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<p>In light of the many other cited cases in the Supreme Court judgement, it is clear that an apparently defective &quot;order of court&quot; should still be treated as binding until the court itself has resolved the issue. If the order is real then the court can do the necessary formal steps that were missed originally, or simply confirm that the order does indeed reflect what the court had intended to order. If it contained some serious mistake then it is up to the court to remedy the situation (and not the parties to the case). If it were a total forgery then a very different course of events would follow.</p>


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Question Title: Do NDAs apply to all future interactions between the two parties or just the next one?

Question Body: <p>A follow up to the question <a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/questions/89244/is-an-nda-binding-for-sex-workers-or-escorts">is an NDA binding for sex worker or escorts?</a></p>
<p>If someone hired an escort (or sex worker) and had her sign an NDA stating that she will not divulge their relationship, and that the client had hired her as an escort, would such an NDA need to be signed before each encounter or just the first one? Basically I'm asking what is the perpetuity of when an NDA applies to confidential information. For example you normally sign an NDA once for an employer at the start, but I guess with an escort it might be considered separate encounters each time.</p>


Answer 1: <h2>Depends on the NDA</h2>
<p>Just like any other contract, it does what it says it does. You could draft the NDA either way.</p>


Tags: canada, non-disclosure, confidentiality


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Question Title: Warranty (globally) on software licenses: Beerware vs BSD-0 Clause, does beerware imply liability?


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Question Body: <p>Hi most FOSS licenses like 0-clause BSD <a href="https://opensource.org/license/0bsd/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://opensource.org/license/0bsd/</a> contain something like this:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED “AS IS” AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL
WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES</p>
</blockquote>
<p>From MIT:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED &quot;AS IS&quot;, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, ...</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Can the beerware license mean that the author of some code can be sued or something in some
jurisdictions, which? Only in 'murica' or even globally?</p>
<blockquote>
<p>&quot;THE BEER-WARE LICENSE&quot; (Revision 42):  * phk@FreeBSD.ORG wrote this file.  As long as you retain this notice you  * can do whatever
you want with this stuff. If we meet some day, and you think  * this


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you want with this stuff. If we meet some day, and you think  * this
stuff is worth it, you can buy me a beer in return.   Poul-Henning
Kamp  *</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It feels a bit awkward that the reason people always put somekind of license on their code, usually MIT or BSD for the more permissive ones that negotiates away liability. I cannot see in what universe the person who wrote some code and put it up can be responsible for anything.</p>
<p>Shoudlnt something that a person makes and gives away for free, lets say on github.com automatically cancel out all warranties and supplier laws.</p>
<p>The only reference I could find online was American consumer laws, which should be of little considerations for an international website, or someone not based in US.</p>


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Answer 1: <h2>Such clauses are problematic</h2>
<p>For example, the Australian Consumer Law imposes statutory <a href="https://www.accc.gov.au/consumers/buying-products-and-services/consumer-rights-and-guarantees" rel="nofollow noreferrer">guarantees</a> on the supply of goods and services to consumers even when when these are supplied as gifts. The one we are interested in for software is they must be provided with Due care and skill:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Service providers must carry out all services using an acceptable level of care and skill. Their work must be at least as good as what a competent service provider with average skills and experience would provide. They must also take reasonable steps to avoid causing loss or damage when providing the service.</p>
</blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p>A blanket “as is” statement does not and cannot remove the requirement that the software author must “ take reasonable steps to avoid causing loss or damage when providing the service.” Further, claiming that they have no obligation when they actually do is misleading and a breach of the law all by itself (<a href="https://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/valve-to-pay-3-million-in-penalties-for-misrepresenting-gamers-consumer-guarantee-rights" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Valve to pay $3 million in penalties for misrepresenting gamers' consumer guarantee rights</a>)</p>


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Question Title: Does volunteer photographer own copyright?

Question Body: <p>An amateur photographer at a scenic rest stop sees a couple trying to compose a decent photo of themselves with the beautiful river in the background.  This happens so often that as he approaches nobody even needs to say a word: They hand him their camera, and then step back so he can take their picture with it.</p>

<p>But in this hypothetical scenario something extraordinary happens: As he takes their picture a commercial airplane doing an emergency landing hits the river <em>in the frame of the photo</em>.  So he happens to have pressed the shutter button on what turned out to be a very valuable picture.  Let us supposed that a media buyer offers $10k to license the photo.  Who owns the copyright to that photo?</p>


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<p>On the one hand, the camera owners could argue that the photographer exercised no more "creative expression" than does a tripod or selfie stick.  They just didn't have one handy, so they composed the photo and the photographer was just a mechanism to hold the camera and release the shutter.  Therefore, they must own the copyright.</p>

<p>On the other hand, the photographer could argue that he "fixed the expression" of the creative work.  As an experienced photographer he made subtle decisions regarding framing and timing of the photo that were outside of the control of the couple.  Alternatively, if he hadn't been volunteering to photograph the couple with their camera, he could have instead been holding his own camera and captured the valuable element of the photo, which was the serendipitous emergency landing.</p>

<p>Does any law or jurisprudence inform who owns the copyright in this scenario?</p>


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<p>Does any law or jurisprudence inform who owns the copyright in this scenario?</p>

<p>If the aforementioned facts suggest it is the couple (and owners of the camera), then let us change one fact: After taking the couple's desired photo, the photographer sees the airplane out of the corner of his eye and, with no time to spare, shifts the camera to capture a separate spectacular photo of the water landing.  Does he now have firm claim on the copyright to that photo?</p>

<p>And if so, can the photographer enforce his property rights in the photo, given that it was captured and is stored on equipment he does not own and cannot legitimately possess?  I.e., can't the camera owner say, "OK, you own the photo copyright, but I own the medium where you put its only copy, and I will not sell or grant you access to that medium except for the full value of the photo."</p>


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Answer 1: <p>What a lovely question!</p>
<p>US Copyright law is clear: the author of a creative work owns the copyright unless it is work for hire. In this instance, the photographer is not doing work for hire so they own the copyright.</p>
<p>However, the photographer does not own a copy of the photograph – that is owned by the owner of the camera. The photographer cannot demand that they give him a copy but the parties can agree on such a transfer on whatever terms they like.</p>
<p>As the owner of a “physical” copy they can do what they like with that copy but they cannot duplicate it except as fair use or as licensed. They could sell the memory card to whomever they like but the new owner couldn’t copy it either so it would seriously limit publication. Similarly they could move the file provided there was only one copy. Arguably, they could make a print of it providing they deleted the electronic version without copyright violation.</p>


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<p>Which brings us to who owns the copyright <em>now</em>. The camera owner can argue that the photographer has gifted the copyright to them. This is quite a strong argument as the parties' intentions at the time of arranging the taking of the photograph is that the photographer would have no further interest in it – after all he probably doesn’t want to hang a photo of some strangers on his wall. However, in many jurisdictions, including the <a href="/questions/tagged/united-states" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-united-states-tooltip-container">united-states</a>, copyright transfers must be in writing.</p>


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<p>As a fallback position the camera owner can argue there is an <em>implicit</em> license given even if copyright was not transferred. The scope of the license then becomes an issue. It is probably indisputable that the license is perpetual and royalty free. What is arguable is if the license allows commercial exploitation or only personal use. This is where the battle lines would be drawn and I don’t know how it would play out.</p>
<h2>Other jurisdictions are different</h2>
<p>For example, in Australia, copyright in a photo commissioned “for valuable consideration” for a “private or domestic purpose” vests in the commissioning party, not the photographer; even though this is not work for hire by an employee.</p>


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<p>For the circumstances you describe, the purpose is “private or domestic” but there is no “valuable consideration” so the photographer owns the copyright in this case. However, if there was an agreement to “pay” the photographer (even one as simple as “I’ll take your family photo if you’ll take mine”) then the person who asked for the photo to be taken owns the copyright.</p>


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Answer 2: <p>A case this year (2023) addresses this:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Shah v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 2023 WL 266511 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2023).</p>
</blockquote>
<p>From the court's ruling:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Shah’s claim raises an interesting question: who should hold copyright
in a photograph when the photographer only takes the photo upon being
asked? The law, with strict requirements for joint authorship, does
not reflect the current circumstances surrounding cellphone photo
etiquette. Nonetheless, Shah [the camera owner] has not alleged authorship under current
Seventh Circuit law and the Court dismisses his copyright infringement
claim.</p>
</blockquote>
<p><a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2023/01/if-you-ask-your-friend-to-take-your-photo-using-your-camera-who-owns-the-copyright-shah-v-nyp.htm" rel="noreferrer">Analysis by Eric Goldman.</a></p>


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<p><a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/illinois/ilndce/1:2021cv06148/409000/64/" rel="noreferrer">Link to the case.</a></p>


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Question Title: What offence if any is committed by guessing a combination entry lock on a door?

Question Body: <p>If one effectively guesses the correct passcode to the lock so as to open it without causing any damage and then peacefully enters (seemingly a mere civil trespass) the (previously) secured premises, do they commit any criminal offence?</p>


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Answer 1: <p><strong>None</strong>, if the intention is merely trespassing, unlike <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1968/60/section/9?timeline=false" rel="noreferrer">burglary</a> which requires intent to steal, commit criminal damage, or inflict grevious bodily harm or if the building is a <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/15/part/4/crossheading/trespass-on-designated-site?timeline=false" rel="noreferrer">protected site</a> - neither of which isn't evident from the question.</p>
<p>Note, for both offences, the <em>actus reus</em> is <strong>entry</strong> - there is no requirement for any form of &quot;breaking&quot;</p>
<p>Further to ohwilleke's comment, unless the lock is damaged or destroyed etc, then there is no offence of <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1971/48/section/1?timeline=false" rel="noreferrer">criminal damage</a></p>


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Answer 2: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/canada" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-canada-tooltip-container">canada</a></p>
<p>This would be breaking and entering contrary to <a href="https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-46/section-348.html" rel="noreferrer">s. 348</a> of the <em>Criminal Code</em>.</p>
<p>&quot;Breaking&quot; under this offence means &quot;to break any part, internal or external, or ... to open any thing that is or intended to be used to close or cover an internal or external opening&quot; (s. 321).</p>


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<p>A person is deemed to have broken and entered if they &quot;enter[] without lawful justification or excuse by a permanent or temporary opening&quot; (s. 350). Even entry through an unlocked door, when it is done without consent, is deemed to be breaking and entering. See <em>Todorov c. R.</em>, <a href="https://canlii.ca/t/ghjlj" rel="noreferrer">2015 QCCA 812</a>.</p>


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Answer 3: <h2><a href="https://legislation.nsw.gov.au/view/whole/html/inforce/current/act-1901-033#sec.4" rel="noreferrer">Unlawful entry on Inclosed Land</a></h2>
<p><a href="/questions/tagged/new-south-wales" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;new-south-wales&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;new-south-wales&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-new-south-wales-tooltip-container">new-south-wales</a></p>
<p>Under s4 of the Inclosed Lands Protection Act 1901:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(1)  Any person who, without lawful excuse (proof of which lies on the person), enters into inclosed lands without the consent of the owner, occupier or person apparently in charge of those lands, or who remains on those lands after being requested by the owner, occupier or person apparently in charge of those lands to leave those lands, is liable to a penalty not exceeding …</p>
</blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p>There is an additional penalty if you don’t close the door when you leave. Because the Act is primarily about protecting agricultural land and leaving gates open can lead to stock wandering but it is applicable to all land.</p>


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Answer 4: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/illinois" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;illinois&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;illinois&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-illinois-tooltip-container">illinois</a></p>
<p>This answer assumes no intent of wrongdoing other than opening the lock was proven by the prosecution.</p>
<p>Tampering with security devices is a class 4 felony. The bold text below is mine.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(720 ILCS 5/17-11.5) (was 720 ILCS 5/16-22)<br />
Sec. 17-11.5. Tampering with a security, fire, or life safety system.<br />
(a) A person commits tampering with a security, fire, or life safety system when he or she knowingly damages, <strong>sabotages</strong>, destroys, or causes a permanent or <strong>temporary malfunction</strong> in any physical or electronic security, fire, or life safety system or any component part of any of those systems including, but not limited to, [...] (a long list of devices) [...].<br />


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(b) Sentence. A violation of this Section is a Class 4 felony.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The lock suffered a temporary malfunction, as it was not doing its job of keeping the door closed. The security feature was also sabotaged (though not harmed), not fulfilling its function, when it was left open.</p>
<p><a href="https://definitions.uslegal.com/s/sabotage/" rel="noreferrer">https://definitions.uslegal.com/s/sabotage/</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>Sabotage is the act of hampering, deliberating subverting, or hurting the efforts of another.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In this case, the efforts of whoever wanted the door to stay locked were <em>sabotaged</em>.</p>
<p>Did the intruder tamper with the lock?</p>
<p><a href="https://definitions.uslegal.com/t/tampering/" rel="noreferrer">https://definitions.uslegal.com/t/tampering/</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>Tampering is an intentional act of interfering improperly or in a harmful manner. [...]</p>
</blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p>Tampering is an intentional act of interfering improperly or in a harmful manner. [...]</p>
</blockquote>
<p>By switching the lock to &quot;open&quot; without permission, the person exposed the secured area to intruders (and became one in the process). Testing combinations until the correct one was entered is an intentional act. The opening of the lock is harmful as it compromises the security of the venue.</p>
<p>The trespasser, aside from civil charges, can also face 1 to 3 years in prison and fines up to USD 25k. (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-45)</p>


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Answer 5: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/victoria" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;victoria&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;victoria&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-victoria-tooltip-container">victoria</a></p>
<p>Summary Offences Act 1966, Section 9(1)(e)</p>
<blockquote>
<p>without express or implied authority given
by the owner or occupier or given on behalf
of the owner or occupier by a person
authorised to give it or without any other
lawful excuse, wilfully enters any private
place or Scheduled public place, unless for a
legitimate purpose; or</p>
</blockquote>


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authorised to give it or without any other
lawful excuse, wilfully enters any private
place or Scheduled public place, unless for a
legitimate purpose; or</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Normally prosecuted as &quot;unlawfully on premises&quot;. Note: for whatever reason, section 9 is titled <strong>Wilful destruction, damage etc. of property</strong>, which makes it a little harder to find.  This is a summary offense tried by a magistrate without a jury, so &quot;lawful&quot; and &quot;legitimate&quot; are not complicated legal terms: they limit rather than extend the terms &quot;excuse&quot; and &quot;purpose&quot;.</p>


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Question Title: What crime(s) was Deedee Blanchard guilty of, and what sentences do they carry (in any jurisdictions)?


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Question Body: <p>Deedee Blanchard was found to have been <a href="https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Murder_of_Dee_Dee_Blanchard" rel="nofollow noreferrer">murdered</a> by her daughter and her boyfriend. The daughter was going to receive 30 years imprisonment but upon the court hearing of the crimes to which she has been subjected by her mother which presented the backdrop to Deedee’s murder, they reduced this to 10 years for Gypsy Rose.</p>
<p>Does this suggest that in some sense or other, the crimes of Deedee against her daughter were somehow “worth” 20 years of imprisonment?</p>
<p>Regardless, if Deedee’s abuse of Gypsy Rose had occurred in any given jurisdiction (first and foremost her own in the US), what would she have been guilty of, and what sort of sentences might she have expected to receive?</p>


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<p>I’m most  interested in the likely sentences in the U.S., including any states folks may especially know about, and then England &amp; Wales, and then any other European or other global jurisdictions.</p>
<hr/> 
<p>It’s really hard to encapsulate the extent of the depravity of Deedee’s abuse of her daughter, but it amounted to insisting to her and to society that she was terminally ill and spuriously subjecting her to copious harmful medical treatments, not allowing her to stand or  walk out of her wheelchair, socialise, live normally, and forcing her to be very malnourished.</p>


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Answer 1: <p>I am addressing only a detail of the question, but I think it is important.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Does this suggest that in some sense or other, the crimes of Deedee against her daughter were somehow “worth” 20 years of imprisonment?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>No.</p>
<p>For most countries(*) criminal procedures are not a matter of revenge or settling the scores. They are not something between the criminal who caused the damage and the victim who suffered the damage, but between the criminal who broke a law and the state that established that law and wants it enforced.</p>
<p>The opinion of the victim is, theoretically(*2), not important. It does not matter if they pardon the criminal or even if they think that they deserved the crime, the state should prosecute the criminal nonetheless. A very usual example is marital violence; many jurisdictions have guidelines forcing the state to prosecute even if the victim does not want to press charges.</p>


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<p>So, how long could Deedee Blanchard have been convicted to has no relation at all with those twenty years that you claim were &quot;reduced.&quot;</p>
<p>And from <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Murder_of_Dee_Dee_Blanchard" rel="nofollow noreferrer">the WP page</a> it seems that she pleaded guilty, which means that a deal was reached with the DA. She got a reduced sentence, the DA ensured a conviction. Nothing out of the ordinary here.</p>
<p>Maybe the DA thought that the case against her was weak and not good enough to pursue a first-degree murder accusation. Maybe the DA thought the mother abuse could be used as part as a successful insanity defense. Perhaps the DA even feared the jury showing some sympathy for her.</p>
<p>We cannot tell, so the whole &quot;was going to receive 30 years imprisonement&quot; thing is just your opinion.</p>
<p>*1 And certainly all Western countries.</p>


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<p>We cannot tell, so the whole &quot;was going to receive 30 years imprisonement&quot; thing is just your opinion.</p>
<p>*1 And certainly all Western countries.</p>
<p>*2 At a practical level, if the victim does not want to press charges, it can help the criminal as either the prosecution feels that they will not be able to get evidence without the victim's testimony, or because they want to concentrate their resources on other crimes. But theoretically it would not matter.</p>


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Question Body: <p>Article 72 states that the president can pardon offences relating to a matter to which the power of the union extends.</p>
<p>Article 161 states that the governor can pardon offences relating to a matter to which the power of the state extends.</p>
<p>There's these additional provisions, too.</p>
<p>Article 73 states</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the executive power of the Union shall extend</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>(a) to the matters with respect to which Parliament has power to make laws; and</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>(a) to the matters with respect to which Parliament has power to make laws; and</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>(b) to the exercise of such rights, authority and jurisdiction as are exercisable by the government of India by virtue of any treaty on agreement: Provided that the executive power referred to in sub clause (a) shall not, save as expressly provided in this constitution or in any law made by Parliament, extend in any State to matters with respect in which the Legislature of the State has also power to make laws</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>(2) Until otherwise provided by Parliament, a State and any officer or authority of a State may, notwithstanding anything in this article, continue to exercise in matters with respect to which Parliament has power to make laws for that State such executive power or functions as the State or officer or authority thereof could exercise immediately before the commencement of this Constitution Council of Ministers</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Article 162 states</p>
<blockquote>
<ol start="162">


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</blockquote>
<p>Article 162 states</p>
<blockquote>
<ol start="162">
<li>Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the executive power of a State shall extend to the matters with respect to which the Legislature of the State has power to make laws Provided that in any matter with respect to which the Legislature of a State and Parliament have power to make laws, the executive power of the State shall be subject to, and limited by, the executive power expressly conferred by the Constitution or by any law made by Parliament upon the Union or authorities thereof Council of Ministers</li>
</ol>
</blockquote>
<p>What are the provisions of the constitution referred to here ?</p>
<p>Does this mean that neither the governor nor the president can pardon offences and sentences in the concurrent list ? (There are 3 lists : the union list , the state list and the concurrent list.  These lists provide the things on which the union , state or both can make laws.)</p>


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Answer 1: <h2>You’re overthinking this</h2>
<p>The President can pardon Federal crimes, the state Governor can pardon state crimes.</p>
<p>A convicted person will have been convicted under a Federal law, a State law or, possibly, both. The President can pardon the Federal convictions but not the State ones and vice-versa for the Governor.</p>


Tags: india, indian-constitutional-law


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Question Title: Karen sues a workshop for damages as she was trespassing and disregarding mandatory safety gear. Does she have a case?


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Question Body: <p>Let's paint the scene: We work in the back of a metalworking workshop in Austin Texas. Huge machines make lots of noise, at times there are steel panels on the floor with access holes to access the cabeling, in the entry area is grating to try and keep the metal shavings sticking to boots and pants in check. To complete the picture, there's a big sign &quot;Safety Gear required at all times&quot;, &quot;Crane operation only by trained personnel&quot; and &quot;Only Employees allowed in the workshop&quot; on the door, together with &quot;NO TRESPASSING&quot;. Every employee wears the mandatory steel-toed boots, coveralls, hearing protection, glasses and whatever else is needed.</p>


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<p>A wild Karen enters the premises in her car, parks in the loading zone, opens the (unlocked) door to the workshop, then just enters the workshop and, of course, disregards all the signs that tell her that she can't be there. Nothing demands for the premises to be access controlled during work, so the gate of course is open - which also helps with deliveries, for which a bell exists to call someone to the door. But Karen doesn't use that. Entering the clearly marked workshop most likely constitutes trespass on its own, but we don't want to fight <em>that</em> battle if she was trespassing or not.</p>


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<p>We focus on the real event: Because people wear the mandated hearing protection in the deafening loud workspace, nobody noticed her entering the moment she does. And, in her infinite wisdom, Karen wears stilettos. The OSHA-compliant grating at the entry traps one of her heels, it breaks and she falls forward, right into the clearly marked waste dropoff area. She falls face-first into a bin of metal filings, suffering injuries to her face and eyes. Blinded, she flails around and moments later finds the remote of the very crane that put the box of shavings there. Using it as a way to lift herself, her fingers press the button to release the hook and it hits the back of her head.</p>
<p>Now, about a minute after the events started, someone notices the intruder and calls an ambulance. After being released from hospital, Karen believes that she is in the right to sue our metal workshop for negligence so we have to pay her hospital bills...</p>


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<p><strong>Does Karen's claim, that the shop 'caused her injuries and suffering' hold water, if the shop was OSHA compliant and she was trespassing without mandated safety equipment, which directly lead to the injuries? Or might her claim be useless because she violated all sorts of clearly marked rules?</strong></p>
<p>(useless here means: can be dismissed in the very first stages of litigation due to a motion for dismissal/summary judgement, or even dismissal as frivolous)</p>


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Answer 1: <p>This is a pretty good example of &quot;Contributory Negligence&quot;.</p>
<p>Depending on the precise details of the case, both (or multiple) parties may have contributed to Karen's injuries.</p>
<p>She certainly had some role by ignoring posted signs and wearing inappropriate footwear.</p>
<p>But the shop may have made access too easy.  Maybe they didn't have a front-desk person posted in a safe-area, causing her to go seeking an employee.</p>
<p>The shop had a dangerous bin of metal shavings without a lid on it, and at a height and location where a single misstep means someone could fall into it head-first.</p>
<p>They had dangerous crane-control mechanism in easy reach that didn't need a Key or other Lock-out mechanism.</p>


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<p>They had dangerous crane-control mechanism in easy reach that didn't need a Key or other Lock-out mechanism.</p>
<p>Ultimately, the details will matter. But it should be straightforward for mediation or a trial to determine each parties contribution to the overall unsafe situation and injuries.  Taking the description above at face-value, I think Karen and the shop might both be found partially responsible for the injuries.  It may not be a 50/50 split, but Karen likely acted unreasonably, and the shop, despite OSHA compliance, may well have created more hazards than appropriate.</p>


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Question Body: <p>Bob has tried to resolve an issue with a large company’s customer service department to no avail. He then sends them a letter before claim and finally issues a small claim against them for the refund amount, all of which go ignored by the defendant ACME. Bob thus wins his claim in default and would now like to collect it.</p>
<p>It seems that there are various options Bob might have. For example a third party debt order (if Bob knows who ACME banks with), or bailiffs/court enforcement agents (if the registered corporate service address is actually a location where chattels are stored and not simply a virtual mail forwarder’s address or a coworking shared office). If ACME owns real property, then a charging order against it may be sought and that might rouse them into action, but here Bob must first become aware of ACME’s property holdings.</p>


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<p>And here, in these respective caveats, lies Bob’s question: how can sensible methods of enforcement against ACME be discovered/selected?</p>
<p>Related: “reverse whois for UK property” (HMLR can tell us the owner of a given property but not alas the property of a given owner.)</p>


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Answer 1: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/australia" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-australia-tooltip-container">australia</a></p>
<p>Here are the <a href="https://www.matthewsfolbigg.com.au/services/debt-recovery/enforcement-of-judgments/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">options</a>:</p>
<ul>
<li>Examination summons. The debtor must front court and disclose all their assets and liabilities. This doesn’t get you the money but it can inform which of the following methods might be best.</li>
<li>Garnishee order. This is served on anyone who owes money to the debtor and requires them to pay you instead of them. Usually served on a bank or employer.</li>


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<li>Garnishee order. This is served on anyone who owes money to the debtor and requires them to pay you instead of them. Usually served on a bank or employer.</li>
<li>Writ for the Levy of Property. The Sheriff (which is a different job from a UK or US Sheriff) goes to their place, takes their stuff, sells it at public auction and gives you your money. If the judgement is for more than $3,000, you can instead get a lien over real property.</li>
<li>Bankruptcy (for individuals) or Liquidation (for corporations). For debts of more than $5,000 and $2,000 respectively (temporarily raised to $20,000 for both during the Covid pandemic and not yet repealed), you can begin the process of having a bankruptcy trustee or liquidator appointed.</li>
</ul>
<p>You can, of course, sell the debt to a debt collector at a discount and make it their problem instead of yours.</p>


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</ul>
<p>You can, of course, sell the debt to a debt collector at a discount and make it their problem instead of yours.</p>
<p>Note, specific dollar thresholds are specific to <a href="/questions/tagged/new-south-wales" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;new-south-wales&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;new-south-wales&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-new-south-wales-tooltip-container">new-south-wales</a> but the processes are the same everywhere.</p>


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Answer 2: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/england-and-wales" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-england-and-wales-tooltip-container">england-and-wales</a></p>
<p>In no particular order:</p>
<ul>
<li>ask the debtor</li>
<li>apply to court to order the debtor to provide information under oath
about their financial situation (<a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/form-n316-application-for-order-that-debtor-attend-court-for-questioning" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Form N316: Apply for an order for a
debtor to attend court</a>) (on pain of imprisonment)</li>
<li>search their publicly available financial reports</li>
<li>search <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/companies-house" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Companies House</a></li>
<li>search the Land Registry</li>


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<li>search <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/companies-house" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Companies House</a></li>
<li>search the Land Registry</li>
<li>check the <a href="https://rojof.org.uk/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Register of Judgments, orders and fines</a></li>
<li>search the insolvency courts and the London Gazette to check whether
the debtor company is subject to any ongoing insolvency procedures</li>
<li>instruct an 'enquiry agent' (aka private investigator) or debt recovery agent</li>
<li>ask the court to make a winding up order to force the company into
insolvency proceedings - at this point the company might pay up or go
into insolvency</li>
<li>ask the court to instruct bailiffs to seize and sell goods owned by
the debtor</li>
<li>ask the court to make a third party debt order to seize money held by
a third party, e.g. the debtor's bank account</li>
<li>ask the court to make a charging order on the debtor's property to secure the debt on it</li>
</ul>


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a third party, e.g. the debtor's bank account</li>
<li>ask the court to make a charging order on the debtor's property to secure the debt on it</li>
</ul>
<p><a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/what-to-do-if-a-defendant-doesnt-pay-money-after-judgment-ex321/what-to-do-if-you-have-a-judgement-but-the-defendant-has-not-paid-ex321" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/what-to-do-if-a-defendant-doesnt-pay-money-after-judgment-ex321/what-to-do-if-you-have-a-judgement-but-the-defendant-has-not-paid-ex321</a></p>


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Question Title: Can a restaurant or retailer be held to &quot;posted&quot; prices?

Question Body: <p>I walked into a fast food restaurant in New York City where a large poster in the front of the store advertised a new dinner special for $6.99. That was quite a bargain so I went to the counter and ordered it. Apparently the "special" was so new, it wasn't on the menu. At any rate the staff refused to honor the advertised $6.99 price, and computed an a la carte (sum of the parts) price that came to over $10. I declined to buy the special at that price.</p>

<p>I returned the following week, and the special was available, with a new posted price of $9.99. The staff would let me have it at that price (a small discount from $10-plus but not the bargain of $6.99), but for the same price, I ordered something else.</p>

<p>I didn't want to be an SOB the first time, but supposing I was, could I have legally held the restaurant to the posted $6.99 price for the special?</p>


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<p>I didn't want to be an SOB the first time, but supposing I was, could I have legally held the restaurant to the posted $6.99 price for the special?</p>


Answer 1: <p>Under the law of common law contracts, posting a price is an <a href="https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Invitation_to_treat" rel="noreferrer">invitation to treat</a> and is <strong>not</strong> binding.</p>

<p>However, in many jurisdictions, there may be (probably is) statutory <a href="https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consumer_protection" rel="noreferrer">consumer protection</a> law that make this practice illegal. Whether this means the business must honor the price or merely makes them liable to prosecution and fines depends on the specific law.</p>


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<p>For example, in Australia the law refers to this as <a href="https://www.accc.gov.au/consumers/prices-receipts/price-displays" rel="noreferrer">multiple pricing</a>. The law requires that the business withdraw the product from sale until the multiple pricing is fixed (i.e. they take the poster down) or, if they are unable or unwilling to do this, they must sell for the lower price. If they do neither then they have committed an offence and are liable to be fined by the government; the consumer does not get any compensation.</p>


Answer 2: <p>It depends on where exactly in the world you are. </p>

<p>In the United Kingdom, you cannot force the shop to trade at the advertised price. They can claim that they made a mistake and refuse. </p>


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<p>In the United Kingdom, you cannot force the shop to trade at the advertised price. They can claim that they made a mistake and refuse. </p>

<p>However, they are not allowed to use incorrect pricing to lure customers in. After you try to buy and they refuse because of a mistake, they need to fix that mistake and change the advertised price. If they deliberately advertise a price at which they don't sell, that would be misleading customers and illegal. In the UK, "Trading Standards" would be interested to hear about that. </p>

<p>If you suspect that's what's happening, take a photo of the advertised price, ask them to change the price, and come back the next day. If the price is unchanged, and they still refuse to sell, you might be forced to notify Trading Standards. Obviously that shouldn't happen. </p>


Tags: consumer-protection, new-york-state, commerce, advertisements


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Question Title: How many years of his life sentence will Nicolas Godejohn actually have to serve?

Question Body: <p>He was sentenced to life in prison for the first degree murder of Deedee Blanchard, but I note that it wasn’t life without parole. So what does this mean in practice? How much do such sentenceees commonly serve of their sentences?</p>


Answer 1: <p>N.G. was <a href="https://www.news-leader.com/story/news/crime/2018/11/16/nicholas-godejohn-found-guilty-blanchard-murder/2027186002/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">sentenced to life <em>without</em> the possibility of parole</a>.</p>


Tags: united-states, parole, life-sentence


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Question Body: <p>Suppose I have a computer and I set up two logins that are identical other than one <a href="https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Solid_state_drive/Memory_cell_clearing" rel="nofollow noreferrer">sanitises my data SSD</a> upon logging on.  This would cause any information I have on said drive to be inaccessible to anyone.  Have I committed any crime?  Assume the data itself is legal, and is not evidence of a crime I have commited.  An important use case of such a tool would be reporters who may have evidence of crimes they are investigating.  If that changes the situation that should be mentioned in the answer.</p>
<p>Suppose someone verbally requests the login credentials of the computer, and I provide the sanitising one which they proceed to use.  Have I committed any crime?</p>


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<p>Any jurisdiction would be relevant, as would any values for the &quot;someone&quot; above (such as employer, police officer, border agent).  Cases where such a question would be particularly relevant seem to occur at borders in particular, with examples in the <a href="https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/02/what-could-happen-if-you-refuse-to-unlock-your-phone-at-the-us-border/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">USA</a>, <a href="https://www.cnet.com/culture/man-charged-for-refusing-to-give-up-phone-passcode-to-canadian-border-agents/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Canada</a> and most recently in the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2023/apr/18/french-publisher-arrested-london-counter-terrorism-police-ernest-moret" rel="nofollow noreferrer">UK</a>.  So I can be specific about what I have done I have used the example of a general purpose computer, but I assume the same thing would apply to <a


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rel="nofollow noreferrer">UK</a>.  So I can be specific about what I have done I have used the example of a general purpose computer, but I assume the same thing would apply to <a href="https://www.ghacks.net/2015/03/16/privacy-look-adds-disk-wiping-unlock-code-to-your-android-device/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">commercially available tools</a>.</p>


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Answer 1: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/canada" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-canada-tooltip-container">canada</a></p>
<p>If this is done with the specific intention of obstructing justice (see <em>R. c. Charbonneau</em>, <a href="https://canlii.ca/t/1pd96" rel="nofollow noreferrer">1992 CanLII 2979</a> (QCCA)), then this is an offence contrary to <a href="https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-46/section-139.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">s. 139(2) of the <em>Criminal Code</em></a>. The offence is not dependent on the deleted evidence being evidence that would have been used against the deleter.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Every person who intentionally attempts in any manner other than a manner described in subsection (1) to obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of justice is guilty of [an offence].</p>
</blockquote>
<p>A couple of examples:</p>
<ul>


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</blockquote>
<p>A couple of examples:</p>
<ul>
<li>In <em>R. c. Renaud</em>, <a href="https://canlii.ca/t/j7vs0" rel="nofollow noreferrer">2019 CM 4021</a>, the accused had asked someone to delete photographs and texts off of their smart phone. He was found not guilty on this charge because the <em>mens rea</em> was not proved.</li>
<li>In <em>R. v. Subia</em>, <a href="https://canlii.ca/t/jn6sb" rel="nofollow noreferrer">2022 ONSC 1693</a>, the accused admitted that he used specialized software in an attempt to delete traces of evidence (images) from his phone. He was found guilty of attempted obstruction of justice.</li>
</ul>


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Answer 2: <h2>Using it may be a crime</h2>
<p><strong>Having it is fine</strong></p>
<p><a href="/questions/tagged/australia" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-australia-tooltip-container">australia</a></p>
<p>There is a similar crime in all jurisdictions which in <a href="/questions/tagged/new-south-wales" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;new-south-wales&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;new-south-wales&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-new-south-wales-tooltip-container">new-south-wales</a> is called <a href="https://www.sydneycriminallawyers.com.au/criminal/legislation/crimes-act/tampering-with-evidence/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Tampering etc with evidence</a> under <a href="http://www5.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/ca190082/s317.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">s317</a> of the Crimes Act 1900.</p>
<blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p>To establish the offence, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that:</p>
<ol>
<li><p>You suppressed, concealed, destroyed, altered or falsified information knowing it is or may be required as evidence in a judicial proceeding, or you fabricated false evidence (other than by perjury), or you knowingly made use of false evidence, and</p>
</li>
<li><p>You intended by doing so to mislead any judicial tribunal in judicial proceedings.</p>
</li>
</ol>
<p>A ‘judicial proceeding’ is any proceeding in or before a judicial tribunal in which evidence may be taken on oath.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Evidence of a crime (even if not your crime) “is or may be required as evidence in a judicial proceeding” even if no such proceeding has commenced. If you know its there and your intention is to destroy this evidence to prevent it being used in the (hypothetical) judicial proceeding, then you have committed the crime.</p>


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Answer 3: <p>Yes using it can be illegal depending on the circumstances.</p>
<p>In numerous (if not all) jurisdictions there are offences like the following:</p>
<ul>
<li>tampering with, destroying, mutilating, altering or concealing evidence; and/or</li>
<li><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Obstruction_of_justice" rel="nofollow noreferrer">obstructing justice</a>, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perverting_the_course_of_justice" rel="nofollow noreferrer">perverting the course of justice</a> or defeating the ends of justice (more broad); and/or</li>
<li>contempt of court (even more broad).</li>
</ul>
<p>Some jurisdictions compel the preservation or disclosure of records (e.g. for tax assessments or freedom of information law).</p>
<p>Some jurisdictions compel cooperation with agents of the state (e.g. when being questioned at a border).</p>


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<p>Some jurisdictions compel cooperation with agents of the state (e.g. when being questioned at a border).</p>
<p><a href="/questions/tagged/england-and-wales" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-england-and-wales-tooltip-container">england-and-wales</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>[At common law] the offence of <a href="https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/public-justice-offences-incorporating-charging-standard#_Toc536105663" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Perverting the Course of Justice</a> is committed when an accused:</p>
<ul>
<li>does an act or series of acts;</li>
<li>which has or have a tendency to pervert; and</li>
<li>which is or are intended to pervert;</li>
<li>the course of public justice.</li>
</ul>
</blockquote>
<p><a href="https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2011/729.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">T v. R [2011] EWCA Crim 729</a>:</p>


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<li>the course of public justice.</li>
</ul>
</blockquote>
<p><a href="https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2011/729.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">T v. R [2011] EWCA Crim 729</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>In a criminal case, the course of justice includes the police investigation of a possible crime. An act that makes that investigation more difficult, or which may mislead the police in their investigation, may tend to pervert the course of justice.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The circumstances might be such that there is a more appropriate or specific offence (that would be preferred to a broader offence). For example, in England and Wales there is the <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/36/section/77" rel="nofollow noreferrer">offence of altering etc. records with intent to prevent disclosure, s77 Freedom of Information Act 2000</a>.</p>


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<p>In some circumstances using it is not illegal, e.g. if someone steals your device and demands you tell them your username and password.</p>


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Question Body: <p>REASON FOR QUESTION:</p>
<p>I was born in the EU and lost my citizenship when I immigrated to the US many years ago.   As many know, our privacy protections are a joke and our data gets collected and sold to the highest bidder with almost no controls.</p>
<p>Anonymous accounts and using a US VOIP number provided by an EU company used to be a good enoufh defense, but lately there is an online trend positively identify customers by requiring a mobile number (meaning that unscrupulous companies can track every movement you make) and rejecting VOIP numbers.  This is obviously disturbing, especially with the evolution of AI and thus the possibility to profile and know an individual better than he knows himself.  I have no problem with a government agency of a trustworthy country having access to my data AFTER  getting a warrant if there is a justified reason, but I certainly do not want private companies to have access to it.</p>


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<p>So I thought that I might be able to obtain GDPR privacy protection by using a VPN to move my point of online presence to the EU and doing most of my online business and activity through EU-based services.   For example, if I use google or youtube through a local US address my history and activity can be sold, but if I do it through the VPN to do it through their EU servers... my data would be protected from sale due to GDPR.</p>
<p>RESEARCH DONE:</p>
<p>From what I researched, companies based and providing service in Europe are required to follow GDPR privacy rules.</p>
<p>Sure, they can easily do the common international trick of establishing local companies in each company and &quot;franchising&quot; their brand so that they appear global while &quot;legally&quot; being independent companies in each country.</p>


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<p>But... so long as I get my services in the EU (through a VPN that establishes my presence there and thus ensures I interact with EU servers) it seems that I would be protected by GDPR.</p>
<p><strong>QUESTION</strong>:<br />
Am I right in thinking that using a VPN server in the EU would get me GDPR privacy protections?</p>
<p>IMPLICATIONS:
If the answer is yes, this could move a lot of personal-privacy-concerned customer electronic business from the US to the EU and if enough people do it even prompt the US to finally pass laws that put consumer privacy ahead of corporate profits.</p>


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Answer 1: <p>Kinda but not really.</p>
<p>As a rough approximation, GDPR applies when in a controller–subject relationship, at least one of them is in Europe:</p>
<ul>
<li>GDPR applies per Art 3(1) to all processing activities that occur in the context of an European establishment.</li>
<li>For non-European data controllers, GDPR applies per Art 3(2) to those processing activities that relate to the offering of goods or services to people who are to Europe, i.e. services that are marketed to Europeans.</li>
</ul>
<p>Citizenship is explicitly not a factor here.</p>
<p>If you're interacting with European companies (not via non-European intermediaries), then you're covered by GDPR regardless of whether you use a VPN.</p>


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<p>If you're interacting with European companies (not via non-European intermediaries), then you're covered by GDPR regardless of whether you use a VPN.</p>
<p>If you're interacting with non-European companies but consume their Europe-oriented services, for example by pretending to have an European network location, then things are tricky. You'd clearly be covered by GDPR if you were physically in Europe, for example during a tourist trip. <strong>It is likely that websites would treat you as GDPR-covered. However, you might run into practical difficulties if you'd try to enforce your rights.</strong> In particular, I think that no data protection authority would be responsible for your case, and no European court would have jurisdiction.</p>
<p>If you're interacting with non-European companies that don't explicitly offer their services to an European market, GDPR will likely not apply at all, regardless of where you are or where you purport to be.</p>


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<p>In this answer, &quot;Europe&quot; means EU/EEA/UK as appropriate.</p>
<p>Personal opinion: using a VPN like this might or might not work, but it is unlikely to make things worse privacy-wise. So you might as well try. But you shouldn't rely on this as legal protection. Also, note that many companies should comply with privacy rules, but don't.</p>


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Question Title: Who is the data controller of footage taken on a retail worker’s personal phone?

