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8. The reason for founding a state will become still clearer, if we consider that other means of restraining the malice of men would not have sufficed. For although the natural law commands men to abstain from inflicting any injury, still respect for that law cannot insure to men the ability to live quite safely in natural liberty. For although there may be men or so quiet a temper that, even with impunity assured, they would not injure others; and also other men who somehow check their desires from the fear of an evil that will result; still there is, on the other hand, a great multitude of those to whom every right is worthless, whenever the hope of gain has enticed them, or confidence in their own strength or shrewdness, by which they hope to be able to repel or elude those whom they have injured. There is no one who does not strive to protect himself against such persons, if he loves his own safety; and that protection cannot be had more conveniently than by the help of states. For in spite of the fact that some may have given a mutual pledge to help each other, still, unless there be something to unite their judgments, and firmly bind their wills to carry out the pledge, it is vain for one to promise himself unfailing aid from the others. 9. Lastly, although the natural law sufficiently teaches men that those who inflict injury upon others will not go unpunished, nevertheless neither fear of the Divinity nor the sting of conscience is found to have strength to control the malice of all sorts of men. For with many, through defect of training and habit, the force of reason grows deaf as it were. The result is that they aim at things present only, indifferent to the future, and are moved only by what strikes upon the senses.


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9. Lastly, although the natural law sufficiently teaches men that those who inflict injury upon others will not go unpunished, nevertheless neither fear of the Divinity nor the sting of conscience is found to have strength to control the malice of all sorts of men. For with many, through defect of training and habit, the force of reason grows deaf as it were. The result is that they aim at things present only, indifferent to the future, and are moved only by what strikes upon the senses. But since divine vengeance commonly walks with slow foot, for that reason wicked men are given an opportunity to attribute the evils which befall the impious to other causes; especially since they often see wicked men in possession of abundance in those things by which the crowd measures felicity. And then the goads of conscience, which precede the crime, seem less strong than those which follow it, when the deed can no longer be undone. But to check evil desires, the prompt remedy, and one well adapted to human nature, is found in states. Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen (1673) Page 84 © Copyright 2003, 2005 Lonang Institute CHAPTER 6 On the Internal Structure of States 1. Our next task is to investigate the manner in which states have been erected, and how their internal structure is held together. In this investigation it is first evident that, to meet the dangers which threaten individuals from the perversity of men, it was impossible for some place, or arms, or brutes, to furnish a more convenient and effective protection than could other men. But since their power is not carried to distant objects, it was necessary that those by whom that end was to be attained should join together. 2. And it is not less certain that the agreement of two or three cannot afford that sort of security against other men.


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But since their power is not carried to distant objects, it was necessary that those by whom that end was to be attained should join together. 2. And it is not less certain that the agreement of two or three cannot afford that sort of security against other men. For it is easy for so many to conspire to overpower these few, that they can insure for themselves a perfectly certain victory over the others; and the hope of success and impunity will give them confidence for the attack. Therefore, to this end it is necessary for a considerable mass of men to join together, that the addition of a few to the numbers of the enemy may not be of appreciable moment in helping them to victory. 3. Among the many who unite with this end in view, there must be agreement in regard to the employment of means suited to that same end. For even many will accomplish nothing, if they are not agreed among themselves, but are divided in opinion and have different aims. Or, they may for a time agree, under the impulse of some emotion, and yet presently they will go in different directions, with the usual changeableness of man's nature and inclinations. And although they promise by general agreement that they will employ their powers for the common defense, still, even in this way, the multitude is not sufficiently safeguarded for any length of time. But something further must be added, that those who have once consented together for peace and mutual aid in the interest of the common good, may be prevented from disagreeing again later, when their own private good seems to clash with the public. 4. But in human nature two faults in particular are found, which hinder many persons, who are their own masters and independent of each other, from long agreeing for some common end.


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But something further must be added, that those who have once consented together for peace and mutual aid in the interest of the common good, may be prevented from disagreeing again later, when their own private good seems to clash with the public. 4. But in human nature two faults in particular are found, which hinder many persons, who are their own masters and independent of each other, from long agreeing for some common end. One is the diversity of inclinations and of judgment, in distinguishing what is most useful for that end; and with this is joined in many cases dullness in discerning which proposal of several is more advantageous, and also obstinacy, in defending with tooth and nail what has once somehow caught one's fancy. The second fault is indifference and reluctance to do the useful thing of one's own motion, when there is no necessity, to compel the recalcitrant to do their duty willy-nilly. The former fault is counteracted by permanently uniting the wills of all; the latter, if there is constituted some authority, which can inflict upon those who resist the common advantage, some immediate and sensible punishment. 5. The wills of many men can be united in no other way, than if each subjects his will to the will of one man, or one council, so that henceforth, whatever such an one shall will concerning things necessary to the common security, must be accounted the will of all, collectively and singly. 6. Moreover, a power, such as must be feared by all, can likewise be constituted among a multitude of men in no other way than if all, collectively and singly, have bound themselves to employ their powers in the way he shall prescribe, to whom they have all resigned the direction of their powers. Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen (1673) Page 85 © Copyright 2003, 2005 Lonang Institute But when a union both of wills and powers has been brought about, then at last a multitude of men is quickened into the strongest of bodies, a state. 7.


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Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen (1673) Page 85 © Copyright 2003, 2005 Lonang Institute But when a union both of wills and powers has been brought about, then at last a multitude of men is quickened into the strongest of bodies, a state. 7. Again, for a state to coalesce regularly, two compacts and one decree are necessary. For first of all, when the many men, who are thought of as established in natural liberty, gather to form a state, they individually enter into a joint agreement, that they are ready to enter into a permanent community, and to manage the business of their safety and security by common counsel and guidance, in a word, that they mutually desire to become fellow-citizens. They must all together and singly agree to this compact; and a man who shall not do so, remains outside the state that is to be. 8. After this compact a decree must be made, stating what form of government is to be introduced. For until they have settled this point, nothing that makes for the common safety can be steadily carried out. 9. After the decree concerning the form of government, another compact is needed, when the person, or persons, upon whom the government of the nascent state is conferred are established in authority. By this compact these bind themselves to take care of the common security and safety, the rest to yield them their obedience; and by it also all subject their own wills to the will of that person or persons, and at the same time make over to him, or to them, the use and employment of their powers for the common defense. And only when this compact has been duly executed, does a perfect and regular state come into being. 10.


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By this compact these bind themselves to take care of the common security and safety, the rest to yield them their obedience; and by it also all subject their own wills to the will of that person or persons, and at the same time make over to him, or to them, the use and employment of their powers for the common defense. And only when this compact has been duly executed, does a perfect and regular state come into being. 10. A state thus constituted is conceived as a single person, and distinguished and differentiated from all individual men by a single name; and it has its own peculiar rights and its possessions, which neither individuals, nor many persons, nor in fact all together, can claim for themselves, except him who has the highest authority, that is, to whom the rule of the state has been entrusted. Hence a state is defined as a composite moral person, whose will, intertwined and united by virtue of the compacts of the many, is regarded as the will of all, so that it can use the powers and resources of all for the common peace and security. 11. But the will of a state, as the source of public acts, declares itself either through one man, or one council, according as the chief authority has been conferred upon him or them. Where the government of the state is in the hands of one man, the state is understood to will whatever that man shall please (it is presupposed that he is in his right mind), in regard to matters concerning the end for which states exist. 12. But where the government of a state has been conferred upon a council, consisting of a number of men, each one of whom retains his natural will, the will of the state is regularly understood to be that upon which a majority of the men composing the council have agreed; unless it has been expressly determined what fraction of the council must be in agreement, in order to represent the will of the whole body. But when two rival proposals are evenly matched, nothing will be done, but the case will remain as before.


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But when two rival proposals are evenly matched, nothing will be done, but the case will remain as before. As between several rival proposals, that one will prevail which has more votes than its rivals singly; provided the number voting for it is that which, according to public enactments, can otherwise represent the will of the whole body. 13. The state being thus constituted, the central authority, according as it is one man, or one council Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen (1673) Page 86 © Copyright 2003, 2005 Lonang Institute of the few, or of all, is called a monarch, a senate, or a free people. The rest are styled subjects, or citizens, understanding the latter term in its wider sense. There are some, however, who, in a narrower sense, usually call only those citizens, who by their union and consent formed the state in the first place, or else their successors, namely, the heads of households. Moreover, citizens are either original or adopted. The former are those who were present in the beginning at the birth of the state, or their descendants. These it is the custom also to call indigenous. The adopted citizens are those who from without join themselves to a state already constituted, with the purpose of planting the seat of their fortunes there. As for those who sojourn in the state, merely to tarry for a time, though subject just so long to its authority, they are still not regarded as citizens, but are called strangers or immigrants. 14. However, what has been laid down with regard to the origin of states does not prevent us from saying with good reason, that civil authority is from God. For it is His will that the natural law be observed by all men; and in fact, after the race had multiplied, life would have come to be so barbarous, as to leave scarcely any place for the natural law, whereas its observance is greatly promoted by the establishment of states.


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14. However, what has been laid down with regard to the origin of states does not prevent us from saying with good reason, that civil authority is from God. For it is His will that the natural law be observed by all men; and in fact, after the race had multiplied, life would have come to be so barbarous, as to leave scarcely any place for the natural law, whereas its observance is greatly promoted by the establishment of states. In view of all this, and since he who orders an end is understood to order also the means necessary to the end, God too, through the medium of reason's mandate, is understood antecedently to have enjoined upon the now numerous human race to establish states, which are animated, so to speak, by their highest authority. Their order also He expressly approves in the Holy Scriptures, and confirms its sacredness by special laws, and testifies that all this is peculiarly His care. Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen (1673) Page 87 © Copyright 2003, 2005 Lonang Institute CHAPTER 7 On the Functions of the Supreme Authority 1. What are the functions of the supreme authority, and in what ways its force exerts itself in states, can be clearly deduced from the nature and end of the latter. 2. In a state all have submitted their will to the will of the rulers, in regard to the things that make for the safety of the state, as the citizens are willing to do whatever the rulers desire. To make this possible it is necessary for the latter to make known to the former what is their will in such matters. They do this, then, not only by mandates addressed to individuals, concerning particular affairs, but also by general regulations, from which everyone may for all time be certain in regard to things to be done or left undone.


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To make this possible it is necessary for the latter to make known to the former what is their will in such matters. They do this, then, not only by mandates addressed to individuals, concerning particular affairs, but also by general regulations, from which everyone may for all time be certain in regard to things to be done or left undone. By these also is usually defined what ought to be regarded as a man's own, and what another's; what is to be held lawful or unlawful in that state, what honorable or dishonorable; what part of his natural freedom each one retains, or how each should adapt the enjoyment of his rights to the peace of the state; and finally what each has the right to exact of the other, and in what manner. For it is of the utmost importance to the fair name and peace of a state to have all these things clearly defined. 3. Moreover, it is the chief end of states, that by mutual agreement and help men should be safe from the losses and injuries which their fellow-men can, and usually do, inflict. To obtain this from the men with whom we unite to form the same community, it is not enough for them to agree to abstain from injuries, nor for the mere will of a superior to be made known to the citizens. But there is need of the fear of punishment, and of the power to enforce it. And the punishment, if it is to suffice for our purpose, must be so regulated that violation of the law is manifestly a greater hardship than the observance; and thus that the severity of the penalty outweigh the pleasure or profit received, or hoped for, from the injury. For, of two evils, men can only choose the less. There may indeed be many men who are not restrained from doing injury by a threatened penalty, but this is to be counted among the exceptional cases, which human conditions do not allow us altogether to avoid. 4.


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For, of two evils, men can only choose the less. There may indeed be many men who are not restrained from doing injury by a threatened penalty, but this is to be counted among the exceptional cases, which human conditions do not allow us altogether to avoid. 4. Furthermore, controversies very often arise in regard to the right application of the laws to single acts, and, if a violation of law is claimed, many points are encountered which have to be carefully weighed. Consequently, that peace may be maintained among the citizens, it is the duty of the supreme authority to hear and decide the suits of its citizens, to examine the acts of individuals, which are charged with being contrary to law, and to pronounce and execute a sentence in conformity with the laws. 5. But, in order that those who have united to form a state, may be safe against outsiders, it is the duty of the supreme authority to assemble, unite and arm, such a number of citizens, or hire such a number of substitutes, as shall seem needful for the common defense, in view of the uncertain numbers and strength of the enemy; and again to make peace, when that shall be expedient. And the interests both of war and peace are served by treaties, that the advantages of different states may be better shared with each other, and also a stronger enemy may be repelled by united forces, or reduced to order. Hence it belongs also to the supreme authority to enter into treaties that will serve both situations, and to bind all the subjects to the observance of the same; also to turn to the account of the state all advantages flowing therefrom. Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen (1673) Page 88 © Copyright 2003, 2005 Lonang Institute 6. Again, the affairs of a large state, whether in time of war or of peace, cannot be administered by one man, without ministers and magistrates.


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Hence it belongs also to the supreme authority to enter into treaties that will serve both situations, and to bind all the subjects to the observance of the same; also to turn to the account of the state all advantages flowing therefrom. Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen (1673) Page 88 © Copyright 2003, 2005 Lonang Institute 6. Again, the affairs of a large state, whether in time of war or of peace, cannot be administered by one man, without ministers and magistrates. Consequently the supreme authority must appoint men in its place to examine the controversies of citizens, to discover the intentions of neighbors, command soldiers, collect and disburse the resources of the state, and finally to look out for the interest of the state everywhere. And the possessor of supreme authority has the power and the obligation of compelling these men to do their duty, and of demanding an account of what they have done. 7. And inasmuch as the affairs of a state cannot be carried on either in war or peace without expense, it is the duty of the supreme authority to compel the citizens to meet the same. And this is done in various ways; for instance, the citizens may set aside for these needs some part of the property or income of the country they occupy; or individual citizens may contribute out of their own possessions, and at the same time give their services when necessary; or customs duties may be imposed upon wares imported or exported (the former, however, being a burden chiefly to the citizens, the latter to foreigners); or a suitable fraction may be taken from the price of commodities which are consumed. 8.


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8. Finally, since the actions of men are controlled by their several opinions, and most men are in the habit of judging things in accordance with their habit, or as they see the matter is commonly judged; and since very few can by their own ability distinguish truth and honor, it is expedient for the state that it resound with such teachings, publicly taught, as are in harmony with the proper end and need of states, and, at the same time, that the citizens' minds be imbued with them from boyhood. Hence it is the duty of the supreme authority to appoint men to give such instruction publicly. 9. These functions of the supreme authority are, moreover, so connected by nature, that, if the form of the state is to remain regular, they must, all together and singly, belong root and branch to one man. For if one or two of them are quite lacking, the government will be defective, and unfitted to accomplish the purpose of the state. But if, on the other hand, they are divided, so that some belong root and branch to one man and the rest to another, an irregular state, lacking in coherence, necessarily results. Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen (1673) Page 89 © Copyright 2003, 2005 Lonang Institute CHAPTER 8 On the Forms of Government 1. The supreme authority usually produces different forms or government, according as it is found in the possession of a single man, of a council consisting of a few, or of one including all. 2. And the forms of government are either regular or irregular. The former are found where the supreme authority is so concentrated in a single entity, that, from a single will, it is conveyed to every part and concern of the state, without division and separation. Where this is not found, the form of government will be irregular. 3.


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2. And the forms of government are either regular or irregular. The former are found where the supreme authority is so concentrated in a single entity, that, from a single will, it is conveyed to every part and concern of the state, without division and separation. Where this is not found, the form of government will be irregular. 3. Of the regular state there are three forms: first, when the supreme authority is in the hands of one man, and is called monarchy; second, when the supreme authority is in the hands of a council composed of selected citizens only, and is called aristocracy; third, when the supreme authority is in the hands of a council composed of all the heads of households, and is called democracy. In the first the possessor of power is called a monarch, in the second the nobles, in the third the people. 4. In all these forms the power is indeed the same. But monarchy has this conspicuous advantage over the other forms, that there deliberation and decision, that is, the actual exercise of government, do not demand the naming of times and places, but can take place anywhere and at any time, so that the monarch has always the power immediately to perform acts of government. But for a decision of nobles and people, who are not one natural person, they must come together at a fixed place and time, and there deliberate and decide in regard to public affairs. For otherwise the will of senate and people, which results from the unanimous opinions of a majority, cannot be learned. 5. But, as with other rights, so also with the supreme authority, it happens in one place to be well administered, in another ill and unwisely. Hence some states are called healthy, others unhealthy and corrupt. Yet it is unnecessary to invent special forms, or species, of state, in view of such maladies. As for the maladies, however, which afflict states, some are connected with persons, others with the state itself. Hence some are called personal defects, others constitutional. 6.


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5. But, as with other rights, so also with the supreme authority, it happens in one place to be well administered, in another ill and unwisely. Hence some states are called healthy, others unhealthy and corrupt. Yet it is unnecessary to invent special forms, or species, of state, in view of such maladies. As for the maladies, however, which afflict states, some are connected with persons, others with the state itself. Hence some are called personal defects, others constitutional. 6. Personal defects in a monarchy are these: if he who occupies the throne is devoid of the arts of reigning, and unconcerned, or insufficiently concerned, for the state, and prostitutes it to be rent asunder by the ambition or avarice of unworthy ministers; or if he is dreaded for his cruelty and proneness to anger; if, even without necessity, he delights in exposing the state to danger; if by extravagance or unwise largesses he dissipates the resources gathered to meet the expenses of the state; if he unreasonably accumulates money extorted from the citizens; if he is insulting and unjust, or has any other faults by which one gains the name of a bad prince. 7. Personal defects in an aristocracy are these: if by intrigue and base arts a way into the senate is open to wicked or incompetent men, while their betters are excluded; if the nobles are divided by factions; if they try to abuse the commons as if slaves, and to increase their private patrimony by appropriating the possessions of the state. 8. Personal defects in a democracy are these: if incompetent and turbulent men are in the habit of defending their opinions turbulently and rudely; if great talents, not dangerous to the state, are Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen (1673) Page 90 © Copyright 2003, 2005 Lonang Institute suppressed; if, because of fickleness, laws are made and unmade at random, and things approved are soon without reason disapproved; if low-bred and incompetent men are set over the administration of affairs. 9.


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8. Personal defects in a democracy are these: if incompetent and turbulent men are in the habit of defending their opinions turbulently and rudely; if great talents, not dangerous to the state, are Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen (1673) Page 90 © Copyright 2003, 2005 Lonang Institute suppressed; if, because of fickleness, laws are made and unmade at random, and things approved are soon without reason disapproved; if low-bred and incompetent men are set over the administration of affairs. 9. Personal defects applying to any kind of state are: if those upon whom the administration is incumbent perform their duty negligently or basely; and if citizens, who have no distinction left them but that of obedience, champ the bit. 10. But it is a constitutional defect when the laws or institutions of a state are not adapted to the genius of the people or of the country; or where these dispose the citizens to internal discord, or to incur the righteous indignation of their neighbors; or if they make the citizens incapable of performing the functions necessary to the preservation of the state; for example, if, owing to the laws, they can only lapse into an unwarlike sloth, or be unfitted to endure peace; or if the fundamental laws are so ordered that, because of them, public affairs cannot be transacted except slowly or with difficulty. 11. To such unhealthy states many apply special names also, calling a defective monarchy tyranny, a defective government of the few, oligarchy, a defective popular government, ochlocracy. Yet it frequently happens that many men in using these terms do not express so much a malady of the state, as their own feeling or displeasure with the present regime, or the rulers. For, if a man dislikes a king or a monarchy, he commonly calls even a lawful and good prince tyrant or despot, especially when he enforces the laws strictly.


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Yet it frequently happens that many men in using these terms do not express so much a malady of the state, as their own feeling or displeasure with the present regime, or the rulers. For, if a man dislikes a king or a monarchy, he commonly calls even a lawful and good prince tyrant or despot, especially when he enforces the laws strictly. So too the man who grieves at his exclusion from the senate, while thinking himself in no way inferior to the other senators, contemptuously and enviously calls them oligarchs, that is, a few persons who, though in no way superior to the rest, still exercise authority over their equals or betters, not without arrogance. Finally, haughty men, and those who dislike popular equality, seeing that in a democracy all have equal right to vote on a public question, whereas in every state the common people is the most numerous, call that an ochlocracy, that is, a state where the common herd is in power, and no privilege is left to uncommon men, such as they reckon themselves. 12. An irregular state is one in which that union, in which the essence of the community consists, is not so perfectly found, and that not by reason of a malady or defect inherent in the administration, but under such conditions that that form of government has by public law or custom been established as legitimate. But, since the varieties of aberration from a standard can be infinite, it is also impossible to establish certain definite species of irregular forms of government. The character, however, of such a form can be plainly understood from one or two examples. For instance, if in a republic the senate and people should both have an equal authority to carry on public business, neither being responsible to the other. Or, if in a kingdom the power of the nobles should so increase that henceforth they are subordinate to the king only as inferior colleagues. 13.


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The character, however, of such a form can be plainly understood from one or two examples. For instance, if in a republic the senate and people should both have an equal authority to carry on public business, neither being responsible to the other. Or, if in a kingdom the power of the nobles should so increase that henceforth they are subordinate to the king only as inferior colleagues. 13. We speak of systems of states where several perfect states are so connected by some special bond, that their several powers can be regarded as substantially the powers of one state. And systems arise chiefly in two ways; by a common king, or by a treaty. 14. A system arises through a common king, when several separate kingdoms have one and the same king as the result of an agreement, or by virtue of a marriage, an inheritance, or a victory, with the Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen (1673) Page 91 © Copyright 2003, 2005 Lonang Institute reservation, however, that they do not form one kingdom, but are separately administered by their common king according to the fundamental laws of each kingdom. 15. Another species of system appears when several neighboring states are connected by perpetual treaty in such a way that certain functions of the supreme authority, having especially to do with defense against outsiders, are to be exercised only with the consent of all, while the liberty and independence of the several states in other matters remains intact. Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen (1673) Page 92 © Copyright 2003, 2005 Lonang Institute CHAPTER 9 The Characteristics of Civil Authority 1. Every authority by which an entire state is ruled, in any form of government, has this quality, that it is supreme, that is, not dependent in its exercise upon any man as a superior, but operating according to its own judgment and discretion, so that its acts cannot be nullified by any man as a superior. 2.


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Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen (1673) Page 92 © Copyright 2003, 2005 Lonang Institute CHAPTER 9 The Characteristics of Civil Authority 1. Every authority by which an entire state is ruled, in any form of government, has this quality, that it is supreme, that is, not dependent in its exercise upon any man as a superior, but operating according to its own judgment and discretion, so that its acts cannot be nullified by any man as a superior. 2. It follows then that the same supreme authority is unaccountable, in other words, not bound so to render account to any human being, that, if that person did not approve the account, it would for that reason be liable to human penalties or constraint, proceeding as it were from a superior. 3. Connected with this is the fact that the same supreme authority is superior to human and civil laws as such, and thus not directly bound by them. For those laws are dependent upon the supreme authority in origin as well as in duration. Hence it is impossible for it to be bound by them, since it would otherwise be superior to itself. And yet, when the possessor of supreme authority has by a law enjoined certain obligations upon the citizens, and the matter applies to himself as well, it is proper, and helpful in lending authority to the law, for him to comply willingly with the same himself. 4. Lastly, the supreme authority has a special sanctity, so that not only is it wrong to resist its legitimate commands, but also the citizens must patiently bear with ifs severity, just as the peevishness of parents is borne by good children. And even when it has threatened the most cruel injuries, individuals will seek their safety in flight, or endure any amount of misfortune, rather than draw the sword against one who is indeed harsh, but still the father of his country. 5. Moreover, the supreme authority, especially in monarchies and aristocracies, is in some eases found to be absolute, in others limited.


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And even when it has threatened the most cruel injuries, individuals will seek their safety in flight, or endure any amount of misfortune, rather than draw the sword against one who is indeed harsh, but still the father of his country. 5. Moreover, the supreme authority, especially in monarchies and aristocracies, is in some eases found to be absolute, in others limited. Absolute authority is said to belong to the monarch who can administer it according to his own judgment, not according to the norm of definite and permanent statutes, but as the present exigency seems to demand; and who thus provides for the safety of the state at his own discretion, according as its circumstances require. 6. But one man's judgment is not immune from error, and his will, especially in the midst of such liberty, is easily bent in the worse direction. Hence it has seemed wise to same nations to circumscribe the exercise of his authority by certain limits. And this was done when, upon conferring the throne, they bound the king to certain laws concerning the administration of the functions of government. And whenever matters came up affecting the general interest, and incapable of being decided in advance, it was their will that these things should not be undertaken, except with the foreknowledge and consent of the people, or after their representatives had been called together in an assembly, that less occasion might be given the king to turn away from the welfare of the kingdom. 7. Finally, in kingdoms we often meet with a distinction in the method of holding the royal power -- a method which is not found to be uniform in all cases. For some kings are said to hold their kingdom as a patrimony, so that, at their caprice they can divide it, alienate and transfer it to anyone they please. This is particularly the case with those who have gained a kingdom for themselves by arms, and have acquired a people of their own.


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7. Finally, in kingdoms we often meet with a distinction in the method of holding the royal power -- a method which is not found to be uniform in all cases. For some kings are said to hold their kingdom as a patrimony, so that, at their caprice they can divide it, alienate and transfer it to anyone they please. This is particularly the case with those who have gained a kingdom for themselves by arms, and have acquired a people of their own. But the other kings, who have been chosen by the Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen (1673) Page 93 © Copyright 2003, 2005 Lonang Institute will of the people, although they have the highest right to exercise authority, are nevertheless unable to divide the kingdom at their pleasure, to alienate or transfer it. On the contrary, they are bound to follow the fundamental law, or established practice of the nation, in handing on the kingdom to their successors; and for this reason some compare them in a way with usufructuaries. Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen (1673) Page 94 © Copyright 2003, 2005 Lonang Institute CHAPTER 10 On the Methods of Acquiring Authority, Especially Monarchical 1. Although consent of the subjects is required for the establishment of any kind of legitimate authority, this is not everywhere obtained in the same way. For sometimes a people is compelled by the violence of war to consent to the authority of the victor; and again the citizens voluntarily give their consent to the appointment of a prince. 2. The violent method of acquiring authority is usually called seizure, that is, when one, sustained by a just cause for the war, and by the favor of strength in arms, and of fortune, so far reduces a nation that they are compelled henceforth to submit to his authority.


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For sometimes a people is compelled by the violence of war to consent to the authority of the victor; and again the citizens voluntarily give their consent to the appointment of a prince. 2. The violent method of acquiring authority is usually called seizure, that is, when one, sustained by a just cause for the war, and by the favor of strength in arms, and of fortune, so far reduces a nation that they are compelled henceforth to submit to his authority. And the legitimate title to his authority is derived not only from the fact that the victor, had he wished to take advantage of the rigors of war, could have deprived the vanquished of life altogether, and so gains additional credit for clemency, in permitting them to take the lesser evil; but also from the fact that the adversary, in going to war with one whom he had himself previously injured, and to whom he had refused to give fair satisfaction, exposes all his fortunes to the hazard of war, so that already he tacitly agreed in advance to any condition which the issue of the war is to assign to him. 3. But a kingdom is acquired by the voluntary consent of a people through the medium of an election, by which the nation to be established, or already established, voluntarily designates a certain man, as being, in its judgment, capable of authority. And when he has been notified of the decree of the people, and has accepted, and the people have promised their obedience, authority is conferred upon him. 4. Election in an already constituted state, if it follows the death of a former king, is usually preceded by an interregnum. Although in this the state falls back into the imperfect form, when the citizens are bound together merely by their first compact, still the latter gains much strength from the name of the country and the common feeling for it, and the fact that the property of most of the citizens is attached to that place.


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4. Election in an already constituted state, if it follows the death of a former king, is usually preceded by an interregnum. Although in this the state falls back into the imperfect form, when the citizens are bound together merely by their first compact, still the latter gains much strength from the name of the country and the common feeling for it, and the fact that the property of most of the citizens is attached to that place. And these facts constrain the good citizens to keep the peace with one another voluntarily for a time, and to endeavor all the more promptly to restore the full authority. But it is of great assistance, in avoiding the disadvantages apt to arise from an interregnum, if men are named in advance, in whose hands shall rest the administration of the state during a vacancy of the throne. 5. But in some countries, on the death of each monarch, a new election is held. In others the kingdom is conferred upon another man, with the understanding that it is to pass by succession to others without the intervention of a new election. Such right of succession is established either by the will of the king himself, or by that of the people. 6. Kings who hold their kingdom as a patrimony, can dispose as they please in regard to the succession; and their disposition will be respected, just as is the last will of private individuals, especially in the case of one who founded or acquired the kingdom. In so doing it will be permitted, if one so choose, to divide the kingdom among several children, daughters even being not excluded; or even to name as heir an adopted son, or a natural son, or one who is connected with the king by no tie of blood at all. Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen (1673) Page 95 © Copyright 2003, 2005 Lonang Institute 7.


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In so doing it will be permitted, if one so choose, to divide the kingdom among several children, daughters even being not excluded; or even to name as heir an adopted son, or a natural son, or one who is connected with the king by no tie of blood at all. Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen (1673) Page 95 © Copyright 2003, 2005 Lonang Institute 7. When, however, a king of this sort has made no special disposition in regard to the succession, it is presumed in the first place, that he did not by any means wish his kingdom to expire with himself, but that, on account of the ordinary human affection, it should devolve in any case upon his children. It is further assumed that he wished the monarchical form to be maintained after his death, as the form he had himself approved by his example; also that the kingdom should remain undivided, since division involves the sundering both of the kingdom and of the royal family; further, that, among those of the same degree, the male should be preferred to the female, the first-born to those born later; and finally that, if children are lacking, the kingdom should devolve upon the nearest blood relation. 8 But in such kingdoms as were in the beginning established by the free will of the people, the order of succession depends originally upon the will of that same people. And if they, in conferring upon the king his authority, have also given him the right to appoint his successor, the man of his choice will succeed him. Where this has not been done, the people are understood to have reserved that right to themselves. And if the people have been pleased to confer a kingdom with hereditary rights upon an elected king, they have either made the order of succession like that of ordinary inheritances, so far as the welfare of the kingdom permits, or have modified it in some particular way. 9.


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Where this has not been done, the people are understood to have reserved that right to themselves. And if the people have been pleased to confer a kingdom with hereditary rights upon an elected king, they have either made the order of succession like that of ordinary inheritances, so far as the welfare of the kingdom permits, or have modified it in some particular way. 9. When the people have simply bidden the king to hold the kingdom with hereditary rights, and have added no particulars, it was indeed their will that the kingdom should devolve after the manner of private inheritances, but not without some modification. For the welfare of states requires that succession to a throne should differ from private inheritances substantially in these respects: (1) the kingdom must be indivisible; (2) the succession should be confined to those who are descended from the first king; (3) only those born in accordance with the laws of the country shall succeed, excluding not only bastards, but also adoptive heirs; (4) in the same degree, males shall be preferred to females, though older; (5) the successor should recognize the fact that the kingdom is a gift of the people, not of his predecessor. 10. But as inextricable controversies could easily arise, as to which of two members of the reigning family was most nearly related to the late king, when they were far removed from the founder of the house, for this reason many nations have introduced the lineal succession. It consists in this, that each draw, as it were, a perpendicular line, following his descent from the founder of the reigning family; and that members of the family be called to the throne, according as their line takes precedence over the others. And there is no passing from one line to another, so long as anyone of the former line survives, in spite of the fact that there may be someone who is very closely related, and in a nearer degree, to the deceased king. 11. The commonest forms of lineal succession are the cognate and the agnate.


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And there is no passing from one line to another, so long as anyone of the former line survives, in spite of the fact that there may be someone who is very closely related, and in a nearer degree, to the deceased king. 11. The commonest forms of lineal succession are the cognate and the agnate. In the former women are not excluded, but postponed to men in the same line, with a return to them, however, if there is a failure of males of a preferred or equal degree. The latter form, on the other hand, forever excludes women and their children, even males. 12. In case a controversy should arise in regard to the succession in a patrimonial kingdom, it will be best to take the matter before arbitrators among the royal family. If the succession has been determined by will of the people, a declaration of the people will remove the uncertainty. Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen (1673) Page 96 © Copyright 2003, 2005 Lonang Institute CHAPTER 11 On the Duty of Rulers 1. What precepts make up the duty of rulers, is clearly deduced from the character and end of states, and from a consideration of the functions of the supreme authority. 2. Here it is above all required that rulers themselves diligently learn all that tends to a complete knowledge of that duty; since no one can perform creditably what he has not learned thoroughly. Hence the prince must put aside those pursuits which do not make for this end. He must restrict pleasures, delights and empty employments, in so far as they interfere with that end. Accordingly he must also admit to his intimacy men of sense, skilled in affairs; while flatterers, triflers, and those who have learned only useless accomplishments, must be kept at a distance. But, in order to know how rightly to apply the general precepts of statecraft, he must himself learn as intimately as possible the condition of his state, and the character of the subject people.


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He must restrict pleasures, delights and empty employments, in so far as they interfere with that end. Accordingly he must also admit to his intimacy men of sense, skilled in affairs; while flatterers, triflers, and those who have learned only useless accomplishments, must be kept at a distance. But, in order to know how rightly to apply the general precepts of statecraft, he must himself learn as intimately as possible the condition of his state, and the character of the subject people. Furthermore, he must devote himself especially to those virtues whose practice is most conspicuous in so arduous an office, and adapt his habits to the dignity of such eminence. 3. The general law of rulers is this: the welfare of the people is the supreme law. For authority was conferred upon them, with the intention that the end for which states have been established, should thereby be insured. Hence they ought also to believe that nothing is to their private advantage, if it is not also to the advantage of the state. 4. For the internal tranquillity of states it is necessary that the wills of the citizens be controlled and guided, as is expedient for the welfare of the state. Hence it is the duty of rulers not only to prescribe laws suited to that end, but also so to confirm the public education, that the citizens shall accept legal prescription not so much from fear of punishment as by habit. It contributes to this end also, to take care that Christian doctrine, in its pure and unmixed form, shall nourish in the state, and that in the public schools such teachings be imparted, as are in conformity with the purpose of states. 5. It is expedient for the same purpose to have plain and clear laws in writing, concerning matters of the most common occurrence among the citizens. There must not, however, be more provisions of the civil laws than conduce to the good of the state and its citizens.


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It contributes to this end also, to take care that Christian doctrine, in its pure and unmixed form, shall nourish in the state, and that in the public schools such teachings be imparted, as are in conformity with the purpose of states. 5. It is expedient for the same purpose to have plain and clear laws in writing, concerning matters of the most common occurrence among the citizens. There must not, however, be more provisions of the civil laws than conduce to the good of the state and its citizens. For, in regard to what they ought to do, or leave undone, men more usually deliberate in the light of natural reason than by knowledge of the law. Hence, if there are more laws than can be readily retained in memory, and they forbid things which reason does not in itself prohibit, in ignorance and without any evil intent, people must necessarily stumble upon the laws, as upon a snare. Thus an unnecessary inconvenience is caused the citizens by the rulers, which is contrary to the purpose of states. 6. But since it is in vain that laws are passed, if the rulers allow them to be violated with impunity, it is accordingly their duty to have charge of the execution of the same; to see to it that every man gets his rights without tedious delays, evasions and vexations; to inflict penalties according to the gravity of each offense, and the intention and ill-will of the transgressor; and not to bestow pardon without a sufficient reason; since it is unjust and most productive of irritation among the citizens, other things being equal, to treat differently those who have deserved the same treatment. 7. Again, just as nothing must be forbidden under a penalty, if not to the advantage of the state, Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen (1673) Page 97 © Copyright 2003, 2005 Lonang Institute penalties too must be regulated, so that they are in proportion to that object, and also that the citizens may not suffer more than the state gains.


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7. Again, just as nothing must be forbidden under a penalty, if not to the advantage of the state, Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen (1673) Page 97 © Copyright 2003, 2005 Lonang Institute penalties too must be regulated, so that they are in proportion to that object, and also that the citizens may not suffer more than the state gains. For the rest, if penalties are to accomplish their aim, it is clear that they must be made just so serious, that their seventy outweighs the gain and pleasure which can be derived from the act forbidden by the law. 8. Moreover, inasmuch as the purpose with which men united to form a community was to insure security from injuries inflicted by others, it is the duty of rulers to prevent citizens from injuring each other, and this with a severity proportioned to the increased opportunities for injury afforded by their living constantly together. And the differences of class and rank must not go so far that the stronger can at their pleasure insult the weaker. Moreover, it conflicts with the aim of the supreme authority, if citizens avenge by private violence the wrongs they fancy have been done them. 9. Furthermore, although a single prince is not equal to the task of carrying on directly all the business of a large state, so that of necessity ministers must be called to share his cares, nevertheless, just as the latter borrow all their authority from the ruler, so the responsibility for their doings, both good and bad, still remains his in the end. For this reason, and because affairs are conducted well or ill, according to the character of the ministers, rulers are bound to employ in the service of the state honest and capable men, and from time to time to inquire into their acts, and finally to reward or punish them, according as they are found to have done their part, in order that the rest may understand that public business is to be conducted with no less fidelity and diligence than private.


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For this reason, and because affairs are conducted well or ill, according to the character of the ministers, rulers are bound to employ in the service of the state honest and capable men, and from time to time to inquire into their acts, and finally to reward or punish them, according as they are found to have done their part, in order that the rest may understand that public business is to be conducted with no less fidelity and diligence than private. So also, in view of the fact that wicked men are lured to the commission of crime by hope of impunity, which they find easiest of attainment where judges are open to corruption, it is the duty of rulers severely to punish such judges, as promoters of crimes, by which the security of the citizens is destroyed. Moreover, though the ordinary conduct of affairs is to be intrusted to ministers, the rulers will nevertheless never refuse to lend an ear patiently to the complaints and desires of the citizens. 10. Since citizens are not bound to bear tributes and other burdens, except in so far as these are necessary to meet the expenses of the state in peace and war, it will therefore be the duty of the rulers in this connection not to exact more than the necessities, or conspicuous advantage, of the state require, and, so far as possible, to regulate the burdens so that the citizens shall be injured as little as possible by them. Also the burdens must be distributed in due proportion, and no immunities conceded to some citizens, to the loss and oppression of the rest. And the revenue yielded must be spent for the needs of the state, not dissipated in luxury, largesses, superfluous display, or vanities. Finally, care must be taken that appropriations correspond to income, and in case the latter is insufficient, the remedy must be found in economy, the unnecessary expenses being cut down. 11.


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Also the burdens must be distributed in due proportion, and no immunities conceded to some citizens, to the loss and oppression of the rest. And the revenue yielded must be spent for the needs of the state, not dissipated in luxury, largesses, superfluous display, or vanities. Finally, care must be taken that appropriations correspond to income, and in case the latter is insufficient, the remedy must be found in economy, the unnecessary expenses being cut down. 11. Rulers are not indeed bound to support their subjects, except that charity commands a special care of those who, because of some undeserved misfortune, are unable to sustain themselves. However, since the funds necessary to the maintenance of the state are to be gathered from the property of the citizens, and the strength of a state consists also in the courage and the riches of its citizens, rulers must, therefore, see to it, so far as in them lies, that the property of the citizens increases. It makes for this end if the citizens are encouraged to get the largest possible return from the land and its waters; to apply their industry to the materials produced in their country, and not to purchase from others the labor they can conveniently perform themselves. And this is brought about, if the mechanic arts are fostered. It is of the greatest importance also to cultivate trade, and, in Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen (1673) Page 98 © Copyright 2003, 2005 Lonang Institute maritime countries, navigation. And not only must indolence be proscribed, but the citizens must also be recalled to economy by sumptuary laws, forbidding superfluous expenses, especially those which transfer the wealth of the citizens to foreigners. However, the example of the rulers is more effectual in this matter than any laws. 12.


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It is of the greatest importance also to cultivate trade, and, in Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen (1673) Page 98 © Copyright 2003, 2005 Lonang Institute maritime countries, navigation. And not only must indolence be proscribed, but the citizens must also be recalled to economy by sumptuary laws, forbidding superfluous expenses, especially those which transfer the wealth of the citizens to foreigners. However, the example of the rulers is more effectual in this matter than any laws. 12. Moreover, the soundness and internal strength of states is brought about by the union of the citizens, and the more carefully the latter is maintained, the greater is the effectiveness with which the power of the authority is distributed through the whole body of the state Therefore, it is incumbent upon rulers to see to it that factions do not arise in the state; that some citizens are not linked together by special compacts; and that they are not all, or a part of them, on whatever pretext, sacred or profane, more dependent on any other man, whether within or without the state, than upon their lawful prince; and that they do not imagine that more protection for themselves is found in any one than in him. 13. Finally, since the international condition of states is a peace that is quite untrustworthy, it is the duty of rulers to take care that the courage of the citizens and their skill in arms are fostered, and all the things needed to repel an attack made ready in time -- fortified places, arms, soldiers, and money, the sinews of action. But, even assuming a just cause for war, no one is to be deliberately attacked, unless a very safe opportunity favors, and the circumstances of the state easily permit. To the same end, the plans and undertakings of neighbors must be carefully ascertained and watched; and friendships and alliances must be contracted with prudence. Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen (1673) Page 99 © Copyright 2003, 2005 Lonang Institute CHAPTER 12 On Civil Laws in Particular 1.


