Farseen0/scar-weights
Feature Extraction • Updated
Datasets:
query large_stringlengths 38 1.7k | positive large_stringlengths 18 171k | hard_negative large_stringlengths 18 171k | negative_type large_stringclasses 8
values | source large_stringclasses 9
values | severity large_stringclasses 3
values | vuln_type large_stringclasses 315
values | quality_tier int64 1 3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
HIGH severity: BufferBinaryPool can permanently lock funds on early exercise. **Details**
[BufferBinaryOptions.sol#L380-L395](https://github.com/Buffer-Finance/Buffer-Protocol-v2_5/blob/84b6060b4447b2550de595202e8820c7f515988b/contracts/core/BufferBinaryOptions.sol#L380-L395)
if (option.expiration > closingTi... | uint256 transferTokenXAmount = tokenXAmount > ll.amount
? ll.amount
: tokenXAmount; | def _balanceAdapters( _target_asset_balance: uint256, pregen_info: DynArray[Bytes[4096], MAX_ADAPTERS], _withdraw_only : bool = False, _max_txs: uint8 = MAX_BALTX_DEPOSIT ):
# Make sure we have enough assets to send to _receiver.
txs: BalanceTX[MAX_ADAPTERS] = empty(BalanceTX[MAX_ADAPTERS])
blocked_adapters: address[MA... | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | HIGH | 2 | |
HIGH severity: Market direction signature can be abused if privateKeeperMode is disabled. **Details**
https://github.com/Buffer-Finance/Buffer-Protocol-v2_5/blob/84b6060b4447b2550de595202e8820c7f515988b/contracts/core/BufferRouter.sol#L233-L246
if (
!Validator.verifyMarketDirection(
... | if (
!Validator.verifyMarketDirection(
params,
queuedTrade,
optionInfo.signer
)
) {
emit FailUnlock(
params.optionId,
params.targetContract,
"Router: Wrong market direction"
);
continue;
} | function calcFunding(uint256 collateralAdded, uint256 totalShares, uint256 poolValue)
internal
pure
returns (uint256 sharesMinted)
{
if (totalShares == 0) {
// funding when LP pool is empty
sharesMinted = collateralAdded;
} else {
// mint LP tokens proportional to how much value the new investment
// brings to the pool | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | HIGH | 2 | |
HIGH severity: closeAnytime timestamp is never validated against current timestamp. **Details**
[BufferRouter.sol#L248-L258](https://github.com/Buffer-Finance/Buffer-Protocol-v2_5/blob/84b6060b4447b2550de595202e8820c7f515988b/contracts/core/BufferRouter.sol#L248-L258)
try
optionsContract.u... | try
optionsContract.unlock(
params.optionId,
params.closingPrice,
publisherSignInfo.timestamp,
params.isAbove
)
{} catch Error(string memory reason) {
emit FailUnlock(params.optionId, params.targetContract, reason);
continue;
} | function _debit(uint256 _amountLD, uint256 _minAmountLD, uint32 _dstEid)
internal
override
returns (uint256 amountSentLD, uint256 amountReceivedLD)
{
(amountSentLD, amountReceivedLD) = _debitView(_amountLD, _minAmountLD, _dstEid);
uint256 shares = sharesByUsd(amountSentLD);
_burnShares(msg.sender, shares);
_setTotalUs... | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | HIGH | 2 | |
HIGH severity: Math error in Dynamo4626#\_claimable_fees_available will lead to fees or strategy lockup. **Details**
[Dynamo4626.vy#L428-L438](https://github.com/DynamoFinance/vault/blob/c331ffefadec7406829fc9f2e7f4ee7631bef6b3/contracts/Dynamo4626.vy#L428-L438)
fee_percentage: uint256 = YIELD_FEE_PERCENTAGE
... | fee_percentage: uint256 = YIELD_FEE_PERCENTAGE
if _yield == FeeType.PROPOSER:
fee_percentage = PROPOSER_FEE_PERCENTAGE
elif _yield == FeeType.BOTH:
fee_percentage += PROPOSER_FEE_PERCENTAGE
elif _yield != FeeType.YIELD:
assert False, "Invalid FeeType!" | (, uint256 feeAmount,) = IMarketMakerV1_2(market).buyFor(
buyer,
buys[i].investmentAmount,
buys[i].outcomeIndex,
buys[i].minOutcomeTokensToBuy,
extraFeeDecimal,
feeProfileId
);
totalFees += feeAmount;
}
if (totalInvestment > 0 && (data.length > 0 || affiliate != address(0x0))) {
@> emit BuyWithData(buyer, affilia... | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | HIGH | 2 | |
HIGH severity: MarketMaker.sol is vulnerable to inflation attacks. **Details**
[FundingMath.sol#L21-L37](https://github.com/SportsFI-UBet/ubet-contracts-v1/blob/2766b47bed2cf027e29053af2afc4d35256747a5/contracts/funding/FundingMath.sol#L21-L37)
function calcFunding(uint256 collateralAdded, uint256 totalShares, u... | function calcFunding(uint256 collateralAdded, uint256 totalShares, uint256 poolValue)
internal
pure
returns (uint256 sharesMinted)
{
if (totalShares == 0) {
// funding when LP pool is empty
sharesMinted = collateralAdded;
} else {
// mint LP tokens proportional to how much value the new investment
// brings to the pool | pg: PregenInfo = empty(PregenInfo)
if len(pregen_info) > 0:
pg = _abi_decode(pregen_info, PregenInfo)
else:
#Info not provided, compute it expensively
pg.approx_params_swapExactYtForPt = self.default_approx_params()
pg.approx_params_swapExactTokenForPt = self.default_approx_params()
ytToPTL: uint256 = 0
pg.mint_returns... | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | HIGH | 2 | |
HIGH severity: After migration, the old MarketFundingPool contract will fail to correctly distribute fees to new MarketFundingPool. **Details**
[FundingPool.sol#L135-L142](https://github.com/SportsFI-UBet/ubet-contracts-v1/blob/2766b47bed2cf027e29053af2afc4d35256747a5/contracts/funding/FundingPool.sol#L135-L142)
... | function _beforeTokenTransfer(address from, address to, uint256 amount) internal override {
if (from != address(0)) {
// LP tokens being transferred away from a funder - any fees that