Question Body: <p>An on-duty retail employee draws their personal smartphone while in uniform and commences recording a customer. Who is the data recorded and held/controlled by, for GDPR purposes? Does the customer enjoy Subject access rights to the footage?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>The data would be recorded and held/controlled by the retail employee, making them a controller under the Data Protection Act 2018. In <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/eur/2016/679/article/4" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Article 4 of the GDPR</a> a controller is defined as</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(7) ‘controller’ means the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data (but see section 6 of the 2018 Act);</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Section 6 of the 2018 Act is irrelevant to this question. In this case, it seems clear that the employee determines, on their own, the purposes and means of processing personal data by recording a customer using their personal smartphone. They control the data.</p>


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<p>In theory, the customer would enjoy subject access rights to view the recording under <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/eur/2016/679/article/15" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Article 15 of the GDPR</a> because the recording constitutes personal data. In reality, it seems unlikely the employee would give them access.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller confirmation as to whether or not personal data concerning him or her are being processed, and, where that is the case, access to the personal data [...]</p>
</blockquote>


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Question Title: Copyright and the consitution regarding promotion

Question Body: <p>The US constitution provides copyright protection for the works of authors. Specifically, &quot;To promote the progress of science and useful arts&quot;.</p>
<p>If I were to create a work, and after a few years decide I no longer want to promote it (sell), does this run contrary to copyright as per the Constitution whereby the art is no longer promoted; copyright protection would now cease.</p>


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Answer 1: <p>A person's exclusive rights granted under U.S. statutory copyright law do not expire when the person ceases to promote the work.</p>
<p>The Copyright Clause of the Constitution does not provide copyright protection. It grants a power to Congress to create laws with a particular purpose. The Supreme Court has analyzed Congress's exercise of this power under a rational basis standard: are the laws chosen by Congress rationally connected to the specified purpose of the granted power (i.e. the promotion of science and useful arts)? See e.g. <em>Golan v. Holder</em>, 566 U.S. 302 (2012).</p>
<p>The Court has not required the laws created by Congress under this power to be so narrowly tailored such that they would only grant rights in circumstances where the rights <em>actually</em> promote the progress of science and the useful arts in that particular case.</p>


Tags: copyright, constitutional-law


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Question Title: Can Cooperatives other than worker and consumer cooperatives be designated?

Question Body: <p>The main forms of co-operatives are consumer and worker cooperatives and a bunch of variations of this
<a href="https://www.gov.mb.ca/jec/busdev/coop/types.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://www.gov.mb.ca/jec/busdev/coop/types.html</a>.</p>
<p>but according to Canadian law , can there be other forms of co operatives established to with a &quot;custom&quot; membership critera ? like a community cooperatives where anyone in the community can be a member or employee cooperatives where a company is owned by employees of a certain other company ?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>Businesses (in its broadest meaning) may be organized under either federal or provincial laws in Canada in parallel.</p>


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<p>Federally, a cooperative may be formed under the <a href="https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-1.7/FullText.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Canada Cooperatives Act</a>. Under federal law, membership in a federally incorporated cooperative must be &quot;open, in a non-discriminatory manner, to persons who can use the services of the cooperative and who are willing and able to accept the responsibilities of membership&quot; according to s. 7(1)(a), &quot;subject to any restrictions on the classes of persons to which membership may be available that may reasonably relate to any business restriction set out in the articles of the cooperative and to the reasonable commercial ability of the cooperative to provide services to prospective members, as long as the restrictions are consistent with applicable laws with respect to human rights&quot; under s. 7(2).</p>


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<p>The central aspect of a cooperative is that the coop must provide services to members and the membership rule is open and non-discriminatory, other than for explicit business reasons.</p>
<p>I did not check all provinces' cooperative acts, but at least in Alberta and Manitoba, the basis of membership rules are similar to the federal rules. In Alberta's case, the cooperative can impose any restriction on membership not in violation of human rights laws.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>a community cooperatives where anyone in the community can be a member</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Depending on how community is defined. Membership based on restrictions of race, sex, national origins etc. may or may not be held as a violation of human rights laws depending on specifics.</p>
<p>A geographical community based cooperative focusing on local development for example should usually be acceptable.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>employee cooperatives where a company is owned by employees of a certain other company</p>


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<blockquote>
<p>employee cooperatives where a company is owned by employees of a certain other company</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In any case an incorporated body that is not owned by its own employees is not a worker cooperative within the meaning of the Cooperative Acts. Specific worker coop rules apply to coops where their own employees are members of the coop.</p>
<p>But it could well be another type of coop. Membership restriction based on employment is usually acceptable and a coop, other than a worker coop, may employ non-members freely and all coops may own subsidiary assets, including other corporations.</p>


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Question Body: <p><strong>Context</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>The institution I am working for - in EU member-state <em>A</em> - recently suffered a cyber-attack which led to data being copied from the institution's infrastructure outside of it.</li>
<li>The offenders asked for ransom to not publish the data, which the institution refused to pay, leading to a data breach.</li>
<li>We are still waiting (roughly 30 days, now) to be informed by our law department about what exact data have been breached.</li>
<li>I am working remotely for that institution, residing in EU member-state <em>B</em> for the last 4 years and 4 months.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>My Question</strong></p>
<p>I am considering to submit a complaint to the corresponding DPA about the breach and the way our institution is/has been handling the situation. Nevertheless, I am not sure to which the &quot;corresponding DPA&quot; in my case is.</p>
<ul>


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<ul>
<li>Should I address the DPA of my home country, <em>B</em>, where I stay in, my institution country's DPA, <em>A</em>, or probably both?</li>
<li>Would it be better if, probably on top of that, I also address some EU body/institution, since more than one member-states are involved?</li>
</ul>


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Answer 1: <p>GDPR gives you a lot of flexibility here to choose either DPA. From Art 77:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Without prejudice to any other administrative or judicial remedy, every data subject shall have the right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority, in particular in the Member State of his or her habitual residence, place of work or place of the alleged infringement if the data subject considers that the processing of personal data relating to him or her infringes this Regulation.</p>
</blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p>However, the DPA from the company's country would be designated the lead supervisory authority for this investigation. If multiple DPAs are involved, they would coordinate with each other. There is no EU body that you could contact directly. But if the different DPAs have a dispute regarding this investigation, the EDPB would provide a consistency mechanism. This mechanism has been used in the past e.g. to force the Irish DPA to correctly apply the GDPR against companies from the Meta group, like WhatsApp and Instagram.</p>
<p>Though it might slow things down, it could be advantageous to have multiple DPAs involved, precisely so that the investigation is double-checked. If the lead supervisory authority declines the case, this would also enable the other DPA to do its own investigation.</p>


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<p>So, it would be a good idea to lodge a complaint with the DPA of your home country, and let it forward the issue to other DPAs as needed. However, contacting the DPA in the company's country would also be fine, especially if you are fluent in the relevant official language, and/or if you live in Ireland.</p>


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Question Title: Jurisdiction over FDA

Question Body: <p>What exactly grants Federal courts jurisdiction / authority over the FDA, such that they can invalidate approval of pharmaceuticals?</p>
<p>This article prompts the question:
<a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Health/canada-offer-access-mifepristone-abortion-drug-banned-us/story?id=98750787" rel="noreferrer">https://abcnews.go.com/Health/canada-offer-access-mifepristone-abortion-drug-banned-us/story?id=98750787</a></p>


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Answer 1: <p><a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/articleiii" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Article III</a> of the United States Constitution vests the nation's judicial power -- which includes the authority to hear &quot;all cases, in law and equity, arising under ... the laws of the United States&quot; -- in the Supreme Court of the United States, and in the inferior courts established by Congress.</p>
<p>The federal courts therefore have authority under the Constitution to hear basically any case alleging that a federal law has been violated.</p>
<p>The federal district courts specifically have jurisdiction over any case in which the United States or any federal agency is a <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/1345" rel="nofollow noreferrer">plaintiff</a> or <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/1346" rel="nofollow noreferrer">defendant</a>.</p>


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<p>But jurisdiction to hear a case is different than being empowered to grant the relief requested in a case. That authority comes from the Administrative Procedure Act, where Congress has specifically permitted judicial review of agency actions in <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/702" rel="nofollow noreferrer">5 U.S.C. § 702</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.</p>
</blockquote>


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Answer 2: <p>The <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Administrative_Procedure_Act_(United_States)" rel="noreferrer">Administrative Procedures Act</a> grants federal courts the power to review agency actions, including approval of pharmaceuticals. See <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/706" rel="noreferrer">5 U.S.C. § 706</a>. This section gives federal courts the power to invalidate agency actions on various bases.</p>


Tags: united-states, jurisdiction


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Question Title: Musical video production

Question Body: <p>I paid a video man to film a lady dancer and myself in a hotel dancing to my new music to be released. I wrote the lyrics, composed, recorded and sang it myself. He signed a contract with the hotel but there was no contract signed between us because he was my friend. After the shoot, he posted the video clips on Instagram and snapchat without my consent. I question why he didn't discuss it with me first. He said he owns the right to post any of the video without my permission. Who owns the copyright and what can I do. I assume I retain copyright to at least the music.</p>


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Answer 1: <p>From  <a href="https://fairuse.stanford.edu/overview/faqs/copyright-ownership/#:%7E:text=Copyrights%20are%20generally%20owned%20by,the%20employer%20owns%20the%20copyright." rel="nofollow noreferrer">Stanford Fair Use</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>What are the exceptions to the rule that the creator of a work owns the copyright?</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>Copyrights are generally owned by the people who create the works of expression, with some important exceptions:</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>If a work is created by an employee in the course of his or her
employment, the employer owns the copyright.</p>
<p>If the work is created by an independent contractor and the
independent contractor signs a written agreement stating that the work
shall be “made for hire,” the commissioning person or organization
owns the copyright only if the work is (1) a part of a larger literary
work, such as an article in a magazine or a poem or story in an


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owns the copyright only if the work is (1) a part of a larger literary
work, such as an article in a magazine or a poem or story in an
anthology; (2) part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work,
such as a screenplay; (3) a translation; (4) a supplementary work such
as an afterword, an introduction, chart, editorial note, bibliography,
appendix or index; (5) a compilation; (6) an instructional text; (7) a
test or answer material for a test; or (8) an atlas. Works that don’t
fall within one of these eight categories constitute works made for
hire only if created by an employee within the scope of his or her
employment.</p>
<p>If the creator has sold the entire copyright, the purchasing business
or person becomes the copyright owner.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It would appear that by failing to gain a written agreement that the work was &quot;made for hire&quot; you have lost the rights to it.</p>


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Answer 2: <h2>You own the copyright under Australian law</h2>
<blockquote>
<p>The owner of any copyright in a sound recording or a film is normally the person/s who made it. The 'maker' of a sound recording is the owner of the master recording, but where the recording is of a live performance, the performers are also ‘makers’. The 'maker' of a film is the person who undertook the arrangements necessary for the making of the film.</p>
<p>However, for commissioned sound recordings and films, the default position is that the copyright is owned by the commissioning party. The rules for first ownership of copyright in sound recordings and films can, as in the case of works, be varied by contract.</p>
</blockquote>
<p><em>The Australian Government’s <a href="https://www.infrastructure.gov.au/sites/default/files/short_guide_to_copyright.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Short Guide to Copyright</a> p.8</em></p>


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<p><em>The Australian Government’s <a href="https://www.infrastructure.gov.au/sites/default/files/short_guide_to_copyright.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Short Guide to Copyright</a> p.8</em></p>
<p>You state that you paid the video man - that means you commissioned the film and that makes you the copyright owner baring any other agreement to the contrary. You have a verbal contract and, presuming you did not discuss copyright, there is no “agreement to the contrary”.</p>
<p>If you still consider him a friend, you can ask him to take the videos down. If you don’t, you can just sue him for damages.</p>


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Question Body: <p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2023/apr/18/french-publisher-arrested-london-counter-terrorism-police-ernest-moret" rel="nofollow noreferrer">It is reported</a> that Ernest Moret was arrested for failing to answer police questions.</p>
<p>The incident was described as:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>When the officers began questioning Moret, [his colleague Stella] Magliani-Belkacem called her friend Sebastian Budgen, a senior editor at Verso Books in London, at whose home she and Moret had arranged to stay.</p>
<p>Budgen arranged for a lawyer to visit Moret. The lawyer called Budgen at 1am on Tuesday to confirm that Moret had been arrested over his refusal to tell police the passcodes to his confiscated phone and laptop.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This is the police statement:</p>
<blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p>This is the police statement:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>At around 7.30pm on Monday 17 April, a 28-year-old man was stopped by ports officers as he arrived at St Pancras station, using powers under schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000.</p>
<p>On Tuesday 18 April, the man was subsequently arrested on suspicion of wilfully obstructing a schedule 7 examination, contrary to <strike>section</strike> [<em>schedule 7, paragraph</em>] 18 of the Terrorism Act 2000.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>What is the law here?  At what point does it become a crime to answer a police question with &quot;I would like to speak to my lawyer&quot;?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>I do not know the exact circumstances for the alleged obstruction (and whether there was a political or diplomatic purpose to prompt the questioning would be off-topic here) so I have just focused on the relevant legislation in answer to:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>What is the law here?</p>
</blockquote>
<p><strong>SHORT ANSWER</strong></p>
<p>It's not a crime <em>to answer a police question with &quot;I would like to speak to my lawyer&quot;?</em></p>
<p>But it is a(n alleged) crime to obstruct or otherwise fail to comply with an examination under the Terrorism Act 2000.</p>
<p>This Act is one of a very small number of laws that makes it compulsory for someone to answer questions or provide information, but as they are not under arrest there is no statutory requirement for them to have independent legal advice.</p>
<p>What they say or provide cannot be used against them (with some exemptions, below) and failure to comply is an offence.</p>
<p><strong>LONG ANSWER</strong></p>


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<p>What they say or provide cannot be used against them (with some exemptions, below) and failure to comply is an offence.</p>
<p><strong>LONG ANSWER</strong></p>
<p>A police officer is an <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/schedule/7/paragraph/1?timeline=false" rel="nofollow noreferrer">examining officer</a>, and under <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/schedule/7/paragraph/2?timeline=false" rel="nofollow noreferrer">paragraph 2</a>
Schedule 7, Terrorism Act 2000:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(1) An examining officer may question a person to whom this paragraph applies for the purpose of determining whether he appears to be a person falling within section 40(1)(b).</p>
</blockquote>
<p><a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/section/40?timeline=false" rel="nofollow noreferrer">section 40(1)(b)</a>
says:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(b) is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism.</p>
</blockquote>


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says:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(b) is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Under <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/schedule/7/paragraph/5?timeline=false" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Paragraph 5</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>A person who is questioned under paragraph 2 or 3 <strong>must</strong>—</p>
<p>(a) give the examining officer any information in his possession which the officer requests;</p>
<p>(b) give the examining officer on request either a valid passport which includes a photograph or another document which establishes his identity;</p>
<p>(c) declare whether he has with him documents of a kind specified by the examining officer;</p>
<p>(d) give the examining officer on request any document which he has with him and which is of a kind specified by the officer.</p>
</blockquote>


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<p>(d) give the examining officer on request any document which he has with him and which is of a kind specified by the officer.</p>
</blockquote>
<p><strong>BUT</strong>, under <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/schedule/7/paragraph/5A?timeline=false" rel="nofollow noreferrer">paragraph 5A</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>(1) An answer or information given orally by a person in response to a question asked under paragraph 2 or 3 may not be used in evidence against the person in criminal proceedings.</p>
<p>(2) Sub-paragraph (1) does not apply—</p>
<ul>
<li><p>(a) in the case of proceedings for an offence under paragraph 18 of this Schedule,</p>
</li>
<li><p>(b) on a prosecution for perjury, or</p>
</li>
<li><p>(c) on a prosecution for some other offence where, in giving evidence, the person makes a statement inconsistent with the answer or information mentioned in sub-paragraph (1).</p>
</li>
</ul>
</blockquote>


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</li>
</ul>
</blockquote>
<p>Failure to comply with paragraph 5 is an offence under <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/schedule/7/paragraph/18?timeline=false" rel="nofollow noreferrer">paragraph 18</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>(1) A person commits an offence if he—</p>
<ul>
<li><p>(a) wilfully fails to comply with a duty imposed under or by virtue of this Schedule,</p>
</li>
<li><p>(b) wilfully contravenes a prohibition imposed under or by virtue of this Schedule, or</p>
</li>
<li><p>(c) <strong>wilfully obstructs, or seeks to frustrate, a search or examination under or by virtue of this Schedule.</strong></p>
</li>
</ul>
</blockquote>
<p>Once they're arrested on suspicion of this offence then they are entitled to free and independent legal advice under <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/58?timeline=false" rel="nofollow noreferrer">section 58</a> Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.</p>


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Question Title: Why would this law apply?

Question Body: <p>An Extract from Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) prohibits:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions;</p>
</blockquote>
<p>From my research it has been implemented mainly in pharmaceutical(Pfizer/Flynn) and food industry(United brands).
But it has also been implemented in the non-essential industries - technology(Rambus &amp; IMAX).</p>
<p>Doesn't this goes against the core of the free market and why does the CJEU believe it is fair to limit how much can be made for <strong>non-essential</strong> goods or services, especially when the customer has a choice <em>not</em> to buy those goods?</p>
<p>Furthermore, wouldn't this automatically bring luxury brands such as Louis Vuitton under fire because they naturally have very large markups, which are not at all relative to the risk?</p>


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Answer 1: <h2>Unfair trading usually means selling below cost or engaging in cartel behaviour</h2>
<p>LV is not captured because they sell well above the cost of production, distribution, and retail.</p>
<p>The type of behaviour that is captured is known as predatory pricing where a large competitor sells below cost in a market to drive smaller competitors out of business either by cross-subsidies from other markets or by simply absorbing the losses from greater capital reserves. A large North American coffee company has been accused of doing this when expanding into new markets.</p>
<p>Another type of unfair practice is actively conspiring with your competitors to agree a market price, or to not compete in other dimensions - perhaps by agreeing not to advertise in certain markets. This deprives consumers of choice because there is no price differentiation or there is no opportunity to learn about competition.</p>


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<p>Other types of (arguable) unfair practices is buying up your competitors or refusing to supply certain markets (i.e. tacit or explicit agreements not to compete).</p>


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Question Title: Could a justice be sued in a case that goes, ‘‘all the way up to the Supreme Court?’’

Question Body: <p><em>Hypothetical</em>. Person (A), before in his life, had engaged in some act that, allegedly, defamed some other person (B); later on in life, person (A) becomes an associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court... Could person (B) sue person (A), and take his case, ‘‘All the way up to the Supreme Court?’’ If so, what would happen? Would the justice (being sued) recuse himself? What happens if he does not recuse himself?</p>
<p>(<em>Amending hereafter</em>: Given that comments &amp; answers were disrupted by the issue of the ‘‘Statute of Limitations,’’ while being good willing as is obvious, then it should be neglected, for the purpose of extending this query to its most lucid extension.)</p>


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Answer 1: <p>To the title question, yes, of course, Justices are subject to the law same as anyone else is (at least in theory; whether actual practice bears that out is another matter).  Chief Justice Roberts (and the rest of SCOTUS, and a good chunk of the judiciary to boot, and then some) was a named defendant in the case <a href="https://casetext.com/case/shao-v-roberts" rel="noreferrer">Shao v. Roberts</a> that was appealed to SCOTUS.  The Justices all recused themselves <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3388975323636448078" rel="noreferrer">rendering the court short of a quorum</a> and leaving the prior appellate court decision to dismiss the case <em>sua sponte</em> in place.</p>


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<p>However, Justices essentially police themselves.  As the head of the judicial branch they are largely independent of Congressional or Executive attempts to control how they go about their business.  Recent calls to create a legal code of ethics for Justices <em>exist</em> because such a code perhaps cannot, and currently does not, exist under the current constitutional order.  As such Justices make their own decisions on when to recuse (see <a href="https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/48131/can-john-roberts-rule-on-whether-witnesses-have-to-testify-in-the-impeachment-in/48134#48134">my answer here</a> for further details).  Your hypothetical justice would do the same, and the court would proceed as it always does whether they do or don't.</p>


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Answer 2: <h2>The problem is the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Statute_of_limitations" rel="noreferrer">Statute of Limitations</a></h2>
<p>Let's say Abel defames Bob. Abel then studies law and becomes a judge, and about 30 years down the line becomes Supreme Court Judge Abel.</p>
<p>Now, Defamation is one of the shorter statutes of Limitation: <a href="https://mullenlawfirm.com/federal-defamation-statute-of-limitations/" rel="noreferrer">The claim has to be made one year from the defaming statement.</a> By the time Abel has his law degree, the case can no longer be brought and Bob has no legal recourse to sue. His case will be dismissed with prejudice for the statute of Limitations in the first instance, the appeals court will deny to review a case that is multiple decades past its statute of limitations and the Supreme court will deny to hear the case also.</p>
<p>As the case can't reach the supreme court, there is no reason for the judge to recuse themselves.</p>


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<p>As the case can't reach the supreme court, there is no reason for the judge to recuse themselves.</p>
<h2><a href="https://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/desktop/document/USCode28USC455Disqualificationofjusticejudgeormagistratejudge?doc_id=XEIMFQ003" rel="noreferrer">Judges involved with the case or parties should recuse themselves</a></h2>
<p>However, two much more likely setups are the following, and repeatedly have happened:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Judge Abel hears Bob's case in his time at the Court of Appeals and is elevated to SCOTUS. Then case slogs through the instances and ends up on the SCOTUS table years later. Judge Abel now should recuse themselves, since they had already judged on it.</p>
</li>
<li><p>Judge Abel has an investment in Bob Inc, and Bob Inc ends in front of SCOTUS, they should recuse themselves.</p>
</li>
</ul>


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</li>
<li><p>Judge Abel has an investment in Bob Inc, and Bob Inc ends in front of SCOTUS, they should recuse themselves.</p>
</li>
</ul>
<p>SCOTUS does not need to disclose their form of involvement with the case, so it is often a <a href="https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/alito-kagan-top-justices-in-supreme-court-recusal-black-box-1" rel="noreferrer">Black Box.</a> To some degree, how often a judge recuses themselves is highly dependent on how long they are on the court: new judges like Barrett and Jackson are much more likely to meet their own old cases in court while judges that are on the bench longer have other reasons to recuse themselves.</p>


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<p>But the decision of each judge is on their own, and at times there is critique on some of the judges that do not recuse themselves, as SCOTUS is the last instance and no other instance can review their decision to recuse themselves. However, most of the times, if a SCOTUS judge is an actual defendant, they will recuse themselves. Which... in case the whole court is sued jointly and separately - as happened in <a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/a/91655/10334">Shao v Roberts (et al.)</a> - would usually lead to the whole bench recusing themselves for being involved with the case.</p>


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Answer 3: <h2>Yes</h2>
<p>To avoid statute of limitations issues assume a sitting Supreme Court justice allegedly defames someone today outside the colour of their office. The aggrieved person can sue and because judges are not the President, they are not immune from civil suits in their private capacity.</p>
<p>Since Supreme Court judges serve for life, that justice could very well be there when any appeal reached that level. They would then have to decide if there is a conflict of interest or not. Now, most people would say yes, there is but the decision isn’t up to most people, it’s up to the judge themselves. And, since there is no appeal from the Supreme Court, their decision on recusal is binding.</p>


Tags: united-states, us-supreme-court, judge, recusal


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Question Body: <p>I am trying to understand GDPR's right to erasure (and principle of storage limitation) in the following case:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Company A offers a online data storage service that is intended to be used by the users of other companies (e.g. company A hosts a FTP server for company B and its users).</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>The users of the service that company B subscribes to may be employees of company B or just regular private consumers.</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>The users can upload arbitrary files, they may or may not contain their personal information, it is each user's individual decision what data they upload and/or access.</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>The storage system that company A uses for its service deduplicates all uploaded files. This means that if user A uploads a file, and then user B uploads the same file, the file will exist only once but under two distinct aliases chosen individually by each user. This also means that if user B deletes their file (or more precisely their alias to the file), then the file will still be present in the storage service until user A also deletes it.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>A common sense counter-argument for this would be that without deduplication, in a system where each file is always distinct, if there are duplicate files then if one user requests erasure then we would not also delete all duplicates of the file which might belong to other users. Is there any reason for this to not extend to deduplicated files with aliases?</p>


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<p>According to section 65 of the GDPR<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32016R0679" rel="nofollow noreferrer">1</a>, personal data can be kept for as long as it is needed for its intended purpose. Is the purpose that it is needed for other users to be able to access their data valid?</p>
<p>I would really appreciate any insight on this and any good resources to further my understanding of GDPR.</p>


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Answer 1: <p>I think there are a couple of different ways to look at this.</p>
<h2>Deduplication is a technical detail that's irrelevant here</h2>
<p>While the data may be deduplicated on a technical level, the files remain logically distinct.
If users 1 and 2 upload identical files, and then one user edits or deletes their file, this will not affect the other user's data.
Users cannot tell whether their files are duplicates of someone else. From the user's perspective, it makes no difference whether or not the storage uses deduplication, except perhaps via the cost of the service.</p>
<p>Because there is no user-perceptible difference, it would be difficult to interpret some GDPR significance into this scenario.</p>
<h2>Whose personal data is it anyway?</h2>


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<p>Because there is no user-perceptible difference, it would be difficult to interpret some GDPR significance into this scenario.</p>
<h2>Whose personal data is it anyway?</h2>
<p>Personal data is any information that relates to an identifiable data subject. The files here are likely to be their uploader's personal data. Thus, the uploaders would also have a right to have their uploaded files erased. In case of deduplicated storage, this would affect their logical copy.</p>
<p>The contents of the uploaded files might also be personal data relating to a third party. Then that third party might have a right to get the file contents erased. But this right must be invoked with the data controller for that processing activity, which might be company A, company B, or the uploaders, depending on context. Which leads us to the next aspect:</p>
<h2>Company A is not responsible for handling erasures</h2>


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<h2>Company A is not responsible for handling erasures</h2>
<p>From your description, it sounds like company A is a data processor providing services on behalf of company B. In turn, B might be a processor acting on behalf of the uploaders. In any case, it seems that A would not be the data controller for these processing activities. Data subject rights like erasure must be invoked against the controller, as only the controller can understand whether such a request should be granted. The right to erasure is not absolute, and depends a lot on <em>why</em> that data is being processed. In particular:</p>
<h2>Personal data need not be erased if it is still necessary</h2>


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<h2>Personal data need not be erased if it is still necessary</h2>
<p>For example, a person might very well be the data subject of some of these files, and might then ask for erasure. But if the files are being stored because they are going to be needed as evidence in legal proceedings, the data subject can't use this GDPR right to destroy evidence. The data controller would be allowed to refuse a request in such cases.</p>
<p>It could now happen that two different users of this deduplicated storage are storing the same file, but for entirely different purposes. Blanket deletion of all copies of a file could be quite problematic. Note that deletion is also a &quot;processing activity&quot; and needs a legal basis under the GDPR. Unexpected data loss could be a data breach. One user's erasure could be another user's reportable data breach incident.</p>
<p>Thus, I would strongly expect such requests to be handled on a logical file level, not on the deduplicated storage level.</p>


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<p>Thus, I would strongly expect such requests to be handled on a logical file level, not on the deduplicated storage level.</p>
<h2>Caveat: public access and cloned files</h2>
<p>If the (logical) file is made available to the public who can then clone or copy this file, and if the &quot;original&quot; is taken down due to an erasure request (or copyright takedown notice), it might be appropriate to remove logical clones as well. Again, this might not involve deleting the contents on the deduplicated storage level, but it might affect other users' copies.</p>
<p>In a GDPR context, the grounds for this would be the Art 17(2) right to be forgotten:</p>
<blockquote>


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<p>In a GDPR context, the grounds for this would be the Art 17(2) right to be forgotten:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Where the controller has made the personal data public and is obliged pursuant to paragraph 1 to erase the personal data, the controller, taking account of available technology and the cost of implementation, shall take reasonable steps, including technical measures, to inform controllers which are processing the personal data that the data subject has requested the erasure by such controllers of any links to, or copy or replication of, those personal data.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But this depends crucially on who those other controllers are. If A is the sole controller, the logical files could probably be deleted directly. If B or the end users are controllers, it could be more appropriate to forward the erasure request to them.</p>


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Question Body: <p>I feel like everywhere you go you'll see copyright infringement. When I open social media, people post copyrighted videos and photos all the time. I suppose I'm assuming they've not got permission - but what 30 follower account is able to get permission from big movie studios etc?</p>
<p>My question - Why is this kind of infringement not acted on more, and prosecuted? For example:</p>
<ol>
<li>There are so many YouTube Shorts that just blatantly post clips of Movies, Football games, TV Programmes, etc. Why do these never get in trouble? Perhaps they get a copyright strike, but surely they would be prosecuted/sued?</li>


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<li>There are 'Leak' sites for mods of games, which operate under the proviso of having all content that is uploaded copyright free and not owned by a single entity. Enough so that newer users may not be aware that they're downloading pirated items/stolen source code. Why do those who upload to these sites, or even host these sites, not get in trouble, and prosecuted/sued, or even those that download from these sites?</li>
</ol>


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Answer 1: <ul>
<li>You are wrong that they never get into legal trouble.  It isn't terribly common but it certainly happens to those that get relatively prominent.</li>
<li>Many of the folks doing the copyright infringement are judgement proof.  It makes little sense for Disney, for example, to sue some guy living in his parents' basement for uploading a clip of their movie when that guy has no assets.  Financially, it wouldn't be worth the cost of a lawyer.</li>
<li>Many of the folks doing the copyright infringement are in jurisdictions that look the other way.  If you're a Russian citizen pirating content owned by American companies, the Russian authorities aren't going to cooperate and arrest you and the American companies likely can't recover any judgement they'd get because you don't have any assets in America.</li>


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<li>There is a whack-a-mole problem.  If there are hundreds of people posting pirated content to Facebook and each one is running hundreds of pages, that's tens of thousands of pages posting content.  By the time you identify and close all of them, the pirates will have created tens of thousands of new pages.</li>
<li>There is a cat-and-mouse problem.  Copyright owners have automated tools to scan for their IP to issue takedown notices.  Piraters know this so they modify the video (posting it as a mirror image or adding some additional video elements) in order to evade the automated tools.  If copyright owners have to manually identify pirated content, it's realistically not cost effective to do so.  The humans finding that content would cost more than the business loses in revenue to pirates.</li>


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<li>Tracking down the actual human/ business behind the copyright infringement is often a fair amount of work and may involve motions in courts in multiple countries.  That work tends not to be highly prioritized by law enforcement.  If you're a small fish, it is unlikely that anyone would go to the effort of unmasking you in order to sue.</li>
</ul>


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Answer 2: <p>There's also a political dimension here: the copyright holders (e.g., music labels, publishers etc.) as a group would be extremely ill-advised to prosecute commoners for something like posting on social media. The copyright law evolved to its existing shape as copyright holders were strongly lobbying, and no-one else was paying attention. Thus, for example, the original 14+14 years of copyright turned to 28+14, then to 28+28, then to 50 after author's death, then to 70 after author's death. Maybe this really reflects a consensus of how many years is fair and best serves public interests, but I find other explanation more plausible - when these laws were passed, it was not a tangible issue for anyone besides the copyright holders.</p>
<p>Making it a tangible issue for every user of social media, and thus bringing on a serious discussion of whether the current copyright law is fair, is not something they want to do.</p>


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Answer 3: <blockquote>
<p>There are so many YouTube Shorts that just blatantly post clips of Movies, Football games, TV Programmes, etc. Why do these never get in trouble? Perhaps they get a copyright strike, but surely they would be prosecuted/sued?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>If they are using the clip for commentary, then it's covered under Fair Use doctrine (in the U.S. at least).</p>
<p>Another big reason is optics. When a big media corporation goes after some small fry for copyright infringement on a small scale, it tends to generate a lot of negative publicity. If you see a headline like &quot;Multi-billion dollar Disney corporation sics their lawyers on 20-year-old for unauthorized use of 'Let It Go' on YouTube&quot;, what's your gut reaction? An average person's reaction will be more along the lines of &quot;damn those big corporations and their soulless corporate lawyers&quot; than &quot;shame on that young adult for their flagrant violation of copyright law!&quot;</p>


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Answer 4: <p>Uploading an exciting movie excerpt which is so short that it cannot be a substitute for watching the actual movie is actually <strong>an advertisement</strong> for the movie. There is no incentive for the publisher to harass fans and interdict free advertisements. All to the contrary: Going viral online is the best thing that can happen to a TV show or a movie.</p>
<p>Actual valuable assets are much more closely guarded. You won't find live streams of top sports events on YouTube for which TV networks have payed millions of dollars, and you typically don't find entire movies, with a few exceptions where copyright has expired or where the monetary value is so low (no streaming sales, no theater screenings) that nobody really cares (is my guess) — one example I stumbled across recently are the tacky Winnetou western movies of my childhood, like <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hQCbTBGWUuc&amp;pp=ygUId2lubmV0b3U%3D" rel="nofollow noreferrer">this one</a>.</p>


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Answer 5: <p>The first cut that should be made regards &quot;prosecution&quot;. Copyright infringement as crime is a narrow subset of general copyright infringement, in the US involving copying and redistribution for monetary gain. The incidence of <em>criminal</em> infringement is relatively low, compared to &quot;infringement for free&quot;. The government might have an interest and does have the resources to criminally prosecute infringers, though it also has many other interests and demands on its resources.</p>


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<p>At the level of pursuing infringement via individual civil suits, the next cut that needs to be made, in understanding lack of legal action, is in terms of the kinds of plaintiffs out there. This is a continuum based on the &quot;size&quot; of the plaintiff (resources, really) and their interest, with Disney being towards the top of that list, and me being towards the bottom. Disney is highly motivated to protect its lucrative primary source income, but my content is a tiny source of income.</p>
<p>The third factor to consider is potential for awareness. I know of artists whose music is repeatedly copied from CD and posted on Youtube. Even if you know in principle that your work is being infringed, you may not know the details required for taking legal action (such as the URL).</p>


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Answer 6: <p>In the <a href="/questions/tagged/united-states" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-united-states-tooltip-container">united-states</a>, the basic unit of copyright infringement enforcement on the modern internet is the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (<strong>DMCA</strong>) take-down.</p>
<p>Online service providers (e.g. YouTube) are given <strong>safe harbor</strong> (are protected from litigation) as long as they expeditiously remove infringing content their users have uploaded.</p>
<p>This enforcement mechanism is much cheaper than hiring a P.I., process server, lawyer, etc. to identify, sue, and prevail in court against some unknown person, who in all likelihood won’t even have any valuable assets to seize. So, in general, a DMCA takedown (or an automated identification system like YouTube’s) is the only one that is used.</p>


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Answer 7: <p>Regardless of what country copyright infringement occurs in, it's all about money.
In most cases the reason why infringer are not pursued is because of money.  The cost of court proceedings is extremely expensive regardless of Country so it makes it prohibitive.
The other issue is that a lot of copyright infringement online cannot be traced because of cloudflare as well as other similar services.<br />
We wrote and article about this topic here: <a href="https://www.dundaslawyers.com.au/copyright-infringement-online-lessons-for-website-owners/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://www.dundaslawyers.com.au/copyright-infringement-online-lessons-for-website-owners/</a></p>
<p>Hope that helps.</p>


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Answer 8: <p>I just want to comment on that &quot;there are so many YouTube Shorts that just blatantly post clips of&quot; copyrighted material, as the OP says. I can tell that in my experience that kind of content is actually detected and dealt with by Youtube.</p>


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<p>I made a video with a piece of music (taken from a CD) and some free images (taken from Wikimedia Commons and used according to their licenses) and uploaded it to Youtube. In a few days, Youtube notified me that the copyrighted content (the piece of music) had been automatically identified and that all income that my video could produce would be given to the copyright holder of the music. It wasn't a big deal because I didn't expect any income from my video (1.8 k views in 9 years), but it shows that copyright infringements are controlled in Youtube so they become somehow a licensed use. A lot of the apparent copyright infringements that you can find in Youtube can be actually allowed by the copyright owner in the same way.</p>


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Question Title: Tests to determine when the Residential Tenancy Act applies. E.g. what counts as providing health care?