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But, even assuming a just cause for war, no one is to be deliberately attacked, unless a very safe opportunity favors, and the circumstances of the state easily permit. To the same end, the plans and undertakings of neighbors must be carefully ascertained and watched; and friendships and alliances must be contracted with prudence. Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen (1673) Page 99 © Copyright 2003, 2005 Lonang Institute CHAPTER 12 On Civil Laws in Particular 1. It remains for us to consider also the functions of the supreme authority in particular and the points that are to be especially observed in regard to them. In this the first place belongs to the civil laws, which are the decrees of the civil ruler, by which it is enjoined upon the citizens what they ought to do in the civil life, and what they should leave undone. 2. Now they are called civil laws chiefly for two reasons, either as regards their authority or their origin. In the former sense, the term civil laws can be applied to all laws according to which justice is administered in the civil court, from whatever source they draw their origin. In the latter sense, we call those laws civil, which proceeded in the first place from the will of the supreme civil authority, and have to do with those matters which have not been defined by the natural and divine law, but make for the particular advantage of individual states. 3. But the civil laws should ordain nothing which is not for the good of the state. And so it is of great importance to the order and tranquillity of the civil life, that the natural law should be well observed by the citizens. Hence it is incumbent upon the rulers to give to that law the force and effectiveness of civil law. For in most men we find such depravity, that neither the evident utility of the natural law, nor the fear of the Divinity, is enough to restrain it.


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3. But the civil laws should ordain nothing which is not for the good of the state. And so it is of great importance to the order and tranquillity of the civil life, that the natural law should be well observed by the citizens. Hence it is incumbent upon the rulers to give to that law the force and effectiveness of civil law. For in most men we find such depravity, that neither the evident utility of the natural law, nor the fear of the Divinity, is enough to restrain it. Therefore, by bestowing upon natural laws the force of civil laws, the supreme authority has the power to cause the uprightness of the civil life to be somehow maintained. 4. And the force of the civil laws consists in this, that a penal sanction is added to the precepts in regard to doing or leaving undone; in other words, that there is a definition of the penalty which, in the court of the state will await the man who has failed to do what was to be done or has done what should have been left undone. Natural laws, lacking this penal sanction, are violated with impunity in the human court, punishment being reserved, however, by the divine tribunal. 5. Furthermore, because the character of the civil life does not permit that each man exact by his own violence whatever he thinks is due him, for that reason the civil laws at this point too come to the aid of the natural law, in affording an action for obligations under that law, by virtue of which action the obligations can be enforced in a civil court, with the assistance of a magistrate. Whatever has failed to be thus confirmed by civil laws, cannot be exacted against the will of the other party, but depends solely upon the honor and conscience of the debtors. It is the custom, however, of the civil laws to furnish an action particularly for those obligations which have been contracted between men by express agreements.


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Whatever has failed to be thus confirmed by civil laws, cannot be exacted against the will of the other party, but depends solely upon the honor and conscience of the debtors. It is the custom, however, of the civil laws to furnish an action particularly for those obligations which have been contracted between men by express agreements. For the others, resting upon some undefined duty of the natural law, they have generally refused an action, that the better men might have opportunity to practice their virtue, and that they might gain high praise, if they appeared to have done well without compulsion. Often, too, the matter did not seem so important that the judge should be troubled about it. 6. Again, since many precepts of the natural law are indefinite, their application being left to the discretion of every man, the civil law, with a view to the order and tranquillity of the state, is accustomed to assign to such actions their time, manner, place, and persons, also to determine other circumstances, and at times to encourage men by rewards to undertake them. Also, if there is any obscurity in the natural law, it belongs to the civil law to explain it. And this explanation the citizens Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen (1673) Page 100 © Copyright 2003, 2005 Lonang Institute are bound to follow in practice, in spite of the fact that their own private opinion may perhaps take a different direction. 7. Moreover, since by the natural law, many acts have been left to the judgment and discretion of the individual, but in a state peace and public order require that these acts be regulated in a uniform manner, the civil laws for that reason usually prescribe for acts and matters of this kind a certain form, as is the case in last wills, in contracts, and many others. For the same reason also civil laws are in the habit of circumscribing the exercise of those rights which a man has naturally. 8.


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7. Moreover, since by the natural law, many acts have been left to the judgment and discretion of the individual, but in a state peace and public order require that these acts be regulated in a uniform manner, the civil laws for that reason usually prescribe for acts and matters of this kind a certain form, as is the case in last wills, in contracts, and many others. For the same reason also civil laws are in the habit of circumscribing the exercise of those rights which a man has naturally. 8. To the civil laws, in so far as they do not openly conflict with the divine law, the citizens owe obedience, not from mere dread of punishment, but from an intrinsic obligation, confirmed by the natural law itself; for among its precepts is this also, that one must obey lawful rulers. 9. Finally, citizens are bound to obey particular commands of their rulers, no less than the general laws. In this, however, we must notice whether the ruler commands the citizen to do something, as an act belonging to the citizen, or bids him undertake the mere execution of an act, which must belong properly to the ruler. For in the latter case, necessity being imposed by the ruler, a citizen can without sin on his own part do something whereby the ruler himself commits a sin. But a citizen cannot rightly commit in his own name a sin repugnant to the natural and divine law. Hence it follows that, if a citizen, by command of the ruler, bears arms, even in unjust war, he does not sin. But, if a man, by command of the same ruler, condemns an innocent person, bears false witness, or slanders another, he certainly does sin. For a citizen serves as a soldier in the name of the state, but judges, testifies, and accuses in his own name. Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen (1673) Page 101 © Copyright 2003, 2005 Lonang Institute CHAPTER 13 On the Power of Life and Death 1. Power over the lives of the citizens belongs to the supreme civil authority in two ways, indirectly and directly.


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But, if a man, by command of the same ruler, condemns an innocent person, bears false witness, or slanders another, he certainly does sin. For a citizen serves as a soldier in the name of the state, but judges, testifies, and accuses in his own name. Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen (1673) Page 101 © Copyright 2003, 2005 Lonang Institute CHAPTER 13 On the Power of Life and Death 1. Power over the lives of the citizens belongs to the supreme civil authority in two ways, indirectly and directly. The former is for the defense of the state, the latter to check crimes. 2. For, since the violence of foreigners must often be repelled by violence, or our rights must be obtained from them by force, the supreme authority certainly may compel its citizens to carry this out, in which case there is no intention that the citizens shall lose their lives, but they are merely exposed to the danger of death. And that in such dangers the citizens may be able to conduct themselves with energy and skill, the supreme authority is bound to train and prepare them. Moreover, no citizen may render himself incapable of military service, from fear of that danger. And the enrolled soldier will by no means desert his assigned post out of fear, but rather will fight to the last breath; unless he knows it to be the will of the ruler, that he preserve his life, rather than the position; or else, in case the place is not worth so much to the state as the lives of those citizens. 3. On the other hand, the supreme authority can take the lives of citizens directly on account of flagrant crimes, and as a punishment, which, however, falls upon the man's other possessions also. And at this point we must make some general explanations of the nature of punishment. 4. Punishment then is an evil that one suffers, inflicted for an evil that one has caused; in other words, a vexatious evil imposed upon a man by authority and forcibly, in view of a previous offense.


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3. On the other hand, the supreme authority can take the lives of citizens directly on account of flagrant crimes, and as a punishment, which, however, falls upon the man's other possessions also. And at this point we must make some general explanations of the nature of punishment. 4. Punishment then is an evil that one suffers, inflicted for an evil that one has caused; in other words, a vexatious evil imposed upon a man by authority and forcibly, in view of a previous offense. For although certain acts may often be imposed upon a man as a punishment, the point, however, is that they are laborious and vexatious to the doer, and that, while he is acting, a certain suffering is thereby imposed upon him. Moreover, punishment must be inflicted upon unwilling subjects, because otherwise it would not accomplish its purpose, which is to deter men from wrongdoing by its severity. And this effect does not belong to the things that one willingly accepts. Finally the character of a punishment does not attach to evils which come to one in war or battle, while resisting, since they are not ordered by authority; nor to those which a man suffers unjustly, since they do not come to one in view of a previous offense. 5. But although natural liberty has this effect, that one who is in that state and has no superior but God, is liable to the divine punishments only, with the introduction of authority among men, the safety of communities has assigned to rulers this further power, that they themselves restrain the wickedness of their subjects by executing punishment, so that the larger number may be able to live in mutual security. 6. Again, although there appears to be no injustice in letting the evil-doer suffer evil, nevertheless in human punishments we have not merely to consider what evil has been committed, but also what advantage can be derived from the punishment.


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6. Again, although there appears to be no injustice in letting the evil-doer suffer evil, nevertheless in human punishments we have not merely to consider what evil has been committed, but also what advantage can be derived from the punishment. Thus also punishments are by no means to be inflicted, with the intent to let the injured party gloat, and take pleasure in the pain and punishment of him who did the injury. For this pleasure is dearly inhuman and contrary to sociability. 7. The real purpose of human punishments is the prevention of wrongs and injuries; and this is achieved, either if the wrongdoer is reformed, or others by his example, so that they do not desire to do wrong in the future, or else if the wrong-doer is so restrained that he cannot henceforth injure Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen (1673) Page 102 © Copyright 2003, 2005 Lonang Institute anyone. Which can also be stated in these terms: in punishment regard is had to the interest either of the wrong-doer, or of him who would have gained, if the wrong had not been done, and who has thus been injured by the wrong deed; or for the interest of all without distinction. 8. In the first place, then, in inflicting punishment regard is had to the interest of the wrong-doer, when his spirit is reformed by the pain of punishment, and the desire to do wrong quenched by the same means. This kind of punishment is in many states left to heads of households, to exercise over their domestics. But one is evidently not permitted to go so far as a death-penalty, for that one object, since the dead man cannot be reformed. 9. And then there is involved in punishment the interest of the injured party, that for the future he may suffer nothing similar from the same man or others. The former object is attained if the wrong-doer is destroyed, or else, if, without prejudice to his life, the power to injure is taken from him; or if by his punishment he learns not to offend.


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But one is evidently not permitted to go so far as a death-penalty, for that one object, since the dead man cannot be reformed. 9. And then there is involved in punishment the interest of the injured party, that for the future he may suffer nothing similar from the same man or others. The former object is attained if the wrong-doer is destroyed, or else, if, without prejudice to his life, the power to injure is taken from him; or if by his punishment he learns not to offend. The latter object may be attained by open and public punishment, with ceremony suited to inspire terror in others. 10. Finally, in punishment the interest of all is sought, when the aim, namely, is to prevent the man who has injured one, from going on to injure others, or that, frightened by his example, the rest may abstain from similar crimes. And this is attained in the same way as above. 11. If, then, we proceed to consider both the ends of punishment and the condition of the human race, it is evident that not all sins are of such a character that it is at all proper for them to be punished in a human court. Hence we exempt from human punishment acts that are merely inward, that is, the pleasurable thought of some sin, greed, desire, intention without effect, even if they should come to the knowledge of others by a subsequent confession. For, as harm comes to no one from such an inward motion, it is not to the advantage of anyone either, that a man be punished for the same. 12. It would also be excessively harsh to subject to human punishments those very small lapses which, in the present state of human nature, it is not given us to escape, no matter how great the attention one endeavors to bestow upon them. 13.


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For, as harm comes to no one from such an inward motion, it is not to the advantage of anyone either, that a man be punished for the same. 12. It would also be excessively harsh to subject to human punishments those very small lapses which, in the present state of human nature, it is not given us to escape, no matter how great the attention one endeavors to bestow upon them. 13. Moreover, many acts are unnoticed by human laws, on account of the peace of the state, or for other reasons; for example, in case a good act will be more conspicuous, if it does not seem to have been undertaken with any regard to a penalty; or where it is not worth while to trouble the judges, or if the question is most difficult to decide, or a really inveterate evil cannot be removed without a convulsion in the state. 14. Finally, it is necessary to exempt also from human punishment the vices of mind, resulting from the common corruption of mankind, and so numerous that there would be no subjects left, if you should wish to punish those faults with severe penalties, so long as they have not broken out in wicked acts; for example, there are ambition, avarice, inhumanity, ingratitude, hypocrisy, envy, arrogance, anger, animosity and the like. 15. However, if some offenses worthy of human punishment have been committed, it is not always necessary for a punishment to be exacted. It sometimes happens, in fact, that pardon for their offense Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen (1673) Page 103 © Copyright 2003, 2005 Lonang Institute can properly be given to the culprits. This, however, should not be done without serious reasons. Among such are these: if the ends of punishment in a certain case do not seem necessary, or if pardon is likely to produce a greater advantage than is punishment, or if the ends of punishment can be better attained in some other way.


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It sometimes happens, in fact, that pardon for their offense Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen (1673) Page 103 © Copyright 2003, 2005 Lonang Institute can properly be given to the culprits. This, however, should not be done without serious reasons. Among such are these: if the ends of punishment in a certain case do not seem necessary, or if pardon is likely to produce a greater advantage than is punishment, or if the ends of punishment can be better attained in some other way. Also, in case the guilty party alleges, as worthy of special reward, his own great services to the state, or those of his relatives; or if he is recommended by some other distinction, as. for instance, by a rare art; or if it is hoped that the offense will be wiped out by noble deeds; especially where ignorance in some form, though not altogether without blame, has been involved, or if the particular reason for the law has ceased to apply to the act in question. Often, too, pardon must be granted on account of the number of the guilty, that the state may not be depopulated by punishments. 16. But the seriousness of offenses is estimated from the object upon which it was committed, according as that is accounted noble and valuable; also from the effect, according as a great loss or a small one results for the state; and finally from the wickedness of the intent, which is gathered from various indications; for example, if the man could easily have resisted the reasons by which he was impelled to sin; or if, in addition to the general, there was also some particular, reason which should have deterred him from wrongdoing; or where peculiar circumstances aggravate the deed; or if a man has a disposition capable of resisting the wiles of wicked men. Moreover, we usually consider whether a man was the first to do wrong, or seduced by the example of others, whether once, or oftener, and after advice has been spent in vain. 17.


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Moreover, we usually consider whether a man was the first to do wrong, or seduced by the example of others, whether once, or oftener, and after advice has been spent in vain. 17. The kind of punishment, however, and the precise amount to be inflicted for each offense, it rests with the supreme civil authority to define. And it should in this matter have only the advantage of the state before its eyes. Hence it is possible and a frequent occurrence for the same penalty to be imposed for two unequal offenses. For the equality which judges are instructed to observe with regard to defendants, is understood to concern defendants who have committed the same kind of offense, in so far as an offense punished in the one case ought not, without the weightiest reason, to be condoned in the other. But although man ought, so far as possible, to be more merciful toward man, sometimes, however, the welfare of the state and security of the citizens require that penalties be aggravated; for example, if there is need of a more heroic remedy against increasing vices; or when an offense is most destructive to the state. But in general, with regard to the scale of penalties, care must be taken that they be sufficient to repress that desire by which men are carried into the crime for which the penalties are established. Also severer penalties must not be exacted than have been defined by law, unless very extreme circumstances aggravate the deed. 18. But the same penalty does not affect all equally, and thus does not produce the same effect upon all in repressing the desire to do wrong. Therefore, both in the general assignment of penalties, and in the application of them to individuals, regard must be had to the person of the delinquent himself, and those qualities of his which may increase or diminish his sense of punishment; for example, age, sex, rank, wealth, strength, and the like. 19.


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18. But the same penalty does not affect all equally, and thus does not produce the same effect upon all in repressing the desire to do wrong. Therefore, both in the general assignment of penalties, and in the application of them to individuals, regard must be had to the person of the delinquent himself, and those qualities of his which may increase or diminish his sense of punishment; for example, age, sex, rank, wealth, strength, and the like. 19. Again, just as no one can have a penalty properly so-called visited upon him in a human court for another man's offense, so, in case wrong has been done by some society, he who did not consent thereto will not be bound thereby. And hence from such dissenter nothing can be taken away which he did not acquire on account and by virtue of the society. Yet in general when a society is punished, even the innocent usually suffer loss. Moreover, the offenses of societies expire when no one Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen (1673) Page 104 © Copyright 2003, 2005 Lonang Institute survives any longer of those by whose consent and cooperation the misdeed was committed. 20. It happens frequently, however, that the crime of one man furnishes an occasion whereby a disadvantage comes to others, or a benefit previously hoped for is intercepted. Thus, in case the property of parents is confiscated on account of a crime, even innocent children are reduced to poverty. And when the defendant flees, his security is compelled to pay the fine, not because of guilt, but because he voluntarily pledged himself in such a contingency. Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen (1673) Page 105 © Copyright 2003, 2005 Lonang Institute CHAPTER 14 On Reputation 1. Reputation in general is the value of persons in the common life, according to which value they are capable of being placed on an equality with other persons, or compared with them, and either preferred or postponed to them. 2. It is divided into the simple and the intensive.


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Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen (1673) Page 105 © Copyright 2003, 2005 Lonang Institute CHAPTER 14 On Reputation 1. Reputation in general is the value of persons in the common life, according to which value they are capable of being placed on an equality with other persons, or compared with them, and either preferred or postponed to them. 2. It is divided into the simple and the intensive. Both are considered with reference to those who live in natural liberty, or to those who live together in the civil state. 3. Simple reputation, as between those who live in natural liberty, consists principally in this, that a man show himself, and be regarded as one with whom men can deal as with a good man, and as one who is ready to live with others according to the precept of the natural law. 4. And this reputation is maintained intact, so long as a man has not yet violated the natural law as regards others by some wicked or flagrant deed, knowingly and purposely, with malice aforethought. Hence also, one is naturally accounted a good man until the contrary is proved. 5. Reputation of this kind is diminished by flagrant deeds maliciously perpetrated against the natural law, -- deeds which cause the need of greater circumspection, if one is to deal with such a person. This stain, however, can be wiped out, by making a voluntary reparation of the damage caused, and by giving proof of serious repentance. 6. It is likewise utterly destroyed by a manner and mode of life aimed directly at the promiscuous hurting of others, and at making profit out of the evident injury of others. So long as men of this type are unwilling to come to their senses, they can be treated as common enemies by all whom their malice can in any way touch. Yet these men can recover their reputation, when they have refunded the damages, or obtained pardon, and giving up a vicious mode of life, have entered upon one that is honorable. 7.


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6. It is likewise utterly destroyed by a manner and mode of life aimed directly at the promiscuous hurting of others, and at making profit out of the evident injury of others. So long as men of this type are unwilling to come to their senses, they can be treated as common enemies by all whom their malice can in any way touch. Yet these men can recover their reputation, when they have refunded the damages, or obtained pardon, and giving up a vicious mode of life, have entered upon one that is honorable. 7. Simple reputation, in the case of those who live in states, means that a man has not been declared a vicious member of the state, in accordance with its laws and customs, and that he is considered of some account. 8. It is lost in a state, cither because of one's condition alone, or on account of crime. The former kind of loss takes place in two ways: when that condition naturally involves no shame, or else when it is connected with vice, or at least that assumption. The first of these occurs in some states, where slaves are of no account; the second obtains with regard to panders, harlots, and the like, who indeed enjoy the common defense, so long as they are officially tolerated in the state, but are to be excluded from the company of honorable men. This also happens to some who are occupied with things loathsome or vile, though not naturally vicious. 9. By crime, on the other hand, reputation is clearly lost, when according to the civil laws, and for a certain crime, a man is branded with infamy, and this whether he is further punished with death, and his memory thus branded, or he is expelled from the state, or retained in the state, as an infamous and rotten member. Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen (1673) Page 106 © Copyright 2003, 2005 Lonang Institute 10. It is plain, moreover, that simple reputation, or natural honor, cannot be taken away from a man by the mere will of the rulers.


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Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen (1673) Page 106 © Copyright 2003, 2005 Lonang Institute 10. It is plain, moreover, that simple reputation, or natural honor, cannot be taken away from a man by the mere will of the rulers. For this in no way makes for the advantage of the state, and so can by no means be understood as a power bestowed upon the rulers. Thus also a man who executes the orders of the state, in the capacity of a mere minister, cannot, it seems, contract real infamy. 11. Intensive reputation is that by virtue of which persons, otherwise equal as regards the simple reputation, are preferred to one another, according as one, more than another, possesses those qualities by which others are prompted to render honor. And honor is, properly, the expression of our judgment of another's superiority. 12. This intensive reputation can be considered with reference to those who live in natural liberty, or to the citizens of the same state. We must next weigh its bases, and in fact according as these produce a mere fitness to expect honor from others, or a right strictly so-called, by which the honor can be claimed from others as one's due. 13. The bases of intensive reputation in general are all those things which involve conspicuous perfection and superiority, or are thought to prove the same, the effect of this superiority being in harmony with the purpose of the natural law, or of states. Examples are perspicacity of mind, and the ability to learn various sciences and arts, a keen judgment in administering affairs, a mind strong and unshaken from without, superior to temptations and alarms, eloquence, beauty and dexterity of body, the blessings of fortune, and above all remarkable achievements. 14. All of these, however, produce merely an imperfect right, that is, a fitness to receive honor and respect from others. Hence, if a man refuses it to others, in spite even of their high merits, he does no injury, but is merely in bad repute for his churlishness and rudeness.


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14. All of these, however, produce merely an imperfect right, that is, a fitness to receive honor and respect from others. Hence, if a man refuses it to others, in spite even of their high merits, he does no injury, but is merely in bad repute for his churlishness and rudeness. But a perfect right to receive honor from another, or the outward signs of it, is derived either from the authority which one has over the other, or from an agreement entered into with him on this point, or from a law made or approved by their common master. 15. But as for princes and whole nations, they usually defend their preeminence and precedence, by alleging chiefly the antiquity of the kingdom and the family, the size and wealth of their subject territory, and their power, also the nature of the power by which the king possesses the authority in his kingdom, and the splendor of his title. All of these, however, do not in themselves produce a perfect right to precedence over other kings and nations, unless this has been acquired by agreement or concession on their part. 16. Among citizens, on the other hand, it is the duty of the ruler to designate grades of dignity. In this, however, he rightly regards each man's superiority and fitness to serve the state. And whatever rank he has assigned to a citizen, the latter has a right to defend against his fellow-citizens, and he is no less bound to rest content with it himself. Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen (1673) Page 107 © Copyright 2003, 2005 Lonang Institute CHAPTER 15 On the Power of the Supreme Authority over Property in the State 1. Where citizens have had their property bestowed upon them by the rulers, it is for the latter to deride what rights the former have over the property. In the same way, such property as citizens have acquired completely by their own industry, or in some other way, is subject to three principal rights, resulting from the nature of states, necessary for their purpose, and belonging to the rulers. 2.


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Where citizens have had their property bestowed upon them by the rulers, it is for the latter to deride what rights the former have over the property. In the same way, such property as citizens have acquired completely by their own industry, or in some other way, is subject to three principal rights, resulting from the nature of states, necessary for their purpose, and belonging to the rulers. 2. The first right consists in this, that the rulers can prescribe laws for the citizens, with regard to the use of their property, in conformity with the interest of the state, or concerning the amount and quality of their possessions, as also the method of transfer to others, and other matters of the kind. 3. The second right consists in this, that the ruler can take away a small part of their property, under the name of tribute or taxes. For, since the life and fortunes of the citizens must be defended by the state, the citizens must contribute the means from which the expenses necessary to that end may be met. Hence he is very shameless who wishes to enjoy the protection and advantage of the state, and yet to contribute no services or property to its maintenance. And yet in this matter wise rulers with good reason adapt themselves to the querulous nature of the crowd, and endeavor to bring about the collection of taxes as imperceptibly as possible, especially by observing equality, and by exacting moderate and assorted taxes, rather than large and uniform ones. 4. The third right is that of eminent domain, consisting in this, that, when urgent necessity of the state demands, any subject's property which the immediate situation especially requires, can be seized and applied to public purposes, even if the property far exceeds the proportion which he was bound to contribute to the expenses of the state. But for this reason the excess ought to be refunded to that citizen from the public treasury, or by contribution of the other citizens, so far as possible. 5.


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4. The third right is that of eminent domain, consisting in this, that, when urgent necessity of the state demands, any subject's property which the immediate situation especially requires, can be seized and applied to public purposes, even if the property far exceeds the proportion which he was bound to contribute to the expenses of the state. But for this reason the excess ought to be refunded to that citizen from the public treasury, or by contribution of the other citizens, so far as possible. 5. Besides these three rights, there are in many states special public properties, which are called the patrimony of the state or kingdom. And in some places this is divided into patrimony of the prince and that of the state, or the royal and the state treasury. The former of these is designed to support the king and his household, the latter for the public needs of the kingdom. Of the first the king has the usufruct, and can at his own discretion dispose of the income derived from it. For the second he performs the part of an administrator, and is obliged to apply it to the uses for which it was designed. He cannot alienate either, except with the consent of the people. 6. Much less, however, can he who does not have a kingdom as his patrimony, alienate the whole kingdom, or a part of it, unless the consent of the people is given, and in the latter case the separate consent of the part to be alienated. So also when the situation is reversed, a member cannot break itself off from the state against the will of the latter, unless by the might of a foreign foe it is reduced to such a condition that it cannot be saved in any other way. Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen (1673) Page 108 © Copyright 2003, 2005 Lonang Institute CHAPTER 16 On War and Peace 1. It accords most closely with the natural law, if men are at peace with one another, voluntarily performing their obligations; in fact peace itself is a state peculiar to man, as distinguished from the brutes.


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Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen (1673) Page 108 © Copyright 2003, 2005 Lonang Institute CHAPTER 16 On War and Peace 1. It accords most closely with the natural law, if men are at peace with one another, voluntarily performing their obligations; in fact peace itself is a state peculiar to man, as distinguished from the brutes. Yet at times, even for man himself, war is permitted, and sometimes necessary; when, namely, owing to another's malice, we are unable to preserve our possessions, or gain our rights, without employing force. Even in this case. however, prudence and humanity persuade us not to resort to arms, if more harm than good will result for us and ours from the avenging of our wrongs. 2. The just causes for which war can be undertaken reduce themselves to these: that we may preserve and protect ourselves and our belongings against the unjust invasion of others; or that we may assert our claim to what is owed us by others who refuse to pay; or to obtain reparations for an injury already inflicted, or a guarantee for the future. A war waged for the first cause is called defensive, if for the other causes, offensive. 3. And yet when one thinks he has been injured, there must be no instant recourse to arms, especially when there is still some doubt about the right or the fact. But we must try to see whether the matter can be settled in a friendly way, for example, by arranging a conference of the parties, by appealing to arbitrators, or intrusting the case to the decision of the lot. These methods are especially to be tried by the nation making the demand: since an advantage certainly attends possession with some sort of tide. 4. Moreover, the unjust causes of war are either openly such, or they admit some color, however pale. The former are referred chiefly to two heads, avarice and ambition, the passion, that is, for possession, or for rule.


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These methods are especially to be tried by the nation making the demand: since an advantage certainly attends possession with some sort of tide. 4. Moreover, the unjust causes of war are either openly such, or they admit some color, however pale. The former are referred chiefly to two heads, avarice and ambition, the passion, that is, for possession, or for rule. The latter are various, as, for example, fear prompted by the wealth and power of a neighbor, an advantage not based upon right, the desire to gain better lands, the refusal of what we have earned by some good quality as such, the stupidity of the possessor, the desire of extinguishing a right lawfully acquired by the other party, if it seems rather irksome to us, and so forth. 5. Again, the most appropriate mode of action in war is force and terror; but it is nevertheless permitted to use trickery and ruses against an enemy, provided there as no breach of faith. Hence it is permissible to deceive an enemy by a pretended speech, or fictitious reports, but not at all by promises or agreements. 6. As for the force employed in war against the enemy and his property, we should distinguish between what an enemy can suffer without injustice, and what we cannot bring to bear against him, without violating humanity. For he who has declared himself our enemy, inasmuch as this involves the express threat to bring the worst of evils upon us, by that very act, so far as in him lies, gives us a free hand against himself, without restriction. Humanity, however, commands that, so far as the clash of arms permits, we do not inflict more mischief upon the enemy than defense, or the vindication of our right, and security for the future, require. 7. War is classified as formal and informal. For the first it is required that it be waged on both sides by authority of him who has the supreme power, and that a declaration shall have preceded.


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Humanity, however, commands that, so far as the clash of arms permits, we do not inflict more mischief upon the enemy than defense, or the vindication of our right, and security for the future, require. 7. War is classified as formal and informal. For the first it is required that it be waged on both sides by authority of him who has the supreme power, and that a declaration shall have preceded. A war Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen (1673) Page 109 © Copyright 2003, 2005 Lonang Institute not declared, or waged against private citizens, is informal. To this class belong also civil wars. 8. The right of making war in a state belongs to him who has the supreme authority. Hence, to engage in war without permission given by the ruler, exceeds the authority of a magistrate, even in case he infers that the supreme power, if consulted, would decide to wage war here and now. But all who are placed with military forces in charge of some province or fortified place are understood, from the purpose of their office, to be also instructed to repel by any means an attacking enemy from the places intrusted to them. They may not, however, rashly transfer the war to hostile territory. 9. But whereas one living in natural liberty can be attacked in war only for injuries which he has himself inflicted, in a state the ruler is often attacked by war, or the whole state is attacked, even though he was not responsible for the injury. But if this is to be rightly done, the injury must have been in some way transferred to him. And rulers of states share in the injuries done by their former citizens, or by those who have recently taken refuge among them, if the rulers have suffered the acts, or afford shelter. Suffering an act becomes culpable, only in case one knows the wrong is being done, and has the power to prevent. But the ruler of a state is assumed to know what is openly and frequently done by the citizens. Ability to prevent is always presumed, unless the lack of it is plainly proved.


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And rulers of states share in the injuries done by their former citizens, or by those who have recently taken refuge among them, if the rulers have suffered the acts, or afford shelter. Suffering an act becomes culpable, only in case one knows the wrong is being done, and has the power to prevent. But the ruler of a state is assumed to know what is openly and frequently done by the citizens. Ability to prevent is always presumed, unless the lack of it is plainly proved. But the right to make war upon a ruler who receives and protects a guilty person fleeing to him, merely to escape punishment, results rather from a particular agreement between neighbors and allies, than from some common obligation, except in case the fugitive while he is among us plans acts of hostility against the state which he has abandoned. 10. There is also an established custom among nations that in payment for a debt incurred by the state, or in which the state has involved itself by maladministration of justice, the property of individual citizens is held, to this extent, that foreigners to whom the debt is owed, can lay hands upon such property, if found among them. However, a restitution to the citizens who have had their property taken away in this manner, should be arranged by those who contracted the debt. Such executions are usually called reprisals, and they are frequently the prelude to wars. 11. War can be waged not only by anyone for himself, but also on behalf of another. But for this to be rightly done, requires a just cause on the part of him for whom the war is waged, and on the part of his helper a satisfactory reason, in view of which, and for the other's defense, he can carry on hostilities against a third. But among those for whom we not only can, but also must, take up arms, there are in the first place our subjects, not only collectively, but also singly; provided it is clear that the state will not be involved in greater evils in consequence. Next come allies, if this was included in the treaty with them.


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But among those for whom we not only can, but also must, take up arms, there are in the first place our subjects, not only collectively, but also singly; provided it is clear that the state will not be involved in greater evils in consequence. Next come allies, if this was included in the treaty with them. These, however, yield precedence to our citizens, when they have need of help at the same time. And, furthermore, a just cause of war is presupposed in their case, and a certain prudence in undertaking the war. Then come friends, even though no express promise has been made to them. Finally, when there is no other reason, common descent alone may be a sufficient ground for our going to the defense of one who is unjustly oppressed, and implores our aid, if we can conveniently do so. 12. License in war goes so far that, although in killing, devastating and plundering a man may have overstepped the limits of humanity, still in the general opinion of nations he is not regarded as infamous, and a man whom good men should avoid. Nevertheless the more civilized nations despise certain methods of injuring an enemy; for example, using poison, or bribing the citizens and soldiers Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen (1673) Page 110 © Copyright 2003, 2005 Lonang Institute of another state to slay their rulers. 13. Movable property is understood to have been captured in war only after it is safe from the enemy's pursuit; immovable property, when we hold it under such circumstances that we have the power to keep the enemy at a distance. And yet, in order to extinguish completely the former owner's right to recover such property, it is necessary for him to renounce all claim by a subsequent agreement. For otherwise, what was acquired by force, may be taken away again by force. But just as soldiers fight under authority of the state, so what they take from the enemy, as properly acquired for the state, not for the soldiers.


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And yet, in order to extinguish completely the former owner's right to recover such property, it is necessary for him to renounce all claim by a subsequent agreement. For otherwise, what was acquired by force, may be taken away again by force. But just as soldiers fight under authority of the state, so what they take from the enemy, as properly acquired for the state, not for the soldiers. Yet it is everywhere customary to leave movable property, especially of small value, to the soldiers who have taken it; and this is connived at, or it takes the place of a reward, or sometimes of pay; or it is to tempt such as may be willing to sell their blood when there is no compulsion. But when captured property is again wrested from the enemy, the immovable things return to their former owners, and the movable should do likewise. But among most nations these too are given up to the soldiers as booty. 14. Finally, authority also is acquired in war, as well over individuals as over whole peoples that have been conquered. But to make this legitimate, and binding upon the consciences of the subjects, the vanquished must have given their word to the victors, and the latter must have laid aside their hostile attitude and temper towards the former. 15. Warlike acts are suspended by truces, that is, a convention by which, for a time, although the state of war and the quarrel out of which the war arose still remain, they must abstain from warlike acts of offense; and when the truce has expired, unless peace has meanwhile been restored, they return to hostilities without a fresh declaration. 16. Truces can, moreover, be divided into two kinds: one when the armies come to a halt on their expedition, and warlike preparations are continued by both sides, -- a truce which is generally made for a short time only; the other, under which warlike preparations are terminated on both sides.


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16. Truces can, moreover, be divided into two kinds: one when the armies come to a halt on their expedition, and warlike preparations are continued by both sides, -- a truce which is generally made for a short time only; the other, under which warlike preparations are terminated on both sides. These can be entered into for a considerable length of time, and usually are; they also have the appearance of a complete peace, and sometimes are called by that name, with the addition of a definite time. For otherwise, as a rule, every peace is perpetual, that is, it permanently extinguishes the controversies on account of which the war was begun. But the so-called tacit truces involve no obligation; in that case the parties both remain quiet at their discretion, and can proceed again to warlike acts, whenever they please. 17. But war ceases entirely when peace has been ratified by the rulers of both sides. Although it rests with the parties to the negotiations to define the terms and conditions of peace, they must be faithfully executed at the time agreed upon, and must be observed. In confirmation thereof, besides the customary oath, and giving of hostages, others, especially those present at the negotiations, often guarantee the observance of the peace, promising their aid, if one party is injured by the other in defiance of the terms of peace. Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen (1673) Page 111 © Copyright 2003, 2005 Lonang Institute CHAPTER 17 On Alliances 1. Times of war and times of peace are equally served by alliances, or agreements entered into by the rulers on both sides. As regards their subject matter, they may be divided into those which are made with a view to the mutual performance of some duty already enjoined by the natural law; and those which add something over and above the natural law, or at least give a certain precision to those duties, in case they seem indefinite. 2.


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Times of war and times of peace are equally served by alliances, or agreements entered into by the rulers on both sides. As regards their subject matter, they may be divided into those which are made with a view to the mutual performance of some duty already enjoined by the natural law; and those which add something over and above the natural law, or at least give a certain precision to those duties, in case they seem indefinite. 2. To the former class belong alliances in which the agreement concerns the mere exercise of simple humanity, or abstention from injury. Here too belong those by which a mere friendship is confirmed, without the performance of anything in particular; or those by which the right of hospitality or trade is sanctioned, in so far as it is already required by the natural law. 3. In the latter class, alliances are either equal or unequal. The former of these are such as are the same for both parties, that is, when the promises of both sides are not only equal, absolutely, or in due proportion to their resources, but also on a basis of equality, so that neither party is in an inferior position as compared with the other, or subject to the other. 4. Alliances are unequal when the respective performances are unequal, or else when one party is in an inferior position. And unequal performances are promised, either by the ally of higher rank, or by the lower. The former happens when the more powerful promises assistance to the other, without any stipulation in return, or promises on a larger scale than the other. The second case occurs, if the inferior ally is bound to perform more than he receives from the other. 5. Of the requirements exacted of an inferior ally, some involve a diminution of his sovereignty; for example, if it has been agreed that the inferior ally is not to exercise a certain function of his sovereignty, except with the consent of the superior.


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The second case occurs, if the inferior ally is bound to perform more than he receives from the other. 5. Of the requirements exacted of an inferior ally, some involve a diminution of his sovereignty; for example, if it has been agreed that the inferior ally is not to exercise a certain function of his sovereignty, except with the consent of the superior. Some requirements, however, do not diminish sovereignty, although they bring with them some temporary burden, that is, one which can be disposed of once and for all; for instance, in case one party is bound by a treaty of peace to pay the soldiers of the other, to make good the expenses of war, to pay a certain sum of money, to raze walls, give hostages, surrender ships and arms, and so forth. Even permanent burdens do not in all cases diminish sovereignty. Examples are: the requirement that one side have the same friends and enemies as the other, while the obligation is not reciprocal; or the prohibition to build walls at certain places, or to take certain voyages, and so on. Also, if one of the allies is bound to show polite deference to the majesty of the other, or to pay him a certain amount of reverence, and to acquiesce modestly in his derision. 6. Again, both equal and unequal alliances are commonly contracted for various reasons. Of the latter those which aim at some permanent combination of several states produce the closest form of alliance. But most frequent are those which concern help to be furnished in defensive or offensive warfare, or the regulation of commerce. 7. There is also a well-known division of alliances into the real and the personal. The latter are entered into with a king in reference to his own person, and expire with his death. The former are contracted not so much with reference to the king or rulers of the people as such, as in the interest Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen (1673) Page 112 © Copyright 2003, 2005 Lonang Institute of that state or kingdom; and they endure even when their authors are dead. 8.


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7. There is also a well-known division of alliances into the real and the personal. The latter are entered into with a king in reference to his own person, and expire with his death. The former are contracted not so much with reference to the king or rulers of the people as such, as in the interest Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen (1673) Page 112 © Copyright 2003, 2005 Lonang Institute of that state or kingdom; and they endure even when their authors are dead. 8. Connected with alliances are overtures, the proper term for agreements entered into by a minister of the supreme power in regard to matters of its concern, but without its instructions. The ruler is not indeed bound by these, except after he has ratified them; but if the minister has absolutely contracted, and ratification has not followed, he must see how he can satisfy those who, relying upon his word, have been deceived by agreements that are null and void. Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen (1673) Page 113 © Copyright 2003, 2005 Lonang Institute CHAPTER 18 On the Duties of Citizens 1. The duty of citizens is either general or particular. The former arises from the common obligation, by virtue of which they are subject to the civil authority. The latter arises from a particular office and function, which has been laid upon individuals by the supreme authority. 2. The general duty of citizens has regard to the rulers of the state, or to the entire state, or to their fellow-citizens. 3. To the rulers of the state a citizen owes respect, loyalty and obedience. This implies that one acquiesce in the present regime, and have no thoughts of revolution; that one refrain from attaching himself to any other, or admiring and respecting him; that one have a good and honorable opinion of the rulers and their acts, and express himself accordingly. 4.


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2. The general duty of citizens has regard to the rulers of the state, or to the entire state, or to their fellow-citizens. 3. To the rulers of the state a citizen owes respect, loyalty and obedience. This implies that one acquiesce in the present regime, and have no thoughts of revolution; that one refrain from attaching himself to any other, or admiring and respecting him; that one have a good and honorable opinion of the rulers and their acts, and express himself accordingly. 4. A good citizen's duty towards the whole state is to have nothing dearer than its welfare and safety, to offer his life, property, and fortunes freely for its preservation; to exert all the strength of his mind and industry to add to its fame and promote its interests. 5. As regards his fellow-citizens, it is the duty of the citizen to live friendly and peaceably with them, to show himself obliging and good-natured, and not to make trouble by peevishness or obstinacy ; not to envy the advantages of the others, or to deprive them of the same. 6. Particular duties either permeate the whole state, or they concern themselves with a part merely. In regard to all of these there is this general precept: a man should not seek or undertake any duty in the state, for which he knows that he is unfit. 7. Those who by their counsel assist the rulers of states, should turn the eye of their mind to every part of it; whatever shall seem to the interest of the state, they must declare with skill and fidelity, without bias or unworthy motives; in all their counsels they must have the welfare of the state as their aim, not their own wealth of power: they are not to humor the evil inclinations of princes by flattery; but to abstain from factions and unlawful gatherings; not to conceal anything that ought to be said, not to reveal anything that should be kept in confidence; to show themselves inaccessible to corruption by foreigners; not to postpone public business for private business or pleasures. 8.


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8. Those who are publicly appointed to perform the rites of religion must do so with dignity and attention, set forth true dogmas concerning the worship of God, show themselves to the people a conspicuous example of their own teaching, and not rob their office of dignity, their teaching of weight, by moral depravity. 9. Those who are publicly commanded to instil knowledge of various kinds into the minds of the citizens, must teach nothing false or pernicious; but so impart the truth that their hearers may assent, not from the mere habit of the lecture-room, so much as because they have perceived the substantial reasons therefor. They must avoid all teachings tending to disturb civil society, and hold all human knowledge vain, if no advantage flows from it for the life of man and citizen. Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen (1673) Page 114 © Copyright 2003, 2005 Lonang Institute 10. Those in charge of the administration of justice must give easy access to all, and protect the common people from oppression on the part of the more powerful. They must render the same justice to the poor and lowly, as to the powerful and influential; and not drag suits out beyond what is necessary. They should abstain from corruption, use diligence in the hearing of cases, set aside every passion that corrupts honest judgment; and in doing right they should fear no one. 11. Those intrusted with the command of the army are to train the soldiers with diligence and in due time, and strengthen them to endure the hardships of the service; they must keep military discipline intact; they are not rashly to expose the soldiers to slaughter by the enemy, but to provide grain and pay as promptly as they can, and not make away with any of it. They must see that the soldiers are always loyal to the state, and must never gain their favor against the state. 12.


