the news-gatherer, it would render publication profitless</em>, or so little profitable as in effect to cut off the service by rendering the cost prohibitive in comparison with the return. The practical needs and requirements of the business are reflected in complainant's bylaws which have been referred to. Their effect is that <em>publication by each member must be deemed not by any


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The practical needs and requirements of the business are reflected in complainant's bylaws which have been referred to. Their effect is that <em>publication by each member must be deemed not by any means an abandonment of the news to the world for any and all purposes, but a publication for limited purposes; for the benefit of the readers of the bulletin or the newspaper as such; not for the purpose of making merchandise of it as news, with the result of depriving complainant's other members of their reasonable opportunity to obtain just returns for their expenditures</em>.&quot;</p>


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Question Title: On what basis is s14 EA2010 “prospective”?

Question Body: <p>On legislation.gov.Uk, this <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/section/14" rel="nofollow noreferrer">provision</a> is marked as “prospective.” What does that mean, and what particularly in this case makes it so?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>Clicking on the &quot;?&quot; symbol at your link reveals:</p>
<p><a href="https://i.stack.imgur.com/XeqJX.jpg" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><img src="https://i.stack.imgur.com/XeqJX.jpg" alt="enter image description here" /></a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>... A version of a provision is prospective either:</p>
<ol>
<li><p>where the provision (Part, Chapter or section) has never come into force or;</p>
</li>
<li><p>where the text of the provision is subject to change, but no date has yet been appointed by the appropriate person or body for those changes to come into force.</p>
</li>
</ol>
</blockquote>


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<li><p>where the text of the provision is subject to change, but no date has yet been appointed by the appropriate person or body for those changes to come into force.</p>
</li>
</ol>
</blockquote>
<p>Section 14 was never brought into force. See <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2010/2317/article/2/made" rel="nofollow noreferrer">1</a>, <a href="https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201516/ldselect/ldeqact/117/11702.htm" rel="nofollow noreferrer">2</a>, <a href="https://5essexcourt.co.uk/resources/blogs-view/menopause-and-the-workplace-a-future-protected-characteristic-under-the-equality-act-2010" rel="nofollow noreferrer">3</a>, <a href="https://www.frettens.co.uk/site/blog/employment-blog/equality-act-2010-provisions-coming-into-force-in-october" rel="nofollow noreferrer">4</a>.</p>


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Answer 2: <p><strong>What makes it so?</strong></p>
<p>According to <a href="https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/109975/html/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">written evidence</a>, submitted by the Discrimination Law Association (DLA) in July 2022 to Parliament's Woman and Equalities Committee, the government said in their letter to the DLA on 25 May 2022 that its introduction would create...</p>
<blockquote>
<p>...<strong>unwelcome regulatory complexity and place new costly burdens on business and the public sector</strong>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Note that despite the DLA evidence concluding with:</p>
<blockquote>
<ol start="9">


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</blockquote>
<p>Note that despite the DLA evidence concluding with:</p>
<blockquote>
<ol start="9">
<li><p>It is understood that the s14 amendment to the Equality Act Bill was introduced late in the day and as a consequence there was little parliamentary scrutiny. The DLA consider this should be given further consideration and with time for further Parliamentary scrutiny, it may be that the Government wish to consider not simply enacting s14, but expanding it beyond simply direct discrimination to include indirect and harassment as well as discrimination on the grounds of more than 2 characteristics.</p>
</li>


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</li>
<li><p>In summary, the DLA disagree that the administrative or regulatory burden is sufficiently substantial to justify not enacting s14. Furthermore, the DLA consider that as part of its review of enacting s14, the Government should take the time to consider expanding this to include harassment and indirect discrimination as well as discrimination on the grounds of more than 2 characteristics.</p>
</li>
</ol>
</blockquote>
<p>There does not appear to be any subsequent developments, intent or moves by the government to introduce section 14.</p>


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Question Title: Are foreign sellers exempt from consumer protection laws?

Question Body: <p>German law offers certain protections for online buyers, essentially the right to return the goods for a refund within 14 days and a certain warranty within 2 years of purchase.</p>
<p>I was under the impression (but I might be mixing it up with GDPR) that if an online seller advertises their products to customers in Germany, those laws would apply, even if the seller is outside the EU.</p>
<p>Now I had a seller blatantly tell me that those laws don't apply to them as they are outside the EU and that they don't offer any refunds whatsoever.</p>
<p>A cursory search suggest that they might actually be correct or at least that I don't have any recourse if they don't follow those laws?</p>


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Answer 1: <h2>No, they are not exempt</h2>
<p>Consumer protection laws (in general) apply to anyone doing business with consumers in that jurisdiction.</p>
<p>You need to follow that law and apply to the company for a refund in compliance with the law. If they refuse, you can report them to the German regulator who may, or may not, take action against them.</p>
<p>If you paid with a credit card, PayPal etc., once the company has broken the law, you can apply to them for a reversal of the charge. Similarly, most online platforms like eBay or Amazon will reverse the charge if you used them.</p>


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Answer 2: <p>The EU has pretty clear rules on this in form of the <em>Rome I</em> regulation (reg 593/2008). In general, it allows the contractual parties to choose the law governing the contract. By default, the seller's law will apply.</p>
<p>However, there are more restrictions for <em>consumer contracts</em>. If the buyer is a consumer in the context of this contract, and the seller &quot;by any means, directs such activities to that country or to several countries including that country&quot;, then the consumer's law applies. The parties can choose another law, but this cannot deprive the buyer from essential consumer protections in their own country's laws.</p>
<p>The question is then what it means to &quot;direct activities to that country&quot;. Here, cases like C-144/09 (<em>Hotel Alpenhof</em>) provide clarity.</p>
<ul>
<li>Mere availability of a website does not by itself demonstrate any intent to target a particular country.</li>


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<ul>
<li>Mere availability of a website does not by itself demonstrate any intent to target a particular country.</li>
<li>However, other factors might be evidence of an intention to target customers in that country:
<ul>
<li>mentioning that country by name, e.g. &quot;free shipping to Germany&quot;</li>
<li>running online ad campaigns that target people in that country</li>
<li>not targeting that country specifically, but targeting an international clientele</li>
<li>using the language or the currency of the targeted country (e.g. accepting payment in EUR rather than CNY)</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<p>This means your hunch here is 100% correct, as far as European rules on consumer contracts are concerned:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I was under the impression (but I might be mixing it up with GDPR) that if an online seller advertises their products to customers in Germany, those laws would apply, even if the seller is outside the EU.</p>
</blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p>Having rights is different from being able to enforce them, though. For easier enforcement, it makes sense to prefer contracting with sellers that</p>
<ul>
<li>are established within the EU, and/or</li>
<li>sell via a platform that provides a non-judicial enforcement mechanism.</li>
</ul>
<p>You mentioned the GDPR. There is a direct connection here in that the GDPR applies to non-EU data controllers if they offer goods or services to people who are in Europe. The EDPB interprets this territorial scope to be aligned with the Rome I and Alpenhof criteria.</p>


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Question Title: What is the disposal of premises?

Question Body: <p><a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/part/4" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Part 4</a> Equality Act 2010 makes extensive references to the disposal of premises. What specifically does this concern?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>Disposal of premises is explained by the interpretation of Part 4 at <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/section/38?timeline=false" rel="nofollow noreferrer">section 38</a> which includes:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(3) A reference to disposing of premises includes, in the case of premises subject to a tenancy, a reference to—</p>
<p>(a)assigning the premises,</p>
<p>(b)sub-letting them, or</p>
<p>(c)parting with possession of them.</p>
<p>(4) A reference to disposing of premises also includes a reference to granting a right to occupy them</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The supporting <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/notes/division/3/4/7" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Explanatory Notes</a> include this:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>This section explains what is meant by terms used in this Part. In particular it sets out the kinds of property transactions meant by “disposing of premises” in the case of premises which are subject to a tenancy...</p>
</blockquote>


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Question Title: Is there anything to stop a private business from barring a previous customer who takes a civil action against it?


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Question Body: <p>Suppose that a customer C sues a shop, S, for some reason or other, whether it be discrimination, negligence, or another reason. Or they make a claim but it gets settled by the business without going to court. Can the business refuse future dealings with the individual supposing that the claim was valid and successful?</p>
<p>It seems to me that they could unless there are provisions preventing retributive refusals that I’m not aware of. And this would be even if the triumphant claim was for discrimination on a protected characteristic.</p>
<p>Because the previous refusal would be unlawful discrimination, but the future would be on the basis of the customer having been litigious and the business not wanting the trouble of that which is not a protected characteristic per se, although perhaps this could be argued indirect discrimination.</p>


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<p>Or could the retributive future refusal generally be seen as contempt of court and contempt of the law, in trying to evade future repercussions for any potential unlawful conduct?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>A business has the right to refuse service, except in the case of unlawful discrimination. &quot;Sued us&quot; is not a protected characteristic.</p>
<p>Unless part of the settlement was that the business must serve that customer in future, there is no way this could be considered contempt.</p>


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Answer 2: <p><strong>It depends</strong>.  I think it would turn sharply on a couple of things.</p>
<h2>The underlying reason for the suit</h2>
<p>Let us suppose that the business is a lumberyard that sells the customer roof trusses.  The insurer has a problem with the trusses for complex engineering reasons: the store says the customer misapplied perfectly good product.  Yes, that lumberyard can be expected to &quot;86&quot; that customer (at least, as regards to selling them engineered products LOL.)</p>
<p>However.  If the suit is &quot;you refused to sell trusses to me <strong>because I am Irish</strong>&quot;, that is a horse of a different color and should rapidly result in a ruling that &quot;you can't refuse service for that reason&quot;. If the shop could simply change the reason to &quot;you sued me&quot;, that would utterly defeat the ruling <em>and civil-protection law generally</em> - so yeah, that would be a &quot;contempt of court&quot; scenario.</p>