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Question Body: <p>My friend was in a work related accident and suffered brain damage. He pays rent to live in a building that the average person would not be eligible to live in. Guests are required to check in at the front desk and the staff help him (or at least remind him) to take his medication. Though I was told this was more them doing him a favour and not an official policy.</p>
<p>He was served a &quot;<a href="https://www2.gov.bc.ca/assets/gov/housing-and-tenancy/residential-tenancies/forms/rtb33.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">One Month Notice to End Tenancy</a>&quot;. I am uncertain if the Residential Tenancy Act <a href="https://www.bclaws.gov.bc.ca/civix/document/id/complete/statreg/02078_01#section4" rel="nofollow noreferrer">would apply</a>. Specifically</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(i) in a community care facility under the Community Care and Assisted
Living Act,</p>
<p>(ii) in a continuing care facility under the Continuing Care Act,</p>


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<blockquote>
<p>(i) in a community care facility under the Community Care and Assisted
Living Act,</p>
<p>(ii) in a continuing care facility under the Continuing Care Act,</p>
<p>(iv) if designated under the Mental Health Act, in a Provincial mental
health facility, an observation unit or a psychiatric unit,</p>
<p>(v) in a housing based health facility that provides hospitality
support services and personal health care, or</p>
<p>(vi) that is made available in the course of providing rehabilitative
or therapeutic treatment or services,</p>
</blockquote>
<p>To my understanding the arbitrator to decide whether she has authority to decide such as a case, and whether the RTA applies. Is my understanding correct? If she does not have authority or the RTA doesn't apply, would that mean the eviction is cancelled unless a different avenue is taken?</p>


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<p>A lot of these conditions do not seem very objective to me. Are there concrete tests to determine if the RTA applies? For example if there is a nurse or social worker whose job it is to assist the tenants, would that mean the RTA doesn't apply?</p>


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Answer 1: <blockquote>
<p>To my understanding the arbitrator to decide whether she has authority
to decide such as a case, and whether the RTA applies. Is my
understanding correct?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The tribunal handling the eviction determines if it applies.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>If she does not have authority or the RTA doesn't apply, would that
mean the eviction is cancelled unless a different avenue is taken?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Yes.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>A lot of these conditions do not seem very objective to me. Are there
concrete tests to determine if the RTA applies?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This is much more definite and specific that many, many others statutes. Nothing in the law is perfectly objective and there are always edge cases, but this is relatively clear. There might be case law interpreting the statute, but even if there is, there might be no cases on point.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>For example if there is a nurse or social worker whose job it is to


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<blockquote>
<p>For example if there is a nurse or social worker whose job it is to
assist the tenants, would that mean the RTA doesn't apply?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In cases (i), (ii), (iv) and (vi) there is probably a license for the facility or some kind of equivalent government documentation that establishes its status. One could ask the facility how, if at all, it is licensed, and that is probably also a public record somewhere. The residual category would be (v) which states:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>in a housing based health facility that provides hospitality support
services and personal health care</p>
</blockquote>
<p>One would have to investigate the facts about the facility to determine the truth, but this is still a fairly clear standard. If it is not a &quot;health facility&quot; or does not provide &quot;personal health care&quot; it might not quality.</p>


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Question Title: If the 21st Amendment was repealed, would Prohibition go back into effect?

Question Body: <p>The 18th Amendment prohibited alcoholic beverages; the 21st repealed the 18th. If the 21st Amendment was repealed, would that &quot;un-repeal&quot; the 18th Amendment and reinstate Prohibition?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>Since one of the things that the 21st amendment does is repeal that Amendment, the 18th Amendment would again be a valid part of the Constitution (until SCOTUS says otherwise). Also note that prior to repeal of the 18th Amendment, the restrictions were lightened e.g. via the <a href="https://govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/48/STATUTE-48-Pg16.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Cullen-Harrison Act</a>. In the original instance, enabling legislation had to be passed – <a href="https://govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/41/STATUTE-41-Pg305a.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">the National Prohibition Act</a>. That act was not formally repealed or amended, it just fell to desuetude. Congress could re-pass enabling legislation like it did the first time. Or, the executive branch could conclude that the National Prohibition Act is good law, it would be enforced, there would be a lawsuit, and SCOTUS would decide.</p>


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Question Title: Is it legal to shine a non-laser light source at an aircraft?

Question Body: <p>After all the media coverage about people pointing lasers at commercial aircraft, I started to wonder what was so special about lasers.</p>

<p>It seems to me that the amount of distraction that could be done with a 5mW laser is significantly less than what could be done with something else.</p>

<p>For example, if I bought/borrowed <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luxor_Las_Vegas#Luxor_Sky_Beam" rel="nofollow">the light beam from the Luxor hotel</a>, put it in my backyard, turned it on, and pointed it at the planes flying out of a major airport, I would expect that pilots might have some more issues with a 4.3 Billion candela beam than with a 5mW laser (right?)</p>

<p>However, I can't find any laws against it, so would this be legal?</p>


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<p>However, I can't find any laws against it, so would this be legal?</p>

<p>Alternatively, what if I just wanted to swing that beam around in the sky, and it accidentally crossed the path of a plane?  Are there different laws regarding unintentionally hitting a plane with something like this?</p>


Answer 1: <p>If I were a federal prosecutor (which I'm emphatically not), I might try to charge you under <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/32" rel="nofollow">18 USC § 32</a> (a) (5):</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>a) Whoever willfully— [...] (5) interferes with or disables, with intent to endanger the safety of any person or with a reckless disregard for the safety of human life, anyone engaged in the authorized operation of such aircraft or any air navigation facility aiding in the navigation of any such aircraft;
  [...] shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years or both.</p>
</blockquote>


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<p>Since you clearly know, or believe, that this has the potential to interfere with piloting, which would obviously be a serious danger to people on board the aircraft, I'd argue you would be acting with "reckless disregard for the safety of human life."</p>

<p>If your conduct results in anybody's death, then life imprisonment and/or the death penalty are also on the table, under <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/34" rel="nofollow">18 USC § 34</a>.</p>


Tags: united-states, aviation


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Question Body: <p>I'm a 3D modeler by trade, and in the past I've used some software to create a base mesh for humanoid renders. I'm seeing now that, while it used to be AGPL and CC0, it's now entirely AGPL, and by some mechanism which I do not fully understand this seems to apply to products and meshes created with it.</p>
<p>That is, if I produce a model while using this software, I am required to release the model, and any software dependent on the model (say, a game or a web app), under the same license. This feels extraordinarily aggressive.</p>
<p>This is very strange to me. It feels like a paintbrush manufacturer demanding royalties on all paintings done with their brush. Additionally, when AGPL was created, it was apparently to close a gap in GPLv3 which allowed companies to alter software on a server and open it to the public via a web interface; which was phrased loosely enough to potentially apply to all products created by the program.</p>


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<p>While I'm historically a big fan of GPL-created works and feel that they have done wonders for the whole of the software and multimedia community, this AGPL oddity is a total deal-breaker for the software-in-question. I'm no longer even entirely certain about my rights to my videos. What is the nature of this reach? Do I need to make my application AGPL simply because I used an AGPL-produced resource in it? And, perhaps most importantly, <em>has this ever been enforced in a court of law, or could it be in the United States?</em></p>


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Answer 1: <p>OK, seems I was right to begin with, but after building some work with this I had to be sure. The problem seems to step from a lot of not-lawyers overinterpreting the reach and applicability of copyright law, which, with a few asides, is the full extent of the AGPL. Additionally, the software is not based in an English-speaking country, which may have thrown the interpreted meaning of &quot;derivative product&quot;, as opposed to simply &quot;product&quot;.</p>
<p>The AGPL is indeed in almost all ways the same as the GPL version 3; in fact you can see this by <code>diff</code>ing the two documents. The only extension of the GPLv3 made for AGPL applies to software being run on a server. While it is indeed possible to include code in the final files, which might, in theory, constitute a significant portion of this program, that does not happen.</p>


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<p>The AGPL is apparently also meant almost exclusively for software, though the wording does include the ambiguous phrase &quot;and other products&quot;; this concerned me as it felt as though it might apply to the resources created by the work. It, broadly speaking, does not.</p>
<p>So, I've got nothing to worry about--unless I was distributing derivative software, which would be an entirely different question and subject to this.</p>


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Answer 2: <p>The AGPL and GPL can be applied to output, since the output is a derivative of data licensed under the (A)GPL. Making a model with MB-Lab is not the same as writing a word document from scratch. The model is not conjured from the end-user's input. The sliders are illusions of user input and control; the programmer, not you, decided what happens when a slider is moved. To claim that a MB-Lab character model belongs to you because you moved a slider is similar to claiming that a Skyrim or Fire Emblem Awakening character model belongs to you because you moved a slider.</p>
<p>This is why <a href="https://spdx.org/licenses/exceptions-index.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">exceptions to the AGPL and GPL exist</a>. One fitting exception is <a href="https://www.gnu.org/licenses/autoconf-exception-3.0.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Autoconf-exception-3.0</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>AUTOCONF CONFIGURE SCRIPT EXCEPTION</p>
<p>Version 3.0, 18 August 2009</p>


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<blockquote>
<p>AUTOCONF CONFIGURE SCRIPT EXCEPTION</p>
<p>Version 3.0, 18 August 2009</p>
<p>Copyright (C) 2009 Free Software Foundation, Inc. <a href="https://fsf.org/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://fsf.org/</a></p>
<p>Everyone is permitted to copy and distribute verbatim copies of this license document, but changing it is not allowed.</p>
<p>This Exception is an additional permission under section 7 of the GNU General Public License, version 3 (&quot;GPLv3&quot;).  It applies to a given file that bears a notice placed by the copyright holder of the file stating that the file is governed by GPLv3 along with this Exception.</p>
<p>The purpose of this Exception is to allow distribution of Autoconf's typical output under terms of the recipient's choice (including proprietary).</p>
<ol start="0">
<li>Definitions</li>
</ol>
<p>&quot;Covered Code&quot; is the source or object code of a version of Autoconf that is a covered work under this License.</p>


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<ol start="0">
<li>Definitions</li>
</ol>
<p>&quot;Covered Code&quot; is the source or object code of a version of Autoconf that is a covered work under this License.</p>
<p>&quot;Normally Copied Code&quot; for a version of Autoconf means all parts of its Covered Code which that version can copy from its code (i.e., not from its input file) into its minimally verbose, non-debugging and non-tracing output.</p>
<p>&quot;Ineligible Code&quot; is Covered Code that is not Normally Copied Code.</p>
<ol>
<li>Grant of Additional Permission.</li>
</ol>


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<p>&quot;Ineligible Code&quot; is Covered Code that is not Normally Copied Code.</p>
<ol>
<li>Grant of Additional Permission.</li>
</ol>
<p>You have permission to propagate output of Autoconf, even if such propagation would otherwise violate the terms of GPLv3.  However, if by modifying Autoconf you cause any Ineligible Code of the version you received to become Normally Copied Code of your modified version, then you void this Exception for the resulting covered work.  If you convey that resulting covered work, you must remove this Exception in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 7 of GPLv3.</p>
<ol start="2">
<li>No Weakening of Autoconf Copyleft.</li>
</ol>
<p>The availability of this Exception does not imply any general presumption that third-party software is unaffected by the copyleft requirements of the license of Autoconf.</p>
</blockquote>


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</ol>
<p>The availability of this Exception does not imply any general presumption that third-party software is unaffected by the copyleft requirements of the license of Autoconf.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This exception permits the end-user to own and choose the license of the output by making an explicit distinction between &quot;Ineligible Code&quot; and &quot;Normally Copied Code&quot; and spelling out what you may and may not do with each. However, without an explicit exception, such output would be automatically be covered by GPL. If it were otherwise, as you claim, then such exceptions wouldn't be necessary. To put it another way, the need to explicitly list an exception indicates that the rule and its associated problems do indeed exist, i.e. <em>the exception proves the rule</em>.</p>


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<p>Another exception is the the <a href="https://github.com/makehumancommunity/makehuman/blob/master/LICENSE.md" rel="nofollow noreferrer">MakeHuman's license exception</a>: Unlike ML-Lab, they explicitly licensed their data under CC0 so that the end-user can choose the license for the output derived from that data. I have to wonder if the original question mistakenly conflated MakeHuman and MB-Lab together: MakeHuman uses <a href="https://github.com/makehumancommunity/makehuman/blob/master/LICENSE.md" rel="nofollow noreferrer">a AGPL+CC0 combo</a>, while MB-Lab uses <a href="https://github.com/animate1978/MB-Lab/blob/master/license.txt" rel="nofollow noreferrer">a GPL+AGPL combo</a>.</p>


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Answer 3: <p>I suspect this might depend on the program you're refering to. At least with MB-Labs, the meshes themselves are considered under gnu3/agpl according to the license faq - they seem to use agpl and gnu3  interchangably, which doesn't help matters, but i think thry changed from gnu3 to agpl once it was designed. Unfortunately, the licence basically made the program impossible for me to use for anything other then diy drawing references. :(</p>
<p>if I am wrong, i would LOVE to know that! So far mb has been the best free human design program i've found.</p>
<p>quote from the official website for MB-Labs</p>
<blockquote>
<p>All data files released in the MB-Lab package, including all the meshes and data &gt;contained in .blend files or in any other 3d file format, all the images and all the &gt;json files are released under GNU Affero General Public License 3.</p>
</blockquote>


Tags: open-source-software, gpl


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Question Title: What happens when there are multiple opinions joined by a majority of justices of the U.S. Supreme Court?

Question Body: <p>The chief justice, or the most senior justice in the majority if the chief justice is in the dissent, assigns a justice in the majority to write the opinion of the Court.</p>
<p>Suppose that the selected justice writes the opinion of the court which is joined by a majority of justices. However, another justice in the majority chooses to write a concurring opinion and it is also joined by a majority of justices. As a result, there are 2 opinions and both are joined (agreed to) by a majority of justices.</p>
<p>Would both opinions be considered majority opinions and binding precedents?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>There is only one majority &quot;opinion of the court&quot;, which is the one that is binding. Concurring opinions are not binding, but can be persuasive. However, the opinion of the court can be w.r.t. a section so there can be multiple non-overlapping opinions of the court, see <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/boundvolumes/540bv.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">McConnell v. FEC</a>, 540 U.S. 93. At the tail end of the syllabus, there is statement of who delivered the opinion and who joined in that opinion (also a statement of &quot;exceptions&quot;). Those three opinions define &quot;the law&quot;. Then there are concurring opinions, and dissenting opinions, and an opinion which is not &quot;the opinion of the court&quot; can concur in part and dissent in part.</p>


Tags: united-states, us-supreme-court


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Question Title: Can I use a recorded phone call as evidence in a federal court case if I&#39;m a participant in the conversation (in two single-party consent states)?

Question Body: <p>Would it be legal for me to record a phone call, without the other party’s explicit knowledge or consent that it was being recorded beforehand, as long as I, a participant in the conversation, consent to it being recorded, to use as evidence in a federal court case if both calls were made in single party consent states (i.e., from Texas, Connecticut, South Dakota, etc)?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>There are two distinct legal questions lurking in this question.</p>
<p>One, in a conversation on the phone between someone in a single party consent state and a two party consent state, is it legal for the single party consent state participant to record the conversation.</p>
<p>Second, assuming for the sake of argument that the recording was made illegally, it is admissible in evidence in a civil lawsuit in federal court.</p>
<p>I'll answer only the second piece.</p>
<p>There is not an automatic exclusionary rule to exclude the admission of evidence illegally obtained by a private individual in a federal civil lawsuit in the way that such evidence would be automatically excluded from evidence in a criminal case if it was obtained illegally by law enforcement.</p>


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<p>Instead, the court applies a balancing test on a case by case basis, weighing the circumstances that render the obtaining of the evidence illegal against the probative value of the evidence to establishing a disputed evidentiary fact in the case. The federal judge has fairly wide discretion to admit or exclude illegally obtained evidence in a federal civil lawsuit.</p>


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Question Body: <p>I signed a very general contract to do some work with a contractor. The contract specified that the work would be completed in 30 days. It also gave &quot;the owner&quot; the right to terminate the contract if the company did not supply the people and materials in time to complete the project. Within the 30 days, the project manager declared that the project was done. The work was done poorly and they did not do all they promised and left off some of the work they had decided unilaterally that they would not leave out. It has now been over 60 days since the beginning effective date of the contract and the problems have not been resolved. I had to argue with different people in their hierarchy and the VP decided I was correct in my complaints and claims they plan to do what is needed to fulfill the contract. I am very sour over this and really do not want them on my property anymore. Does this lapse of deadlines affect the validity of the contract?</p>


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<p>I asked about other aspects of this contract earlier. They made up a last name for me on the contract and also have the wrong address of the work on the contract. It was humorous, on the last meeting at the property, one of their people went to the wrong address from the contract.</p>


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Answer 1: <p>Suggested finishing dates in contracts carry little weight, unless they are expressed clearly via a <a href="https://www.hahnlaw.com/insights/time-is-of-the-essence-or-is-it/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">time is of the essence clause</a>. A 30 day delay in completion is not too surprising in the ordinary home-reno business. Obviously, they can't get away with repeatedly declaring &quot;We'll get you on the schedule as soon as possible&quot; for 5 years, but what constitutes an unreasonable delay depends on the local facts. Lawyering up could speed things up: even writing a simple formal letter that implies that legal action will be your next step could facilitate a solution.</p>


Tags: contract-law


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Question Title: How can roomate finder offer an &#39;LGBT household&#39; option for filtering potential roomates without violating USA&#39;s fair housing act?

Question Body: <p>The title sort of says it all.  I was using a roommate finding/room rental app when I noticed it had an option to filter for 'LGBT housing'.  The Fair Housing Act forbids discriminating against sex, including sexuality.  Thus I'm wondering how allowing preferential treatment to LBGT sexualities/genders wouldn't constitute discrimination?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>The words of the prohibition in <a href="https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-24/subtitle-B/chapter-I/part-100" rel="nofollow noreferrer">24 CFR 100.60(a)</a>are that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>It shall be unlawful for a person to refuse to sell or rent a dwelling
to a person who has made a bona fide offer, because of race, color,
religion, sex, familial status, or national origin or to refuse to
negotiate with a person for the sale or rental of a dwelling because
of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin, or
to discriminate against any person in the sale or rental of a dwelling
because of handicap.</p>
</blockquote>


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of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin, or
to discriminate against any person in the sale or rental of a dwelling
because of handicap.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It <em>would</em> be discriminatory for the landlord to refuse to rent to a person because they are or are not of some sex. Based just on the plain language of the prohibition, the author of the app or operator of a website is not renting / refusing to rent. Nevertheless, Roommate.com was sued, and found not liable, though not on the grounds that they hadn't discriminated</p>
<p><a href="https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2012/02/02/09-55272.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Fair Housing Councils v. Rommate.com</a> addressed an attempt to punish roommate.com on discriminatory grounds. The court states that &quot;The pivotal question is whether the FHA applies to roommates&quot;.
The court's reasoning is a clear application of the notion of &quot;Congressional intent&quot;. As they say,</p>


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The court's reasoning is a clear application of the notion of &quot;Congressional intent&quot;. As they say,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>There’s no indication that Congress intended to interfere with
personal relationships inside the home. Congress wanted to address the
problem of landlords discriminating in the sale and rental of housing,
which deprived protected classes of housing opportunities. But a
business transaction between a tenant and landlord is quite different
from an arrangement between two people sharing the same living space.
We seriously doubt Congress meant the FHA to apply to the latter.
Consider, for example, the FHA’s prohibition against sex discrimination. Could Congress, in the 1960s, really have meant that
women must accept men as roommates? Telling women they may not
lawfully exclude men from the list of acceptable roommates would be
controversial today; it would have been scandalous in the 1960s</p>
</blockquote>


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lawfully exclude men from the list of acceptable roommates would be
controversial today; it would have been scandalous in the 1960s</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The court continued on other grounds, observing that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>given that the FHA is a remedial statute that we construe broadly...
we turn to constitutional concerns, which provide strong
countervailing considerations</p>
</blockquote>
<p>That is, even if you ignore congressional intent, there is a constitutional reason why FHA cannot apply to roommate choice.</p>
<p>SCOTUS in Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of


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<p>That is, even if you ignore congressional intent, there is a constitutional reason why FHA cannot apply to roommate choice.</p>
<p>SCOTUS in Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of
Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 stated that &quot;the freedom to enter into and carry on certain intimate or private relationships is a fundamental element of liberty protected by the Bill of Rights&quot;, and &quot;Courts have extended the right of intimate association to marriage, child bearing, child rearing and cohabitation with relatives&quot;. Then in order to &quot;determine whether a particular relationship is protected by the right to intimate association we look to 'size, purpose, selectivity, and whether others are excluded from critical aspects of the relationship'&quot;. After extensive analysis centered around the point that &quot;Government regulation of an individual’s ability to


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pick a roommate thus intrudes into the home, which 'is entitled to special protection as the center of the private lives of
our people'&quot;, the court &quot;adopt[s] the narrower construction that excludes roommate selection from the reach of the FHA&quot;.</p>
<p><strong>TL;DR</strong> the FHA doesn't apply to roommates and it's legal to select one's roommates based on their race, color, religion, sex, sexuality, etc...</p>


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Answer 2: <p>Whether this is lawful, has already been answered. Whether this is ethical (and by extension <em>should</em> be lawful) can be argued. Without knowing the intentions of the advertisers, your best approach would be to interpret this as a way to search for homes that are friendly towards queer folks. Similarly, tenants may be looking for homes friendly to their religion or race, neurodiversity, or hobbies. This filter lets advertisers be proactive and explicit about non-tangible aspects of the home.</p>


Tags: united-states, fair-housing-acts


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Question Body: <p>In the UK, there are strict safeguarding rules for children. If a child is not picked up after school or an activity by their parents or caregivers, the teachers need to wait until they are picked up and their responsibilities are clear to ensure the child's safety.</p>
<p>I haven't found any similar advice for Germany. There is plenty of advice for parents and leaving children alone (usually at home), but I have not found anything concrete on the responsibilities of others who might be looking after the children and where that responsibility ends.</p>
<p>Are there particular laws that apply to children in this context in Germany, particularly in what context they can be unaccompanied and who is responsible for them? Do the laws change at particular ages?</p>


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<p>Let's say I run a swimming course, for instance, and the class finishes at 5 pm. Who is responsible for the child now that the class has ended? If a 10-year-old child says that their parents &quot;said they could go home alone&quot;, can I reasonably stop them? If their parents then instruct me verbally (e.g. over the phone) to send them home, am I free to send them walking off into the sunset with no more responsibility? Is this different if they were 6 years old? Or a 6 year old accompanied by a 10 year old?</p>


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Answer 1: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/germany" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-germany-tooltip-container">germany</a></p>
<p>Ah, okay, there isn't any easy answer/number/table for this.</p>
<p>In general, the &quot;Aufsichtspflicht&quot; results from <a href="https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bgb/__1631.html" rel="noreferrer">Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB)
§ 1631 Inhalt und Grenzen der Personensorge</a>.</p>
<p>There are not clear cut lines or given ages. This is mainly because it does not make a lot of sense. A very independent and mature 6 year old can do things a less developed or even disabled person might not be able to do, even at the age of 18+.</p>
<p>Generally speaking, the parents have the duty to care for the child, anything else can be handled by contracts. For example a contract with a kindergarten. Or School. Or private/public pool.</p>


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<p>Generally speaking, the parents have the duty to care for the child, anything else can be handled by contracts. For example a contract with a kindergarten. Or School. Or private/public pool.</p>
<p>From personal experience I can say this: Germany is <em>very</em> safe. Kids go to school on foot, on bike or longer distances by <em>normal public transport</em> among all the other adults. We do not have &quot;school busses&quot;. Between 07:00 and 08:00 public transport is <em>packed</em> with kids of all ages going to school. Schools do not normally have their own stops. Kids get off at the nearest stop and walk the rest of the way. Around the school you will see streams of children coming from all directions on bike or foot. It is rare to see adults accompanying them, unless it's the first weeks of elementary school or the last day before school holidays where parents pick up their kids to do something fun after school.</p>


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<p>When I was a kid, I walked to school every day, almost from day one of elementary school. The first few weeks an adult would accompany us (one of the parents, they had a rotation going), then we walked on our own, as a group of 3-4 kids in the same class from the same neighborhood block. Google maps says it's a 10 minute walk of 800 meters. If any teacher had stopped me from leaving the school building on my own when school was finished, I am sure people would have wondered why. That only happened for mentally handicapped kids. Even kids who needed transport for one reason or another would just know to wait in front of the school. No teacher or other adult would be there.</p>


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<p>At 5th grade, I know half my class came by bike and in the winter or on rainy days by public transport, because they did not live in walking distance to the school. Neither did I, but I lived close enough to not get the public transport ticket subsidized, so the kids from our street got there by bike, or on foot when the parents deemed riding a bike to unsafe in snow and ice in winter.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Who is responsible for the child now that the class has ended?</p>
</blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p>Who is responsible for the child now that the class has ended?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The parents. Unless the contract says otherwise, or circumstances are exceptionally dangerous. There is no exact written guideline for this, because it would not make sense. The adult has to know what is exceptionally dangerous and what is not. It can be perfectly safe for a 10 year old to walk home through the woods. If that is what the parents deem okay, then it is okay. Yet as the adult in charge, you have the duty to keep them back, if you know the woods are on fire today, or a criminal escaped into the woods or something similar that would make it significantly more dangerous then the parents had in mind when they made their general decision.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>If a 10-year-old child says that their parents &quot;said they could go home alone&quot;, can I reasonably stop them?</p>
</blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p>If a 10-year-old child says that their parents &quot;said they could go home alone&quot;, can I reasonably stop them?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>If you have a contract that says they cannot go home alone, sure. If there is a special situation that implies the conditions have changed from what your contract said (lets say the radio broadcasts a storm warning and you see that the weather is horrible and branches flying around could injure a smaller kid) you can (maybe even have to), even if you do not have a contract.</p>
<p>Otherwise... why would you? It’s their parents decision. If they had wanted you to keep an eye on their kids when the time is up, they would have made a contract that says so.</p>


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Answer 2: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/australia" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-australia-tooltip-container">australia</a></p>
<p>This is a matter of <a href="https://www.bhg.com.au/legal-age-children-can-walk-to-school-alone" rel="noreferrer">state</a> law:</p>
<ul>


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<p>This is a matter of <a href="https://www.bhg.com.au/legal-age-children-can-walk-to-school-alone" rel="noreferrer">state</a> law:</p>
<ul>
<li><p><a href="/questions/tagged/queensland" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;queensland&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;queensland&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-queensland-tooltip-container">queensland</a> A person who, having the lawful care or charge of a child under 12 years, leaves the child for an unreasonable time without making reasonable provision for the supervision and care of the child during that time commits a misdemeanour. Maximum penalty — 3 years imprisonment. However, this is not a blanket prohibition - it may be reasonable for an 11-year-old to walk 5 minutes home alone.</p>
</li>


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</li>
<li><p><a href="/questions/tagged/new-south-wales" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;new-south-wales&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;new-south-wales&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-new-south-wales-tooltip-container">new-south-wales</a> No specific law, according to Family and Community Services NSW, at the judgement of the parents based on the family circumstances and the age and maturity of the child.</p>
</li>
<li><p><a href="/questions/tagged/victoria" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;victoria&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;victoria&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-victoria-tooltip-container">victoria</a> A person who has the control or charge of a child must not leave the child without making reasonable provision for the child's supervision and care for a time which is unreasonable having regard to all the circumstances of the case.</p>
</li>


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<li><p><a href="/questions/tagged/western-australia" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;western-australia&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;western-australia&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-western-australia-tooltip-container">western-australia</a>, <a href="/questions/tagged/australian-capital-territory" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;australian-capital-territory&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;australian-capital-territory&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-australian-capital-territory-tooltip-container">australian-capital-territory</a>, <a href="/questions/tagged/tasmania" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;tasmania&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;tasmania&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-tasmania-tooltip-container">tasmania</a>, <a href="/questions/tagged/south-australia" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;south-australia&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged


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<a href="/questions/tagged/south-australia" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;south-australia&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;south-australia&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-south-australia-tooltip-container">south-australia</a> &amp; <a href="/questions/tagged/northern-territory" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;northern-territory&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;northern-territory&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-northern-territory-tooltip-container">northern-territory</a> No specific laws and no government guidance.</p>


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</li>
</ul>
<p>Even though Queensland is the only state with a specific legislated age, the laws are basically not that different: parents (and in loco paretis) have a duty to protect children in their care, including providing reasonable supervision. However, reasonable supervision may be <em>no</em> supervision if appropriate to the circumstances.</p>
<p>If you are their swimming instructor, you can and should be guided by the parents, but it is ultimately your decision. If harm were to come to the children, you might be called upon to justify your decision.</p>
<p>Of course, you are a mandatory reporter, so if you believe that what the parents allow amounts to neglect, you must tell the government of your concerns.</p>


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Answer 3: <p>This is a question of <em>Aufsichtspflicht</em> (duty to supervise). Minors have to be supervised, as appropriate for the individual circumstances and the child's maturity. There is an expectation that children incrementally get more freedom as they grow, especially once they reach school age. Thus, it <em>can</em> be entirely appropriate to let six- or seven year olds play unattended for multiple hours, or to let them go home alone. There is no explicit age limit, just the full legal age at 18 years.</p>
<p>A swimming course is dangerous, and will require intense supervision.</p>


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<p>A swimming course is dangerous, and will require intense supervision.</p>
<p>After such an activity, it would generally be expected that young children are picked up by their parents. In order to minimize liability, the supervisors should make explicit arrangements with the parents. Who is authorized to pick up the kid? Or shall the child be sent home by itself? <strong>If the parents/guardians want the child to go home alone, that's an issue for the parent's duty of care.</strong> For swimming lessons and youth groups this will probably be discussed informally, but more institutional supervisors might keep written notes about this to avoid misunderstandings.</p>


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<p>If a child should be picked up, supervisors/instructors would have to wait with the child, or have to make alternative arrangements.  If a child claims that it can go alone, but this contradicts other arrangements or doesn't seem appropriate for this child, then supervisors should clarify, for example by calling the parents.</p>
<p>Further reading:</p>
<ul>
<li><a href="https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aufsichtsperson_(Erziehung)" rel="noreferrer">Aufsichtsperson</a> on the German Wikipedia</li>
<li><a href="https://dejure.org/gesetze/BGB/832.html" rel="noreferrer">§ 832 BGB</a> which establishes liability when the duty of care is violated</li>


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<li><a href="https://dejure.org/gesetze/BGB/832.html" rel="noreferrer">§ 832 BGB</a> which establishes liability when the duty of care is violated</li>
<li><a href="https://kita.rlp.de/fileadmin/kita/01_Themen/Startseite/Aktuelle_Meldungen_2023/Infoblatt_Aufsicht_in_Kitas_BF.pdf" rel="noreferrer">Infoblatt <em>Aufsicht in Kitas</em> der Unfallkasse RLP</a> which summarizes liability concerns for day care providers. See in particular the Q&amp;A on page 6: <em>Dürfen Kinder den Nachhauseweg alleine antreten?</em> and <em>Was passiert, wenn das Kind nicht abgeholt wird?</em></li>
</ul>


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Answer 4: <p>For your question:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>If a 10-year-old child says that their parents &quot;said they could go home alone&quot;, can I reasonably stop them?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>I would consider two scenarios. First, assume you are the supervisor of a sports course or similar activity with a bunch of kids. That means you have an agreement with the parents that you are responsible for their supervision during the course. You also need some kind of agreement what happens at the end of the course. Either the parents tell you they will pick up the kids or they tell you the kid can leave on their own. There are no formal age limits, you do what the parents tell you.</p>


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<p>Second, you are 'a random stranger' and just observe the kids walking off on their own. You have no basis to intervene just because the kids are on their own, even if they are much younger. You can offer help but please don't call the police just because you saw a 5-year old walking around on their own with no sign of any problems.</p>


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Question Title: does a purposive approach of statuary construction neccesarily always favour a state in a trial?