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11. Those intrusted with the command of the army are to train the soldiers with diligence and in due time, and strengthen them to endure the hardships of the service; they must keep military discipline intact; they are not rashly to expose the soldiers to slaughter by the enemy, but to provide grain and pay as promptly as they can, and not make away with any of it. They must see that the soldiers are always loyal to the state, and must never gain their favor against the state. 12. Soldiers on their part are to be content with their pay, to abstain from plundering and annoying the peasants, to undergo hardships for the defense of the state willingly and actively, not to invite dangers recklessly, nor avoid them through cowardice, to show bravery against the enemy, not against their comrades, to defend manfully the post assigned, to prefer an honorable death to a shameful flight and life. 13. Those whose services the state employs in foreign countries, should be careful and circumspect, skilled in distinguishing the unreal from the real, the true from the fictitious, very tenacious of secrets, persistent in the interest of their state as against corruption in any form. 14. Those who have charge of gathering or disbursing the resources of the state must avoid all needless harshness, and not add any burden for their own profit, or out of petulance or ill-will. They are not to retain any public moneys, and must satisfy without unnecessary delay the creditors of the state. 15. The duration of the citizens' particular duty is, so long as they fill the office from which the duty springs; and when they leave the same, the latter too expires. In the same way the general duty lasts as long as they are citizens.


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They are not to retain any public moneys, and must satisfy without unnecessary delay the creditors of the state. 15. The duration of the citizens' particular duty is, so long as they fill the office from which the duty springs; and when they leave the same, the latter too expires. In the same way the general duty lasts as long as they are citizens. But they cease to be citizens, if they leave with the express or tacit consent of the state, and fix the abiding-place of their fortunes elsewhere; or if for some crime they are exiled and deprived of the right of citizenship; or if they have been overpowered by the enemy, and compelled to submit to the rule of the victor. THE END Glory to God Alone


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Pufendorfs föreläsningar i Lund, på engelska och latin. Innehåller introduktion med biografi och kontakt.pdf


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T H E PU F EN D O R F L EC T U R E S Annotations from the teaching of S a m u e l P u f e n d o r f 1672–1674 Edited by B O L I N D B E R G kungl. vitterhets historie och antikvitets akademien handlingar filologisk-filosofiska ser ien 23 KVHAA HANDLINGAR Filologisk-filosofiska serien 23 Portrait of Samuel Pufendorf (1632–1694), by Johann Ulrich Kraus. The distich below recommendsthestudy of hisworksto knowhim better.Asimilarrelation exists between the manuscripts here published and the original texts of Pufendorf. The P u f e n d o r f L e c T u r e s Annotations from the teaching of S a m u e l P u f e n d o r f 1672–1674 B o L i n d B e r g (ed.) KUNGL . V IT TERHETS H ISTORIE OCH A NT IK VITETS A KA DEMIEN H ANDL INGA R Filologisk-filosofiska serien 23 Lindberg, Bo (ed.). 2014. The Pufendorf Lectures. Annotations from the teaching of Samuel Pufendorf 1672–1674. Kungl. Vitterhets Historie och Antikvitets Akademien (KVHAA), Handlingar, Filologisk-filosofiska serien 23. Stockholm 2014. 223 p. Abstract This isan edition of two manuscriptswith notes taken during Samuel Pufendorf’s teaching at the University of Lund in the early 1670s. The shorter manuscript consists of annotations from lectures on De jure naturae et gentium, the lengthier renders notes taken during lectures on De officio hominis et civis. The texts show Pufendorf’s doctrine at the pedagogic level, as it was presented to students immediately after his books were published.Theeffect ofthatisthat natural lawisimbedded in religion; Biblicalreferencesare numerous compared to in the printed books. Still, many comments reflect Pufendorf’s conflict with local adversaries in Lund and with Lutheran theologians in Germany. The main message, however, is that natural law, i.e. Pufendorf, should replace Aristotle as foundation for the teaching of moral philosophy.


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Still, many comments reflect Pufendorf’s conflict with local adversaries in Lund and with Lutheran theologians in Germany. The main message, however, is that natural law, i.e. Pufendorf, should replace Aristotle as foundation for the teaching of moral philosophy. Keywords Pufendorf, lectures, natural law, moral philosophy, Aristotle, Johann Scheffer, Hobbes, state of nature © 2014 Bo Lindberg and KVHAA, Stockholm ISBN 978-91-7402-426-5 ISSN 0083-677X Publisher Kungl. Vitterhets Historie och Antikvitets Akademien (KVHAA, The Royal Swedish Academy of Letters, History and Antiquities), Box 5622, SE-114 86 Stockholm, www.vitterhetsakad.se Distribution eddy.se ab, Box 1310, SE-621 24 Visby, http://vitterhetsakad.bokorder.se Graphic design Lars Paulsrud Cover The first page of the manuscript with lecture notes on De officio hominis et civis. (National Library of Sweden, Stockholm.) Printed by Elanders Fälth & Hässler, Mölnlycke, Sweden 2014 c o n t e n t s Introduction 7 Background 8 The manuscripts 13 Natural law as moral philosophy 23 The edition 39 Bibliography 42 Observationes super librum de J. N. & G. [De jure naturae et gentium] Puffendorfii ex ipsius Auctoris ore in collegio privato Londini Scanorum A:o 1672 Mens. Septemb excerptae 46 Observationes in libellum Sam: Pufendorfii de officio hominis et civ is ex publicis lectionibus auctoris Ao 1673 d. 11 Febr. 74 Appendices 217 Acknowledgements 223 I n t r o d u c t I o n Samuel Pufendorf (1632–1694)isa key figurein the history of European political thought and moral philosophy, ranking just behind Hugo Grotius and Thomas Hobbes. His theory of natural law was immensely influential at the end of the 17th century and in the following 100 years: it dominated at the universities of Lutheran Europe and had substantial impact in France and the English-speaking countries. Much research has been devoted to the political, philosophical and theological aspects of his thought, to the spread of his ideas and to the contexts where they were formed and received.


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His theory of natural law was immensely influential at the end of the 17th century and in the following 100 years: it dominated at the universities of Lutheran Europe and had substantial impact in France and the English-speaking countries. Much research has been devoted to the political, philosophical and theological aspects of his thought, to the spread of his ideas and to the contexts where they were formed and received. This volume presents sources pertaining to the mediation of histhoughtin a particularand hitherto unnoticed context – the academic pulpit.It isan edition of notes taken during Pufendorf’s lectures in Lund in the early 1670s. The manuscripts comment on his two works on natural law that appeared during his stay in Lund. One manuscript is shortand contains the beginning ofaseries of lectures on De jure naturae etgentium (1672).The otheris longerand offerscomments on the whole of De officio hominis et civis (1673). No other annotations from lectures given by Pufendorf are known. That in itself isareason to publish them: sourcesconnecting to prominent persons may prove valuable from unforeseen aspects. But the value of the edition should be more clearly articulated. There are famous men in the history of learning whose thought is known to us only through lecture notes – Aristotle and de Saussure for example. That is not the case here. Pufendorf’s doctrine is known to us through the books that had just appeared when he commented on them in the specific context of academic 8 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s teaching. The annotations represent a delicate process of mediation: first what Pufendorfchoseto emphasizewhen presenting his booksto hisaudience; second what thestudents who took notes wereableto grasp orfound interesting;and third, the modification that may have occurred when the notes were transformed into a readable manuscript afterwards. The pedagogical context may be a restriction if one looks for elaborate theory in the manuscripts.


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The annotations represent a delicate process of mediation: first what Pufendorfchoseto emphasizewhen presenting his booksto hisaudience; second what thestudents who took notes wereableto grasp orfound interesting;and third, the modification that may have occurred when the notes were transformed into a readable manuscript afterwards. The pedagogical context may be a restriction if one looks for elaborate theory in the manuscripts. University professors in 17th century Sweden were not encouraged to linger on theoretical subtleties in their teaching, to say nothing of subversive ideas, and one should not expect Pufendorf to have presented more innovative thought as a teacher than as a writer. On the other hand, the manuscripts edited in this volume show his clear intentions about the role of his doctrine in university teaching: natural law should replace Aristotle in moral philosophy. In the introduction to thelectures on De officio he points out thatAristotelian ethicsand politics pertain only to ancient Greek society, in contrast to universal natural law. Thatargument suggestsa more visionary pedagogiccontext of natural law than the mere training of students. The overall aim of his doctrine was pedagogic.Allmankindwasto beeducated.Our discipline, heasseverated a few years later in the midst of his quarrels with the theologians, was not invented to provide topics for academic dispute, but in order to bring the actions of individuals and nations in concordance with it. 1 B ac kg roun d The University of Lund was founded in 1668. Located in the province of Skåne, itsaim was to contributeto theintegration of the newly conquered province into the Swedish kingdom. During its first eight years, however, it was an international university with students and professors from Sweden, Denmark and Germany. The German professors brought with them the polemical academic culture of their homeland, including the habit of publishing anonymous or pseudonymous pamphlets with feigned places of publication.


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Located in the province of Skåne, itsaim was to contributeto theintegration of the newly conquered province into the Swedish kingdom. During its first eight years, however, it was an international university with students and professors from Sweden, Denmark and Germany. The German professors brought with them the polemical academic culture of their homeland, including the habit of publishing anonymous or pseudonymous pamphlets with feigned places of publication. Pufendorf was among the first of the scholars recruited 1. “Specimen controversiarum”, III:2, in Pufendorf: Eris Scandica, 2002, p. 132: “Neque inventa est nostra disciplina, ut disputandi materiam praebeat, sed ut actiones ac negotia tum singulorum hominum, tum integrorum populorum ad eandem exigantur.” B o L i n db e r g: I n t ro du c t io n 9 to the new university, leaving his chair in Heidelberg, where his position had become uncertain after the publication of De statu imperii Germanici (1667), the critique of the constitution of the Holy Roman Empire he had published under the pseudonym Severinus de Monzambano. The Swedish authorities did not hesitateto offer him achairat the newly-founded university:eversincethe1620sit had been a Swedish practiceto appoint prominent German professors of politics in Uppsala. That tradition was continued with the well-known Pufendorf, who had previously had Swedish contacts. Hearrived with his family in Lund in August 1668 to be “professor of natural law and the law of nations and of ethics and politicsas well” 2 . His salary exceeded that of hiscolleagues by 50 percent.3 The professorship was located in the faculty of law, like other early chairs 2. “Juris Naturae et Gentium nec non ethices et politices professor” (Ahnfelt 1859, p. 186). 3. According to the planned budget, the professor of natural law was to be paid 900 daler (Ahnfelt 1859, p. 77). Pufendorf mentions his extra salary himself in “Epistula ad amicos”, in Eris Scandica, 2002, p. 90. Drawing ofthecity of Lund, by ErikDahlberg 1676.


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His salary exceeded that of hiscolleagues by 50 percent.3 The professorship was located in the faculty of law, like other early chairs 2. “Juris Naturae et Gentium nec non ethices et politices professor” (Ahnfelt 1859, p. 186). 3. According to the planned budget, the professor of natural law was to be paid 900 daler (Ahnfelt 1859, p. 77). Pufendorf mentions his extra salary himself in “Epistula ad amicos”, in Eris Scandica, 2002, p. 90. Drawing ofthecity of Lund, by ErikDahlberg 1676.In 1675,war broke out between Sweden and Denmark, which caused the university to discontinue, and Pufendorf to leave for Stockholm. In Stockholm he became official historian of the kingdom (historiographus regni). The drawing shows part of the decisive battle that took place outside Lund in 1676. 10 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s in natural law in Europe, 4 but the extended specification of Pufendorf’s chair to include ethics and politics indicated that he regarded natural law as a philosophical discipline. Pufendorf did not fall short of expectations and soon became the leading figure at the university. He attracted German and Swedish students, among the latter were some of the high nobility. Alongside teaching and academicassignments he published the hugeand impressive De jure naturaeetgentium libri octo,which appeared in latespring of1672 but had been in preparation since his years in Heidelberg. In thefollowing year,early in 1673,cametheabridged version of his magnum opus, De officio hominis et civis libri duo, designed for students. His successapparently aroused envy among hiscolleagues, but that sentimentalone doesnotexplain all ofthecriticismhisworks provoked among Lutheran theologians. De jure was criticized already before it appeared. The bishop of Lund, the Dane Peder Winstrup,and Josua Schwartz,afervent orthodox of German nationality, scented dangerouserrors in De jure and wanted to censureit.


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His successapparently aroused envy among hiscolleagues, but that sentimentalone doesnotexplain all ofthecriticismhisworks provoked among Lutheran theologians. De jure was criticized already before it appeared. The bishop of Lund, the Dane Peder Winstrup,and Josua Schwartz,afervent orthodox of German nationality, scented dangerouserrors in De jure and wanted to censureit. 5 In April 1672 Winstrup wroteto thechancellor of the university, Gustaf Stenbock,warning about theologicalerrors,atheism, Hobbesianism and also against collegia Pufendorf had given on the notorious Monzambano. In May, Schwartz, when defending a dissertation under thechairmanship of Winstrup, took the opportunity to attack Pufendorf fiercely.6 Pufendorf, however, went to Stockholm and had the 4. Ahnfelt, ibid. In Uppsala, natural law had been taught since 1663 by professors belonging to the law faculty (Lindberg 1976, p. 16), in Kiel Samuel Rachelius was professor of natural law in the law faculty from 1666 (Denzer 1972, p. 319). The connection between natural law and the law of nations, especially in the version of Grotius, probably made it seem reasonable to locate the chairs in the law faculty. Add to this, in the case of Pufendorf, the possibility of paying him more if he belonged to one of the higher-ranking faculties of the university. 5. There is no modern study of Pufendorf in Lund. The best account is still Almquist 1941. Additional information can be extracted from Pufendorf ’s correspondence in the early 1670s, published by Döring in Breifwechsel 1996, and in Palladini´s edition of Eris Scandica 2002. 6. The letter of Winstrup to Stenbock, dated April 19 1672, is published by Ahnfelt 1859, pp. 190–193. At that time, De jure, according to Winstrup, was already in print, but Pufendorf withheld the book until he had secured support for publication in Stockholm. About Schwartz, Almquist 1941, p. 73. The dissertation defended, De auctoritate symbolica formulae concordiae, has nothing to do with natural law or Pufendorf.


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6. The letter of Winstrup to Stenbock, dated April 19 1672, is published by Ahnfelt 1859, pp. 190–193. At that time, De jure, according to Winstrup, was already in print, but Pufendorf withheld the book until he had secured support for publication in Stockholm. About Schwartz, Almquist 1941, p. 73. The dissertation defended, De auctoritate symbolica formulae concordiae, has nothing to do with natural law or Pufendorf. See also the final comment in the Index quarundam novitatum (in Almquist 1941, p. 100; below note 8), describing the frustration of the theologians in Lund over Pufendorf. Title page of De jure naturae etgentium, printed in Lund 1672. National Library of Sweden, Stockholm. 12 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s book approved by the authorities, avoiding theological control. When De jure finally appeared, Schwartz was asked to account for his critique of it; a number of critical points were delivered to the university senate and passed on to theauthoritiesin Stockholm,togetherwith Pufendorf’sreply. The result was that further criticism of De jure on Swedish territory was ordered to cease. The theological assault failed, but a new adversary appeared in Pufendorf’scolleaguein thelaw faculty in Lund, Nicolaus Beckman. Beckman, likewise of German origin – it is noteworthy that none of the Swedish professors in Lund took part in the attacks on Pufendorf 7 – envied the prosperous Pufendorf and tried to bring him into disrepute by having an anonymous pamphlet printed in Germany.In thisIndex quarundam novitatum helisted 31serioustheologicaland politicalerrorsin Pufendorf’s De jure naturae et gentium. A jurist himself, Beckman had borrowed – seemingly without permission – several of the theological arguments from the errors listed by Josua Schwartz and added some political accusations. But Pufendorf,still protected by theauthoritiesin Stockholm,could showthat the arguments had been plagiarized, and also eventually that Beckman had compiled the Index.


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A jurist himself, Beckman had borrowed – seemingly without permission – several of the theological arguments from the errors listed by Josua Schwartz and added some political accusations. But Pufendorf,still protected by theauthoritiesin Stockholm,could showthat the arguments had been plagiarized, and also eventually that Beckman had compiled the Index. Beckman was outmanœuvred, tried for calumny and finally exiled.Nonetheless,Josua Schwartzand theologiansin Germany continued to criticize Pufendorf, and their polemics were to continue throughout the1670sand 80s, largely on thesameissuesas thoseraised in the Index quarundam novitatum. 8 According to themanuscript, Pufendorfstarted commenting onDejure in September 1672 in acollegium privatum, i.e. to a group of students who probably paid fortheteaching. On February 111673, he began a protracted series of publiclectures on De officio that did notcometo an end until May the following year, according to the manuscript. 9Thus the lectures were 7. Pufendorf mentions this himself in “Apologia” in Eris Scandica 2002, § 38, p. 45. The priest and theologian Haquin Spegel wrote a memorandum where he listed possible controversial points in De jure, but it seems to have been drawn up by order of chancellor Gustaf Stenbock and not with the intention of attacking Pufendorf (Lindberg 1979). 8. Almquist 1941 republished the “Index quarundam novitatum, quas Dnus Samuel Pvfendorff libro suo De jure naturae et gentium contra orthodoxa fundamenta Londini edidit”. The Index is rendered in Italian by Palladini 1978, pp. 163–169. 9. According to the extant lecture catalogue for 1671 he taught the “officia hominis et civis” as early as that, i.e. before the book was published. B o L i n db e r g: I n t ro du c t io n 13 delivered in close connection to the publication of Pufendorf’s books on natural lawand in an atmosphere of increasing scholarly antagonismatthe fledgling university.


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The Index is rendered in Italian by Palladini 1978, pp. 163–169. 9. According to the extant lecture catalogue for 1671 he taught the “officia hominis et civis” as early as that, i.e. before the book was published. B o L i n db e r g: I n t ro du c t io n 13 delivered in close connection to the publication of Pufendorf’s books on natural lawand in an atmosphere of increasing scholarly antagonismatthe fledgling university. The m an uscr i p ts The two manuscripts are kept in the National Library in Stockholm, in a volume with shelfmark B 399 together with manuscripts from lectures delivered by other professors. 10 They are written in the same hand, which does not necessarilymean, however,thatthesame person took the original notes from Pufendorf’s teaching. The first manuscript, on De jure, is entitled, “Annotations on Pufendorf’s book On thelaw of natureand nations gleaned during a private collegium in September 1672 from the mouth of the author himself ”. 11 The words “from the mouth of the author himself ” suggestauthenticity; “gleaned” on the other hand indicates that the notes are selective. And indeed they are; the manuscript runs to 24 pages in 4:o only, six of which consist of a table of the contents of the whole of De jure (which have not been included in this edition). The remaining 18 pages contain annotations on paragraphs from the first book of De jure and a few scattered passages from book two. Out of the 210 paragraphs in book one and two, covering 250 pages of the edition of 1672, only 36 have been commented on. As a rule the comments are much shorter than the corresponding paragraphs in De jure. The more detailed comments on book one deal with important doctrinal issues concerning Pufendorf’s theological critics, and Grotius. Others are short and seem arbitrarily chosen; sometimes they are too concise to be fully understandable.


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Out of the 210 paragraphs in book one and two, covering 250 pages of the edition of 1672, only 36 have been commented on. As a rule the comments are much shorter than the corresponding paragraphs in De jure. The more detailed comments on book one deal with important doctrinal issues concerning Pufendorf’s theological critics, and Grotius. Others are short and seem arbitrarily chosen; sometimes they are too concise to be fully understandable. The notes on De jure are therefore a mere torso, very soon interrupted for some reason – perhaps thestudent gave up or Pufendorf found the massive De jure too cumbersomefor teaching purposesand wrote his De officio instead for the use of students. Still, the lecture notes on De jure identify theological and 10. The volume was reported missing by Almquist 1941, p. 64, perhaps because it seems to have carried another shelfmark for some decades. Now it is back where it belongs, and the old shelfmark restored. 11. Observationes super librum de J.N.&G. Puffendorfii ex ipsius Auctoris ore in collegio privato Londini Scanorum A:o 1672 Mens. Septemb excerptae. Henceforward referred to as ObsJ. 14 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s philosophical topics that wereto be debated during thefollowing decades. The other manuscript, from thelectures on De officio, runs to 105 pages in 4:o and is titled “Annotations on the booklet on the duty of man and citizen from the public lectures of the author himself, February 11 1673”.12 Compared to the De jure notes, this manuscript is morecompleteand better organized. The text is a full series of lectures, ending on May 15 1674. Severalannotationsare more detailed than thecorresponding paragraphs in De officio. However, theannotationsaresomewhat imbalanced. Out of the105 pages, 71are devoted to book one of De officio,and only 34 to book two. The annotations on book one are more detailed, starting with a connected exordium and proceeding to comments on the paragraphs of the following chapters,although notall of them.


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The text is a full series of lectures, ending on May 15 1674. Severalannotationsare more detailed than thecorresponding paragraphs in De officio. However, theannotationsaresomewhat imbalanced. Out of the105 pages, 71are devoted to book one of De officio,and only 34 to book two. The annotations on book one are more detailed, starting with a connected exordium and proceeding to comments on the paragraphs of the following chapters,although notall of them. 13Those on book two become progressively sparser,ending up in thelastchaptersin occasional briefcomments, similar to the arbitrary notes in the manuscript on De jure. The dates of the lecturesare not given after December 3 1673, when Pufendorf had reached chapter three of book two. Usually, the annotations are based on a line or a single word from the text of De officio to clarify what exactly is commented on; in the other manuscript on De jure there are only occasionally vague directions about what part of the paragraph is commented on. The presence of these quotations from De officio in the manuscript makes it likely that the listener taking the notes had a copy of the De officio at hand. 14 Their history Thestate ofthemanuscripts provokesa number ofinteresting questions,to which, however, no definite answers can be given. One peculiarity of the De officio-annotations concerns their dating. The date of the first lecture is given as February 11 1673. The dedication of the printed De officio to the counsellor Gustaf Stenbock is dated the day before, on February 10. It seems very unlikely that the book was printed and distributed in one 12. Observationes in libellum Sam: Pufendorfii de officio hominis et civis ex Publicis lectionibus ipsius auctoris Ao 1673 d. 11 Febr. Henceforward referred to as ObsO. 13. For the distribution of the comments, see appendices I and II on pp. 217–219. 14. The alternative would be that the listener had no book and that Pufendorf first read the whole paragraph in De officio and then the word or phrase he wanted to comment on.


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It seems very unlikely that the book was printed and distributed in one 12. Observationes in libellum Sam: Pufendorfii de officio hominis et civis ex Publicis lectionibus ipsius auctoris Ao 1673 d. 11 Febr. Henceforward referred to as ObsO. 13. For the distribution of the comments, see appendices I and II on pp. 217–219. 14. The alternative would be that the listener had no book and that Pufendorf first read the whole paragraph in De officio and then the word or phrase he wanted to comment on. That seems too awkward a procedure. B o L i n db e r g: I n t ro du c t io n 15 day. Hence one could suspect that the dating of the first lecture is wrong. The difficultymay beexplained ifweassumethat De officiowasavailablein February 1673 in proof sheets only, without the dedication to Stenbock.15 Oneargument for that is the manuscript’s lack ofannotations on the preface to the reader, in which Pufendorf made important statements on the relationship between the natural law and moral theology. Instead there is the exordium with the equally important critique of Aristotelian moral philosophy, which has no counterpart in the printed De officio. More doubts on the dating of the first lectureare prompted by the mention in the exordium of an adversary to Pufendorf – “a bawler” – who, seeing thatthetheological objections did notwork, hasaccused Pufendorf of horrendous political errors. This adversary is in all likelihood Nicolaus Beckman.16 But his Index quarundam novitatum with criticism of Pufendorf did not appear until the late spring of 1673, that is after Pufendorf began lecturing on De officio. 17 There is no good solution to this problem: Beckman’s opinion on Pufendorf’s De jure may have already been known early in 1673 or the assumed date of the appearance of Beckman’s Index may be erroneous. The dating of thelectures on De officio is in itself not of decisiveimportance.Butthese possibleerrorsarousesuspicionabouthowthemanuscripts edited hereactually cameinto being.


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17 There is no good solution to this problem: Beckman’s opinion on Pufendorf’s De jure may have already been known early in 1673 or the assumed date of the appearance of Beckman’s Index may be erroneous. The dating of thelectures on De officio is in itself not of decisiveimportance.Butthese possibleerrorsarousesuspicionabouthowthemanuscripts edited hereactually cameinto being. It is unlikely that the manuscriptsas we have them are notes taken during the lectures. It is true that the two manuscripts are written in the same hand and seemingly go together, but the scribe was probably not a student who listened to Pufendorf. Indications of this are the references in the De officio lectures to two of Pufendorf’s later publications, the Specimen controversiarum and Spicilegium controversiarum. 18 These volumes appeared in 1678 and 1680 respectively, 15. Books could be ready for use before they were bound. In Winstrup’s letter to councellor Stenbock (above footnote 6) proofsheets of Pufendorf ’sDejure are mentioned (Ahnfelt 1859, p. 190). Pufendorf did not send De officio to his colleague in Uppsala Johann Scheffer until November 1673, which may indicate that the book appeared later during the year (Briefwechsel, No 63). That the year 1673 is wrong is not likely; a reference to the French invasion of Holland in 1672 is made on p. 15 with the words “previous year”. 16. ObsO, p. 9: “nuperrime surrexit in me quidam magnus clamator …” 17. Almquist 1941, p. 77. 18. Specimen controversiarum circa jus naturale ipsi nuper motarum (Uppsaliae 1678), actually printed in Leipzig according to Palladini, (in: Eris Scandica 2002, p. 401) and Spicilegium controversiarum circa jus naturae ipsi motarum (Francoforti 1680). 16 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s which is to say that the references have been added to the notes after the lectures were given.


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16. ObsO, p. 9: “nuperrime surrexit in me quidam magnus clamator …” 17. Almquist 1941, p. 77. 18. Specimen controversiarum circa jus naturale ipsi nuper motarum (Uppsaliae 1678), actually printed in Leipzig according to Palladini, (in: Eris Scandica 2002, p. 401) and Spicilegium controversiarum circa jus naturae ipsi motarum (Francoforti 1680). 16 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s which is to say that the references have been added to the notes after the lectures were given. Furthermore, in the annotations on the chapter on man’s duties towards himself, there is a parallel numbering of the paragraphs in the margin that likewise indicates the activity of a later scribe. 19 So do the nota bene-remarks (NB) in the margin appearing now and then, sometimes invoking a theological perspective. Although the possibility that these additions were actually made by the note-taker at Pufendorf’s lectures cannot be ruled out, I find it more likely thattheextantmanuscriptsarethework ofsomeonewho got hold of notes taken during Pufendorf’s teaching in Lund and copied them, inserting references to Pufendorf’s later writings, and perhaps other references too. The notes he worked from were perhaps not always in good order or fully legible. Taking notes during lectures is notalwayseasy. Occasionally – but not remarkably often – there are missing steps in an argument or unnecessary repetitions, which suggests that the listener has not followed it properly. The frequent use of the abbreviation “etc.” in the manuscripts may in some cases indicate that the scribe has failed to make sense of the notes he had before him. A scribe has been proposed: Jacob Troilius (1657–1716), vicar of Husby, a parish in the diocese ofVästerås170 kilometres northwest of Stockholm.


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Occasionally – but not remarkably often – there are missing steps in an argument or unnecessary repetitions, which suggests that the listener has not followed it properly. The frequent use of the abbreviation “etc.” in the manuscripts may in some cases indicate that the scribe has failed to make sense of the notes he had before him. A scribe has been proposed: Jacob Troilius (1657–1716), vicar of Husby, a parish in the diocese ofVästerås170 kilometres northwest of Stockholm. Troilius was an enthusiastic collector who assembled several volumes of manuscripts from various fields; he is also known as a sedulous copyist.20 The manuscript volume B 399 in the National Library contains another two lecture manuscripts dealing with natural law and isascribed to Troilius, and there are others by the same hand. The attribution was made en passantin afootnotein 1921 byAndersGrape: itisareasonableassumption but cannot be regarded as more than probable. 21 19. ObsO, pp. 50–52. 20. Anders Grape: “Om Schefferi Sciagraphia juris naturae”, Nordisk tidskrift för bok- och biblioteksväsen 1921, p. 219. 21. Grape was a librarian, well experienced in manuscript sources in Swedish libraries and may lean on observations not accounted for. I have tried to find in the Troilius collection inVästerås a manuscript incontestablywritten byTroiliusthat could prove Grape’s assumption, but in vain. Extant manuscript volumes that belonged to Troilius contain manuscripts in handwriting more or less similar to that in the Pufendorf lectures (National Library, Stockholm, Mss X 503 and M 6, also in the City Library of Västerås, Ms B 6). One of these (annotationsfrom “Collegium anatomicum” by Andreas Drossander, B o L i n db e r g: I n t ro du c t io n 17 If the manuscripts were written by Troilius, he is likely to have copied notes taken during Pufendorf’s lectures lent or given to him either by one or possibly two individuals who listened to them, or by someone else who in turn had acquired them from the original listener or listeners.


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One of these (annotationsfrom “Collegium anatomicum” by Andreas Drossander, B o L i n db e r g: I n t ro du c t io n 17 If the manuscripts were written by Troilius, he is likely to have copied notes taken during Pufendorf’s lectures lent or given to him either by one or possibly two individuals who listened to them, or by someone else who in turn had acquired them from the original listener or listeners. In an age when printed books were still expensive, copied lecture notes were an indispensable complement to textbooks. In this case the reputation of Pufendorf may have madethem desirable not only as study material. That Troilius himself listened to Pufendorf is notcredible. Thereis no evidence that he was ever in Lund; in 1672, he was 15 years old and scarcely able to follow Pufendorf’s lectures adequately. Our knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the Pufendorf lectures must remain obscure. The questions raised are interesting from the point of view of the history of academic teaching. They also draw our attention to theinstances of reception following the delivery of thelectures. Obviously the manuscripts do notrenderthe wholeseries of lectures, with thecomments on Dejurecoming to an end so soon and those on De officio progressively petering out towards the end. Furthermore, we cannot be sure that the existing notes correspond fully to what Pufendorf chose to pay attention to: the selection of paragraphs commented on is sometimes rather arbitrary. Add to this that there may have occurred distortions or even conscious changes during the transmission from the original notes to the versions now extant. Such questions appeal to the neo-philological scholarly interest that focuses on mediation and transmission rather than on the original text. However, the main issue here is whether the circumstances jeopardize the credibility of the manuscripts as testimony to the teaching of Pufendorf.


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Add to this that there may have occurred distortions or even conscious changes during the transmission from the original notes to the versions now extant. Such questions appeal to the neo-philological scholarly interest that focuses on mediation and transmission rather than on the original text. However, the main issue here is whether the circumstances jeopardize the credibility of the manuscripts as testimony to the teaching of Pufendorf. Oneshould notjump to hypercriticalconclusions.The manuscripts undoubtedly give a fair representation of what Pufendorf actually said. The contents oftheannotations fitinwellwith Pufendorf’s opinions. Nothing contradicts them. There are several continuous passages that render his arguments soundly, often illustrated by examples taken from De jure. The impact of the pedagogic context of the manuscripts consists, apart from the obvious brevity and arbitrariness of some comments, of enlightening in Ms X 503) is explicitly ascribed to Troilius, but only by a later hand, possibly that of Grape. In the end, the case must remain undecided. 18 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s similes,examples,and simplifications. Anothereffect is the great frequency of biblical references (see below). Finally judgements, stereotypes and latent valuescan beadded that havelittleto do with thetheory of natural law but belong to the social world of the 17th century. The contents Pufendorf started lecturing on his two books before any critique of them had been published. Nevertheless, they reflect the incipient controversy with the Lutheran theologians by replying to objectionsraised in the Lund environment already before the final publication of De jure in May 1672. The notes from the De jure lectures, however brief and abortive, touch on several of thetheologicaland philosophical issues that wereto beraised in Beckman’s Index novitatum22 and then debated during the following decade in texts finally published in 1686 by Pufendorf himself in the volume Eris Scandica.


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Nevertheless, they reflect the incipient controversy with the Lutheran theologians by replying to objectionsraised in the Lund environment already before the final publication of De jure in May 1672. The notes from the De jure lectures, however brief and abortive, touch on several of thetheologicaland philosophical issues that wereto beraised in Beckman’s Index novitatum22 and then debated during the following decade in texts finally published in 1686 by Pufendorf himself in the volume Eris Scandica. The notes pertain to crucialelements in Pufendorf’s doctrine. 23 He defends his theory of moralentities (entia moralia) thatconstitutethe moral and socialworld ofman.24 In contrastto the physicalentitiesin thecreated world,moralentitiesaretheeffect ofacts ofthewill bywhich amoral value or a function is ascribed to something. Human actions are moral entities and so are differentrolesin society – king,subject,mother,servant, official, and so on – and institutionslike household,state, law,contractandmoney. Pufendorf’s example in the lectures is the creation of a rector, on whom the function and title of a rector is imposed by the authorities. Although some moral entities are invented by God, most of them are the effects of human judgementand the doctrine of moralentitiessuggestsin away that the moral and social sphere is a human construct. Pufendorf’s adversaries sawan opportunity here ofaccusing himofmoral indifference, iftherewas no intrinsic difference between good and bad human actions. Pufendorf respondsto thisaccusation by trying to explain the difference between the 22. See “Index novitatum” (in Almquist 1941) §§ 9, 13, 14 and 19. However, Pufendorf does not address or quote “Index …” which had not appeared in the autumn of 1672 when he lectured on De jure. 23. For an analytical account of Pufendorf ’s doctrine, based on all his production, see Denzer 1972. 24. ObsJ, p. 1, 3.


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Pufendorf respondsto thisaccusation by trying to explain the difference between the 22. See “Index novitatum” (in Almquist 1941) §§ 9, 13, 14 and 19. However, Pufendorf does not address or quote “Index …” which had not appeared in the autumn of 1672 when he lectured on De jure. 23. For an analytical account of Pufendorf ’s doctrine, based on all his production, see Denzer 1972. 24. ObsJ, p. 1, 3. B o L i n db e r g: I n t ro du c t io n 19 neutral materialelement in human actionsand their superimposed moral value.25 Pufendorf’s guarantee for the existence of objective moral values was of course that they were grounded in human nature created by God and expressed in natural law. Here, however, was another scandal in the eyes of his opponents, since he did not posit human nature in its unsullied form in Adam before the fall but in fallen man in the present state of corruption. According to Pufendorf, we have only incomplete knowledge ofAdam in Paradise, based on what has been revealed in the Bibleto Christians only,and thatcould not bethefoundation ofa moral doctrine designed for the whole of mankind. The lecture notes do not render this fundamental point of Pufendorf’s clearly.26 Instead, they portray him involved in purely theological arguments about the image of God as related to the doctrine of moralentities. Theseargumentsare not quiteconsistent and indicatesome difficulty in hisendeavoursto separate natural lawfrom Lutheran theology while at the same time remaining a believer in that dogma as the road to salvation. 27 Another major issue commented on with some amplitude in the lectures on De jure is Pufendorf’s voluntarist standpointconsidering natural law. God created natural lawout of Hisfreewill. Hewas not bound by any pre-existing norms of right and wrong or some Stoic fate that would have infringed on His liberty. We cannot presuppose that natural law reflects God’sessence: in factthe difference betweenGod andman isimmenseand no analogies between the qualities of man and God are appropriate.


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27 Another major issue commented on with some amplitude in the lectures on De jure is Pufendorf’s voluntarist standpointconsidering natural law. God created natural lawout of Hisfreewill. Hewas not bound by any pre-existing norms of right and wrong or some Stoic fate that would have infringed on His liberty. We cannot presuppose that natural law reflects God’sessence: in factthe difference betweenGod andman isimmenseand no analogies between the qualities of man and God are appropriate. The voluntarist standpoint wasa position taken in a philosophicalcontroversy that had been going on since the Middle Ages. It offended Pufendorf’s theological adversaries but was also a critique of Grotius, who believed that God regarded what was right and wrong before the promulgation of natural law.28 Finally,theDejurelectures defend Pufendorf’sepistemological position as to moral knowledge: moral preceptsare notconnate; St Paul’sassertion in Romans 2:15 that the work of the law is “in the hearts” of the heathens 25. ObsJ, p. 8. 26. It is hinted at in ObsO, p. 72sq. 27. ObsJ, p. 2sq., 5. 28. ObsJ, p. 6sq. 20 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s is to be interpreted only metaphorically. The infant child has no moral concepts. This position does not entail relativism: there are “dictates of right reason” in man but they have to be built up by habit, accustomization and education, including, one may observe,that ofthewhip. 29 On the other hand,and not in fullaccordance with empiricistand historical moral epistemology, Pufendorf claims that the principal and general parts of moral knowledgecan be madea demonstrableand certain science. This is opposed to Aristotle, who held that moral philosophy deals with changeablethings of which thereis no certain knowledge.


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29 On the other hand,and not in fullaccordance with empiricistand historical moral epistemology, Pufendorf claims that the principal and general parts of moral knowledgecan be madea demonstrableand certain science. This is opposed to Aristotle, who held that moral philosophy deals with changeablethings of which thereis no certain knowledge. Pufendorfreduces this insight to theconcept of latitude, theinexactitudethat must beapplied in the praxis of moral knowledge, like for instance determining penalties.30 Thelectures on De officio contain comments on these positionstoo (except on thetheory of moralentities),although in alesstheoreticalsetting,since De officio is a textbook without references to other authors. There are also comments on the political element of natural law, not least on Hobbes. Pufendorf’sadversariesaccused him of being afollower of Hobbes, which he admits to some extent. He mentions Hobbes with respect, reprehending the usual vehement uproar against him and admitting that he is the best theorist of natural law together with Grotius; the doctrine of natural law would not have reached so far without him.31 On the other hand, he is critical of the extremism of Hobbes, along the same lines as in the printed De jure, but with some pedagogical simplification: for instance, he describes his own position with regard to the controversial question of man in thestate of natureasa middle way between Aristotleand Hobbes. Man is not a political animal longing for social life together with other human beings, as Aristotle imagined, nor are men in the state of nature essentially enemies,as Hobbes said. Instead, men in thestate of natureare friends, but not trustworthy friends: hencethe peacein thestate of nature is unreliable. 32 The political aspects of moral philosophy did not give the theologians so much to quarrel with Pufendorf about. Some theologians 29. ObsJ, p. 15sq. The whip is not mentioned when the issue is dealt with in De jure II:3:13. 30. ObsJ, p. 6, 9. 31. ObsO, p. 7sq. 32. ObsO, p. 75sq.


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Instead, men in thestate of natureare friends, but not trustworthy friends: hencethe peacein thestate of nature is unreliable. 32 The political aspects of moral philosophy did not give the theologians so much to quarrel with Pufendorf about. Some theologians 29. ObsJ, p. 15sq. The whip is not mentioned when the issue is dealt with in De jure II:3:13. 30. ObsJ, p. 6, 9. 31. ObsO, p. 7sq. 32. ObsO, p. 75sq. B o L i n db e r g: I n t ro du c t io n 21 probably sympathizedwith thetheocratic doctrine ofthe origin ofauthority and stateauthority in particular,which Pufendorfrejectsin accordance with his theory of the moral entities that makes authority a human creation resting on contractand ordained by God only indirectly. 33 His theory of thestate was based on contract between rulersand ruled but did not lay weight on the participation of theruled. Instead, it focused on thestateas a moral person,where, in thewords ofthe manuscript,“thewilland power of many individuals are united in one will for common defence”. 34 All the topics mentioned above are well-known issues in Pufendorf’s thought. Nothing elseshould beexpected.There may be details unnoticed before. His outrightacceptance of thetheological distinction between the state of innocence before the fall and the state of corruption after the fall causes him to declarethat theimage of God (imago Dei) in man, that was lostin thefall,was notamoralentity,asmight beexpected.Instead itwasa physicalentity,an ens physicum, belonging to man’s original natureand including moralas wellas physical qualities of perfection. 35 Furthermore, he starts his explication of De officio by explaining the choice of the word officium, duty, in thetitle ofthe book: itisto stressthatthe precepts ofethics should beapplied in practiceand notremain meretheory.


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35 Furthermore, he starts his explication of De officio by explaining the choice of the word officium, duty, in thetitle ofthe book: itisto stressthatthe precepts ofethics should beapplied in practiceand notremain meretheory. 36There may also be something not previously observed in the way he phrases his opinion that God’s promulgation of natural law presupposes not only the power of the divine legislator but also that He has given rational reasons for the law;37 this position,which seemsto contradict Pufendorf’s firmvoluntarist belief that natural law is founded in God’s willalone, has prompted scholarly discussion ever since Leibniz criticized it in 1706. 38 33. ObsO, p. 80, 86, 95. 34. ObsO, p. 85. 35. ObsJ, p. 3, 5, where imago Dei entails moral perfection, whereas in “Specimen controversiarum” in Eris Scandica 2002, p. 140, it is a quality of medical health. 36. ObsO, p. 10. 37. ObsO, p. 23. 38. Saastamoinen 1995, pp. 95–110. The lecture catalogue of Lund University for the Spring semester 1671. Pufendorf, the first of the law professors, announces that he has been “ordered by the authorities” to take care of the teaching of moral philosophy, and will account for the duties of man and citizen. “Ordered by the authorities” is obviously misleading; rather he usurped the teaching of moral philosophy that normally belonged to thefaculty of philosophy (University Library, Lund.) B o L i n db e r g: I n t ro du c t io n 23 N at ur a l l aw a s mor a l phi losoph y Such details, however, do notchangethesubstanceand structure of Pufendorf’s theory. There is one theoretical element, however, that is not a novelty but is usually overlooked and deserves attention since it pertains to the role of natural law as academic moral philosophy. That is the critique of Aristotle delivered in the exordium of the lectures on De officio. The exordium isa programmatic declaration: Pufendorfexplainswhy De officio is a new textbook in moral philosophy and points out the shortcomings of previous moral philosophy.