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<h2>Alternative sources for that thing</h2>
<p>This was also trotted out in the <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Business/indiana-pizza-restaurant-cater-gay-wedding-supports-religious/story?id=30045085" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Memories Pizza affair</a>.  &quot;We're not the only pizzeria in town&quot;.  (well there's ONE other in town; all others are at least a 25 minute drive).</p>
<p>The argument is the customer has a variety of alternative sources so they don't need <em>this one</em>.  Versus the customer saying &quot;No, I really don't&quot;.</p>
<p>But again, this turns on the facts and circumstances.  If you're in a protected class, the business really can't turn you away on that basis. (imagine if businesses in the US rural south were able to turn away minorities on the basis of &quot;you have many other choices. In reality, if every business does that, you'd have no choice and it would be a lie.)</p>


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<p>I could also see this appearing in Right to Repair litigation.  Manufacturers are often the only source for repair parts (e.g. because the are a vertical manufacturer or it contains propriety embedded software)... if a manufacturer litigated to stop a 3rd party repair shop from servicing their equipment, <em>and lost</em>, courts would take a dim view of the company then refusin to sell repair parts to the shop, since that would simply be another attempt to do what the court already said was impermissible.</p>


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Question Title: Extensions of time to respond

Question Body: <p>Is an extension of time to file a response something that is available in the case of a petition to confirm arbitration award?</p>


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Answer 1: <h2><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arbitration" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Arbitration</a></h2>
<p>Arbitration is an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) method where the p[arties voluntarily submit to the binding decision (award) of the arbitrator(s). It gets its legal effectiveness by being legislated in the relevant jurisdiction. Most jurisdictions have different laws for international, domestic commercial, and other (e.g. family law) arbitrations. Notwithstanding, there is a great deal of commonality across types and jurisdictions.</p>
<h2>Extension of time for making submissions</h2>
<p>How an arbitration is conducted is by the agreement of the parties, or, if the parties can't agree, at the discretion of the arbitrator(s). Often, the parties will agree on rules that will be followed in their arbitration clause.</p>


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<p>So, if you are asking if a party can be given an extension of time to make a submission, then yes - if all parties agree, the rules allow it, or the arbitrator(s) agree.</p>
<h2>Enforcement</h2>
<p>In most cases, arbitral awards are voluntarily complied with. It is estimated that in international arbitrations, only 11% of awards are not voluntarily complied with, and most of those stem from an inability to pay rather than an unwillingness to pay.</p>
<p>Failing to honour an arbitral award is a breach of contract, and the successful party can sue for recovery like any other breach. The law of arbitration is that an award is binding, and the courts will simply enforce the award as a judgement debt. Like any breach, there may be a statute of limitations beyond which action can no longer be taken without the court agreeing to waive those limits.</p>
<h2>Challanging an award</h2>


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<h2>Challanging an award</h2>
<p>There are very limited grounds and strict timeframes for challenging an arbitral award. While courts have the discretion to extend those timeframes  (because they're courts), they very rarely (approaching never) do so for arbitral awards.</p>


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Question Title: Working a car cleaner now, my manager asked me to take some pictures before cleaning and after clearing, privacy issue of the car owner

Question Body: <p>I understand that the car's owner and the company have some agreements before the service begins. But as a worker, I would like to ensure doing so would not break any laws, even if the instructions are given by the manager. Since home and car are personal private property in general and people take that vary seriously.</p>
<p>While I don't want to ask the manger directly if they have such an agreement (of taking picture of car clearing service ) with their customers. And  pictures <strong>would not</strong> reveal car plates.</p>
<p>Q: Can we do that legally while as a cleaner without knowing company's agreement? <br />
Q: Can the company have that kind of agreement with its customers in the first place?</p>


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Answer 1: <blockquote>
<p>Working a mobile car cleaner now, my manager asked me to take some
pictures before cleaning and after clearing, privacy issue of the car
owner</p>
</blockquote>
<p>California law creates an expectation of consent for taking photographs of people for purposes of commercial distribution of the image to the public. <a href="https://codes.findlaw.com/ca/civil-code/civ-sect-3344.html?/" rel="noreferrer">California Civil Code § 3344</a>.</p>
<p>But, absent copyright or design patent issues (which would only very rarely come up since most people don't own the copyrights or patents to the designs of their cars, and the owner of the copyrights generally grants an implied license for the owners of the cars to display the copyrighted or patented designs), there is no parallel requirement of consent for taking photographs of things.</p>


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<p>Furthermore there is no common law expectation of privacy in anything that someone you do business with must necessarily see with their own eyes.</p>
<p>So, if you must see the car to clean it, then taking photographs before and after the work is done does not violate any expectation of privacy to which the customer has not implicitly consented and does not violate any California or federal statute.</p>
<p>Better practice would be for the business to explicitly have the customers consent in writing to the photographs, to remove all doubt. But the implied consent to having someone see your car when they are cleaning it would be unreasonable to deny in almost all circumstances.</p>


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<p>A company might voluntarily have an agreement to keep any photographs taken confidential and to have its employees sign non-disclosure agreements not to reveal what they see while working. If it did, this would create a legally enforceable expectation of privacy for the customer. For some VIP clients, this contractually enforceable discretion might be something that would induce them to pay a higher price for the same services. But those kind of protections are not the default standards of law that apply in the absence of an agreement. And, even then, taking photographs for purposes of internal use only would probably not violate an agreement of this kind. The work still requires that people inside the business, including remote supervisors, be able to see the cars to do their work.</p>


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Question Title: Low-Ball Buyout Offers in Multi-Class Share Structures: Protecting the Interests of Series A Stockholders


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Question Body: <p>In USA listed-stock (even ADR), when there are two series (classes) of stocks: A (common) and B. Say, series B is not tradable but has above 90% of voting power despite the number of shares are much smaller compared to series A, let also assume no conversion is possible between the types of shares. In short the scenario is that series B holders represent less 50% of ownership, but more than 50% of voting power.</p>
<p>Given that, can the owner(s) of Series B accept a low-ball buyout offer (might be even with discount to the market value) - even theoretically $1?  is that legal? what protects the interest of series A stockholders?</p>
<p>(*) Due to their percentage of ownership they are not so much harmed by selling the company in absurdly low price, and might have received (being usually executive of the company) some compensation in the transaction.</p>


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<p><strong>Edit:</strong> to clarify the question, let's consider Twitter example. Musk offered to buy Twitter, which triggered a shareholder vote that passed despite more <a href="https://www.sec.gov/ix?doc=/Archives/edgar/data/0001418091/000119312522244289/d403306d8k.htm" rel="nofollow noreferrer">than 4M shareholders votes that were against.</a> But, as I understood, they were forced to accept the majority vote and their shares were converted to cash as in the offer. I ask, then, in case of discord between voting rights and ownership what happens? do the voting rights do not apply in this case? or they rather they do and the owners are in &quot;danger&quot;?</p>


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<p>Basically, my question also applied where entity holds &gt; 50% of ownership (and voting rights) - what prevent this entity (or for that matter - separated legal entity that has close ties with that entity) from offering to buy the company for one cent and make it private? (and then even sell?). I could not find the legal mechanism that prevents this kind of action.</p>


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Answer 1: <blockquote>
<p>Given that, can the owner(s) of Series B accept a low-ball buyout
offer (might be even with discount to the market value) - even
theoretically $1? is that legal? what protects the interest of series
A stockholders?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The Class A shareholders don't have to accept offers to buy their shares of stock unless they believe the amount offered is sufficient.</p>
<p>The Class B shareholders with a majority of the vote don't control when particular Class A shareholders do or do not sell their shares.</p>
<p>Historically, a tender offer to buy shares of stock of a public company has taken a premium over the current market value to induce the shareholders subject to the offer to sell their shares.</p>


Tags: finance, sec


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Question Title: is there a limit of speed cops can go on a high speed pursuit?