Question Body: <p>the purposive approach choses the interpretation that furthers the purpose of a legislature. but does it take into account things like  if a broadly worded law was intended to he applicable to particular cases or not (example if such a case was taken into account, would the  drafters want the case to fall within th scope of the law or not)</p>


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Answer 1: <p>It does not, as prosecutors often use statutes for purposes other than the purposes for which they were intended. <em>See</em>, <em>e.g.</em>, <a href="https://casetext.com/case/yates-v-united-states-26" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>Yates v. United States</em>, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2014)</a>.</p>
<p>For a very straightforward example, take the classic law school hypothetical: A law that says &quot;No cars in the park.&quot;</p>
<p>If you drive your truck into the park, a purposivist approach would permit your conviction for violating the statute. In that case, purposivism favors the state.</p>
<p>But if you bring a Matchbox car into the park, a purposivist approach would not permit your conviction for violating the staute. In that case, purposivism favors the defendant.</p>
<p>And of course, prosecutors are a creative bunch, so they're forever coming up with new ways to existing statutes to prosecute people using statutes that aren't a natural fit for their misconduct.</p>


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Question Body: <p>Legally consequential instructions direct one on Wednesday the 3rd to submit something within 7 business days, and to expect a response within 7-10 business days. Are the weekend days of the 6th and 7th counted in the 7 days (as the 7th day from the 3rd, ie the 10th, the following Wednesday, does in fact fall on a business day)? Or does the clock stop on the weekend (as Saturday and Sunday the 6th &amp; 7th aren’t business days)?</p>
<p>In other words, does 7 business days necessarily imply at least 9 calendar days?</p>
<hr/>


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<p>In other words, does 7 business days necessarily imply at least 9 calendar days?</p>
<hr/>
Note: I understand the meaning of a business day. It generally excludes weekends and public holidays. But the question is deeper than this, and is about whether or not the clock and day tally stops on non-business days. For example, 3 business days (unlike 7 business days) need not necessarily straddle a weekend so make a poor illustration of the question. The question is in essence whether 3 business days beginning on a Tuesday is the same length in calendar days as a 3 business days beginning on a Thursday. Forgetting holidays and only considering weekends, do three business days from a Friday


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Expire on Monday or Wednesday? If they expire on Monday that means that the condition of business days counts weekend days as days while simply stipulating that if the count would end on a non-business days, then the period should be taken to be extended such as to end on the next business day after the non-business day on which it naturally ended. In this case, if both periods begin on a Friday, then all of {1 business day, 2 business days and 3 business days} would end at the same time (ie the next Monday). But if it expires on a Wednesdays, it means that it is as though the clock and tally
<p>Of days fully stop on non-business days and resume counting on the next business days after the expiration of the period.</p>


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Answer 1: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/canada" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-canada-tooltip-container">canada</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>does 7 business days necessarily imply at least 9 calendar days?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>&quot;7 business days&quot; does not necessarily imply &quot;at least 9 calendar days.&quot;</p>
<p>For example, until 2017, section 67 of the <em><a href="https://www.canlii.org/en/bc/laws/stat/rsbc-1996-c-267/latest/rsbc-1996-c-267.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Liquor Control and Licensing Regulation</a></em> defined &quot;business day&quot; to mean &quot;in respect of a licensee, a day specified by the general manager [of the Liquor Control and Licencing Branch] as a business day.&quot;</p>


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<p>In a contract, &quot;business day&quot; would be interpreted in the full context of the agreement, including the background, the market, etc. See generally <em>Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp.</em>, <a href="https://canlii.ca/t/g88q1" rel="nofollow noreferrer">2014 SCC 53</a>. And for a specific example, see <em>Goldstein et al. v. Grant</em>, <a href="https://canlii.ca/t/g1b3h" rel="nofollow noreferrer">1978 CanLII 1476</a> (Ont. C.A.), finding that in that particular agreement, a Saturday was a &quot;business day.&quot;</p>
<p>Under Rule 8-1 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules of British Columbia, &quot;business day&quot; means &quot;a day on which the court registries are open for business.&quot;</p>
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<p>Under Rule 8-1 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules of British Columbia, &quot;business day&quot; means &quot;a day on which the court registries are open for business.&quot;</p>
<hr />
<p>When counting business days, one does not count non-business days. I do not have a clear citation for this principle, but see <em>D.R. v The Co-operators</em>, <a href="https://canlii.ca/t/jc04x" rel="nofollow noreferrer">2020 CanLII 95858</a> (Ont. Licence Appeal Tribunal); <em>G.A. v Allstate Insurance</em>, <a href="https://canlii.ca/t/j8nvv" rel="nofollow noreferrer">2020 CanLII 47718</a> (Ont. Licence Appeal Tribunal).</p>
<p>You do not necessarily start counting from zero. Whether the first or last days are included in the count depends on surrounding phrasing and context. See e.g. <em>Interpretation Act</em>, <a href="https://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/i-21/page-2.html#h-279382" rel="nofollow noreferrer">s. 27</a>.</p>
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<p>This answer says nothing about how to count business hours.</p>


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Answer 2: <h2>TL;DR</h2>
<p>You do not count non-business days and you count starting from 0. So the next business day after you receive the correspondence is 1, then 2, and so on. And days end at midnight.</p>
<h2>Business Days are defined by the context</h2>
<p>What is, and what is not, a business day is not a straightforward proposition. Your understanding that it does not include weekends and public holidays is common-sensical but possibly wrong.</p>
<p>Most jurisdictions define business days, often in a foundational act like the <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2019C00028" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Acts Interpretation Act</a> 1901:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><strong>business day</strong> means a day that is not a Saturday, a Sunday or a public holiday in the place concerned.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>However, those definitions are limited to the particular scope. In the above example, to the interpretation of Commonwealth legislation:</p>
<ul>


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</blockquote>
<p>However, those definitions are limited to the particular scope. In the above example, to the interpretation of Commonwealth legislation:</p>
<ul>
<li>State legislation will have their own definition (which happens to be the same but only by coincidence),</li>
<li>specific legislation may override the general definition (e.g the NSW Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 adds 27, 28, 29, 30 or 31 December as non-business days and its Queensland equivalent excludes the entire period from 22 December to 10 January)</li>
<li>it doesn’t apply to contracts, which need to define the term or risk having it be ambiguous. For example, for a retail store that is open every day of the year except Good Friday, a reasonable understanding of “business day” is every day except Good Friday.</li>
</ul>


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Question Body: <p>I've heard various claims that &quot;slow walking&quot; (walking slowly in a road) is not illegal or at best <a href="https://drillordrop.com/2016/06/16/law-firm-advised-slow-walking-protests-are-legal-court-told/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">its illegality is ambiguous</a>. Is that true? To what extent is it legal to walk <em>in</em> a road? I can certainly imagine that this is allowed in some jurisdictions and types of roadways, and it seems reasonable (certainly slow biking would be a legal substitute almost everywhere). But I can't find anything definitive about it.</p>
<p>The relevant scenario I'm envisioning is one where (as recently in London) many small groups walk or bike through streets at a normal pace for brief periods, dispersing when asked by authorities (and possibly reforming elsewhere). So in a sense there are two parts to the question:</p>
<ol>
<li>Is biking or waking in streets permitted generally and,</li>


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<ol>
<li>Is biking or waking in streets permitted generally and,</li>
<li>in cases where it is permitted, does it remain permitted if practiced in an organized fashion?</li>
</ol>


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Answer 1: <p>In my State (Louisiana, USA), pedestrians may walk on the side of the road.  No guidance is given on how fast they should walk.  Pedestrians are not allowed to walk in the middle of the street. In the US, the laws for this will vary by state.  Louisiana has statutes that say that pedestrians are bound by traffic laws, and obstruction of traffic is not legal on foot or in a vehicle.  Basically, consult your local laws.</p>
<p>§216.  Pedestrians on highways or interstate highways</p>
<p>A.  Where sidewalks are provided, it shall be unlawful for any pedestrian to walk along and upon an adjacent highway.</p>
<p>B.  Where sidewalks are not provided, any pedestrian walking along and upon a highway shall, when practicable, walk only on the left side of the highway or its shoulder, facing traffic which may approach from the opposite direction.</p>
<p>C.  It shall be unlawful for any pedestrian to cross an interstate highway, except in the case of an emergency.</p>


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<p>C.  It shall be unlawful for any pedestrian to cross an interstate highway, except in the case of an emergency.</p>
<p>D.  Upon conviction of a violation of this Section, a court may order, in lieu of the penalty provisions provided in R.S. 32:57, that the offender perform three eight-hour days of court-approved community service activities, at least half of which shall consist of participation in a litter abatement or collection program.</p>
<p>§213. Crossing at other than crosswalks</p>
<p>A.  Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point other than within a marked crosswalk or within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles upon the roadway.</p>
<p>B.  Between adjacent intersections at which traffic-control signals are in operation pedestrians shall not cross at any place except in a marked crosswalk.</p>


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<p>B.  Between adjacent intersections at which traffic-control signals are in operation pedestrians shall not cross at any place except in a marked crosswalk.</p>
<p>&quot;Highway&quot; means the entire width between the boundary lines of every way or place of whatever nature publicly maintained and open to the use of the public for the purpose of vehicular travel, including bridges, causeways, tunnels and ferries; synonymous with the word &quot;street&quot;.</p>


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Answer 2: <p>Laws may govern the speed of motor vehicles on highways, either stating maximum or minimum speeds. Pedestrians are not subject to any specific speed limits in any jurisdiction that I know of, but they can be subject to &quot;conduct&quot; restrictions. In Washington, <a href="https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=46.61.250" rel="nofollow noreferrer">RCW 46.61.250</a> states those limits. Stay on the sidewalk. If there is no sidewalk,the restrictions are that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(a) When shoulders are provided and are accessible, walk or move on
the shoulder of the roadway as far as is practicable from the edge of
the roadway, facing traffic when a shoulder is available in this
direction; or</p>
<p>(b) When shoulders are not provided or are inaccessible, walk or move
as near as is practicable to the outside edge of the roadway facing
traffic, and when practicable, move clear of the roadway upon meeting
an oncoming vehicle</p>
</blockquote>


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as near as is practicable to the outside edge of the roadway facing
traffic, and when practicable, move clear of the roadway upon meeting
an oncoming vehicle</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Sprinting and slow walking at the edge of the road (when there is no shoulder) are legal, doing same in the middle of the lane is illegal. The law generally says &quot;motor vehicles have to suck it up when there are pedestrians on the road&quot;. But walking (or bicycling) 6 abreast is illegal, because it is practical to walk (or cycle) single-file at the edge of the road.</p>


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Answer 3: <p>In <a href="/questions/tagged/germany" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-germany-tooltip-container">germany</a>, demonstrating in public is a constitutionally protected right. How exactly it can be exercised is restricted by law, but the laws must make protests possible.</p>
<ul>
<li>For <strong>preplanned demonstrations</strong>, the organizers must contact the police with the planned route, an estimate of the expected numbers, etc. The police consider this estimate, the likelihood of counter-protests, and similar factors, and &quot;negotiate&quot; with the organizers about the actual route of the demonstration.<br />


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When the organizers predict tens of thousands, and the police find that credible, a main street may be closed to motor traffic while the protesters march that way. If the police expect a couple of dozen to come (whatever the organizers hope), they may be told to stay on the sidewalk, with a lone patrol car to watch the traffic.<br />
When the organizers and the police disagree, the organizers can go to court and ask for an injunction. This commonly happens when the organizers feel that the police wants to &quot;shuffle them away&quot; out of sight ...</li>
<li>For <strong>spontaneous demonstrations</strong>, there are no organizers who could contact the police beforehand. When the demonstration has started, the police will watch numbers and regulate traffic according to the size of the protest.<br />
Again, a few dozen protesters will be told to stay on the sidewalk, while thousands will justify the closure of the road.</li>
</ul>


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Again, a few dozen protesters will be told to stay on the sidewalk, while thousands will justify the closure of the road.</li>
</ul>
<p>Organizers can try to pretend that a demonstration is spontaneous to get around the planning requirements. This is not legal, but the prosecution would have to prove it. (For instance, people might have &quot;shared&quot; the time and place on public internet forums.)</p>
<p>So as to your question: <strong>It depends on the number of walkers, in proportion to the location.</strong></p>


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Question Title: Is it illegal for a firm to train an AI model on a CC BY-SA 4.0 corpus and make a commercial use of it without distributing the model under CC BY-SA?


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Question Body: <p><a href="https://meta.stackexchange.com/q/388551/178179">https://meta.stackexchange.com/q/388551/178179</a> mentions that SE will force some firms to pay to be allowed to train an AI model on the SE data dump (CC BY-SA licensed) and make a commercial use of it without distributing the model under CC BY-SA.</p>
<p>This makes me wonder: Is it illegal for a firm to train an AI model on a CC BY-SA 4.0 corpus and make a commercial use of it without distributing the model under CC BY-SA?</p>
<p>I found <a href="https://creativecommons.org/2021/03/04/should-cc-licensed-content-be-used-to-train-ai-it-depends/" rel="noreferrer">https://creativecommons.org/2021/03/04/should-cc-licensed-content-be-used-to-train-ai-it-depends/</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>At CC, we believe that, as a matter of copyright law, the use of works to train AI should be considered non-infringing by default, assuming that access to the copyright works was lawful at the point of input.</p>
</blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p>Is that belief correct?</p>
<p>More specifically to the share-alike clause in CC licenses, from my understanding of <a href="https://creativecommons.org/faq/#artificial-intelligence-and-cc-licenses" rel="noreferrer">https://creativecommons.org/faq/#artificial-intelligence-and-cc-licenses</a>, it is legal for a firm to train an AI model on a CC BY-SA 4.0 corpus and make a commercial use of it without distributing the model under CC BY-SA, unless perhaps if the output is shared (2 questions: Is the output of an LLM considered an adaptation or derivative work under copyright? Does the &quot;output&quot; in the flowchart below mean LLM output in the case a trained LLM?).</p>
<p><a href="https://i.stack.imgur.com/A2opt.png" rel="noreferrer"><img src="https://i.stack.imgur.com/A2opt.png" alt="enter image description here" /></a></p>


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Answer 1: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/united-states" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-united-states-tooltip-container">united-states</a></p>
<p>The flowchart included in the question is trying to summarize a rather large amount of legal uncertainty into one image. It must be emphasized that each decision point represents an unsettled area of law. Nobody knows which path through that flowchart the law will take, or even if different forms or implementations of AI might take different paths. The short and disappointing answer to your question is that <strong>nobody knows what is or isn't legal yet.</strong></p>
<p>To further elaborate on each decision point:</p>
<ul>
<li>The first point is asking whether the training process requires a license at all. There are two possible reasons to think that it does not:
<ul>


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<ul>
<li>The first point is asking whether the training process requires a license at all. There are two possible reasons to think that it does not:
<ul>
<li>AI training is protected by fair use (see <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/17/107" rel="noreferrer">17 USC 107</a>). This is a case-by-case inquiry that would have to be decided by a judge.</li>
<li>AI training is nothing more than the collection of statistical information relating to a work, and does not involve &quot;copying&quot; the work within the meaning of <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/17/106" rel="noreferrer">17 USC 106</a> (except for a <em>de minimis</em> period which is similar to the caching done by a web browser, and therefore subject to a fair use defense).</li>
</ul>
</li>


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</ul>
</li>
<li>The second point is, I think, asking whether the model is subject to copyright protection under <a href="https://www.oyez.org/cases/1990/89-1909" rel="noreferrer"><em>Feist v. Rural</em></a> and related caselaw. Because the model is trained by a purely automated process, there's a case to be made that the model is not the product of human creativity, and is therefore unprotected by copyright altogether.
<ul>
<li>Dicta in <em>Feist</em> suggest that the person or entity directing the training might be able to obtain a &quot;thin&quot; copyright in the &quot;selection or organization&quot; of training data, but no court has ever addressed this to my knowledge.</li>


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<li>This branch can also be read as asking whether the output of the model is copyrightable, when the model is run with some prompt or input. The Copyright Office <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/03/16/2023-05321/copyright-registration-guidance-works-containing-material-generated-by-artificial-intelligence" rel="noreferrer">seems to think</a> the answer to that question is &quot;no, because a human didn't create it.&quot;</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>The third decision point is, uniquely, not a legal question, but a practical question: Do you intend to distribute anything, or are you just using it for your own private entertainment? This determines whether you need to consult the rest of the flowchart or not.</li>
<li>The final decision point is whether the &quot;output&quot; (i.e. either the model itself, or its output) is a derivative work of the training input.
<ul>


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<li>The final decision point is whether the &quot;output&quot; (i.e. either the model itself, or its output) is a derivative work of the training input.
<ul>
<li>This would likely be decided on the basis of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Substantial_similarity" rel="noreferrer">substantial similarity</a>, which is a rather complicated area of law. To grossly oversimplify, the trier of fact would be shown both the training input and the allegedly infringing output, and asked to determine whether the two items have enough copyrightable elements in common that copying can reasonably be inferred.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>


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Question Title: How can you make a fresh new translation of the bible without running into copyright problems?


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Question Body: <p>I have been looking for open source versions of the bible written in Hebrew, with annotations, such as the literal english meaning of each Hebrew term, the definition of each Hebrew term, the part of speech, etc.. Some things I've found:</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Hebrew bible text</strong>: There is a <strong>public domain</strong> codex for the Hebrew bible available online in text format.</li>
<li><strong>Hebrew bible dictionary</strong>: There is the &quot;Strong's Hebrew Dictionary&quot; which is <strong>public domain</strong> as well, made in the late 1800's.</li>
<li><strong>Interlinear translation</strong>: I found the <a href="http://berean.bible/terms.htm" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Berean Bible</a>, which is not public domain, that link takes you to the license which says you can use it in software but can't sell it directly basically, as long as you attribute them. Interlinear translation are basically the literal meaning of each Hebrew word in English.</li>


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<li><strong>Part of speech mapping</strong>: The <a href="https://github.com/openscriptures/morphhb/blob/master/LICENSE.md" rel="nofollow noreferrer">OpenScriptures</a> project has mapped the Hebrew bible text with the Hebrew dictionary, which I think you can do pretty easily automatically given the two data sources are public domain and online in text format usable by software. But they put a <a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">CC v4 license</a> on it (attribution but commercial use is okay).</li>
<li><strong>Combining it all</strong>: The <a href="https://github.com/eliranwong/OpenHebrewBible" rel="nofollow noreferrer">OpenHebrewBible</a> project combines all of that stuff into one package, and puts a <a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">CC v4 non-commercial license</a> on it, partly because the interlinear translation says something to that degree in the free rendition of their product.</li>


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</ul>
<p>Now, the first part of my question is, say I want to create the same thing as &quot;Combining it all&quot;, but I also want to release it as <strong>public domain</strong>. I can use the public domain Hebrew bible text and dictionary to get started, mapping words to definitions basically. But I can't use the interlinear translation. But <strong>I could hire some people</strong> to make an interlinear translation, and it would probably end up being pretty close to the Berean Bible, because interlinear translations mean like 1-3 word translations per word, and so you are going to have a lot of same translations. Then we have the part of speech mapping which I could hire people to help write for each word.</p>


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<p>So say I hired people to make an interlinear version, and part of speech tagging, and I released it as public domain. How is that any different than just using the &quot;Combining it all&quot; project, and releasing <em>that</em> as public domain? I mean, just the data (not any software related to it).</p>
<p>Second part of the question is, isn't all this type of stuff marked as &quot;generic data&quot; in legal terms, stuff which is &quot;public common knowledge&quot; and so isn't copyrightable? For example, the part of speech tagging is common knowledge to anyone who speaks Hebrew. And the interlinear English translation is <em>pretty much</em> common knowledge to any translator, although you could have translators come up with different end results.</p>


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<p>So I don't understand how I can safely/effectively go about creating a public domain version of the annotated bible written in Hebrew, given this data is common knowledge and yet there are projects which have put licenses on various aspects of this common knowledge. What are the laws or high-level factors to consider in such a dilemma?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>Limiting this to the legal question, it is actually extremely simple. The Hebrew Bible is in the public domain, end of story. Therefore you can freely create a derivative work, a translation to English if you like, based on that original text. You may have to use some copyrighted aids, such as a dictionary, but that's okay, because &quot;using a dictionary&quot; is not copyright infringement. You may want to use some copyrighted software to format the result, but again using software is not itself copyright infringement. It would be infringement to lift someone else's protected English translation, but it would not be infringement to consult competing translations as a means of better understanding the original text.</p>


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<p>It is true that in the case of a translation from language to language, there is going to be a substantial similarity in translations to a particular language. This is especially true when dealing with a text that has been independently translated to English hundreds of times. You may therefore have to prove that there is only one possible English translation of בְּרֵאשִׁ֖ית בָּרָ֣א אֱלֹהִ֑ים אֵ֥ת הַשָּׁמַ֖יִם וְאֵ֥ת הָאָֽרֶץ׃
and that there are only two or three reasonable translations of וְהָאָ֗רֶץ הָיְתָ֥ה תֹ֙הוּ֙ וָבֹ֔הוּ וְחֹ֖שֶׁךְ עַל־פְּנֵ֣י תְהֹ֑ום וְר֣וּחַ אֱלֹהִ֔ים מְרַחֶ֖פֶת עַל־פְּנֵ֥י הַמָּֽיִם׃
in other words that the similarity is a necessary coincidence, given the subject matter.</p>


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Question Title: Can you bet sexual acts?

Question Body: <p>I'm pretty sure you cannot make a bet and have the outcome one or way another be a sexual favor. But why would this be illegal?</p>


Answer 1: <p>This would be entirely dependant on the jurisdiction.</p>
<p>The things that would need to be legal to make this transaction legal are:</p>
<ol>
<li>Is the sexual act legal?</li>
<li>Is gambling legal?</li>
<li>Ongoing consent by both parties</li>
</ol>
<p>To make this an enforceable contract, in addition you would need:</p>
<ol>
<li>Sexual acts to be valuable consideration, basically, is prostitution legal?</li>
<li>The fundamentals of a binding contract: intention, legality of objects etc.</li>
</ol>


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Answer 2: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/united-states" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-united-states-tooltip-container">united-states</a></p>
<p>In most jurisdictions in the U.S. this would be unenforceable, and possible even a crime. (Many non-U.S. jurisdiction are more legally tolerant of both gambling and of prostitution, and I'm not familiar with those jurisdictions at a sufficient level of detail to answer regarding those places.)</p>
<p>First, most U.S. jurisdictions have a common law rule that contracts with meretricious consideration (i.e. where sex is one of the things that someone is contributing economically to the contract) are void as contrary to public policy.</p>


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<p>Second, this would be considered prostitution in most jurisdictions as it is defined under local laws. Prostitution is illegal in essentially every jurisdiction but a few counties in Nevada and is regulated there in a way that wouldn't allow this kind of contract in those jurisdictions. The illegality of prostitution would make the contract unenforceable, and depending upon the definition of prostitution in a particular jurisdiction would also make it a crime.</p>
<p>Third, most U.S. jurisdictions prohibit gambling generally, subject to only narrow exceptions, most of which are regulated, and this would not fall within any of the common exceptions to the rule prohibiting gambling. Gambling is usually a misdemeanor or low level felony depending upon the nature of one's involvement.</p>


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<p>This said, however, between consenting adults who have or are open to having a sexual relationship with each other, who would never consider seeking to enforce their bet legally, one of the stronger defenses legally would be to argue that it isn't what it superficially seems to be.</p>


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<p>In other words, one could argue that this was not really a true &quot;contract&quot; or transactional sex, and was also not bona fide gambling, that would actually be enforced or considered binding by the participants, but was instead merely a form of role playing or informal adult play that isn't a genuine gambling or transactional sex transaction, even though it mimics the form of such an arrangement. If the implicit assumptions of the parties in context was that someone losing a bet could decline to perform the sexual act without consequences despite the seeming obligation arising from losing the bet, this defense could prevail. And, as a practical matter, this kind of activity would not be likely to be characterized as criminal conduct by people with knowledge of it, reported to authorities, prosecuted, or enforced in a civil lawsuit, if it was just silliness between friends as opposed to genuine commercial prostitution in bet form or genuine gambling with hard stakes that


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authorities, prosecuted, or enforced in a civil lawsuit, if it was just silliness between friends as opposed to genuine commercial prostitution in bet form or genuine gambling with hard stakes that would be taken seriously and enforced extra-legally.</p>


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Question Title: different days of signing a contract

Question Body: <p>Can two natural persons sign a contract on a different day?</p>
<p>E.g. Peter lives in a country A, Joe in a country B. Peter signs it in the country A and sends by slow post, no electrically, to Joe. Joe will sign in 10 days later in the country B.</p>
<p>Do there have to be written different dates of signing, the actual ones, on the contract?</p>
<p>context: studying contract law</p>
<p>Thank you.</p>


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Answer 1: <blockquote>
<p>Can two natural persons sign a contract on a different day?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Yes.</p>
<p>This happens routinely. In general, the contract is formed when the last person signs in this situation (unless the contract says otherwise).</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Do there have to be written different dates of signing, the actual
ones, on the contract?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>No.</p>
<p>It is convenient to note the dates of signing on the contract to simplify proving of what happened if there is every a lawsuit where the dates of signing turn out to be material for some reason (e.g., proving when the contract was entered into for tax purposes). But this is not required by law for the contract to be valid. If the dates of signing are material facts in a later lawsuit, then the dates of signing can be proved with other evidence, such as sworn witness testimony in the course of that lawsuit.</p>
<p><strong>Related Point</strong></p>


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<p><strong>Related Point</strong></p>
<p>Also, the parties to the contract do not need to sign the same physical piece of paper (unless the contract says otherwise). When one person signs one physical signature page and another person signs a different physical signature page for the same contract, this is called &quot;executing the contract in counterparts.&quot;</p>
<p>Many contracts expressly authorize the parties to sign the contract in counterparts, but the default rule if the contract is silent on the question is that executing the contract in counterparts is permitted.</p>


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Question Title: In Illinois, can a company contact their employee&#39;s other company?

Question Body: <p>In the case where an Illinois resident holds two full-time jobs (e.g.remote jobs) without the knowledge of either company and Company A becomes aware of this. Surely, Company A will rightfully terminate the employee.</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Can Company A legally contact Company B to inform them that the employee has been working at both companies, resulting in dual termination? Any laws that would prevent a company from doing this?</p>
</li>
<li><p>Does it changed anything if the companies are headquartered in a different state?</p>
</li>
</ul>


Answer 1: <p>The First Amendment protects freedom of speech. This protection includes the right of one employer to contact another employer.</p>


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Answer 2: <blockquote>
<p>Surely, Company A will rightfully terminate the employee.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>If Company A terminates the employee for also working full time at Company B, this is likely to be wrongful conduct by Company A, although the analysis is complicated and the stakes are relatively low.</p>
<p>It isn't illegal to work two full time jobs, unless an employment contract provides that <a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/questions/55239/what-is-the-point-of-devotion-of-all-working-time-clauses/55253#55253">the employee's full efforts will be devoted to the job</a>, which is rare except in the case of senior executives.</p>


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<p>While the analysis under the <a href="https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/flsa" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Fair Labor Standards Act</a> (which regulates minimum wages and overtime pay at the federal level), and the parallel Illinois state law on the subject, is somewhat involved, it is probably illegal to have a &quot;full efforts&quot; clause in an employment contract for a full time hourly worker who is not exempt from overtime pay requirements under the FLSA and state law. Many remote workers are not exempt from overtime pay requirements (even in the tech industry). The federal FSLA exemptions from overtime pay requirements which are important in relation to dual-timing, are described <a href="https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/overtime/interpretive-guidance" rel="nofollow noreferrer">here</a>. State limitations on exemptions from overtime are often more constraining on employers but I haven't independently reviewed if this is case in Illinois.</p>


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<p>Most employees of U.S. based companies are employees at will and can be fired at any time for any reason.</p>
<p>Thus, outside of a unionized employer or a civil service employment situation, a wrongfully fired employee can't be reinstated. And, unless the employee is fired for a discriminatory reason or for something like trying to organize a union, the employee is not allowed to sue the employer for money damages arising from a wrongful termination. (A handful of states are exceptions: Montana requires that terminations of employment be for good cause in most circumstances. Colorado authorized limited remedies when an employee is fired for lawful conduct while away from work like smoking. Many states authorize wrongful termination lawsuits for very narrow reasons like firing someone for taking legally mandated time off to vote in a Presidential election. New York City is atypical in many respects.)</p>


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<p>The only distinction in a state like Illinois between a termination for good cause and a termination of employment without good cause, is eligibility for unemployment benefits. Someone who quits or is terminated for good cause isn't eligible for unemployment benefits. But, someone who is not terminated for good cause (either in a layoff or for some wrongful reason) is entitled to unemployment benefits.</p>
<p><strong>As a general rule, for unemployment insurance benefits purposes, working two full time jobs is not good cause to terminate an employee's employment</strong> (unless you affirmatively lied to your employer and said you were only working one job, in which case the good cause for termination is dishonesty and not just working two jobs at once).</p>


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<p>But there would be exceptions to the general rule if there was an exclusivity clause in an employment contract, if there was a non-competition clause in the employment agreement and it identified Company B as a competitor of Company A, or if there was a common law duty of loyalty of the employee and Companies A and B were competitors.</p>


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<p>These are low stakes fights, however. You have to have worked for an employer for a certain amount of time to be eligible for unemployment insurance benefits at all. Unemployment benefits are limited in duration and amount (a percentage of past wages with a fairly modest maximum benefit cap) and continued receipt of benefits requires active efforts to find new work which are communicates to the unemployment office. A claim that pays benefits doesn't directly impact the bottom line of the employer. But the unemployment insurance premium rates of employers who have lots of successful claims made against them go up a little (although usually less in the aggregate than the amount of claims paid on those successful claims).</p>
<p>An overview of the unemployment insurance system in Illinois can be found <a href="https://ides.illinois.gov/content/dam/soi/en/web/ides/ides_forms_and_publications/CLI111L.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">here</a>.</p>


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<p>To be clear, Company A could terminate the employee in this situation and would face only very limited consequences for doing so. But, (1) usually any &quot;full efforts&quot; clause in the employee's employment contract would be invalid, and (2) the employee would not be considered &quot;terminated for good cause&quot; for unemployment insurance benefits purposes if this happened (which would be likely to cause Company A's unemployment insurance premium to go up prospectively).</p>
<p>Also to be clear, simply contacting Company B with no intent to cause a termination of employment and not saying anything untruthful, that does not result in the employee's termination by Company A or by Company B, is not wrongful in any way. The First Amendment privileges truthful, non-tortious communication from liability.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Can Company A legally contact Company B to inform them that the
employee has been working at both companies, resulting in dual
termination?</p>
</blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p>Can Company A legally contact Company B to inform them that the
employee has been working at both companies, resulting in dual
termination?</p>
</blockquote>
<p><strong>Yes.</strong></p>
<blockquote>
<p>Any laws that would prevent a company from doing this?</p>
</blockquote>
<p><strong>No.</strong></p>
<blockquote>
<p>Does it changed anything if the companies are headquartered in a
different state?</p>
</blockquote>
<p><strong>No</strong> (with the possible exception of New York City based firms in some circumstances similar to this, although perhaps not exactly the same, I have some vague recollection of a NYC specific employment ordinance related to a similar fact pattern, but can't find a citation to it at this time).</p>
<p><strong>Other Similar Fact Patterns</strong></p>
<p><em>Defamation</em></p>


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<p><strong>Other Similar Fact Patterns</strong></p>
<p><em>Defamation</em></p>
<p>If Company A calls Company B and tells Company B something false (e.g. that you falsified records when it had no reason to think that was true) that causes you to be fired at Company B, the fired employee could probably sue Company A (and could also personally sue the Company A employee who made the statement) <a href="https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/defamation-lawsuits-do-you-have-case-against-former-employer.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">for defamation</a> with damages equal to the wages lost from being fired by Company B.</p>
<p><em>Tortious Interference</em></p>


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<p><em>Tortious Interference</em></p>
<p>If Company A calls Company B and knowing that you have an employment contract with Company B tries to get you fired from Company B, in some circumstances this could constitute actionable <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tortious_interference/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">tortious interference with contract</a> (i.e. this is something that the employee could sue Company A over). Indeed, this business tort originally emerged from employee poaching cases which have some similarities to the question in this case. As explained at the link above:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Tortious interference with contract rights can occur when one party
persuades another to breach its contract with a third party (e.g.,
using blackmail, threats, influence, etc.) or where someone knowingly
interferes with a contractor's ability to perform his contractual
obligations, preventing the client from receiving the services or


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interferes with a contractor's ability to perform his contractual
obligations, preventing the client from receiving the services or
goods promised (e.g., by refusing to deliver goods). The tortfeasor is
the person who interferes with the contractual relationship between
others. When a tortfeasor is aware of an existing contract and
deliberately induces a breach by one of the contract holders, it is
termed &quot;tortious inducement of breach of contract.&quot;</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But, the full scope of when there is intentional interference with contract liability is beyond the scope of this answer.</p>
<p>The most famous recent tortious interference with contract case in recent memory involved <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/14/entertainment/taylor-swift-verdict/index.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">allegations that Taylor Swift caused a Denver DJ whom she alleged groped women to lose his job</a> (a jury ruled in her favor on the claim following a federal court trial).</p>


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<p>Many companies, as a matter of policy, avoid making calls like the one described in the question, in part, to avoid potential defamation or tortious interference with contract liability.</p>


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Question Title: Probation Before Judgment

Question Body: <p>In a case that has the disposition Probation Before Judgement, what happens at the end of the probation period (assuming no violation of the probation)?  Does the defendant need to do anything (<em>i.e.</em> petition the court), or is the verdict entered automatically?</p>
<p>Interested specifically in the State of Maryland</p>


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Answer 1: <blockquote>
<p>In a case that has the disposition Probation Before Judgement, what
happens at the end of the probation period (assuming no violation of
the probation)?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The case is closed and <a href="https://triallawyersmaryland.com/maryland-probation-before-judgment/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">the defendant does not have a criminal conviction associated with the charge</a>. It is equivalent to what most states call a deferred prosecution.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Does the defendant need to do anything (i.e. petition the court), or
is the verdict entered automatically?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The guilty verdict is stricken with the probation before judgment is entered. After the duration of the probation before judgment has expired without a violation, there is no longer any basis for citing the defendant for a probation violation.</p>


Tags: criminal-procedure, maryland


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Question Title: Can I bring a firearm into NJ?

Question Body: <p>If I'm planning to visit some family in NJ would it be legal for me to bring a pistol that is locked in a container into the state?</p>
<p>I've found information saying that it should not be an issue if I'm traveling through the state but may be an issue if I'm stopping in the state?  There are several conflicting pieces of information around it that make me too unsure to try and interpret myself.</p>


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Answer 1: <p>From <a href="https://nj.gov/njsp/firearms/firearms-faqs.shtml" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Firearms Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ's) | New Jersey State Police</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>25: Can I travel through New Jersey with my firearms?</p>
<p>Yes.  With no unreasonable deviations from your travels you may drive
through New Jersey with any type firearm or ammunition.  If New Jersey
is the State of destination, then the firearms must be legal in this
State.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>and</p>
<blockquote>
<p>6: How do you transport firearms?</p>
<p>Firearms shall be carried unloaded and contained in a closed and
fastened case, gunbox, securely tied package, or locked in the trunk
of the automobile in which it is being transported.  If the vehicle
does not have a compartment separate from the passenger compartment,
the firearm and or ammunition shall be in a locked container other
than the vehicle's glove compartment or center console and kept
farthest from the driver.</p>


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the firearm and or ammunition shall be in a locked container other
than the vehicle's glove compartment or center console and kept
farthest from the driver.</p>
<p>As a precaution, ammunition shall be transported in a separate
container and locked in the trunk of the automobile in which it is
being transported.  Ammunition magazines may remain loaded during
transportation and shall be carried separate from the firearm.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Unless, of course, the gun is a type simply illegal to own in NJ, such as an assault rifle, automatic rifle, etc. This may be dated, but outlines what firearms are illegal: <a href="https://www.hg.org/legal-articles/a-guide-to-legal-firearms-possession-in-new-jersey-51287" rel="nofollow noreferrer">A Guide to Legal Firearms Possession in New Jersey - HG.org</a>.</p>


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<p>See also <a href="https://www.state.nj.us/njsp/info/pdf/firearms/njac-title13-ch54.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">New Jersey State Police - NJ Firearm Laws - N.J.A.C. Title 13 Chapter 54 - Firearms and Weapons - njac-title13-ch54.pdf</a></p>


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Answer 2: <p>I recommend that you study this page and it's links carefully as New Jersey has notoriously arbitrary and complex gun laws and enforcement:</p>
<p><a href="https://handgunlaw.us/states/newjersey.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">HandgunLaw NJ</a></p>
<p>Specifically this:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>New Jersey Law also states that before possessing or transporting any
rifle or shotgun without first having obtained a New Jersey firearms
purchaser identification card (FPIC), or possessing or transporting
any handgun without first having obtained a New Jersey handgun carry
permit is a violation of their law. You can transport it from place of
purchase to home. Home to a Certified Shooting Range. Going hunting
but must have a valid hunting license. You just can’t have it in your
vehicle. Again the law says you must have a FPIC or NJ Carry Permit to
even transport firearms in NJ. From all I read and have heard someone
from outside NJ must have a very good reason to transport a firearm


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even transport firearms in NJ. From all I read and have heard someone
from outside NJ must have a very good reason to transport a firearm
into NJ and better have the proper paperwork.</p>
</blockquote>


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Question Title: Who has right of way at an intersection with two stop signs across from each other?

Question Body: <p>The traffic on the main road (with no stop signs) of course has first right of way.  Suppose two cars are across from each other turning onto the main road.  One is turning right and one is turning left (to both ultimately go the same direction).  Who has right of way?</p>

<ol>
<li>Is it the person turning right?</li>
<li>Is it the person who got to the stop sign first?</li>
</ol>

<p>Does the answer change if there's a whole line of people turning right from one side and a whole line of people turning left from the other side?</p>

<p>I'm looking for the general rule in the United States.  If the state matters, I'm in Ohio.</p>


Answer 1: <p>The <a href="https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/rightofwayrules.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">NHTSA gives rules for the United States</a>.</p>


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Answer 1: <p>The <a href="https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/rightofwayrules.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">NHTSA gives rules for the United States</a>.</p>

<p>Right of way goes to the first person to stop.  So if a line of cars were at both stop signs, and all cars wanted to make the same conflicting turns, they would alternate.</p>

<p>If the opposing cars stop at the same time then the one turning right has the right of way.  (This is because a right turn falls under the "Straight Traffic Goes First" rule.)</p>


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Answer 2: <p>This scenario is covered in every state I've looked at, including Ohio, with a rule like &quot;A driver must yield the Right of Way to oncoming traffic when making a left turn.&quot;  The rules of 4-way stop signs are a special case, and do not necessarily apply at 2-way stops.</p>
<p><a href="https://driving-tests.org/ohio/oh-bmv-drivers-handbook-manual/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://driving-tests.org/ohio/oh-bmv-drivers-handbook-manual/</a> Page 40.</p>
<p>This explanation can help you see the logic:</p>


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<p>This explanation can help you see the logic:</p>
<p>At a two-way stop when you’re at a stop sign, you obviously yield to traffic crossing in front of you. But if you’re making a left-hand turn, you’re expected to yield to any vehicle that’s facing you and coming across the intersection – even if you had to wait for traffic to clear and that driver got there after you did. (If that doesn’t make sense to you, picture the intersection with traffic lights. No matter who arrived first, when the light turns green, you always wait for cars to proceed before you make a left-hand turn. This is the same, only with signs instead of red lights.)</p>
<p>In almost all driving situations, when you’re making a left-hand turn, you are expected to yield to other vehicles, including when a driver facing you is turning right.</p>


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<p>In almost all driving situations, when you’re making a left-hand turn, you are expected to yield to other vehicles, including when a driver facing you is turning right.</p>
<p><a href="https://driving.ca/column/how-it-works/how-it-works-right-of-way" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://driving.ca/column/how-it-works/how-it-works-right-of-way</a></p>
<p>Here's a video from a driving school that covers the same situation (The second intersection in the video) <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X4e1XPcDIZ0" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X4e1XPcDIZ0</a></p>


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Question Title: Does the First Amendment protect foreign government entity?