// have accumulated so far due to trading activity should be given
// to the original owner for the period of time he held the LP
// tok... | uint256 vestIndexLength = vests.length;
if (vesting[msg.sender].length < vestIndexLength) {
revert InvalidLength();
} | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | HIGH | 2 | |
HIGH severity: Precision error in \_fetchTWAP causes vesting to be free after initial lockdrop period. **Details**
[BlueberryStaking.sol#L830-L843](https://github.com/Blueberryfi/blueberry-staking/blob/efaf7fc690e38914ba475d5ac61a4d0bd3f45c0d/src/BlueberryStaking.sol#L830-L843)
// Adjust for decimals
if (BLB_... | if (blbIsToken0) {
return FullMath.mulDiv(_priceX96, 10 ** (18 + BLB_DECIMALS stableDecimals), 2 ** 96);
} else {
uint256 inversePrice = FullMath.mulDiv(_priceX96, 10 ** (18 - BLB_DECIMALS + stableDecimals), 2 ** 96);
return 10**36 / inversePrice;
} | function claim(
address to,
uint256 amount,
bytes32[] calldata proof
) external {
// Throw if address has already claimed tokens
require(!hasClaimed[to], "ALREADY_CLAIMED");
// Verify merkle proof, or revert if not in tree
bytes32 leaf = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(to, amount));
bool isValidLeaf = MerkleProof.verify(pr... | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | HIGH | 2 | |
MEDIUM severity: It is impossible to complete any vest unless all vests are mature. **Details**
[BlueberryStaking.sol#L328-L331](https://github.com/Blueberryfi/blueberry-staking/blob/efaf7fc690e38914ba475d5ac61a4d0bd3f45c0d/src/BlueberryStaking.sol#L328-L331)
uint256 vestIndexLength = vests.length;
if (vestin... | uint256 vestIndexLength = vests.length;
if (vesting[msg.sender].length < vestIndexLength) {
revert InvalidLength();
} | function calcFunding(uint256 collateralAdded, uint256 totalShares, uint256 poolValue)
internal
pure
returns (uint256 sharesMinted)
{
if (totalShares == 0) {
// funding when LP pool is empty
sharesMinted = collateralAdded;
} else {
// mint LP tokens proportional to how much value the new investment
// brings to the pool | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | MEDIUM | 2 | |
MEDIUM severity: Rewards will be permanently lost for ibToken with no deposits. **Details**
[BlueberryStaking.sol#L482-L485](https://github.com/Blueberryfi/blueberry-staking/blob/efaf7fc690e38914ba475d5ac61a4d0bd3f45c0d/src/BlueberryStaking.sol#L482-L485)
function rewardPerToken(address _ibToken) public view retu... | function rewardPerToken(address _ibToken) public view returns (uint256) {
if (totalSupply[_ibToken] == 0) {
return rewardPerTokenStored[_ibToken];
} | function _accrueInterest(MarketParams memory marketParams, Id id) internal {
uint256 elapsed = block.timestamp - market[id].lastUpdate;
if (elapsed == 0) return;
if (marketParams.irm != address(0)) {
@> uint256 borrowRate = IIrm(marketParams.irm).borrowRate(marketParams, market[id]);
@> uint256 inter... | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | MEDIUM | 2 | |
HIGH severity: Malicious proposer can use pregen_info to drain vault assets through sandwich attack. **Details**
[AdapterVault.vy#L662](https://github.com/adapter-fi/AdapterVault/blob/3c2895a69ad5eb2c4be16d454f63a6f2f074f351/contracts/AdapterVault.vy#L662)
self._balanceAdapters(claim_amount, pregen_info)
When cl... | pg: PregenInfo = empty(PregenInfo)
if len(pregen_info) > 0:
pg = _abi_decode(pregen_info, PregenInfo)
else:
#Info not provided, compute it expensively
pg.approx_params_swapExactYtForPt = self.default_approx_params()
pg.approx_params_swapExactTokenForPt = self.default_approx_params()
ytToPTL: uint256 = 0
pg.mint_returns... | function prepareCondition(
...
) public returns (ConditionID) {
// Limit of 256 because we use a partition array that is a number of 256 bits.
if (outcomeSlotCount < 2 || outcomeSlotCount > 255) revert InvalidOutcomeSlotsAmount();
// If not prepared, initialize, and emit the event, otherwise just return existing condi... | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | HIGH | 2 | |
HIGH severity: Failure to pass \_withdraw_only to \_getBalanceTXs allows any withdrawing user to drain vault assets through sandwich attack. **Details**
[AdapterVault.vy#L1045-L1060](https://github.com/adapter-fi/AdapterVault/blob/3c2895a69ad5eb2c4be16d454f63a6f2f074f351/contracts/AdapterVault.vy#L1045-L1060)
def... | def _balanceAdapters( _target_asset_balance: uint256, pregen_info: DynArray[Bytes[4096], MAX_ADAPTERS], _withdraw_only : bool = False, _max_txs: uint8 = MAX_BALTX_DEPOSIT ):
# Make sure we have enough assets to send to _receiver.
txs: BalanceTX[MAX_ADAPTERS] = empty(BalanceTX[MAX_ADAPTERS])
blocked_adapters: address[MA... | try
optionsContract.unlock(
params.optionId,
params.closingPrice,
publisherSignInfo.timestamp,
params.isAbove
)
{} catch Error(string memory reason) {
emit FailUnlock(params.optionId, params.targetContract, reason);
continue;
} | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | HIGH | 2 | |
MEDIUM severity: ADAPTER_BREAKS_LOSS_POINT is too tight for volatile assets leading to near constant adapter blocking. **Details**
[FundsAllocator.vy#L14](https://github.com/adapter-fi/AdapterVault/blob/3c2895a69ad5eb2c4be16d454f63a6f2f074f351/contracts/FundsAllocator.vy#L14)
ADAPTER_BREAKS_LOSS_POINT : constant(... | adapter_brakes_limit : uint256 = adapter.last_value - convert(convert(adapter.last_value, decimal) * ADAPTER_BREAKS_LOSS_POINT, uint256)
if adapter.current < adapter_brakes_limit:
# We've lost value in this adapter! Don't give it more money!
blocked_adapters[blocked_pos] = adapter.adapter
blocked_pos += 1
adapter.delta... | if (
!Validator.verifyMarketDirection(
params,
queuedTrade,
optionInfo.signer
)
) {
emit FailUnlock(
params.optionId,
params.targetContract,
"Router: Wrong market direction"
);
continue;
} | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | MEDIUM | 2 | |
MEDIUM severity: Withdraw and deposit methodology leads to valuation exploits under certain circumstances. **Details**
[FundsAllocator.vy#L107-L117](https://github.com/adapter-fi/AdapterVault/blob/3c2895a69ad5eb2c4be16d454f63a6f2f074f351/contracts/FundsAllocator.vy#L107-L117)
for pos in range(MAX_ADAPTERS):
... | elif adapter.current > 0:
withdraw : uint256 = min(target_withdraw_balance, adapter.current)
target_withdraw_balance = target_withdraw_balance - withdraw
adapter.delta = convert(withdraw, int256) * -1
if adapter.delta != 0:
adapter_assets_allocated += convert(adapter.delta * -1, uint256) # TODO : eliminate adapter_... | function calcFunding(uint256 collateralAdded, uint256 totalShares, uint256 poolValue)
internal
pure
returns (uint256 sharesMinted)
{
if (totalShares == 0) {
// funding when LP pool is empty
sharesMinted = collateralAdded;
} else {
// mint LP tokens proportional to how much value the new investment
// brings to the pool | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | MEDIUM | 2 | |
MEDIUM severity: PT donation attack will DOS spell deposit permanently. **Details**
[PendleSpell.sol#L128-L137](https://github.com/Blueberryfi/blueberry-core/blob/d0ed24769704cf5d9a8b0616cf534f29db32f6ca/contracts/spell/PendleSpell.sol#L128-L137)
(uint256 ptAmount, , ) = IPendleRouter(_pendleRouter).swapExactToke... | (uint256 ptAmount, , ) = IPendleRouter(_pendleRouter).swapExactTokenForPt(
address(this),
market,
minPtOut,
params,
input,
limitOrder
); | elif adapter.current > 0:
withdraw : uint256 = min(target_withdraw_balance, adapter.current)
target_withdraw_balance = target_withdraw_balance - withdraw
adapter.delta = convert(withdraw, int256) * -1
if adapter.delta != 0:
adapter_assets_allocated += convert(adapter.delta * -1, uint256) # TODO : eliminate adapter_... | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | MEDIUM | 2 | |
LOW severity: Events in BatchBet can be spoofed using custom pool/market. **Details**
[BatchBet.sol#L89-L111](https://github.com/SportsFI-UBet/ubet-contracts-v1/blob/7b61ff6631091056be51bf0bd88377560f6986f7/contracts/markets/BatchBet.sol#L89-L111)
for (uint256 i = 0; i < buys.length; i++) {
@> addres... | (, uint256 feeAmount,) = IMarketMakerV1_2(market).buyFor(
buyer,
buys[i].investmentAmount,
buys[i].outcomeIndex,
buys[i].minOutcomeTokensToBuy,
extraFeeDecimal,
feeProfileId
);
totalFees += feeAmount;
}
if (totalInvestment > 0 && (data.length > 0 || affiliate != address(0x0))) {
@> emit BuyWithData(buyer, affilia... | (uint256 ptAmount, , ) = IPendleRouter(_pendleRouter).swapExactTokenForPt(
address(this),
market,
minPtOut,
params,
input,
limitOrder
); | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | LOW | 2 | |
HIGH severity: BloomPool#redeemBorrower fails to decrement \_idToTotalBorrowed leading to large portions of borrower funds being permanently trapped in the contract. **Details**
[BloomPool.sol#L133-L136](https://github.com/Blueberryfi/bloom-v2/blob/87a60380331cc914be41ad57691f08b532a4d6fb/src/BloomPool.sol#L133-L136)
... | _idToCollateral[id].assetAmount -= uint128(reward);
_tbyBorrowerReturns[id] -= reward;
_borrowerAmounts[msg.sender][id] -= borrowAmount; | function getTargetBalance()
public
view
returns (AmmMath.TargetContext memory targetContext, uint256[] memory fairPriceDecimals)
{
// The logic is such that any excess collateral is always returned to the parent
uint256 localReserves = reserves();
assert(localReserves == 0);
function buyFor(
...
) public returns (uint... | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | HIGH | 2 | |
HIGH severity: BloomPool#\_normalize price will cause severe mis-pricing for RWAs that are not 18 dp. **Details**
[BloomPool.sol#L349-L351](https://github.com/Blueberryfi/bloom-v2/blob/87a60380331cc914be41ad57691f08b532a4d6fb/src/BloomPool.sol#L349-L351)
uint256 totalValue = (existingCollateral.mulWad(startPrice)... | uint256 totalValue = (existingCollateral.mulWad(startPrice) + amount.mulWad(currentPrice)) / _rwaScalingFactor;
uint256 totalCollateral = existingCollateral + amount;
return uint128(totalValue.divWad(totalCollateral)); | function _reevaluateGainsOnPool(bool force) private returns (uint256 fees) {
uint256 lastBlock = lastFeeEvaluationBlock;
uint256 period = feeEvaluationBlockPeriod;
if (!force && (block.number - lastBlock <= period)) return fees;
lastFeeEvaluationBlock = uint64(block.number);
uint256 poolValue = getPoolValue();
if (poo... | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | HIGH | 2 | |
HIGH severity: Malicious borrower can repeatedly fill then kill orders to permanently lock funds of lenders and other borrowers. **Details**
[Orderbook.sol#L118-L133](https://github.com/Blueberryfi/bloom-v2/blob/87a60380331cc914be41ad57691f08b532a4d6fb/src/Orderbook.sol#L118-L133)
function killBorrowerMatch(addre... | uint256 len = matches.length;
for (uint256 i = 0; i != len; ++i) {
if (matches[i].borrower == msg.sender) {
lenderAmount = uint256(matches[i].lCollateral);
borrowerReturn = uint256(matches[i].bCollateral);
// Zero out the match order to preserve the array's order
matches[i] = MatchOrder({lCollateral: 0, bCollateral: 0,... | uint256 transferTokenXAmount = tokenXAmount > ll.amount
? ll.amount
: tokenXAmount; | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | HIGH | 2 | |
HIGH severity: Yield spread cannot be decrease without causing significant loss to the stUSDC pool. **Details**
[StUsdc.sol#L313-L324](https://github.com/stakeup-protocol/stakeup-contracts/blob/b4d8a83e9455efb8c7543a0fc62b5aea598c7f49/src/token/StUsdc.sol#L313-L324)
function _liveTbyValue(IBloomPool pool) interna... | function _liveTbyValue(IBloomPool pool) internal view returns (uint256 value) {
uint256 startingId = lastRedeemedTbyId();
// Because we start at type(uint256).max, we need to increment and overflow to 0.
unchecked {
startingId++;
}
uint256 lastMintedId = pool.lastMintedId();
if (lastMintedId == type(uint256).max) retur... | function prepareCondition(
...
) public returns (ConditionID) {
// Limit of 256 because we use a partition array that is a number of 256 bits.