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There is one theoretical element, however, that is not a novelty but is usually overlooked and deserves attention since it pertains to the role of natural law as academic moral philosophy. That is the critique of Aristotle delivered in the exordium of the lectures on De officio. The exordium isa programmatic declaration: Pufendorfexplainswhy De officio is a new textbook in moral philosophy and points out the shortcomings of previous moral philosophy. Thecontroversy with thetheologians is less important here and only mentioned at the end. According to Pufendorf, there are three reasons why moral philosophy has not hitherto been taught properly: first theauthority of Aristotle, second the influence of Roman law, and third the scholastic philosophy of the papists. The negative role of Roman law is merely mentioned with no furthercomment,39whereas theshortcomings of scholastic philosophy are rejected ascasuisticrelativism that basically serves to make people willing to paymoney to be pardoned oftheirsins – severaltimes Pufendorfaccuses priests, catholic clergy and those of antiquity, of being far too concerned with their economic interests. The main constraint on moral philosophy is the exaggerated respect for Aristotle. Pufendorf adduces a basically historical and contextualist argumentfor his opinion.Theethicsand politics ofAristotleare no longer relevant: they presuppose the citizenship of ancient Greece and the democracy of classical Athens. Pufendorf surveys the virtues described by Aristotlein the Nichomachean Ethicsand finds that they aretheeffects of specific Greek circumstancesand of no useto human beings in general;as for politics, the democracy Aristotle so espoused, in Pufendorf’s account, is even less useful, nay even dangerous in monarchical states. Contrary to this, the moral philosophy outlined in Pufendorf’s new book is general in scope, applicable to all societies and hence more appropriate for contemporary students. 40 In the ensuing lectures, Aristotle’s allegedly naïve belief in man as a 39.


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Contrary to this, the moral philosophy outlined in Pufendorf’s new book is general in scope, applicable to all societies and hence more appropriate for contemporary students. 40 In the ensuing lectures, Aristotle’s allegedly naïve belief in man as a 39. He expands on it in “Specimen controversiarum” I:3, in Eris Scandica 2002, p. 125. 40. ObsO, p. 1–5. 24 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s political animal is criticized; likewise his teleological concept of the state as the naturalaim of human social intercourseis rejected. 41 Thus Aristotle – ortheAristotelian tradition,to beexact; Pufendorf isaware ofthe difference between the masterand his followers – is the main target ofcriticism in the lectures on De officio, surpassed in that respect only by the papists; some of his gibesaffectAristotleas well, sincescholastic moral philosophy was partly based on Aristotle. That Pufendorf attacks Aristotle is no surprise; most leading philosophersand scientists in thelatter part of the17th century turned their backs on Aristotle. At the universities and schools of Germany and Scandinavia, however, Aristotle still held sway, at least in moral philosophy. There were numerous chairs in moral philosophy with names that indicated the Aristotelian framework: ethices et politices professor, moralium professor, professor philosophiae practicae. Teaching was often based on compendia of or commentaries on Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics or Politics, makingAristotelian concepts, distinctionsand topicsthesubstrate ofscholarly political discourse. There were also more advanced theorists who based their doctrine on a more thorough understanding of Aristotle. The most prominent Aristotelian of this kind was the polymath Hermann Conring in Helmstedt(1606–1681),withwhom Pufendorfexchanged politeletters. True, Aristotelian moral philosophy began to weaken during the course of the 17th century, when much political discourse was inspired by other trends like Tacitism, Lipsianism and natural law in Grotius’s version.


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There were also more advanced theorists who based their doctrine on a more thorough understanding of Aristotle. The most prominent Aristotelian of this kind was the polymath Hermann Conring in Helmstedt(1606–1681),withwhom Pufendorfexchanged politeletters. True, Aristotelian moral philosophy began to weaken during the course of the 17th century, when much political discourse was inspired by other trends like Tacitism, Lipsianism and natural law in Grotius’s version. 42 Nevertheless, at the level of university teaching, Pufendorf’s judgement “that Aristotle resounds from every lecturer’s desk” 43 was pertinent. Add to this the presence of Aristotle within the tradition of scholastic, that is catholic, moral philosophy. Therefore, Pufendorf made a significant strategic move when he announced his book as a textbook in moral philosophy and the doctrine of natural law as a substitute for the ethics and politics of Aristotle. Other remarks and measures confirm that the effort to replace Aristotle with natural law was important to him. It was probably at his own request that 41. ObsO, p. 72, 74sq., 82sq. 42. Denzer 1972, pp. 296–324. 43. ObsO, p. 1. B o L i n db e r g: I n t ro du c t io n 25 the denomination of his chair had been extended to juris naturae et gentium nec non ethices et politices. In 1670, discussing the economic difficulties of the university, he recommended the withdrawal of the chair for ethics and politics in the faculty of arts, justifying the downsizing with the argument that the real and genuine moral philosophy was treated in his own chair.44 Thesame opinion echoes in thelecturecatalogue of 1671, where he announced that he had been ordered by the authorities to take on moral philosophy and that he would lecture on the duties of man and citizen, which constitute genuine moral philosophy. 45 As mentioned above, theexordium to thelectures isabsent in the printed book, the preface of which is given to the relationship between natural law and moral theology instead.


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45 As mentioned above, theexordium to thelectures isabsent in the printed book, the preface of which is given to the relationship between natural law and moral theology instead. Because of this the programmaticreform of moral philosophy lacks mention in De officio. Pufendorf did not give up the idea, however. In Specimen controversiarum he says that he would have developed his critique of the irrelevance of Greek, i.e. Aristotelian, moral philosophy in a special publication, had not the uncivilized rudeness of hiscalumniators – hiscriticsamong thetheologians – directed his thoughtelsewhereand weakened his inclination for the project.46 In 1688, in the preface to a new edition of De jure, he repeated the argument that ancienttheories, bothRoman lawand the political philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, have caused serious errors in contemporary political thought. He also says that he had long since prepared a commentary on “Politica Graecanica”, Greek politics, which however was impeded by other more necessary matters.47 The argument against Greek moral philosophy is repeated in aletterto ChristianThomasius in 1688 along thesamelinesas in theexordium to De officio 1673and once morein aletterto Justus Schomer in 1690. 48 44. “… die eigentliche und rechte philosophiam moralem tractiret …” Letterto Gustaf Stenbock July 11 1670, in Briefwechsel, No 49, p. 75. Compare ObsO, p. 5, where he explains why genuine moral philosophy (genuina Ethica et Politica) has not been taught properly. 45. “… postquam a Superioribus jussus est Professionem moralium obire, publicis lectionibus id agit, ut hominis ac civis officia, quae genuinam philosophiam moralem absolvunt, … demonstret”. See p. 22. 46. “Specimen controversiarum”, § 4, in Eris Scandica (2002), p. 126:“… ni ingruens calumniatorum importunitas alio cogitationes avertissent, et alacritatem meam non parum refrigerasset”. 47. De jure naturae et gentium (Amstelodami 1688), “Praefatio alteri editioni praemissa”. 48. Briefwechsel, No 137, p. 194sq.


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See p. 22. 46. “Specimen controversiarum”, § 4, in Eris Scandica (2002), p. 126:“… ni ingruens calumniatorum importunitas alio cogitationes avertissent, et alacritatem meam non parum refrigerasset”. 47. De jure naturae et gentium (Amstelodami 1688), “Praefatio alteri editioni praemissa”. 48. Briefwechsel, No 137, p. 194sq. (Thomasius); No 190, p. 286sq. (Schomer). 26 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s To these testimonies of Pufendorf’s endeavour to reform moral philosophy can be added a handwritten fragment of the beginning of a text entitled “Tractatus de politica graecanica”. It announces the intention to show that it is futile to teach moral philosophy with the help of Plato and Aristotle who are not concerned with general precepts, only with those thatareapt forancient Greece. Thefragment was found in the University Library of Lund and probably originated during Pufendorf’s stay in Lund. Is thisaremnant of theaborted project mentioned in De jure of 1688? The handwriting allows no certain judgement, but it could be his. The Aristotelian alternative Obviously, theattack on Aristotle wasan importantand enduring part of Pufendorf’s projectto reformmoral philosophy.Modern scholars have not paidmuch attention to it.Nor did hiscontemporary adversaries.49 Even so, the intended dethronement of Aristotle is important for the understanding of the function of Pufendorf’s doctrine. What was it his theory of natural lawwassupposed to replace,andwhywould that beadvantageous? An example of moral philosophy as taught with the help of Aristotle will show the effects of Pufendorf’s doctrine on the practical contentsand applications of moral philosophy. At the University of Uppsala, theleading authority in the field of moral philosophy at the time was Johann Scheffer (1621–1679), an immigrant German fromStrassburgwho taughtatUppsalafrom1648 until his death.


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What was it his theory of natural lawwassupposed to replace,andwhywould that beadvantageous? An example of moral philosophy as taught with the help of Aristotle will show the effects of Pufendorf’s doctrine on the practical contentsand applications of moral philosophy. At the University of Uppsala, theleading authority in the field of moral philosophy at the time was Johann Scheffer (1621–1679), an immigrant German fromStrassburgwho taughtatUppsalafrom1648 until his death. Scheffer was an all-round scholar, a prominent philologist and even an archaeologist, known to posterity for his treatise on the Lapps, the exotic inhabitants of northern Sweden. He held aspecialchair of “eloquenceand politics”, a combination unique for Uppsala but representing the political humanism of the 17th century. Several of his pupils were the sons of Sweden’s leading families whom he prepared for their future careers by teaching rhetoric, ethics and politics based on classical historians, Cicero, and Aristotle. In fact, hetaught natural law as well, being appointed honorary professor ofthelawof natureand nationsin 1665.In thatcapacity hewrote acompendium on natural law, which,although never printed, was widely 49. Beckman, in a pamphlet 1677, complained about the absurdity of rejecting Aristotle in ethics and politics. Palladini 1978, p. 205. “De Politica Graecanica”, a fragment on Greek political philosophy that promises to show the unsuitability of the Greek political and moral philosophy for modern states. Possibly written by Pufendorf himself. (Lund University Library.) 28 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s used,ascan beseen from numerous hand-written versions,and also influential during the final decades of the 17th century, when natural law was introduced in Uppsala.50 However, taking up natural law was an adaptation to a new trend by a dutiful and extremely capable professor; the core of Scheffer’steaching remained classical,with itstheoretical foundation in Aristotle.


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Possibly written by Pufendorf himself. (Lund University Library.) 28 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s used,ascan beseen from numerous hand-written versions,and also influential during the final decades of the 17th century, when natural law was introduced in Uppsala.50 However, taking up natural law was an adaptation to a new trend by a dutiful and extremely capable professor; the core of Scheffer’steaching remained classical,with itstheoretical foundation in Aristotle. Scheffer and Pufendorf knew of each other, they corresponded, and Pufendorf, ten years younger than his colleague, respectfully sent Scheffer De jure as well as De officio. 51 Their relationship was friendly – Pufendorf was invited to Uppsala butcould notcome – but Scheffer must have been conscious of Pufendorf’s critical attitude to Aristotelian moral philosophy. 52 However, we can disregard Scheffer’s personal attitude to Pufendorf and natural law, using instead his lectures on Aristotle as an object of comparison in order to show the effects of Pufendorf’s doctrine at the level of pedagogic application. Extensive notesfromScheffer’slectures on ethicsand politicsareextant. He wrote a compendium of the Politics of Aristotle, Breviarium Politicorum Aristotelis, that was printed posthumously in 1684 and had possibly been circulated earlier in manuscript. In a volume of lectures from theend of his life, the part dealing with politics was based on the not yet printed Breviarium. 53Thesituationwasanalogousto Pufendorf’slecturesin Lund. Scheffer commented on his own compendium of Aristotle, as Pufendorf commented on De officio, his own compendium of De jure naturae et gentium. The difference is that De jure represented a new mode of moral philosophy, whereas Aristotle was the cornerstone of tradition. 50. On Scheffer and natural law, Lindberg 1976, pp. 54–72. 51. Pufendorf ’s letters to Scheffer in Briefwechsel, No 45, 56, 59, 63. 52.


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53Thesituationwasanalogousto Pufendorf’slecturesin Lund. Scheffer commented on his own compendium of Aristotle, as Pufendorf commented on De officio, his own compendium of De jure naturae et gentium. The difference is that De jure represented a new mode of moral philosophy, whereas Aristotle was the cornerstone of tradition. 50. On Scheffer and natural law, Lindberg 1976, pp. 54–72. 51. Pufendorf ’s letters to Scheffer in Briefwechsel, No 45, 56, 59, 63. 52. In December 1669, Pufendorf gibes at Hermann Conring, whose ongoing project of writing on natural law will probably fail, since he depends so much on Aristotle. Briefwechsel, No 45. 53. Manuscript in Uppsala university library, Ms P 11. There are two parts, one containing Scheffer’s private lectures on ethics (“Annotata quaedam in Ethicam”), commenced in February 1678 (245 pp.), the other the commentary on Scheffer’s Breviarium Politicorum Aristotelis (480 pp.), dated February 10, 1680, i.e. after the death of Scheffer. A thematic index after the text, but without the page numbers filled in, indicates that the commentaries were intended for publication. According to the cover, the volume was written by Johan Olderman, who eventually became professor of theology in Uppsala. B o L i n db e r g: I n t ro du c t io n 29 Scheffer’s lectures are basically a normative exegesis of Aristotle although he cannot avoid scholarly remarks that arise because of the historical distance to antiquity. He comments on the philological problem of the obvious lacunae in the Politics. He is also aware of the objection that Aristotle does not write about contemporary politics, especially not monarchy, but only about the Greeks and those who live in a free state – apparently he refers to Pufendorf here, whose warnings against Aristotle he must have heard about.


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He comments on the philological problem of the obvious lacunae in the Politics. He is also aware of the objection that Aristotle does not write about contemporary politics, especially not monarchy, but only about the Greeks and those who live in a free state – apparently he refers to Pufendorf here, whose warnings against Aristotle he must have heard about. He gives no answer to this objection, however, except to remark that the silence of Aristotle concerning the merits of monarchy compared to democracy were due to the precarious position of the philosopher between thecourt ofAlexanderand democraticAthens. 54 Further, hecompensates for the meagre discussion of monarchy at theend of Aristotle’s Politics by expanding on various forms of monarchy, including tyranny.It is presupposed that monarchy is preferable, not becauseit is universally and alwaysthe bestformof government, but becauseitisaptfor bellicose nations like the French and the Swedes, while democracy better suits the Dutch, a nation of merchants. The argument takes as its starting pointAristotle’s opinion that different nations have differentconstitutions dueto theircharacter,arelativist ideathat Schefferembracesenergetically. A good patriot should regard the form of state he lives in as the best: that goes for philosophers too.55 Scheffer’s problem with monarchy showsclearly the difficulty in relying on Aristotle, whose horizon was quite different from that of 17th-century Europe. Scheffer encounters the same difficulty, if not equally seriously, when dealing with other fundamental political concepts. A citizen, according to Aristotle, is one who takes part in decision.


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A good patriot should regard the form of state he lives in as the best: that goes for philosophers too.55 Scheffer’s problem with monarchy showsclearly the difficulty in relying on Aristotle, whose horizon was quite different from that of 17th-century Europe. Scheffer encounters the same difficulty, if not equally seriously, when dealing with other fundamental political concepts. A citizen, according to Aristotle, is one who takes part in decision. Why should we knowaboutthat, Schefferasksrhetorically, knowing thatthereare no such citizensin Sweden.Theansweristhatit helps usto determinetherelationship between stateand citizen in our own age.56 Likewise, the Aristotelian notion of the middle class and its healthy influence on the political community is not quite easily harmonized with the 17th century and its four estates.In addition, he discussesthecomplicated interpretation ofthestate 54. Scheffer: Breviarium Politicorum Aristotelis , p. 18. 55. Op. cit., p. 140. Scheffer refers to Lipsius, but it applies to himself as well. 56. Op. cit., pp. 112–114. 30 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s in terms of Aristotelian matter and form, the citizens being matter and thestateimposed on them theform, while monarchy,aristocracy,and democracy are varieties of that form. The argument entails the consequence that thestateceases to exist when theform of governmentchanges, which in turn means that the popular, common-sense concept of the stateas the aggregate of territory, inhabitants and government must be rejected. 57 Beside these topics that apparently do not square with early modern political realities, Scheffer renders, and defends, more philosophical parts of Aristotle’s Politics that were at odds with the development of political thought in the 17th century. Man is a political animal, and the state is the 57. Op. cit., pp. 112–120. Johann Scheffer (1621–1679), holder of the chair in eloquence and politics at Uppsala University from 1648. Portrait by E. Jetsche. Photo SPA.


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57 Beside these topics that apparently do not square with early modern political realities, Scheffer renders, and defends, more philosophical parts of Aristotle’s Politics that were at odds with the development of political thought in the 17th century. Man is a political animal, and the state is the 57. Op. cit., pp. 112–120. Johann Scheffer (1621–1679), holder of the chair in eloquence and politics at Uppsala University from 1648. Portrait by E. Jetsche. Photo SPA. B o L i n db e r g: I n t ro du c t io n 31 purpose of the smaller associations – marriage, nuclear family, household – where virtue can be practiced and the greatest good obtained (apart from Christian salvation, ofcourse).58 Accumulating money iscontrary to theaim of money, which is only theexchange of natural property. Taking interest may be appropriate but must be moderate. 59 Wilful agreements and contracts are secondary to nature in the formation of human society. That implies natural hierarchy; Scheffer maintains that slavery is natural, although rejecting the arbitrary treatment of slaves in antiquity.60 At the same time, equality is a recurrent topic in the lectures. Contrary to the master’s rule over his slaves, political rule is over equals, not only in a democracy: even in a monarchy or aristocracy, government is for the benefit ofall,which impliesequality. Some nations, likethe Russians, may beslavish and hence apt for rule by masters (servile imperium), but applied to civilized nations, that would be tyranny.61 Here, Scheffer echoes the old Western conviction of the despotism of the east. Scheffer’s account of Aristotle is barely coherent and only partly valid as a normative political philosophy. Furthermore, and more significantly, there is an asymmetry, or skewness, between the Aristotelian political conceptsand the society of the early modern state in the making that was becoming apparent during the course of the 17th century.


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Scheffer’s account of Aristotle is barely coherent and only partly valid as a normative political philosophy. Furthermore, and more significantly, there is an asymmetry, or skewness, between the Aristotelian political conceptsand the society of the early modern state in the making that was becoming apparent during the course of the 17th century. Scheffer, not a die-hard protagonist ofAristotle,could seethat himselfand started lecturing on natural law. His attitude to political theory was rather that of an academic scholar, who imparts the standard repertoire with some added critical remarks, than that ofa political philosopher with a programmatic idea. Radical democracy played asubstantialrolein theAristotelian repertoireand linked to ittopics ofequality,and even ofclass,since democracy is therule of the poor. Although always rejected and,as in thecase of Scheffer, compensated by much talk of monarchy, democracy was an inevitable topicin academic political teaching as long as Aristotle provided the basic material for study. To whatextentconcern with democracy posed any real threat to the existing order is hard to say. But obviously Pufendorf’s ap58. Op. cit., pp. 43–52. 59. Op. cit., pp. 69–73. 60. Op. cit., p. 39sq. 61. Op. cit., p. 134, 138. 32 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s prehensions about the danger of teaching politics according to Aristotle not only served to promote his new textbook but also expressed genuine uneasewith the possibility thatrepublican tendenciesmight bestimulated by the inadequacy of Aristotelian political doctrine. In contrast to complicated and partly maladjusted Aristotelianism, Pufendorf offered a universal moral philosophy,adapted to contemporary society and based on the rationalist scientific outlook of his time. It dealt with the duties of members ofsociety, notthe virtues ofcitizens participating in politics, and it avoided the intricacies of the Aristotelian theory of the state.


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In contrast to complicated and partly maladjusted Aristotelianism, Pufendorf offered a universal moral philosophy,adapted to contemporary society and based on the rationalist scientific outlook of his time. It dealt with the duties of members ofsociety, notthe virtues ofcitizens participating in politics, and it avoided the intricacies of the Aristotelian theory of the state. The idea of the state as a moral person, although presupposing a contract between rulers and ruled, emphasized the unity of the state as an actor among other states. It is striking that, in the lectures, the state of natureis obviously betterillustrated by theexamples ofsovereign state persons not subject to any authority than by the independent individuals living in the pre-politicalcondition postulated by the philosophers of natural law.62 That pedagogical simplification isconfirmed when stateauthority is normally spoken of in terms of monarchy. The idea of the original liberty and equality in thestate of naturethat is given up when thestateiserected to check man’s negative inclinations does not entail any weakening of social hierarchy. Pufendorfmay besaid to have undermined thesociety based on estates by reducing society to moral entities based on contract, but he did not question the estate structure. The fact that natural law is derived by thecommon reason of mankind does notentailegalitarian suggestions. In practice, knowledge of natural lawisreserved fortheeducated:the peasant who lacks reason cannot deduce the precepts of natural law from the principle of sociality but has to be informed about them by the priest. 63 On the other hand, there is the idea of natural equality that was to be an important topic in the discourse on natural law in the 18th century. In Pufendorf’s account, it certainly does not abolish social inequality, but it obliges men to regard othersasfellowhuman beings.Thisisa moralequality that exhorts people to peacefulness, modesty and respect for the right of others.


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63 On the other hand, there is the idea of natural equality that was to be an important topic in the discourse on natural law in the 18th century. In Pufendorf’s account, it certainly does not abolish social inequality, but it obliges men to regard othersasfellowhuman beings.Thisisa moralequality that exhorts people to peacefulness, modesty and respect for the right of others. The idea is certainly not new: Cicero and the Stoics had it, as appears from various quotations Pufendorf adduces in De jure. However, 62. ObsO, p. 74, 85. 63. ObsO, p. 12, 26. Also in De jure (1672), II:3:13, p. 179. B o L i n db e r g: I n t ro du c t io n 33 it has a more systematic setting in Pufendorf’s doctrine, which opened for a more radical exploitation of the idea during the following century. It applies to slaves too; discussing their treatment in De officio, Pufendorf uses the word humanitas. 64 The word does not occur in the lectures, but instead thereare potentially egalitarian phraseslike“the otherisas much a human being as I am” and “I am as free as you”. 65 Scheffer too talks about humanitas, not in the sense of equality, however, but to refer to the social virtue Aristotle had no specific namefor but described in terms ofaffability, politenessand civility. 66Thetwo meanings of humanity indicateasubtle difference. Aristotelian humanity is the friendliness the citizens of the Athenian state wereexpected to practicein asociety that wascomparably equal.Itisa virtueforsocial intercourse between fairly equalcitizens, butit does notincludeslaves. Humanity in Pufendorf’sargumentisa philosophical concept lacking connotations of convivial affability but supported by a philosophical postulate of moralequality, derived from Stoic philosophy and Christian religion.Itextendsto all human beings,even slaves.Neither of the two implies social equality; they are rather lubricants in unequal relations, which are less equal in Pufendorf’s early modern state than in Aristotelian Athens.


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Humanity in Pufendorf’sargumentisa philosophical concept lacking connotations of convivial affability but supported by a philosophical postulate of moralequality, derived from Stoic philosophy and Christian religion.Itextendsto all human beings,even slaves.Neither of the two implies social equality; they are rather lubricants in unequal relations, which are less equal in Pufendorf’s early modern state than in Aristotelian Athens. The difference between Aristotle and Pufendorf is obvious: Scheffer, who uses the word humanitas for Aristotelian friendliness, vacillates between them, accepting natural slavery but opposing the Greek treatment of slaves. Jur isprudence A striking feature of Pufendorf’s doctrine, in spite of hisefforts to makeit a philosophical discipline, is its juristic tone. This is not surprising, given that natural law is indeed alaw, but it becomesconspicuous in comparison with Scheffer’s lectures. The juristic quality is both theoreticaland practical. Pufendorf’s philosophic voluntarism emphasizes that God is the sovereign legislator of natural law justas the king promulgates positivelaw in thestate –which in turn isan analogy thatcorroborates the preferencefor 64. De officio (1673), II:4:5. In De jure, a whole chapter is given to the topic. 65. De officio (1673) II:4:5; ObsO, p. 10, 74. 66. Scheffer: “Annotata quaedam in Ethicam”, p. 174. Compare Aristotle: Nichomachean Ethics, IV:6 (1126 b12). The concept is close to ϕιλια, Aristotle remarks. 34 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s monarchy. Obligation is a key juristic concept, presupposing the power of the superior to enjoin on someone the duty to do something. Much space is given to theconcept of imputatio, i.e.theconditions underwhich people become accountable for their actions. Contract is another central juristic concept,applied to economictransactionsas wellas therelations between superiorsand those who obey.


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The concept is close to ϕιλια, Aristotle remarks. 34 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s monarchy. Obligation is a key juristic concept, presupposing the power of the superior to enjoin on someone the duty to do something. Much space is given to theconcept of imputatio, i.e.theconditions underwhich people become accountable for their actions. Contract is another central juristic concept,applied to economictransactionsas wellas therelations between superiorsand those who obey. In fact,even between warriorsand duellers there is supposed to be a contract allowing both to kill each other.67 The contract concept is given a paradoxically commercial connotation when applied to the discussion of absolute and limited monarchy: the former is when you commission someone to do a job for you and leave him to do it as he pleases, whereas the latter is compared to giving a hired worker instructions about how the job should be done. 68 Furthermore, the juristic flavour isemphasized by the numerous tangibleexamples, which are more often juristicthanmoral:casesconcerning burning houses, hiringworkers, keeping entrusted property,sharing gains orlosses, betting etc.Add to this that the only benefit the citizen derives from the state is the possibility to have controversies settled in court or by the king. That is an elementary function ofstateauthority and certainly not new,although probably better enforced in the 17th century than before. 69 Thus, Pufendorf filled moral philosophy with legal substance. But he did not subordinate moral philosophy to study of the law. Rather the other way round: law studies were subordinated to the philosophical disciplines ofethicsand politics,at thesametimeinfiltrating them with new contents. This is noteworthy: law was one of the higher faculties of the university and its scholars enjoyed greater prestige, often better salaries too,as in Pufendorf’scase.


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69 Thus, Pufendorf filled moral philosophy with legal substance. But he did not subordinate moral philosophy to study of the law. Rather the other way round: law studies were subordinated to the philosophical disciplines ofethicsand politics,at thesametimeinfiltrating them with new contents. This is noteworthy: law was one of the higher faculties of the university and its scholars enjoyed greater prestige, often better salaries too,as in Pufendorf’scase. Academically, however, the field of law became subsumed and ranked belowthat of philosophy.Thetransfer of natural law from law studies to philosophy wasa general phenomenon around 1700, 70 the deeper significance of which remains to be researched. 67. ObsO, p. 30. 68. ObsO, p. 96. 69. ObsO, p. 76, 87. 70. Observed and described by Denzer 1972, pp. 322–324. B o L i n db e r g: I n t ro du c t io n 35 Religion Finally,an important difference betweenmoral philosophy as presented by Scheffer and Pufendorf respectively concerns the role of religion. God is necessary in Pufendorf’s theory,as thelegislator who constrainsand punishes.Awholechapter of De officio and extensivecomments in thelectures are devoted to thesubject of naturalreligion.Theidea ofthe political use of religion isacornerstonein Pufendorf’s doctrine. His quarrelswith Lutheran theologians and his separation of natural law from moral theology are of no relevance here,although in thelong run they entailed astep towards secularization. In fact, Pufendorf’s attitude to religion is fully compatible with thetenor of Lutheran theology, with its distinction between thespiritualand thesecular regiment, both ordained by God but theformeraiming at salvation and eternal life, the latter at the maintenance of order in human society.Theologically, Pufendorfwasaloyal Lutheran. 71 Hisscornful polemics reveal him as a critic of the sacerdotal guild, be it heathen, papist or Lutheran, but not a hidden freethinker, not even a syncretistic spokesman of conciliation between Lutherans and Calvinists.


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71 Hisscornful polemics reveal him as a critic of the sacerdotal guild, be it heathen, papist or Lutheran, but not a hidden freethinker, not even a syncretistic spokesman of conciliation between Lutherans and Calvinists. Scheffer on the other hand gives no particular place to religion in his comments on Aristotelian moral philosophy. Scheffer was a political humanist, his repertoire comprised Cicero, the ancient historians, and Aristotle. It was subordinated to Christian religion, but not harmoniously integrated with it, as appears from the recurrent accusations within the Lutheran tradition against the allegedly heathen classical authorities. Of course, he says nothing contrary to religion, but his lectures include few references to the Bible. In those of Pufendorf, they are numerous. He quotes St Paul frequently but also moral precepts and examples found in Proverbs, the apocryphal Sirach and the historical books of the Old Testament. The history of Israel as told in the Old Testament is taken for granted: states did not appear until long after the Flood, God did not institute slavery but approved of it afterwards, the proclamation of the Ten Commandments in Exodus 20 is the prototype of the promulgation of a binding law.72 71. As shown by Döring 1992, pp. 55–114. In ObsO, Grotius is blamed en passant for his heterodox opinions in theology (p. 7). 72. ObsO, p. 82, 86, 23. 36 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s Pufendorf quotes or alludes to the classics too, but only half as much as to Holy Writ. 73 This is in striking contrast to De jure, where Pufendorf demonstrated his wide reading in Greek and Roman classical literature by corroborating most of his allegations with extensive quotations. There arereferences to the Bibletoo, but much fewerand rarely accompanied by quotations.74 The biblical dominancein thelecture manuscriptsis dueto theirimmediate pedagogicalcontext: thereligiousand theological impact on university teachingwasstrong, most ofthestudentswere destined forecclesiastic careers.


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73 This is in striking contrast to De jure, where Pufendorf demonstrated his wide reading in Greek and Roman classical literature by corroborating most of his allegations with extensive quotations. There arereferences to the Bibletoo, but much fewerand rarely accompanied by quotations.74 The biblical dominancein thelecture manuscriptsis dueto theirimmediate pedagogicalcontext: thereligiousand theological impact on university teachingwasstrong, most ofthestudentswere destined forecclesiastic careers. However, the references to the Holy Writ also confirm the internal connection between religion and Pufendorf’s doctrine. The fact that he separated natural law, deduced by reason and intended to regulate the life of all mankind in this world, from moral theology that presupposed revelation and concerned only Christians destined for eternal salvation, did not make Christian religion irrelevant for lifein this world. Quitethe contrary;as Pufendorf pointed outin the prefaceto De officio – the preface he neglected in thelectures –moraltheology ismostefficientin promoting human morality. 75 In conclusion, the comparison with Scheffer indicates the advantages of Pufendorf’s doctrine that made it a suitable moral philosophy for the universities in the 17th century. First, it was liberated from the Aristotelian heritage, with itsawkward concepts of stateand citizen and potential republicanism. Second, it was founded in contemporary philosophy and deductive method. Satisfactory as this may have been to professors with intellectual interests, it wasalso attractivefrom the political point of view, 73. In ObsO, there are 53 referencesto passagesin the Bible, and 27 to the classics.There are 32 references to modern texts, 14 of them, however, to Pufendorf ’s own books. I have not found all the references in the texts indicated, but that does not affect the point here, i. e. the reversed relation between classical and biblical references in the lectures. 74.


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Satisfactory as this may have been to professors with intellectual interests, it wasalso attractivefrom the political point of view, 73. In ObsO, there are 53 referencesto passagesin the Bible, and 27 to the classics.There are 32 references to modern texts, 14 of them, however, to Pufendorf ’s own books. I have not found all the references in the texts indicated, but that does not affect the point here, i. e. the reversed relation between classical and biblical references in the lectures. 74. Denzer 1972, pp. 333–357, has counted all the references to classical, medieval and modern texts in De jure, but not those to the Bible. For instance, in the 1672 edition of De jure, book II chapter 2, there are 30 references to ancient texts (including two Christian) and three references to the Bible, in book VII chapter 1, there are 35 references to ancient texts (two of them Christian) and six references to the Bible. In De officio (1673) there are very few explicit references, and a minor number of allusions. 75. De officio (1673), [p. 7] preface (Benevolo lectori salutem) “Theologia quoque moralis honestatem vitae civilis efficacissime promoveat.” B o L i n db e r g: I n t ro du c t io n 37 since it made ethics and politics demonstrable. Natural law made it possible for professors to show the necessity of the existing order and demonstrate not only the nature of royal power and entitlement but also the obligation to obey.Thosetruthscould becorroborated from othersources, but, as an Uppsala professor stated in 1700, when it comes to proving and demonstrating “why it is so and cannot be otherwise, so that no one can say against it”, then one has to rely on natural law.76 Third, Pufendorf’s doctrine presented a theory of the state as a moral person that was in accordance with the new situation in Europe after the peace ofWestphalia,wheresovereign statesfollowing theirinterestexisted and acted in astate of natureatlarge.


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Fourth, itincreased the practical usefulness of moral philosophy by including more juristic material. Last but not least, it established a harmonious relation between moral philosophy and religion.True, itcontained elementsthat paved theway forsecularization,as perceived by his orthodox adversaries, but that proved no obstacle to itssuccessas dominanttheory ofsociety,moralsand politicsin northern Europe during the first half of the 18th century. Pufendorf’s doctrine suited the time and it suited the authorities. It seems that it appealed to the students too. As we have seen, some of them came from noble families of the Swedish elite, who were paying guests in his houseand could meet him not only in thelecture hall. 77Onecan imagine that there was a kind of freshness in his teaching. His criticism of the authority of tradition and force of habit and the fact that he represented something new may have met with response among the students. So too, perhaps, did hisexamplestaken not only fromtheBibleand theclassics but also from everyday life, some of them rendered with a slight touch of humour. Euphemisticallusionsto corporeal needsand criticalremarksabout irrationalcomplaintsabout the way young people dress may likewise have been palatable to his audience. 78 The same probably goes for his polemic gibes at his adversaries, which, however, are moderate compared to the excesses in the writings collected in Eris Scandica. 76. Quoted from Lindberg 1976, p. 86: “… hwi det är så och så, och kan intet annars wara, så at ingen der emot må något säga …” 77. Almquist 1941, p. 69. 78. For instance ObsO, p. 16, 102. 38 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s These assumptions about the atmosphere surrounding Pufendorf ’s lectures seem fairly reasonable, although there is no testimony from students to confirm them.The only extantcomment on Pufendorf’s teaching points in a different direction and probably testifies to a deeper significance.


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Almquist 1941, p. 69. 78. For instance ObsO, p. 16, 102. 38 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s These assumptions about the atmosphere surrounding Pufendorf ’s lectures seem fairly reasonable, although there is no testimony from students to confirm them.The only extantcomment on Pufendorf’s teaching points in a different direction and probably testifies to a deeper significance. Jesper Swedberg, a future bishop with orthodox theological views and father of Emanuel Swedenborg, studied in Lund at the beginning of the 1670s and listened to lectures on both De jure and De officio. In his autobiographic notes he remembers that Pufendorf, “taught real stuff, not scholastics”: 79 Swedberg learnt from him “how a young man should become not only book-learned but also a polite, well prepared and a useful member of this human society”. 80 Complaints about useless scholastic learning were platitudinousand do not say so much, but Swedberg wasan interested pedagogue who criticized authoritarian and sterile methods, so his argument may reflect a genuine experience of inspiring teaching. The phrase “real stuff” (realia) may be a reminiscence of the many examples by which Pufendorf illustrated the precepts. One should note that in the other merit Swedberg ascribes to his studies in Lund he uses the words “useful man in this human society”, where the pronoun “this” probably serves to distinguish this worldly society from heavenly eternity:a distinction thataccords with Pufendorf’s doctrine. Further, it is noteworthy that hesays “useful man” – notcitizen or subject, neither of the political terms suggesting freedom and subordination respectively. Swedberg represents members of society whose affiliation to their social estate was not indicated or presupposed.


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Further, it is noteworthy that hesays “useful man” – notcitizen or subject, neither of the political terms suggesting freedom and subordination respectively. Swedberg represents members of society whose affiliation to their social estate was not indicated or presupposed. They are social agents of a kind that corresponds to the citizen in Pufendorf’s De officio hominis et civis, a citizen who is definitely not a citizen of Athens or Rome, nor that of a liberal state, nor, however,asubjectexposed to arbitrary government.Also,theepithet“useful” in Swedberg’s mouth, suggests a protestant morality of industrious labour, including the ambition to be helpful to others that is consonant with Pufendorf’s teaching.81 79. Jesper Swedberg: Lefwernes beskrifning, ed. G. Wetterberg, 1941, p. 551 sq., 29sq.: “dref realia och intet scholastica”. 80. Op. cit., p. 29sq., 551sq.: “… huru en yngling skall blifwa icke blott boklärd utan en belefwad, wel skickad en nyttig man i thetta menniskliga samheldet”. 81. See for instance De officio (1673), I:8:2, and the comment in ObsO, p. 55. B o L i n db e r g: I n t ro du c t io n 39 the e di tion The handwriting in the manuscripts is generally fairly easy to make out. There are numerous abbreviations and contractions, which I have broken up. Abbreviations have been written out, without italicization. Abridgements have also been written out, except frequent “e.g.” (exempli gratia), “v.g.”(verbigratia),“s”(seu orsive)and “sc.”(scilicet).Theabridgements“tn” for tamen and “tm”, for tantum, often difficult to distinguish from each other, are written out. The scribe uses a special sign, , that seems mostly to represent a Latin scilicet or videlicet, in German ‘nämlich’ or ‘also’, in English ‘that is’, or ‘viz.’. Sometimes it is wholly pleonastic,and one or two times obscure.I havemostly rendered itwith videlicet,and sometimesleft it out. Abridged book titles, mostly the works of Pufendorfand thosein the Bible,areretained. Small initial letters have been replaced with capital letters.


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The scribe uses a special sign, , that seems mostly to represent a Latin scilicet or videlicet, in German ‘nämlich’ or ‘also’, in English ‘that is’, or ‘viz.’. Sometimes it is wholly pleonastic,and one or two times obscure.I havemostly rendered itwith videlicet,and sometimesleft it out. Abridged book titles, mostly the works of Pufendorfand thosein the Bible,areretained. Small initial letters have been replaced with capital letters. Underlined words orsentences in the manuscriptarerendered in italics. Punctuation is modernized and extended in orderto facilitatereading. Pages of the manuscripts are given in bold type, within brackets [p. 10]. The manuscripts give only the numbers and chapters and paragraphs of De jure and of the chapters of De officio. This sometimes makes it difficult to find the context of the annotations. Therefore, the headings have been added in theedition,within brackets[…].82 My changesin the manuscripts, and my failures to read it, are indicated in footnotes to the Latin text. References to textsreferred oralluded to are given in footnotes in the English translation,aswellassomefactualcomments.Indexesto themanuscripts, with names and texts quoted or referred to, have been added on page 220sq. Language The language in the manuscripts may be characterized as simple Latin without stylistic ambitions, reflecting ordinary academic usage under the stress caused by the lecture situation. One should not expect classical 82. For the headings in English, I have followed, with a few modifications, Michael Silverthorne’s translation of On the Duty of Man and Citizen According to Natural Law (1991) and the translation of the 1688 edition ofDejure by C.H. Oldfather and W.A. Oldfather (1934). For the quotations on which Pufendorf often bases his comments on De officio, I have mainly followed Silverthorne’s translation. 40 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s standards in texts likethese.83 Morphology is generally correct.Thesyntax lacks complex clause constructions.


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Oldfather and W.A. Oldfather (1934). For the quotations on which Pufendorf often bases his comments on De officio, I have mainly followed Silverthorne’s translation. 40 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s standards in texts likethese.83 Morphology is generally correct.Thesyntax lacks complex clause constructions. Many comments on words or phrases are incomplete sentences begun with conjunctions and adverbs introducing a comparison: ut, ut si, quemadmodum, sicut, ita. Several connecting words are more or less pleonastic: nam, verbi gratia, exempli gratia. The rules on tensesandmodes of verbsin classical Latin are not often observed. Occasionally thesyntax of the vernacular becomes visible under the Latin surface.84 The vocabulary mostly stays within the boundaries of Roman Latin. There are philosophical terms of medieval or later origin, like ens and entia (entity; ObsJ, p. 1) notionalia (conceptual; ObsJ, p. 1), aptitudo (aptitude; ObsO, p. 83), absolutio (to be freed from the restriction of the laws; ObsO, p. 96).85 Other words not found in dictionaries of Roman or classical Latin 86 are usurari (pay interest; ObsO, p. 62), uxoratus (married; ObsO, p. 77), immorigerus (vicious; ObsO, p. 15), zizania (weed; ObsO, p. 17), and embryo (ObsO, p. 99). The constructions with a final gerund following after each other in ObsO, p. 19, Non est solvendo, unable to pay his debt, and cui non eram resistendo, whom I cannot resist, seem to be Neo-Latin neologisms as well. All in all, the language of the manuscripts is a kind of academic spoken language, unsophisticated in syntax and style. It is not the Latin of Pufendorf, although the lectures use the first person: “I respond”, “we believe”etc. Still it isafunctional language;almostallannotationsarecomprehensible, at least after checking the paragraph in De jure or De officio referred to. 83. Academic Latin in early modern Sweden is well researched; for a recent survey, see Sjökvist 2012, pp. 26–28.