Question Body: <p>Does a foreign government agency or its subsidiary, particularly on U.S. territory, have the First Amendment right?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>It does not, as I understand what you mean. in  <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/19-177_b97c.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International, Inc. II</a>, the Supreme Court held that &quot;plaintiffs’ foreign affiliates possess no First Amendment
rights&quot;. Specifically</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Two bedrock legal principles lead to this conclusion. As a mat- ter of
American constitutional law, foreign citizens outside U. S. territory
do not possess rights under the U. S. Constitution.  And as a matter
of American corporate law, separately incorporated organizations are
separate legal units with distinct legal rights and obligations....it is long settled as a matter of American constitu-
tional law that foreign citizens outside U. S. territory do not
possess rights under the U. S. Constitution.</p>
</blockquote>


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tional law that foreign citizens outside U. S. territory do not
possess rights under the U. S. Constitution.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Thus a First Amendment argument against a law prohibiting funds being given to a foreign entity would fail (it did fail in that instance).</p>
<p>On the other hand, if you mean, can the US government suppress speech by a foreign person <strong>in</strong> the US, it cannot, not even if they are government agents.</p>


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Answer 2: <blockquote>
<p>I am asking about foreign government agency operating on U.S. territory where the US does have jurisdiction.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Foreign government agencies are generally immune from US jurisdiction in the US under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.  As such, they cannot be prosecuted for any crime nor sued for any civil violation unless the foreign government agrees to waive the immunity.</p>
<p>However, if a foreign government agency says anything that the US doesn't like, the US can expel the foreign government agency, or any subset of its officers, or even the entire diplomatic and consular delegation of that country.  They can do this regardless of where the disliked statement was made, because under the convention a host country can expel diplomats for any reason or for no reason at all.  In its most extreme manifestation, this is called &quot;breaking off diplomatic relations&quot; or similar.</p>


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<p>The reaction of the US government to unpopular speech by a foreign government is therefore a political and diplomatic matter, not a legal one, and it is not particularly affected by the provision &quot;Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech.&quot;</p>


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Question Body: <p>According to <a href="https://euaa.europa.eu/country-guidance-afghanistan-2022/210-individuals-considered-have-committed-blasphemy-andor#:%7E:text=According%20to%20Islamic%20law%20apostasy,serious%20offence%20under%20Islamic%20law" rel="nofollow noreferrer">this source</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>According to Islamic law apostasy is punishable by death, imprisonment or confiscation of property and blasphemy is punishable by death. Conversion from Islam to another faith is also considered as a serious offence under Islamic law. Individuals who have committed blasphemy or converted from Islam have three days to withdraw their behaviours or face punishment. Children of ‘apostates’ are still considered Muslims unless they reach adulthood without returning to Islam, in which case they may also be put to death [Society-based targeting, 1.2].</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Is this true?</p>


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</blockquote>
<p>Is this true?</p>
<p>Hypothetically if a Shari'a country also has a freedom of religion right (without a restrictions clause) how would the conflict be resolved between the two?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>There is no single answer under Shari`ah law, for example because apostacy is not a single thing, and because there are multiple schools of interpretation. <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apostasy_in_Islam" rel="nofollow noreferrer">This article</a> gives a fairly detailed analysis. This <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20171011180050/http://www.loc.gov/law/help/apostasy/apostasy.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">other article</a> focuses on statutory implementations of the prohibition against irtidād and its punishments. In Brunei, Section 112(1) of the Syariah Penal code allows execution for a Muslim who declares himself non-Muslim and does not repent, and Iranian law also apparently allows the death penalty. Presumably the same holds of current Afghanistan.</p>


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Answer 2: <h2><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apostasy_in_Islam#:%7E:text=Apostasy%20from%20Islam%20is%20considered,repents%20and%20return%20to%20Islam." rel="nofollow noreferrer">Yes</a>, but ...</h2>
<p>&quot;Shari'a Law&quot; means the same as &quot;Common Law&quot; or &quot;Civil Law&quot;: it tells us nothing about whether the ancient punishments are part of that nation's law or, if such laws are on the books, whether they are enforced. All of these legal systems have, at some time in the past, had capital punishment for religious deviancy.</p>
<p>As of <a href="https://www.secularism.org.uk/news/2021/11/death-sentence-for-apostasy-in-nearly-a-dozen-countries-report-says" rel="nofollow noreferrer">2021</a>, Afghanistan, Iran, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritania, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen have the death penalty for apostasy. In addition, Pakistan has the death penalty for blasphemy, which includes apostasy.</p>


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<p>In total, there are 17 countries where apostasy is a criminal offence and 83 which criminalise blasphemy (with 6 having the death penalty). Since only 50 countries worldwide are Muslim-majority, some of these laws are from non-Shari'a legal traditions.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, some countries where the death penalty is still on the books don't actually implement it, whether under a formal moratorium or as a de-facto policy. Even in countries that still have and use the death penalty, official execution for apostasy is rare: there have been no reported cases since 1998 and only four between 1985 and 1998. However, the mere existence of the punishment can and does lead to extra-judicial murders on that basis.</p>
<p>Blasphemy and apostasy laws are more commonly used as tools of suppression by authoritarian regimes where imprisonment or the threat of it is usually sufficient.</p>


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Answer 3: <p>Solid answers by <a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/a/91710/9517">user6726</a> and <a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/a/91711/9517">DaleM</a> answer the first part of the question (&quot;Is this true?&quot;). This answer addresses the second part of the question:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Hypothetically if a Shari'a country also has a freedom of religion
right (without a restrictions clause) how would the conflict be
resolved between the two?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The death penalty is generally reserved, in places that have it, for apostasy to conversions away from Islam, rather than simply adhering to a faith other than Islam by a person who has never been a Muslim. Apostasy is conceptually similar to the secular crime of treason (which is also punishable by death), in that it can only be committed by people who owe allegiance to the sovereign against whom treason is committed.</p>


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<p>Islamic law recognizes the right of &quot;<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People_of_the_Book" rel="nofollow noreferrer">people of the book</a>&quot; who have never converted to Islam, including Christians, Jews, &quot;Sabians&quot;, and in some interpretations, certain other faiths, to engage in the free exercise of their religions on a subordinate basis to an established Islamic religion in places subject to Islamic law. Not all religions are entitled to this deference. Some relevant sources in Islamic law arguably <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People_of_the_Book" rel="nofollow noreferrer">also reserve for god rather than men, the task of punishing people for not being Muslims</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Several verses in the Quran are commonly understood as identifying the
Jews, the Christians, and the Sabians as People of the Book. Thus for
example Sūrat al-Māʾida 5:68–69, which mentions these groups along


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Jews, the Christians, and the Sabians as People of the Book. Thus for
example Sūrat al-Māʾida 5:68–69, which mentions these groups along
with the Muslims (&quot;the believers&quot;) as being safe from fear and grief:</p>
<p><em>Say, ˹O Prophet,˺ “O People of the Book! You have nothing to stand on unless you observe the Torah, the Gospel, and what has been revealed
to you from your Lord.” And your Lord’s revelation to you ˹O Prophet˺
will only cause many of them to increase in wickedness and disbelief.
So do not grieve for the people who disbelieve. Indeed, the believers,
Jews, Sabians and Christians—whoever ˹truly˺ believes in Allah and the
Last Day and does good, there will be no fear for them, nor will they
grieve.</em></p>
<p>Sūrat al-Baqara 2:62 is similar to this, but there is also a verse
(Sūrat al-Ḥajj 22:17) which lists the same groups in another context,
that of how God will judge them on the Day of Resurrection, but now
adding two more groups to the list:</p>


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(Sūrat al-Ḥajj 22:17) which lists the same groups in another context,
that of how God will judge them on the Day of Resurrection, but now
adding two more groups to the list:</p>
<p><em>Indeed, the believers, Jews, Sabians, Christians, Magi, and the polytheists—Allah will judge between them ˹all˺ on Judgment Day.
Surely Allah is a Witness over all things.</em></p>
<p>The last named group, &quot;the polytheists&quot; (the mushrikūn, lit. 'those
who associate'), are the opposite of the first named, &quot;the believers&quot;
(the Muslims). What is less clear, however, is the status of the
groups mentioned in between, who now also include the &quot;Magi&quot;
(al-majūs), that is to say, the Zoroastrians (who are named only once
in the Quran, in this verse). This was a matter of dispute among
medieval Muslim scholars, who questioned whether the Zoroastrians had
a clear prophet and scripture, as well as whether their doctrines on


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medieval Muslim scholars, who questioned whether the Zoroastrians had
a clear prophet and scripture, as well as whether their doctrines on
the nature of God and creation were in accordance with those of Islam
and the other religions recognized as having received a revelation.
Ultimately though, most Islamic jurists granted the Zoroastrians
partial status as a People of the Book, while still disagreeing on the
extent to which legal privileges such as intermarriage with Muslims
should be allowed.</p>
<p>From the Quran, 98th Surah Al-Bayyina - the clear proof, those who
reject the truth from among the People of the Book and polytheists are
described as the worst of all creatures, and are destined for hell.</p>
</blockquote>


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reject the truth from among the People of the Book and polytheists are
described as the worst of all creatures, and are destined for hell.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Similarly, some faiths in the Middle East and South Asia with some overlap with Islamic views, that are a stretch to consider Muslim in a rigid or fair minded evaluation, are sometimes deemed as a matter of tolerance and religious convenience by local authorities as sects of Shi'ite Islam, for purposes of religious toleration.</p>
<p>Countries in which Islamic law is enforced by the government typically enshrine it as an entrenched principle of their legal system, similar to the status of the U.S. Constitution in U.S. law, which is supreme over all other secular laws, domestic and international. This was done, for example, in the pre-2021 constitution of Afghanistan (before the Taliban regained power) and in the drafting of the current constitution of Iraq.</p>


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<p>So, the most obvious way, although not the only way, to reconcile freedom of religion found in a constitutional right or human rights treaty of a country, and the requirements of Islamic law, in a country where Islamic law is the supreme law of the land, is to allow freedom of religion as fully as possible consistent with Islamic law's requirements.</p>
<p>In that approach, Muslims are not free to cease to convert away from Islam, or to otherwise engage in blasphemy. But &quot;people of the book&quot; are not required to convert to Islam, and differences of opinion about Islam that don't rise to the level of blasphemy such as those found in different schools of Islamic theology should be tolerated.</p>


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<p>A historical example of how this notion of religious freedom could play out in practice is the effort made by Muslim communities in France during World War II to hide and shelter Jews from the Nazis, without treating them as genuine converts to Islam for their own religious law purposes, even though the Nazis were deceived into believing that the sheltered Jews were really Muslims.</p>
<p>Also, the death penalty that is justified for apostasy under many interpretations of Islamic law, or even any other particularly harsh penalty is not necessarily required under Islamic law, even when members of a religious faith are not &quot;people of the book&quot; with limited religious freedom under Islamic law (who <em>may</em> therefore be punished for practicing their faith in Islamic law). This is true even though an Islamic leader may be justified in conquering people of these faiths in order to convert them under Islamic law.</p>


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<p>The history of the Islamic world reflects many instances in which people who are not people of the book have been tolerated by Islamic leaders in light of practical realities and considerations, even though Islamic law did not demand their tolerance.</p>


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<p>In the same vein, while Islamic law does not forbid polygamous marriage, a couple of Islamic majority countries have forbidden it as a matter of secular law. These countries concluded that it is not inconsistent for secular law to ban conduct for secular reasons even when it is not a violation of Islamic law to do so, in much the same way that Islamic countries still have traffic laws even though Islamic law does not forbid driving though stop signs or going faster than a posted speed limit. As applied to the freedom of religion, while Islamic law does not require accommodation of the faiths of people who not &quot;people of the book&quot; it also doesn't affirmatively require that Muslims persecute such people in most cases (except some kinds of blasphemy).</p>


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<p>So there are approaches to interpreting Islamic law that can afford considerable substantive freedom of religion to non-Muslims, and to different kinds of Muslims within non-blasphemous Islam, even though it is not as expansive a view of freedom of religion as the U.S. First Amendment provides - particularly as applied to Muslims who want to convert to another faith.</p>


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<p>Another final point is that the majority view in Islamic theology is that adherence to Islamic law and the Islamic faith is a matter of overt actions and not internal sincerity. The leading view is that if you fulfill your outward religious duties like praying five times a day, observing Ramadan, honoring Islamic dietary restrictions, and not making public blasphemous statements, that you are still a &quot;legitimate Muslim in good standing&quot; so to speak. This is true in the leading view, even if in your heart of hearts and internal monologs with yourself, you have deep doubts about Islam or even actually don't believe that God exists at all. Theologically, in Islam, the leading view is that actions speak louder than words or thoughts.</p>


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Question Body: <p>According to the <a href="https://codes.findlaw.com/ca/business-and-professions-code/bpc-sect-2903.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">California Code, Business and Professions Code - BPC § 2903</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(a) No person may engage in the practice of psychology, or represent
himself or herself to be a psychologist, without a license granted
under this chapter, except as otherwise provided in this chapter.  The
practice of psychology is defined as rendering or offering to render
to individuals, groups, organizations, or the public any psychological
service involving the application of psychological principles,
methods, and procedures of understanding, predicting, and influencing
behavior, such as the principles pertaining to learning, perception,
motivation, emotions, and interpersonal relationships; and the methods
and procedures of interviewing, counseling, psychotherapy, behavior
modification, and hypnosis; and of constructing, administering, and


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and procedures of interviewing, counseling, psychotherapy, behavior
modification, and hypnosis; and of constructing, administering, and
interpreting tests of mental abilities, aptitudes, interests,
attitudes, personality characteristics, emotions, and motivations.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>To me, this sounds like it would cover a lot of behavior that people who market themselves as coaches engage in.</p>
<p><a href="https://wetrainlifecoaches.com/ca/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">WeTrainLifeCoaches</a> which trains life coaches in California suggests:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>There are no legal requirements to become a general life coach in
California, so the best way to show your legitimacy to clients is by
receiving certification from an agency. The best-known certification
agency is The International Coach Federation (ICF), which offers
different levels of life coach certification.</p>
</blockquote>


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receiving certification from an agency. The best-known certification
agency is The International Coach Federation (ICF), which offers
different levels of life coach certification.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>As they speak about there not being a legal requirement, it seems like the coaches they train are not automatically licensed via the above-quoted profession code.</p>
<p>In actual case law, where's the line between what coaches can legally do and what they require being licensed under that section?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>In California, psychologists are regulated under <a href="https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displayexpandedbranch.xhtml?tocCode=BPC&amp;division=2.&amp;title=&amp;part=&amp;chapter=6.6.&amp;article=" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Ch 6.6</a> within Division 2 (Healing Arts) of the <a href="https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codesTOCSelected.xhtml?tocCode=BPC&amp;tocTitle=%20Business%20and%20Professions%20Code%20-%20BPC" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Business and Professions Code</a>. §2902 identifies the essential restriction on the business practice, stating that &quot;A person represents himself or herself to be a psychologist when the person holds himself or herself out to the public by any title or description of services...&quot; using various forms of the word 'psychologist', as well as &quot;when the person holds himself or herself out to be trained, experienced, or an expert in the field of psychology&quot;. In order to say that you are a psychologist,


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'psychologist', as well as &quot;when the person holds himself or herself out to be trained, experienced, or an expert in the field of psychology&quot;. In order to say that you are a psychologist, you have to hold a professional psychologists's license. Likewise to hold yourself out as a nurse, you need a nurse's license. A consequence of being a licensed psychologist is that under the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act, you may assess a patient's mental state, and you must keep that information confidential. A life coach cannot make a diagnosis, and cannot prescribe cures for mental conditions.</p>


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<p>§2908 in particular allows other people to do some of what psychologists do:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prevent qualified
members of other recognized professional groups licensed to practice
in the State of California, such as, but not limited to, physicians,
clinical social workers, educational psychologists, marriage and
family therapists, licensed professional clinical counselors,
optometrists, psychiatric technicians, or registered nurses, or
attorneys admitted to the State Bar of California, or persons
utilizing hypnotic techniques by referral from persons licensed to
practice medicine, dentistry, or psychology, or persons utilizing
hypnotic techniques which offer avocational or vocational
self-improvement and do not offer therapy for emotional or mental
disorders, or duly ordained members of the recognized clergy, or duly
ordained religious practitioners from doing work of a psychological


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disorders, or duly ordained members of the recognized clergy, or duly
ordained religious practitioners from doing work of a psychological
nature consistent with the laws governing their respective
professions, provided they do not hold themselves out to the public by
any title or description of services incorporating the words
“psychological,” “psychologist,” “psychology,” “psychometrist,”
“psychometrics,” or “psychometry,” or that they do not state or imply
that they are licensed to practice psychology; except that persons
licensed under Chapter 13.5 (commencing with Section 4989.10) of
Division 2 may hold themselves out to the public as licensed
educational psychologists.</p>
</blockquote>


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licensed under Chapter 13.5 (commencing with Section 4989.10) of
Division 2 may hold themselves out to the public as licensed
educational psychologists.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Analogously, we can talk about the law here without running afoul of UPL laws, because &quot;talking about the law&quot; is not the same as &quot;practicing law&quot;. It is a fairly formalistic distinction, but I or a life coach can talk about what would be good for your soul, as long as I don't claim to be a psychologist dispensing professional advice.</p>


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Question Title: Can a German declaration of division (Teliungserkl&#228;rung) or community ordinance (Gemeinschaftsordnung) prohibit long-term rentals?


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Question Body: <p>Consider an apartment block consisting of three equal units A, B, and C, located in Bavaria, Germany.  At present, all are owner-occupied and the Community of Apartment Owners (<em>Wohnungseigentümergemeinschaft</em>) has three members Asani, Bahar, and Camille, with equal power.  Units B and C are on the market and are bought by Diya, who decides to rent them out.  Now Asani finds himself having a minority in the Community of Apartment Owners and, as an owner-occupier, having other needs and interests than Diya, but Diya can possibly push through or block any decisions taken by majority vote (depending on the specifics in the declaration of division (<em>Teilungserklärung</em>), a person owning two units may have either one or two votes).  This situation is not desirable for Asani.</p>
<p>Is it legally possible in Bavaria, Germany, to enact a rule that restricts the rights of owners to rent out their property long-term?  For example, could it contain</p>
<ul>


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<p>Is it legally possible in Bavaria, Germany, to enact a rule that restricts the rights of owners to rent out their property long-term?  For example, could it contain</p>
<ul>
<li>a rule that every owner must live in their property, or</li>
<li>that the majority of homes must be owner-occupied, or</li>
<li>that new rentals are not allowed, or</li>
<li>that everyone who owns a property in the building must also live in the building, or</li>
<li>something similar?</li>
</ul>
<p>Such a rule would need to be changeable only by unanimous consent, otherwise Diya owning two out of three properties could simply abolish the rule, so Asani, Bahar, and Camille would together agree on such a rule (perhaps Asani would pay Bahar and Camille in case they fear the rule might reduce the sale value, but that is separate from the legal question).</p>


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<p>I've searched the web about restrictions on renting out, but all I find is either about restrictions on <em>short-term</em> (holiday) rentals, or about owner-occupiers objecting to <em>specific</em> prospective tenants.  I couldn't find anything about the possibility to restrict long-term rentals <em>in general</em>.  Is there any law that would prevent the rules governing the property as a whole (such as the Declaration of Division (<em>Teilungserklärung</em>) or the Community Ordinance (<em>Gemeinschaftsordnung</em>)) from containing such a restriction?</p>
<p>I am primarily interested in the situation in Bavaria, Germany, but for context it's also interesting to know the situation elsewhere.</p>


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Answer 1: <p>Yes, you can put <em>pretty much anything</em> you like into the co-op statutes.
You are actually interested in whether it <em>makes a difference</em>, though, whether the sheriff will come enforce a court order if it came to a trial.</p>
<blockquote>
<ul>
<li>a rule that every owner must live in their property, or</li>
<li>that everyone who owns a property in the building must also live in the building, or</li>
</ul>
</blockquote>
<p>By virtue of indirect effect of basic rights (<em>mittelbarer Wirkung von Grundrechten</em>) a court will never issue an order mandating Diya to live in her apartment, Art. 11 GG.
The sheriff will not forcefully “shove” her into her apartment:
“You <em>must</em> live here now!”</p>
<blockquote>
<ul>
<li>that the majority of homes must be owner-occupied, or</li>
</ul>
</blockquote>
<p>Similar, but Art. 2 I GG.
Vacancy of apartments is legal in Germany.</p>
<blockquote>
<ul>
<li>that new rentals are not allowed, or</li>
</ul>
</blockquote>


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</ul>
</blockquote>
<p>Similar, but Art. 2 I GG.
Vacancy of apartments is legal in Germany.</p>
<blockquote>
<ul>
<li>that new rentals are not allowed, or</li>
</ul>
</blockquote>
<p>As soon as Diya is recorded in the <em>Wohnungsgrundbuch</em> (apartment register) as the new owner of units B and C, she incontestably assumes the <em>role</em> of owner about said units.
If she rents them out despite the co-op statutes forbidding so, she does nothing illegal (that means breaking <em>state</em>/<em>federal</em> <em>law</em>).
After all she <em>is</em> indeed the owner, so there is no fraud involved, § 263 Ⅰ StGB.</p>
<p>The fact that she agreed to <em>not</em> rent out is a matter between Diya and the co-op.
<em>No court</em> will evict the new tenants from units B and C, because Diya has breached <em>her</em> obligations.</p>
<p>However, it <em>might</em> be a just cause to oust Diya from the co-op, § 17 WEG.


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<p>However, it <em>might</em> be a just cause to oust Diya from the co-op, § 17 WEG.
Yet still it requires <em>severe</em> grounds as it <em>essentially</em> means exercising eminent domain, Art. 14 Ⅲ GG.
I tentatively claim it won’t work out as long as Diya pays her share in maintenance and the tenants chosen by Diya are well-behaved.</p>
<blockquote>
<ul>
<li>something similar?</li>
</ul>
</blockquote>
<p>You will need something that produces <em>evidence</em>.
“Diya does not live in unit B” is a claim that needs corroboration in court.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>[…] restrict long-term rentals <em>in general</em>. […]</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Tenancy agreements are by default unlimited in time.
Short-term rents are sort of “forbidden” except if <em>justified</em> by one of the reasons named in § 575 Ⅰ BGB.
Hence restricting long-term rentals borders on a blanket-ban on <em>all</em> rentals.</p>


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Answer 2: <p>It would seem this is not possible.</p>
<p>From the <a href="https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/woeigg/BJNR001750951.html#BJNR001750951BJNG000102360" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Gesetz über das Wohnungseigentum und das Dauerwohnrecht (Wohnungseigentumsgesetz - WEG)</a> (Act on the Ownership of Apartments and the Permanent Residential Right):</p>
<blockquote>
<p>§ 13 Rechte des Wohnungseigentümers aus dem Sondereigentum<br />
(1) Jeder Wohnungseigentümer kann, soweit nicht das Gesetz entgegensteht, mit seinem Sondereigentum nach Belieben verfahren, insbesondere dieses bewohnen, vermieten, verpachten oder in sonstiger Weise nutzen, und andere von Einwirkungen ausschließen.</p>
</blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p>From the <a href="https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_woeigg/englisch_woeigg.html#p0050" rel="nofollow noreferrer">translation by Iyamide Mahdi in cooperation with the Language Service of the Federal Ministry of Justice</a> (based on an older version of the law, but this paragraph appears to not have changed):</p>
<blockquote>
<p>§ 13 Rights of the Apartment Owners<br />
(1) Every apartment owner shall have the right, in the absence of conflicting laws or third party rights, to deal at will with the parts of the building forming part of the separately owned property and in particular to occupy them, rent them out, lease them out or use them in any other manner, and to exclude others from interfering.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>I am not a lawyer, but from my reading, it is not possible to restrict by declaration of division or community ordinance the rights of owners to rent out or lease out their property.</p>


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Question Title: Why does &quot;object&quot; mean &quot;the persons who may benefit from property on the exercise of a distributive power, or discretionary trust&quot;?


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Question Body: <p>I know that legal persons can be natural/physical, or juridical/fictitious. But even fictitious persons are animate, or are run by humans! Hence, this word choice of OBJECTS feels weird, because &quot;objects&quot; denote inanimacy, whereas OBJECTS defined below refer to animate persons.</p>
<h4>Why did trust law choose &quot;OBJECTS&quot; for the definitions below? Can you explain this word choice to make it feel more natural? Has anyone proffered a better term?</h4>
<blockquote>
<p>OBJECTS the persons who may benefit from
property on the exercise of a distributive
power or discretionary trust.</p>
</blockquote>
<p><em>Pearce and Stevens' Trusts and Equitable Obligations</em> (2022) 8th edn, page lxiii.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Another form of express trust is the discretionary trust under which the trustees have discretion to ‘appoint’
(meaning ‘to distribute’) the property as they wish to people from a particular class of potential


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(meaning ‘to distribute’) the property as they wish to people from a particular class of potential
beneficiaries, known as the <strong>objects [emphasis added]</strong>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Paul Davies, <em>Equity &amp; Trusts: Text, Cases, and Materials</em> (2019) 3rd edn, page 30.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>3.7 The result of the trustees having a discretion to select only some of the possible beneficiaries
means, of course, that some might not receive any money at all, in which case
they will not really be ‘beneficiaries’ of the trust. For this reason, the term <strong>‘objects’ [emphasis added]</strong> is
used, and the group of objects among whom the trustee may select is called the ‘class of
objects’. ‘Objects’, then, is the compendious term that covers beneficiaries under a fixed
trust, possible beneficiaries under a discretionary trust, and possible recipients under a
power of appointment, to which we now turn.</p>
</blockquote>


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trust, possible beneficiaries under a discretionary trust, and possible recipients under a
power of appointment, to which we now turn.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>James Penner, <em>The Law of Trusts</em> (2022) 12th edition, page 52.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>        But trusts need not work in this way. The settlor may pass property to a trustee to
distribute among a defined group of individual beneficiaries, but leave it to the trustee
to decide exactly who is to get what. These trusts are known as discretionary trusts,
for the simple reason that the trustee has a discretion as to how the property is to be
distributed among this group of beneficiaries (or, as we more usually call them in such
cases, <strong><em>objects</em> [emphasis added]</strong>). The discretion given to the trustee may be more or less extensive. So, a
settlor may give his trustee free rein to decide what property, if any, each beneficiary


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settlor may give his trustee free rein to decide what property, if any, each beneficiary
is to receive. Alternatively, he may stipulate that each of the beneficiaries must receive
something, but leave it to the trustee to determine exactly what each gets.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Tim Akkouh, <em>Trusts Law</em> (2017) 5th edn, page 19.</p>


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Answer 1: <p>&quot;Object&quot; doesn't necessarily denote inanimacy.  Consider the sentence <em>Alice likes Bob.</em>  Grammatically, <em>Bob</em> is the object of the sentence.  Apart from grammatical analysis, we can also say that Bob is the object of Alice's affection.</p>
<p>In other words, a more general sense of <em>object</em> is &quot;something toward which something else is directed.&quot;  (In modern idiomatic English, you will probably more likely hear <em>objective</em> used for that, especially when the object/objective is an abstract goal.)</p>
<p>The concept at use here is defined in Black's law dictionary (second edition) under the phrase <em>objects of a power:</em></p>
<blockquote>


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<p>The concept at use here is defined in Black's law dictionary (second edition) under the phrase <em>objects of a power:</em></p>
<blockquote>
<p>Where property is settled subject to a power given to any person or persons to appoint the same among a limited class, the members of the class are called the &quot;objects&quot; of the power.  Thus, if a parent has a power to appoint a fund among his children, the children are called the &quot;objects&quot; of the power.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Analogous to Bob being the object of Alice's affection because the affection is directed toward Bob, the children in the example are the objects of the power because the power is applied to the children.</p>


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Question Title: Is it illegal to display a price perpetually while giving the impression it&#39;s a discount?


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Question Body: <p>Over a year ago, I purchased a license for <a href="https://esotericsoftware.com/spine-purchase" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Spine</a>. At the time, it had an offer from $99, to $69.</p>
<p>I didn't have plans to use it yet, but I purchased it at the time to catch a better price. However, since I bought it, it has always had that pricing. Reviewing the <a href="https://archive.org/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Internet Archive</a>, the pricing as it's shown today has been perpetual since 2016.</p>
<p>While there's no deadline, it gives the impression that it's a discount, but in reality it's an arbitrarily inflated price, struck out, with the normal price next to it.</p>
<p>Is this pricing actually legally compliant, and if not, where can one report such behavior?</p>
<p>The organization is based in Washington, United States.</p>
<p>Regarding governance, these are the relevant terms of the license:</p>
<blockquote>


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<p>The organization is based in Washington, United States.</p>
<p>Regarding governance, these are the relevant terms of the license:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><strong>17 Governing Law.</strong> This Agreement is governed by and construed in accordance with, without regard to conflicts of law provisions, the internal laws of:</p>
<p><strong>(a)</strong> the State of California and any suit, action, or proceeding arising out of or relating to this Agreement will be brought in the state or federal courts located in Los Angeles County, California; or,<br />
<strong>(b)</strong> England and Wales, provided You are located in the United Kingdom, Norway, Switzerland, or a member state of the European Union, and any suit, action, or proceeding arising out of or relating to this Agreement will be brought in the courts located in London, England.</p>


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<p>You irrevocably submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of these courts in any such suit, action, or proceeding and waive any objection based on improper venue or forum non conveniens.</p>
<p><strong>18 Trade Control Laws.</strong> The Spine Editor and Your use of the Spine Editor are subject to United States and international laws, restrictions, and regulations that may govern the import, export, and use of the Spine Editor. You agree to comply with all such laws, restrictions, and regulations.</p>
<p>— <em><a href="https://esotericsoftware.com/spine-editor-license#s17" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://esotericsoftware.com/spine-editor-license#s17</a></em></p>
</blockquote>


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Answer 1: <p>In England and Wales, falsely suggesting a sale or discount price would be contrary to the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.hants.gov.uk/business/tradingstandards/consumeradvice/goodsandservices/pricinglaw" rel="noreferrer">https://www.hants.gov.uk/business/tradingstandards/consumeradvice/goodsandservices/pricinglaw</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>practices that have been widely used by businesses for many years are
now deemed under the Guide as “less likely to comply” or, in other
words, more likely than not to be viewed as misleading and in breach
of the CPUT Regulations.</p>
<p>So what is now <strong>less likely to comply</strong>?</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Price establishing for 28-days within a 6-month period</p>
</li>
<li><p>Using a reference price that applied many months (at least more than 2 months) prior to the promotion.</p>
</li>


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<ul>
<li><p>Price establishing for 28-days within a 6-month period</p>
</li>
<li><p>Using a reference price that applied many months (at least more than 2 months) prior to the promotion.</p>
</li>
<li><p>Using a reference price when only a minimal amount of product actually sold at that price. There is now an expectation that a<br />
business will have sold a “significant number” of units at the higher
price in order to make a price comparison.</p>
</li>
</ul>
</blockquote>
<p><a href="https://marketinglaw.osborneclarke.com/advertising-regulation/no-more-28-day-rule-pricing-and-promotions-under-the-spotlight/" rel="noreferrer">https://marketinglaw.osborneclarke.com/advertising-regulation/no-more-28-day-rule-pricing-and-promotions-under-the-spotlight/</a></p>


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Question Title: Why did the strict rules of evidence result in a debt being due twice, even though common law dismissed this as absurd?


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Question Body: <p>As &quot;<em>the common
law held that a debt was due twice . . . [that proposition] would have been dismissed as
absurd</em>&quot;, why wasn't this the end of the story for the debtor? Why was this &quot;<em>the result which followed from observing strict rules of evidence</em>&quot;?</p>
<p>I am befuddled by the modal verb &quot;<strong>might</strong>&quot; in quotation beneath. Did the rules of evidence truly  &quot;<em>exclude the merits of the case from consideration but which could not be relaxed without destroying certainty and condoning carelessness</em>&quot;?</p>
<p>Most lawyers and judges are crafty. I am startled that even they could not skirt, outjockey, and/or relax the rules of evidence in order to actualize  a common law proposition dismissed as absurd (&quot;a debt was due twice&quot;)</p>
<blockquote>
<p>1.5 The first is that equity, fairness, or justice were never absent from the common law


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<blockquote>
<p>1.5 The first is that equity, fairness, or justice were never absent from the common law
courts. The difference was that from the mid-fourteenth century the complaints that the
common law courts would hear became fixed. That is, the common law courts refused to
invent new categories of writs, or different ‘forms of action’; the procedures of the court
as to pleading and evidence also became fixed. Baker (2002), at 102–103 (slightly modified)
illustrates the sort of problem that could arise because of this:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>[T]he growing strength of the substantive law could also work injustice, because the
judges preferred to suffer hardship in individual cases than to make exceptions to clear
rules. The stock example was that of the debtor who gave his creditor a sealed bond
[a paper document recording the obligation to pay the debt], but did not ensure that it
was cancelled when he paid up. The law regarded the bond as incontrovertible evidence


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[a paper document recording the obligation to pay the debt], but did not ensure that it
was cancelled when he paid up. The law regarded the bond as incontrovertible evidence
of the debt, and so payment was no defence. Here the debtor would suffer an obvious
hardship if he was made to pay twice; but the mischief was a result of his own foolishness,
and the law did not bend to protect fools . . . <strong>Now it was not that the common
law held that a debt was due twice . . . [that proposition] would have been dismissed as
absurd. Yet that was the result which followed from observing strict rules of evidence,
rules which might exclude the merits of the case from consideration but which could not
be relaxed without destroying certainty and condoning carelessness. [emphasis added]</strong></p>
</blockquote>
</blockquote>
<p>On page 4 of <em>The Law of Trusts</em> 12th edn (2022), James Penner quoted  Baker, J. H. (2002). <em>An Introduction to English
Legal History</em>, 4th Ed.</p>


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Answer 1: <p>The &quot;rule which might exclude the merits of the case from consideration&quot; referred to in this passage is the rule that &quot;a sealed bond [was] incontrovertible evidence of the debt, and so payment was no defence.&quot;</p>
<p>Strict application of a rule about &quot;incontrovertible evidence&quot; can result in absurdity when the proposition which is legally &quot;incontrovertible&quot; – in this case, that the debt evidenced by the sealed bond continued to exist – is actually false. <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_explosion" rel="nofollow noreferrer">From falsehood, anything follows.</a></p>


Tags: england-and-wales, equity


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Question Body: <p>The embolded phrases make it sound like a court can unpreventably, necessarily appoint trustees. Are there no exceptions?</p>
<p>Can't a court fail to appoint  a trustee?  For example, can't a court fail to find anyone willing to be a trustee —  particularly if the trust appears too complicated or controversial, and/or the trustee would not be recompensed enough?</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(3) It is a fundamental principle of Equity that a trust will not fail for want of a trustee.65
If a trust is created by the settlor, <strong>but the trustee declines to act as trustee, the beneficiary
can apply to the court to have a trustee appointed [emphasis mine]</strong>. The right of the beneficiary to have a
trustee appointed cannot be considered to be a right against the trustee’s right of ownership,
because there will be no trustee at that particular moment. It is much more satisfactory
to analyse this right as arising because Equity will ensure that the beneficiary’s


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because there will be no trustee at that particular moment. It is much more satisfactory
to analyse this right as arising because Equity will ensure that the beneficiary’s
proprietary right to the trust property is respected.</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>65 See Section 12.4.5, p. 374.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Virgo, <em>Principles of Equity &amp; Trusts</em> 2020 4th edn, page 51.</p>


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Answer 1: <h2>The court can appoint a <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/official-solicitor-and-public-trustee" rel="nofollow noreferrer">government trustee</a></h2>
<p>All common law governments have an office called something like the Public Trustee that can act as a trustee of last resort. They work to a schedule of fees payable by the trust. Often they also provide their services commercially.</p>
<p>They are often the same office that acts as the public guardian of “wards of the state”.</p>
<p>They don’t have the right to refuse a court appointment.</p>
<p>Of course, for an unsustainable trust, the court can order it would up instead and have the assets distributed to the beneficiaries.</p>


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Answer 2: <blockquote>
<p>Can't a court fail to appoint a trustee? For example, can't a court
fail to find anyone willing to be a trustee — particularly if the
trust appears too complicated or controversial, and/or the trustee
would not be recompensed enough?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>There are circumstances under which a court can find that a trust should be terminated prior to its express terms (beyond the Rule Against Perpetuities or its modern equivalent).</p>
<p>For example, a court can terminate a trust because the amount of the trust estate is too small to be practical to manage in trust form.</p>
<p>In order to decline to appoint a trustee, the court would, in practice, have to find valid grounds to dissolve the trust. The inability of the court or parties to locate anyone who would consent to serve as trustee (including the lack of eligibility to have a government trustee appointed) would be one factor among many that might be considered in a case like that.</p>


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<p>In the alternative, if there was one particular provision of the trust that made it impossible to find a trustee for an otherwise valid trust (e.g. compensation was limited to 1 British pound per year for a trust owning hundreds of profitable rental properties), the Court could exercise its powers in equity to reform the offending trust provision.</p>
<p>But if a court declined to appoint a trustee for a viable trust just because it didn't want to do so, this would be an abuse of discretion which would be grounds for an appeal of that ruling that would very likely prevail.</p>
<p>Also, while, absent grounds to dissolve the trust, a court has a duty to appoint a successor trustee, that doesn't mean that the court has a duty to do so immediately.</p>


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<p>Also, while, absent grounds to dissolve the trust, a court has a duty to appoint a successor trustee, that doesn't mean that the court has a duty to do so immediately.</p>
<p>For example, suppose that the trustee died, and the beneficiaries of the trust filed a petition with the appropriate court to have a successor trustee appointed, but due to a staffing shortage on the court and scheduling conflicts of the counsel for the parties in setting a hearing on the matter, a trustee can be appointed no sooner than seven months later. The court's delay would only rarely be something that could be raised in an interlocutory emergency request for a writ (or whatever it is called these days) insisting that the court take action immediately on the matter in order to prevent urgent harm.</p>


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Answer 3: <p>I am startled that Graham Virgo didn't expound this in his textbook! Perhaps you ought try another better textbook? <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/trusts-law-9781137606723/" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>Trusts Law</em> (2017) by Charlie Webb &amp; Tim Akkouh</a> explain this at page 302, just like <a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/a/75304">Dale M's answer</a>.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The first question to be addressed concerns the role of trustee. In the first instance,
the choice of trustees is (in relation to intended trusts) a matter for the settlor. He
can decide how many trustees he would like and who they will be. The law imposes
few limitations on this freedom. One is that a child cannot act as trustee: section 20
of the Law of Property Act 1925. Another is that, in respect of trusts of land, there
may be no more than four trustees: section 34 of the Trustee Act 1925. Those chosen


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of the Law of Property Act 1925. Another is that, in respect of trusts of land, there
may be no more than four trustees: section 34 of the Trustee Act 1925. Those chosen
by the settlor to act as trustees are free to refuse. However, if they do, this will not
lead to the failure of the trust. <strong>The principle is that a trust will not fail for want of
a trustee and the court will ensure that another, willing trustee is appointed. In the
last resort, the trust will be taken on by the Public Trustee, a corporate trustee provided
by the state. [emphasis added]</strong></p>
</blockquote>


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Question Title: Did the adoption of the Canadian Charter of Rights and freedoms cause any existing laws to be immediately struck down?