if (outcomeSlotCount < 2 || outcomeSlotCount > 255) revert InvalidOutcomeSlotsAmount();
// If not prepared, initialize, and emit the event, otherwise just return existing condi... | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | HIGH | 2 | |
HIGH severity: The yield distribution methodology for stUSDC#poke will lead to substantial loss of yield due to MEV for both stUSDC and StakeUpStaking. **Details**
[StUsdc.sol#L166-L185](https://github.com/stakeup-protocol/stakeup-contracts/blob/b4d8a83e9455efb8c7543a0fc62b5aea598c7f49/src/token/StUsdc.sol#L166-L185)
... | uint256 globalShares_ = _globalShares;
uint256 protocolValue = _protocolValue(pool);
uint256 newUsdPerShare = protocolValue.divWad(globalShares_);
uint256 lastUsdPerShare = _lastUsdPerShare;
if (newUsdPerShare > lastUsdPerShare) {
uint256 yieldPerShare = newUsdPerShare - lastUsdPerShare;
// Calculate performance fee
u... | function _beforeTokenTransfer(address from, address to, uint256 amount) internal override {
if (from != address(0)) {
// LP tokens being transferred away from a funder - any fees that
// have accumulated so far due to trading activity should be given
// to the original owner for the period of time he held the LP
// tok... | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | HIGH | 2 | |
HIGH severity: Shares of stUSDC can be lost/gained during cross chain transfers due to differing conversion rates across chains. **Details**
[StUsdcLite.sol#L418-L428](https://github.com/stakeup-protocol/stakeup-contracts/blob/b4d8a83e9455efb8c7543a0fc62b5aea598c7f49/src/token/StUsdcLite.sol#L418-L428)
function _... | function _debit(uint256 _amountLD, uint256 _minAmountLD, uint32 _dstEid)
internal
override
returns (uint256 amountSentLD, uint256 amountReceivedLD)
{
(amountSentLD, amountReceivedLD) = _debitView(_amountLD, _minAmountLD, _dstEid);
uint256 shares = sharesByUsd(amountSentLD);
_burnShares(msg.sender, shares);
_setTotalUs... | function liquidatePosition(address _vault, address _target, uint256 _debtToRepay, uint256 _sharesToLiquidate)
external
{
if (msg.sender != liquidationManager) {
revert OnlyLiquidatorManager();
}
// Debt and collateral shares are adjusted for the liquidated account
_debtSnapshot[_target][_vault] -= _debtToRepay;
collate... | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | HIGH | 2 | |
HIGH severity: SUP rewards will be completely lost when depositing TBYs to stUSDC via wstUSDC. **Details**
[StUsdc.sol#L118-L130](https://github.com/stakeup-protocol/stakeup-contracts/blob/b4d8a83e9455efb8c7543a0fc62b5aea598c7f49/src/token/StUsdc.sol#L118-L130)
function depositTby(uint256 tbyId, uint256 amount) e... | function depositTby(uint256 tbyId, uint256 amount) external nonReentrant returns (uint256 amountMinted) {
IBloomPool pool = _bloomPool;
require(amount > 0, Errors.ZeroAmount());
require(!pool.isTbyRedeemable(tbyId), Errors.RedeemableTbyNotAllowed());
// If the token is a TBY, we need to get the current exchange rate of... | function removeCollateral(uint256 sharesToBurn)
external
whenNotPaused
returns (uint256 collateralReturned, uint256 sharesBurnt)
{
address funder = _msgSender();
// force re-evaluation because some value is exiting
_reevaluateGainsOnPool(true);
uint256[] memory noTokens = new uint256[](0);
emit FundingRemoved(funder, ... | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | HIGH | 2 | |
HIGH severity: TBY#burn incorrectly burns id 0 for all burns causing complete loss of funds for lenders. **Details**
[Tby.sol#L78-L82](https://github.com/Blueberryfi/bloom-v2/blob/87a60380331cc914be41ad57691f08b532a4d6fb/src/token/Tby.sol#L78-L82)
function burn(uint256 id, address account, uint256 amount) externa... | function burn(uint256 id, address account, uint256 amount) external onlyBloom {
_totalSupply[id] -= amount;
_burn(account, 0, amount);
emit Burn(account, id, amount);
} | function liquidatePosition(address _vault, address _target, uint256 _debtToRepay, uint256 _sharesToLiquidate)
external
{
if (msg.sender != liquidationManager) {
revert OnlyLiquidatorManager();
}
// Debt and collateral shares are adjusted for the liquidated account
_debtSnapshot[_target][_vault] -= _debtToRepay;
collate... | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | HIGH | 2 | |
MEDIUM severity: \_convertMatchOrders will fail to function properly for lenders if any borrower has canceled a matched order. **Details**
function killBorrowerMatch(address lender) external returns (uint256 lenderAmount, uint256 borrowerReturn) {
MatchOrder[] storage matches = _userMatchedOrders[lender];
... | uint256 len = matches.length;
for (uint256 i = 0; i != len; ++i) {
if (matches[i].borrower == msg.sender) {
lenderAmount = uint256(matches[i].lCollateral);
borrowerReturn = uint256(matches[i].bCollateral);
// Zero out the match order to preserve the array's order
matches[i] = MatchOrder({lCollateral: 0, bCollateral: 0,... | function prepareCondition(
...
) public returns (ConditionID) {
// Limit of 256 because we use a partition array that is a number of 256 bits.
if (outcomeSlotCount < 2 || outcomeSlotCount > 255) revert InvalidOutcomeSlotsAmount();
// If not prepared, initialize, and emit the event, otherwise just return existing condi... | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | MEDIUM | 2 | |
MEDIUM severity: In the event of a partial match inside \_convertMatchOrders, borrower funds will be over-allocated. **Details**
[BloomPool.sol#L399-L403](https://github.com/Blueberryfi/bloom-v2/blob/87a60380331cc914be41ad57691f08b532a4d6fb/src/BloomPool.sol#L399-L403)
if (lenderFunds == matches[index].lCollatera... | if (lenderFunds == matches[index].lCollateral) {
matches.pop();
} else {
matches[index].lCollateral -= uint128(lenderFunds);
} | elif adapter.current > 0:
withdraw : uint256 = min(target_withdraw_balance, adapter.current)
target_withdraw_balance = target_withdraw_balance - withdraw
adapter.delta = convert(withdraw, int256) * -1
if adapter.delta != 0:
adapter_assets_allocated += convert(adapter.delta * -1, uint256) # TODO : eliminate adapter_... | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | MEDIUM | 2 | |
MEDIUM severity: Using address rather than bytes32 for destinationAddress in wstUsdcBridge#bridgeWstUsdc causes incompatibility with chains that utilize 32 byte addresses. **Details**
[WstUsdcBridge.sol#L44-L49](https://github.com/stakeup-protocol/stakeup-contracts/blob/b4d8a83e9455efb8c7543a0fc62b5aea598c7f49/src/mes... | function bridgeWstUsdc(
address destinationAddress, <- @audit uses address instead of bytes32
uint256 wstUsdcAmount,
uint32 dstEid,
LzSettings calldata settings
) external payable returns (LzBridgeReceipt memory bridgingReceipt) { | if (blbIsToken0) {
return FullMath.mulDiv(_priceX96, 10 ** (18 + BLB_DECIMALS stableDecimals), 2 ** 96);
} else {
uint256 inversePrice = FullMath.mulDiv(_priceX96, 10 ** (18 - BLB_DECIMALS + stableDecimals), 2 ** 96);
return 10**36 / inversePrice;
} | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | MEDIUM | 2 | |
MEDIUM severity: stUSDC#deposit compares current tby price with potentially stale pool price which can lead to small yield loss for pool. **Details**