Question Body: <p>Let's have the following scenario, where a police officer is trying to pull a car over, but the car decides to try to run away. HOW fast is the police officer legally allowed to go when chasing the car?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>Here's the relevant statute for Virginia, <a href="https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title46.2/chapter8/section46.2-920/" rel="noreferrer">46.2-920</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>A. The driver of any emergency vehicle, when such vehicle is being used in the performance of public services, and when such vehicle is operated under emergency conditions, may, without subjecting himself to criminal prosecution:</p>
<ol>
<li>Disregard speed limits, while having due regard for safety of persons and property;</li>
</ol>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>B. The exemptions granted to emergency vehicles by subsection A in subdivisions A1, A3, A4, A5, and A6 shall apply only when the operator of such vehicle displays a flashing, blinking, or alternating emergency light or lights as provided in §§ 46.2-1022 and 46.2-1023 and sounds a siren, exhaust whistle, or air horn designed to give automatically intermittent signals, as may be reasonably necessary.</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>Such exemptions shall not, however, protect the operator of any such vehicle from criminal prosecution for conduct constituting reckless disregard of the safety of persons and property. Nothing in this section shall release the operator of any such vehicle from civil liability for failure to use reasonable care in such operation.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>So the law does not impose any specific speed limit.  Department policy may still impose speed limits on its own officers in this situation, but violating department policy is not a violation of the law <em>per se</em>, if the violation of policy is not reckless.  Of course, the million dollar question is what constitutes reckless disregard for the safety of persons and property.</p>


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Answer 2: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/england-and-wales" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-england-and-wales-tooltip-container">england-and-wales</a></p>
<p>As fast as is reasonable and proportionate in the circumstances, as long as it is for &quot;police purposes&quot; which includes pursuing a car that fails to stop.</p>
<p>Properly trained and qualified officers have an exemption to the posted speed limit under <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/27/section/87?timeline=false" rel="noreferrer">section 87</a> Road Traffic Regulations Act 1984:</p>
<blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p>(1) No statutory provision imposing a speed limit on motor vehicles shall apply to any vehicle on an occasion when it is being used for fire and rescue authority, for ambulance purposes or police purposes, if the observance of that provision would be likely to hinder the use of the vehicle for the purpose for which it is being used on that occasion.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>For awareness, they also have statutory exemptions to observing keep left/right signs, and complying with red traffic lights. The latter are to be treated as a &quot;give way&quot; (aka yield in certain countries).</p>


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<p><sub>Although tagged <a href="/questions/tagged/virginia" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;virginia&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;virginia&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-virginia-tooltip-container">virginia</a>, I have answered in line with the <a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/help/on-topic">LawSE Help Centre</a>: &quot;<em>we expect and encourage answers dealing with other jurisdictions ... please tag your answer using the tag markdown: [tag: some-tag]</em>&quot;</sub></p>


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Answer 3: <h2>The speed limit for the road OR if it is reasonable in the circumstances that the speed limit should not apply, as fast as the driver, acting reasonably, determines</h2>
<p><a href="/questions/tagged/australia" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-australia-tooltip-container">australia</a></p>
<p>The relevant provisions are detailed in each state or territories’ road rules. Most have adopted a modified form of the <a href="https://pcc.gov.au/uniform/Australian-Road-Rules-19March2018.pdf" rel="noreferrer">Australian Road Rules</a>.</p>
<p>These make it an offence to exceed the posted speed limit or, if there isn’t one, 50km/h in a built-up area (one with street lights) or 100km/h in a rural area. Police are bound to follow the road rules just like everybody else.</p>


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<p><a href="https://pcc.gov.au/uniform/Australian-Road-Rules-19March2018.pdf" rel="noreferrer">s305</a> provides an exemption for drivers of police vehicles if, in the circumstances, the police driver is taking reasonable care and it's reasonable that a provision of the road rules should not apply.</p>
<p>Every police force in Australia has <a href="https://www.afp.gov.au/sites/default/files/PDF/IPS/National%20Guideline%20on%20Urgent%20Duty%20Driving%20and%20Pursuits.pdf" rel="noreferrer">guidelines</a> on pursuit and an officer who follows those guidelines will almost certainly be found by a court to have been acting reasonably. Operating beyond the guidelines may also be reasonable in the circumstances.</p>


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<p>Again, in every Australian police force, a pursuit, like the discharge of a firearm or taser, is a critical incident and will be subject to automatic investigation by a police integrity unit. Depending on the state, this may be part of the police force or an independent body.</p>
<p>If the pursuit results in a death, there will be a coronial inquest which will examine the lawfulness of the pursuit. Anyone harmed by a pursuit may seek compensation which will also examine the lawfulness of the pursuit.</p>


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Question Title: Is an employer permitted to use images of employees for marketing without their consent?

Question Body: <p>Paul works in a restaurant, sometimes as a chef and sometimes as a bartender. David is the manager of that restaurant.</p>
<p>David has been taking pictures inside the restaurant including some showing Paul at work cooking and tending bar.</p>
<p>David posted those pictures on the company's website to promote the business.</p>
<p>Paul did not consent to having his picture used in this context. What are his legal rights?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>The law varies greatly among U.S. states, most of which treat this as a common law tort action rather than having a statute on point.</p>
<p>But, the question tags California, and under California law, the relevant statute, which is called the &quot;Right of Publicity Law&quot; is <a href="https://codes.findlaw.com/ca/civil-code/civ-sect-3344.html?/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">California Civil Code § 3344</a> (rights of publicity after you are dead are governed by parallel California Civil Code § 3344.1).</p>
<p>This statute, under the relevant circumstances, gives the person whose photos were used commercially without their consent the right to economic damages (but not less than statutory damages of $750), disgorgement of profits from the commercial use of the image, attorney fees, and sometimes punitive damages. In the case in the question, the economic damages are unlikely to exceed the $750 amount unless the employer is a massive chain of restaurants.</p>


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<p>There are arguments that could be made against liability in this case, so it wouldn't be a sure recovery, but it would have a decedent chance of success.</p>
<p>The goal of the statute in this context is to have the employer separately pay a small fee, perhaps a few hundred bucks, to employees who serve as models for advertisements in addition to being employees doing their ordinary work. Of course, if your occupation is to be a promotional model (my wife's line of work for many years), your consent is inferred from the circumstances.</p>
<p>The statute states, in the pertinent part:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(a) Any person who knowingly uses another's name . . . photograph, or
likeness, in any manner, . . . for purposes of advertising or selling,
or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods or services,
without such person's prior consent, . . . shall be liable for any
damages sustained by the person or persons injured as a result


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or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods or services,
without such person's prior consent, . . . shall be liable for any
damages sustained by the person or persons injured as a result
thereof. In addition, in any action brought under this section, the
person who violated the section shall be liable to the injured party
or parties in an amount equal to the greater of seven hundred fifty
dollars ($750) or the actual damages suffered by him or her as a
result of the unauthorized use, and any profits from the unauthorized
use that are attributable to the use and are not taken into account in
computing the actual damages. In establishing such profits, the
injured party or parties are required to present proof only of the
gross revenue attributable to such use, and the person who violated
this section is required to prove his or her deductible expenses.
Punitive damages may also be awarded to the injured party or parties.


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this section is required to prove his or her deductible expenses.
Punitive damages may also be awarded to the injured party or parties.
The prevailing party in any action under this section shall also be
entitled to attorney's fees and costs.</p>
<p>(b) As used in this section, “photograph” means any photograph or
photographic reproduction, still or moving, or any videotape or live
television transmission, of any person, <strong>such that the person is</strong>
<strong>readily identifiable.</strong></p>
<p>(1) A person shall be deemed to be readily identifiable from a
photograph when one who views the photograph with the naked eye can
reasonably determine that the person depicted in the photograph is the
same person who is complaining of its unauthorized use.</p>
<p>(2) I<strong>f the photograph includes more than one person so
identifiable,then the person or persons complaining of the use shall
be represented as individuals rather than solely as members of a


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<p>(2) I<strong>f the photograph includes more than one person so
identifiable,then the person or persons complaining of the use shall
be represented as individuals rather than solely as members of a
definable group represented in the photograph.</strong> A definable group
includes, but is not limited to, the following examples: a crowd at
any sporting event, a crowd in any street or public building, the
audience at any theatrical or stage production, a glee club, or a
baseball team.</p>
<p>(3) A person or persons shall be considered to be represented as
members of a definable group if they are represented in the photograph
solely as a result of being present at the time the photograph was
taken and have not been singled out as individuals in any manner.</p>
<p>(c) <strong>Where a photograph or likeness of an employee of the person
using the photograph or likeness appearing in the advertisement or
other publication prepared by or in behalf of the user is only


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using the photograph or likeness appearing in the advertisement or
other publication prepared by or in behalf of the user is only
incidental, and not essential, to the purpose of the publication in
which it appears, there shall arise a rebuttable presumption affecting
the burden of producing evidence that the failure to obtain the
consent of the employee was not a knowing use of the employee's
photograph or likeness.</strong></p>
<p>(d) For purposes of this section, a use of a name, . . . photograph,
or likeness in connection with any news, public affairs, or sports
broadcast or account, or any political campaign, shall not constitute
a use for which consent is required under subdivision (a).</p>
<p>(e) The use of a name, . . . photograph, or likeness in a commercial
medium shall not constitute a use for which consent is required under
subdivision (a) solely because the material containing such use is
commercially sponsored or contains paid advertising. Rather it shall


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subdivision (a) solely because the material containing such use is
commercially sponsored or contains paid advertising. Rather it shall
be a question of fact whether or not the use of the person's name, . .
. photograph, or likeness was so directly connected with the
commercial sponsorship or with the paid advertising as to constitute a
use for which consent is required under subdivision (a).</p>
<p>(f) Nothing in this section shall apply to the owners or employees of
any medium used for advertising, including, but not limited to,
newspapers, magazines, radio and television networks and stations,
cable television systems, billboards, and transit ads, by whom any
advertisement or solicitation in violation of this section is
published or disseminated, unless it is established that such owners
or employees had knowledge of the unauthorized use of the person's
name, . . . photograph, or likeness as prohibited by this
section.</p>


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or employees had knowledge of the unauthorized use of the person's
name, . . . photograph, or likeness as prohibited by this
section.</p>
<p>(g) The remedies provided for in this section are cumulative and shall
be in addition to any others provided for by law.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The most relevant language to this question is in bold.</p>


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Question Title: Is it libel if a company lies about being the first to achieve something?