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All in all, the language of the manuscripts is a kind of academic spoken language, unsophisticated in syntax and style. It is not the Latin of Pufendorf, although the lectures use the first person: “I respond”, “we believe”etc. Still it isafunctional language;almostallannotationsarecomprehensible, at least after checking the paragraph in De jure or De officio referred to. 83. Academic Latin in early modern Sweden is well researched; for a recent survey, see Sjökvist 2012, pp. 26–28. However, studies have dealt with printed dissertations which were expected to be written with respect to the language of ancient authors. The Latin of lecture manuscripts has so far not been investigated. 84. For instance ObsJ, p. 17: “Unde hic et suum telum extrahens alterum prosternit.” (Therefore, he too, draw his sword and destroyed the other), where he too (Germ. “er auch”, Swed. “han också”) is rendered with “hic et”; ObsO, p. 27: “Ergo ipse legislator si adsit, confiteatur se hunc in tali casu habuisse exemptum …” (And if the legislator is present he should declare that he in such a case would have exempted him.) The predicate seems to be constructed with an auxiliary verb here. 85. Pufendorf seems aware that this is not Latin: “absolutio, ut ita loquar”. 86. As represented by Lewis & Short, A Latin Dictionary. B o L i n db e r g: I n t ro du c t io n 41 The translation There are frequent syntactical changes and repetitive or pleonastic phrases which have occasionally been cut out. Translation of Roman political words is sometimes problematic, due to their republican connotations. Civis has been translated with ‘subject’ or ‘citizen’, depending on the context: in the plural occasionally ‘fellow countrymen’. Respublica and civitas are rendered with ‘state’, sometimes with ‘country’.


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B o L i n db e r g: I n t ro du c t io n 41 The translation There are frequent syntactical changes and repetitive or pleonastic phrases which have occasionally been cut out. Translation of Roman political words is sometimes problematic, due to their republican connotations. Civis has been translated with ‘subject’ or ‘citizen’, depending on the context: in the plural occasionally ‘fellow countrymen’. Respublica and civitas are rendered with ‘state’, sometimes with ‘country’. Respublica is frequent but has no republican connotation; it can stand in the same sentence as regnum denoting thesamecountry.In thefootnotes,abbreviated titlesare written out and references or allusions indicated, as far as they have been identified. 42 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s B i bl iog r a ph y Manuscr ipts national Library of Sweden (KB), Stockholm Observationes super librum de J.N.&G. Puffendorfii ex ipsius Auctoris ore in collegio privato Londini Scanorum A:o 1672 Mens. Septemb excerptae. Ms B 399. Observationes in libellum Sam. Pufendorfii de officio hominisetcivisex Publicis lectionibus ipsius auctoris Ao 1673 d. 11 Febr. Ms B 399. Collegium anatomicum (Drossander) 1684. Ms X 503. Praelectiones in Hoffwenii Physicam (Drossander). Ms X 503. Collegium geographicum (Norcopensis). Ms M 6. University Library, Uppsala (Scheffer, Johannes): Collegium ethicum et politicum;annotations in ethicsand in his own Breviarium Politicorum Aristotelis). Ms P 11. University Library, Lund Tractatus de politica graecanica, fragment. Ms in Handlingar under G.O. Stenbocks kansleriat. City Library of Västerås Praelectiones in Josuam (Benzelius). Ms B 6. Printed sources Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics. The Holy Bible. New Revised Standard Version. Oxford, 1995. B o L i n db e r g: I n t ro du c t io n 43 Elenchus lectionum quas Deo Duce Professores in Regia Gothorum Academia Carolina Studiosae Iuventuti public et privatim proponere decreverunt … (Lund) 1671. In: Fehrman, Carl: Lärdomens Lund. Epoker – episoder – miljöer – människor.


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Ms in Handlingar under G.O. Stenbocks kansleriat. City Library of Västerås Praelectiones in Josuam (Benzelius). Ms B 6. Printed sources Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics. The Holy Bible. New Revised Standard Version. Oxford, 1995. B o L i n db e r g: I n t ro du c t io n 43 Elenchus lectionum quas Deo Duce Professores in Regia Gothorum Academia Carolina Studiosae Iuventuti public et privatim proponere decreverunt … (Lund) 1671. In: Fehrman, Carl: Lärdomens Lund. Epoker – episoder – miljöer – människor. Kristianstad, 1984. Gerhard, Johann: Locorum theologicorum tomus secundus. Francofurti et Hamburgi, 1657. Pufendorf, Samuel: De jure naturae et gentium libri octo. Londini Scanorum, 1672. Pufendorf, Samuel: De officio hominis et civis juxta legem naturalem libri duo. Londini Scanorum, 1673. Pufendorf, Samuel: Specimen controversiarum circa jus naturale ipsi nuper motarum. Uppsaliae, 1678. Pufendorf, Samuel: Spicilegium controversiarum circa jus naturae ipsi motarum. Francoforti, 1680. Pufendorf, Samuel: De jure naturae et gentium libri octo. The translation of the edition of 1688, by C.H. Oldfather & W.A. Oldfather. Oxford, 1934. (The Classics of International Law 17:2.) Pufendorf, Samuel: On the Duty of Man and Citizen Accordingto Natural Law. Ed. J. Tully, translation. M. Silverthorne. Cambridge, 1991. Pufendorf, Samuel: Briefwechsel. Hrsg. Detlef Döring. In: Gesammelte Werke, 1. Berlin, 1996. Pufendorf, Samuel: Dejure naturaeetgentium libri octo. Hrsg. Frank Böhling. In: Gesammelte Werke, 4:1–2. Berlin, 1998. Pufendorf, Samuel: Eris Scandica und andere polemische Schriften über das Naturrecht. Hrsg. Fiammetta Palladini. In: Gesammelte Werke. 5. Berlin, 2002. Schwartz, Josua: De auctoritate symbolica formulae concordiae. Lund, 1672 (Dissertation, under the presidency of Peder Winstrup.) Swedberg, Jesper: Lefwernes beskriffning. Ed. G. Wetterberg. Lund, 1941. Secondary sources Ahnfelt, P.G.: Lunds universitets historia. Stockholm, 1859. Almqu ist, Jan Eric: Samuel Pufendorf och Nicolaus Beckman.


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Berlin, 1998. Pufendorf, Samuel: Eris Scandica und andere polemische Schriften über das Naturrecht. Hrsg. Fiammetta Palladini. In: Gesammelte Werke. 5. Berlin, 2002. Schwartz, Josua: De auctoritate symbolica formulae concordiae. Lund, 1672 (Dissertation, under the presidency of Peder Winstrup.) Swedberg, Jesper: Lefwernes beskriffning. Ed. G. Wetterberg. Lund, 1941. Secondary sources Ahnfelt, P.G.: Lunds universitets historia. Stockholm, 1859. Almqu ist, Jan Eric: Samuel Pufendorf och Nicolaus Beckman. En akademisk fejd på1670-talet. Lychnos. Lärdomshistoriska samfundets årsbok, 1941. Denzer, Horst: Moralphilosophie und Naturrecht bei Samuel Pufendorf. Eine geistes- und wissenschaftsgeschichtliche Untersuchung zur Geburt des Naturrechts aus der praktischen Philosophie. München, 1972. 44 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s Dör ing, Detlef: Pufendorf-Studien. Beiträge zur Biographie Samuel Pufendorfs und zu seiner Entwicklung als Historiker und theologischer Schriftsteller. Berlin, 1992. Fehrman, Carl: Lärdomens Lund. Epoker – episoder – miljöer – människor. Kristianstad, 1984. Grape, Anders: Om Schefferi Sciagraphia juris naturae. Nordisk tidskrift för bok- och biblioteksväsen, 1921. Lew is, Charlton T. & Short, Charles: A Latin Dictionary. Oxford, 1984 (1879). Lindberg, Bo: Naturrätten i Uppsala 1655–1720. Uppsala, 1976. (Acta universitatis Upsaliensis.) Lindberg, Bo: Haquin Spegel och Samuel Pufendorf. Lychnos. Lärdomshistoriska samfundets årsbok, 1979. Palladini, Fiametta: Discussioni seicentesche su Samuel Pufendorf. Scritti latini: 1663–1700. s.l., 1978. (Societa editrice il Mulino.) Saastamoinen, K ar i:The Morality of the Fallen Man. Samuel Pufendorf on Natural Law. Helsinki, 1995. (Societas historica Finlandiae.) Sjökv ist, Peter: The Music Theory of Harald Vallerius. Three Dissertations from 17th Century Sweden. Uppsala, 2012. (Acta universitatis Upsaliensis.) The first page of the manuscript with lecture notes on De jure naturae etgentium. National Library of Sweden, Stockholm.


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Scritti latini: 1663–1700. s.l., 1978. (Societa editrice il Mulino.) Saastamoinen, K ar i:The Morality of the Fallen Man. Samuel Pufendorf on Natural Law. Helsinki, 1995. (Societas historica Finlandiae.) Sjökv ist, Peter: The Music Theory of Harald Vallerius. Three Dissertations from 17th Century Sweden. Uppsala, 2012. (Acta universitatis Upsaliensis.) The first page of the manuscript with lecture notes on De jure naturae etgentium. National Library of Sweden, Stockholm. Observationes super librum de J.N.&G. Puffendorfii ex ipsius Auctoris ore in collegio privato Londini Scanorum A:o 1672 Mens. Septemb excerptae Caput I. de entibus moralibus Observandum est triplices statui posse classes rerum seu entium. Alia entia sunt (1.) Physica, quia sunt a natura, seu facta sunt per creationem, ut omnes res quas cernimus in hoc mundo. Alia (2.) entia moralia quae partim inventa sunt a Deo, partim ab homine, ad dirigendam hominis voluntatem, quaejam nos intendimus. Aliasunt (3) notionalia quaeconducuntad intellectum hominis dirigendum. Primaactertiasignificatione omissa mediam nostram facimus. par. 3. [Quid sint entia moralia, quae eorum causa, quae finis] circa finem Finis entium moralium non est perfectio hujus universi ut calor et frigus etc sunt modi physici, qui pertinent ad hujus universi complementum. Obligatio autem v.g. est modus, seu ens morale, quod non resultat ex materia vel forma, sed ex judicio alteriuscujusdam hominis. Sic ut si quis sit Rex, Rector, Magistratus etc non venit ex hominis substantia, sed ex alterius impositione potestatem habentis talia officiafaciendi. Quaedam tamen Deo tamquam authori assignantur ut esse pater, mater etc sunt a Deo superimposita.Addituribidemfinis, quiestconcinna harmonia vitae humanae. Sic e.g. voces hominum sunt in cantu admodum horribiles, si quisque pro suo arbitrio absque regula suam vocem edat; sic etiam in vita humana, si quisque vitam transigat secundum suum arbitrium ac phantasiam sine aliquo ordine, esset maxima inconcinnitas.


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Quaedam tamen Deo tamquam authori assignantur ut esse pater, mater etc sunt a Deo superimposita.Addituribidemfinis, quiestconcinna harmonia vitae humanae. Sic e.g. voces hominum sunt in cantu admodum horribiles, si quisque pro suo arbitrio absque regula suam vocem edat; sic etiam in vita humana, si quisque vitam transigat secundum suum arbitrium ac phantasiam sine aliquo ordine, esset maxima inconcinnitas. Annotations on the book On the Law of Nature and Nations by Pufendorf, taken down from the mouth of the author himself in a private collegium in Lund September 1672 Chapter I on moral entities Note that three classes of things or entities can be established. First, there are physical entities, which are natural or made by creation, like all the things we observe in this world. Second, there are moral entities, some of which are invented by God, others by man and the aim of which is to direct man’s will; it is these I intend to deal with now. Third, there are conceptual entities, which contribute to the direction of man’s thinking. Putting aside the first and the third meanings, I make the one in the middle mine. par. 3. [Definition of entia moralia. Their cause. Their end] at the end /of the paragraph/ Theaim of moralentities is not the perfection of this universe,as it is for instance with warmth and coldness, which are physical modes pertaining to the completion of the universe. But obligation, for instance, is a mode or a moral entity that does notresultfrommatter orformbutfromthejudgement ofsome human being. That somebody is king, rector or magistrate does notcomefrom thesubstance of the man but from theimposition of someone who has the power ofcreating such offices. Some moral entities are ascribed to God, like being a father or mother, which is superimposed by God. Here is added an end, which is the appropriate harmony in human life.


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But obligation, for instance, is a mode or a moral entity that does notresultfrommatter orformbutfromthejudgement ofsome human being. That somebody is king, rector or magistrate does notcomefrom thesubstance of the man but from theimposition of someone who has the power ofcreating such offices. Some moral entities are ascribed to God, like being a father or mother, which is superimposed by God. Here is added an end, which is the appropriate harmony in human life. In singing, human voices are rather horrible if everyone sings as he wants to and without direction; similarly in human life, if someone leads a life according to his own will and fancies without any order, maximal disorder will arise. 48 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s par. 4. [Modus eadem producendi. Impositio. Eorundem operatio et unde?] [p. 2] Declarari hocce potest per exemplum v.g. Doctoris. Sic titulus ille Doctoris non fitex eius substantia, sed alius v.g. Regis vel promotoris impositione.Nec deinceps postadeptumDoctoristitulumfit novacreatura. Sic quandoRectorcreatur,estensmorale.Ille postacceptionemvel depositionem Rectoratus necfactusestcrassior vel tenuior, longior vel minor, sed venit extrinsecus illud saltem ex arbitrio entium intelligentium. Contra hanc thesin opponitur, quod hoc absurdi hinc emergeret sc. Primum hominem creatum fuissein puris naturalibus sc.absque obligationead legem et Deiconditoris praecepta, si videlicetex auctoris sententia postmodum sint superimpositaentia moralia, qualee.g.est obligatio. Respondemus (1) illos de re non bene intellecta imprudenter judicare: nam nos infraapertestatuimus hominicongenitam fuisse obligationem, dum eandem distinxerimus in congenitam et adventitiam vid. Puf. l. 3. c.iv par.3 pag 312. (2) Observandaest distinctio inter prius temporeet natura. Saepeenim causatamquam prius naturasimulestcum suo effectu, adeoqueeffectusetcausasicsuntsimul, ut patetex umbra hominis, lumine solis.


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Respondemus (1) illos de re non bene intellecta imprudenter judicare: nam nos infraapertestatuimus hominicongenitam fuisse obligationem, dum eandem distinxerimus in congenitam et adventitiam vid. Puf. l. 3. c.iv par.3 pag 312. (2) Observandaest distinctio inter prius temporeet natura. Saepeenim causatamquam prius naturasimulestcum suo effectu, adeoqueeffectusetcausasicsuntsimul, ut patetex umbra hominis, lumine solis. Sic in Adamo erat statim obligatio legis; attamen consideramus jam illum tamquam priorem natura, cum subjectum obligationis prius natura requiratur. Alia objectio contra ea verba, quibus dicimus, posse deleri, sine ulla mutatione, physica entia moralia, ut in exemplo Rectoris, qui nec major vel minor deinceps fit. Invertunt autem sic sequi amissionem imaginis Divinae in homine [p. 3] non esse aliquam mutationem, quod absurdissimum. Respondemus hocargumento nihilaliud ostendunt quam suam ignorantiamadversarii, quasi imagoDei in homineessetensmorale,cum tamen juxta Theologiam nostram sitens physicum sc. qualitasac perfectio. Sicsapientiaacrectitudo voluntatisacintellectus in Adamo non erat ens morale seu modus quidam, sed revera ens physicum. Sic peccatum originis, non erat modus, de quo jam nos loquimur, sic privationes succedentes imagini, sunt et quid positivi, ut hominis delirium etc. o b s e r va t ion e s s u p e r l i b r u m d e J.n.&g. 49 par. 4. [How they are produced. Imposition. Their operation and source] [p.2]Thiscan beexplained by theexample ofa doctor.Thetitle of the doctor does notcomefromhissubstance butfromtheimposition ofsomeoneelse,forinstance the king or another conferrer of degrees. He does not become another creature when he has obtained thetitle of doctor. Likewise,when arectoriscreated, itisthe moralentity thatisconcerned.After he hasacquired orrelinquished hisrectorate, he is neither thinner, nor taller or smaller. It is all about something that comes from outside, by the decision of intelligent entities.


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He does not become another creature when he has obtained thetitle of doctor. Likewise,when arectoriscreated, itisthe moralentity thatisconcerned.After he hasacquired orrelinquished hisrectorate, he is neither thinner, nor taller or smaller. It is all about something that comes from outside, by the decision of intelligent entities. Itis objected againstthisthesisthatan absurditywould arise, viz.thatthe First man was created in the state of original purity without being subject to the law and the precepts of God. This would follow if the moral entities, such as obligation, were superimposed afterwards, as the author says. The answer is, first, that they unwisely pass judgement on something they have not understood: for I state openly, bymaking the distinction between congenitaland adventitious obligation (see Pufendorf, Dejure naturaeetgentium book IIIchap. 4 par.3), that obligation wascongenital to man. Second, one must distinguish between before bytimeand by natural order. Often the cause, although prior by nature, is simultaneous with itseffect,asappears from theshadow ofa man orthelight of thesun. Similarly, in Adam,therewasimmediately subjectionto thelaw, butweconsiderhimto be prior by natural order, sincethesubject ofan obligation must be prior by natural order. There is another objection to the words where I say that moral entities may be abolished without any physical change, as in the example of the rector who is neither larger nor smaller afterwards. From that follows, they say, that the loss of theimage of God in man [p. 3] did not involveachange, which isabsurd. Ianswer that my adversaries in thisargument demonstrate nothing but their ignorance,as if theimage of God in man wasa moralentity, when according to our theology it is a physical entity, i.e. a quality and perfection. 1 The wisdom and righteousness of Adam’s willand intellect was nota moralentity ora mode but really a physical entity.


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From that follows, they say, that the loss of theimage of God in man [p. 3] did not involveachange, which isabsurd. Ianswer that my adversaries in thisargument demonstrate nothing but their ignorance,as if theimage of God in man wasa moralentity, when according to our theology it is a physical entity, i.e. a quality and perfection. 1 The wisdom and righteousness of Adam’s willand intellect was nota moralentity ora mode but really a physical entity. Thus original sin was not a mode of the kind we are now talking of; likewise, the ensuing losses that befell the image are something positive, like human madness etc. 1. According to Lutheran theologians, the image of God was a “donum naturale cum homine concreatum” as against the Roman catholic dogma of the imago Dei as a supranatural addition (superadditum) to human nature. (Johann Gerhard: Locorum theologicorum tomus secundus, Francofurti et Hamburgi, 1657, p. 99sq.) This explains why Pufendorf describes the image of God as an ens physicum, i.e. something natural in the sense of being original and not added or imposed. It may seem paradoxical that the moral perfection of Adam and Eve before the fall is described as something physical, but the perfection included immortality and health too, which are physical qualities. 50 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s par. 5. [Divisio] Dividimus nos entia moralia in 4. potissimum praedicamenta. (1.) substantiae, quamvis non sint substantiae tamen concipiuntur tamquam substantiaeseu analogiamquandamhabentad substantias.(2.) qualitatis (3) quantitatis (4) actionis. par. 6. [Status quid] Quaedam substantiae Physicae sunt suppositivae, seu supponunt quid, ut spacium, quod aliis substantiis substernitur: sic hoc loco est Status qui personis moralibus substernitur, quamquam in eo differant (nam quodvis simile est et dissimile) quod spatium post substantiae abolitionem maneat, non autem status, sublatis enim personis moralibus et status tollitur.


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2.) qualitatis (3) quantitatis (4) actionis. par. 6. [Status quid] Quaedam substantiae Physicae sunt suppositivae, seu supponunt quid, ut spacium, quod aliis substantiis substernitur: sic hoc loco est Status qui personis moralibus substernitur, quamquam in eo differant (nam quodvis simile est et dissimile) quod spatium post substantiae abolitionem maneat, non autem status, sublatis enim personis moralibus et status tollitur. Sic sublatis omnibus professoribus, professio ibidem non est, sublatis penalibus, penalismus tollitur. Nam status non est, nisi ibi personae sint. par. 11. [Monita quaedam circa status] Dicitur unam personam in pluribus statibus existere posse. Sic e.g. Rex est una persona,tamen ei non repugnatesse(1) praeterregem (2.) maritus (3.) Pater(4)foederatus(5.) hostisetc. [p.4] Sed observandum bene quod additur, qui status videlicet sibi invicem non adversentur. Circamediumhujus paragraphi dicuntur obligationes diversis principiis derivari. Res clara clarior evadet exemplis. V.g. Theologi tractant de magistratu, de conjugio etc et Philosophi morales sed ex diversis principiis, illiex luminerevelationisacscripturae, hiex luminerationis.V.g. disserit Theologus de officio sacerdotum eisque praescribit rationem peculiarem administrandi v.g.sacramenta petitam ex revelatione, quam Philosophus Moralis qua talis non novit, sed hoc tamen in genere ut omnia decenter fiant, idque suo lumine naturae, quod tenendum accurate, nam unius positio non estalteriusexclusio. Fatemur plura hominiessea Sacra Scriptura praescripta ut varios ritus etc quam ex jure naturali, sed non statim excludendum est jus naturae, quod quamvis non tam exacte ac perfecte ergo nullomodo? Quae circa finem hujus paragraphi disputantur ea sunt contra Boeclerum, qui inutiliter prorsus hanc quaestionem movetin notisad Grotium, quomodo futurusessetstatus hominis,siAdampermansissetin suasanctitate? Hac deresane non possumus judicare. Resest meraerevelationis. o b s e r va t ion e s s u p e r l i b r u m d e J.n.&g. 51 par. 5.


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Quae circa finem hujus paragraphi disputantur ea sunt contra Boeclerum, qui inutiliter prorsus hanc quaestionem movetin notisad Grotium, quomodo futurusessetstatus hominis,siAdampermansissetin suasanctitate? Hac deresane non possumus judicare. Resest meraerevelationis. o b s e r va t ion e s s u p e r l i b r u m d e J.n.&g. 51 par. 5. [Their division] I divide the moral entities in four particular predicaments: (1) of substance; although they are not substances they are regarded as such or have some analogy with substances (2) of quality (3) of quantity (4) of action. par. 6. [Definition of state] 2 Certain physical substances sub-impose something, like space that is laid under other substances. The analogy to this is the state, which is laid under moral persons,although thereisthe difference(foreverything similarisalso dissimilar)that space remains after the substances have been taken away, not the state, however, for when moral persons are removed, the state is abolished as well. If all professorsareremoved thereis no professorship, without freshmen, thereis no bullying. There is no state, if there are no persons. par. 11. [Some injunctions regarding states] One person may exist in several states. A king is a person, but he may very well apart from king be a husband, father, an ally, an enemy etc. [p.4] Note carefully, that these states are not opposed to each other. In themiddle ofthis paragraph itis said that obligations are derived fromdifferent principles. This is clear but it becomes even clearer by examples. Theologians and moral philosophers deal with authority, matrimony etc. but from diverse principles, the former from the light of revelation, the latter from the light of reason. The theologian talks about the office of priests and prescribes to them a certain way of handling for instance the sacraments that is derived from revelation.


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In themiddle ofthis paragraph itis said that obligations are derived fromdifferent principles. This is clear but it becomes even clearer by examples. Theologians and moral philosophers deal with authority, matrimony etc. but from diverse principles, the former from the light of revelation, the latter from the light of reason. The theologian talks about the office of priests and prescribes to them a certain way of handling for instance the sacraments that is derived from revelation. The moral philosopher does not know revelation as such but nevertheless he knows in general how these things should be handled decently, and does so through the light of nature. This is to be maintained carefully, for the one proposition does not exclude the other. It is true that the Holy Writ prescribes more rules to man concerning various rites than natural law, but oneshould notexclude natural law at once. It is notcompletely irrelevant just becauseit is not thatexactand perfect. The argument at the end of this paragraph is levelled against Boecler who in his comments on Grotius quite pointlessly raises the question of what the state of man would have been if Adam had remained in his sanctity. 3 We can make no judgement about this; the matter depends on revelation alone. 2. Note that ‘state’ (status) in this paragraph does not refer to the political community; instead, as Pufendorf explains, it is the counterpart to space in physics and rather means ‘condition’. 3. Johann Boeclerus: In Hvgonis Grotii Ius belli et pacis annotata, 1663. 52 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s Undetacendum cum Scriptura. Interim tamen non video, quare non futuraetuncfuissentRespublicaeetiamsi non tales, quales nuncsuntin statu malitiae, quiatunc Rex non poneretur ut gladium impiis stringeretac nunc. Potuitessecongruus Sanctis moribus istius status.


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3. Johann Boeclerus: In Hvgonis Grotii Ius belli et pacis annotata, 1663. 52 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s Undetacendum cum Scriptura. Interim tamen non video, quare non futuraetuncfuissentRespublicaeetiamsi non tales, quales nuncsuntin statu malitiae, quiatunc Rex non poneretur ut gladium impiis stringeretac nunc. Potuitessecongruus Sanctis moribus istius status. Iuxta quosdam theologos statuitur verisimiliter inter sanctos [p.5] genios Angelos, videlicet Hierarchia ut unus imperetalii, quod si ibidem, cur ni quaeso apud sanctos homines futurus esset certus ordo imperantium et parentium. par. 14. [Monita circa personas morales] Quando disputatum est cum gentilibus et quidem ex rationibus sc. contra πoλυθείαν, quia ratio nobis suppeditat plura dari non posse infinita. Respondebant eorum mentem non talem esse, quasi vellent diversos numero deos statuere et colere, sed unum saltem Numen quod propter diversa officia, variisac diversissuis nominibusinsignitur, utVenus,Jupiter, Bacchus etc. Breviter: non plures dicunt Deos esse sc. personas physicas sed tantum morales plures. par. 16. [Res morales] Hic paragraphus observandus est contra authoris elementa. Nam unus dies docet alterum. par. 23. [Entia moralia quomodo pereant] Contra hujustheseos principium, opponuntimaginemDei in hominibus deperditam. Rs. imago Dei in homineeratacest non ensaliquod morale ex impositione, sed maxime Physicum. Nos dicimus entia moralia ut ab impositione habent suam originem, sic ab eadem mutationes sortiri. Ita quando Deus in Veteri Testamento populo judaico dederit legem caeremonialem, obligabatstatimillosad observationemejusdem.Quando vero deus tempore Messiae legem illam abrogabat statim expirabat ejusdem obligatio. Sanetuncin judaeo nullafactaerat mutatio Physica nec major, nec minor.


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Rs. imago Dei in homineeratacest non ensaliquod morale ex impositione, sed maxime Physicum. Nos dicimus entia moralia ut ab impositione habent suam originem, sic ab eadem mutationes sortiri. Ita quando Deus in Veteri Testamento populo judaico dederit legem caeremonialem, obligabatstatimillosad observationemejusdem.Quando vero deus tempore Messiae legem illam abrogabat statim expirabat ejusdem obligatio. Sanetuncin judaeo nullafactaerat mutatio Physica nec major, nec minor. Ita quando servo meo mandatis dedero, hoc vel illud exsequi, statim revocans mandatum, [p.6] certe obligatio illa nulla ulterius manet, et ea obligatione amissa ac admissa servus physice non mutatus est. o b s e r va t ion e s s u p e r l i b r u m d e J.n.&g. 53 Therefore, one has to besilent together with the Holy Writ. Meanwhile, Icannot see why there would have been no political societies,although notas they are now in the state of corruption. For then, there would have been no king who checked evil with his sword, as there is now. Adam could have been concordant with the sanctity of the original state. According to sometheologians, it is likely that there is a hierarchy among [p.5] the angels, so that the one commands the other: if it is like that with them, why would there not have been some kind of order of command and obedience among innocent men? par. 14. [Injunctions regarding moral persons] In the disputations with the pagans and in particular in the arguments against polytheism, it was said that reason shows clearly that there cannot be several infinite entities. The pagans answered that their intention was not to set up and worship different and separate gods, but only one Divinity which because of its diverse functions was distinguished by its various names, like Venus, Jove, Bacchus etc. In short: they did not believe there were several, i.e. physical persons, only moral persons. par. 16. [Things moral] This paragraph is contradictory to the author’s Elements. 4 One becomes wiser with the passage of time. par. 23.


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The pagans answered that their intention was not to set up and worship different and separate gods, but only one Divinity which because of its diverse functions was distinguished by its various names, like Venus, Jove, Bacchus etc. In short: they did not believe there were several, i.e. physical persons, only moral persons. par. 16. [Things moral] This paragraph is contradictory to the author’s Elements. 4 One becomes wiser with the passage of time. par. 23. [How moral entities become extinct] It is argued against this that that the image of God in man is lost. I answer that theimage of God in man wasand is nota moralentity but something very physical. I say that the origin of the moral entities as well as their change is in the imposition. Thus, in the Old Testament when God gave the ceremonial law to the Jewish people he immediately obliged them to observe it. However, when, in the time of Messiah, he abrogated it, the obligation expired immediately. 5 And indeed, no major or minor physical change then occurred in the Jewish people. If I have ordered my servant to do this or that and recall the mandate, there is [p.6]certainly no mandate any longer, and the servant does not undergo any physical change regardless of the imposition or abrogation of the obligation. 4. Pufendorf admits that he has changed his opinion since his Elementa jurisprudentiae universalis, 1660. 5. The rules on sacrifices, circumcision, holy days and eating observed by the Jews in the OldTestament do not apply to Christians, according to passagesin the NewTestament, for instance Colossians 2:14–17. 54 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s Sicin monetis, pretium ac valor potest minuiaccresceretamen manente eodem pondere monetae valore vel mutato vel prorsus abolito. Adhuc clarius patet ex remissione peccatorum, quae (peccata) Deus nobis condonat,sanetuncexpiratilla vis damnationisin nobis,moralitertumesset tamquam non peccavissemus, quamvis physice peccavimus. Post remissionem non fit physica aliqua mutatio, sed tantum moralis. Cap.


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Adhuc clarius patet ex remissione peccatorum, quae (peccata) Deus nobis condonat,sanetuncexpiratilla vis damnationisin nobis,moralitertumesset tamquam non peccavissemus, quamvis physice peccavimus. Post remissionem non fit physica aliqua mutatio, sed tantum moralis. Cap. II [De certitudine disciplinarum quae circa moralia versantur] par. 4. [In illam dumtaxat disciplinam moralem cadat demonstratio, quae de rectitudine et pravitate actionum moralium agit] Moralis disciplinae quaedam pars videtur Theoretica, ubicerta datur demonstratio, quaedam practica, ut quando in hac vel illa Republicaagitur etc an utile sit nec ne. Fatemur hic adeo certam non dari demonstrationem. Dicitur Divinam providentiam astutissime cogitata deludere ut Henricus IV. Rex Galliarum proposuit totam Europam subigere sub suampotestatem,ac deincepssubactamjuxtasuumarbitriumgubernare, tamen cum in hoc erat, in curru occidebatur a nebulone quodam. par. 6. [An quid honestum aut turpe ante omnem impositionem?] Sicuti in paragrapho praecedenti demonstratum est falsum statuere eos, qui omnemtolluntcertitudinemab entibusmoralibus, itain hocstringemuseorumerrorem, qui, positacertitudineentiummoralium, in alterum extremum inciderunt, videlicet entia moralia ita stabilia esse, ut eorum rationem Deus habuerit ante impositionem seu infusionem [p.7] qualitatum in homine, quae est Grotii. Nos dicimus turpitudinem vel honestatem actionum humanarum provenire ex lege Divina. Nam et nostri Theologi disputantes contra pontificiorum traditiones, dicunt falsos in ea doctrina esse, quia tales traditionesac praecepta quaeipsi fingunt, non sunta Deo praecepta, itaque nullam habent in se bonitatem. Sic constat ex peccati definitione quod scilicet sit ἀνομία, ante legem latam malitia nulla erat. Ita unicuique innatum est, v.g. si quis rustico diceret, quare hos lapides etc. tollas, vapulabis. Respondebit statim: quare paenam subeam, cum non sit hoc ipsum prohibitum a quopiam?


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Nam et nostri Theologi disputantes contra pontificiorum traditiones, dicunt falsos in ea doctrina esse, quia tales traditionesac praecepta quaeipsi fingunt, non sunta Deo praecepta, itaque nullam habent in se bonitatem. Sic constat ex peccati definitione quod scilicet sit ἀνομία, ante legem latam malitia nulla erat. Ita unicuique innatum est, v.g. si quis rustico diceret, quare hos lapides etc. tollas, vapulabis. Respondebit statim: quare paenam subeam, cum non sit hoc ipsum prohibitum a quopiam? Grotius dicit Deum in legibus naturalibus ferendis respexisse ad id quod in rebus antea erat conveniens vel inconveniens: in positivis autem ideo esse justum, quia Deus ita voluit. Sed prius illud est et impium et o b s e r va t ion e s s u p e r l i b r u m d e J.n.&g. 55 Similarly regarding money, price and value may decrease and increase, but the weight of the coin remains the same, even if its value has changed or been cancelled completely. This is even more obvious in the remission of sins: when God remits us from our sins, then indeed the power of condemnation expires in us, and morally it isas if we had not sinned, however much we havesinned physically. After the remission, no physical change occurs, only a moral one. Chapter II [On the certa inty of moral sciences] par. 4. [Demonstration is possible only in that moral science which treats of the goodness and evil of human actions] Of moral science one part seems to be theoretical, which can be demonstrated with certainty and one practical as when its utility for some state is concerned. I admit that no certain demonstration of this practical part can be found. Divine providence deluded theshrewd plans of Henry IV.TheKing of France planned to bring thewhole of Europe under his dominion and govern itaccording to hiswill. But in the middle of this, a sorry wretch killed him in his chariot. par. 6. [Can moral good or evil exist before any imposition?]


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I admit that no certain demonstration of this practical part can be found. Divine providence deluded theshrewd plans of Henry IV.TheKing of France planned to bring thewhole of Europe under his dominion and govern itaccording to hiswill. But in the middle of this, a sorry wretch killed him in his chariot. par. 6. [Can moral good or evil exist before any imposition?] In the preceding paragraph I demonstrated that those are wrong who remove all certainty from moral entities; here I will criticize the mistake of those who, presupposing the certainty of moral entities, go to the other extreme, believing that moral entities are so stable that God had their reasons in mind before [p.7] moral qualities were imposed on man and infused in him; this is the opinion of Grotius. I say that the shamefulnessand honesty of human action come from the law of God. Even our theologians, disputing against the traditions of the papists, hold that the papistsare wrong in this doctrine, sincethetraditionsand precepts they imagine are not of God and therefore have no goodness in themselves. It is clear from the definition of a sin, that it is a violation of the law; before the law was given, there was no evil. This is innate in everybody; for instance, if someone says to a peasant: “You took those stones, therefore you shall be flogged”, he will answer at once: “Why shall I be punished, nobody has forbidden it?” Grotius says that God in making the laws of nature considered in advance what was convenient or inconvenient, whereas in the positive laws of God the just is just because God willed it. But the former is both impious and 56 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s falsum. Nam nihil erat justum vel injustum antequam Deus quid praecepit vel prohibuit. Quia honestum et inhonestum est a lege, sed lex erat a Deo, et honestas ac turpitudo a Deo sc. mediante lege. Nam alias haec sequerenturabsurda(1)sc.anteDeumfingerealiquemlegislatorem, quod impium, vel (2) statuendum Stoicorum fatum, quod Deus nec mutare potuit.


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But the former is both impious and 56 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s falsum. Nam nihil erat justum vel injustum antequam Deus quid praecepit vel prohibuit. Quia honestum et inhonestum est a lege, sed lex erat a Deo, et honestas ac turpitudo a Deo sc. mediante lege. Nam alias haec sequerenturabsurda(1)sc.anteDeumfingerealiquemlegislatorem, quod impium, vel (2) statuendum Stoicorum fatum, quod Deus nec mutare potuit. Nam lex naturalis tum esset ante Deum, quod Deus deinceps coactus fuerit imponerejuxtafatum. Siclibertas Dei periclitaretur. [p.8] Deus enim deliberabat in designandis hominibus qualitatibus. In libertate Deierat itaque qualis homo futurusesset, dicitur in Sacra Scriptura, Gen. c. 3. Hinc maxima est eorum calumnia, qui falsissime dicunt, me statuisse furtum et adulterium esse actiones indifferentes. Quin contr/ ar/ium expresse statui p. 26 etc. Sed hoc dico, quasdam actiones esse indifferentes, ut v.g. motus seu extensio manus, quae nec bona, nec mala, quando autem extendo illam ad eripiendam rem alienam, tunc mala, ad sumendam autem meam, tunc bona, quae malitia ac bonitas non provenit ex actione in se, sed extrinsece tantum, quantum sc. illa discrepet a lege, haec vero conveniat. Ad locum Aristotelis adductum circa medium p. 26. Respondemus Aristotelem ibi disputarecontra Stoicos statuentes omnes hominisaffectusesse malos,adeoque dicit quosdam tantum esse malos, ut adulterium, furtum, homicidium etc quod et nos concedimus. Nec dicimus omne in actionibus absolute esse indifferens, omnes actiones esse indifferentes, sed omne materiale in actionibus est indifferens, ut v.g. extensio manus. At quae Aristoteles adfert, haec vocabula non simplicem inferunt motum physicum, sed insuper et respectum ad legem, ut furtum non est ablatio rei simpliciter sed quae legibus repugnat. Sic vocabulum invidiae etc denotat aberrationem a lege. [p.9] par. 8. [De latitudine actionum moralium ratione qualitatis] Quid sit latitudo qualitatis sciri potestex latitudine quantitatis.


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At quae Aristoteles adfert, haec vocabula non simplicem inferunt motum physicum, sed insuper et respectum ad legem, ut furtum non est ablatio rei simpliciter sed quae legibus repugnat. Sic vocabulum invidiae etc denotat aberrationem a lege. [p.9] par. 8. [De latitudine actionum moralium ratione qualitatis] Quid sit latitudo qualitatis sciri potestex latitudine quantitatis. Quaeest quando duomilites propteraequale delictumper virgamtransire debent, et unus praealtero pluribus plagiscaeditur,tum illud multum non refert, num magis vel minus, quae est latitudo quantitatis. o b s e r va t ion e s s u p e r l i b r u m d e J.n.&g. 57 false. For nothing was just or unjust before God enjoined or forbade it. The honourable and the disgraceful come from the law, and the law was of God; therefore honesty and shamefulness are of God, through the law. Otherwise absurdities would follow, first, that oneimagesalegislator who preceded God, which is impious; or, second, thata Stoicfateis postulated that God could notchange. For the law of nature would be before God and God would have been forced to impose it in accordance with fate. That would jeopardize the freedom of God. [p.8] For God deliberated in shaping the qualities of man. What man would be depended on thefreedom of God,as said in the Holy Writ, Genesischap. 3. Therefore, they are very malicious who falsely accuse me of claiming that theft and adultery are morally indifferent actions. Quite the reverse, I say the contrary in page 26 sqq. But I do hold that some actions are indifferent, for instance moving or putting out one’s hand, which are neither good norevil; however, when I put out my hand to take something that is not mine, it is evil, but good when I do it to take what is mine. The evil or the good come not from the action itself but only from the outside, i.e. it depends on how much theevilaction deviates from thelaw and the good action conforms to it.


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Quite the reverse, I say the contrary in page 26 sqq. But I do hold that some actions are indifferent, for instance moving or putting out one’s hand, which are neither good norevil; however, when I put out my hand to take something that is not mine, it is evil, but good when I do it to take what is mine. The evil or the good come not from the action itself but only from the outside, i.e. it depends on how much theevilaction deviates from thelaw and the good action conforms to it. To the passage cited in the middle of page 26, I answer that Aristotle there arguesagainst the Stoics6 who held thatall human emotions wereevil, wherefore hesaysthatcertain actionsareevil, likeadultery,theft,murderetc.,which Iadmit. Nor do I say thateverything in actions is indifferentand thatallactionsareindifferent, buteverythingmaterial in actionsisindifferent, like putting out one’s hand. The words adduced by Aristotle do not refer to a simple physical motion but also the regard to the law: theft is not simply the removal of something but one that violates the laws. Likewise, the word envy denotes an aberration from the law.7 [p.9] par. 8. [The extent of moral actions on the base of quality] What latitude of qualityiscan be understood from latitude of quantity.Thelatter is when two soldiers are to be flogged because of some offence, and one of them gets moreraps than the other. Then it is not very important if the number of raps is larger or smaller; that is latitude of quantity. 6. Modern historiography of philosophy does not acknowledge any contact between Aristotle and Stoicism. 7. The passage of Aristotle is from Nichomachean Ethics II:6. Pufendorf quotes it in De jure II:1.6, however without the insinuation about the Stoics. 58 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s par. 10. [In quantitatibus moralibus datur latitudo] Dicimus παχυλως personas aestimari, ut v.g. Doctor censetur magistro vel alio docto viro praeclarior, ac existimatione major, sic consul consiliario etc.