[StUsdc.sol#L154-L157](https://github.com/stakeup-protocol/stakeup-contracts/blob/b4d8a83e9455efb8c7543a0fc62b5aea598c7f49/src/token/StUsdc.sol#L154-L157)
function ... | function poke() external nonReentrant {
uint256 currentTimestamp = block.timestamp;
uint256 lastUpdate = _lastRateUpdate;
if (currentTimestamp - lastUpdate < 24 hours) return;
function depositTby(uint256 tbyId, uint256 amount) external nonReentrant returns (uint256 amountMinted) {
IBloomPool pool = _bloomPool;
require... | (uint256 ptAmount, , ) = IPendleRouter(_pendleRouter).swapExactTokenForPt(
address(this),
market,
minPtOut,
params,
input,
limitOrder
); | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | MEDIUM | 2 | |
MEDIUM severity: In the event of yield loss, yield will be double counted leading to excess fees. **Details**
[StUsdc.sol#L171-L181](https://github.com/stakeup-protocol/stakeup-contracts/blob/b4d8a83e9455efb8c7543a0fc62b5aea598c7f49/src/token/StUsdc.sol#L171-L181)
if (newUsdPerShare > lastUsdPerShare) {
u... | if (newUsdPerShare > lastUsdPerShare) {
uint256 yieldPerShare = newUsdPerShare - lastUsdPerShare;
// Calculate performance fee
uint256 fee = _calculateFee(yieldPerShare, globalShares_);
// Calculate the new total value of the protocol for users
uint256 userValue = protocolValue - fee;
newUsdPerShare = userValue.divWad(... | function _afterTokenTransfer(address from, address to, uint256 amount) internal override {
// When address other than parent gets shares, immediately eject them to
// maintain invariant that all funding is by parent
if (from == getParentPool() && to != address(0x0)) {
_removeFunding(to, amount);
}
}
function _removeFu... | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | MEDIUM | 2 | |
MEDIUM severity: SUP rewards for depositing TBYs can be gamed by depositing TBYs that are close to expiration. **Details**
[StUsdc.sol#L118-L130](https://github.com/stakeup-protocol/stakeup-contracts/blob/b4d8a83e9455efb8c7543a0fc62b5aea598c7f49/src/token/StUsdc.sol#L118-L130)
function depositTby(uint256 tbyId, u... | function depositTby(uint256 tbyId, uint256 amount) external nonReentrant returns (uint256 amountMinted) {
IBloomPool pool = _bloomPool;
require(amount > 0, Errors.ZeroAmount());
require(!pool.isTbyRedeemable(tbyId), Errors.RedeemableTbyNotAllowed());
// If the token is a TBY, we need to get the current exchange rate of... | uint256 vestIndexLength = vests.length;
if (vesting[msg.sender].length < vestIndexLength) {
revert InvalidLength();
} | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | MEDIUM | 2 | |
HIGH severity: Donations to MarketMaker will completely freeze all buy/sell capability of market. **Details**
[MarketMaker.sol#L672-L679](https://github.com/SportsFI-UBet/ubet-contracts-v1/blob/64157824f67d6000588ae4235a49ccd24dede5c3/contracts/markets/MarketMaker.sol#L672-L679)
function getTargetBalance()
... | function getTargetBalance()
public
view
returns (AmmMath.TargetContext memory targetContext, uint256[] memory fairPriceDecimals)
{
// The logic is such that any excess collateral is always returned to the parent
uint256 localReserves = reserves();
assert(localReserves == 0);
function buyFor(
...
) public returns (uint... | uint256 transferTokenXAmount = tokenXAmount > ll.amount
? ll.amount
: tokenXAmount; | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | HIGH | 2 | |
HIGH severity: Frontrunning or reorg attacks can be used to corrupt initial pricing data to drain funds from MarketMaker. **Details**
[ConditionalTokens.sol#L92-L131](https://github.com/SportsFI-UBet/ubet-contracts-v1/blob/64157824f67d6000588ae4235a49ccd24dede5c3/contracts/conditions/ConditionalTokens.sol#L92-L131)
... | function prepareCondition(
...
) public returns (ConditionID) {
// Limit of 256 because we use a partition array that is a number of 256 bits.
if (outcomeSlotCount < 2 || outcomeSlotCount > 255) revert InvalidOutcomeSlotsAmount();
// If not prepared, initialize, and emit the event, otherwise just return existing condi... | adapter_brakes_limit : uint256 = adapter.last_value - convert(convert(adapter.last_value, decimal) * ADAPTER_BREAKS_LOSS_POINT, uint256)
if adapter.current < adapter_brakes_limit:
# We've lost value in this adapter! Don't give it more money!
blocked_adapters[blocked_pos] = adapter.adapter
blocked_pos += 1
adapter.delta... | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | HIGH | 2 | |
HIGH severity: Sending child shares before burning shares allow reentrancy vulnerability in ParentFundingPool#removeChildShares. **Details**
[MarketMaker.sol#L268-L274](https://github.com/SportsFI-UBet/ubet-contracts-v1/blob/64157824f67d6000588ae4235a49ccd24dede5c3/contracts/markets/MarketMaker.sol#L268-L274)
... | function _afterTokenTransfer(address from, address to, uint256 amount) internal override {
// When address other than parent gets shares, immediately eject them to
// maintain invariant that all funding is by parent
if (from == getParentPool() && to != address(0x0)) {
_removeFunding(to, amount);
}
}
function _removeFu... | function depositTby(uint256 tbyId, uint256 amount) external nonReentrant returns (uint256 amountMinted) {
IBloomPool pool = _bloomPool;
require(amount > 0, Errors.ZeroAmount());
require(!pool.isTbyRedeemable(tbyId), Errors.RedeemableTbyNotAllowed());
// If the token is a TBY, we need to get the current exchange rate of... | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | HIGH | 2 | |
MEDIUM severity: Fees will be lost in the event that a user withdraws from MarketFundingPool and there isn't enough reserves to cover fees. **Details**
[ParentFundingPool.sol#L631-L646](https://github.com/SportsFI-UBet/ubet-contracts-v1/blob/64157824f67d6000588ae4235a49ccd24dede5c3/contracts/funding/ParentFundingPool.... | function _reevaluateGainsOnPool(bool force) private returns (uint256 fees) {
uint256 lastBlock = lastFeeEvaluationBlock;
uint256 period = feeEvaluationBlockPeriod;
if (!force && (block.number - lastBlock <= period)) return fees;
lastFeeEvaluationBlock = uint64(block.number);
uint256 poolValue = getPoolValue();
if (poo... | function burn(uint256 id, address account, uint256 amount) external onlyBloom {
_totalSupply[id] -= amount;
_burn(account, 0, amount);
emit Burn(account, id, amount);
} | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | MEDIUM | 2 | |
MEDIUM severity: ParentFundingPool#removeCollateral fails to update valueHighPoint resulting in lost fees. **Details**
[ParentFundingPool.sol#L233-L251](https://github.com/SportsFI-UBet/ubet-contracts-v1/blob/64157824f67d6000588ae4235a49ccd24dede5c3/contracts/funding/ParentFundingPool.sol#L233-L251)
function remo... | function removeCollateral(uint256 sharesToBurn)
external
whenNotPaused
returns (uint256 collateralReturned, uint256 sharesBurnt)
{
address funder = _msgSender();
// force re-evaluation because some value is exiting
_reevaluateGainsOnPool(true);
uint256[] memory noTokens = new uint256[](0);
emit FundingRemoved(funder, ... | function _liveTbyValue(IBloomPool pool) internal view returns (uint256 value) {
uint256 startingId = lastRedeemedTbyId();
// Because we start at type(uint256).max, we need to increment and overflow to 0.