Question Body: <p>If a company publishes false statements claiming that it was the first to achieve some notable technological milestone, or that it currently provides the most of some measurable service, can that count as libel against the company which truly achieved that or holds that record?</p>
<p>Because claiming to be the first seems to include saying that the other company was not the first, so is that libel if that's false?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>Typical in any of the several <a href="/questions/tagged/united-states" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-united-states-tooltip-container">united-states</a></p>
<p>No, this fails to meet two of the core elements of libel.  The statement must be</p>
<ul>
<li>Adverse (fails)</li>
<li>Stated by one party</li>
<li>To a second party</li>
<li>About a third party (fails)</li>
</ul>
<p>The case you're thinking of, where a company brags excessively about their company or products, are covered by a variety of securities and trade laws, such as false advertising.  Many of these are applicable in the Federal domain, i.e. are Federal rather than state laws.</p>


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<p>Edit: Now I see you've changed the question a bit to claiming to be first. Yes, the injured party can sue for that, but they are more claiming false advertising than libel. Accusing someone of not being first-to-market is not a particularly powerful or damning claim. Oreo didn't invent the sandwich cookie nor did Apple invent the computer.  So <strong>such a claim is really a lot more about the publicity</strong> than actual, provable damages; so the controversy is more likely to be aired <em>outside</em> the court system, or in the courts but mainly for the publicity. (an example of the latter being the &quot;Taco Tuesday&quot; trademark-busting action; IIRC Taco Bell even paid the other party's legal fees, despite prevailing.)</p>


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Answer 2: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/canada" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-canada-tooltip-container">canada</a></p>
<p>In contrast to <a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/a/94223/46948">Trish's answer</a> (I don't know what jurisdiction that applies in), the law in Canada leaves open the possibility that the circumstance you describe could make out a successful defamation claim.</p>
<p>The elements of defamation are (<em>Grant v. Torstar Corp.</em>, <a href="https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/7837/index.do" rel="noreferrer">2009 SCC 61</a>, para. 28):</p>
<blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p>(1) that the impugned words were defamatory, in the sense that they would tend to lower the plaintiff’s reputation in the eyes of a reasonable person; (2) that the words in fact referred to the plaintiff; and (3) that the words were published, meaning that they were communicated to at least one person other than the plaintiff.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But, <strong>whether the impugned words were defamatory</strong> and <strong>whether the words in fact referred to the plaintiff</strong> can only be determined <strong>in context</strong> by a finder of fact. Whether a person to which the statement was published would reasonably understand the statement to be a defamatory statement about another company is judged based on the full context of the statement. <strong>Defamation need not be literal; it can be inferential or based on inuendo.</strong></p>
<blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p>Where a claim is based on the inferential meaning of words, the question is one of impression: what would the ordinary person infer from the words in the context in which they were used?  Both literal and inferential defamatory meaning reside within the words, as part of their natural and ordinary meaning.  In contrast, <strong>where legal innuendo is pleaded the impugned words take on defamatory meaning from outside circumstances beyond general knowledge, but known to the recipient</strong>.</p>
<p><em>Weaver v. Corcoran</em>, <a href="https://canlii.ca/t/h398d#par72" rel="noreferrer">2017 BCCA 160 at para 72</a></p>
</blockquote>
<p>See also R.E. Brown, <em>The Law of Defamation in Canada</em>, 2nd ed. (1999), quoted in <em>S.G. v. J.C.</em> (2001), <a href="https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2001/2001canlii3041/2001canlii3041.html" rel="noreferrer">56 O.R. (3d) 215</a>:</p>
<blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p>Therefore, in order to recover, the plaintiff must plead and prove that he or she is the one to whom the defamatory statement refers, that is, it must be shown to have been published 'of and concerning' the plaintiff. The defamatory publication 'must refer to some ascertained or ascertainable person, and that person must be the plaintiff.' It must refer to or concern him personally. <strong>The test in every case is whether the ordinary sensible person to whom the words were published would understand them as referring to the plaintiff</strong>.</p>


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<p>It is not necessary that the plaintiff be identified by his or her proper name, or even mentioned at all, if it is otherwise shown that the words would be reasonably understood to refer to the plaintiff. He or she may be referred to in the guise of some fictional or historical character or by a play on words. It may be clear from other evidence that he was the one alluded to, but he must satisfy the court in that regard. This may be done by introducing evidence, apart from the publication, connecting the plaintiff with the defamatory publication. <strong>The question in such a case is whether or not the words used are such as to lead an ordinary sensible person, or reasonable persons, who pay reasonable attention to the contents of the communication, to understand that it was the plaintiff to whom the defendant referred</strong>.</p>


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<p>The test of whether words that do not specifically name the plaintiff refer to him or not is this: Are they such as reasonably in the circumstances would lead persons acquainted with the plaintiff to believe that he was the person referred to? That does not assume that those persons who read the words know all the circumstances or all the relevant facts. But although the plaintiff is not named in words, he may, nevertheless, be described so as to be recognized; and whether that description takes the form of a word-picture of an individual or the form of a reference to a class of persons of which he is or is believed to be a member, or any other form, <strong>if in the circumstances the description is such that a person hearing or reading the alleged libel would reasonably believe that the plaintiff was referred to, that is a sufficient reference to him</strong>.</p>
</blockquote>


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Answer 3: <h2>No in the <a href="/questions/tagged/united-states" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-united-states-tooltip-container">united-states</a></h2>
<p><a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/libel" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Libel</a> is written <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/defamation" rel="nofollow noreferrer">defamation</a>, its sibling is slander. That is not simply stating something wrong, libel is stating <em>something</em> that is disparaging a different person in the eye of the public and which does not have the defense of truth or being an opinion.</p>
<p>In general, the test if something is Defamation has four factors, which were outlined above:</p>
<blockquote>
<ol>
<li><p>a <strong>false statement purporting to be fact</strong> [about a second person];</p>
</li>


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<blockquote>
<ol>
<li><p>a <strong>false statement purporting to be fact</strong> [about a second person];</p>
</li>
<li><p><strong>publication</strong> or communication <strong>of that statement</strong> to a third person;</p>
</li>
<li><p><strong>fault</strong> amounting to at least negligence; and</p>
</li>
<li><p>damages, or some
<strong>harm caused to the reputation</strong> of the person or entity who is the
subject of the statement.</p>
</li>
</ol>
</blockquote>
<p>If Alice says &quot;Bob won a medal&quot;, that would not be disparaging about Bob, as that is not causing harm to Bob's reputation.</p>
<p>If Alice says &quot;I won a medal&quot; that is not a statement about a different person than yourself.</p>
<p>If Alice says &quot;I won a medal, Bob didn't&quot;, now <em>that</em> could be causing harm to the reputation of Bob - if the statement is patently wrong and Alice knows or should have known the truth.</p>


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<p>Where the line is between the second and third statement is very much dependent on the exact state law: if implication can qualify is generally in statutes.</p>
<h2>Different laws apply to ads</h2>
<p>If anything, claiming that your company achieved something and if that claim is more than <em><a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/puffing" rel="nofollow noreferrer">puffery</a></em>, then the statement might be <strong>false or misleading advertisement</strong> - which are usually violations of state law.</p>


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Answer 4: <p>An interesting case of something like this is an ongoing (as of 2023) lawsuit by Nona Gaprindashvili, against Netflix, for claiming in its show <em>The Queen’s Gambit</em> that its main character is making history in an episode set in 1968 because, “There's Nona Gaprindashvili, but she's the female world champion and has never faced men.”</p>
<p>in fact, Gaprindashvili had played against nearly 60 men by the time the episode is set.  In its early filings, Netflix defended itself by saying the show was a work of fiction set in an alternative timeline. This alleges defamation, not fraud. That is, it alleges that viewers will believe the show’s historically-inaccurate claims denigrating Gaprindashvili’s accomplishments, not that the audience will think the show is a documentary about a real person.</p>


Tags: libel


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Question Title: Is there any need to offer communication by standard/interoperable/asynchronous means?


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Question Body: <p>Many companies only offer customer support through “web chat” or similar which forces a customer to keep a browser window open whilst waiting for the representative’s responses to each of their messages which may take multiple minutes.</p>
<p>Furthermore it prevents customers from being able to see all of their correspondence with different companies’ representatives in one place.</p>
<p>Suppose Bob would like to communicate with ACME about issues he is having with their product by either post or email. Is there anything in the laws meaning that they must have a more standardised means of communication available such as an address for service of legal communications?</p>
<p>I’m thinking along the lines that there are indeed laws that stipulate consumers rights, providing that customer service avenues have been exhausted to resolve the issues, etc.</p>


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<p>I’m thinking along the lines that there are indeed laws that stipulate consumers rights, providing that customer service avenues have been exhausted to resolve the issues, etc.</p>
<p>Is there any way in which any of these types of provisions accordingly insinuate that companies must have some more standardised means of contact available to be reachable for resolving quality related complaints etc?  Such as phone or email?</p>


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Answer 1: <h2>Not for normal correspondence</h2>
<p>There are laws that require a specified channel of communication for specific purposes such as a physical address for the service of legal notices, but there is no general requirement.</p>


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<p>There are laws that require a specified channel of communication for specific purposes such as a physical address for the service of legal notices, but there is no general requirement.</p>
<p>How, or if, a company communicates with its customers about complaints will either be specified in the contract or up to the company to determine and advertise. For example, <a href="https://stackoverflow.com/legal/terms-of-service#provisions">this</a> site specifies “ will be deemed to have been duly given when received, if personally delivered or sent by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested; when receipt is electronically confirmed, if transmitted by facsimile or e-mail; or the day after it is sent, if sent for next day delivery by recognized overnight delivery service” - any other method of delivery (Whatsapp, Facebook, even their own chatrooms etc.) is not a valid method of service, if you use those methods, then legally, you have not communicated.</p>