Question Body: <p>In the Charter, certain laws became more difficult to pass without the use of the notwithstanding clause. Some laws theoretically violated the Charter as soon as it was enacted (certain sections of the Indian act, for instance). Did any laws immediately become void simply by the Charter being enacted?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>The invalidity of laws that are inconsistent with the <em>Charter</em> is by virtue of section 52(1) of the <em>Constitution Act, 1982</em>, which came into force with the bulk of the <em>Charter</em>. It states that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect.</p>
</blockquote>


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<p>This might be read as immediately applying by its own force to render laws inconsistent with the <em>Charter</em> to be void. And language to this effect has been even used by the Court, saying that a provision inconsistent with the Constitution is &quot;invalid from the moment it is enacted&quot; (e.g. <em>Nova Scotia (Workers' Compensation Board) v. Martin; Nova Scotia (Workers' Compensation Board) v. Laseur</em>, <a href="https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/2088/index.do" rel="nofollow noreferrer">2003 SCC 54</a>). But for Section 52 to have effect &quot;requires the exercise of judicial power to declare the law to be unconstitutional&quot; (<em>R. v. Sullivan</em>, <a href="https://decisions.scc-csc.ca/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/19390/index.do" rel="nofollow noreferrer">2022 SCC 19</a> at para. 54). That a law is inconsistent with the Constitution is &quot;revealed through litigation, specifically the judgment that declares the inoperability of the impugned law&quot;


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SCC 19</a> at para. 54). That a law is inconsistent with the Constitution is &quot;revealed through litigation, specifically the judgment that declares the inoperability of the impugned law&quot; (<em>Sullivan</em> at para. 55). Section 52 has no practical effect aside from Courts or other decision-makers declining to apply law that is inconsistent with the Constitution. Whether a law was void as soon as the <em>Charter</em> was enacted is not really a meaningful question nor even detectable until a Court declares the law to be invalid.</p>


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<p>The Court has also clarified that declarations of invalidity are not necessarily retroactive to the moment of enactment (internal citations removed):</p>
<blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p>[60] ... Mr. Sullivan points to the idea that an unconstitutional law is invalid from the moment it is enacted. But the strict enforcement of such a principle “cannot easily be reconciled with modern constitutional law”. Instead, it is subject to a number of exceptions and s. 52(1) must be read “in light of all constitutional principles”. In <em>Albashir</em>, my colleague Karakatsanis J. explained that declarations of unconstitutionality are generally retrospective, consistent with the notion that a law is unconstitutional from its enactment. However, other constitutional principles may require a purely prospective declaration of unconstitutionality or a suspended declaration. Similarly, the legal effect of a s. 52(1) declaration by a superior court must be defined with reference to constitutional supremacy, the rule of law, and federalism.</p>
</blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p>I'll say this one more way: while it's true that some laws were immediately inconsistent with the <em>Charter</em>, s. 52(1) did not have any observable effect until a court declared such laws to be invalid.</p>


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Question Title: UK law and time limits

Question Body: <p>A patient with a history of mental health problems goes to his/her GP claiming depression. However, because the patient does not appear to act in the expected manner, the GP refuses time off.</p>
<p>This is contrary to the <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/9/contents" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Mental Capacity Act of 2005</a> that requires
(3) A lack of capacity cannot be established merely by reference to—
(a) a person’s age or appearance, or
(b) a condition of his, or an aspect of his behaviour, which might lead others to make unjustified assumptions about his capacity.</p>
<p>It turns out that the patient does have some serious problems and suffers at work.</p>
<p>Can the patient take the GP to court because the GP broke the 2005 Act and, if so, is there a time limit that must be observed? If not, what recourse to action would he/she have?</p>


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Answer 1: <h2>How is the Mental Health Act relevant?</h2>
<p>It sets out the law relating to removing a person’s decision making ability over their own life and placing it in the hands of a guardian and, possibly, confine them to an institution against their will. The question is not whether a person is mentally ill, it’s whether that illness prevents them from making decisions about their life.</p>


Tags: united-kingdom, medical, time-periods


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Question Title: What legal relief is available when a neighbour uses my address as his own for communication without written consent from me?


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Question Body: <p>A property, say plot no.31, was sub-divided into two parts. After subdivision the plot number on record for the newly created subdivision was, say, 31-A; the original plot number remained 31.</p>
<p>The division was challenged, and the challenge dismissed at all levels after the first initial success. Many years later, after the challenger passed away and that sub-division was inherited by the challenger's heirs, it was discovered that even after dismissal the challenger continued to use the postal address of the challenged sub-division. This continued for years even when the heirs too knew from record that the address was 31-A instead of 31. When asked the postal department stated the address being next door, all mail was delivered assuming the misstated address  to be simple oversight by the sender/s. Even assuming defence by 31-A claim the misrepresentation was by oversight, it comes across as far-fetched for such oversight to continue for whole decades.</p>


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<p>What legal relief is available when a neighbour uses my address as his own for communication without written consent from me? Is the the postal department also culpable?</p>
<p>EDIT: To follow up with @eis' answer that tort demands establishing damage here is my concern. Documents which establish proof of address s.a. Utility Bills - telephone, energy, water service lose clarity. If so inclined, one may call this behaviour causing loss of value to the property simply because it amounts to squatting - if only on paper.</p>
<p>EDIT 2: Pursuant to the comment by R.M below, an additional question that comes to mind is as follows -</p>
<ul>
<li>Could such use of my address as an alias for their own address serve to establish 'proof of residence'? For instance, some days ago I encountered a pizza delivery boy waiting outside my premises. Upon enquiry he intimated the pizza was to be delivered to them but the address given by them was mine.</li>
</ul>


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Answer 1: <p>Mark the mail delivered as &quot;addressee unknown, return to sender&quot; and give it to the postal delivery person next time around. If the mail stops getting through, the neighbor will update their address.</p>


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Answer 2: <p>Based on the description, there is no legal relief available.</p>
<p>To quote:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>a tort is breach of a non-contractual duty which has caused damage to
the plaintiff giving rise to a civil cause of action and for which
remedy is available.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>To establish a tort, you need to establish that damage has occurred. Since mail is simply being delivered to the correct location despite the address, and you don't claim any harm having occurred, it does not sound like you have suffered any damage, hence no legal relief is available.</p>
<hr />
<p>You added:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Documents which establish proof of address s.a. Utility Bills - telephone, energy, water service lose clarity. If so inclined, one may call this behaviour causing loss of value to the property simply because it amounts to squatting - if only on paper.</p>
</blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p>But you need to establish damage having happened. In general you would need to have receipts proving the amount of money you have lost. You don't have a bill to pay for losing clarity, hence you can't prove that you've suffered any damage.</p>


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Answer 3: <h2>None</h2>
<p>Unless the neighbour was a company (which, since they died, they can’t be), or they are giving out false information (like the address) with the intention of committing a crime like fraud.</p>
<p>You could, perhaps, have sought an injunction for them to stop but it seems unlikely the court would grant it since it doesn’t appear to have caused you or anyone else any harm. In any event, any remedy you might have had ended with the person’s death.</p>


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Answer 4: <p>Firstly, the fact that utility bills can be used to prove title to the property is in itself a cause for worry, and can also constitute a cause of action by itself. This is due to the mere fact that these documents, can in fact, constitute proof of address, for example, for <a href="https://cleartax.in/s/gst-registration-documents-checklist" rel="nofollow noreferrer">GST registration</a> of the individual.</p>
<p>Further, you can refer to the following court cases which have treated utility bills as proof of title on a balance of probabilities.</p>
<ol>
<li><a href="https://www.lawyerservices.in/Nileshkumar-Hiralal-Modi-Versus-Hitesh-Kaushi-Kumar-Modi-2012-07-17" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Nileshkumar Hiralal Modi v/s Hitesh Kaushi Kumar Modi</a> at paragraphs 10 and 15.</li>
<li><a href="https://indiankanoon.org/doc/79916882/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Rabari Nagjibhai Maneklal vs Nilamben Upendrabhai Shah</a> at paragraph 56</li>
</ol>


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<li><a href="https://indiankanoon.org/doc/79916882/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Rabari Nagjibhai Maneklal vs Nilamben Upendrabhai Shah</a> at paragraph 56</li>
</ol>
<p>Since you are the owner of property with presumably a perfect title, you are entitled to file a suit for <strong>mandatory injunction</strong> which will prevent the neighbour from using your address, there being &quot;<em>no standard to ascertain the actual damage caused</em>&quot;. This relief is provided under <a href="https://www.indiacode.nic.in/show-data?actid=AC_CEN_3_20_00009_196347_1517807320084&amp;sectionId=30253&amp;sectionno=38&amp;orderno=42" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Section 38 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963</a>.</p>


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<p>You must also bear in mind that, if the neighbour also claims title, you may have to contest the title to the suit property since this remedy will not then be available to you, and instead you will have to claim for declaratory relief first as per the guidelines by the Supreme Court of India in paragraph 13 of <a href="https://indiankanoon.org/doc/540361/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Anathula Sudhakar vs P. Buchi Reddy (Dead) By Lrs &amp; Ors</a></p>


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Question Body: <p>The link <a href="https://www.alberta.ca/turning.aspx#:%7E:text=Turning%20left%20from%20a%201%2Dway%20onto%20a%201%2Dway,pedestrians%20crossing%20to%20your%20left." rel="nofollow noreferrer">Turning | Alberta.ca</a> says &quot;when the light is red, if there are no signs prohibiting the turn, you may turn left on a red light from a one way to a one way after you come to a complete stop at the proper stopping location (stop line or crosswalk) and it is safe. This also applies to dual lane turns. Yield to pedestrians crossing to your left.&quot;  It seems it's saying with dual lane turns, one can also turn left on a red light.</p>


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<p>However, in this link <a href="https://www.alberta.ca/turning-lanes.aspx" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Turning lanes | Alberta.ca</a> it says &quot;unless prohibited by a sign, at a dual right turn intersection, you may turn right on a red light after you come to a complete stop at the proper stopping point (stop line or crosswalk).&quot; It doesn't mention turning left on a red light.</p>
<p>So can one turn left or right at a red light with dual lane turns? Thank you!</p>


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Answer 1: <p>The critical consideration is that the permitted left turn must be onto a one-way roadway in that direction. One is not permitted to perform a left turn which involves crossing traffic from the left, which would also imply that it is not a one-way roadway.</p>


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Answer 2: <p>Intersections have a number of possible paths through them. Where those possible paths cross is called a <a href="https://highways.dot.gov/public-roads/januaryfebruary-2003/reducing-points-conflict" rel="nofollow noreferrer">conflict point.</a></p>
<p>Canada drives on the right.  That means that right turns only do not entail any conflict points, except for a merge into the lane you are joining.   This means you only have three things to watch for: pedestrians, moose, and oncoming traffic in that lane.  That is the rationale behind allowing &quot;right on red&quot; - given the <em>de minimis</em> number of conflict points involved,  the driver workload is reasonable.</p>
<p>As a matter of policy they allow 2 lanes of right on red, but that's not your question.</p>
<p><a href="https://i.stack.imgur.com/Ss4do.png" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><img src="https://i.stack.imgur.com/Ss4do.png" alt="enter image description here" /></a><br />


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<p><a href="https://i.stack.imgur.com/Ss4do.png" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><img src="https://i.stack.imgur.com/Ss4do.png" alt="enter image description here" /></a><br />
<a href="https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/research/safety/04091/10.cfm" rel="nofollow noreferrer">source</a></p>
<p>A &quot;left on red&quot; isn't going to work as a general rule, because of a much larger number of conflict points, mostly the worst kind, <em>crossing</em> conflict points.   Is this too much workload for the driver? Yes - we know that, because <em>that was the whole reason why the intersection was upgraded from stop signs to traffic lights in the first place!</em>  So a <em>general</em> left on red is unworkable.</p>


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<p>However,  one-way streets to the left create a special situation.  From a one-way to a <em>leftward</em> one-way has no conflict points except the &quot;merging&quot; one discussed with right turns.  As such, &quot;left on red&quot; is allowed there.  This is the situation being discussed in your first link.  The first link isn't referring to left turns onto two-way streets.</p>
<p>This isn't relevant to this conversation, but from a two-way to a leftward one-way <em>arguably</em> creates this favorable situation again; while there are crossing conflict points, they are only with your own street's traffic which is held by the red light. As such, some jurisdictions allow left turns from a 2-way to a 1-way. <strong>Alberta is not one of them</strong>, probably due to moose :)</p>
<p>The simplest way to think of this is, &quot;you are allowed to turn into the nearest lane to you, if you don't cross any lanes at all&quot;, and in Alberta 2 lanes can do this at once.</p>


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Question Body: <p>I want to use a railway poster from the 1930s in publicity for a play, but the Science Museum wants a fee for it, claiming copyright (<a href="https://collection.sciencemuseumgroup.org.uk/objects/co231218/london-midland-scottish-railway-poster-see-the-peak-district-poster" rel="noreferrer">https://collection.sciencemuseumgroup.org.uk/objects/co231218/london-midland-scottish-railway-poster-see-the-peak-district-poster</a>).</p>
<p>On what basis might their claim be legitimate? afaict they are not paying the money to descendants of the artist, and it seems likely that he wouldn't have had copyright in the first place (that would have been with the railway company, which no longer exists, and was absorbed by British Rail).</p>
<p>When I (politely) asked them, they said: &quot;The copyright was revived in the 1990’s and the rights were assigned to us by the British Railways Board at that time.&quot;</p>
<p>Revived by whom? How?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>The modern rule in the UK is that copyright lasts until the end of the calendar year following 70 years after the death of the author. So if the author died in or later than 1953, it would be under copyright under this general rule.</p>
<p>However, this wasn't always the rule and the museum speaks of a copyright revived in the 1990s. So I went down that rabbit hole of historical UK copyright legislation. I personally find it interesting, but it turned out to not be entirely determinative.</p>
<p>It all turns on publication date and date of death of the artist, neither of which I can find, with the museum only stating the artist was <a href="https://collection.sciencemuseumgroup.org.uk/people/cp20240/s-r-wyatt" rel="noreferrer">active in the 1930s</a>. But even assuming the most favourable facts for this to still be copyright under a &quot;revived&quot; copyright, the latest date I can find for copyright to still remain under that regime is end of 2015.</p>
<hr />


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<hr />
<p>Per <em>Copyright Act <strong>1956</strong></em> <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1956/74/section/3/enacted" rel="noreferrer">s. 3(4)(a)</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>in the case of an engraving, if before the death of the author the engraving had not been published, the copyright shall continue to subsist until the end of the period of fifty years from the end of the calendar year in which it is first published;</p>
</blockquote>
<p>For the fact pattern I'm outlining, we must assume the author died before publication. As for the engraving bit, s. 48 defines that lithographs are engravings, and while I am far from an expert in this field, skimming the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lithography" rel="noreferrer">Wikipedia article on lithography</a>, it does seem quite possible the poster could be a lithograph.</p>


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<p>I'll note here since you bring up who precisely would be the owner of the original copyright, that it does seem likely that the poster was a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Work_for_hire" rel="noreferrer">work for hire</a>, following the provisions of <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1956/74/section/4/enacted" rel="noreferrer">s. 4(2)</a>. As such, the copyright would have indeed ultimately transferred to British Rail.</p>
<p>Jumping ahead a bit, the more precise year which the museum states is &quot;the 1990's&quot; is 1995 (we'll get to why). So in order for copyright to have first expired as per the museum's statement and the authors active years, we must assume a publication date between  1930-1945 (or thereabouts, I'm not being super careful in this answer about the months things happen in, so there may be accumulation of off-by-one errors).</p>


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<p>Because of those years, I now have to quickly address why the <em>Copyright Act <strong>1911</strong></em> isn't relevant. The transitional provisions outlined in the <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1956/74/schedule/SEVENTH/enacted" rel="noreferrer">Seventh Schedule</a> reveal that only for photographs are the copyright duration provisions maintained from the 1911 Act.</p>
<hr />
<p>Now we can jump into the modern law, the <em>Copyright, Designs and Patents Act <strong>1988</strong></em> (<em>CDPA</em>). The transitional provision in the <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/48/schedule/1/enacted" rel="noreferrer">Schedule 1</a> s. 12(2)(b) directly maintains the 1956 copyright duration in this case which given our possible publication years, would have led to copyright expiry sometime between 1980-1995.</p>


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<p>However, in 1995, the UK passed <em>The Duration of Copyright and Rights in Performances Regulations <strong>1995</strong></em>. This was in accordance with European legislation harmonizing copyright duration, in <em><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A31993L0098" rel="noreferrer">Directive 93/98/EEC</a></em> (itself since replaced by <em><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32006L0116" rel="noreferrer">Directive 2006/116/EC</a></em>).</p>
<p><em>Side Note: 1995 is a peculiar year for copyrights in Europe due to that directive and so is exactly where I started my research for this answer, because it caused weird quirks for copyright terms in some countries in some cases.</em></p>


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<p>For the UK, <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1995/3297/regulation/5/made" rel="noreferrer">s. 5</a> of the regulation amended the <em>CDPA</em>, basically establishing the general European standard of copyrights expiring 70 years after the author's death.</p>
<p>More importantly for our case though is the regulations own section explaining in which cases the new copyright term expires. In <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1995/3297/regulation/16/made" rel="noreferrer">s. 16</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The new provisions relating to duration of copyright apply— (a) [...] (b) [...] (c) [...] (d) to existing works in which copyright expired before 31st December 1995 but which were on 1st July 1995 protected in another EEA state under legislation relating to copyright or related rights.</p>
</blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p>Now, I'm not going to go through and look at all the EEA contries legislation to confirm, but it seems incredibly likely that one of them would have had engravings protected for life+70 in 1995, given that's what Europe has now standardized on (since we're assuming pre-publication death for an author who was active in the 1930s).</p>
<p>Notably, <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1995/3297/regulation/17/made" rel="noreferrer">s. 17</a> even defines cases of expired works re-entering copyright as &quot;revived copyright&quot;, matching the terminology the museum's statement used.</p>
<p>It would have been great if the 1995 regulation explicitly spelled out the relationship with <em>CDPA</em>'s Schedule 1 s. 12, but in judicial interpretation, newer legislation takes priority, so the 1995 law would control.</p>


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<p><em>Note: The answer is getting long enough so I'm not going to fully research/cite this, but for regulations vs. legislation, we have a weird case of a regulation amending a statute. I'm fairly certain this is due to UK Acts passed for European Community membership elevating regulations to primary legislation when they are passed for compliance with European law.</em></p>
<p>So given our assumed facts, the poster would have revived copyright per the 1995 Regulations. However, you may note (as I belatedly did after first posting this answer) that even given revived copyright, that revived copyright is still life+70. And the assumptions made for copyright revival under this clause requires a posthumous publication date of 1945 at the latest. This means at best any copyright under these particular circumstances would have expired in 2015.</p>
<hr />


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<hr />
<p>There is a bit of a middle ground here. If the poster is not a lithograph, or the publication was not posthumous, the work would have gained a life+50 term per aformentioned <em>Copyright Act 1956</em> <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1956/74/section/3/enacted" rel="noreferrer">s. 3(4)</a>. But then for copyright to expire and be revived, we still have to assume a 1945 death date at the latest.</p>
<p>Alternatively, instead of copyright revival, it could have gotten extended from life+50 to life+70 per the 1995 Regulations <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1995/3297/regulation/16/made" rel="noreferrer">s. 16(c)</a>. But because we are more than 20 years from 1995, it mathematically works out that it doesn't matter anymore and we can just work with the life+70 rule.</p>


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<p>A combination of 1995 Regulations s. 16(c) and posthumous publication though does actually give another reasonable way for the work to still be under copyright. If published in 1988 before the <em>CDPA</em> entered into force, it would have followed the cited 1956 rules of copyright expiring 50 years after publication. The 1995 Regulations s. 16(c) specifies that longer existing terms can continue. So that results in 2038 as a latest possible year through this method.</p>
<hr />
<p>In the end I think there are two or three reasonable interpretations:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>The museum is correct the work is under copyright, but incorrect about the reason.</p>
<ul>
<li>It's instead because the work is under copyright because the author died after 1953 (or is still living), or</li>


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<ul>
<li>It's instead because the work is under copyright because the author died after 1953 (or is still living), or</li>
<li>The work is still covered under the 50 years after posthumous publication rule for engravings established in the <em>Copyright Act 1956</em> (publication years 1973-1988 for copyright expiry at the end of calendar years 2023-2038).</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><p>The museum is correct that copyright was revived, but I can't find a way for this to be true and for the work to still be under copyright (with 2015 the latest year I can find for the given facts).</p>
</li>
</ul>
<p>Note that this is my own reading of legislation, please take it with a grain of salt.</p>
<hr />


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Question Title: Do US born children whose parents are NOT citizens get automatic citizenship at birth?

Question Body: <p>If you immigrate to the USA, will the baby get automatic citizenship? Wouldn't that kind of be a loophole?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>Yes, the <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/amendmentxiv" rel="noreferrer">Fourteenth Amendment</a> makes a person born on U.S. soil a U.S. citizen at the moment of birth.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This is not a &quot;loophole,&quot; because it is exactly what the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment were trying to achieve.</p>
<p>There are narrow exceptions because of the &quot;subject to the jurisdiction thereof&quot; clause:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The children of an ambassador are held to be subjects of the prince whom he represents, although born under the actual protection and in the dominions of a foreign prince. ... Thus the children of enemies, born in a place within the dominions of another sovereign, then occupied by them by conquest, are still aliens.</p>
</blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p><a href="https://casetext.com/case/inglis-v-trustees-of-sailors-snug-harbour" rel="noreferrer"><em>Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor's Snug Harbour</em>, 28 U.S. 99, 155-56 (1830)</a>.</p>


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Answer 2: <p>Not a loophole but the intent of the constitution.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1: All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It might seem odd to you because many other countries are less generous with their citizenship.</p>
<p>Do note the caveat. It means children born to foreign diplomats do not get automatic citizenship.</p>


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Answer 3: <p>Yes, children born in the territory of the United States automatically become U.S. citizens by the <a href="https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/amendment-14/#:%7E:text=No%20State%20shall%20make%20or,equal%20protection%20of%20the%20laws" rel="noreferrer">14th Amendment</a>.</p>
<p>It is not a &quot;loophole&quot; in that, while the child is a U.S. citizen, their parents can still be deported.</p>
<p>The U.S.-born children of immigrants cannot sponsor their parents for a green card until they are at least 21 years of age or older. <a href="https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/guides/A1en.pdf" rel="noreferrer">Source</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>As a citizen of the United States, you may help a relative become
a lawful permanent resident of the United States by obtaining what
is often referred to as a “Green Card.” To do so, you need to sponsor
your relative and be able to prove that you have enough income


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a lawful permanent resident of the United States by obtaining what
is often referred to as a “Green Card.” To do so, you need to sponsor
your relative and be able to prove that you have enough income
or assets to support your relative(s) when they come to the United
States.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>If eventually granted a green card, the parents must be a permanent resident for five years before they can apply for naturalization <strong>or</strong> be a permanent resident for at least 3 years and married to a US citizen (who is <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legality_of_incest_in_the_United_States#:%7E:text=No%20person%20shall%20marry%20his,is%20not%20a%20criminal%20offense." rel="noreferrer">not your descendant</a>). <a href="https://www.uscis.gov/forms/uscis-early-filing-calculator#:%7E:text=You%20may%20file%20Form%20N,married%20to%20a%20US%20citizen." rel="noreferrer">Source</a></p>
<p>A common (derogatory) term for this is &quot;Anchor Baby&quot;.</p>


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Answer 4: <p>Unfortunately yes. My daughter did not have the choice and became a citizen of this country. Now 30 years later she has lots of problems because of that citizenship. There is an association called Accidental Americans working for those citizens who do not want being citizens of the US. Check out the wiki page for Accidental Americans. Repudiating this citizenship is not easy and quite expensive.</p>


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Answer 5: <p>That all those born in the US having citizenship being a constitutional right is generally based on the Fourteenth Amendment, which says &quot;All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States.&quot; There is some debate as to what exactly the &quot;subject to the jurisdiction thereof&quot; qualification means. It has been interpreted as not granting citizenship to the children of parents who have diplomatic immunity, and there are some of the position that it also requires the parents' presence in the US to be legal, and/or open and notorious, but that view has little support in the legal community. There is also the issue of what counts as &quot;the United States&quot;. While people in America Samoa are US nationals, courts have denied them citizenship. <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Samoan_citizenship_and_nationality#Federal_citizenship_controversy_(1960%E2%80%93present)"


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Samoa are US nationals, courts have denied them citizenship. <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Samoan_citizenship_and_nationality#Federal_citizenship_controversy_(1960%E2%80%93present)" rel="noreferrer">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Samoan_citizenship_and_nationality#Federal_citizenship_controversy_(1960%E2%80%93present)</a></p>


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<p>There are indeed people who travel to the US late in their pregnancy specifically to give birth in the US and thus have their children be US citizens. See <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Birth_tourism" rel="noreferrer">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Birth_tourism</a> . There is also the term &quot;anchor baby&quot;, which is generally used in a derogatory manner to refer to children of immigrants who were born in the US (though not necessarily implying that the parents immigrated for the purpose of having the child in the US).</p>


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Answer 6: <p>IANAL, and this has already been well answered legally, but I wanted to give a personal example for historical context.</p>
<p>My aunt's parents emigrated to the U.S. from Italy in 1934, having delivered their oldest son on the ship while crossing the Atlantic from Italy, and my aunt was born a year later (1935) in New Castle PA.  Her older brother was thus not born in the U.S. and had to apply for citizenship years later.  My aunt, on the other hand, was a citizen by birth, <em>even though her parents had not yet become citizens themselves</em> and never had to apply for it.</p>
<p>My point being that this is nothing new or special in America, it has been going on for hundreds of years and has applied to many hundreds of thousands of citizens, new-born to parents who were not citizens.</p>


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Answer 7: <p>It seems worth mentioning that birthright citizenship in the United States is part of the aftermath of the Civil War of 1861–1861. Part of the outcome of the war was the abolition of slavery. Earlier the Supreme Court had ruled in the case of Scott v. Sandford that negroes are not citizens, regardless of whether they are enslaved or not. Everything about the status of persons of African descent was a big issue in the aftermath of the war. Before that, different states had different laws about who was a citizen, although there were also federal naturalization laws. The 14th Amendment was intended to supersede much of that.</p>


Tags: united-states, citizenship


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Question Body: <p>If a law is passed that contains a demonstrably false statement or assumption about the world, how is it generally interpreted?</p>
<p>For example, laws will often list a category of things, and then give examples of specific things in the category. It is easy for some of the examples not to be true members of the category. You might have a law that says &quot;Only fish, such as pike, capybara, and perch, may be eaten on Fridays; animal meat is right out.&quot;</p>
<p>Does that make the capybara legally a &quot;fish&quot; for the purpose of that particular law? How would that affect courts trying to make determinations about what other things not specifically enumerated are (legal) fish?</p>
<p>Would an attorney be able to get any mileage out of the argument that the capybara is not in fact a fish, as noted by leading fish experts?</p>
<p>Can a law or part of a law be struck down not for being <em>wrong</em> but just for being <em>false</em>?</p>


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Answer 1: <p><a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/149/304/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Nix v. Hedden</a>, 149 U.S. 304 (1893) is a famous &quot;error of fact&quot; case in the US. The situation was that there was an import tariff imposed on &quot;vegetables in their natural state&quot; brought in from outside the US, but not on &quot;Fruits, green, ripe, or dried, not specially enumerated or provided for in this act&quot; which were on a &quot;free&quot; list. Since imported tomatoes were taxed, it was said that tomatoes are fruits and not vegetables. The court ruled that <em>for legal purposes</em> the terms &quot;vegetable&quot; and &quot;fruit&quot; have their ordinary meaning, and are not held to a possibly variable scientific definition.</p>


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<p>Definitions were read from Webster's Dictionary, Worcester's Dictionary and the Imperial Dictionary, and witnesses with decades of experience in the produce trade were called who testified as to whether the words had &quot;any special meaning in trade or commerce, different from those read&quot;. Dictionary entries were read regarding the definition of the words pea, eggplant, cucumber, squash, pepper, potato, turnip, parsnip, cauliflower and so on.</p>
<p>The court reasoned as follows based on the evidence. First,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The passages cited from the dictionaries define the word ‘fruit’ as
the seed of plaints, or that part of plaints which contains the seed,
and especially the juicy, pulpy products of certain plants, covering
and containing the seed. These definitions have no tendency to show
that tomatoes are ‘fruit,’ as distinguished from ‘vegetables,’ in
common speech, or within the meaning of the tariff act</p>
</blockquote>


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that tomatoes are ‘fruit,’ as distinguished from ‘vegetables,’ in
common speech, or within the meaning of the tariff act</p>
</blockquote>
<p>and since the terms do not have a special meaning in trade or commerce, they must receive their ordinary meaning. Observe that &quot;scientific definition&quot; is not even a contender in this discussion. The court observed that &quot;dictionaries are admitted, not as evidence, but only as aids to the memory and understanding of the court&quot;.</p>
<p>The crux of the ruling is the following observation:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Botanically speaking, tomatoes are the fruit of a vine, just as are
cucumbers, squashes, beans, and peas. But in the common language of
the people, whether sellers or consumers of provisions, all these are
vegetables which are grown in kitchen gardens, and which, whether
eaten cooked or raw, are, like potatoes, carrots, parsnips, turnips,
beets, cauliflower, cabbage, celery, and lettuce, usually served at


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eaten cooked or raw, are, like potatoes, carrots, parsnips, turnips,
beets, cauliflower, cabbage, celery, and lettuce, usually served at
dinner in, with, or after the soup, fish, or meats which constitute
the principal part of the repast, and not, like fruits generally, as
dessert.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In other words, specialized scientific definitions are not assumed to underlie the use of words selected by lawmakers. If lawmakers list &quot;fish, such as pike, capybara, and perch&quot;, then for purposes of that law and that law alone, capybara is defined to be a fish. Explicit redefinitions are fairly commonplace in writing laws, and lawmakers universally have the power to redefine words so that &quot;and means or and or means and, as necessary&quot;.</p>


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<p>An example of a deliberate statutory redefinition is the fact that a bee is a fish in California, for some purposes, see <a href="https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/archive/C093542S.PDF" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Almond v. Fish</a>. In the Fish &amp; Game Code, <a href="https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displayText.xhtml?lawCode=FGC&amp;division=0.5.&amp;title=&amp;part=&amp;chapter=1.&amp;article=" rel="nofollow noreferrer">FGC §45</a>,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Fish” means a wild fish, mollusk, crustacean, invertebrate,
amphibian, or part, spawn, or ovum of any of those animals</p>
</blockquote>
<p>which means that worms and jellyfish, and insects, are legal fish. The <a href="https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displayText.xhtml?lawCode=FGC&amp;division=3.&amp;title=&amp;part=&amp;chapter=1.5.&amp;article=1." rel="nofollow noreferrer">Endangered Species Act</a> §2062 then says</p>
<blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p>“Endangered species” means a native species or subspecies of a bird,
mammal, fish, amphibian, reptile, or plant which is in serious danger
of becoming extinct throughout all, or a significant portion, of its
range due to one or more causes, including loss of habitat, change in
habitat, overexploitation, predation, competition, or disease.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Notice that under an interpretation of the law that ignores the statutory redefinition in §45, invertebrates and a number of chordates would not be protected by law. The court notes that this was a deliberate action by the legislature in 1969, in that
enrolled bill reports in support of this modification included the argument that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The expanded definition of fish will permit closer control and
monitoring of the harvest of species such as starfish, sea urchins,
sponges and worms, and the ... Commission will be authorized to make
regulations deemed necessary for proper protection and management of


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sponges and worms, and the ... Commission will be authorized to make
regulations deemed necessary for proper protection and management of
these species</p>
</blockquote>


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Answer 2: <p>When a statute presents a general category and says that category &quot;includes&quot; some specific examples, those specific examples are <em>deemed</em> to belong to that category for the purpose of the statute.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Statutory definitions are also used to expand the usual scope of <strong>a word or expression</strong>, for example:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>In this section,</p>
<p>&quot;fish&quot; includes shell fish, crustaceans, and marine mammals;</p>
</blockquote>
<p>...</p>
<p>In these examples, the statutory definition enlarges the ordinary (or technical) meaning of the defined terms by including things that might normally be thought to fall outside their denotation.</p>
<p>(Ruth Sullivan, <em>Statutory Interpretation</em>, 3rd ed. (2016), p. 81)</p>
</blockquote>
<p>And in the U.S. textualist context:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Individual statutes often contain definition sections giving ordinary words a limited or artificial meaning.</p>


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</blockquote>
<p>And in the U.S. textualist context:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Individual statutes often contain definition sections giving ordinary words a limited or artificial meaning.</p>
<p>(Antonin Scalia &amp; Bryan A. Garner, <em>Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts</em>)</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But Ruth Sullivan notes, &quot;statutory definitions do not necessarily lighten the interpreter's load. Many simply add to the ordinary or technical meaning of the defined term, which must still be determined in the usual way&quot; (p. 82).</p>


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<p>There are many other competing canons and principles of interpretation. The fact that an unexpected example is listed may be read to imply that the general category is actually broader than its common meaning would normally convey. <strong>One cannot answer interpretation questions in the abstract</strong>. In <a href="/questions/tagged/canada" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-canada-tooltip-container">canada</a>, the current approach to statutory interpretation is that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.</p>


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<p><em>Rizzo &amp; Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re)</em>, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27 at <a href="https://canlii.ca/t/1fqwt#par21" rel="noreferrer">para. 21</a></p>
</blockquote>
<p>This approach has not been as universally accepted in the U.S., but given the inherent tensions between various <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Statutory_interpretation#Canons" rel="noreferrer">canons of interpretation</a> (same word–same meaning; <em>expressio unius</em>; etc.), it is similarly not possible to answer interpretive questions in the abstract. In all but the clearest cases (and even these would only be clear in context), to make any meaningful argument, one would need at least the full statute for examination.</p>


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Answer 3: <blockquote>
<p>Does that make the capybara legally a &quot;fish&quot; for the purpose of that
particular law?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Yes.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>How would that affect courts trying to make determinations about what
other things not specifically enumerated are (legal) fish?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>They would do their best to find a general principle. You see something similar in the efforts of Jewish legal scholars trying to apply Biblical Kosher food requirements to situations not described in the Hebrew Bible with <a href="https://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/113425/jewish/What-Is-Kosher.htm" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Talmudic arguments</a>.</p>


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<p>In Catholic Canon law (from which this particular example is drawn), which presents the same fish on Friday conundrum, they have a somewhat easier task, because the Pope is someone who has the capacity to resolve such questions in an absolutely authoritative manner even without coming up for a consensus reason for the distinction. Historically, <a href="https://www.mentalfloss.com/posts/lent-beavers-muskrats-capybaras-fish" rel="nofollow noreferrer">what happened was</a> this:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>During Lent, many Catholics deny themselves earthly pleasures to honor
Jesus's sacrifice. Abstaining from meat has nothing to do with animal
rights; instead, it's supposed to be a break from an ingredient
traditionally viewed as indulgent and luxurious. That's why beef,
pork, and poultry are considered meat but fish isn't. Fish was thought
of as a &quot;simple&quot; source of protein in the Middle Ages, whereas meat


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pork, and poultry are considered meat but fish isn't. Fish was thought
of as a &quot;simple&quot; source of protein in the Middle Ages, whereas meat
from land animals was considered rich and therefore more &quot;sinful.&quot;</p>
<p>As is the case with the laws of most religions, Catholics have found
creative ways around this rule over the centuries. Between the 16th
and 18th centuries, a clergyman in Venezuela wrote to the Vatican
asking if it was alright to eat capybaras during times of fasting. The
South American rodents (the largest on Earth) are certainly not fish,
but because they spend a lot of time swimming, the church decided to
classify them as such. The Vatican has also made exceptions for other
semi-aquatic mammals like beavers and muskrats. Reptiles that live in
water, like turtles and alligators, qualify as fish during Lent as
well.</p>
</blockquote>


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semi-aquatic mammals like beavers and muskrats. Reptiles that live in
water, like turtles and alligators, qualify as fish during Lent as
well.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In general, it is always possible to devise a rule that includes all outlier terms in a list, although in some cases that rule will be more contrived than in others.</p>


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well.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In general, it is always possible to devise a rule that includes all outlier terms in a list, although in some cases that rule will be more contrived than in others.</p>
<p>For an example from non-religious law, the term &quot;commodities&quot; in which trading in future is regulated by the independent government agency known as the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (based in Chicago), includes all agricultural crops except onions. This is due to the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Onion_Futures_Act" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Onion Futures Act of 1958</a> which was passed because there was a notorious incident in 1955 in which someone committed a massive market manipulation with the onion futures market that did massive harm to everyday people in the U.S. economy, even though, in principle, there is no good reason to regulate onion futures any differently from, for example, potato futures.</p>


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<p>Similarly, even if two bottles of wine have contents that are chemically indistinguishable from each other (a client of mine is actually in the business of making exact chemical replicas of high priced wines using mass spectrometry and similar precision chemical tests) <a href="https://michaelfatelaw.com/articles/californias-wine-labeling-laws/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">under U.S. law</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>To be designated as a “California” wine, 100% of the grapes used in
the wine must be grown in that state. To bear a viticultural area
designation such as “Napa,” “Sonoma,” or “El Dorado County,” 85% or
more of the grapes used must be grown in the designated area.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>So, it makes a factual distinction that doesn't really exist in a meaningful way from the perspective of a wine consumer.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Would an attorney be able to get any mileage out of the argument that
the capybara is not in fact a fish, as noted by leading fish experts?</p>