unchecked {
startingId++;
}
uint256 lastMintedId = pool.lastMintedId();
if (lastMintedId == type(uint256).max) retur... | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | MEDIUM | 2 | |
HIGH severity: `RewardDistributor#claim` will revert for tokens with expired locks leading to loss of rewards. **Details**
[RewardsDistributor.sol#L277-L287](https://github.com/hyperstable/contracts/blob/35db5f2d3c8c1adac30758357fbbcfe55f0144a3/src/governance/RewardsDistributor.sol#L277-L287)
function claim(u... | function claim(uint256 _tokenId) external returns (uint256) {
if (block.timestamp >= time_cursor) _checkpoint_total_supply();
uint256 _last_token_time = last_token_time;
_last_token_time = _last_token_time / WEEK * WEEK;
uint256 amount = _claim(_tokenId, voting_escrow, _last_token_time);
if (amount != 0) {
@> ... | function rewardPerToken(address _ibToken) public view returns (uint256) {
if (totalSupply[_ibToken] == 0) {
return rewardPerTokenStored[_ibToken];
} | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | HIGH | 2 | |
MEDIUM severity: `PositionManager#liquidatePosition` fails to update vaultDebt and vaultCollateral. **Details**
**First discovered by Dev team during audit period**
[PositionManager.sol#L169-L185](https://github.com/hyperstable/contracts/blob/35db5f2d3c8c1adac30758357fbbcfe55f0144a3/src/core/PositionManager.sol#L169-... | function liquidatePosition(address _vault, address _target, uint256 _debtToRepay, uint256 _sharesToLiquidate)
external
{
if (msg.sender != liquidationManager) {
revert OnlyLiquidatorManager();
}
// Debt and collateral shares are adjusted for the liquidated account
_debtSnapshot[_target][_vault] -= _debtToRepay;
collate... | elif adapter.current > 0:
withdraw : uint256 = min(target_withdraw_balance, adapter.current)
target_withdraw_balance = target_withdraw_balance - withdraw
adapter.delta = convert(withdraw, int256) * -1
if adapter.delta != 0:
adapter_assets_allocated += convert(adapter.delta * -1, uint256) # TODO : eliminate adapter_... | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | MEDIUM | 2 | |
MEDIUM severity: Airdrop supply methodology has been changed leading to excess token emissions. **Details**
[MerkleClaim.sol#L48-L69](https://github.com/velodrome-finance/v1/blob/de6b2a19b5174013112ad41f07cf98352bfe1f24/contracts/redeem/MerkleClaim.sol#L48-L69)
function claim(
address to,
... | function claim(
address to,
uint256 amount,
bytes32[] calldata proof
) external {
// Throw if address has already claimed tokens
require(!hasClaimed[to], "ALREADY_CLAIMED");
// Verify merkle proof, or revert if not in tree
bytes32 leaf = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(to, amount));
bool isValidLeaf = MerkleProof.verify(pr... | function _debit(uint256 _amountLD, uint256 _minAmountLD, uint32 _dstEid)
internal
override
returns (uint256 amountSentLD, uint256 amountReceivedLD)
{
(amountSentLD, amountReceivedLD) = _debitView(_amountLD, _minAmountLD, _dstEid);
uint256 shares = sharesByUsd(amountSentLD);
_burnShares(msg.sender, shares);
_setTotalUs... | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | MEDIUM | 2 | |
MEDIUM severity: Curve gauge rewards can be griefed. **Details**
[Gauge.sol#L123-L131](https://github.com/hyperstable/contracts/blob/35db5f2d3c8c1adac30758357fbbcfe55f0144a3/src/governance/Gauge.sol#L123-L131)
function claimFees() external lock {
@> require(msg.sender == IVotingEscrow(_ve).team(), "o... | def claim_rewards(_addr: address = msg.sender, _receiver: address = ZERO_ADDRESS):
"""
@notice Claim available reward tokens for _addr
@param _addr Address to claim for
@param _receiver Address to transfer rewards to - if set to
ZERO_ADDRESS, uses the default reward receiver
for the caller
"""
if _receiver != ZERO_ADDR... | function _beforeTokenTransfer(address from, address to, uint256 amount) internal override {
if (from != address(0)) {
// LP tokens being transferred away from a funder - any fees that
// have accumulated so far due to trading activity should be given
// to the original owner for the period of time he held the LP
// tok... | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | MEDIUM | 2 | |
MEDIUM severity: `AdaptiveIRM#_curve` multiples instead of dividing leading to "V" shaped curve instead of expected "L" shaped curve. **Details**
[AdaptiveIRM.sol#L110-L115](https://github.com/hyperstable/contracts/blob/35db5f2d3c8c1adac30758357fbbcfe55f0144a3/src/libraries/AdaptiveIRM.sol#L110-L115)
function... | function _curve(int256 _rateAtTarget, int256 err) private pure returns (int256) {
// Non negative because 1 - 1/C >= 0, C - 1 >= 0.
@> int256 coeff = err < 0 ? INT_WAD - INT_WAD.sMulWad(CURVE_STEEPNESS) : CURVE_STEEPNESS - INT_WAD;
// Non negative if _rateAtTarget >= 0 because if err < 0, coeff <= 1.
return (coeff... | function calcFunding(uint256 collateralAdded, uint256 totalShares, uint256 poolValue)
internal
pure
returns (uint256 sharesMinted)
{
if (totalShares == 0) {
// funding when LP pool is empty
sharesMinted = collateralAdded;
} else {
// mint LP tokens proportional to how much value the new investment
// brings to the pool | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | MEDIUM | 2 | |
MEDIUM severity: `AdaptiveIRM` has been integrated incorrectly and will not work as expected. **Details**
[Morpho.sol#L483-L509](https://github.com/morpho-org/morpho-blue/blob/eb65770e12c4cdae5836c0027e35b9c82794c3eb/src/Morpho.sol#L483-L509)
function _accrueInterest(MarketParams memory marketParams, Id id) i... | function _accrueInterest(MarketParams memory marketParams, Id id) internal {
uint256 elapsed = block.timestamp - market[id].lastUpdate;
if (elapsed == 0) return;
if (marketParams.irm != address(0)) {
@> uint256 borrowRate = IIrm(marketParams.irm).borrowRate(marketParams, market[id]);
@> uint256 inter... | uint256 len = matches.length;
for (uint256 i = 0; i != len; ++i) {
if (matches[i].borrower == msg.sender) {
lenderAmount = uint256(matches[i].lCollateral);
borrowerReturn = uint256(matches[i].bCollateral);
// Zero out the match order to preserve the array's order
matches[i] = MatchOrder({lCollateral: 0, bCollateral: 0,... | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | MEDIUM | 2 | |
HIGH severity: No storage gap for upgradeable contracts. **Description:**
1. `__gap` is used in base upgradable contracts to avoid storage clashes while using inheritance.
2. It was observed that both `ERC721ACollection.sol`and `ERC20Token.sol`were missing the `\_\_gap`variable which could lead to... | uint256[50]private \_\_gap;
\ | function decimals() external pure returns (uint8 dec) {
dec = 8;
}
uint256 public constant TARGET_DIGITS = 18;
function _scalePriceByDigits(uint256 _price, uint256 _answerDigits) internal pure returns (uint256 scaledPrice) {
if (_answerDigits == TARGET_DIGITS) {
scaledPrice = _price;
} else if (_a... | random | Solodit | HIGH | 2 | |
HIGH severity: `initialize`functions not protected. **Description:**
ERC20Token is an upgradeable contract that does not protect its initialize functions from inherited contracts.