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<p>So, if the company requires complaints to deal with by online chat, they can safely ignore any letter or email you might send them.</p>


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Answer 2: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/british-columbia" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;british-columbia&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;british-columbia&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-british-columbia-tooltip-container">british-columbia</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>Is there anything in the laws meaning that they must have a more standardised means of communication available such as an address for service of legal communications?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Yes, service of legal documents can be by way of delivery to a corporation's registered office in the corporate register.</p>
<p>See <a href="https://www.bclaws.gov.bc.ca/civix/document/id/complete/statreg/168_2009_01" rel="nofollow noreferrer">B.C. Supreme Court Civil Rules 4-3(2)(b)(iv)</a>:</p>
<blockquote>


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<p>See <a href="https://www.bclaws.gov.bc.ca/civix/document/id/complete/statreg/168_2009_01" rel="nofollow noreferrer">B.C. Supreme Court Civil Rules 4-3(2)(b)(iv)</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Unless the court otherwise orders, personal service of a document is to be effected as follows: ... on a corporation, ... in the manner provided by the <a href="https://www.bclaws.gov.bc.ca/civix/document/id/complete/statreg/02057_01#section9" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>Business Corporations Act</em></a></p>
</blockquote>
<p>The <a href="https://www.bclaws.gov.bc.ca/civix/document/id/complete/statreg/02057_01#section9" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>Business Corporations Act</em>, s. 9(a)</a> says:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>... a record may be served on a company ... by delivering the record to the delivery address, or by mailing it by registered mail to the mailing address, shown for the registered office of the company in the corporate register</p>
</blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p>The &quot;corporate register&quot; is &quot;the information filed with or recorded by the registrar under [the <em>Business Corporations Act</em>] or a former Companies Act, and includes any corrections made to that information by the registrar under [the <em>Business Corporations Act</em>] or a former Companies Act.&quot;</p>


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Question Title: Are lone excerpts considered derivative works?

Question Body: <p>Specific context:</p>
<ul>
<li>I am in the United States as is the owner of the work.</li>
<li>The work is licensed under CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0</li>
</ul>
<p>Someone has digitized a public domain reference dictionary and posted it on the internet under CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0. It is in a format where the entire contents of the dictionary are in a single web page.</p>
<p>I would like to make a searchable version of this dictionary (it is very hard to navigate in a single web page). In this case, I would be providing a web page that contains a search bar, and the results would be unmodified excerpts from the original digitized version corresponding to the entry being requested.</p>
<p>Does this break the terms of CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>If we subtract the public domain aspect of the situation, <a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode" rel="noreferrer">CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 means</a> that you may not &quot;Share&quot; any &quot;Adapted Materials&quot;. Share means what you think it means: you can adapt materials for yourself, you cannot share (redistribute) that adaptation. &quot;Adapted materials&quot; is material &quot;translated, altered, arranged, transformed, or otherwise modified in a manner requiring permission under the Copyright and Similar Rights held by the Licensor&quot;. No you may not, if you are talking about material protected by copyright.</p>


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<p>Material that is simply digitized does not gain copyright protection from being digitized, see <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp2/36/191/2413183/" rel="noreferrer">Bridgeman v. Corel</a>. So if a work was un-creatively digitized and was in the public domain, then it does not become re-protected by the act of scanning. However, if the work was creatively digitized, even minimally, then that new work <em>is</em> protected by copyright.</p>


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Question Title: Can a company in the Netherlands which has an American parent company hire an Iranian?

Question Body: <p>Because of the US sanctions, there are many limitations and restrictions on some countries, and these sanctions also affect the people of those countries.</p>
<p>Suppose that a person, A, was going to work with a company in the Netherlands which in 2019 was acquired by an American company. Recently the company told A that because the company belongs to an American company, they can not proceed and get A the work permit, but they also said if A were in the Netherlands now, it would be easier.</p>
<ol>
<li><p><strong>Is there any way this company can hire A while A is still in Iran?</strong></p>
</li>
<li><p><strong>How can they hire A if A were in the Netherlands? (For instance as a traveler in the Netherlands)</strong></p>
</li>
<li><p><strong>If they can hire A while a/he is in the Netherlands, could they also hire A if A were in Turkey?</strong></p>
</li>
</ol>


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Answer 1: <p>It's difficult to tell: it's possible that you could be hired, or that you can't be hired. The easy part, the third question, is that this is not a ban based on ethnicity or citizenship, it is based no residence, so it you are not in Iran, you're not a target of the ban.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-31/subtitle-B/chapter-V/part-560" rel="nofollow noreferrer">The sanctions</a> prohibit the importation of certain services of Iranian origin (e.g. employment), and also §560.419 says that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The prohibitions in §560.201 make it unlawful to hire an Iranian
national ordinarily resident in Iran to come to the United States
solely or for the principal purpose of engaging in employment on
behalf of an entity in Iran or as the employee of a U.S. person,
unless authorized pursuant to § 560.505. See also § 560.418 with
respect to the release of technology and software.</p>
</blockquote>


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behalf of an entity in Iran or as the employee of a U.S. person,
unless authorized pursuant to § 560.505. See also § 560.418 with
respect to the release of technology and software.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But you are not coming to the US (or The Netherlands). Nevertheless, HR of the employing firm may have misinterpreted the regulation.</p>
<p>There is a good chance that you would not be subject to the importation of services regulation, §560.201:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Except as otherwise authorized pursuant to this part, and
notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit
granted prior to May 7, 1995, the importation into the United States
of any goods or services of Iranian origin or owned or controlled by
the Government of Iran, other than information and informational
materials within the meaning of section 203(b)(3) of the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)(3)), is prohibited.</p>
</blockquote>


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materials within the meaning of section 203(b)(3) of the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)(3)), is prohibited.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>First, is there a reasonable interpretation of the circumstances where your services are imported into the US? Second, is the hiring company a subsidiary of a US firm and is controlled by the US firm (if not, the US sanctions do not apply to a foreign employer). Under the Iran Threat Reduction and Syrian Human Rights Act §218, that would be</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(1) one that is more than 50%  owned by the U.S. parent; (2) one in
which the parent firm holds a majority on the Board of  Directors of
the subsidiary; or (3) one in which the parent firm directs the
operations of the  subsidiary.</p>
</blockquote>


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which the parent firm holds a majority on the Board of  Directors of
the subsidiary; or (3) one in which the parent firm directs the
operations of the  subsidiary.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The nature of the services imported also matters: information services can be imported, likewise sports-related services. Importation of oil and gas related services is prohibited. So all told, it's difficult to say what is allowed in this circumstance.</p>


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Question Body: <p>I have an old login with Comcast under a relative’s primary (billed) account that I'd like to have deleted under CCPA. The relative lives in Florida, but I am a California resident. I'm attempting to request the deletion of my login and personal information through CCPA.</p>
<p>After many emails and calls to Comcast's privacy department, I finally got them to proceed with my account deletion about a month ago. But a few days ago I got a voicemail that it hadn't gone through because the &quot;primary account holder needed to approve it&quot;. Since I've already been authenticated and this CCPA request is solely for my own account and personal information, I don’t see why this is necessary. The primary account holder could call to delete their own account, but that would be subject to Comcast’s national policy and not covered by CCPA.</p>


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<p>Is this a valid reason to deny a CCPA request? I’ve made it clear in writing multiple times that it is only for my own personal information.</p>


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Answer 1: <p><strong>Update:</strong> I've filed a complaint with the CA Attorney General. They automatically forwarded the complaint to Comcast and sent me a notice in the mail.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>If you have filed a complaint against a business, we will forward your complaint to that business and request that it contact you promptly to resolve the issues you raised. Please note that we cannot represent you, advocate for you with the business, or force the business to satisfy individual requests for relief. Please contact the business directly to discuss your complaint.</p>
<p>While we cannot provide specific legal advice, please see the information below, which may help address your concern. For more information about the CCPA, please see <a href="https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/ccpa" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/ccpa</a> and <a href="https://cppa.ca.gov/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://cppa.ca.gov/</a>.</p>
<p>[...]</p>


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<p>[...]</p>
<p>If a business has violated the CCPA, you may notify the Office of the Attorney General by filing a consumer complaint. While we cannot file an action on behalf of an individual consumer over an individual violation, consumer complaints are an important source of information for the office. We will review consumer complaints to identify patterns of misconduct and to determine what law enforcement actions to take.</p>
<p>You can sue a business under the CCPA only if your unencrypted and un-redacted personal information was stolen in a data breach as a result of the business's failure to maintain reasonable security procedures and practices to protect it. You must generally give the business written notice of its violations and 30 days to fix the violations before you can sue. For more information about when you can sue for a CCPA violation, visit <a href="https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/ccpa" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/ccpa</a></p>


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<p>If you want to consult an attorney, you can obtain a referral to a certified lawyer referral service through the State Bar at (866) 442-2529 (toll-free in California) or (415) 538-2250 (from outside California), or online at <a href="https://www.calbar.ca.gov" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://www.calbar.ca.gov</a>. If you cannot afford to pay an attorney, contact your local legal aid office to see if you qualify for free or reduced-rate legal assistance. For a referral to local legal aid offices, visit <a href="https://lawhelpca.org/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://lawhelpca.org/</a> and click on the Search for Legal Help tab.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Comcast responded immediately to the forwarded complaint and appears to have deactivated my login, but nearly a month later have still not confirmed whether any personal information has been deleted.</p>