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<blockquote>
<p>Would an attorney be able to get any mileage out of the argument that
the capybara is not in fact a fish, as noted by leading fish experts?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>No.</p>
<p>The best the attorney could hope for would be that there is also a capybara fish which is not as well known as the capybara mammal. If that were the case, the attorney could argue that the reference was to the capybara fish and not to the capybara mammal. But, if that isn't the case, the attorney has no leg to stand on legally. And, if there is an argument like that to be made, the legislative history of a law or regulation, regulations interpreting a statute shortly after it was adopted, or long standing practice in interpreting a law since its inception that is never authoritatively included in an authoritative legal document, could clearly rule out that interpretation.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Can a law or part of a law be struck down not for being wrong but just
for being false?</p>
</blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p>Can a law or part of a law be struck down not for being wrong but just
for being false?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Not really.</p>
<p>In very rare instances, when the plain meaning of a law is absurd to the point of undermining the intent of the law expressed in other contexts the courts will interpret &quot;and&quot; to mean &quot;or&quot;, or &quot;shall&quot; to mean &quot;may&quot;, or &quot;do X&quot; to mean &quot;don't do X&quot; and will interpret it contrary to the plain reading on the grounds that it was a mere drafting error in the law. But this authority is virtually never used to invalidate a legal finding of fact.</p>
<p>Indeed, sometimes the law compels us to ignore certain facts.</p>


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<p>Indeed, sometimes the law compels us to ignore certain facts.</p>
<p>For example, even if a parole eligibility model that included race as a factor was more accurate in predicting recidivism while on parole than the best available model that doesn't consider that factor, a parole eligibility model that considers race as a factor would be invalid as a matter of law.</p>
<p>Similarly, even if it is factually true that someone was in possession of illegal drugs, juries in a criminal prosecution for possession of those illegal drugs cannot consider that undisputedly true factual evidence if it was obtained in violation of the 4th Amendment.</p>
<p>The case of &quot;fish&quot; for the purpose of a particular law is much easier than that, however, because definitions can't be false by definition. There is no absolutely and universally true definition of any word. Instead, legal terms usually have multiple similar but not identical meanings.</p>


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<p>The situation where a word has multiple meanings is called in linguistics and legal theory: <strong>polysemy</strong>.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Polysemy—the existence of multiple related meanings for the same word
or phrase—is a frequent phenomenon in legal and lay language. Although
polysemy sometimes arises by accident, it also can be strategic:
framers of legal rules can advance private and public interests by
assigning meanings to terms that are different from—though connected
to—the meanings that those terms carry outside the law. Understanding
the functions of polysemy can help us design more effective legal
rules and can shed light on ways in which legal actors translate
language into power.</p>
</blockquote>
<ul>


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the functions of polysemy can help us design more effective legal
rules and can shed light on ways in which legal actors translate
language into power.</p>
</blockquote>
<ul>
<li>Daniel J. Hemel, &quot;Polysemy and the Law&quot; 76 Vanderbilt Law Review (Forthcoming 2023) available at the <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4264800&amp;dgcid=ejournal_htmlemail_nyu%3Alaw%3Aeconomics%3Aresearch%3Apaper%3Aseries_abstractlink" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Social Science Research Network</a>.</li>
</ul>
<p>Even if you are trying to conform to some meaningful and consistent concept in defining a legal term in a particular way, you can't really choose the correct definition until you know what the definition is seeking to distinguish from things outside the definition, i.e. the purpose of the law.</p>
<p>Definitions that don't match the most common sense of word in plain language are common in both legal statute and regulation drafting, and in contractual drafting.</p>


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Answer 4: <blockquote>
<p>Does that make the capybara legally a &quot;fish&quot; for the purpose of that particular law?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Yes.</p>
<hr />
<p>I actually just dealt with this issue on the municipal level. A project of mine was before the Planning Board proposing an objectionable vice use. Pursuant to the zoning conditions, such a use could not be situated within 1,000 feet of a public park.</p>
<p>Because of the proposed vice use there was some public outcry on the matter. In an effort to kill the project, members of the public focused upon a publicly accessible walking trail immediately behind the site which the general public perceived as being a public park. After all, it was a public walkway with various amenities to facilitate the public's use of the space for biking and walking. Testimony was provided by the public that police periodically patrol for loitering. From the perception of the general public, it was a park.</p>


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<p>Unfortunately, the zoning ordinance lacked a definition for 'public park', so the matter was referred to the Zoning Board for an official interpretation and it was deemed to not be a public park for the following reasons:</p>
<ul>
<li>The walking trail itself isn't actually public property, it's a private utility's right-of-way with an easement to permit the walking trail.</li>
<li>The zoning ordinance does have a definition for right-of-ways which was likely initially crafted imagining public roads in mind, but regardless is applicable for this site.</li>
<li>For the proposed use, the Township's Council needed to issue a letter approving the use at the specific location in order for a license to be issued <em>prior</em> to the Planning Board hearing (which the Council did). Given the conditional use requirements were set prior to the issuance of the letter, presumably, the Council did not perceive the walking trail as being a public park by virtue of them issuing the letter.</li>


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</ul>
<p>Ultimately, the project was approved, against the wishes of some members of the public who insist that the trail is a public park. Regardless, their perception of it being a park is irrelevant for the purposes of what it is legally defined as.</p>


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Question Body: <p>This question is referring to law in the Canadian province of Nova Scotia.</p>
<p><strong>Intro</strong></p>
<p><a href="https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/zipper_merge" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Zipper merging</a> is very uncommon here. There are many that simply frown upon it as trying to &quot;get further ahead&quot; in the traffic line, whereas others believe it's the most effective and safe form of merging. Others claim still that it's simply illegal based on our <a href="https://nslegislature.ca/sites/default/files/legc/statutes/motor%20vehicle.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Motor Vehicle Act</a> and actively discouraged by our <a href="https://novascotia.ca/sns/rmv/safe/handbook.asp" rel="nofollow noreferrer">driver handbook</a>.</p>


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<p>Researching this so far, I found various discussions on Reddit (<a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/NovaScotia/comments/rhc0vb/zipper_merge/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">1</a>, <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/halifax/comments/yojkqx/zipper_merging_the_correct_way/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">2</a>, <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/NovaScotia/comments/vyxa9w/to_all_the_people_i_went_past_on_highway_102/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">3</a>, <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/halifax/comments/9mr9m0/psa_zipper_merge_outbound_102/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">4</a>, <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/NovaScotia/comments/puxnfj/merging_lesson_101/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">5</a>) as to the legality of zipper merges in Nova Scotia. I've linked the original discussions, but will try to summarize the points here.</p>


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<p>Some of the discussions talk about &quot;high speed&quot; zipper merges, i.e. where two lanes are reduced into one (either normally or abnormally), but there is no slow down of traffic. That's a separate case.</p>
<p>To simplify the question, I'm primarily interested in &quot;low speed&quot; zipper merges, where one lane is <em>temporarily</em> blocked, usually due to construction. This can happen on community roads, or our <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/100-series_highways_(Nova_Scotia)" rel="nofollow noreferrer">&quot;100-series&quot;</a> highways. This is the most usual case I encounter in day-to-day driving.</p>


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<p>The scenario being that I'm driving normally on the highway (near the posted speed-limit of 100 km/h) and by coincidence I notice a backup of traffic in the alternate lane I'm driving in (heading in the same direction, either right or left). That's because the lane I'm driving in eventually comes to a temporary end due to construction, and I'm required to merge into the backed up lane to continue.</p>
<p>What usually happens is the person in the non-blocked lane slows down immediately once they notice they backup, still far from the lane end, and tries to merge to the backed up lane as soon as possible (since that's the one that continues forward).</p>
<p>The less-common alternative is to continue in the non-blocked lane until the lane actually ends, then someone in the blocked lane would allow you to merge in (this is the zipper merge).</p>
<p><strong>Arguments for the Zipper merge being illegal:</strong></p>


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<p><strong>Arguments for the Zipper merge being illegal:</strong></p>
<p>The most common cited reasoning for zipper merging being illegal in the Reddit threads is a line of text in the <a href="https://novascotia.ca/sns/rmv/handbook/DH-Chapter3.pdf#page=20" rel="nofollow noreferrer">driver handbook</a> that reads:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Merge as soon as safely possible. A common mistake is to approach the merge point at too high a speed in the lane to be closed, then to push into the other lane at the last moment. This causes collisions.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The second oft-cited reasoning is that all construction zones have a &quot;Do Not Pass&quot; proceeding the point of the lane ending, which can even be several kilometers away from the lane end. This is also mentioned on the same page in the driver handbook:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Obey the “Do Not Pass” sign. It prepares traffic for an orderly merge.</p>
</blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p>Obey the “Do Not Pass” sign. It prepares traffic for an orderly merge.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The <a href="https://nslegislature.ca/legc/bills/60th_2nd/1st_read/b170.htm" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Motor Vehicle Act (amended)</a>, section 111A, says that the left-hand lane shall yield to the right-hand lane.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>111A (1) Where two lanes of a street or highway merge into one lane,
the driver of a vehicle in the left lane shall yield the right of way
to a vehicle in the right lane unless the driver of the vehicle in the
right lane is directed by a sign to yield to the vehicle in the left
lane.</p>
</blockquote>


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to a vehicle in the right lane unless the driver of the vehicle in the
right lane is directed by a sign to yield to the vehicle in the left
lane.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This could be interpreted differently depending on which lane is closing, right or left. If the left lane is closing, drivers on the right would not be allowed to yield to traffic entering on the left (effectively making a zipper merge illegal). However, if the right lane was closing, drivers in the left lane would be required to allow traffic to merge from the right, thereby making a zipper merge legal. The illegality of the former case (left lane closing) does necessitate that it's never permitted for a driver in the right to yield to a driver in the left lane. I don't know if that's actually supported elsewhere in the text of the MVA.</p>


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<p>One Redditor even says they were <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/NovaScotia/comments/puxnfj/comment/he80ua5/?utm_source=share&amp;utm_medium=web2x&amp;context=3" rel="nofollow noreferrer">specifically ticketed</a> for attempting a zipper merge, presumably due to the no passing sign.</p>
<p><strong>Arguments for the Zipper merge being legal:</strong></p>
<p>The language around &quot;Merge as soon as safely possible&quot; is unclear. It doesn't mean merge as soon as you notice you <em>need</em> to merge. If you're travelling in the unblocked lane, and there's a sufficient gap in the blocked lane for you to safely &quot;merge early&quot;, then by all means do so. But if the traffic in the blocked lane is sufficiently stopped such that you cannot &quot;merge early&quot; there is no harm continuing until the end of the lane. To the contrary, stopping early to try to merge into the blocked lane could be more dangerous, as it gives drivers behind you less reaction time.</p>


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<p>The language around the &quot;Do Not Pass&quot; sign isn't clear either. The drivers handbook has a <a href="https://novascotia.ca/sns/rmv/handbook/DH-Chapter2.pdf#21" rel="nofollow noreferrer">section on passing</a>. In short, it's described as moving to an alternate lane, specifically for the purpose of moving pass another vehicle (&quot;overtaking&quot;), and returning to that lane. But that's not what is happening in the scenario I described. Maintaining your current, unblocked lane is only &quot;passing&quot; the vehicles in the blocked lane in the absolute strictest sense of the word, not the commonly accepted definition of passing. The &quot;Do Not Pass&quot; sign is intended to prevent you from passing normally, assuming neither lane is blocked. The driver handbook is also not necessarily consistent with the actual law.</p>


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<p>As mentioned above, the language in the MVA <em>could</em> be interpreted such that left-lane closing zipper merges are illegal, while right-lane closing zipper merges are legal.</p>
<p>The Halifax Regional Police (biggest city in Nova Scotia) had a <a href="https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=pfbid026L7GfyYFB9AC2eiJMz8ReLJV3QdJ2PALx3Nn4aditPmR52DY79ML8TQQwQYVgfv9l&amp;id=90564450046" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Facebook Post</a> in 2016 explaining zipper merges and encouraging their use. Although the timeline isn't completely clear, this is likely before the mentioned ticket (it's also unclear if they were ticketed by HRP or RCMP). Of course, strictly speaking, a post like this even from police doesn't mean zipper merging is legal, if it's contradicted by the Motor Vehicle Act.</p>


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<p>The neighbouring province of New Brunswick has recently been trying <a href="https://fb.watch/j-1Wwc-Huk/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">to educate people</a> on the use of zipper merges (of course, their law and NS laws are different, but the same logic applies).</p>
<p><strong>Conclusion so far</strong></p>
<p>Ergo the common conclusion is that while zipper merges are useful, they cannot legally be used in N.S., and most people here avoid them due to the aforementioned language in the driver handbook and/or MVA.</p>
<p>After several hours of researching, it does not <em>seem</em> to me like zipper merges are explicitly illegal, but I'm by no means certain, and I don't know why someone would be ticketed for it. Hence the question. If anyone has any advice or is able to find specific and clear language in the Motor Vehicle Act that explains it either way, I'd be very interested. Thanks.</p>


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Answer 1: <h2>No</h2>
<p>The law (s111A) is clear that the right lane has right-of-way (except when it doesn't). This does not make it illegal for a car to merge from the left - it just makes it illegal to do so where that cannot be done safely. In a situation where traffic is zipper merging at low speed, this is not a problem.</p>


Tags: canada, traffic


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Question Title: In any US states are there laws, other than abortion laws, which require professionals to lie?


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Question Body: <p>Several US states have laws which require doctors to lie to patients who are trying to obtain an abortion.  <a href="https://www.aclu.org/news/reproductive-freedom/a-tennessee-law-requires-doctors-to-lie-to-their-patients-were-suing" rel="nofollow noreferrer">This 2020 ACLU article</a> summarizes several examples.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>In four states, doctors have to tell their patients that abortion increases the risk of breast cancer, even though that is factually wrong. Eight states insist that physicians include “negative emotional response” among the lists of risks associated with the procedure, even though mainstream medical associations have uniformly determined that this is false. Four states require doctors to lie to their patients about the risk having an abortion could have on their future fertility.</p>
</blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p>These are clearly established as lies by actual medical research, e.g. obtaining an abortion objectively does not increase one's risk of breast cancer.</p>
<p>As Martin points out in the comments, if doctors are permitted to explain that the information is false they can avoid actually lying.  &quot;I am required by law to tell you that if you get an abortion you are more likely to die by suicide or breast cancer, but that is not actually true.&quot;</p>
<p>I am unfortunately unfamiliar with the best way to find the actual text of each state's laws, so I am unable to determine if any of the abortion laws in question forbid doctors from revealing that false information is false.  Consequently, I will broaden the scope to either being required to lie or being required to provide false information with the option of revealing it as such.</p>


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<p>Are there other examples of laws in US states that require one person to lie to or mislead another?  If some narrowing of scope is needed, I am mostly wondering about examples which are similar in the sense of a professional being required to lie to someone obtaining some service or good from them.</p>


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Answer 1: <p>A law requiring you to explicitly lie to someone would be a form of compelled speech, which is a violation of the 1st Amendment's free speech clause.  However, a &quot;lie&quot; in the legal sense would be a statement of fact that is objectively and demonstrably false.  There are lots of disclosure laws that require lots of people in different professions to do and say all kinds of things to and for their clients that might even be widely regarded as stupid, but that does not make them lies.</p>


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<p>Taking the ACLU's claims at face value (I'm sure these laws exist but I'm not going to take the time to look them up), requiring doctors to disclose potential negative side effects of a drug or surgical procedure to a patient is clearly within the legislature's authority to do if they've determined that there is sufficient evidence to warrant it.  It's ultimately up to the courts to decide, but courts generally give wide latitude to legislatures and administrative agencies in this regard unless the statute is egregiously unreasonable.</p>
<p>Either way, the doctor does not have to assert the disclosures as statements of fact, and they are free to tell their patients that they do not believe them to be true, so there is no compelled speech involved.</p>
<hr />


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<hr />
<p>I'm not trying to express support or opposition to abortion here, so please don't start a dumpster fire in the comments.  But the ACLU article you linked is a straight-up opinion piece.  The ACLU believes that the statements are lies.  There are a lot of weasel words just in the paragraph you quoted.  Out of curiosity, I did a search on their claims.</p>
<p>The top search result for &quot;abortion and breast cancer&quot; is <a href="https://www.cancer.org/healthy/cancer-causes/medical-treatments/abortion-and-breast-cancer-risk.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">this article from the American Cancer Society</a>, which contains this statement:</p>
<blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p>The results of studies looking at the possible link between breast cancer and induced abortion often differ depending on how the study was done. Cohort studies and studies that used records to determine the history of abortions have not found an increased risk. Some case-control studies, however, have found an increase in risk.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In other words, we don't really know for sure.  So it's not as &quot;factually wrong&quot; as the ACLU says.</p>
<p>A search for &quot;abortion effects on future fertility&quot; yields <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/2225607/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">this study from the U.S. National Institute of Health</a></p>
<blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p>... Women whose pregnancy is terminated by dilatation and evacuation may have an increased risk of subsequent premature delivery and a low birthweight baby. Very little has been published and no conclusions can be made regarding the effects of instillation procedures and repeat abortions on future reproduction.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>So there's definitely a risk from a <em>particular kind</em> of abortion (a D&amp;E, which are performed usually for mid-late term pregnancies), but no significant risk from an instillation abortion (a vacuum catheter in early pregancy).  This study is from 1990, so medication-induced abortions were not available then.  It was just the first search result that wasn't a news article.</p>


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<p>And then there's the &quot;negative emotional response&quot; risk.  I'm not even going to tackle that one it's so weaselly.  What does that even mean exactly?  &quot;...Mainstream medical associations have uniformly determined that this is false.&quot;  Which medical associations?  And what constitutes &quot;mainstream?&quot;  I highly doubt there is uniformity of opinion.</p>
<hr />
<p>Bottom line is, no, a law cannot require you to lie.  And the laws in this example are not lies per se.</p>


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Question Body: <p>In the UK, civil partnerships and marriages are both options open to same-sex and opposite-sex couples alike.</p>
<p>Where there seems to be a disparity between the two however is that same-sex couples have the option to <a href="https://www.gov.uk/convert-civil-partnership" rel="nofollow noreferrer">'convert' their civil partnership into a marriage</a> whilst it is explicitly stated that opposite-sex couples cannot do this.</p>
<p>I suppose I can see the logic- for those in same-sex couples who formed their legal relationship before they were able to get married, they might have wished to make this correction when same-sex marriage was formalised and there's no point in taking it off the books now it is there.</p>
<p>But why opposite-sex couples are not permitted to do this too is an unusual oversight.</p>
<p>So, the question; an opposite-sex couple in a civil partnership decide they now want to be married. What can they do?</p>


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<p>So, the question; an opposite-sex couple in a civil partnership decide they now want to be married. What can they do?</p>
<p>A conversion is explicitly not allowed.</p>
<p>Can they get married whilst still in the civil partnership?</p>
<p>Do they first need to dissolve their relationship and then get married again?</p>
<p>What?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>The legislation simply provides a novel conversion process for same-sex couples to convert their civil partnership to a marriage, with a date retroactive to the commencement of their civil partnership. See <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2014/3181" rel="nofollow noreferrer">the regulations</a> and the <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/30/section/9/enacted" rel="nofollow noreferrer">provision of the legislation</a> allowing for this process to be created.</p>
<p>There are no restrictions on access to marriage based on the sex of the couple. Any couple can still get married outside of the conversion process, even while in a civil partnership.</p>


Tags: united-kingdom, marriage


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Question Title: Why was the Dominion v. Fox case tried in Delaware?

Question Body: <p>As reported, <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/US/dominion-case-fox-news-trial-judge-rules/story?id=98276968" rel="noreferrer">Fox News is sued in the Delaware courts by Dominion.</a></p>
<p>What determines which state(s) the Dominion v. Fox case is tried?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>The defendant Fox corporation (there are a variety of affiliated or formerly affiliated companies with very similar names) is organized under the laws of Delaware so lawsuits related to its activities anywhere in the world may be brought in that forum. This choice of venue denied Fox any means of contesting jurisdiction or venue.</p>
<p>Also, the Delaware courts have a great level of expertise in handling litigation involving publicly held corporations. While this may not have been very important for a jury trial on the merits itself, this expertise was quite relevant in the pre-trial discovery phase of the trial which alleged widespread misconduct by the inner circle of a publicly held company's employees and officers.</p>


Tags: jurisdiction, delaware


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Question Title: if a non profit uses the .com domain or a for profit uses the .org domain , would that be false advertising and suable?

Question Body: <p>Do organizations have to use domains according to their financial status and would they be liable for civil or criminal liability if they didn't use domains appropriate to their status (non profit/.org or for profit/.com). Also would using a website that has ad revenue or cookies on it automatically make one a customer or trader legally (the item traded being personal data)?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>There is no law pertaining to top level domains, defining &quot;appropriateness&quot;. Instead, some organization is an administrator, and there is an understanding as to what the purpose of the domain is, but this is not legally enforceable. The TLDs com, org, net are open to anyone, whereas edu is limited in the US to accredited post-secondary institutions, however some non-educational commercial enterprises were grandfathered in. Insofar as registering a com-domain website does not entail &quot;an intent to make profit&quot; and registering an org-domain website does not entail &quot;an intent to not make a profit&quot;, there is no deception w.r.t. internet users. One would of course have to be truthful in registering the domain.</p>
<p><a href="https://thenew.org/" rel="noreferrer">Public Interest Registry</a>, the administrator for org, does not even purport that businesses registered under org should be &quot;nonprofit&quot;.</p>


Tags: canada


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Question Title: Legality of IRS requiring taxpayers to swear to statements

Question Body: <p>The IRS requires taxpayers to swear under &quot;penalties of perjury&quot; to their statements and figures given concerning their income. Since obviously this constitutes a potential incrimination, it would appear to violate the 7th Article of the Bill of Rights which provides that noone &quot;shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself&quot;. Since perjury is a criminal offense and tax fraud is also a criminal offense, it would seem the IRS is requiring taxpayers to act as witnesses against themselves. Has this been tested in court?</p>


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Answer 1: <blockquote>
<p>The IRS requires taxpayers to swear under &quot;penalties of perjury&quot; to
their statements and figures given concerning their income. Since
obviously this constitutes a potential incrimination</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The privilege against self-incrimination applies to giving testimony that reveals that you have committed a crime, not to doing something prospectively in a way that does not violate criminal laws.</p>
<p>The solution is that you may truthfully report the amount of income that you have on your tax return.</p>
<p>Ordinarily, the information that you had a certain amount of income, without a specific description of its source, would not in and of itself be incriminating. So, it is not &quot;obvious that this constitutes potential incrimination[.]&quot;, at least in the general case.</p>


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<p>There might be some circumstance in which merely filling out the information on a tax return required by law and signing it under penalty of perjury would be incriminating, although this is far more narrow that your question suggests. In those circumstances, the solution would be to file an unsigned tax return accompanied by a disclaimer stating that you are not signing it under penalty of perjury as it would be potentially incriminating for you to do so would on a signed and attached explanation that explicitly claims the 5th Amendment privilege.</p>
<p>There is actually an IRS form for doing that or similar things on: <a href="https://www.meadowscollier.com/form-8275-disclosure-statement-a-tax-practitioners-best-friend-forever" rel="nofollow noreferrer">IRS Form 8275</a>.</p>


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<p>This would result in serious civil tax penalties, but would probably protect you from a criminal tax law violation (at least for the failure to file offense, not necessarily from the failure to pay offense).</p>


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Answer 2: <p>The underlying principle is that the Fifth Amendment does <em>not</em> protect you from being required to testify as a witness in general, even if some or all of the questions could be about incriminating matters.  Unless you are actually the defendant in the trial, you must appear to testify and be sworn, and then you may claim the privilege in refusing to answer each individual question that would incriminate you.  But you may be asked other questions that do not incriminate you, and you are still required to answer those.</p>


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<p>This is how it works in court, and the same principle applies on tax returns. You are not on trial, and have not been charged with anything, so the Fifth Amendment does not give you the right to refuse to file a tax return at all, nor to file a tax return containing false statements.   Rather, if the answer to one or more questions (line items) on the form would incriminate you, then you must state objections to those specific items, and truthfully fill in all the rest.  Then signing the declaration that the information on your form is true, will not in itself incriminate you, nor would it perjure you (since it is a true statement), so you have no privilege against signing it.</p>
<p><a href="https://casetext.com/case/united-states-v-schiff" rel="nofollow noreferrer">United States v. Schiff, 612 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1979)</a></p>
<blockquote>


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<p>On appeal, the appellant emphasizes that a person filling out a tax form is a &quot;witness&quot; for purposes of the Fifth Amendment. Clearly, this is the rule. See Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 656, 96 S.Ct. 1178, 47 L.Ed.2d 370 (1976); United States v. Sullivan, supra. But the Fifth Amendment privilege does not immunize all witnesses from testifying. Only those who assert as to each particular question that the answer to that question would tend to incriminate them are protected. As the Court observed in Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 382 U.S. 70, 79, 86 S.Ct. 194, 15 L.Ed.2d 165 (1965), the questions in the income tax return are neutral on their face and directed to the public at large rather than to a &quot;selective group&quot; inherently suspect of criminal activities, cf. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 88 S.Ct. 697, 19 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) and Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 88 S.Ct. 709, 19 L.Ed.2d 906 (1968) (occupational and


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criminal activities, cf. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 88 S.Ct. 697, 19 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) and Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 88 S.Ct. 709, 19 L.Ed.2d 906 (1968) (occupational and excise tax on gambling). Hence privilege may not be claimed against all disclosure on an income tax return.</p>


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Question Body: <p>I notice that the IRS requires taxpayers to sign their tax forms under a notice that states &quot;I declare under penalty of perjury that ....[the information provided on the form is true]&quot;. Obviously there are potential criminal penalties for false statements on a tax form.</p>
<p>So, essentially the IRS is requiring taxpayers to act as a witness against themself by compelling testimony and oaths in potentially criminal matters regarding their finances. This would seem on its face to be a blatant violation of the 5th Amendment to the Constitution which states: &quot;No person...shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself&quot;.</p>
<p>Obviously the oath requirement is indefensible from a logical point of view, so I am curious (1) what specious pretext is currently being used to legally justify the compulsion of this oath, and (2) what court cases, if any, have tested the constitutionality of taxpayer oaths?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>The 5th Amendment is not a license to commit fraud. The right not to testify about your past crimes does not mean that you are allowed to be untruthful in the present.</p>


Tags: united-states, constitutional-law, tax-law


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Question Title: What are some new examples of judge made law?

Question Body: <p>What are some recent examples of judge made law? (On both the criminal and civil side.)</p>
<p>I am not looking for interpretations in long standing common law. I am looking for development of a new principle, prohibition, theory of liability, ect. invented by a judge on the basis of reason, equity, analogy ect (perhaps to meet a new circumstance or development). Am am also not looking for new interpretaions of statutes, but purely for judge made law.</p>


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Answer 1: <p>I am using 1960s and later as a cutoff for &quot;new&quot; in the absence of other clear guidance in the question (keep in mind that the common law goes back to before the 1600s in many cases). I'm also treating a judge made law innovation as &quot;new&quot; even if it was present in a handful of outlier cases in a handful of jurisdictions but was not widely used and widely adopted until much later.</p>
<p>A few that come to mind are:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>The direct strict liability for defective products in torts originated in California in the 1960s.</p>
</li>
<li><p>The market share method of allocating damages for product liability in class action lawsuits when the exact manufacturer could not easily be determined because multiple manufacturers made the same defective product is a fairly recent innovation.</p>
</li>


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</li>
<li><p>The widespread adoption of the common law implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in cases not governed by the Uniform Commercial Code is more recent than that.</p>
</li>
<li><p>The common law practice of treating installment land contracts upon which many payments have been made as mortgages under a lien theory is relatively recent.</p>
</li>
<li><p>The generalized and widespread adoption of unjust enrichment as a cause of action is a late 20th century judicial innovation.</p>
</li>
<li><p>The concept of a trust protector for express trusts is relatively recent (maybe seeing widespread adoption in the 1980s).</p>
</li>
<li><p>The outrageous conduct/intentional infliction of emotional distress tort is relatively recent (probably seeing wide use around the 1970s or 1980s).</p>
</li>
<li><p>The negligent misrepresentation tort is relatively recent.</p>
</li>


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</li>
<li><p>The negligent misrepresentation tort is relatively recent.</p>
</li>
<li><p>the injurious falsehood tort (imposing fraud liability when fraud directed at a third-party harms the person seeking relief)</p>
</li>
<li><p>The intentional interference with contractual rights/business opportunity tort is relatively recent, at least in wide application.</p>
</li>
<li><p>Palimony causes of action.</p>
</li>
<li><p>Enforcement of domestic partnership agreements (previously disallowed as a matter of public policy).</p>
</li>
<li><p>The use of the contempt of court power to enforce unpaid child support and alimony judgments.</p>
</li>
<li><p>The erosion (but not complete abolition) of common law authority for someone to make decision for spouses and children as a &quot;natural guardian&quot; in the absence of a court order or written instrument.</p>
</li>
<li><p>The demise of college and university <em>in loco parentis</em> authority over college students.</p>
</li>


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</li>
<li><p>The demise of college and university <em>in loco parentis</em> authority over college students.</p>
</li>
<li><p>The demise of the common law defense to assault for a husband's &quot;reasonable&quot; discipline of his wife.</p>
</li>
<li><p>The demise of marital tort immunities in many states (in other states this was statutory).</p>
</li>
<li><p>The demise of the heart balm torts in states where they were not abolished by statute.</p>
</li>
<li><p>The common law choice of law rules were revolutionized between roughly the 1960s and 1980s with the &quot;most significant relationship&quot; test largely replacing rigid black and white rules.</p>
</li>


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</li>
<li><p>The tender year's doctrine was a common law innovation that came and went (in the face of constitutional gender equality norms that overruled it). It has been somewhat superseded by a weak primary caretaker presumption and by the concept that the best interests of the child are served by reproducing the pre-divorce/separation status quo to the extent possible.</p>
</li>
<li><p>Validating shrink wrap licensing and the theories of contract formation that go with website terms of service are fairly recent common law innovations.</p>
</li>
<li><p>Various common law legal theories of relief for revenge porn are quite recent. This is a currently developing area of the common law.</p>
</li>
</ul>
<p>Some innovations that started with common law decisions were later widely codified:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Putative marriage was a common law innovation before it was codified.</p>
</li>
<li><p>Time shares were a common law innovation before they were regulated on a statutory basis.</p>


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<ul>
<li><p>Putative marriage was a common law innovation before it was codified.</p>
</li>
<li><p>Time shares were a common law innovation before they were regulated on a statutory basis.</p>
</li>
<li><p>The concept of quasi-community property was a fairly recent innovation that was a common law concept before it was statutory.</p>
</li>
<li><p>The concept of derivatives is largely a common law innovation.</p>
</li>
<li><p>The common law reporter's privilege, in places where it does not arise from a shield law, dates mostly from the 1970s.</p>
</li>
<li><p>Implied warranties of habitability for residential real estate were originally a common law innovation although they have been codified in many jurisdictions now.</p>
</li>
<li><p>Limitations on the duration, allowability, and scope of non-competition agreements (some of which remains common law and some of which is now statutory).</p>
</li>
</ul>


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</li>
<li><p>Limitations on the duration, allowability, and scope of non-competition agreements (some of which remains common law and some of which is now statutory).</p>
</li>
</ul>
<p>It is somewhat hard to stick to the question's limitation on &quot;not looking for new interpretations of statutes, but purely for judge made law&quot; because lots of constitutional law and civil procedure, for example, have a very thin statute-like touchstone but have predominantly been a matter of judicial innovation. These include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>The demise of notice pleading in the federal courts after decades without significant case law change and no new statutory language.</p>
</li>
<li><p>The dramatic narrowing of &quot;general jurisdiction&quot; after decades without significant case law change and no new statutory language.</p>
</li>
<li><p>The creation of the &quot;qualified immunity&quot; doctrine in civil rights cases.</p>
</li>


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</li>
<li><p>The creation of the &quot;qualified immunity&quot; doctrine in civil rights cases.</p>
</li>
<li><p>The creation and then limitations of the <em>Bivens</em> remedy for civil rights violations by federal officials no spurred by new statutory language.</p>
</li>
<li><p>The &quot;fraud on the market&quot; theory of securities fraud liability.</p>
</li>
<li><p>The concept of insider trading.</p>
</li>
<li><p>The definition of &quot;security&quot; in the case of investment contracts.</p>
</li>
<li><p>The narrowing of defamation law in multiple respects.</p>
</li>
<li><p>The Miranda rule.</p>
</li>
<li><p>Case law regarding reasonable expectations of privacy under the 4th Amendment in light of new technologies (infrared, drones, DNA testing, etc.)</p>
</li>
<li><p>The &quot;major questions doctrine&quot; for judicial review of administrative action on constitutional grounds.</p>
</li>


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</li>
<li><p>The &quot;major questions doctrine&quot; for judicial review of administrative action on constitutional grounds.</p>
</li>
<li><p>The development of sexual harassment claims from statutes prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex.</p>
</li>
<li><p>The application of existing statutes and constitutional provisions to LGBT rights with no new statutory language.</p>
</li>
<li><p>The determination that juvenile life without parole violates the 8th Amendment.</p>
</li>
<li><p>The determination that the Second Amendment creates an individual right and that this right is applicable against state and local governments and not just the federal government.</p>
</li>
<li><p>The determination that the 6th Amendment allows for non-unanimous criminal case juries followed by a determination decades later that it does not allow for non-unanimous criminal case juries based upon the experience of Louisiana and Oregon that used those options.</p>
</li>


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</li>
<li><p>The jurisdictional issues of when a state can impose sales taxes on mail order purchases (which involved a double flip of authority at the U.S. Supreme Court level).</p>
</li>
</ul>


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Answer 2: <p>See <em>Air &amp; Liquid Systems Corp. v. DeVries</em> <a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/586/17-1104/#tab-opinion-4067382" rel="nofollow noreferrer">586 U.S. ___ (2019)</a>. This was a maritime law tort case, where the Court explicitly acknowledged that &quot;[i]n maritime tort cases, we act as a common-law court.&quot;</p>
<p>The Court recognized a new duty to warn for a manufacturer where:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(i) its product requires incorporation of a part, (ii) the manufacturer knows or has reason to know that the integrated product is likely to be dangerous for its intended uses, and (iii) the manufacturer has no reason to believe that the product’s users will realize that danger.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In this case, the manufacturer's product required integration with an asbestos product.</p>


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Answer 3: <h2>The tort of Invasion of Privacy</h2>
<p><a href="/questions/tagged/australia" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-australia-tooltip-container">australia</a></p>
<p>Only … not quite yet. This is an area of law which is currently developing with two District Court judgements in Victoria and Queensland stating that the tort exists but, since both settled before appeal, we have no appellate court decisions. The High Court has said in obiter that it is not closed to the idea that such a tort might exist but it hasn’t yet been of material interest in any case they have addressed.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.sydney.edu.au/content/dam/corporate/documents/sydney-law-school/research/publications/slrv43n2jun2021lerchfinal.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Aiden Lerch, ‘The Judicial Law-Making Function and a Tort of Invasion of Personal


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Answer 4: <p>In patent law there are two kinds of doctrines called “double patenting”. One is a statutory prohibition (that originates in the word “a” in the constitution) on two patents covering the same invention, the other is actually called “judicially created double patenting”. It limits patents in the case where one is obvious from the other. In that situation you can get two patents as long as it isn’t possible that the term is extended beyond what it would be for a single patent or result in an alleged infringer potentially needing to fight two different owners.</p>
<p>It was created by Judge Rich in In re Zickendraht, 319 F.2d 225 (C.C.P.A. 1963) and solidified by other cases shortly thereafter.</p>
<p>More recently there have been a string of SCOTUS cases that have drastically expanded the meaning of “abstract” in in patent law, although Justice Thomas wrote that there was no reason to belabor over defining it.</p>


Tags: united-states, common-law, legal-history


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Question Body: <p>I have an assigned parking space, which is labeled &quot;Compact.&quot; There is another parking space immediately to the right of mine, which is also labeled &quot;Compact.&quot; I have a compact car, but the person in the next space over uses it to park a large SUV. Due to the geometry of the parking garage, this makes it VERY hard for me to get my car out.</p>
<p>But there's a problem (or lack of a problem, depending on how you look at it). Although the person next to me frequently parks a very large vehicle in a very small space, I would have to concede that they have always kept their vehicle inside the lines. So it seems to me that the only way I could argue that they are doing something wrong is by saying that they shouldn't be parking a large vehicle in a compact spot.</p>
<p>Is labeling a spot &quot;Compact&quot; a suggestion? A mandate? Something else? Does it have any enforceability?</p>


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<p>Is labeling a spot &quot;Compact&quot; a suggestion? A mandate? Something else? Does it have any enforceability?</p>
<p>Edit: The garage is owned by my employer, which is a non-profit organization.</p>


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Answer 1: <p>TLDR: &quot;Compact&quot; is a legal fiction to get the right to build a building.  It's pretty much useless.</p>
<p>The &quot;compact car parking space&quot; is about <em>entitlements</em> aka the right to build, which is decided <strong>at the local</strong> level.  Cities <em>often</em> require a minimum number of parking spaces for a development. This then requires defining a minimum space size and aisle size. And builders pressure cities to allow a percentage of &quot;compact&quot; spots with smaller space and sometimes aisle size.  An example of code in Pinole, California (exurban San Francisco, and the kind of place you need a car to get by).</p>
<blockquote>
<p>A.   Up to twenty-five percent (25%) of the required number of parking spaces may be sized for compact cars.<br />
B.   Compact car parking spaces shall be at least eight (8) feet in width and sixteen (16) feet in length, and shall be clearly marked, “COMPACT CARS ONLY,” “COMPACT,” or “C.”<br />