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6. Modern historiography of philosophy does not acknowledge any contact between Aristotle and Stoicism. 7. The passage of Aristotle is from Nichomachean Ethics II:6. Pufendorf quotes it in De jure II:1.6, however without the insinuation about the Stoics. 58 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s par. 10. [In quantitatibus moralibus datur latitudo] Dicimus παχυλως personas aestimari, ut v.g. Doctor censetur magistro vel alio docto viro praeclarior, ac existimatione major, sic consul consiliario etc. Non statim possum exacte ut in mathematicis fit, pronunciare hunc(doctorem)essealio viro doctioremduplo,triplo etc. Sicresse habet circa res ac actiones ut equus v.g. constans 300 thaleris, certe si emptor dederit 299 magis vel minus non adeo anxiecuratur, quin ibiest latitudo quaedam. Sic et in paenis, ut constitutum sit aliquem in carcere mansurum 9 dies, quaeri potest cur ne 8 diebus. Respondetur: est ibi latitudo quaedam, unde certi quid non datur. Datur et latitudo in omnibus fere virtutibus. Sic in misericordia non teneor dare pauperi 6. pecuniasalbas vel plus vel minus,sed hiceststatim quaedamlatitudo, quaeameo arbitrio dependet,tamen utmisericordiam penitus non deponam. Sicliberalisesseestetiamex libera hominis voluntate, loco muneris dare vel centum vel 50 vel 20, vel 10 taleros. Cap. III [De intellectu hominis, prout concurr it ad actiones morales] par. 2. [Facultati intellectus repraesentativae qualis indoles?] Metaphysici distingvunt potentiam in liberam et naturalem. [p. 10] Illa respicit opposita, haec non potest non agere positis requisitis. Iam in hoc paragrapho quaeritur, numhominis intellectus debeatreferri ad potentiam liberam vel naturalem. Respondemusad naturalem, idque patetexemplo speculi nam deformem speculum recte positum non potest non deformem repraesentare. Siccum intellectu seseres habet, nam quando semel audivi viri cujusdam inscitiam in studiis, non possum non postmodum illumjudicareidiotam,si quismihi dixeritipsumadeo doctumesse ut Salomoni non multum cedat.


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Iam in hoc paragrapho quaeritur, numhominis intellectus debeatreferri ad potentiam liberam vel naturalem. Respondemusad naturalem, idque patetexemplo speculi nam deformem speculum recte positum non potest non deformem repraesentare. Siccum intellectu seseres habet, nam quando semel audivi viri cujusdam inscitiam in studiis, non possum non postmodum illumjudicareidiotam,si quismihi dixeritipsumadeo doctumesse ut Salomoni non multum cedat. Nivem quoqueesse non albam sed atram non possum cogi sentire, quamvis Rex aliter sentientibus supplicium capitis intentaverit. Unde recte statuitur nullum sumere debere sibi potestatem cogendi aliquem ad religionem, sed cogi tamen potest ad media quibus religio vera adquiritur, sc. frequentationem templi, lectionem librorum virorumorthodoxorumetc.Namnec ChristusmisitApostolossuoscum gladiis sed ut praedicando propagarent doctrinam caelestem. o b s e r va t ion e s s u p e r l i b r u m d e J.n.&g. 59 par. 10. [Latitude is admitted in moral quantities] We can say that individuals are rated approximately, as when a doctor is considered more excellent than a master or another scholar and more esteemed, and a consul more respected than a counsellor. I cannot on the spot state exactly, as in mathematics, that this doctor is twice or three times more learned. That is how matters stand with thingsand actions. Ifa horsecosts 300 thaler it does not matter so much if the buyer gives 299 or 301, for there is some latitude. Similarly in punishments: if someoneis sent to jail for nine days, onecould ask: why noteight? The answer is that there is a latitude, and hence nothing certain. Also, there is latitude in almost all virtues. I am not obliged through pity to give 6 silver coins, or more or less, to the poor man; there is some latitude here, which depends on my decision. But I should not disregard it completely. Similarly, generosity too is a matter of man’s free will and it depends on the office and position whether one gives 100, 50, 20, or 10 thaler.


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The answer is that there is a latitude, and hence nothing certain. Also, there is latitude in almost all virtues. I am not obliged through pity to give 6 silver coins, or more or less, to the poor man; there is some latitude here, which depends on my decision. But I should not disregard it completely. Similarly, generosity too is a matter of man’s free will and it depends on the office and position whether one gives 100, 50, 20, or 10 thaler. Chapter III [On the understanding of man as it concurs in moral actions] par. 2. [What is the property of the representative faculty of the understanding] Metaphysicians distinguish between free and natural faculty. [p. 10] The former concerns oppositealternatives, thelatter has necessary prerequisites. In this paragraph the question is whether man’s understanding belongs to thefree or natural faculty. The answer is: to the natural, which appears from the example of a mirror. A mirror, if correctly positioned, cannot but represent the ugly as ugly. This is how matters stand with understanding: for once I have heard the ignorance of a student, I cannot but judge him an idiot afterwards, even if someone tells me he is almost as wise as Salomon. I cannot be forced to believe that snow is not white but black, even if the king threatens those who think otherwise with the death penalty.Thereforeit is right to say that nobody ought to claim the power to force someone to a particular religion. However, he can be forced to use the media whereby truereligion isacquired, likefrequentattending church and reading books by orthodox men. For Christ did not send his apostles with swords but to propagate the Christian doctrine by preaching. 60 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s par. 10.


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However, he can be forced to use the media whereby truereligion isacquired, likefrequentattending church and reading books by orthodox men. For Christ did not send his apostles with swords but to propagate the Christian doctrine by preaching. 60 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s par. 10. [Ignorantia quid, et quotuplex] Quiafactaest mentio Eustratii, sciendum esteum optimum fuisseinterpretem Aristotelis, quia erat ipse Graecus, ac Graeci interpretes admodum sunt rari, ac quot sunt, sunt meliores latinis, et prorsus miraculum est, quodThomaset ScotusaliiqueaggressisuntinterpretariAristotelem, qui tamen ipsi [p. 11] graecam linguam non callebant. Unde tot errores adscribuntur Aristoteli, quae ipsi nunquam ne quidem per somnium in mentem venerunt. par. 14. [Aut indifferentes] Sic fieri potest ut Christianusaliquis sibi plane persuasum habeat omnino esseabstinendum ab esu sanguinis, quod praeceperunt Apostoli Act. 15. (:quod praeceptum tantum fuisse temporarium a theologis est ostensum:). Si quis credat et hoc praeceptum his aeque ac primis temporibus valere,ac nefasessesanguineafarcimenta1 edereet non edat, non peccat; si autem contra suam suasionem ac conscientiam erroneam edat, tum peccat. Sed videndum ne sub hac abstinentia quid religionis ac cultus lateat. Quia Deo non cura est quid edat quis, quid non ex suis donis, estque hoc fictum praeceptum quo Deus non colitur. par. 15. [Error practicus] Saepecontingiterrorin praxicirca objectum, v.g.Jacob Patriarchaerravit, quando concubuit cum Lea sorore Rachelis. Tum non errabat errorem in theoria, nam optime sciebat se non debere cubare cum ea, quae ejus non erat sponsa, sed error erat in praxi. Error circa locum est, ut si conduxissem aliquem ut mihi fossam effoderet, et ille alibi quam ego ipsi demonstraveram effodisset, sane praemium expectare non potest, quia ibi fossa mihi non est utilis. par. 16.


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15. [Error practicus] Saepecontingiterrorin praxicirca objectum, v.g.Jacob Patriarchaerravit, quando concubuit cum Lea sorore Rachelis. Tum non errabat errorem in theoria, nam optime sciebat se non debere cubare cum ea, quae ejus non erat sponsa, sed error erat in praxi. Error circa locum est, ut si conduxissem aliquem ut mihi fossam effoderet, et ille alibi quam ego ipsi demonstraveram effodisset, sane praemium expectare non potest, quia ibi fossa mihi non est utilis. par. 16. [Error circa actionem malam] Quando maritus concubitum cupit cum ancillis et [p. 12] illae interim hoc mariti propositum herae patefaciunt, quae deinceps constituto tempore supponit, et cum illa rem habet, num adulter sit? Respondemus in foro divino ita est, non vero in humano. 1. Manuscript: fereimenta. o b s e r va t ion e s s u p e r l i b r u m d e J.n.&g. 61 par. 10. [The nature and forms of ignorance] Since Eustratius8 was mentioned, one should know that he wasa very good interpreter of Aristotle, because he was a Greek himself. Greek interpreters are rare, and those that do exist are better than the Latin ones. It is a mere wonder that Thomas and Scotus and others who [p. 11] did not themselves understand Greek have ventured to interpret Aristotle. This is why so many errors are ascribed to Aristotle that he could not even have dreamt of conceiving. par. 14. [Theoretical error in indifferent actions] It may happen thata Christian isabsolutely convinced that he mustabstain from eating blood,astheapostlesenjoined inActs15.(Thetheologians have proved that preceptto be only temporary.)Ifsomeone believesthisinjunction appliestoday as wellas in early timesand considers it sinful to eat black pudding, he does not sin. Butif heeatsagainst hisconviction and failing conscience,then hesins. However, one ought to investigate if in that abstinence there lurks something that is mere worship and cult. For God does not care about what one eats, that is not one of his gifts. This is a feigned precept whereby God is not worshipped. par. 15.


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Thetheologians have proved that preceptto be only temporary.)Ifsomeone believesthisinjunction appliestoday as wellas in early timesand considers it sinful to eat black pudding, he does not sin. Butif heeatsagainst hisconviction and failing conscience,then hesins. However, one ought to investigate if in that abstinence there lurks something that is mere worship and cult. For God does not care about what one eats, that is not one of his gifts. This is a feigned precept whereby God is not worshipped. par. 15. [Practical error] Error often occursin practicewith regard to the object.The patriarch Jacob sinned when he slept with Lea, the sister of Rachel. His error was not in theory, for he knew very well that he should not sleep with her as she was not his betrothed. Instead, the error was in practice. It isan error with regard to place if I have hired someone to dig a trench for me and he digs somewhere else than I showed him; then he can certainly expect no salary, for in that place the trench is of no use to me. par. 16. [Error in an evil action] Suppose a married man wants to sleep with his maids, and [p. 12] they tell the mistressabout her husband’s proposal. At theappointed time, she puts herself in their place, and he sleeps with her. Is he then an adulterer? I answer: in the court of God he is, but not in a human court of law. 8. Eustratius (fl. c. 1100 A.D.) was a Metropolitan in Nicaea, known for his commentaries on Aristotle. 62 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s Cap. IV [De voluntate hominis, prout concurr it ad actiones morales] par. 5. [Voluntatem solicitant constitutiones certae corporis] Dicimus voluntatemmoveri principio intrinseco.Namvidimus quasdam res moveri ex principio extrinseco, ut navis, currus etc. Duo sunt actus voluntatis, velle, nolle, appetere, aversari. Sponte fieri quaedam actiones dicuntur, quae fiuntab intrinseco principio, sed libere ubi praecedit aliqua electio. par. 10.


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IV [De voluntate hominis, prout concurr it ad actiones morales] par. 5. [Voluntatem solicitant constitutiones certae corporis] Dicimus voluntatemmoveri principio intrinseco.Namvidimus quasdam res moveri ex principio extrinseco, ut navis, currus etc. Duo sunt actus voluntatis, velle, nolle, appetere, aversari. Sponte fieri quaedam actiones dicuntur, quae fiuntab intrinseco principio, sed libere ubi praecedit aliqua electio. par. 10. [Invitum quid] Coactum in seet sua causa simulest, si vigilratione officii noctibus plateas oberrat, ac verberatur a studiosis. Si autem studiosi tumultuantes noctu per plateas inciderint in alios a quibus verbera accipiebant, hoc est coactum in se, nam se domi debebant continere. Cap. V [De actionibus moralibus in genere, deque earundem ad agentem pertinentia, seu ad imputationem aptitudine] par. 4. [Actio moralis formaliter considerata semper est ens positivum] Hinc constat etiam peccatum esse quid positivi, nec est quod quidam Theologi metuant, inde fieri, quod Deus fit ejus causa, cum omnium entium positivorum sit causa. Sed non distingvunt inter causam moralem et physicam. Deus omnium rerum est causa physica, non autem causa entium moralium, ad quam classem etiam peccatum pertinet. Et non quod quisfacit,tantum habetur pro ente positivo,sed id quod omittitest ens positivum morale, quia homini [p. 13]eo nomine imputatur. par. 5. [Causa, et fundamentum, cur imputari possit vel non] In hoc paragrapho agitur de causa, cur actio homini imputanda sit, vel non? Respondemus simpliciter quia penes illum qui agit, est ut hoc fiat et non. Quod ipsum et nobis sensus communis suppeditat. o b s e r va t ion e s s u p e r l i b r u m d e J.n.&g. 63 Chapter IV [On the w ill of man as it concurs in human action] par. 5. [Certain dispositions of the body incite the will] I say that the will is moved by an internal principle. Somethingsare moved by an external principle, like a ship, a chariot etc. There are two actions of the will, willing and not willing, desire and shun.


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Respondemus simpliciter quia penes illum qui agit, est ut hoc fiat et non. Quod ipsum et nobis sensus communis suppeditat. o b s e r va t ion e s s u p e r l i b r u m d e J.n.&g. 63 Chapter IV [On the w ill of man as it concurs in human action] par. 5. [Certain dispositions of the body incite the will] I say that the will is moved by an internal principle. Somethingsare moved by an external principle, like a ship, a chariot etc. There are two actions of the will, willing and not willing, desire and shun. Someactionsaresaid to bespontaneouswhen they occur because oftheinternal principle, but free if they are preceded by some choice. par. 10. [The involuntary] It is involuntaryin itself and in itscausetoo ifawatchman on patrol in thestreetsat night is beaten up by students. However, if students who make noisein thestreets at night come across others who beat them up, it is involuntary in itself /but not in its cause/9 , because they ought to have stayed at home. Chapter V [On moral actions in general and their application to the agent, or that which allows them to be held to account] par. 4. [A moral action considered formally is always a positive entity] Of this it is clear that a sin too is something positive. That does not entail, as some theologians fear, that God is the cause of the sin, since he is the cause of all positive entities. They do not distinguish between moral and physical cause. God is the physical cause of all things, but he is not the cause of moral entities, 10 to which class sinful action also belongs. And not only is what someone does a positive entity but also what he omits is a positive moral entity, since man is held to account for this. [p. 13] par. 5. [The cause or ground why something can be imputed to a man, or not] This paragraph is about the cause of why a man is held to account for an action. Thesimpleansweristhatit depends on himwho actswhether heis held to account for his action or not. Common sense confirms this abundantly. 9.


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And not only is what someone does a positive entity but also what he omits is a positive moral entity, since man is held to account for this. [p. 13] par. 5. [The cause or ground why something can be imputed to a man, or not] This paragraph is about the cause of why a man is held to account for an action. Thesimpleansweristhatit depends on himwho actswhether heis held to account for his action or not. Common sense confirms this abundantly. 9. The added or similar words are obviously missing here; the students were not involuntarily put in the situation where they were beaten up. 10. This seems to contradict what is said on p. 1 where some moral entities are ascribed to God. 64 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s Concludit quidam ex iis quae hoc loco habentur nos non teneri2respondere ad peccatum originis, quod sane impium. Nos enim hic dicimus, nos non debereresponderead id, quod penes nos non est, quod sane est peccatum originis, nam in nostra potestate non est, ut ita nascamur vel non. Sed distingvendum est inter forum humanum et forum divinum. Nos hicetalibi deforo humano agimus. Deinderesponderi potest etiam juxta nonnullos theologos corruptionem illam esse in nobis tanquam in sua causa, cum omnes peccavissemus existentes in lumbis Adami, ut nos omnes lapsi fuerimus, cum ille lapsus est. Sed prior responsio est manifestissma. Cap. V I [De norma actionum moralium, seu de lege in genere] par. 3. [Et jure] Sic dicimus: habeo jus hoc ipsum vel illud faciendi, quia non est interdictum et est libertas quaedam, et lex est quasi vinculum, quo illa constringitur. Cap. V II [De actionum moralium qualitatibus] par. 6. [Justitia est vel personarum, vel actionum] Distingvendum omnino est inter justitiam causae ac personae; quae distinctio maximam lucem lucratur exemplo Davidis, qui multoties in ψalmis allegat, suam justitiam videlicet non personae, quae nulla, sed causae, quia [p. 14] injusta de causa eum persequebatur Saulus.


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Cap. V II [De actionum moralium qualitatibus] par. 6. [Justitia est vel personarum, vel actionum] Distingvendum omnino est inter justitiam causae ac personae; quae distinctio maximam lucem lucratur exemplo Davidis, qui multoties in ψalmis allegat, suam justitiam videlicet non personae, quae nulla, sed causae, quia [p. 14] injusta de causa eum persequebatur Saulus. Sic aliud est virjustus,aliud actio justa, hancetinjustusaliquando edere potest.Ut quamvissitinjustusac malustyrannus,tamen propteraliquam actionem est laudandus. par. 9. [Justitia distributiva] Quid justitia distributivasit patetex lege, quam habent in hocsplendido oppido resultantem ex societate pastoritiali. 3 Nam qui duas vaccas habet ac dederit tres marcas, apparet quod qui unam habet, dare cogeretur unam ac dimidiam marcam, quia est justitia distributiva, in qua observanda est aequalitas geometrica seu comparata. 2. Manuscript: tenere. 3. Added in the margin: NB. o b s e r va t ion e s s u p e r l i b r u m d e J.n.&g. 65 Someone concludes from what is treated here that we are not responsible for the original sin, which is really impious. What I say here is that we ought not to answer for that which does not lie with us. This indeed applies to the original sin, forit is not within our powerto be born with or without it. One must distinguish between human courts and the court of God. Here and elsewhere, I talk of the former. Further, one could answer in accordance with several theologians that corruption isin us by its own cause,sinceweallwho are ofAdam’sseed sin because we fell when he fell. But the former answer is the most apparent. Chapter V I [On the rule of moral actions, or of the law in general] par. 3. [A law differs from right] Thus wesay thatI havetheright to do this orthat, becauseit is not forbidden,and there is some liberty, whereas the law is like a bond that fetters actions. Chapter V II [On the qualities of moral actions] par. 6.


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But the former answer is the most apparent. Chapter V I [On the rule of moral actions, or of the law in general] par. 3. [A law differs from right] Thus wesay thatI havetheright to do this orthat, becauseit is not forbidden,and there is some liberty, whereas the law is like a bond that fetters actions. Chapter V II [On the qualities of moral actions] par. 6. [The cause of justice lies either in persons or actions] One must distinguish wholly between the justice of cause and of persons. That distinction gains great illumination from the example of David, who says many times in the Psalms that his justice was not in his person, which was insignificant, but in hiscause, since Saul persecuted him foran [p. 14] unjustcause. Henceajust man is one thing, a just action another; sometimes the latter can be performed by an unjust man. Someone may be an unjust and evil tyrant but still laudable because of some action. par. 9. [Distributive justice] What distributive justice is appears from the law they have in this splendid town at the proposal of the guild ofcattle-dealers. 11 For if someone who has threecows has given three marks, then it is clear that he who has onecow must give oneand a half marks, sinceit is distributivejustice where geometric orcomparativejustice is observed. 11. The example seems to refer to a local guild in Lund. The unexpected effect of distributive justice that he who has one cow must give one and a half mark (instead of one) suggests that the whole comment is ironic. 66 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s par. 10. [Commutativa] Proportio arithmetica est excessus aequalium, ut 3, 6, 9, 12, 15 etc ubi in omnibus tantum 3. excedunt. par. 11. [Grotii sententia de Justitia] Justitiaattributrix Grotiana patet praeterexemplaallata,ex hoc:Quando sc. quis adsciscitur in numerum senatorum, quamvis sit ad hoc officium capax,tamen juresuo perfecto non potestcum Rege postulare, quod non debeat praetermitti, quia hoc ipsum relictum est arbitrio Regis. par. 13.


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10. [Commutativa] Proportio arithmetica est excessus aequalium, ut 3, 6, 9, 12, 15 etc ubi in omnibus tantum 3. excedunt. par. 11. [Grotii sententia de Justitia] Justitiaattributrix Grotiana patet praeterexemplaallata,ex hoc:Quando sc. quis adsciscitur in numerum senatorum, quamvis sit ad hoc officium capax,tamen juresuo perfecto non potestcum Rege postulare, quod non debeat praetermitti, quia hoc ipsum relictum est arbitrio Regis. par. 13. [Hobbesii sententia de Justitia et injuria] NB Si quis meadeatac verberare velit, dico sane:apagescelus, quid mihi tecum; et ille potest se excusare mente Hobbesii, non sum tibi injurius, quiatecum non pactussum, quam excusationem nullussanae mentis pro rata habeatur. par. 14. [Injusta actio quid?] Quialicuiconfert, quod non teneturac debet, quod bonum sit, dici non potest quod ei fueritinjustus,[p. 15] quiasinecausa possunt deferrialicui. QuemadmodumDeus dicitur permitteresolemdescendereac oririsuper malos aeque ac bonos, ideo non dici potest injustus. par. 16. [Injuria sit tantum ex proaeresi, ubi de culpa quoque] Injustus ac injurius non sunt idem, nam injustitia est habitus, non v. injuria. Sic quando David Uriam occiderit, non vocari potest ideo injustus, sed injurius. Lib. II Cap. III [De lege naturali in genere] par. 5. [An jus naturale Deo cum hominibus commune?] Protypumest v.g.sigillumin seconsideratum,ἐκτύπωμα autemhabetexpressus indecharacterex sigillo. NB Probari neque potest quod homo se geratjuxtajustitiamacsanctitatemDei, quando justeacsanctealiquando vivit. Nam Deus est noster Rex, Dominus ac Pater; nos sumus omnes ejus subditi ac quasi fratres sine disparitate quadam. Iam quomodo aequales esse possumus, si debeamus vivere juxta justitiam ac sanctitatem Dei, potiuscontrarium sequeretur, ut omnesessentreges, domini, nullus subditus necfrater, namnon beneeruditur filius,si praeciperetur ut vivat o b s e r va t ion e s s u p e r l i b r u m d e J.n.&g. 67 par.


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Nam Deus est noster Rex, Dominus ac Pater; nos sumus omnes ejus subditi ac quasi fratres sine disparitate quadam. Iam quomodo aequales esse possumus, si debeamus vivere juxta justitiam ac sanctitatem Dei, potiuscontrarium sequeretur, ut omnesessentreges, domini, nullus subditus necfrater, namnon beneeruditur filius,si praeciperetur ut vivat o b s e r va t ion e s s u p e r l i b r u m d e J.n.&g. 67 par. 10 [Commutative justice] Arithmetical proportion isaddition in equal numbers, like3, 6, 9,12,15etc.,where the increase is only by three in each step. par. 11. [The position of Grotius on justice] The attributive justice of Grotius is clear, apart from the examples given, from this: When someone is admitted to the number of senators, however suitable for an office he may be, he cannot with full right demand from the king not to be dismissed, since this is left to the decision of the king. par. 13. [The position of Hobbes on justice and injury] NB. If somebody comes up to me to beat me, I of course say: get away, you rascal, what have I done to you? Then, according to the thinking of Hobbes, he can excuse himself, saying: Iam not unjust to you, becauseI have made no agreement with you. No sane person should consider that excuse reasonable. par. 14. [What is injury?] If somebody gives someone something that he not is obliged to give and which is good, he cannot be said to be unjust. [p. 15] God is said to let the sun rise and set over evil as well as good; he is not unjust because of that. par. 16. [An injury may come only from previous moral choice. Also the nature of fault] Unjust and wrongful are not the same, for injustice is a matter of character, not so an injury. When David killed Uriah, he cannot be called unjust, only wrongful. Book II Chapter III [On the law of nature in general] par. 5. [Is the natural law common to God and men?] A model isaseal regarded in itself,an ektypoma has theimprintand thecharacter of theseal.


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16. [An injury may come only from previous moral choice. Also the nature of fault] Unjust and wrongful are not the same, for injustice is a matter of character, not so an injury. When David killed Uriah, he cannot be called unjust, only wrongful. Book II Chapter III [On the law of nature in general] par. 5. [Is the natural law common to God and men?] A model isaseal regarded in itself,an ektypoma has theimprintand thecharacter of theseal. NB that itcannot be proved that men, when living in justiceand sanctity, behave in accordance with God’s justice and sanctity. For God is our king, masterand fatherand weareall his subjectsand like brethren withoutany difference between us. Now, how can we beequal, if weshould livein accordance with God’s justice and sanctity? Rather the contrary would follow, so that everybody was king, master ad father and no one subject or brother. A son is not raised well if heis taught to livelike God’s holiness; that would mean that heruled his father 68 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s tanquam Deus sancte, sc. dominaretur patri et subditi regibus, quae inversio! Sed justitia Deiest longeeminentior, quaeconsistit in eo quod sit Rex, Dominus, Pater; esset sane nullus justus nisi qui sit rex, Dominus, pater. Ergo eo modo homines se gerere non possunt ac Deus. par. 13. [De dictamine rectae rationis] scriptum in cordibus:) non notare scientiam congenitam, sed acquisitam, ut illa ita sit impressa, ut homo eam nunquam possit exuere propter ejus claritatem et firmitatem, [p. 16] ut si vel maxime homo callum obducere vellet conscientiae, non posset eam impedire, quod praeter citata loca scripturae probatur et Prov. 3.3. Quod autem videmus ipsos interdum secernere honesta a turpibus, hoc venit ex assuetudine.


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Ergo eo modo homines se gerere non possunt ac Deus. par. 13. [De dictamine rectae rationis] scriptum in cordibus:) non notare scientiam congenitam, sed acquisitam, ut illa ita sit impressa, ut homo eam nunquam possit exuere propter ejus claritatem et firmitatem, [p. 16] ut si vel maxime homo callum obducere vellet conscientiae, non posset eam impedire, quod praeter citata loca scripturae probatur et Prov. 3.3. Quod autem videmus ipsos interdum secernere honesta a turpibus, hoc venit ex assuetudine. Quia potius ex actionibus infantum ac puerorum contrarium probatur, qui statim agunt contra legem naturalem, dum matrem conspurcant, ac pomum in faciem matris proiciunt, quod putant sibi non ita arridere; sed tum honestorum signum produnt, dum aliquoties virga exercitati fuerint, sicut statim nec musicus, nec physicus etc quis fit, sed postmodum ex usu. par. 16. [In Hobbesii sententiam inquiritur] Hobbesius contrarium Aristoteli tenet principium, quod homo sit animal incivile, non vero πολιτικòν et civis bonus, ut interpretatur Hobbesius,sicsane homo non estζώον πολιτικόν,sed per disciplinam sittandem bonuscivis,cum potiusab initio sit ζώονincivile. Et sicreprehendit Aristotelem quod statim consideravit hominem tanquam animal politicum, et non prius inquisiverit in hominis pravas inclinationes, quaein homine reperiuntur. Contra qui Hobbesium reprehendunt, non accipiunt vocem naturaein eo sensu,acipsesumit, videlicet non perfecta, sed imperfecta, quae deinceps per disciplinam emendatur. par. 17. & 18. Hobbesius confundit societatem particularem cum universali, ex illa enim ad hanc nullaconsequentia, [p. 17]si v.g. quiscum aliqua matrimonium inire nolit, quia non ita nobileestejus genus, vel non divesetc,ergo homo in genere non debet colere societatem. o b s e r va t ion e s s u p e r l i b r u m d e J.n.&g. 69 and the subjects the king. What an inversion! However, God’s justice is far more eminent. It consists in him being king, master and father, and nobody would be just unless he was king, masterand father.


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What an inversion! However, God’s justice is far more eminent. It consists in him being king, master and father, and nobody would be just unless he was king, masterand father. Thus, men cannotconduct themselves like God in this way. par. 13. [On the dictate of right reason] written in their hearts:) does not mean connate knowledge but acquired, and it is imprinted so that man never can cast it off, because of its clarity and firmness. [p. 16] However much a man ever wants to subdue his conscience he cannot preclude that knowledge, which is proved from Proverbs 3.3, apart from the other quoted passages from the Holy Writ. That we sometimes see these people /i.e. boys and uneducated people/ distinguishing theshameful from the honest is dueto habituation. Rather thecontrary is proved by the actions of infants and boys, who at once act contrary to natural law by defiling their mothersand throwing applesat their faces, which the mothers do not find very funny. But later on, when they have been drilled a few times with the whip, they show signs of honesty. Likewise, one does not becomea musician or a doctor immediately, but gradually, by habit. par. 16. [Examination of the position of Hobbes] Against Aristotle Hobbes holds that man is an unsociable animal, not a zoon politikon and a good citizen. In the end, he becomes a good citizen, but from the beginning he is instead an uncivilized animal. And he blames Aristotle for having regarded man asa politicalanimal from the beginning without first searching man’s bad inclinations. Those on the other hand who criticize Hobbes do not construe the word nature in the same sense as him, i.e. not the perfect but the imperfect nature that is subsequently reformed through discipline. par. 17. & 18. Hobbes confuses the particular society with the universal. There is no consequence from the former for the latter [p. 17].


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And he blames Aristotle for having regarded man asa politicalanimal from the beginning without first searching man’s bad inclinations. Those on the other hand who criticize Hobbes do not construe the word nature in the same sense as him, i.e. not the perfect but the imperfect nature that is subsequently reformed through discipline. par. 17. & 18. Hobbes confuses the particular society with the universal. There is no consequence from the former for the latter [p. 17]. That for instance someone declines marriage because he is not of noble birth or not rich does not entail that man in general ought not to be social. 70 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s Cap. V. [De defensione sui] par. 19. [De defensione ejus, qui injuriae initium fecit] Notandum hic obiter in aula Henrici IV Regis Galliae accidisse, ut duo aulici contenderint. Inter verba, infigit alter alteri alapam, (:quod maxime vituperandum in aula:) et deinceps tamen paenituit eum facti ut alterummagnopererogaretsibi ignosceret. Sed alter voluit hancinjuriam necessario vindicarestatimextrafores per propriumsuumgladium.Alter injuriaminferenssequituretiterumdeprecatur.Verumalteriraexacutus gladium stringit et alterum vim intendat. Unde hic et suum telum extrahensalterum prosternit. CaedesadRegem defertur,Rex jussitjudices, ut hicabsolveretur, eo quod facti poenituerit eum, et veniam flagitaverit cum reparatione damni dati, et non impetravit. Cap. V I. [De jure et favore necessitatis] par. 1. [Necessitas quotuplex] Verba circa princip. p. 237 sunt paulo obscura, sensus itaque est hic: si contingat ut quis fraudem committat in defendendasuasalute, illud factum quidem non approbatur, meretur tamen veniam et miserationem, qui est sensus Boecleri. [p. 18] citra nostram culpam:) Haec verba omnino attendendasunt; nam ejus periculi in quod quis sese ipse conjicit, ratio non habetur.


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Cap. V I. [De jure et favore necessitatis] par. 1. [Necessitas quotuplex] Verba circa princip. p. 237 sunt paulo obscura, sensus itaque est hic: si contingat ut quis fraudem committat in defendendasuasalute, illud factum quidem non approbatur, meretur tamen veniam et miserationem, qui est sensus Boecleri. [p. 18] citra nostram culpam:) Haec verba omnino attendendasunt; nam ejus periculi in quod quis sese ipse conjicit, ratio non habetur. Ita Dina non eratabsqueculpa quae4 expatiatafueratabsque necessitate, unde urgebatur vindictam illam in obsidenda urbefuissejusto graviorem,cum etipsa in culpa fuerat. etc etc etc etc etc etc etc. 4. Manuscript: qui. o b s e r va t ion e s s u p e r l i b r u m d e J.n.&g. 71 Chapter V [On self-defence] par. 19. [On self-defence by a person who is the first to commit an injury] Here may be noted in passing what happened at the court of Henry IV, King of France, when two courtiers had a quarrel. In the altercation, one gave the other a box on the ear (which is most reprehensible at court). But he regretted his deed afterwards and asked urgently to be forgiven. However, the other insisted on revenge for the injury immediately outdoors with his rapier. He who had inflicted theinjury followed and asked onceagain for forgiveness. But the other, inflamed with anger, drew his rapier and attacked. The other too drew his weapon and destroyed hisadversary.The killingwas submitted to the king and hetold thejudges to acquit him,since he had repented his deed and earnestly pressed forindulgence and compensation for the damage, without obtaining it. Chapter V I [On the r ight and privilege of necessity] par. 1. [The kinds of necessity] The words in the beginning of page 237 are somewhat obscure. The meaning is this: if someone commits an offence in defending his life, then the deed is not approved of, but he deserves indulgence and pity; this is the position of Boecler. [p. 18] through no fault of our own:) These words are important, for a peril into which you put yourself does not count.


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Chapter V I [On the r ight and privilege of necessity] par. 1. [The kinds of necessity] The words in the beginning of page 237 are somewhat obscure. The meaning is this: if someone commits an offence in defending his life, then the deed is not approved of, but he deserves indulgence and pity; this is the position of Boecler. [p. 18] through no fault of our own:) These words are important, for a peril into which you put yourself does not count. Thus Dina, who erred without being forced, was not without fault; therefore it is urged that the revenge consisting in the occupation of the town was too severe, since she too bore guilt.12 12. Refers to Genesis 34. Dina, daughter of Jacob, was raped by Shekem. Her brothers killed Shekem and his father and destroyed their town, which was too severe a revenge since Dina hade accepted Shekem after the rape. Title page of De officio hominisetcivis, printed in Lund 1673.National Library of Sweden, Stockholm. The first page of the notes on De officio hominis et civis. National Library of Sweden, Stockholm. Observationes in libellum Sam: Pufendorfii de officio hominis et civis ex Publicis lectionibus ipsius Auctoris Ao 1673 d. 11 Febr. Exordium Hic libellus merito vocatur novus, tum ratione (a) formae et dispositionis, tum (b) ratione inventionis. Et hoc quidem, quia eum ex aliis non transscripsimus, et aliqua sunt, quae imputanda sunt meis propriis meditationibus. Priussatisclarum est nempe de dispositione, quia hactenus ut omnibus notum est, personuit in omnibus pulpitis Aristoteles, cui suam laudem non defraudamus, maxime propter bonam methodum: nam disposuerat ac digesseratin justamformam, quaeab aliis doctisfueretradita, necinficiamur ipsum haud parum desuaindustriaaddidisse.


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Et hoc quidem, quia eum ex aliis non transscripsimus, et aliqua sunt, quae imputanda sunt meis propriis meditationibus. Priussatisclarum est nempe de dispositione, quia hactenus ut omnibus notum est, personuit in omnibus pulpitis Aristoteles, cui suam laudem non defraudamus, maxime propter bonam methodum: nam disposuerat ac digesseratin justamformam, quaeab aliis doctisfueretradita, necinficiamur ipsum haud parum desuaindustriaaddidisse. Sed praeposterum admodumestcredere naturamomnessuas vires profudissein illumacibi quasisubstitisse, quod contumeliosum in ipsum creatorem.Quin potius, quemadmodum ipsesibi sumseratexaminandos Platonem, Anaxagoram etcet utipse deiisfertur dixisse:Amicus Plato, amicus alius, amica tamen veritas, ita nos secundum ejus exemplum faciamus eumque examinemus dicentes, Amicus Plato, AmicusAristoteles,amica veritas. [p.2] Sed cum maximasit vis consuetudinis, ut omnialaudemus quae patriareceperat,et odio prosequamur quaeexteris(:qui quoque barbari vocantur:)in usu est. Cumitaqueea putantur praestantissima quaein patriamorereceptasunt, non mirum est quod Aristoteles omniasua dogmata,et praeprimis quae ad Philosophiam moralem spectant,composueritad formam democraticam,et ipsum non ita magnanimitersensisse de diversis illi formis. Unde qui sine praejudicio Ethicam Aristotelis (:ut deea priusagamus:) inspexerit perlegeritque, deprehendeteumnon instituere vellecivemuniversiseu omnes homines, sed tantum civem Graecum. Hinc ordo et numerus XI virtutum Aristotelicarum primoqueloco poniturfortitudo. Plato quippe in perfectasua Republicatribuit primum locum militibus, qui pro patria Annotations on the book On the Duty of Man and Citizen from the public lectures by the author himself, February 11 1673 Exordium This book deserves to be called new with regard both to its form and disposition as well as its idea, because I have not copied it from others and some of it should be ascribed to my own thought.


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Hinc ordo et numerus XI virtutum Aristotelicarum primoqueloco poniturfortitudo. Plato quippe in perfectasua Republicatribuit primum locum militibus, qui pro patria Annotations on the book On the Duty of Man and Citizen from the public lectures by the author himself, February 11 1673 Exordium This book deserves to be called new with regard both to its form and disposition as well as its idea, because I have not copied it from others and some of it should be ascribed to my own thought. That the disposition is new is clear enough, for, as everybody knows, Aristotle resounds from every lecturer’s desk. I do not cheat him of praise, in particular because of his good method: for he arranged and digested in proper order what had been handed over by others, and I would not deny that he added quite a lot through his own effort. However, it is quite preposterous to believe that nature poured all its powers on him and then halted,as itwere;which is insolent towards our Creator. Rather, oneshould proceed like he did himself when examining Plato, Anaxagoras and others, and as he is reported to have said: Plato is my friend, and others too, but above all truth is my friend. 1 [p.2] I will follow hisexampleand examine him saying: Plato is my friend, and so is Aristotle, but above all truth is my friend. Sincetheforce of habit is strong, we praiseeverything that iscustomary in our own country and loathe all usage of foreigners (who also are called barbarians). Now, as the customs of one’s own country are considered best, it is no wonder that Aristotle put together all his doctrines, and especially those pertaining to moral philosophy, on the basis of democracy, and that he was not equally generous towards other forms of government. Therefore, who without prejudice looks into and reads through the Ethics of Aristotle (to begin with that), will find that what he wants to educate is not a universal citizen or all human beings but only the Greek citizen.


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Now, as the customs of one’s own country are considered best, it is no wonder that Aristotle put together all his doctrines, and especially those pertaining to moral philosophy, on the basis of democracy, and that he was not equally generous towards other forms of government. Therefore, who without prejudice looks into and reads through the Ethics of Aristotle (to begin with that), will find that what he wants to educate is not a universal citizen or all human beings but only the Greek citizen. Hence the order and number of the Aristotelian virtues, of which courage comes first. Plato, in his ideal republic, ranked the military first, who watch and 1. The quotation originally from Plato, Phaidon, 91 c. Attributed to Aristotle, but not found in his works. 76 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s vigilantatque pugnant, quemetiamAristotelessubinderespexit.(2)locat temperantiam. Plato enim statuit quod uterenturcommuni victu. Tertia enim pars civitatum ad illa symposia seponebatur, ergo inculcanda esset necessario post fortitudinem virtus temperantiae. Si enim miles temperans non esset, centaurorum foret convivium, ubi nihil nisi rixae forent audirenturque. (3) et (4) Liberalitatem et magnificentiam ponit; Haec [p. 3] virtus occupataestcirca magnos sumptus faciendos: jam vero maxima parscivitatium in mediocriconstitutaerat re;ergo omnes non tangit homines, imo ne quidemcentesimampartemmortalium; namego etmei similes potueruntsatis officio nostro defungisineistismagnificissumptibus, nam ita quidem1 sumus circumscripti, atque quibus alae quasi praescisaesunt utsi vel maxime velimus non possimus magnosederesumptus adeoque magnificentiae exercere virtutem. Aristoteli vero sua constabat ratio: illeenim respexitad civium suorum onera. Debebantenim Graeci sumptus publicos sustinere de suis propriis sponte, prout quisque esset in re lauta constitutus.


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Aristoteli vero sua constabat ratio: illeenim respexitad civium suorum onera. Debebantenim Graeci sumptus publicos sustinere de suis propriis sponte, prout quisque esset in re lauta constitutus. Ut v.g. si classis Athenis fabricanda, non imponebatur singulis certum onus contributionis, sed ditissimi conferebant pro lubitu et illi eo modo suam exercebant magnificentiam. Qui vero in mediocri fortuna erant, eorum sumptus facti liberalitas nuncupanda est. (5) agit de modestia quae virtus concernit eos qui gerebant publicos honores, videlicet ne eorum essent appetentiores. (6) modestiam excipit justitia, judicum solum officium, quod alios non concernebat. Sic (7) (8) (9) disponuntur semivirtutes, ut urbanitas [p.4] comitas, humanitas etc. Quodqueetiamerate natura Graecorum, quorumnatiomirismodiserat dicax et faceta, et sic illius virtutis praecepta ad eos tantum pertinuere. Si enim jus naturae et gentium examinaverimus, potest optime quis esse vir bonus si illis virtutibus destituatur. Et ita vidimus hactenus quid censendum sit deAristotelis Ethica,et profecto non magnos faciet saltus ille qui unice et superstitiose ipsius Ethicae adhaereat. Sic de Aristotelis POLITICA idem judicium ferendum; nam prout ille erat Graecus, ita amore flagrabat Democratiarum, atque omnia sua praecepta in Politicis tradita in earundem usum conferebat, aversans maxime monarchiam. Et haec ipsa genuina est causa, quare metuendum est tantum periculi ex Aristotelis Politica, si sine correctione in scholis legetur atque inculcetur. Nam immanum quantum malum provenit ex hac re superioribus temporibus proxime antecedentibus, quod ipsum non latebit, quieorum temporum historiaexactiusevolverit. Et profecto 1. Manuscript: quidam. O b s e r va t ion e s i n l i b e l lu m ... d e o f f ic io hom ini s ... 77 fight for their country, and Aristotle often followed him. Second comes temperance.