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<p>I'd strongly recommend anyone in a similar situation to <a href="https://cppa.ca.gov/webapplications/complaint" rel="nofollow noreferrer">file a complaint</a> as well. There's no guarantee the Attorney General or California Privacy Protection Agency will act on it, but it can increase the civil penalty to the company by <a href="https://cppa.ca.gov/regulations/pdf/cppa_act.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">$5,000 per complaint</a> (see section 1798.155) and makes it more likely they will comply. Don't waste your time with any unnecessary calls from the business or obfuscating information yourself as a commenter here mentioned. Just submit your CCPA request in writing, complete the identity verification, wait the 45 days as allowed by the law (or 90 if an extension is requested, see section 1798.130), and file a complaint if it's not completed.</p>


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<p><strong>Update 2:</strong> I received a forwarded letter from Comcast to the Attorney General in response to my complaint. They lied and backdated their alleged completion date of the deletion request to fall within the 45 day deadline, despite emails I sent past their claimed date repeating the request as I was still able to login. Before filing a complaint, <strong>make sure to take screenshots showing you logged into the account and email it to the business</strong> in order to document it.</p>


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Question Title: Unpacking &quot;If they have a question for the lawyers, they&#39;ve got to go outside and the grand jurors can ask questions.&quot; from former US Fed. prosecutor


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Question Body: <p>I need help understanding in plain language the <em>last few sentences of</em> the following exchange between CNN's anchor <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dana_Bash" rel="noreferrer">Dana Bash</a> and CNN's Chief Legal Analyst (and former federal prosecutor) <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Laura_Coates" rel="noreferrer">Laura Coats</a> in the July 28, 2023 <a href="https://youtu.be/S031PXHggkw?t=419" rel="noreferrer">Trump's lawyers have secret meeting with special counsel</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>BASH: And Laura, how conclusive must the evidence be in a case like this to show intent?</p>


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<blockquote>
<p>BASH: And Laura, how conclusive must the evidence be in a case like this to show intent?</p>
<p>COATS: Well, an average case that's not under the microscope, but a case like this would be, the prosecutors must be able to prove their case beyond a reasonable doubt. They want the jury to -- the grand jury, remember (hearing from?) the actual trial jury -- They're talking about probable cause, probable cause that a crime has occurred and this person (has done) it. But in reality, it's beyond a reasonable doubt in the sense that 'can I really be successful in the courtroom with this?' The vote that's returned, whether it's a majority, whether it's a slim majority, whether it's unanimous, will be very, very telling.</p>


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<p>Well, remember, there's a reason why the lawyers for Trump want to talk to Jack Smith and prosecutors as opposed to Donald Trump himself. In a grand jury climate, it is the defendant alone or the witness alone who can go into the room. <strong>If they have a question for the lawyers, they've got to go outside and the grand jurors can ask questions.</strong> And so by the lawyers trying to have the meeting it's likely to suggest, 'Listen, we want to make sure that if this person would go before the grand jury, (he's chosen not to) that they are protected in some way.' That's for every single defendant, every single witness as well.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Coats packs a lot of information into each sentence and speaks quickly, and the YouTube transcript is imperfect so I've added a few parentheticals.</p>
<p>My confusion is with the line:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>If they have a question for the lawyers, they've got to go outside and the grand jurors can ask questions.</p>
</blockquote>


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<p>My confusion is with the line:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>If they have a question for the lawyers, they've got to go outside and the grand jurors can ask questions.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Is &quot;they&quot; the grand jury? Is she saying that if the grand jury members have questions for Trumps lawyers, they (the grand jury) must leave the room and ask questions of Trump's lawyers in the hall outside the room or some similar &quot;unofficial&quot; location?</p>
<p>I don't see how that fits with the next sentence:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>'Listen, we want to make sure that if this person would go before the grand jury, (he's chosen not to) that they are protected in some way.'</p>
</blockquote>
<p>which seems to be from the point of view of Trump's laywers, not of the grand jury members.</p>
<p>What is Coats' point here?</p>


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Answer 1: <h2>The witness can go outside and ask questions of the witness’ lawyers</h2>
<p>So if, for example, Mr Trump chooses to testify to the grand jury he goes in alone - no lawyers. If he wants to consult his lawyers he needs to ask to do, leave the room and consult them. If I were Mr Trump’s lawyer I would be worried that he wouldn’t know when he should do that.</p>


Tags: lawyer, criminal-procedure, grand-jury, indictment


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Question Body: <p>Stack Exchange has announced that it will introduce as a preview <a href="https://meta.stackoverflow.com/questions/425766">a new form of a question asking assistance</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Through an updated semantic search experience, after a user searches or asks a question in the Stack Overflow search bar, we can leverage AI to provide a results summary that draws from multiple high-quality answers on Stack Overflow, in addition to providing the traditional search results list of questions and answers.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>A screenshot added shows a heading saying &quot;Search results&quot;, followed by a summarizing text that is, as I understand it, produced by an Artificial Intelligence agent. Below that follows a list of links, with a header &quot;Sources&quot;, that list the answers used to produce the summary.</p>


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<p>It is is relatively clear the list is covered under fair use. But what about that summarizing text? To produce it, the whole content of all listed answers needs to be processed, making it <a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode#s1a" rel="nofollow noreferrer">adapted material</a>. Would this form of processing considered to be &quot;fair use&quot;?</p>
<p>Note this is different from using large databases (in this case, the whole of the SO content) to train the AI. The already-trained AI processes a relatively small number of answers (maybe up to 50) to give a summary of their content.</p>


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<p>The practical difference this would make lies in the fact that answers on the Stack Exchange network are licensed by its authors by a <a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">CC-BY-SA</a> license. While the attribution requirement is obviously fulfilled by the listing of the sources, the question remains if the share-alike clause needs to be respected. Must the result summary text be licensed also under a CC-BY-SA license?</p>
<hr />
<p><a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/questions/7683/in-the-us-when-is-fair-use-a-defense-to-copyright-infringement">This Q&amp;A</a> does give a general overview how to determine fair use, but does not give an answer how to apply the tests (especially no. 3, substantiality) to the above case.</p>


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Answer 1: <p>The standard answer to a question about fair use is to recite the fair use defense, with a heavy does of &quot;it depends on whether...&quot;. There are non-legal questions which are outside of the scope of Law SE (the exact technology for extracting text summaries from a small database and how one might tweak the numbers in a huge database given an analysis of a small set of texts). The sample extract-texts are highly-probable word sequences when writing about the particular topic, therefore not demonstrably derived from any particular source.</p>
<p>The required processing that SE does is in order to create this database is within the scope of the <a href="https://stackoverflow.com/legal/terms-of-service#licensing">license</a> granted to the network, so SE creating the summary is allowed. The summary texts are sufficiently associated with protected source text.


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If the content in question is &quot;created by SE&quot;, then it cannot be copied without permission. However, protection only applies to human-created content which is protected by copyright. The fruits of bot-labor are not protected by copyright, therefore SE cannot sue users for copying text that they created with an AI. In other words, the generated text is outside the scope of copyright law and licensing requirements.</p>


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Answer 2: <h2>It’s unlikely the <a href="https://librarycopyright.net/forum/view/94" rel="nofollow noreferrer">summary</a> is an infringement</h2>
<p>First, it can’t be a derivative or an original work because it has no human author.</p>
<p>If it did have a human author, it would most likely be an original work, not a derivative. A summary of a copyrighted work is an original work of creation, not a derivative of the summarised work. Unless it’s a copy.</p>
<p>The test for whether it’s a copy is if a substantial portion of the subject matter has been copied - a qualitative test. This is why I say it’s unlikely rather than being certain - some summaries will cross the line into being copies, but most won’t.</p>
<p>As you observe, the CC-BY-SA gives SE the right to make copies anyway, so long as they give attribution, which they have.</p>


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<p>As you observe, the CC-BY-SA gives SE the right to make copies anyway, so long as they give attribution, which they have.</p>
<p>Because these summaries are machine generated, there is no copyright in them, so there is no need for a licence for anyone to use them. If they are infringing copies, then they are copies of the original work(s) that have already been licensed by the original authors.</p>


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Question Title: Can someone be arrested for bus fare evasion?