**Recommendations:**
Add constructor to ERC20 contract as mentioned in the OpenZeppelin docs... | /// @custom:oz-upgrades-unsafe-allow constructor
constructor(){
\_disableInitializers();
}
\ | assert(!registry.hasRole(REMOVE_TOKEN_FROM_ALLOWED_LIST_ROLE, address(this)));
assert(!registry.hasRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, address(this))); | random | Solodit | HIGH | 2 | |
HIGH severity: Basic validation missing on `mint`and `mintTo`. **Description:**
Observe that both `mint`and `mintTo`functions are missing basic validation for `to`address,amount/quantity.
**Recommendations:**
Add below to mint &mintTo function at ERC20Token.sol
\
Add below to mint &mintTo function at ERC721AColl... | require(to!=address(0)&&amount>0,""Incorrect params"");
\
require(quantity>0 &&to!=address(0),""Incorrect params"");// for mintTo require(quantity>0,""Incorrect params"");// for mint
\ | function addLock(
bytes32 Id,
bytes32 hashlock,
uint48 timelock
) external _exists(Id) _validTimelock(timelock) nonReentrant returns (bytes32) {
HTLC storage htlc = contracts[Id];
if (htlc.claimed == 2 || htlc.claimed == 3) revert AlreadyClaimed();
if (msg.sender == htlc.sender) {
if (ht... | random | Solodit | HIGH | 2 | |
MEDIUM severity: Specified `minOutput` will remain locked in `LSSVMRouter::swapNFTsForSpecificNFTsThroughETH`. **Description:**
The Cyfrin team understands that `LSSVMRouter` is slightly out of scope for this audit, given that it is intended to be deprecated and replaced by `VeryFastRouter`; however, a slightly modifie... | diff --git a/src/test/interfaces/ILSSVMPairFactoryMainnet.sol b/src/test/interfaces/ILSSVMPairFactoryMainnet.sol
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3cdea5b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/interfaces/ILSSVMPairFactoryMainnet.sol
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
+
+import {IERC721}... | /// handle a received message
function _ccipReceive(Client.Any2EVMMessage memory any2EvmMessage) internal override {
bytes memory message = abi.decode(any2EvmMessage.data, (bytes)); // abi-decoding of the sent text
BridgeSendPayload memory payload = Codec.decodeBridgeSendPayload(message);
bytes32 _hash = ke... | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | MEDIUM | 2 | |
HIGH severity: Malicious pair can re-enter `VeryFastRouter` to drain original caller's funds. **Description:**
[`VeryFastRouter::swap`](https://github.com/sudoswap/lssvm2/blob/78d38753b2042d7813132f26e5573c6699b605ef/src/VeryFastRouter.sol#L266) is the main entry point for a user to perform a batch of sell and buy orde... | diff --git a/src/VeryFastRouter.sol b/src/VeryFastRouter.sol
index 16047b9..2bd3797 100644
--- a/src/VeryFastRouter.sol
+++ b/src/VeryFastRouter.sol
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ contract VeryFastRouter {
error VeryFastRouter__InvalidPair();
error VeryFastRouter__BondingCurveQuoteError();
+ event vfr_log_named_uint ... | File: factory/PoolFactory.sol
43: event DaoPoolDeployed(
File: gov/ERC721/multipliers/AbstractERC721Multiplier.sol
25: event Minted(uint256 tokenId, address to, uint256 multiplier, uint256 duration);
26: event Locked(uint256 tokenId, address sender, bool isLocked);
27: event Changed(uint256 tokenId... | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | HIGH | 2 | |
HIGH severity: Linearity assumption on the royalty can lead to denial of service. **Description:**
`VeryFastRouter::swap` relies on the internal functions [`VeryFastRouter::_findMaxFillableAmtForSell`](https://github.com/sudoswap/lssvm2/blob/78d38753b2042d7813132f26e5573c6699b605ef/src/VeryFastRouter.sol#L556) and... | VeryFastRouter.sol
576: // Perform binary search
577: while (start <= end) {
578: // We check the price to sell index + 1
579: (
580: CurveErrorCodes.Error error,
581: /* newSpotPrice */
582: ,
583: /* newDelta */
58... | function checkWalletsForList(address _from, address _to) private {
if (super.balanceOf(_from) == 0) {
removeWalletFromList(_from);
}
function removeWallet(address _address, string memory _id) public override onlyExchangeOrAbove walletExists(_address) walletBelongsToInvestor(_address, _id) returns (bool... | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | HIGH | 2 | |
HIGH severity: Possible reverts due to using stricter requirements in inner swap. **Description:**
`VeryFastRouter::swap` relies on the internal functions `VeryFastRouter::_findMaxFillableAmtForSell` and `VeryFastRouter::_findMaxFillableAmtForBuy` to find the maximum possible amount of tokens to be swapped.
The output ... | VeryFastRouter.sol
326: uint256 numItemsToFill;
327: uint256 priceToFillAt;
328:
329: {
330: // Grab royalty for calc in _findMaxFillableAmtForSell
331: (,, uint256 royaltyAmount) = order.pair.calculateRoyaltiesView(
332: ... | uint256 scaleDown = 10 ** (18 - d);
execPrice = rawExecPriceWad / scaleDown;
function _pricingFromCurveBuy(
uint256 amountInQuote,
uint256 curvePriceWad,
uint256 anchorPriceWad
) internal view returns (uint256 baseOut, uint256 execPriceWad) {
require(anchorPriceWad > 0, "anchor=0"... | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | HIGH | 2 | |
MEDIUM severity: GDACurve does not validate new spot price. **Description:**
The new spot price calculated in `GDACurve::getBuyInfo` and `GDACurve::getSellInfo` is not currently validated against `MIN_PRICE`, meaning that the price could fall below this value.
While a minimum price check is performed explicitly in `GD... | GDACurve.sol (Line 81-91)
// The new spot price is multiplied by alpha^n and divided by the time decay so future
// calculations do not need to track number of items sold or the initial time/price. This new spot price
// implicitly stores the initial price, total items sold so far, and time ela... | // new import at top
import { IVerifierProxy } from "@zaros/external/chainlink/interfaces/IVerifierProxy.sol";
function test_ImpossibleToClosePositionIfSettlementDisabledButStillLiquidatable() external {
// give naruto some tokens
uint256 USER_STARTING_BALANCE = 100_000e18;
int128 USER_POS_SIZE_DELTA = ... | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | MEDIUM | 2 | |
MEDIUM severity: Binary search implementation may not always find the optimal solution. **Description:**
`VeryFastRouter::_findMaxFillableAmtForBuy` and `VeryFastRouter::_findMaxFillableAmtForSell` utilize binary search to determine the maximum trade amount. The binary search seeks a solution in a linear, sorted space ... | function testSwapBinarySearch_audit() public{
//START_INDEX=0, END_INDEX=10
uint256[] memory nftIds;
LSSVMPair pair;
uint256 numNFTsForQuote = END_INDEX + 1;
//1. create an array of nft ids
nftIds = _getArray(START_INDEX, END_INDEX);
assertEq(nftIds.length, END_I... | // Send Relayer message
wormholeRelayer.sendPayloadToEvm{value: msg.value} (
targetChain,
targetAddress,
abi.encode(
investorDetail.investorId,
value,
msg.sender,
investorDetail.country,
investorD... | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | MEDIUM | 2 | |
HIGH severity: Owner calling `LSSVMPair::changeSpotPrice` can cause arithmetic over/underflows on later swaps. **Description:**
Changing the spot price to a value higher than the current ERC20 (or ETH) balance of the pair can cause unintended reverts in valid swap calls later on.