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Et haec ipsa genuina est causa, quare metuendum est tantum periculi ex Aristotelis Politica, si sine correctione in scholis legetur atque inculcetur. Nam immanum quantum malum provenit ex hac re superioribus temporibus proxime antecedentibus, quod ipsum non latebit, quieorum temporum historiaexactiusevolverit. Et profecto 1. Manuscript: quidam. O b s e r va t ion e s i n l i b e l lu m ... d e o f f ic io hom ini s ... 77 fight for their country, and Aristotle often followed him. Second comes temperance. Plato decided thatthey should eatin common.Onethird ofthecitizenswere selected for these symposia; therefore it was necessary to inculcate temperance after courage. For if the warriors were not temperate, the meals would be like those of centaurs, and nothing would be heard but quarrels. As numbers 3 and 4 he ranks liberality and magnificence. This [p. 3] virtue2 is about spending large sums for the state. The majority of the citizens were of moderate fortune so this virtue did notconcern everybody, in fact noteven one percent. Peoplelikemecan do our duty without incurring great expense; our resources are limited and with our wingsclipped wecannotafford to spend a great deal, however much we want to. Therefore, we cannot exercise the virtue of magnificence. However, Aristotle had good reason; he considered the burdens of his citizens. The Greeks were expected to contribute voluntarily to publicexpenses,each and every oneaccording to his property. For instance, if warships were to be built, the individual citizen was not obliged to pay a certain sum; instead the richest contributed as much as they pleased, thereby exercising their magnificence. The contributions of the less wealthy on the other hand, were called generosity. Number 5 is about moderation, a virtue that concerned those who held public offices so that they would not becometoo avaricious. Next to moderation follows number 6, justice, which was the duty of the judges only and did not concern others.


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The contributions of the less wealthy on the other hand, were called generosity. Number 5 is about moderation, a virtue that concerned those who held public offices so that they would not becometoo avaricious. Next to moderation follows number 6, justice, which was the duty of the judges only and did not concern others. As number 7, 8 and 9 are arranged the semi-virtues, like courtesy, [p.4] friendliness, and humanity; this was according to the nature of the Greeks, who were a remarkably witty and humorous nation; therefore the precepts of that virtue pertained to them only. Now, if we examine the law of nature and nations, it is clear that one can very well be a good man even if one is destitute of those virtues. Thus we see so far how Aristotle’s Ethics should be rated; and indeed, he who exclusively and superstitiously adheres to his Ethics only, will not come far. The same judgement should be passed on the Politics of Aristotle: for since he was a Greek, he was afire with love for the democracies and adapted all his precepts in the Politics to them, averse in particular to monarchies. This is the genuine reason why so much danger is to be feared from the Politics of Aristotle, if he is read and inculcated in the schools without correction. The immensity of the evil that arose from this during recent decades will be clear to anyone who reads the history of those times more carefully. And truly, that 2. Obviously, liberality and magnificence are treated as one single virtue. 78 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s ea mala non minus metuendafuere posthac, si similiter oraculi loco adoraretur amplius in scholis, nam non potest non Monarchiarum odium indecapi. Praeterea ut nihil dicam quam sit mutilaet manca, tot lacunis, tot asterismis repleta, [p.5] sicut varie inter eruditos atque acerrime non ita pridem fuerit digladiatum. Intuitu itaque Doctrinae hujus Peripateticae nostra merito nova dicitur.


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Obviously, liberality and magnificence are treated as one single virtue. 78 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s ea mala non minus metuendafuere posthac, si similiter oraculi loco adoraretur amplius in scholis, nam non potest non Monarchiarum odium indecapi. Praeterea ut nihil dicam quam sit mutilaet manca, tot lacunis, tot asterismis repleta, [p.5] sicut varie inter eruditos atque acerrime non ita pridem fuerit digladiatum. Intuitu itaque Doctrinae hujus Peripateticae nostra merito nova dicitur. Nimiaadmiratio, nimiumquestudiumphilosophiaemoralis peripateticae primacausaest quare hactenus genuina Ethicaet Politica non fuerit pro dignitate tradita. (II) causa sunt Scholastici seu moralistae Pontificii, qui cum suis scriptis casuum conscientiae fecere, ut haec doctrina non potuisset ad tantum fastigium emergere, qui scriptores primo sunt tam infaceti,2 ut innutritus bonisauthoribus non poterit non eorum taedio ferri seu capi. Et si investigaverimus quareilli fueretam vecordes in illis disciplinis tam perverse tractandis, inveniemus causam latitare in Pontifice, qui tam in doctrina Dei seu Theologia quam in Morum seu Ethica et Politica tam arrogans exstiterat et existit jam nunc, ut patet omnia in suo pectore latitare tanquam thesaurum opimum. Et quicquid asseclae sibi assumunt scribere, ejus interesse debent imprimis quaerere, et ea de causa sunt ita stulti, ut per nares ita se patiantur deduci a sacerdotibus. Et quid mirum quod tam ludicra philosophia moralis ex illis sit expectanda, quum nullum solidum ponantfundamentum. Necideo reliqui Laici intelligere possunt quod justum quodque injustum fuerit cum nonnisi confugiunt ad Sacerdoteseorumque placita. [p.6] Eteaestcausacur itainvicem dissentiant in scriptis et quaeri omnino potest, quare pontifex non habeat concordem philosophiam moralem atque formaverit certa et generalia quaedam praecepta seu generales regulas, unde ceterorum calamus dirigeretur?


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Et quid mirum quod tam ludicra philosophia moralis ex illis sit expectanda, quum nullum solidum ponantfundamentum. Necideo reliqui Laici intelligere possunt quod justum quodque injustum fuerit cum nonnisi confugiunt ad Sacerdoteseorumque placita. [p.6] Eteaestcausacur itainvicem dissentiant in scriptis et quaeri omnino potest, quare pontifex non habeat concordem philosophiam moralem atque formaverit certa et generalia quaedam praecepta seu generales regulas, unde ceterorum calamus dirigeretur? Respondemus non est ex ipsorum usu: nundinantur enim suorum auditorum peccata, quippe si uniformes haberent regulas, interesse eorum intercideret, seu evanesceret: Nam quivis confessionarius talem imprimit suo auditori opinionem, prout novit ipsi placituram, atque ad quod vidit ipsius inclinationem vergere, sic de castitate, si deprehenderit sacerdos suum hominem esse deditum impudicitiae non ipsicontradicit, et alterum consolatur, ex eo quod unus istorum moralistarum statuerit contra mille alios illud genus vitii posse facile concedi observatis certis circumstantiisetc, modo voluerit sanctum aerarium inaurare. Omneita2. Manuscript: infeceti. O b s e r va t ion e s i n l i b e l lu m ... d e o f f ic io hom ini s ... 79 evil is not least to be feared in the future if he continues to be venerated as an oracle in the schools: hatred of monarchy will of necessity arise from that. And, apart from that, to say nothing of how mutilated and maimed the text is, full of lacunae and asterisms, [p. 5] as was not long ago sharply disputed among scholars.3 Thus, in view of this peripatetic doctrine, ours deserves to be called new. In short, the first reason why genuine Ethics and Politics have not hitherto been taught as their dignity requires is the exaggerated admiration and study of peripatetic moral philosophy. Thesecond reason isthe Scholastics orthe papistmoral philosophers,whowith theirwritings on cases ofconscience havemadesurethatmoral philosophy has not reached the summit.


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In short, the first reason why genuine Ethics and Politics have not hitherto been taught as their dignity requires is the exaggerated admiration and study of peripatetic moral philosophy. Thesecond reason isthe Scholastics orthe papistmoral philosophers,whowith theirwritings on cases ofconscience havemadesurethatmoral philosophy has not reached the summit. First, these writers are so dull that readers brought up with good literature must beseized with disgust by them. If weexamine why they have been so senseless in their perverse dealing with moral philosophy, we will find the causelurking in the pope, who has been,and is still, so arrogant in both theology and in moral philosophy that it is clear that he conceals everything in his breast like a precious treasure. And whatever his followers take up to write about, they are bound to seek his interest in particular: because they are so foolish that they let themselves be taken in by the priests. No wonder that such a ludicrous moral philosophy is to be expected from them, when they do not give it a solid foundation. Because ofthisthelaymen cannot understandwhatisjustand unjust, unless they have recourse to the priests and their rules. [p.6] Also, this is the cause why they dissent so much among each otherin their writings.Indeed, onecan ask why the pope does not have a concordant moral philosophy and has not formulated any fixed and general precepts orrulesthroughwhich the pens ofthe otherscould be directed. The answer is that it is not useful for them: for they trade on the sins of theiraudience,and if they had uniform rules, their profit would belost or vanish.


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The answer is that it is not useful for them: for they trade on the sins of theiraudience,and if they had uniform rules, their profit would belost or vanish. For every confessor instills in his listener an idea that he knows will please him, and to which he has seen his inclination verge: about chastity, for instance, if the priest finds that his man is dedicated to indecency, he does not object to it but consoles him on the ground that one of those moral teachers has stated, contrary to athousand others, that such a vicecan beallowed easily, given certain circumstances, if he will only gild the holy treasury. Therefore, the whole thing 3. It is not clear what exactly Pufendorf refers to here. The textual problems in Aristotle’s Politics are discussed by Hermann Conring, “Introductio in Politica Aristotelis”, in Opera omnia tom. 3, ed. J.W. Göbel, 1730, photographic reprint, Göttingen, 1970, pp. 457–490. 80 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s que huc redit ut in confessione illa sancta auditorem3 disponat ad suum lucrum. Tertia causa est jus Romanum, quod hactenus in tanto fuerat pretio, ut non nisi ex eo tanquam perfectissimo causae dijudicarentur. Decetero fatemuraliquot praestantiaingeniacontulisse variaad hujus disciplinaein lucemgenuinam[p. 7] protractionem,etimprimis virum,si religionemexcipias, undiqueeminentissimumHugonemGrotium,4 cuius librum laudatissimum deIure Belli Et Paciscum ipsein exilio esset,consul Doctissimus Nic. Peresc. procudit. Et sane quid reliqui omnes moliti sunt, ille invenit. In hujus tamen maxime egregio libro duo praecipue desiderantur,(1) quod tammultaimmisceat heterodoxaa nostra verareligione,(2) quodmultaex scriptoribusscholasticissumpserit bona nimium fidesuaquefecerit. Etaddendum (3)eum multa necessaria omisisse. Post magnum illum Grotium surrexit Anglus quidam, cujus nomen tam est odiosum, ut verear efferre, Hobbesius inquam. Qui profecto non tam stupidus fuitacaudiat vulgo. Et saneeoserrores quos habet, non protulit ex imprudentia, sed fultus erat suis rationibus.


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In hujus tamen maxime egregio libro duo praecipue desiderantur,(1) quod tammultaimmisceat heterodoxaa nostra verareligione,(2) quodmultaex scriptoribusscholasticissumpserit bona nimium fidesuaquefecerit. Etaddendum (3)eum multa necessaria omisisse. Post magnum illum Grotium surrexit Anglus quidam, cujus nomen tam est odiosum, ut verear efferre, Hobbesius inquam. Qui profecto non tam stupidus fuitacaudiat vulgo. Et saneeoserrores quos habet, non protulit ex imprudentia, sed fultus erat suis rationibus. Erat enim cum scriberet, bellum inter Regem Angliae et Parlamentum, quod dixit penes Regem non essejus quaevis disponendi. DeindesectaeratinAngliaIndependentium, ubi non opus erat communi aliqua religione, ut hic est in Suetia, non erant alligati ad unam et certam formulam sed secuti eam religionem, quam quisque videret sibi esse commodissimam. Jam Hobbesius conatus fuit hos errores, qui et Regem ad mortem praecipitabant, [p.8] exterminare. Sed cum nitimur curvum baculum rectum reddere, aut in alteram partem curvum redditur, aut abrumpitur; ita Hobbesius quum tentavitinfringere Parlamenti opinionem,revolutusestin alterum extremum, et sic multa inspersit suis Politicis, quae minime possint tolerari: v.g. hancthesin alias non ita detestabilem: Potestatemcivilemconjungi debere cum sacris. Ad quam probandam varia contorsit scripturae dicta. Et sane propter illos errores non omne scriptum est exterminandum atque comburendum. Sic Cicero in libro De natura Deorum multa habet falsa, 3. Manuscript: confessionarium. Dots under the word indicate that the scribe himself has doubted that confessionarium is the right word here. 4. Added in the margin: vid. praef. Osiand. in Grotium. O b s e r va t ion e s i n l i b e l lu m ... d e o f f ic io hom ini s ... 81 amounts to influencing the penitent in the holy confession to the profit of the confessor.


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Et sane propter illos errores non omne scriptum est exterminandum atque comburendum. Sic Cicero in libro De natura Deorum multa habet falsa, 3. Manuscript: confessionarium. Dots under the word indicate that the scribe himself has doubted that confessionarium is the right word here. 4. Added in the margin: vid. praef. Osiand. in Grotium. O b s e r va t ion e s i n l i b e l lu m ... d e o f f ic io hom ini s ... 81 amounts to influencing the penitent in the holy confession to the profit of the confessor. The third cause /sc. of the misery of moral philosophy/ is Roman law, which hitherto has been held in such high esteem thatcaseswere decided only according to that law, as if it was perfect. As for therest, werecognizethat some prominent men of genius havecontributed in various ways to shedding truelight on this discipline, [p.7]and especially Hugo Grotius,4 who is mosteminent in every respect,except religion,and whose most laudable De jure belli ec pacis was printed by the learned Nic. Persc.5 while Grotius himself was in exile. Indeed, he discovered what all the others had endeavoured to. However, in his very good book there are two particular deficiencies, first that he adds so much that deviates from our true religion, and second, that hetook much from thescholastic writersand appropriated it with too much credulity; third, one should add that he left out many things that are necessary. After the great Grotiusacertain Englishman arose, whose nameis so odious that I fear to mention it, I mean Hobbes. He was certainly not as stupid as people say. He published his mistakes not out of imprudence but supported by arguments. When he wrote there was war between the King of England and the Parliament, who denied that the king had the right to decide on anything.


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After the great Grotiusacertain Englishman arose, whose nameis so odious that I fear to mention it, I mean Hobbes. He was certainly not as stupid as people say. He published his mistakes not out of imprudence but supported by arguments. When he wrote there was war between the King of England and the Parliament, who denied that the king had the right to decide on anything. At the time, there was the sect of Independents in England, where there is no need for a common religion, as there is here in Sweden, and where people were not bound by a fixed, particular regulation,everyonefollowing instead thereligion hefound most suitable. [p.8] Hobbes tried to drive out those errors, which even brought about the death of the king. 6 But when wetry to straighten acurved stick, iteither gets bent in the other direction or breaks off.Thus, when trying to check the opinion of the Parliament, he revolved to the other extreme and larded his Politics with many things that are by no means tolerable. For instance, the thesis, otherwise not so detestable, that political power should be joined with religion. To prove that, he came out with various biblical quotations.7 Butawholework should not beexterminated and burnt because ofsuch errors. In Cicero’s book De natura deorum, there is much that is false, but in between 4. In the margin there is a reference to a theological commentary on Grotius by Johann Adam Osiander (1622–1697), Observationes maximam partem theologicae in libros tres de jure belli et pacis, Hugonis Grotii (1671). 5. Nicolas Claude Fabri, Sieur de Peresc (1580–1637), French naturalist, archaeologist, and Maecenas. 6. Refers to the execution of Charles I in 1649. 7. Refers to De cive, chap. III:23 and IV:1–2, where Hobbes claims that natural law is not a law in the proper sense of the word unless mediated through the Holy Writ. Pufendorf regards this as a serious error and comes back to it on p. 35. 82 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s interque ea multa egregia et bona.


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5. Nicolas Claude Fabri, Sieur de Peresc (1580–1637), French naturalist, archaeologist, and Maecenas. 6. Refers to the execution of Charles I in 1649. 7. Refers to De cive, chap. III:23 and IV:1–2, where Hobbes claims that natural law is not a law in the proper sense of the word unless mediated through the Holy Writ. Pufendorf regards this as a serious error and comes back to it on p. 35. 82 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s interque ea multa egregia et bona. Et sane si Hobbesius non fuisset, non pervenisset haec doctrina ad tantum fastigium. Et mihi omnino fuit propositum ex Grotio et Hobbesio tanquam omnium optimis contrahere quae bona atque mea quasi facere, exclusis iis quae cum errore sunt conjuncta, doctus regulam Apostoli Pauli: Omnia probate, quae bona retinete. Moserat Spartanis sia malo viro bona quaedam sententiafuerit prolata, ut narraretur uni Ephorum, quiascenderet dicturuseandemsententiam ne propter malum subjectum salutaris sententia tecta maneret: Sic puto neminem sanum mihi imputaturum vel vitio versurum quod eorum vestigiatam pressealicubi secutus fuero, sed potius ut ipse dicam, [p.9] laudem meretur, qui efficit ut juventus tenella non imbuatur falsis dogmatibus, vel imbibat faecem dum vinum sapientis desiderat. Quantum ad errores theologicos mihi imputatos, hactenus satisfactum puto ita, ut si quid pudoris habeant, illum sentiant. Et tam opimum lucrum unum atque alterum ex illis maledicis manserat hactenus, ut me amplius non lacessant. Et miror eos putavisse me tam idiotam esse in regulis salutis meae aeternae: meque fuisse tam temerarium, quod aucupandae famae gratia incurrere vellem praesentissimum periculum mortis, quod illos in hoc regno manet, qui novatores existunt religionis.


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Quantum ad errores theologicos mihi imputatos, hactenus satisfactum puto ita, ut si quid pudoris habeant, illum sentiant. Et tam opimum lucrum unum atque alterum ex illis maledicis manserat hactenus, ut me amplius non lacessant. Et miror eos putavisse me tam idiotam esse in regulis salutis meae aeternae: meque fuisse tam temerarium, quod aucupandae famae gratia incurrere vellem praesentissimum periculum mortis, quod illos in hoc regno manet, qui novatores existunt religionis. Jam vero nuperrimein mesurrexit quidam magnusclamator, impingens mihi horribiles errores in Politicis postquam vidisset me per theologos non fuisse subversum, nec pudet eum quocumque modo famam meam lacerare atque ingentes ciere clamores: Mundum conflagraturum, si mea dogmata politica stabilita manserint. Tria mihi vertit ingentia peccatain meis scriptis (1) fundamentum meum quod supposui esse Politices, sc. Socialitatem, quod omnino putat removendum (2) quod doceam alicubi dogmata debere talia sonare, quae congruant cum usu civitatum (3) quod dixerim honestatem esseex Dei voluntate, non vero ex ipsiusrei natura etc. [p. 10] Sed illum clamosum nebulonem ita depexum dedi ut in posterum desistat mihi famam lacerare. Nec tamen me sinant quiescere adhuc, quum jam etiam in Germaniasint malevoli quidam, quiadornant quoddam magnum volumen lipsiense in Pufendorfium, sed et ego non desistam magnum illi opponere librum, cujus titulus erit hic: Everticulum sapientiae Schertzerianae. O b s e r va t ion e s i n l i b e l lu m ... d e o f f ic io hom ini s ... 83 that much that is excellent and good. And indeed, had Hobbes not lived, this discipline would not haverisen to its present height. Generally, my endeavour has been to take the good things out of Grotius and Hobbes, who are the best of all, and make them mine, excluding what is connected with error. I have learnt the rule of the Apostle Paul: test everything; hold to what is good.


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O b s e r va t ion e s i n l i b e l lu m ... d e o f f ic io hom ini s ... 83 that much that is excellent and good. And indeed, had Hobbes not lived, this discipline would not haverisen to its present height. Generally, my endeavour has been to take the good things out of Grotius and Hobbes, who are the best of all, and make them mine, excluding what is connected with error. I have learnt the rule of the Apostle Paul: test everything; hold to what is good. 8 If a good proposal was made by a bad man,the Spartans used to communicateitto one oftheephors, whowould stand up and speak forthesameidea,so that no healthy ideashould remain hidden becauseit originated in a bad man.Therefore,I do not think anyone sound in mindwillcharge me or makeita vicethatI hereand therefollowed their footsteps too closely; rather, if I may say it myself, that man [p.9] is praiseworthy who sees to it that tender youth is not imbued with false doctrines or imbibes impurities when they long for the wise man’s wine. As for the theological errors attributed to me, I think they are made up for by theshametheywho do so should feel, ifthey can feel it. One ortwo precious gains from theseslanderers still remain, so that they do not irritate meany longer. How could they believe meto beso ignorant ofwhat governs my eternalsalvation?And that I was so thoughtless that I would, for thesake of fame, be willing to run into the manifest danger of death that threatens those in this country who introduce novelties in religion. Recently there appeared a big bawler who charged me with horrendous errors in politics after he had seen that I was not destroyed by the theologians.9 He is shameless enough to ruin my fame by some means or other, producing enormous cries: the world would burn up, should my political doctrines be established.


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And that I was so thoughtless that I would, for thesake of fame, be willing to run into the manifest danger of death that threatens those in this country who introduce novelties in religion. Recently there appeared a big bawler who charged me with horrendous errors in politics after he had seen that I was not destroyed by the theologians.9 He is shameless enough to ruin my fame by some means or other, producing enormous cries: the world would burn up, should my political doctrines be established. There are three immense sins in my books he alleges against me: first, that I suppose sociality to be the fundament of politics, which he wants to be abolished altogether; second that somewhere I hold that doctrines should say such things that are useful for states; and third that I have said that moral honesty is the result of God’s will, not of the nature of the thingitself. [p. 10] However, I have given this bawling wretch such a beating that he will not disturb my fame in the future. 10 But they will not yet let me rest, since in Germany too there are certain malevolent peoplewho preparesomesort of big Leipzig volumeagainst Pufendorf. But I will not desist from writing a great work in response, thetitle of which will be The Destruction of the Wisdom of Scherzer. 11 8. 1 Thessalonians 21. 9. I.e. Nicolaus Beckman. 10. Cf. Terence: Heavton timoromenos (“The self-tormentor”), v. 951. 11. Refers to Adam Scherzer (1628–1683), a theologian in Leipzig who is said to have caused De jure naturae et gentium to be banned in Saxony. Pufendorf replied to him in Epistola ad Adamum Scherzerum (1674), reprinted in Eris Scandica, 2002. 84 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s Observationes in ipsum librum qui inscr ibitur de officio:) Sic monuimus Ethicae praecepta esse in usum transferenda, non vero consistere in nuda theoria. hominis et civis:) Officia mortalium promanant ex variis fontibus.


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951. 11. Refers to Adam Scherzer (1628–1683), a theologian in Leipzig who is said to have caused De jure naturae et gentium to be banned in Saxony. Pufendorf replied to him in Epistola ad Adamum Scherzerum (1674), reprinted in Eris Scandica, 2002. 84 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s Observationes in ipsum librum qui inscr ibitur de officio:) Sic monuimus Ethicae praecepta esse in usum transferenda, non vero consistere in nuda theoria. hominis et civis:) Officia mortalium promanant ex variis fontibus. Sic multa alicui incumbunt facienda quia quis est homo et animal rationale acsociabile, quae officiaita universaliasunt, uterga quosvis sintexercenda, quia alter aeque homo est ac ego. Sed officium civis non aeque late patet, quia quod teneor exercere erga meum concivem, non adigor exercereergaalterius Reipublicae homines. Sic quod exhibeam officium meo regi, non astringor alterius Reipublicae regi exhibere. Sic certa sunt officia in certis civitatibus, quae nos non describimus, sed tantum generalia quibusviscompetentia.[p. 11]Itacertumest officiumhominis Christiani, quod tractandum relinquimus Theologis. par. 1. Alias officium denotat munus seu functionem, verum nobis est actio, sic si qui solvat quod debet, defunctus suo officio. par. 2. Alii ita hoc exprimunt, distinguentes inter actionem Hominis et actionem humanam: illa est quae venit abs facultate humana, ut nutrire, concoquere, digerere, accrescere, movere, quaeactiones perpetratae quidem ab homine, humanae tamen non appellari, quia eas non facit tanquam homo, sed communes habet cum brutis, de quibus actionibus non est sermo. Sed de iis quae procedunt ab hominibus quatenus distincti sunt ab aliis animantibus etc. /par. 3./ Facultas intellectualis est vel apprehensiva vel judicativa; bruta quidem apprehendunt res, sed de iis non judicium ferunt, ut in proverbio est: aspicis hanc rem ut vacca novam portam.


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Sed de iis quae procedunt ab hominibus quatenus distincti sunt ab aliis animantibus etc. /par. 3./ Facultas intellectualis est vel apprehensiva vel judicativa; bruta quidem apprehendunt res, sed de iis non judicium ferunt, ut in proverbio est: aspicis hanc rem ut vacca novam portam. Intellectusautem noster judicat quid praecedat, quidve sequatur. notiones:) Nam v. g. si quis fumum aspiciat,ex quo ignis proditex collatione horum colligit fumum esse signum subsequentis ignis. O b s e r va t ion e s i n l i b e l lu m ... d e o f f ic io hom ini s ... 85 Observations in the book itself, titled on the duty:) By which we exhort that the precepts of Ethics should be applied in practice and not consist of naked theory. of man and citizen:) The duties of men spring from different fountains. You are obliged to do many things because the other is a human being and a rational and sociableanimal;these dutiesareso universalthatthey areexercised towardseverybody, becausethe other isa human being as much as Iam.The duty of thecitizen, on the other hand, is notequally wide, sinceI do not haveto do whatIam obliged to do in relation to my fellow citizen towards the human beings of another state. Likewise, Iam not bound to do the duty I oweto my king for the king ofanother country. Thus, we do not describe here the duties of certain states but only those general duties thatconcern everybody. [p. 11] Likewise, therearespecial duties for the Christian which we leave to the theologians. par. 1. In other contexts, duty means task or function, but to us it is an action, as when somebody pays what he owes he is discharged from his duty. par. 2. Other scholars express this by distinguishing between theaction of man and human action. The former is what comes from human capacity, like nourishing, chewing, digesting, growing,andmoving,which areactions ofmen butcannot be called human, because he does not performthoseactionsasa human being but has them in common with the animals. Of these actions there is no discussion here.


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2. Other scholars express this by distinguishing between theaction of man and human action. The former is what comes from human capacity, like nourishing, chewing, digesting, growing,andmoving,which areactions ofmen butcannot be called human, because he does not performthoseactionsasa human being but has them in common with the animals. Of these actions there is no discussion here. Instead we talk about those which proceed from human beings, in so far as they are distinct from of other living creatures. /par. 3./ 12 The intellectual faculty is either apprehensive or judging; animals apprehend things but they do not pass judgement, as in the proverb: you look at this as a cow looks at a new gate. Our intellect discerns what comes first and what afterwards. concepts:) for instance, if someone sees smoke, from which comes fire, he concludes from putting these together that smoke indicates subsequent fire. 12. Omitted in original. 86 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s par. 4. matura aetate:) Dicimus superesse tantum. Verum requiritur ut matura sit aetas, sicque exclusos volumus infantes qui [p. 12] ignorant discernere aera lupinis vel ut Sacra Scriptura loquitur discernere inter dextram et sinistram. superesse:) Hocloco monuimus nobis fuissein primaevo statu ampliorem facultatem atque illustriorem sicut in rebus divinis, ita etiam moralibus. Et certe si non alia esset differentia inter utrumque statum, vel haec erit: quod circa nostrum judicium formandum sese obfert ingens difficultas. adhibita cultura:) In Adamo erat lumen nativum, nunc vero est quasi eruendum, disciplinaet meditatio estadhibenda.Ideo videmus quasdam nationes, ubi disciplinaita non est in usu, quasi quoad intellectum obrutuisse. saltem:) Hic vel ad minimum sicut in omnibus nostris scriptis est capiendum. par. 5. Quid recta quidve probabilis sit hominis conscientia adparebit ex subjuncto exemplo. Eruditus novit reddere rationes hujus praecepti de non occidendo, de non adulterium committendo, ut nempe vita humana erit sociabilis etc.


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5. Quid recta quidve probabilis sit hominis conscientia adparebit ex subjuncto exemplo. Eruditus novit reddere rationes hujus praecepti de non occidendo, de non adulterium committendo, ut nempe vita humana erit sociabilis etc. Sed Rusticus etiam tenetur vivere juxta hoc praeceptum, sed non potest artificiosam rationem reddere, videlicet eo violato turbari vitam communem, qui illud observat ex tenore vitae civilis ac authoritatesuperiorum, quiaitain catechismo praecipituret itainculcat pastor noster. [p. 13] par. 7. Error vincibilis vocatur quando res ita obscura non erat quin potuerim recte facere adhibita diligentia, ut si pharmacopola fugitivo oculo inspexerit literas, et apices exacte non observarit, ut noxia sumeret aegrotus medicamenta pro salutaribus, peccat pharmacopola errore vincibili, quod poterat et debebat non errare. Invincibilem autem errorem non erramus circa praecepta generalia, ut homicida et adulter non auditur, qui conatur se excusare ex ignorantia. O b s e r va t ion e s i n l i b e l lu m ... d e o f f ic io hom ini s ... 87 par. 4. in mature age:) I mean that at least so much is left /of our rational capacity/. The ageshould be mature; thus we willexcludechildren, who [p. 12] do not know how the difference between weed and lupines, oras the Holy Writ says, between right and left.13 is left:) Here I call attention to the fact that in the original state our faculties were more perfect and manifest in divine matters as well as in moral ones. And indeed, if thereis no other difference between thetwo states, this thereisat least: an enormous difficulty to form our judgement. with cultivation:) In Adam, light was innate; now it has to be drawn out, as it were, by help of instruction and reflection. Therefore, we see that some nations where instruction is not much in use have, so to speak, become brutish in understanding. at least:) Here, as in my writings, meaning at the very least. par. 5.


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And indeed, if thereis no other difference between thetwo states, this thereisat least: an enormous difficulty to form our judgement. with cultivation:) In Adam, light was innate; now it has to be drawn out, as it were, by help of instruction and reflection. Therefore, we see that some nations where instruction is not much in use have, so to speak, become brutish in understanding. at least:) Here, as in my writings, meaning at the very least. par. 5. What right respectively probableconscienceis will beclear from an example: An educated man can give reasons for the precepts about not killing and not committing adultery, i.e. that human life should be sociable etc. A peasant is obliged to live according to this precept, but he cannot give a logical reason, namely that if the precept is violated, human society would be disturbed. He complies with it because of the customs of social life or the authority of his superiors, since it is laid down in the catechism and our vicar inculcates it. [p. 13] par. 7. It is called vincible error when the matter was not so obscure that I could have acted correctly with care. When a pharmacist reads hastily and does not observe the letters exactly, so the invalid gets the wrong medication, he makes a vincible error, since he could and should have avoided it. We do not commit invincible errors against general precepts: a murderer or an adulterer, who tries to excuse himself with ignorance, is not granted. 13. Jonah 4:11. 88 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s par. 8. Ignorantia voluntaria est ut si quis recusaverit perdiscere catechismum, ac velit seexcusare non novisse hocesse vetitum. Involuntaria autem est, quum non calleam linguam Arabicam. Nullus sane mihi hoc potest objicere, quia meum institutum non erat, necad hoc me posuerunt parentes ut tempus huic studio insumerem. par. 11. Cum alia animantia ut arbores etc agant motu uniformi ut malus nunquam poma profert; sic animantia bruta semper feruntur ad explendum ventrem.


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8. Ignorantia voluntaria est ut si quis recusaverit perdiscere catechismum, ac velit seexcusare non novisse hocesse vetitum. Involuntaria autem est, quum non calleam linguam Arabicam. Nullus sane mihi hoc potest objicere, quia meum institutum non erat, necad hoc me posuerunt parentes ut tempus huic studio insumerem. par. 11. Cum alia animantia ut arbores etc agant motu uniformi ut malus nunquam poma profert; sic animantia bruta semper feruntur ad explendum ventrem. Homines agunt ex voluntate libera quae sese potest flectere ad diversas actiones. Quare autem ad diversa abeat cum bonum semper appetat et malum aversetur? Respondemus quia intellectui objecta varie repraesentantur, ut non ex omni parte videantur purasedmixta, videlicet bonis et malis, ceu de studiis clare adparet; ex una enim parte offert sese utilitas, videlicet scientiis instructum esse, ex altera parte molestiae et alia incommoda. [p. 14] par. 12. solique genius:) E. g. Hollandica natio solers est ad omnem questum faciendum, contra Americi addicti sunt otio, ut quando Hollandus deduxit illuc colonias post unam vel alteram generationem omnem animum Hollandicum exuebant. Sic antiqui Saxones fuere populi fortissimi, sed postquam migraverunt in Angliam, redditi sunt valde molles. multum etiam ex diversitate temperamenti:) Sit aliqua compotatio constans multis hominibus, quando vinum vicerit, et ratio quasi curru excutiatur. Incipit alter melancholicus flere, alter gladium vagina extrahereatque quibusvis minas intentare. Tertius se non continere potest a saltu, quamvis crura vix contineantur, et oberrare ac quaerere suam amasiam. Quartus sit admodum disputax, et sic deinceps. valetudine:) ut podagra laborans non patitur musculum repere. studiorum ratione:) Sic militeset nautaeadmodum sunt feroces propter mortis imminentissimae pericula praeiis, qui post fornacem sederant domi. par.


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Incipit alter melancholicus flere, alter gladium vagina extrahereatque quibusvis minas intentare. Tertius se non continere potest a saltu, quamvis crura vix contineantur, et oberrare ac quaerere suam amasiam. Quartus sit admodum disputax, et sic deinceps. valetudine:) ut podagra laborans non patitur musculum repere. studiorum ratione:) Sic militeset nautaeadmodum sunt feroces propter mortis imminentissimae pericula praeiis, qui post fornacem sederant domi. par. 14. ut hos quam illos plus favoris etc:) Ut si delicatulusque irrumpat in culinam et lardum ac renem ex lepore surripiat, expellitur et nullam excu- O b s e r va t ion e s i n l i b e l lu m ... d e o f f ic io hom ini s ... 89 par. 8. Voluntary ignorance is when someone refuses to learn the catechism and excuses himself on the grounds that he did not know it was forbidden. Involuntary ignorance is when I do not know Arabic: nobody can hold that against me, since I have not studied it and my parents did not make me spend time on studying it. par. 11. Otherliving creaturesliketreesact uniformly,so thatan appletree never produces pears; likewise animals are always driven to fill their belly. Human beings act by free will that can be bent to various actions. But why does it go in various directions, when it always desires the good and abhors the bad? The answer is that the objects are represented to our understanding in various ways, so that they do not appear altogether pure but mixed, i.e. good with bad. That can be clearly seen in studies: on the one hand it is advantageous to be educated, on the other hand studying is connected with irksomeness and other troubles. [p. 14] par. 12. character of the earth:) For instance the Dutch are clever at making all kinds of profit, whereas the Americansare given to an idlelife. But when the Dutch established colonies in America, the Americans deprived them of all their spirit after one ortwo generations. Likewise,the old Saxons used to be very vigorous, butafter they migrated to England, they became very weak.


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12. character of the earth:) For instance the Dutch are clever at making all kinds of profit, whereas the Americansare given to an idlelife. But when the Dutch established colonies in America, the Americans deprived them of all their spirit after one ortwo generations. Likewise,the old Saxons used to be very vigorous, butafter they migrated to England, they became very weak. Further, much depends on different temperament:)14 Imagine a party of several people when the wine gets the upper hand and reason is driven away: then one who is a melancholic starts crying, another draws his sword, issuing threats to everybody, a third cannot help jumping, although his legs hardly hang together, rambling about seeking his lover. A fourth wants to argue about everything, and so on. state of health:) He who suffers from gout does not endure the slightest movement of a muscle. way of life:) Soldiersand sailorsare fierce because oftherisk of imminent death, compared to those who stay at home by the stove. par. 14. that more goodwill and indulgence should be given to the latter passions than to the former:) An adolescent who breaks into a kitchen and snatches lard and kidney 14. These words are not quoted from the paragraph. 90 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s sationem meretur. Ille vero non tam duriter habetur, qui tale facit fame pulsus [p. 15], quia natura hancabhorret. Unde Syracides dicitadulterum magis peccare quam furem. Hic enim non saepe necessitate pellitur. par. 18. ut et operationes:) Ut si mons igneus Aethna incendium evomuerit noxium, nec ego nec ullus hominum est in culpa. quivis eventus:) Ut nobis imputari non potest, quod Rex Galliaesuperiori anno tot urbes occupaverit in Hollandia, nec hodierna tempestas etc. moderari:) Si alterius moderationi subjectus male se gesserit vel bene, utraque actio imputatur moderatori. Quemadmodum regi imputatur, si dissolute vivant subditi, legibus non latis, velearum observatione neglecta, vel neglectu non punito.


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18. ut et operationes:) Ut si mons igneus Aethna incendium evomuerit noxium, nec ego nec ullus hominum est in culpa. quivis eventus:) Ut nobis imputari non potest, quod Rex Galliaesuperiori anno tot urbes occupaverit in Hollandia, nec hodierna tempestas etc. moderari:) Si alterius moderationi subjectus male se gesserit vel bene, utraque actio imputatur moderatori. Quemadmodum regi imputatur, si dissolute vivant subditi, legibus non latis, velearum observatione neglecta, vel neglectu non punito. Quemadmodum et sacerdotibus imputatur, si membraecclesiaesinant ruerein quaevis peccata. Nam Ezech. III v.18. habetur, quod si patiatur sacerdos auditorem suum mori in suo peccato, eumquecum posset, non correxerit, tenetur reddererationem coram tribunali divino deejusanima. Iisdem cancelliscircumscribuntur parentes ut de sacerdote Eli habetur 1.Sam. 2.13 sq. Qui non sat rigidam adhibuerat diligentiam versus suos filios immorigeros proindeque poenam dedit. Dicitur quidem quod eos jusserit bene vivere, sed scabioso capiti acre lixirium est adhibendum. ut quis uni perpetuo:) Posse dicitur vel(1) physice ut [p. 16] homo ambulare, vel ipsum non posse volare, quia non habet pennas, (2) moraliter et civiliter, sic eo modo impossibile est ut moderator ita regere sibi subjectum, quin aliquando et seinvito subjectus quid maliadmittat. Nam non potestassidueipsiassidereet quasiesse vinctus, ut quondam Romaeerat, quod miles qui reum custodiret,copulabaturcum eo quem servaret. E.g. si praeceptor discipulossevereadministrareteteos, quando delinquerent, castigaret, ut suum officium censeatur implevisse; siautem exiretad tale opus, quo nullus hominum supersedere posset, et pueri interim invicem se laceraverint ac turpe fecerint; tum praeceptori culpam non incurrit, sed patrantes nempe discipuli ac eorum petulantia.


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Nam non potestassidueipsiassidereet quasiesse vinctus, ut quondam Romaeerat, quod miles qui reum custodiret,copulabaturcum eo quem servaret. E.g. si praeceptor discipulossevereadministrareteteos, quando delinquerent, castigaret, ut suum officium censeatur implevisse; siautem exiretad tale opus, quo nullus hominum supersedere posset, et pueri interim invicem se laceraverint ac turpe fecerint; tum praeceptori culpam non incurrit, sed patrantes nempe discipuli ac eorum petulantia. Ratio est haec, quia praeceptorierat hocimpossibile, non (1) physice (: responderienim posse pro discipulis, si domi mansisset hoc non esset factum:), sed (2) moraliter ac civiliter; nam gessit seseiuxtatenorem accursum hujus vitae nec potuit, salva venia, apud discipulos in hypocausto alvum exonerare. Idem de pastoretenendum, qui quidem estcustosanimarum,sed non tenetur nec O b s e r va t ion e s i n l i b e l lu m ... d e o f f ic io hom ini s ... 91 for pleasure will be kicked outand deserves no excuse. He who does thesame out of hunger is judged less strictly, [p. 15] since nature abhors hunger. Hence Sirach says that an adulterer sins more than a thief.15 For the adulterer is seldom driven by necessity. par. 18. no operations of any other things:) If the volcano of Etna vomits harmful fire, neither I nor any other person is guilty. no event:)Icannot be blamed forthe occupation last year by theKing of France of numerous towns in Holland, nor for today’s weather. guide:) if someone who is under the leadership of another does well or badly, both actionsareascribed to theleader. The king is blamed if his subjects livelaxly because there are no laws or given laws are not observed nor crimes punished. Likewise, the priests are blamed if they allow the members of the church to sink down in all kinds of sin. In Ezechiel III:18 it says that ifa priest lets his hearer die in sin and has not corrected him when he could, he will have to answer for his soul before the divine tribunal.


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The king is blamed if his subjects livelaxly because there are no laws or given laws are not observed nor crimes punished. Likewise, the priests are blamed if they allow the members of the church to sink down in all kinds of sin. In Ezechiel III:18 it says that ifa priest lets his hearer die in sin and has not corrected him when he could, he will have to answer for his soul before the divine tribunal. The same limits restrict parents as is told about the priest Eli in 1. Samuel 13 sq. He had not been strict enough when instructing his disobedient sons and was therefore punished. It is said that he ordered them to live decently, but scurfy heads need sharp medicine. as if someone were permanently attached to one person:) To be capable can be understood either (1) physically, [p. 16] a man being able to walk or unable to fly because he has no wings, or (2) morally and socially: in that sense it is impossible for a guide to exert such complete control that the subordinate does nothing evil against the will of his supervisor. Hecannotconstantly sit by him and bechained to him, as in Rome, where the soldier who was to watch over a culprit was coupled together with him. For instance, if a teacher handles his pupils severely and punishesthem when they offend, heisconsidered to havefulfilled his obligations. If however he goes out foran errand that no man can avoid,and the boys mangle each other or behaveshamefully;then theteacheris notto blame, only the offenders, i.e. the pupils and their misbehaviour. The reason is that this was impossible fortheteacher not(1) physically(: forin defence ofthe pupilsitcould beanswered, that this would not have happened, if he had stayed at home), but (2) morally and socially, for he behaved according to theconditionsand conventions of human life and could not for the sake of decency relieve himself in the washroom. The same goes for the vicar who, to besure, iscustodian of thesouls, but is not obliged and 15. Reference not found in Sirach.