Question Body: <p>Recently a woman was filmed being arrested for alleged fare evasion in front of her son in Croydon. She is anonymous but the footage has been all over the news and social media.</p>
<p>Was there any legal basis for her arrest? If not what would the closest arguable legal basis for it have been?</p>


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Answer 1: <p><strong>UPDATE</strong></p>
<p>On 24/07/2023, Assistant Commissioner Matt Twist, a senior officer in the Metropolitan Police Service (the &quot;Met&quot;), released a <a href="https://news.met.police.uk/news/statement-in-response-to-video-of-fare-evasion-incident-in-croydon-470067" rel="nofollow noreferrer">statement</a> giving the police's account of the incident and the &quot;legal basis for her arrest&quot; as requested by the OP.</p>
<p>It is quite lengthy but I have resisted editing or redacting it to ensure the whole statement is available to those users (like me) that would rather not follow anonymous links. I have also resisted emboldening any of the text to allow users to make up their own minds without any unconscious bias on my part.</p>
<p>Finally, I have left my original answer as is for posterity.</p>
<p>The statement in full reads as follows (with the description of what caused the arrest bolded):</p>
<blockquote>


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<p>Finally, I have left my original answer as is for posterity.</p>
<p>The statement in full reads as follows (with the description of what caused the arrest bolded):</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“It is clear from the video that has been shared online that this incident was distressing for the woman involved and particularly for her child. We understand why it has prompted significant public concern and we want to be transparent about our position and the role of our officers.</p>
<p>“Officers from the Met’s Roads and Transport Policing Command were supporting TfL ticket inspectors on a pre-planned operation in Whitehorse Road, Croydon on Friday, 21 July. As buses pulled into the stop, TfL inspectors would check the tickets of those onboard and also those getting off.</p>


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<p>“Anyone without a valid ticket is required to provide their details to a TfL inspector so a penalty fare can be issued. This is not a policing matter. <strong>Officers only become involved where details are not provided or where someone tries to leave when challenged.</strong></p>
<p><strong>“The woman involved in this incident was asked to provide her ticket as she got off the bus, but did not do so. She was spoken to by a TfL inspector, then by a PCSO and finally by a police officer. She continued to try to walk away and did not provide her ticket for inspection.</strong></p>
<p><strong>“She was arrested on suspicion of fare evasion and was handcuffed. When officers were able to take her ticket from her so that the TfL inspectors could check it, they were able to confirm it was valid. She was immediately de-arrested and her handcuffs were removed.</strong></p>


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<p>“Throughout the incident, the child was comforted by a PCSO who immediately recognised his distress. Anyone seeing how upset he was would be moved by this, and we regret any impact it may have on him.</p>
<p>“We recognise that the use of handcuffs can be a cause of concern, particularly given the context of this incident and the type of offence involved, but when a person is trying to physically leave an incident it is an option officers can consider. All uses of force must be proportionate and necessary in the circumstances.</p>
<p>“Ticket inspection operations of this nature are difficult. They place police officers in direct confrontation with frustrated members of the public and could escalate what would otherwise be civil matters to a different level.</p>


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<p>“This incident raises questions about the extent to which officers are having to intervene in this way when supporting TfL in their operations. We will now work with TfL to ensure that the balance is right between officers tackling the most serious crime on the transport network and supporting their own operations to ensure revenue protection.</p>
<p>“An initial review of the officers’ actions did not identify any conduct matters but we will reflect on it carefully, in discussion with communities locally, to urgently identify any opportunities to do things differently.</p>
<p>“Given the level of community concern generated we believe it is in the public interest to voluntarily refer the matter to the Independent Office for Police Conduct to review.”</p>
</blockquote>
<hr />
<p><strong>ORIGINAL ANSWER</strong></p>
<p><strong>YES</strong></p>


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</blockquote>
<hr />
<p><strong>ORIGINAL ANSWER</strong></p>
<p><strong>YES</strong></p>
<p>A breach of the Regulations is a summary offence.  As such, a suspect may be arrested if all the relevant conditions at <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/24?timeline=false" rel="nofollow noreferrer">section 24</a> Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 are met.</p>
<p>See <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1981/14/section/67?timeline=false" rel="nofollow noreferrer">section 67</a> Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Penalty for breach of regulations.</p>


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<blockquote>
<p>Penalty for breach of regulations.</p>
<p>Subject to section 68(1) of this Act [<em>i.e. reasonable excuse</em>], if a person acts in contravention of, or fails to comply with, any regulations made by the Secretary of State under this Act and contravention thereof, or failure to comply therewith, is not made an offence under any other provision of this Act, <strong>he shall for each offence be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 2 on the standard scale.</strong></p>
</blockquote>
<p>And see <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1990/1020/regulation/7?timeline=false" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Paragraph 7</a> Public Service Vehicles
(Conduct of Drivers, Inspectors, Conductors and Passengers) Regulations 1990:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(2) ... every passenger on a vehicle being used for the carriage of passengers at separate fares shall–</p>
<ul>


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<blockquote>
<p>(2) ... every passenger on a vehicle being used for the carriage of passengers at separate fares shall–</p>
<ul>
<li><p>(a)declare, if so requested by the driver, inspector or conductor, the journey which he intends to take, is taking or has taken in the vehicle;</p>
</li>
<li><p>(b)where the vehicle is being operated by the driver without a conductor–</p>
</li>
</ul>
<blockquote>
<p>(i)save as provided in (ii) below, immediately on boarding the vehicle, pay the fare for the journey he intends to take to the driver or, where appropriate, by inserting in any fare-collection equipment provided on the vehicle the money or token required to pay that fare; or</p>
<p>(ii)if otherwise directed by the driver, an inspector or a notice displayed on the vehicle, shall pay the fare for his journey in accordance with the direction;</p>
</blockquote>
<ul>


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<p>(ii)if otherwise directed by the driver, an inspector or a notice displayed on the vehicle, shall pay the fare for his journey in accordance with the direction;</p>
</blockquote>
<ul>
<li><p>(c)<strong>where the vehicle is being operated by the driver with a conductor, pay the fare for the journey which he intends to take</strong>, is taking, or has taken in the vehicle to the conductor immediately on being requested to do so by the conductor or an inspector;</p>
</li>
<li><p>(d)accept and retain for the rest of his journey any ticket which is provided on payment of a fare in accordance with sub-paragraph (b) or (c);</p>
</li>
<li><p>(e)<strong>produce during his journey any ticket which has been issued to him either under sub-paragraph (d) or before he started his journey for inspection by the driver, inspector or conductor on being requested to do so by the driver, inspector or conductor</strong>; and</p>
</li>


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</li>
<li><p>(f)as soon as he has completed the journey for which he has a ticket, either–</p>
</li>
</ul>
<blockquote>
<p>(i)leave the vehicle; or</p>
<p>(ii)pay the fare for any further journey which he intends to take on the vehicle.</p>
</blockquote>
</blockquote>
<p><sub>Paragraph 7 covers numerous alternative scenarios and as I have not seen the video, nor know the surrounding circumstances, I have emboldened the more likely alleged breach(es).  I will review this if/when more details become available.</sub></p>


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Answer 2: <p><em>Remember the topic here is how you get arrested for fare evasion. Don't presume the fare evader is cooperating or producing ID on demand</em>.</p>
<p>This is shocking in certain countries where people predominantly drive cars, and are not familiar with high-density transit (even though their city has a new light rail system lol**).  But it actually makes sense.</p>
<p>There has been a change in transit fare collection in the last 25 years. Historically, you paid the driver or conductor, who visited every passenger to collect fares.  Non-payment meant you didn't board (or on trains with roving conductors, were put off the train at the very next stop, and the <em>schadenfreude</em> of disrupting your journey satisfied the railroad).</p>


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<p>However, to save labor costs, they have switched to a model called &quot;Proof of Payment&quot;, which the rider must obtain before boarding*.  There is a small chance that a Fare Inspector may come through the vehicle. That reduces labor costs because the inspector need only visit occasionally: their existence motivates people to self-pay.</p>
<p>When caught, a fare evader is guilty of much worse than evading one fare.  It is likely they are a repeat offender, having successfully evaded 10-20 fares prior to this, depending on how often the fare inspectors come around. <strong>As such, the consequences must be more severe</strong>.</p>


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<p>Generally, a costly citation is issued of 20-100 <em>times</em> the absent fare. However, some people simply do not pay these citations.  They become familiar to fare inspectors... <strong>and yes, the next step on the consequence chain is arrest</strong>.  That may also be an outcome if the person refuses to identify themselves so a ticket could be issued, or refuse to present proof of payment.</p>
<p>So it's not like &quot;OMG someone forgot to validate, call MI5&quot; - that is a false representation of what happened there.</p>
<p>Or it could be exactly that, <em>except the forgetter had an arrest warrant from another agency</em>.  Transit police do a disproportionate amount of gathering up fugitives.</p>
<hr />
<hr />


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<p>Or it could be exactly that, <em>except the forgetter had an arrest warrant from another agency</em>.  Transit police do a disproportionate amount of gathering up fugitives.</p>
<hr />
<hr />
<p>* This is done by a variety of methods: a ticket machine at the station where you buy the ticket immediately before boarding is the simplest, but is a flow constraint and maintenance headache.  Sale of no-time-limit paper tickets, which can be carried indefinitely but must be time-stamped at a validation machine before boarding; valid for 2 hours after stamping. (They tried putting ticket and validation machines on the vehicle, but people congregate around them and validate only when they see an inspector.) Monthly passes, transit &quot;credit cards&quot; like Oyster that can be loaded with monthly passes or validations, or all sorts of things with phones and apps.</p>


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<p>** And that gets extra super fun when they get a bit enlightened, and decide to give the Light Rail system an honest try. PoP is anything but intuitive, and not well explained, so they botch it... so where a normal company <em>who wants their business</em> might give them a gift basket or some swag, they get a $300 citation. <em>That's it. You will never pry them out of the automobile for the rest of their lives</em>.</p>


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Answer 3: <p>When you are caught in the UK without a ticket, someone will ask for your identification. Give them your id, you will be sent off and receive a small fine in the mail.</p>
<p>You don’t have to carry id. And you can refuse to show them an id, and refuse to pay. That will get you arrested. If you don’t want to get arrested in front of your children then you should do nothing to get you arrested. Obviously the presence of your children won’t stop an arrest.</p>
<p>Around London you most likely have an Oyster card or you have registered your debit card or just your phone. You tap in when you go through the gates at your train station and tap out when you leave, so your fare is calculated at the end of the day. Sometimes a tap is missed, so you are seen as entering but not leaving or the other way and your fare is estimated. Once a month you can fix such an estimate on the website.</p>


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<p>London busses you tap in once and then can stay on the bus forever or get on other buses for 60 minutes. The current record is someone getting on 26 different buses in that time.</p>


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Question Title: Why does an LLC have to be filed with most or all states but not an LP?