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B.   Compact car parking spaces shall be at least eight (8) feet in width and sixteen (16) feet in length, and shall be clearly marked, “COMPACT CARS ONLY,” “COMPACT,” or “C.”<br />
C.   Compact car spaces shall be distributed throughout the parking lot.<br />
D.   Where a section of the parking lot is restricted to compact parking with an angle of 90 degrees, the aisle width may be reduced from the standard twenty-three (23) feet to twenty- one (21) feet. Such compact sections should be located so as to minimize the distance from the section to the appropriate building or activity.</p>
</blockquote>
<p><em>Note absence of state-level standard, even in California.</em>  The takeaway here is this a <em>local</em> matter and will be subject to <em>local</em> enforcement if any.</p>


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</blockquote>
<p><em>Note absence of state-level standard, even in California.</em>  The takeaway here is this a <em>local</em> matter and will be subject to <em>local</em> enforcement if any.</p>
<p><strong>Police do not (by default) have standing to enforce on private property</strong>.  Some departments are willing to sign contracts with (larger) parking lot owners to enforce on their property - this will be the case at a large mall, typically. Such consent is a double-edged sword, and smaller entities will think twice about doing it.</p>
<p>Even when they do, &quot;Is a car a compact car?&quot; is too vague and slippery a question, because again <em>it is defined on a local level</em>.  This is <a href="https://www.seattlepi.com/local/transportation/article/Getting-There-An-SUV-is-a-compact-if-it-fits-1185241.php" rel="nofollow noreferrer">a vexation</a> to people who find Tacomas and Dodge Chargers parked in the compact spots.</p>


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<p>Your best bet is to appeal to the private property owner. <strong>The host makes the rules, and they can make ANY rule they want</strong>.  And yeah, they can enforce it with towing, as long as the parker has a reasonable opportunity to know those rules, and the rule is sane enough that a judge doesn't call it a predatory tow.  Penalty tows HURT - they are many times the cost of regular old rescue tows.  They can say &quot;your vehicle may only park in the Designated Loser Spot for the next month as punishment&quot;, or &quot;pay a $60 fine <em>or don't bring the vehicle back here</em>&quot; or just &quot;banned for a month&quot;, with towing-on-sight being the penalty for noncompliance.  So it really depends on the righteousness of the property owner.</p>
<p>Remember though - the property owner only created those spots to get a license to build. So now that they have their entitlement, they're not emotionally invested in the principle.</p>


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Question Title: Insurance claim chain of causality vehicle damages garage causes theft

Question Body: <p>In England.</p>
<p>A vehicle damaged the sole ingress and egress for cars at a block of flats in careless but normal use. The damage was such that the ingress/egress (a garage door) could no longer be closed.</p>
<p>Given that it was required for access, only proper replacement of the door was appropriate in order for the site to be re-secured. The site owners acted to replace the door as quickly as possible while claiming against the insurance of the driver.</p>
<p>The same location holds a bicycle rack for residents. Very shortly after the damage to the doors, two bicycles from inside the parking area were stolen despite being locked to the bicycle rack. Does the owner of the bicycles have any recourse against the driver of the vehicle?</p>


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Answer 1: <p><a href="https://hallellis.co.uk/causation-loss-damages/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">This solicitors' site</a> gives some good information and examples relating to legal causality - and in particular the difference between causality and the opportunity to suffer loss.</p>
<p>The bicycle owner may have a claim against the owner of the garage if it could be shown there was a reasonable expectation of security. Factors affecting this would include whether the bicycle owner had been made aware the garage was no longer secure (and the manner in which they were advised : hand delivered letters to residents or their flats would work in the garage owner's favour. A big sign saying &quot;This door is not secure&quot; would not), whether the garage owner had offered alternative storage or advice (such as &quot;keep it in your flat&quot;), and whether the action taken by the garage owner was really the only - or most reasonable - course.</p>


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<p>In turn, the garage owner may be able to take further action against the driver to recover the damages of that legal action. Factors in this case would include whether the driver could be held accountable for the bicycle owner or garage owner's responses to the incident, and include those points in the paragraph above. This is likely to be where a break in causation occurs.</p>
<p>The question uses the word &quot;careless&quot; - it's worth mentioning that &quot;There was an accident&quot; is not sufficient to establish carelessness, but if there was a specific legally established carelessness this could be relevant in the garage owner's case against the driver.</p>
<p>The bicycle owner is unlikely to be be successful in an attempt to to take direct legal action against the driver or the driver's insurer - unless it can be shown that they were the thief.</p>


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Question Title: FMLA and Paid Leave

Question Body: <p>There is a law called FMLA or the Family Medical Leave Act. A friend of mine makes the
following two claims about it:</p>
<ol>
<li>A person who has an unexpected medical problem (such as a stroke) can use this
act to take paid time off.</li>
<li>A person who has a son who has unexpected medical problem (such as a stroke) can
use this act to take paid time off.</li>
</ol>
<p>I believe that both are wrong. However, I am thinking both claims would be correct if you changed the word paid to unpaid. Also, in the first case the person might be eligible for disability insurance. Am I right?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>There is an FAQ at the FMLA web site here:</p>
<p><a href="https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/fmla/faq" rel="nofollow noreferrer">FLMA FAQ</a></p>
<p>In that page there is this paragraph:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Qualifying conditions (Q) When can an eligible employee use FMLA
leave?</p>
<p>A covered employer must grant an eligible employee up to a total of 12
workweeks of <strong>unpaid, job-protected leave</strong> in a 12 month period for one
or more of the following reasons:</p>
<p>for the birth of a son or daughter, and to bond with the newborn
child; for the placement with the employee of a child for adoption or
foster care, and to bond with that child; to care for an immediate
family member (spouse, child, or parent – but not a parent “in-law”)
with a serious health condition; to take medical leave when the
employee is unable to work because of a serious health condition; or
for qualifying exigencies arising out of the fact that the employee’s


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employee is unable to work because of a serious health condition; or
for qualifying exigencies arising out of the fact that the employee’s
spouse, son, daughter, or parent is on covered active duty or call to
covered active duty status as a member of the National Guard,
Reserves, or Regular Armed Forces. The FMLA also allows eligible
employees to take up to 26 workweeks of unpaid, job-protected leave in
a “single 12-month period” to care for a covered servicemember with a
serious injury or illness.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The next question is what is a &quot;serious&quot; medical condition.  That's also covered in the FAQ:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Serious health condition (Q) What is a serious health condition?</p>
<p>The most common serious health conditions that qualify for FMLA leave
are:</p>
<p>conditions requiring an overnight stay in a hospital or other medical
care facility; conditions that incapacitate you or your family member


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are:</p>
<p>conditions requiring an overnight stay in a hospital or other medical
care facility; conditions that incapacitate you or your family member
(for example, unable to work or attend school) for more than three
consecutive days and have ongoing medical treatment (either multiple
appointments with a health care provider, or a single appointment and
follow-up care such as prescription medication); chronic conditions
that cause occasional periods when you or your family member are
incapacitated and require treatment by a health care provider at least
twice a year; and pregnancy (including prenatal medical appointments,
incapacity due to morning sickness, and medically required bed rest).</p>
</blockquote>
<p>While a &quot;stroke&quot; is not specifically mentioned, the resulting medical conditions after a stroke might certainly fall under the FMLA.</p>
<p>If you believe you are entitled to such benefits, you should start with your HR department.</p>


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Question Body: <p>Alan is aware of an obscure old book that is out of print, and republishes it.</p>
<p>Brenda Books, Inc. objects and sues Alan since they own the copyright. This is not disputed.  Brenda Books' claim is a tremendous amount of money.</p>
<p>The book is indeed out of print, and Brenda Books claims the reason it's out of print is the low probable sales don't justify the cost of reprinting it. &quot;We don't cede our interest in the work; it's just not profitable to reprint it.&quot;</p>


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<p>Thus it is a &quot;dog in the manger&quot; scenario (in which the dog beds down in the cows' food trough, neither partaking of the cows' food not allowing the cows to do so either; thus maliciously wasting the valuable resource to no profit for anyone.)  Note that this is a not a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disney_Vault" rel="noreferrer">&quot;Disney Vault&quot;</a> scenario where the definitely-profitable resource is made artificially scarce to increase its value further: this is a book that the conventional publisher doesn't really have a pathway to make money on.   But setting aside the social or moral issues...</p>
<p>How does the fact of Brenda's unwillingness to print the book, affect the damages?  Can Alan diminish damages by showing Brenda Books wasn't doing anything with the work anyway, and thus, doesn't really have any lost profits to claim against Alan?</p>


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Answer 1: <h2>When you own something, you get to decide what you do with it</h2>
<p>There is no obligation to make a copyrighted work available and the fact that it isn’t is not a defence to a copyright infringement.</p>
<p>Brenda Books is entitled to either damages or an account of profits. Arguably, they have suffered no damage, so Alan’s profits are the better target. In some jurisdictions, such as the United States, statutory damages (a set dollar amount for each infringement) is available even if there are no damages or profits.</p>


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Answer 2: <h2>In the contrary: Copyright can be strengthened by not publishing</h2>
<p>Unpublished works are protected the same as published works and usually, that is the author's death+70 years. In <a href="https://guides.libraries.indiana.edu/c.php?g=158548&amp;p=1486030" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><em>some cases</em></a> - unpublished and author unknown - it is creation+120 years and corporate published works are 90 years.</p>
<p>While copyright lasts, the law dictates that it is the absolute <strong>exclusive</strong> right of the copyright holder to make prints outside of some exceptions. Whether they are printing the work or not does not matter: as long as the right lasts, it's exclusive. The act of refusing to sell a published item does nothing for the strength of their claim in itself.</p>


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<p>On the other hand, refusing to publish an unpublished work <strong>does</strong> strengthen their claim for damages, as an unpublished work that Alan illegally brought to market does not need to be registered - it is still unpublished for the courts!</p>
<h2>Fair Use?</h2>
<p>In the context of the question, the work has been published, but not offering it does not lessen Brenda Books' claim that it was an infringement.</p>
<p>To overcome the infringement claim as the defendant, there <em>might</em> be a fair use argument by satisfying the balancing test, but the copyright owners' rights in the text are not diminished by there possibly being <em>some</em> ways that allow republishing part or the whole of the work within the confines of <a href="https://www.copyright.gov/fair-use/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">fair use</a>/<a href="https://www.lib.sfu.ca/help/academic-integrity/copyright/fair-dealing" rel="nofollow noreferrer">fair dealing.</a></p>


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<p>The problem for Alan is, that unwillingness to grant a license and then not being able to prove fair use/dealing means he should be well aware that he is infringing, possibly even stepping his problem up to wilful infringement in case fair use/dealing is not found. in the US can be penalized with 150 000 USD plus attorneys fees.</p>
<p>A rough estimation of the <strong>fair use</strong> factors:</p>
<ul>
<li>Making copies <em>for sale</em> would weigh extremely against Alan, for <em>archival purposes</em> it would weigh for Alan. (see <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/13-4829/13-4829-2015-10-16.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., (2d Cir. 2015)</a>)</li>
<li>The amount taken, impact on the market, and nature of the work count against Alan - making a finding of fair use <em>very</em> tricky.</li>
</ul>


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<li>The amount taken, impact on the market, and nature of the work count against Alan - making a finding of fair use <em>very</em> tricky.</li>
</ul>
<p>But.... how did Google get away with copying the whole books? It hinges on the whole copy being searchable, very much transformed, and that the users <em>can't</em> get access to the full text as long as the work is under copyright. From the court of appeals' judgement on the Google case:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(1) Google’s unauthorized digitizing of copyright-protected works, creation of a search functionality, and display of snippets from those works are non-infringing fair uses. The purpose of the copying is highly transformative, the public display of text is limited, and the revelations do not provide a significant market substitute for the protected aspects of the originals.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>A rough look at the <strong>fair dealing</strong> factors:</p>
<ul>


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</blockquote>
<p>A rough look at the <strong>fair dealing</strong> factors:</p>
<ul>
<li>The purpose of the copy might cut against Alan most of the time, the mere usage type cuts against, use is ongoing, the whole book is copied, the means are not exactly required, the nature of the book cuts against <em>and</em> it is market usurpation...</li>
</ul>
<p>In short: I don't see how Alan might manage fair dealing unless it would be very much the Google Books example. Making copies even for a 0 profit would not fly.</p>


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Answer 3: <h2>It Doesn’t</h2>
<p>There are many reasons why a copyright holder might want to take books out of print.  The descendants of Theodor “Dr. Seuss” Geisel, for example, recently took a couple of his books out of print on the grounds that they thought some of the lines had become inappropriate by modern standards.  The Arthur Conan Doyle estate has never allowed the original version of the first Sherlock Holmes novel to be published, on the grounds that it would only damage the author’s reputation.  Mark Twain left instructions for how many years after his death to keep some of his writings from being published, based on how much longer he expected the people he wrote about (and their children) to live and how controversial what he said was by the standards of the time.</p>
<p>In cases like that, the fact that a <em>samizdat</em> version would be popular and widely-read would, from the perspective of the author’s heirs, be the harm they were trying to prevent.</p>


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<p>In cases like that, the fact that a <em>samizdat</em> version would be popular and widely-read would, from the perspective of the author’s heirs, be the harm they were trying to prevent.</p>
<p>As you know, a trademark can be lost if it is not used and defended, but this cannot happen to a copyright.  So, when DC acquired the rights to Captain Marvel from Fawcett Comics, and allowed the trademark to lapse, Marvel Comics was able to create a different character named “Captain Marvel,” it took the trademark for itself, and now DC has to call the original, “Shazam!”  However, no one but DC can reprint the original Captain Marvel comics, which remain under copyright.</p>
<p>Proving “A-ha!  You let the book go out of print because you thought it wouldn’t sell well, but it did!” would not do someone any good when the jury awards damages.  Under U.S. federal law (17 U.S. Code § 504(b))</p>
<blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p>The copyright owner is entitled to recover the actual damages suffered by him or her as a result of the infringement, and any profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement and are not taken into account in computing the actual damages.</p>
</blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p>So, if the pirate edition sold well, the legitimate rights-holder is still entitled to all the profits from it.  If the rights-holder claimed a large amount of damages from lost opportunities to sell the book, but the other party can show that the publisher really believed it would not make them any money, that might be helpful.  However, the injured party could still claim statutory damages.  In a case like this, it’s risky, but the pirates might try to claim that the public deserved to have the work available.  When someone infringes copyright knowingly, “the court in its discretion may increase the award of statutory damages to a sum of not more than $150,000,” (17 U.S. Code § 504(c)(2)) so it matters how sympathetic the judge and jury are to them.</p>


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Answer 4: <p><a href="/questions/tagged/canada" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-canada-tooltip-container">canada</a></p>
<p>Copyright explicitly applies &quot;whether published or unpublished&quot; (<em>Copyright Act</em>, <a href="https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/rsc-1985-c-c-42/latest/rsc-1985-c-c-42.html#sec5_smooth" rel="noreferrer">s. 5</a>).</p>
<p>However, in the fair dealing analysis, the fact that a work is unpublished (if not confidential) weighs in favour of finding that what would otherwise be infringement is a fair dealing (see <em>CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada</em>, <a href="https://canlii.ca/t/1glp0#par58" rel="noreferrer">2004 SCC 13 at para 58</a>):</p>
<blockquote>


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<blockquote>
<p>The nature of the work in question should also be considered by courts assessing whether a dealing is fair.  Although certainly not determinative, if a work has not been published, the dealing may be more fair in that its reproduction with acknowledgement could lead to a wider public dissemination of the work — one of the goals of copyright law.  If, however, the work in question was confidential, this may tip the scales towards finding that the dealing was unfair.  See <em>Beloff v. Pressdram Ltd.</em>, [1973] 1 All E.R. 241 (Ch. D.), at p. 264.</p>
</blockquote>


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</blockquote>
<p><a href="/questions/tagged/united-states" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-united-states-tooltip-container">united-states</a> <a href="/questions/tagged/united-kingdom" class="post-tag" title="show questions tagged &#39;united-kingdom&#39;" aria-label="show questions tagged &#39;united-kingdom&#39;" rel="tag" aria-labelledby="tag-united-kingdom-tooltip-container">united-kingdom</a></p>


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<p>The situation is the reverse in the U.K. and U.S.: &quot;[i]n the United Kingdom and the United States, if a work is unpublished, it weighs <em>against</em> fair dealing&quot; (Giuseppina D'Agostino, &quot;Healing Fair Dealing? A Comparative Copyright Analysis of Canada's Fair Dealing to U.K. Fair Dealing and U.S. Fair Use&quot; (2008) <a href="https://www.canlii.org/en/commentary/doc/2008CanLIIDocs166" rel="noreferrer">53:2 McGill L.J. 309</a> at p. 358).</p>


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<p><strong>For works that were previously published but now out of print, this weighs in favour of fair use in the U.S.</strong><sup>1</sup> See e.g. Revision Notes to <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2021-title17/pdf/USCODE-2021-title17-chap1-sec107.pdf" rel="noreferrer">17 U.S.C. §107 at p. 28</a>. See also <em>Authors Guild v. Google, Inc.</em>, (2d Cir. 2015), which affirmed a fair use finding. The district court said (see <a href="https://casetext.com/case/authors-guild" rel="noreferrer">954 F. Supp. 2d 282</a> (S.D.N.Y. 2013)):</p>
<blockquote>
<p>It preserves books, in particular out-of-print and old books that have been forgotten in the bowels of libraries, and it gives them new life.</p>
</blockquote>
<hr />
<p><sup>1. As always for fair use, <a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/questions/7683/in-the-us-when-is-fair-use-a-defense-to-copyright-infringement">simply as one of the several factors</a>.</sup></p>


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Question Title: Do EU or UK consumers enjoy consumer rights protections from traders that serve them from abroad?

Question Body: <p>Bob lives in Manchester, or alternatively in Lyon. He purchases a product or service from a vendor in the USA, or perhaps Timbuktu.</p>
<p>Do European or British consumer rights legislations bind the American/Malian trader to protect Bob, as the GDPR would?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>In theory, what Dale says.  However, in practice:</p>
<h2>Nope, and that's <em>why</em> the trader is in Timbuktu.</h2>
<p>And I apologize profusely to the Malian people, I have every reason to think it is a fine country in which citizens obey international laws and honor claims, <strong>unlike certain other countries</strong>.  In anglo/Five Eyes nations, Timbuktu tends to simply be used as a metaphor for &quot;a country far, far away and different in its ways than us&quot;.</p>
<p>If Bob is regularly buying things in the USA or Timbuktu, then either Bob works for Aperture Science and is using portals, or more likely <strong>Bob is using mail order.  And now, we get to the nut of it</strong>.</p>
<p>Most mail order sales are done by mail-order sellers who deal in volume. Those people choose their jurisdictions and venues carefully. <em>And they have help</em>.</p>
<blockquote>


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<p>Most mail order sales are done by mail-order sellers who deal in volume. Those people choose their jurisdictions and venues carefully. <em>And they have help</em>.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Do European or British consumer rights legislations bind the American/Malian trader to protect Bob, as the GDPR would?</p>
</blockquote>
<p><strong>No! That's WHY they're in Timbuktu!</strong> (or, wherever they actually are; generally behind what I'll call the Red Curtain.) <strong>The point of being there is to be untouchable by civil action or government penalty</strong> due to that government's non-enrollment in international agreements, and outright obstruction of such actions.</p>


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<p>Yes, they and their legal team have crunched the question of &quot;what happens when a European or Briton sues us? What happens when an Anglo or EU government tries to action us?&quot; Their companies are structured so they slough those off at minimal real loss.  Ever notice how many sellers have a company name that looks like they rolled their face across a keyboard? That's a sockpuppet shell company, and they have thousands of them. If their other layers of defense fail, they simply fold that company and create another. Their government lets them do this, because they chose jurisdictions wisely.</p>


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<p>A huge fraction of mail order sales are done on this basis, typically through web sites which purport to be &quot;only a marketplace connecting buyers to sellers&quot;... even though some of those marketplaces also provide warehousing and shipping services to the third party (&quot;only a warehouse&quot; and &quot;only a drop-ship firm&quot;)... and even though they are known for selling their own products, and use the smallest text on the page to mention that this particular item is from a third party.  <em>Not mentioning any names</em>.</p>
<p>This type of &quot;be fully complicit in selling junk, while the seller of record hides behind the Red Curtain and uses arrays of shell companies to limit exposure&quot; has become systemized in much of the mail order world.</p>


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<p>Another scheme I've seen is to trick American consumers into being the seller of record; these people end up &quot;holding the liability bag&quot;, and are typically not insured and not collectible in any practical way.</p>
<p>Of course you have lovely companies like Eaton, Midnight Solar, Harsco Rail, Roshel, ILSCO, etc. who will meet GDPR simply because it's the right thing to do, even if they don't have feet on the ground inside the EU or UK against which those governments might action.  But nobody asks if they're subject to GDPR, do they?</p>


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Answer 2: <h2>Yes</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/15/contents/enacted" rel="noreferrer">Consumer Rights Act 2015</a> applies to most contracts between traders and consumers that are subject to the jurisdiction of English and Welsh, Scottish, or Northern Irish courts. All this requires is sufficient nexus between the contract and the jurisdiction - if either the trader or the consumer is located in say, Nottingham, that’s sufficient.</p>


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<p>The Act cannot be contracted out of so even if the contract is to be governed under the law of another jurisdiction the CRA still applies. This is not an uncommon occurrence in the modern world. For example, an English trader sells to a person in Australia using a contract under Californian law (because most of their customers are American) will be subject to the UK Consumer Rights Act, Australian Consumer Law, and Californian contract law. Depending on the temperament of the judge, this will either be the best or the worst case of their life.</p>


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Answer 3: <p>Under UK law there is a very useful consumer protection provided by section 75 of the consumer credit act 1974.  If I buy an item or service that costs between £100.01 and £29999.99 and use my <strong>credit card</strong> to pay for at least £0.01 towards the purchase and the supplier <strong>anywhere in the world</strong> fails to deliver then the UK based credit card company is liable to return the entire cost of the purchase, <strong>not just the part that was charged to the credit card</strong><br />
As a result there is no need to sue the supplier that is not under the jurisdiction of UK law.</p>


Tags: united-kingdom, european-union, consumer-protection, jurisdiction


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Question Title: What is the &quot;public interest&quot;?

Question Body: <p>Prosecution as in England must only be undertaken if they are required by the public interest. What is this public interest and how is it understood?</p>
<p>Can these decisions not become quite politically loaded? For example, suppose an anti monarchist protestor breaches the public order act. A monarchist sympathetic prosecutor may more likely deem prosecution in the public interest. Suppose a monarchist then assaults him. A republican may deem the protectors prosecution ass contrary to the public interest and the assailant's as required by it.</p>
<p>But that is not really the public interest but rather the interest of a given specific political cause. What is the public interest when it comes to political masters?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>The &quot;public interest&quot; from a charging perspective is <em>not</em> the same as public popularity. From the <a href="https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/charging-directors-guidance-sixth-edition-december-2020" rel="noreferrer">charging guide</a>, prosecutors:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>should consider each of the questions set out in paragraphs 4.14 (a) to (g) of the Code to determine the relevant public interest factors for and against prosecution. These factors, together with any public interest factors set out in any further relevant guidance or policy issued by the DPP, should enable prosecutors and police decision makers to form an overall assessment of the public interest.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Those public-interest factors are listed <a href="https://www.cps.gov.uk/publication/code-crown-prosecutors" rel="noreferrer">here</a> (and each is further elaborated):</p>
<ul>
<li>How serious is the offence committed?</li>


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<ul>
<li>How serious is the offence committed?</li>
<li>What is the level of culpability of the suspect?</li>
<li>What are the circumstances of and the harm caused to the victim?</li>
<li>What was the suspect’s age and maturity at the time of the offence?</li>
<li>What is the impact on the community?</li>
<li>Is prosecution a proportionate response?</li>
<li>Do sources of information require protecting?</li>
</ul>


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Question Title: Whence arises the idea that how to rent in England ought to be served *at the start of the tenancy*?


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Question Body: <p>Gov.uk's preface to the web version of the guide states that the LL or LA should give the current copy of this guide to the tenant &quot;when a new AST starts.&quot;</p>
<p>Yet the enabling provisions seem to be to be found in statutory instrument 2015 No. 1646 The Assured Shorthold Tenancy Notices and Prescribed Requirements (England) regulations 2015, particularly regulation 3, Requirement for landlord to provide prescribed information.</p>
<p>3(1) says that LL &quot;must give the tenant under that tenancy the information mentioned in&quot; (2).</p>
<p>3(2) specifies that the information is how to rent in England.</p>
<p>3(3) specifies when it may be in what format.</p>
<p>3(4) clarifies the lack of requirement to re-serve updated versions published subsequent to original service during a tenancy.</p>


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<p>3(3) specifies when it may be in what format.</p>
<p>3(4) clarifies the lack of requirement to re-serve updated versions published subsequent to original service during a tenancy.</p>
<p>3(5) makes 2 exemptions for certain LLs and where the presently current version <strong>upon the first day of a tenancy</strong> has already previously been served in respect of a previous tenancy where the LL, tenant and premises let are all the same.</p>
<p>3(6) references the appropriate statutory definition of a replacement tenancy.</p>


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<p>3(6) references the appropriate statutory definition of a replacement tenancy.</p>
<p>Apart from 3(5) which alludes to a definition of this idea (IE, of &quot;the start of a tenancy&quot;) albeit for another purpose-context (that is, defining a relevant point in time as a threshold for the earliest time there could have been updated versions of HTRIE published for certain other aspects of the requirement to take effect), nowhere else does this idea that the requirement is to be fulfilled &quot;at the start of the tenancy&quot; seem to appear, much less does it seem to anywhere be more clearly defined. (ie upon the signing or agreement of a written or verbal lease? On the first / &quot;move in&quot; day of the lease itself? Upon handing over the keys to the tenant? Etc).</p>


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<p>Of course, s21B(3) of HA1988 provides the restriction on usage by LL of s21(1)  or s21(4) until they are no longer in breach of regulations referred to by 21B(1). While 21B(2)(b) refers vaguely and non-specifically to &quot;the time the requirement applies,&quot; this is again in the context of defining criteria for ascertaining what version of a document must be served and not per se in that of setting out when to serve it. And this is the closest that anywhere else in s21B comes to touching on the matter.</p>
<p>So, while we have a statutory provision laying out the consequence for not serving the document in a timely way (no allowance to use s21), we are left with no statutory source for the oft-repeated, yet apparently ill-defined idea that this booklet is to be served &quot;at the start of a tenancy&quot;. What is this idea's basis or origin?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>The beginning of the tenancy is defined in <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/50/section/45" rel="nofollow noreferrer">section 45(2) of the Housing Act 1988</a> as:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the day on which the tenancy is entered into or, if it is later, the day on which, under the terms of any lease, agreement or other document, the tenant is entitled to possession under the tenancy.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>(This applies to the statutory instrument because it is made under section <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/50/section/21B" rel="nofollow noreferrer">21B</a> of the 1988 Act, and definitions carry over from primary to secondary legislation in this way.) The definition probably matches what people would expect.</p>


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<p>Section 21B, and the 2015 Regulations, just say that the landlord has to give this information to their tenant. But it follows that if the tenancy has begun, then the landlord's obligation also begins. It binds from day 1. Therefore, the government is justified in saying in the booklet:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The landlord, or the letting agent, should give the current version of this guide to the tenant when a new assured shorthold tenancy starts.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Because of all the other paperwork involved, it's most common for the booklet to be given as part of the bundle of documents when the tenancy agreement is signed - so, along with the inventory and so on. This is typically not too distant in time from when the tenant is entitled to actually move in, and landlords will often only sign on the day itself even if the tenant has completed their part of the formalities earlier.</p>


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<p>Perhaps your doubt is about whether it is &quot;OK&quot; for the landlord to provide the booklet before the actual start date of the tenancy, as opposed to waiting until the tenancy is in effect. In the same way, we could imagine a prospective tenant wanting to see the energy performance certificate well before agreeing to sign anything. Does the landlord have to give them another copy on day 1 of the tenancy, even though it's the same as the copy they already have?</p>
<p>In fact, there <em>are</em> specific different rules for those other items of information.</p>
<ul>
<li>The most recent gas safety certificate must normally be given &quot;to any new tenant of premises ... before that tenant occupies those premises&quot; (<a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1998/2451/regulation/36/made" rel="nofollow noreferrer">SI 1998/2451 reg.36(6)(b)</a>)</li>


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<li>The EPC must be given to any <em>prospective</em> tenant at the earliest opportunity, and in any event must have been given to &quot;the person who ultimately becomes the buyer or tenant&quot; (<a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2012/3118/regulation/6/made" rel="nofollow noreferrer">SI 2012/3118 reg.6</a>, and compare the definition of &quot;prospective tenant&quot; in <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2012/3118/regulation/3/made" rel="nofollow noreferrer">regulation 3</a>).</li>
<li>The EICR must similarly be given to new and prospective tenants before they occupy the premises (<a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2020/312/regulation/3/made" rel="nofollow noreferrer">SI 2022/312 reg.3(e)</a>).</li>
</ul>


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</ul>
<p>So these are meant to be given before the tenancy begins. They are part of what the prospective tenant should know before deciding whether to sign the agreement. The government's <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1084131/Model_agreement_for_a_shorthold_assured_tenancy.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">model tenancy agreement</a> has checklists for landlord and tenant in relation to these documents, plus the &quot;How to rent&quot; booklet. That is consistent with the idea that the tenant is meant to have this information on the day that the tenancy is to begin, whether that's because they're just being given it now, or because they've already seen it. Armed with all the knowledge, they can now proceed to signing the agreement.</p>


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<p>Indeed, the content of the &quot;How to rent&quot; booklet makes it less useful if it's provided after the agreement has started. A lot of the material is about searching for a property, making sure that you are prepared to sign, and avoiding bad behaviour by potential landlords. Even though it would meet the letter of the law to only get this information after signing (but still on the day), it also meets letter and spirit to get it on the day, <em>before</em> signing. Or if you had it even earlier, it would be a bold argument to say that the landlord hadn't given you the information just because they emailed it to you a week before the tenancy actually began - especially if you have checked the appropriate little box on the tenancy agreement to say you received it.</p>


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<p>Nonetheless, because the only practical consequence for landlords is their ability to serve a s.21 notice, it's also common for them to play it safe and send another copy of the booklet before sending the notice itself. They will also often send updated copies as they arise, even though the regulation doesn't require it; some insurers ask for this just to really cement the chance of making a proper s.21 notice.</p>


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<p>I'm not aware of judicial precedent on <em>early</em> delivery of the booklet, but we can get some guidance from a recent Court of Appeal decision on s.21A, <a href="https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Approved-judgment-Trecarrell-House-Ltd-v-Rouncefield-18-06-2020.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Trecarrell House v Rouncefield [2020] EWCA Civ 760</a>. This case examined the nature of breaches and remedies that prevent serving an eviction notice. The conclusion was that if the tenant received a gas safety certificate &quot;before or with&quot; the s.21 notice, then the landlord has fulfilled their obligation - they are not irreparably in breach just becuse they did not give that information at the beginning. What matters for the Housing Act is that the tenant received it by the time that it was needed for the s.21 process. Likewise, it would seem that if the tenant had the &quot;How to rent&quot; booklet from the landlord before the beginning of their tenancy, then


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by the time that it was needed for the s.21 process. Likewise, it would seem that if the tenant had the &quot;How to rent&quot; booklet from the landlord before the beginning of their tenancy, then the landlord is not in breach - because the tenant has the information the whole time even though the act of giving the booklet predated the tenancy itself.</p>


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Question Title: Can members of the media be held legally responsible for leaking documents they never agreed to keep secret?


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Question Body: <p>Larry the Leaker is high up in the US government, and has access to highly classified information/documents. He goes to John the Journalist, and tells him to publish all of it. Obviously, Larry has agreed to a bunch of stuff telling him not to leak or talk about any of that stuff, so Larry has no hope. But John never signed anything. So does John face any solid legal repercussions for wholesale publishing everything he got from Larry?</p>
<p>In the case of Edward Snowden, I'm pretty sure The Guardian (and its journalists) didn't face any repercussions. But Snowden was ultimately a whistleblower reporting on unethical conduct in that case. <strong>I want you to make no such assumptions about what Larry and John are doing.</strong> For example, perhaps Larry literally told John the identities of undercover agents in Russia, and John posted it just for the clout. Will John face any legal repercussions, even though he literally never signed anything?</p>


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<p>Edit: To be clear, I'm not asking about Larry the Leaker (the government employee) whatsoever. I'm asking solely about John the Journalist, who publishes the information, and what legal ramifications he might face. Also if I'm allowed a follow-up: if Nathan the Netizen retweets/reposts John's article and evidence, is Nathan also subject to legal ramifications?</p>


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Answer 1: <p>It depends on the nature of the documents. <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/798" rel="noreferrer">This law</a> specifies that it is illegal to disclose or publish etc. classified information</p>
<blockquote>
<p>concerning the nature, preparation, or use of any code, cipher, or
cryptographic system of the United States or any foreign government</p>
</blockquote>
<p>and there are 4 such subcategories. Violation results in imprisonment up to 10 years. This is an ordinary prohibition. Government employees may also be given access to classified information whose disclosure is not criminal in the general case, but would be illegal for the government employee to disclose owing to his position, under <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1924" rel="noreferrer">this law</a>.</p>


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Answer 2: <p>While there are narrow exceptions, the general rule is that a member of the media who receives leaked material that the media member did not solicit is free of legal liability.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>On June 30, 1971, the Supreme Court decided, 6–3, that the government
failed to meet the heavy burden of proof required for prior restraint
injunction. The nine justices wrote nine opinions disagreeing on
significant, substantive matters.</p>
<p><em>Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in government. And paramount among the responsibilities of a free
press is the duty to prevent any part of the government from deceiving
the people and sending them off to distant lands to die of foreign
fevers and foreign shot and shell.</em></p>
<p>— Justice Black's opinion in <em><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_York_Times_Co._v._United_States" rel="noreferrer">New York Times Co. v. United


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<p>— Justice Black's opinion in <em><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_York_Times_Co._v._United_States" rel="noreferrer">New York Times Co. v. United
States</a></em>, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (a.k.a. the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pentagon_Papers" rel="noreferrer">Pentagon Papers</a>
case).</p>
</blockquote>
<p>(via the Pentagon Papers link).</p>
<p>There is also a non-binding Justice Department policy of not prosecuting reporters in connection with leaks of government information and of <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-garland-announces-revised-justice-department-news-media-policy" rel="noreferrer">not trying to obtain information in their cases from reporters except in a few narrow kinds of cases</a>.</p>
<p>As user6726 notes <a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/a/91622/9517">in another answer</a>, this immunity from liability isn't absolute.</p>


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<p>As user6726 notes <a href="https://law.stackexchange.com/a/91622/9517">in another answer</a>, this immunity from liability isn't absolute.</p>
<p>But protections from liability for reporters who do published leaked confidential government information is also much broader even than in most countries that have strong protections for freedom of the press.</p>
<p>Very few members of the media have been prosecuted successfully for leaking confidential information since this landmark 1971 ruling, although many government officials and members of the U.S. military have been successfully prosecuted and convicted for leaking confidential information to members of the media in the same time period.</p>
<p><strong>The Related Issue Of A Reporter's Privilege</strong></p>


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<p><strong>The Related Issue Of A Reporter's Privilege</strong></p>
<p>Closely related to this question is the issue of whether there should be a <a href="https://www.rcfp.org/reporters-privilege/" rel="noreferrer">reporter's privilege</a> (a.k.a. &quot;shield laws&quot;) allowing them to not disclose their confidential sources which is recognized in some, but not all, U.S. jurisdictions.</p>
<p>Many reporters have been incarcerated for contempt of court for refusing to disclose their confidential sources, despite being compelled to disclosure this pursuant to a valid subpoena, in various U.S. jurisdictions when courts determine that the reporter lack a reporter's privilege.</p>
<p><a href="https://i.stack.imgur.com/LVv9d.png" rel="noreferrer"><img src="https://i.stack.imgur.com/LVv9d.png" alt="enter image description here" /></a></p>
<p><em>The image is from the &quot;reporter's privilege&quot; link.</em></p>


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<p><em>The image is from the &quot;reporter's privilege&quot; link.</em></p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.rcfp.org/introduction-to-the-reporters-privilege-compendium/" rel="noreferrer">federal courts haven't reached a perfect consensus on the issue</a> in the wake of an ambiguous ruling on the question by the U.S. Supreme Court known as the <em>Branzburg</em> case was decided in 1972 with a fractured ruling on an only partially related issue.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>in the decades since <em>Branzburg</em> was decided, most federal appellate
courts have recognized some form of a qualified privilege for
journalistic materials. The U.S. Courts of Appeal for the Seventh and
Eighth Circuits are the only circuits that have not yet definitively
done so. But the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth,
Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have recognized a privilege in at
least some cases, derived from the First Amendment. And at least the


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Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have recognized a privilege in at
least some cases, derived from the First Amendment. And at least the
Third Circuit has also described the privilege as arising from federal
common law.</p>
</blockquote>


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Question Title: Can the Indian Government make laws contrary to the Directive principles of state policy?

Question Body: <p>The directive principles of state policies are embodied in part 4 of the Indian constitution.</p>
<p>in article 37 it is stated</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The provisions contained in this Part shall not be
enforceable by any court, but the principles therein laid
down are nevertheless fundamental in the governance
of the country and it shall be the duty of the State to
apply these principles in making laws.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>but can a government pass a law contrary to those ?</p>