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The reason is that this was impossible fortheteacher not(1) physically(: forin defence ofthe pupilsitcould beanswered, that this would not have happened, if he had stayed at home), but (2) morally and socially, for he behaved according to theconditionsand conventions of human life and could not for the sake of decency relieve himself in the washroom. The same goes for the vicar who, to besure, iscustodian of thesouls, but is not obliged and 15. Reference not found in Sirach. See, however, Proverbs 6:30–33. 92 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s potest omnes homines visitare; verum vitia vulgaria ex suggestu debet repraehendere in genere, sic censetur suo satisfecisse officio. sic et quaevis mala etc:) Exemplum est, quod in vetere [p. 17] Ecclesia, ut et jam apud populos orientales moris est, usurpare tecta plana, quare lege sancitum erat, ut quivis paterfamilias loricam circumduceret suo tecto, ne deciderent homines. Si autem aliquis vel propter avaritiam vel negligentiam mandato morem non gesserit, ipsi culpa imputabatur. Ita legeeratsancitumdivina, ut quis puteumvelfossamtegere deberet, ne vel jumenta vel homines inciderent inprudentes in eandem; quiautem secus fecerit manebat eundem paena culpae. rerumnaturaliumoperationes:) Sic quando videmusagrumbeneexcultum, laudamus non tam ipsum agrum vel fructum, quam agricolam qui eundem excolendo acstercorando tam indefessam curam adhibuerat. Et e contra dedecus manet ipsum cujus ager totus ac plenus est zizaniis vel nullum protrudit fructum. qui alias supra humanam directionem sunt:) Quod optime intelligitur exemplo Eliae, ad cujus preces caelum quasi claudebatur, ne pluviae deciderent, et hoc modo homines converterentur ad Deum, sic et pluvia fiebant deinceps ejus precibus. Siccitas ergo et pluvia imputabantur ipsi prophetae supra cujus vires tamen erat ille actus. de propriis actionibus:) Alias grande et detestabile vitium est πoλυπραγμoσύυη ex aliarum actionum nimia cura.


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Siccitas ergo et pluvia imputabantur ipsi prophetae supra cujus vires tamen erat ille actus. de propriis actionibus:) Alias grande et detestabile vitium est πoλυπραγμoσύυη ex aliarum actionum nimia cura. Sic Paulus dicebat se curam [p. 18] nullam gerere eorum qui constituti erant extra ecclesiam. Quia alterius actionis vel commodum vel incommodum in me non redundat. Unde sapientissime monet Sapiens Hebraeus Syracides: Quae tibi non commissa sunt, in illis non exerce tuam petulantiam, quia multa tibi sunt commissa quae sustinere non potes. par. 20. Sic Abimelechi factum Gen. 20 quando Saram vellet in uxorem ducere erat impossibile moraliter. Ipseenim Rex juxtacommunis vitaetenorem credidit verum esse, quod dixerit Abraham, nec moriserat tum temporis mittere servos suos et explorare num res ita sese haberet, et arbitrabatur Abraham esse virum veracem. O b s e r va t ion e s i n l i b e l lu m ... d e o f f ic io hom ini s ... 93 cannotcontrolevery human being; but heis supposed to castigatecommon vices from the pulpit in generaland in doing so isconsidered to havefulfilled his duty. Similarly all misfortunes:) For example, in the ancient [p. 17] Church and still among the peoples of the Orient it was customary to make use of the flat roofs and therefore it was sanctioned by law that every paterfamilias should erect a fence around his roof so that people would not fall down. But if someone out of avarice or negligence did not follow thecustom, he becameresponsible. Similarly there wasa divinely sanctioned law that oneshould covera well ora ditch so that cattleand imprudent people would not fall into it:anyone who did otherwise was considered guilty of crime. the operations of things in nature:) When weseea well-tilled field, we praise not so much the field and thecrop as the peasant who has devoted such indefatigable care to it by tilling and manuring.


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But if someone out of avarice or negligence did not follow thecustom, he becameresponsible. Similarly there wasa divinely sanctioned law that oneshould covera well ora ditch so that cattleand imprudent people would not fall into it:anyone who did otherwise was considered guilty of crime. the operations of things in nature:) When weseea well-tilled field, we praise not so much the field and thecrop as the peasant who has devoted such indefatigable care to it by tilling and manuring. Inversely, shame befalls him whose field is full of weed or gives no crop. who are above human guidance:)This is very well understood from theexample of Elias, through whose prayers the sky closed, so that the rain ceased and the people became converted to God: thereafter rain too came on his prayers. 16 So both drought and rain were ascribed to the prophet, but both those events were beyond his power. one’s own actions:)Abig and detestable viceis meddlesomeness out oftoo much interest in the actions of others. Paul said that he did not care about [p. 18] those whowere outsidethechurch. Fortheactions of otherscause neitheradvantage nor disadvantage to me. Hence the Hebrew Sirach admonishes most wisely: Do not practiceyour petulance onwhat is notyour business, forthereis much ofyour business you cannot control.17 par. 20. Abilmech’s deed in Genesis 20, 18 when he wanted to marry Sarah, was morally impossible.In accordancewith prevailing customandway oflife, he believedwhat Abraham had said to be true. In those days it was not customary to send one’s servants to find out how things stood and he believed Abraham to be a veracious man. 16. 1 Kings 17–18. 17. Sirach 3:23. 18. Genesis 20 tells the story about Abilmech who married Sarah believing her to be Abraham’s sister, not his wife. 94 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s par.


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In those days it was not customary to send one’s servants to find out how things stood and he believed Abraham to be a veracious man. 16. 1 Kings 17–18. 17. Sirach 3:23. 18. Genesis 20 tells the story about Abilmech who married Sarah believing her to be Abraham’s sister, not his wife. 94 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s par. 22. commodus locus:) Sic reprehendi quis nequit, quod non cantet testudine in diversorio quodamquumibidemsempersitstrepitus, ne vel viriclamor exaudiri queat,aut pilaludat in parva navi,ad quam rem ampluscampus erit. Quis simul potest sorbere et flare?Nam illa actio significat attractionem spiritus, haec vero protrusionem adeoque sunt motus contrarii, qui una et simul effici nequeant, nam homo se dividere non potest. [p. 19] par. 23. Unde de obaerato quaestio ex hoc loco decidi potest facile. Num si is conjiciendus est in carcerem, qui non est solvendo? Dici solet, qui non habet in aere, luat in corpore. Sed attendenda est restrictio: posse videlicet in carcerem compingi, quando opes perdiderit ac decoxerit luxuria, non vero quando easdem amiserit fatali calamitate. Huc referendum exemplum de militibus pollices sibi abscindentibus. Et culpae redargui potestarator si omniainstrumentacorruperit vel reddiderit inidoneaad arationem. par. 24. Prior coactio vocari potest corporalis si tertius sumserit meam manum, accum eatanquam instrumento alteri impegeritcolaphum cui non eram resistendo. Altera illustratur hoc exemplo, si validior me, gladio exserto mihi jam jam necem intentaret, nisi facem immitterem tecto, sane ideo ego non sum in culpa si facem admoveam, declinando eo modo mortis periculum,cum non video, quare vitae dispendium patiar pro tecto stramineo, et ille, si ego non fecissem, alias fecerit idem post meum obitum. par.


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24. Prior coactio vocari potest corporalis si tertius sumserit meam manum, accum eatanquam instrumento alteri impegeritcolaphum cui non eram resistendo. Altera illustratur hoc exemplo, si validior me, gladio exserto mihi jam jam necem intentaret, nisi facem immitterem tecto, sane ideo ego non sum in culpa si facem admoveam, declinando eo modo mortis periculum,cum non video, quare vitae dispendium patiar pro tecto stramineo, et ille, si ego non fecissem, alias fecerit idem post meum obitum. par. 27. qui alterum auctoritate sua ad quid permoverunt:) E.g. si pater jubeat filium adultum facinus quoddam patrare, tum uterque est in culpa si fiat, sed pater gravius delinquit, qui firmiore est judicio ac filius, et deberet potius [p.20] in peccata ruentem retrahere: nec evadet notam peccati filius, nam sciebat non teneri ad obedientiam patri praecipienti legi repugnantia. consensum requisitum adhibuerunt:) Si feroces quidam juvenes in urbe obsessa petunta duce, utfaciantirruptionem, quamconsecutaingensclades, quae utriqueimputatur,etjuvenibus quicomprimere debebantsuam O b s e r va t ion e s i n l i b e l lu m ... d e o f f ic io hom ini s ... 95 par. 22. convenient place:) Nobody can be blamed because he does not sing and play the lutein atavern,whereitisalwaysso noisy that noteven ashoutis heard, or because he does not play darts in a small boat, for which ample space is needed. Who can suck and blow at thesametime? Theformeraction meansacontraction of the breathing, the latter its ejection, and therefore they are opposite motions, which cannot be produced simultaneously: a human being cannot divide himself. [p. 19] par. 23. Here,the question ofthe debtorcan easily be decided. Should anyonewho cannot pay his debt be put into prison? It is usually said: He who has no money shall pay with his body. However, there is a restriction to observe in putting people in jail: someone who has wasted his fortune through extravagance can be confined to prison, not however someone who lost his through a fatal calamity.


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23. Here,the question ofthe debtorcan easily be decided. Should anyonewho cannot pay his debt be put into prison? It is usually said: He who has no money shall pay with his body. However, there is a restriction to observe in putting people in jail: someone who has wasted his fortune through extravagance can be confined to prison, not however someone who lost his through a fatal calamity. To this topic /of weakening one’s power by one’s own fault/ can bereferred the example of soldiers who cut off their thumbs. And thefarmer who can be proved guilty if he has destroyed all his tools or made them unfit for tilling. par. 24. The first kind of coercion could be called corporeal, if somebody, whom I cannot resist, grabs my hand and uses it as a tool to strike another. The second kind is illustrated by thisexample: if someonestronger than me, sword in hand, threatens meifI do notseta house on fire,then Iamreally not guilty ifIapply the firebrand, thereby avoiding mortal peril, since I do not see why I should lose my life for a straw cottage; and had I not done it, he would have done it at another time after my death. par. 27. thosewho incited the other person to action bytheir own authority:) Forinstance, ifa father ordershisadultsonto commitacrime,thenbothare guilty,butthefather offendsmoresince hisjudgementismorestableand heshould haverestrained [p.20] his son from drifting into crime.


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27. thosewho incited the other person to action bytheir own authority:) Forinstance, ifa father ordershisadultsonto commitacrime,thenbothare guilty,butthefather offendsmoresince hisjudgementismorestableand heshould haverestrained [p.20] his son from drifting into crime. Nor does the son escape reproach, for he knew that hewas not obliged to obey hisfatherif hetold himto do something unlawful. those who gave the necessary consent:) If, in a town under siege, some ferocious youngsters ask the commander for permission to make a sally that results in disaster, then both are responsible: the youngsters who should have tempered their 96 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s importunam ferociam,et duci ipsi, qui nosse debebatere non essetalem fieri irruptionem, qui et plus peccavit quam illi, nam sine ejus concessu non irrupuissent feroces milites. qui poterant et debebant prohibere:) E.g. si pater videat filium petulanter facere et effringere fenestram vicini, si eum non castigat pater, ne desistat a tali pacto, est in culpa pater, qui debebat et posset prohibere eum. ad facinus patrandum conducunt:)Quemadmodumsitin Italia, ubiest maximus fervor vindictae,ac magnaseges hominum proscriptorum, qui alios interficient. Aequesicariusac quiconducitest in culpa. Idem etiam patet de incendiario. qui adjuvant:) Ut in furto qui scalam admovet, velalio modo efficit ut fur sine difficultate ac periculo res auferat. qui receptum ac defensionem praestant:) Uterque enim censetur fur, tam qui furatus est, quam qui sciens talibus [p.21] receptum praestat, quod notum etiam est de duce Saxoniae qui et est proscriptus, cum a Caesare proscriptos recepisset. opem ferre injuriam patientis etc:) Ut constat de militibus, qui constitutisuntad prehendendoslatrones,eostamen impunelatrociniumfacere permittentibus. consilium speciale:) Quod est notum ex historia notissimain Scriptura Sacra de Juda Christi proditore, qui suppeditabat consilium Pharisaeis acscribis prehendendi Christum in horto ubi sciebateum fuissesolitum preces fundere.


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Satis sane egregium locum is invenit in hoc facinore. Observationes ad Caput II d. 6. Martii 1673 [De Norma Actionum Humanarum, seu de Lege in genere] par. 1. Ante officium duo veniunt notanda: (1) quomodo sese habere debentactiones hominum, de quibus in capite praecedente; (2) faciendaest regula seu norma ad quam conformare debemus nostras actiones. Ad illustrationem hic dictorum multum facit similitudo ex R E MUSICA petita. Quaedam enim voces ibi suntacutae, quaedam graves, unde oritur maxima discrepantiaacmiser horribilisque ululatus,cumquilibetsuamcantet cantilenam. Eritergo quicujusquesonum examinetetconsonantiam faciet, underesultat demum suavis harmoniaex confusissima dissonantia. O b s e r va t ion e s i n l i b e l lu m ... d e o f f ic io hom ini s ... 97 dangerousferocity and thecommanderwho oughtto have known thatsuch asally would be detrimental;and in fact, hefailed morethan they did, since without his permission, the soldiers would not have launched their sally. those who could and should have prevented:) For instance, ifafather, seeing that his mischievous son breaks the window of the neighbour, does notadmonish him to give up such behaviour, then thefatheris guilty, since hecould and should have prevented him. hire someone to commit a crime:) As it is in Italy, where the passion for revenge is enormous and there is a large supply of outlaws who kill others: here, both the perpetrator and the hirer are guilty.


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The same applies to arson. those who help:) As in a theft, he who applies the ladder or in some other way helps the thief to carry away the loot without difficulty and peril. those who provide refuge and protection:) Both are considered thieves, the thief as wellas he who deliberately provides refugeto such people. [p.21] A known case of this is the Duke of Saxony, who was outlawed because he had given refuge to people who had been outlawed by the Emperor. /those who did not/ help the victim:) As with soldiers who should capture bandits but allow them to rob with impunity. special advice:) This is known from the well-known tale in the Holy Writ of Judas the traitor, who advised the Pharisees and the scribes to arrest Jesus in the garden where he knew he used to say his prayers. Indeed hefound asuitable place for this deed. Annotations on chapter II March 6 1673. [On the rule of human action or on law in general] par. 1. Before we come to the duties, two things should be noted. First, how the actions of menwe dealtwith in the preceding chapter oughtto beregarded:second,arule or norm must be established to which we should ensure our actions conform. To illustrate what has been said here a simile from the sphere of music is helpful. In singing, some voicesaretreble, others bass; from thisarises great discrepancy and a miserable and horrible noise, when everyone sings his own melody. Therefore, there must be someone who supervises the sound of everyone, bringing about consonanceso thatthen indeed lovely harmony resultsfromconfused dissonance. 98 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s Sic se res habet in actionibus humanis, necessaria enim ibi est lex, quae diversitatem hominum conformet. Quid? si unus vel alter in societate praefractus vivat, turbatur equidem tota societas, si hoc, quid futurum esset, si singuli ex suo arbitrio agerent. [p.22] par. 3.


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Therefore, there must be someone who supervises the sound of everyone, bringing about consonanceso thatthen indeed lovely harmony resultsfromconfused dissonance. 98 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s Sic se res habet in actionibus humanis, necessaria enim ibi est lex, quae diversitatem hominum conformet. Quid? si unus vel alter in societate praefractus vivat, turbatur equidem tota societas, si hoc, quid futurum esset, si singuli ex suo arbitrio agerent. [p.22] par. 3. Notius est quam ut dici mereatur duplicia esse vincula, (1) corporalia, ut catena, funis, quae brutis imponuntur, quibus motus corporis restringitur (2) moralia, quae necessitatem injungunt in nostra conscientia quale est v.g. pudor, studium famae, ne turpi vitio sese maculet. Lege libertas non planeextinguiturin homine, quod simili, quamvis dissimili illustratur: v.g.equus generosuscui frenum est impositum,et per quod dirigitur in ea via, qua debet incedere, in eo tamen tantum est virium, ut sessorem soleat deponere ac a via secedere; ast frenum tamen vellicat ejus os, ut sentiat quando incedit recta quando non recta via. Similiter et lex facit in homine. par. 4. Quaedam entia sunt tum abjectae ac ignobilis naturae, ut capacia non sint legum, v.g. bruta animantia et inanimata: quaedam vero entia tam nobilisconditionisac naturae, ut necin eacadat ullalex. Quale majestas eminentissima Divina. per naturam ad uniformem modum:)V.g. ignisadeptusidoneam materiamnon potest non urereeamqueconsumere, utsi quis velmaximeleges praescribat eidem durissimas, ille tamen similiter urit, nec effici potest ullo praecepto ut ignis refrigeret, sicutet frustraferuntur legesad bovem esurientem ut uno die a pabulo se contineat. Certe perinde est ac si quis velit surdo narrare fabulam. par. 5. Si non animadvertatur in eum, qui leges flocci pendet, videntur omnino legesessefrustraneae, requiritur [p.23]ergo in legislatore potentia paenas infligendi inobedientibus. Deinde ea non sufficit sola, sed ratio debet adesse.


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Certe perinde est ac si quis velit surdo narrare fabulam. par. 5. Si non animadvertatur in eum, qui leges flocci pendet, videntur omnino legesessefrustraneae, requiritur [p.23]ergo in legislatore potentia paenas infligendi inobedientibus. Deinde ea non sufficit sola, sed ratio debet adesse. Quod patetexempli diaboli, quiest viribus instructissimusadeoqueetfacultate praescribendi leges. Sed is debetallegarecausasacrationes v.g.seesse nostrum creatorem, defensorem etc. Cum cernimusejusrationes esse falsas, ergo ipsius legibus non obtemperamus. Sic si considerare velimus quare legibus Dei obtemperare debemus, primo deprehendimus O b s e r va t ion e s i n l i b e l lu m ... d e o f f ic io hom ini s ... 99 This applies to human action: there is a necessary law that brings order to the diversity of men.19 If one or two live self-indulgently, the whole of society is disturbed. What would happen if the individual acted according to his will? [p.22] par. 3. It is so well known that it is not worth mentioning that there are two kinds of bond, first the corporeal, like chains and ropes that are placed on animals and restrictcorporealmotion. Second,thereare moral bonds,which imposeaconstraint on conscience, such as for instanceshame, concern for one’s reputation, so that one is not disgraced by shameful vice. The law does not extinguish human liberty, which is illustrated by a parallel however dissimilar:a noble horse equipped with a bridle by which it is manoeuvred in the right direction still has so much power that it may throw the rider and deviate from its course, but the bridle nips its mouth so that it feels when it is going in the right direction or not. The law has the same effect on man. par. 4. Some beings are of such low and ignoble nature that they are not legally competent, for instance animals or inanimate beings. Other beings are of such noble rank and nature that they can be subject to no law.


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The law has the same effect on man. par. 4. Some beings are of such low and ignoble nature that they are not legally competent, for instance animals or inanimate beings. Other beings are of such noble rank and nature that they can be subject to no law. Such is the most eminent divine majesty. by nature to a uniform mode of behaviour:) If fire catches a suitable material, it cannot but burn and consumeit. Even if somebody prescribes thestrictest laws, it continues to burn and no preceptcan makeitcool off. Similarly, lawsare given in vain to makea hungry ox abstain from fodder for onesingle day. Indeed, it is like telling stories to the deaf. par. 5. If someone who considers laws insignificant is not punished,all laws seem worthless. Therefore, it is necessary [p.23] for the legislator to have power to punish the disobedient. But power alone is not sufficient; there must be reason too. This is clear in theexample of the devil, who is most powerfuland ableto prescribelaws. But he should adduce causes and reasons, for instance that he is our creator and defender. When we see that his reasons are false we do not obey his laws. Hence, if we consider why we ought to follow the laws of God, we will find first that he 19. Pufendorf uses the same musical simile in the comments on De jure; above p. 47. 100 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s ipsum omnium esse potentissimum etexinde oritur metus, deinde nobis se ingerunt rationes quod nos creaverit, sustentet, amet, beneficia in nos conferat etc. Exinde oritur reverentia. is terrere quidem me potest:) Sie.g.capiaralatronibusex ipsorumminis cogormultaagerecontrameaminclinationemac voluntatem, idquemetu mortis; sed cum ab ipsorum manibus elabor, potius summo quaero studio quomodo ipsos quovis malo possim mactare, adeoque sola potentia sufficiens non est. Ita Deus quando Populo suo decalogum promulgavit, non provocabat tantum ad potentiam suam, qua ipsos omnes posset fulmine perdere uno ictu oculi. Sed dixit: Ego sum Deus fortis.


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Exinde oritur reverentia. is terrere quidem me potest:) Sie.g.capiaralatronibusex ipsorumminis cogormultaagerecontrameaminclinationemac voluntatem, idquemetu mortis; sed cum ab ipsorum manibus elabor, potius summo quaero studio quomodo ipsos quovis malo possim mactare, adeoque sola potentia sufficiens non est. Ita Deus quando Populo suo decalogum promulgavit, non provocabat tantum ad potentiam suam, qua ipsos omnes posset fulmine perdere uno ictu oculi. Sed dixit: Ego sum Deus fortis. Sed et allegavitrationesadjiciens: Ego sum qui teex servituteAegyptieduxietc. ni potentior aliquis hujus auctoritatem proculcatam adsertum eat:) Si parens senio confectus ac decrepitus habeat filios immorigeros qui nihil minus quam parentis jussa exsequuntur, in tales solet magistratus animadvertere [p.24] et si eorum effugiant castigationes, non eludent severissimas Dei poenas. actu hujus directionem sibi vendicet:) E.g. si ponamus iuxta Epicuraeos Deum creatorum nullam gerere curam, sed nos reliquisse vivere nostro arbitrio; et si parens filiorum curam postponat, ut eos plane negligat. Non teneturcreatura nec filius sesead Dei vel parentis voluntatem componere actionesque suas dirigere. Sed ex adverso ideo tenemur Deo ac parenti obedientiam praestare, quia actu in nos conferunt beneficia et nostri directionem sibi vendicant. ultro alteri sese subjecerit:) Quod Rex protendit in subditos rebelles, quod videlicet semel consenserint in ipsius directionem. Ergo et obstricti sunt ad non mutandam sententiam. Sic maritus dicit ad uxorem, et haec vicissim ad eum vulgatissimo dicterio: Hastu mich genommen, solstu mich befalten. Ita servus non potest recusare Domini imperium, quamdiu durat tempus conductionis, in quod semel consenserat. par. 6. Cognitio necessaria est (1) legislatoris, ut si literas accipio continentes mandatum quoddam, primum inspiciendum sigillum ac nomen, ut in decalogo factum, praemissum est nomen auctoris et promulgatoris Ego Jehova. Et mos idem obtinet in decretis Regum.


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Sic maritus dicit ad uxorem, et haec vicissim ad eum vulgatissimo dicterio: Hastu mich genommen, solstu mich befalten. Ita servus non potest recusare Domini imperium, quamdiu durat tempus conductionis, in quod semel consenserat. par. 6. Cognitio necessaria est (1) legislatoris, ut si literas accipio continentes mandatum quoddam, primum inspiciendum sigillum ac nomen, ut in decalogo factum, praemissum est nomen auctoris et promulgatoris Ego Jehova. Et mos idem obtinet in decretis Regum. Praemittitur enim v.g. talis titulus Nos Dei gratia Carolus XI etc. Sic Pharao quaerebat a Mose O b s e r va t ion e s i n l i b e l lu m ... d e o f f ic io hom ini s ... 101 is the most powerful of all beings, from which comes fear, but then the reasons present themselves that he created us, preserves us, loves us and bestows benefits on us. Of this comes respect. mayindeed terrify me:)If banditscapture me,Iwill beforced by theirthreatsto do many thingsagainst my inclination and will,and this because of fear of death. But when I get away from them, I will be eager to find out how I can hurt them. Therefore, power alone is not sufficient. When God promulgated the Decalogue to his people, he did not only appeal to his power, with which he could destroy them all in the glance ofan eye. But he said: Iam almighty God. And healso adduced reasons, saying: I am that I am and I led you out of Egypt.20 unless a more powerful than he comes to assert the authorityI have flouted:) Ifan old and sick father has disobedient sons who do everything but obey his instructions, then theauthorities willcensure[p.24] them,and if they evadethatcorrection, they will not escape the strictest punishments of God. actually claims direction of him:) Suppose, according to the Epicureans, that God did not care about the universe but had left us to live according to our own will, and suppose a father neglects concern for his sons completely.


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Then neither the universe, nor thesonsare obliged to adapt to the will of God orthefatherand direct theiractionsaccordingly. On thecontrary, weare obliged to pay obedience to God and our father, because they bestow benefits on us and claim to be our guides. voluntarily submitted to him:) This is what a king asserts vis-à-vis rebellious subjects, viz. that they have once consented to be governed by him. In consequence, they are obliged not to changetheir minds. Similarly, the husband says to his wife,and sheto him with thecommon saying: Hastu mich genommen, solstu mich befalten. 21 The servant cannot reject his master’s controlas long as the term of service to which he consented lasts. par. 6. It is necessary that it be known, (1) 22 who the legislator is. If I receivealetter containing an order, I should first inspect the seal and the name, as it is in the Decalogue,wherethe name oftheauthorand promulgatorisindicated in advance: Ego Jehovah.Thesameiscustomary in royal decrees,forinstancein an inscription like We Charles XI by grace of God 23 etc. Similarly, when Mosescameto Pharaoh, he 20. Exodus 20:2–5. 21. German: “If you have taken me, you will command me.” 22. (1) is not followed by (2). 23. Charles XI, King of Sweden 1672–1697. 102 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s ad se veniente nomen Jehovae, quis nimirum esset ille Deus? Qui deinde edoctusest, qualisesset.Quum[p.25] decretumfit, necesseest ut prius de auctore legitimo constet, ut illud non putetur esse supposititium. par. 7. Sanctio paenalis in omnibus legibus cernitur, ut e.g. in decalogo: nam Jehova primo praeponit nomen, deinde proponit leges ipsas, ultimo demum clausulam seu sanctionem paenalem hisce verbis: Ego sum Deus tuus fortis, Zelotes, visitans Patrum iniquitatem in filiosetc., vide Exod. 20,5 seq. Deut. 5, 9, 10. in vetita tendere amantis:) Obiter hic notandaest historia, quam commemorat Franciscus Petrarca in libro De fortunae remediis, de quodam sutore, qui nunquam pedem extulit extra urbis portam in tota sua vita.


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Deut. 5, 9, 10. in vetita tendere amantis:) Obiter hic notandaest historia, quam commemorat Franciscus Petrarca in libro De fortunae remediis, de quodam sutore, qui nunquam pedem extulit extra urbis portam in tota sua vita. Cum autem urbs urgeretur obsidione gravi, suspicabantur quidam eum rem habere cum hoste. Ille apud judices jurabat se nunquam fuisse extra urbem, multo minus hac vice, undeabsolutus. Sed postquam videbat vetitum esse extra urbem vagare ad hostes, statim ac domum rediit, exiit, ex quo facile cuivis est intellectu quam amat homo in vetitum tendere. Legis vis:) Distinctio legis in directivam etcoactivam (:quae distinctio adhibetur quando respondent ad vexatissimam quaestionem: num magistratus summus sit legibus absolutus, dicentes a vi legis coactrice, non directrice eum esse absolutum:) minus accurata est, cum legislator nos cogat, lex vero est tantum instrumentum. Vide I. N. et G. 1.6. 14. p 97. [p.26] par. 8. Omnes leges quidem semper habent conjunctam utilitatem, sed istud commodum omnibus semper non ita adparet, ut rusticis vel propter Reipublicaeignorantiam, vel propter ingenii hebetudinem, qui itaque de Rege suo debent praesumere esse virum sapientem ac prudentem. par. 9. materia legis quadrat:) Utsi de barbalex feratur,ei sane obnoxii non sunt pueri, vel faeminae. Talis lex si praescribitur ordiniecclesiastico,exempti omnino erunt laici. Notandum quando nulla restrictio vel exemptio O b s e r va t ion e s i n l i b e l lu m ... d e o f f ic io hom ini s ... 103 wasaskedwho this godwith the nameJehovahwas.24And Pharaohwasinformed what kind of god he was. When [p.25]a decree is issued, it must be clear that the author is legitimate so that the decree is not considered false. par. 7.


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Talis lex si praescribitur ordiniecclesiastico,exempti omnino erunt laici. Notandum quando nulla restrictio vel exemptio O b s e r va t ion e s i n l i b e l lu m ... d e o f f ic io hom ini s ... 103 wasaskedwho this godwith the nameJehovahwas.24And Pharaohwasinformed what kind of god he was. When [p.25]a decree is issued, it must be clear that the author is legitimate so that the decree is not considered false. par. 7. In every law, there is a penal sanction, for instance in the Decalogue: for Jehovah first declares his name, then he proposed the laws and finally the penal sanction with these words: Iam almighty God, jealous,and will visit thesins of thefathers upon their children, vide Exodus 20.5 seq., Deuteronomy 5.9.10. 25 loves to do what is forbidden:) By the way a story worth noting is told by Francisco Petrarch in his book De fortunae remediis26 about a shoemaker who had never in all his life put his foot outside the town gates. However, when the town was under heavy siege, some people suspected him of collaboration with the enemy. Before the judges, he swore that he had never been outside town, least of all under circumstances like these, and was acquitted. But when he saw that it was forbidden to walk outside town to the enemy he went out, as soon as he had returned home. From thisanyoneeasily understands how man loves to do what is forbidden. force of the law:) The distinction between directiveand binding law (which applies to the much disputed question ofwhetherthesupreme poweris set freefrom thelaws,whereitisargued that heisfreefrom binding lawbut notfrom directive) is lessaccurate, sincethelegislatorcompels us, whilethelaw is justan instrument. See De jure naturae et gentium book 6. Chap. 14. p. 97. [p.26] par. 8. All lawsalwaysareconnected to some utility but the benefit is notalways obvious to everybody, for instance to the peasant because he is ignorant of state affairs or of feebleintellect. Therefore, such peopleshould believetheir king to be wiseand prudent. par.


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See De jure naturae et gentium book 6. Chap. 14. p. 97. [p.26] par. 8. All lawsalwaysareconnected to some utility but the benefit is notalways obvious to everybody, for instance to the peasant because he is ignorant of state affairs or of feebleintellect. Therefore, such peopleshould believetheir king to be wiseand prudent. par. 9. the substance of the law applies:) If a law is made about having beards, boys or women cannot, ofcourse, be punished.If such alaw isenjoined on theecclesiastic estate, laymenwill beentirely exempt.Notethatwhen no restriction orexemption 24. Exodus 5:2. 25. The reference to Deuteronomy seems irrelevant. 26. The full title of this book on consolation by Petrarca is De remediis utriusque fortunae, written around 1366. 104 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s addatur, tum illam legem omnes promiscue concernere. Sicut Decalogus omnibus hominibus praescriptus, ergo et nobilibus, qui aeque sunt homines ac rustici. cavendum ne dispensa promiscuanturetc:) Ut de gradu consanguinitatis 5 matrimoniis quibusdam contrahendis. Ubi aliquando et certis personis dispensatio fit; si fieret promiscue, colligeretur nullam ei rei inesse turpitudinem. par. 10. Quia tam multi casus contingunt in vita humana, ut impossibile sit omnes a mortalibus posse praevideri. Ergo emendatione est opus, quando legis universalitas observari non possit, sine grandiabsurditate, quod vocaturaequitas. Ponamusin urbeegregiemunitatalemesselegem:Nullus peregrinus ascendito moenia urbis. Si vero contigerit, ut hostes videat adventare, et ipse sic ascenderet muros clamitans ad alios homines ut consurgant ad defendendam urbem, certe non potest negari quin egregiam[p.27]aclaude, imo praemio dignamrempraestiterit, dumeomodo civitatem liberaret. Quid fiat si tractus fuerit in forum condemnandus juxta legis vigorem? Certe injuste cum eo ageretur, nisi emendetur legis universalitas.


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Ponamusin urbeegregiemunitatalemesselegem:Nullus peregrinus ascendito moenia urbis. Si vero contigerit, ut hostes videat adventare, et ipse sic ascenderet muros clamitans ad alios homines ut consurgant ad defendendam urbem, certe non potest negari quin egregiam[p.27]aclaude, imo praemio dignamrempraestiterit, dumeomodo civitatem liberaret. Quid fiat si tractus fuerit in forum condemnandus juxta legis vigorem? Certe injuste cum eo ageretur, nisi emendetur legis universalitas. Ergo ipse legislator siadsit, confiteatur se hunc in tali casu habuisse exemptum, cum illos tantum indigitare voluerit, qui vel ex petulantia vel industriaadscenderintmurosad explorandumeorumvel vim vel debilitatem. par. 11. etsi in se honestati naturalirepugnent:)Quamvis honestati naturalirepugnent, tamen nulla poena in foro humano multis actionibus est constituta, v.g. ut in hisce gentibus ebrietas, quasi in mores pertransiit; propter eandem nullus punitur in foro humano, etsi vel maxime honestati contrarietur. Ad verba ultima /sc. paragraphi/ hoc observandum. Ut in mathesi linea recta vocatur, quae nullibi est curva, et contra non recta censetur sed curva, quum in minima parte observatur flexibilis; ita in actionibus tenendum ut malae censeantur, si in una duntaxat parte deficiant: v.g. vel in intentione, ut res alias laudabilis erat eleemosynas dare, sed quia intentio ac finiseratmalus,ergo ipsaactio redditurtalis, quaesusceptaest 5. Manuscript: consangui. O b s e r va t ion e s i n l i b e l lu m ... d e o f f ic io hom ini s ... 105 isadded to alaw, then it willconcern everybody promiscuously. The Decalogueis enjoined on all human beings, that is also on the nobility who are human beings as much as peasants. Oneshould becareful not to underminethelaws byindiscriminate dispensation:) As in marriage between individuals who are blood-related in certain degrees. Here, dispensation sometimes is given certain persons, but if that happened indiscriminately, it would be concluded that there is nothing shameful in it. par. 10.


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The Decalogueis enjoined on all human beings, that is also on the nobility who are human beings as much as peasants. Oneshould becareful not to underminethelaws byindiscriminate dispensation:) As in marriage between individuals who are blood-related in certain degrees. Here, dispensation sometimes is given certain persons, but if that happened indiscriminately, it would be concluded that there is nothing shameful in it. par. 10. Since there are so many unexpected happenings in human life, it is impossible to foresee them. Hence, when the universal prescription of the law cannot be followed withoutabsurd consequences,acorrection is needed which is called equity. Supposethat in a well-fortified town thereisalaw that no stranger may have access to the fortifications. But if it happens that a stranger, observing the enemy coming, ascends the walls crying to other men to stand up and defend the town, then indeed no onecan deny that he has donesomething distinguished [p.27]and worthy not only of praise but ofareward in saving the town in that way. What if he is taken to court to be condemned according to the rigour of the law? Certainly he will be unjustly treated, if the universal rule of the law is not amended. And if the legislator himself is present, he ought to make known that hereleasesthis man in such acasesince he onlywanted to outlawthosewho climb the walls out of petulance or in order to discover their strong and weak points. par. 11. though in themselvesthey arerepugnantto natural honesty:)Therearemany actions in human intercourse for which there is no penalty, although they are repugnant to natural honesty. In these nations, for instance, drunkenness has become habitual, as it were, and no human law punishes anybody for it, although it is most opposed to honesty. To the last words of the paragraph one should observe the following.


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11. though in themselvesthey arerepugnantto natural honesty:)Therearemany actions in human intercourse for which there is no penalty, although they are repugnant to natural honesty. In these nations, for instance, drunkenness has become habitual, as it were, and no human law punishes anybody for it, although it is most opposed to honesty. To the last words of the paragraph one should observe the following. As in mathematicsalineiscalled straightthatis nowherecurved and on the other hand notconsidered straight butcurvedwhen itis bentanywhereatall, oneshould view actions so that they are regarded as bad if they are deficient in one part only. For instance in the intention: normally it is laudable to give alms, but if the aim and intention was bad, the actual act also becomes bad because it was done for the 106 t h e p u f e n d o r f l e c t u r e s ostentationis gratia. Si autem intentio aliquando contingat esse bona, et objectum est malum, ipsa actio censenda est non bona. V.g. procul dubio in Pontificiis multi inveniuntur qui bona intentione suscipiunt peregrinationesad loca(:ut putant:) sancta, [p.28] itajejunium quadraginta per dies suscipiunt,adorant sanctos,et quaesunt hujusmodialia. Sine dubio inquam, haeactionesab illis bonacum intentionesusceptae; tamen quia pars aliqua sc. objectum illarum actionum non est legi conveniens, ergo intentio bona nec sic valet efficere actionem bonam. par. 12. justi hominis non paucae possunt esse actiones injustae:) Quod apparet exemplo notissimo ex scripturis sacris de Davide. Dicitur quod fuerit vir secundum cor Dei, adeoque vir justus, nec tamen sequitur quod omnia fuerintjusta, quae virille perpetrabat. Contrariumsuadetejus pessimum facinus erga Uriam, quod tamen ipsi obrepserat propter imbecillitatem humanam. Ita quando Tyranni semel vel iterum edunt actionem quandamlaudabilemetjustam, necstatimnomen justimerentur.


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12. justi hominis non paucae possunt esse actiones injustae:) Quod apparet exemplo notissimo ex scripturis sacris de Davide. Dicitur quod fuerit vir secundum cor Dei, adeoque vir justus, nec tamen sequitur quod omnia fuerintjusta, quae virille perpetrabat. Contrariumsuadetejus pessimum facinus erga Uriam, quod tamen ipsi obrepserat propter imbecillitatem humanam. Ita quando Tyranni semel vel iterum edunt actionem quandamlaudabilemetjustam, necstatimnomen justimerentur. Sed hacin re maximerespiciendum estad vitaescopum ac propositum, ut iscenseatur juste vivere,cujusactiones pleraequesunt justae,adeoque David injustus dici nequit. Sic Tyrannus nec justus quia ejus scopus vitae maxime consistit in Tyrannide. par. 13. UndeAristoteles dixitjustitiam esse ἀρητήν πρόσ ἓτερoνet quis non censetur juste erga se facere, cum bene se gerit? par. 14. Aliter justitiam dividit Aristoteles, aliter Grotius, [p.29] aliter Hobbesius, aliter moderni philosophi, quorum divisiones quamvis venditentur inter hos pro Aristotelis, ejus tamen non sunt. Ad hanc distinctionem intelligendam plurimum facit, si observetur, quid est deberi modo perfecto et modo imperfecto. Illud est quando quis jus habet alterum cogere ac ad judicem trahere, ut si mihi ex mutuo quid debet, si solvere nequit, jus dicor habere perfectum ab eo vel invito exigendi, quod mihi debet. Jure autem imperfecto extorquere ab aliis non possum, ut pauper cui deferam eleemosynas potest quidem conqueri de mea duritie ac immisericordia, tamen jus non habet eleemosynas a me exigendi nec me eapropter in judicium citare. O b s e r va t ion e s i n l i b e l lu m ... d e o f f ic io hom ini s ... 107 sake of ostentation. However, if theintention happens to be good, but the object is bad, theaction itselfcannot beconsidered good. Among the papists, thereare no doubt certainly many who with good intention travel abroad to what they consider holy places, [p.28] spend 40 days fasting,worship saintsand do other things of that kind.


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O b s e r va t ion e s i n l i b e l lu m ... d e o f f ic io hom ini s ... 107 sake of ostentation. However, if theintention happens to be good, but the object is bad, theaction itselfcannot beconsidered good. Among the papists, thereare no doubt certainly many who with good intention travel abroad to what they consider holy places, [p.28] spend 40 days fasting,worship saintsand do other things of that kind. No doubt I say, theseactionsareentered upon with good intention; however, since one aspect of them, i.e. their object, is not consistent with the law, good intention is not sufficient for an action to be good. par. 12. some of the wise man’s actions may be unjust:) This appears from the well-known examplein the HolyWritabout David. Heissaid to have been a man according to God’s heart, i.e. a just man, which does not entail that all of his doings were just. The opposite is adduced by his evil deed against Uriah that suddenly overcame him due to human frailty.27 Likewise, when tyrants once or twice do something laudableand just,they do not immediately deserveto becalled just.In this matter one has to consideraboveall theaim and purpose of life, so that heis regarded as just whose actions are mostly just; hence David cannot be called unjust. Nor can a tyrant be just, for the aim of his life mainly consists of tyranny. par. 13. HenceAristotlesaid that justiceis virtuein relation to another person, 28 and who is not considered to act justly towards himself, when he behaves well? 29 par. 14. Aristotle, Grotius, [p.29] Hobbes and contemporary philosophers divide justice differently, and although the divisions of the latter are trotted out as Aristotelian, they are not. Understanding this distinction30 is much facilitated if we observe what it means to be indebted perfectly and imperfectly. The former is when someone has the right to force the other and take him to the judge; for instance when someone who owes me money cannot pay, Iam said to have perfect right to exact what he owes me against his will.