Question Body: <p>For example, in New Mexico, California, and Montana, one must create an LLC by filing through the state government.  But as far as I know, none of those states require the same for a Limited Partnership.  (Though if doing a certain type of business in the states, one probably has to register the LLC/LP but that's a different matter than what I'm asking.)</p>


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Answer 1: <p>A limited partnership is a entity with one or more unlimited liability partners and one or more limited liability partners. This form of organization was popular, especially in the 1970s and 1980s in the oil and gas industry and in the real estate development industry, before it was possible to have partnership taxation with a fully limited liability entity (which became possible in the 1990s).</p>
<p>The limited partnership form of organization allowed limited liability investors to receive passthrough taxation, because there were other unlimited liability investors. Unlike limited liability partnerships (LLPs) and limited liability limited partnerships (LLLPs), some partners in a limited partnership (LP) have unlimited liability.</p>


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<p>These days true limited partnerships that are not limited liability limited partnerships are used mostly in estate planning, and residually by not very up to date lawyers in the oil and gas industry and real estate development industries where they used to be the preferred form of organization. One of the main reasons that they are used now is that state law typically decrees that limited partners have no voting or management rights, which is attractive to many promoters and family business owners who want to bring in additional investment or transfer economic ownership rights without ceding control.</p>


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<p>Historically, limited partnership organizational documents had to be filed in the real property records of the counties where the limited partnership owned real estate, because they were used predominantly for real estate investments and because unlimited liability general partnerships usually don't have to file organizational documents with the state because they are the default form of organization.</p>


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<p>Most states have since changed their laws so that limited partnership have to file organizational documents with the state level Secretary of State (see, e.g., <a href="https://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/business/helpFiles/CERT_LP_HELP.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Colorado</a>, <a href="https://www.sos.ca.gov/business-programs/business-entities/starting-business/types#:%7E:text=To%20form%20an%20LP%20in,prompts%20to%20complete%20and%20submit" rel="nofollow noreferrer">California</a>, <a href="https://dos.ny.gov/certificate-limited-partnership-domestic-limited-partnership-0" rel="nofollow noreferrer">New York</a>, and <a href="https://www.sos.state.tx.us/corp/forms/207_boc.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Texas</a>) rather than in county real property records. But a few states, by virtue of inertia, have not changed their laws and retained the historical requirement. Both the historic registration requirement in real property records and the modern requirement of Secretary of State


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of inertia, have not changed their laws and retained the historical requirement. Both the historic registration requirement in real property records and the modern requirement of Secretary of State filings flowed from the language of widely adopted model statutes for limited partnerships.</p>


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Question Title: For an LLC that is not a C-Corp but taxed as a C-Corp (form 8832), does the EIN change when becoming real C-Corp?


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Question Body: <p>Suppose someone creates an LLC and will not be raising funds now, and won't have other company owners yet (like a sole-proprietorship), but elects for the LLC to be taxed as a C-Corp with form 8832.</p>
<p>Now, my understanding (if correct) is that this LLC is <em>not</em> a C-Corp, but only being taxed as one, and it will receive an EIN.</p>
<p>If that previous sentence is correct, does becoming an actual C-Corp later (f.e. the owner decides to raise funds) require getting a new EIN?</p>
<hr />
<p><strong>EDIT:</strong> Someone replied to me from another place saying that the EIN will change if I go from an LLC taxed as a C corp to formal C corp:</p>
<p><a href="https://i.stack.imgur.com/Ea6fW.png" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><img src="https://i.stack.imgur.com/Ea6fW.png" alt="enter image description here" /></a></p>
<p>Are they correct, or incorrect?</p>


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Answer 1: <blockquote>
<p>Now, my understanding (if correct) is that this LLC is not a C-Corp,
but only being taxed as one, and it will receive an EIN.</p>
<p>If that previous sentence is correct, does becoming an actual C-Corp
later (f.e. the owner decides to raise funds) require getting a new
EIN?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Not quite right.</p>
<p>The LLC is a C-Corp for tax purposes now and remains one after the change of state law form of organization.</p>
<p>The LLC is not a corporation for state law purposes, however. C-corporation is a purely tax law term.  An LLC is also not a corporation for the federal tax purposes of issuance of 1099s to it by third-parties.</p>
<p>A new EIN is not required or allowed.</p>


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<p>A new EIN is not required or allowed.</p>
<p>It is necessary for the EIN to remain the same for tax characteristics of the original entity like amortization of formation costs, earnings and profits, inside basis of assets, outside basis of ownership interests, loss carry forwards, and the like to continue to the reorganized entity as part of the IRS tracking of those tax characteristics associated with the entity.</p>
<p>The conversion from being an LLC to a corporation under state law is considered a tax free reorganization of the existing corporation under 26 U.S.C. § 368(a)(1)(F), otherwise known as an &quot;F reorganization&quot; which is &quot;a mere change in identity, form, or place of organization of one corporation, however effected&quot;. This form of entity conversion is tax free pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 351. But, for tax purposes, there is continuity of entity in an F reorganization.</p>


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<p>This F reorganization would probably be noted on the corporation's annual IRS Form 1120 (which has to be filed every year even for shell corporations that aren't funded), with a supplemental disclosure if there is no box to check for it and no separate form for it (I haven't done an F reorganization in eons and let the CPAs handle the forms involved).</p>
<p>There are a few reasons to convert an LLC already taxed as a C-corporation to an actual state law corporation.</p>
<ol>


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<p>There are a few reasons to convert an LLC already taxed as a C-corporation to an actual state law corporation.</p>
<ol>
<li><p>As a general rule with narrow exceptions (e.g. for lawyers), third-parties do not have to issue at IRS Form 1099 information return to state law corporations that they make payments to for goods or services. Ultimately, this is just a rule, but it flows logically from the fact that either an S-corporation or a C-corporation must file IRS Form 1120 every year even if it has no activity, while a partnership must file IRS Form 1065 only in years when it has taxable activity. This rule was created before LLCs taxable as C-corporations existed and the relevant statute has not been amended to reflect the possibility of an LLC taxed as a C-corporation since doing so would not increase revenues and it impacts few taxpayers and is easily circumvented with an F reorganization by any taxpayer that cares.</p>
</li>


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</li>
<li><p>State law corporations have more default rules of law regarding governance and usually more case law regarding governance as well. There are slightly more formalities to follow, but the burden involved is pretty trivial.</p>
</li>
<li><p>The default rule for state law corporations is that the shares are transferrable property so long as a public offering of the shares is not made when they are transferred. In contrast, the default rule in an LLC is that voting rights are not transferrable without the other members admitting the transferee as a member of the company, often by a unanimous vote. This makes it much easier to handle shareholder level transactions without a lawyer's involvement.</p>
</li>


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</li>
<li><p>Members of an LLC will usually assume that it is taxed under Subchapter K and will therefore expect to receive an annual Schedule K-1 to IRS Form 1065 (a partnership tax return), until they learn that it is taxed as a C-corporation. Making the state law entity match the tax law rule prevents this confusion.d</p>
</li>
<li><p>One downside of the conversion is that it is easier for creditors to seize shares of a state law corporation than to seize membership interests in an LLC which is difficult or impossible (a &quot;<a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/charging-order.asp" rel="nofollow noreferrer">charging order</a>&quot;) is the usual remedy for a creditor of an LLC membership interest.</p>
</li>
</ol>
<p>UPDATE:</p>
<p>The quoted material in the question is saying that if you have an LLC taxes as a partnership or sole proprietorship and it elected to be taxed as a C-corporation (while remaining an LLC) that it needs a new EIN, which is correct.</p>


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Question Title: Did cops break the law by entering a rental home when invited by one party and denied by another?


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Question Body: <p><a href="https://notalwaysright.com/roommate-roulette-cannabis-cops-and-a-careless-cretin/298326/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">This story</a> brought up a bit of a debate on the legality of MD cops entering a rental home when one renter originally stated that they could not enter but another later said they could.</p>
<p>As I understand it according to Georgia v Randolph 2004 usually this would be unlawful, though the cops apparently did it and got away with it in this case.  I've seen two arguments for why it may have been lawful.</p>
<ol>
<li><p>after being invited by the second roommate the cop glared at the first and said excuse me, and the first relented and let the guard in.  So one could argue when he let the cops in he had removed his opposition to a search.  I'm not sure if the polices actions count as compelling the tenants moving or not.</p>
</li>


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</li>
<li><p>The cops arguable were invited in the home, but not given permission to search.  They were then lead somewhere where they had plain sight evidence of a crime which authorized a search, but their original entering of the premise did not constitute a search and as such couldn't be an unlawful search.</p>
</li>
</ol>
<p>I'm wondering if either argument would hold up in court.  Would the evidence found be considered lawfully obtained if a lawyer tried to get it thrown out due to the tenants original refusal to allow a search without a warrant?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>Pursuant to <a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/547/103/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Georgia v. Randolph</a>,
Possibility 1 diverges significantly from the linked description in an important way, in that according to the report continued to deny permission and stood in the way of officers until they got menacing. If resident 1 accedes to the permission granted by resident 2, there is consent and the search is legal. The court held that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>a disputed invitation, without more, gives an officer no better claim
to reasonableness in entering than the officer would have absent any
consent. Disputed permission is no match for the Fourth Amendment
central value of “respect for the privacy of the home”</p>
</blockquote>