**Proof of Concept:**
Full proof of c... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
import "forge-std/Test.sol";
import {InvariantERC721LinearERC20} from "./InvariantERC721LinearERC20.t.sol";
import {IERC721Mintable} from "../interfaces/IERC721Mintable.sol";
contract SwapArithmeticOverflow is InvariantERC721LinearERC20 {
function setUp() p... | function lock(uint256 amount) external {
uint256 mintAmount = _GiBGTMintAmount(amount);
poolSize += amount;
_refreshiBGT(amount); //@audit should call after depositing funds
SafeTransferLib.safeTransferFrom(ibgt, msg.sender, address(this), amount);
_mint(msg.sender, mintAmount);
emit iBGTLock(ms... | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | HIGH | 2 | |
HIGH severity: Unreachable code path in `RoyaltyEngine::_getRoyaltyAndSpec`. Within `RoyaltyEngine`, `int16` values have been copied over from the manifold contract for use as enum values relating to different royalty specifications with `int16 private constant NONE = -1;` and `int16 private constant NOT_CONFIGURED = 0... | if (spec == NONE) {
return (recipients, amounts, spec, royaltyAddress, addToCache);
} | // whitelist reward distributors for transferring Karma tokens
karma.setAllowedToTransfer(address(stakeManager), true);
console.log("Whitelisted reward distributor (StakeManager)", address(stakeManager), "for transfer");
@> karma.setAllowedToTransfer(address(stakeManager), true);
console.lo... | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | HIGH | 2 | |
LOW severity: <a name="GAS-4"></a>[GAS-4] Using bools for storage incurs overhead. Use uint256(1) and uint256(2) for true/false to avoid a Gwarmaccess (100 gas), and to avoid Gsset (20000 gas) when changing from ‘false’ to ‘true’, after having been ‘true’ in the past. See [source](https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openze... | File: LSSVMPairFactory.sol
56: mapping(ICurve => bool) public bondingCurveAllowed;
57: mapping(address => bool) public override callAllowed;
60: mapping(address => mapping(address => bool)) public settingsForCollection; | function K(PoolId) internal view virtual returns (uint48) {
return 7200;
}
uint48 internal immutable _K;
function K(PoolId) internal view virtual override returns (uint48) {
return _K;
}
Mainnet
AMAMM_K_1=7200
Arbitrum
AMAMM_K_42161=345600
Base
AMAMM_K_8453=43200
Unichain
AMAMM_K_130=86400 | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | LOW | 2 | |
HIGH severity: <a name="GAS-5"></a>[GAS-5] Cache array length outside of loop. If not cached, the solidity compiler will always read the length of the array during each iteration. That is, if it is a storage array, this is an extra sload operation (100 additional extra gas for each iteration except for the first) and i... | File: LSSVMPair.sol
673: for (uint256 i; i < calls.length;) {
File: LSSVMPairERC20.sol
68: for (uint256 i; i < royaltyRecipients.length;) {
93: for (uint256 i; i < royaltyRecipients.length;) {
File: LSSVMPairETH.sol
57: for (uint256 i; i < royaltyRecipients.length;) { | /// @notice For regular EVK vaults, it transfers the specified amount of vault shares from the sender to the receiver
/// @dev For ERC721WrapperBase, transfers a proportional amount of ERC6909 tokens (calculated as totalSupply(tokenId) * amount / balanceOf(sender)) for each enabled tokenId from the sender to the receiv... | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | HIGH | 2 | |
HIGH severity: <a name="GAS-7"></a>[GAS-7] Use Custom Errors. [Source](https://blog.soliditylang.org/2021/04/21/custom-errors/)
Instead of using error strings, to reduce deployment and runtime cost, you should use Custom Errors. This would save both deployment and runtime cost.
*Instances (21)*: | File: LSSVMRouter.sol
504: require(factory.isValidPair(msg.sender), "Not pair");
506: require(factory.getPairTokenType(msg.sender) == ILSSVMPairFactoryLike.PairTokenType.ERC20, "Not ERC20 pair");
522: require(factory.isValidPair(msg.sender), "Not pair");
536: require(factory.isValidP... | require(isTokenAccepted(token), "Token not accepted");
uint256 hostingFee = calculateHostingFee(duration);
uint256 totalRequiredToken = convertAvaxToToken(
token,
avaxStakeAmount + hostingFee
);
require(amount >= totalRequiredToken, "Insufficient token");
// Transfer tokens from the user to the contract
IERC... | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | HIGH | 2 | |
LOW severity: <a name="GAS-9"></a>[GAS-9] Using `private` rather than `public` for constants, saves gas. If needed, the values can be read from the verified contract source code, or if there are multiple values there can be a single getter function that [returns a tuple](https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-08-frax/blob/... | File: bonding-curves/ExponentialCurve.sol
15: uint256 public constant MIN_PRICE = 1000000 wei;
File: bonding-curves/GDACurve.sol
21: uint256 public constant MIN_PRICE = 1 gwei; | /* snip */
// now check rate limits
bool isAmountRateLimited = _isOutboundAmountRateLimited(internalAmount);
if (!shouldQueue && isAmountRateLimited) {
revert NotEnoughCapacity(getCurrentOutboundCapacity(), amount);
}
if (shouldQueue && isAmountRateLimited) {
// emit an event to notify the user that the transfe... | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | LOW | 2 | |
HIGH severity: <a name="GAS-13"></a>[GAS-13] `internal` functions not called by the contract should be removed. If the functions are required by an interface, the contract should inherit from that interface and use the `override` keyword
*Instances (8)*: | File: lib/LSSVMPairCloner.sol
22: function cloneERC721ETHPair(
112: function cloneERC721ERC20Pair(
204: function isERC721ETHPairClone(address factory, address implementation, address query)
238: function isERC721ERC20PairClone(address factory, address implementation, address query)
274: add... | File: gov/ERC20/ERC20Gov.sol
55: for (uint256 i = 0; i < params.users.length; i++) {
File: gov/proposals/TokenSaleProposal.sol
82: for (uint256 i = 0; i < tierInitParams.length; i++) {
96: for (uint256 i = 0; i < requests.length; i++) {
102: for (uint256 i = 0; i < tierIds.length; i... | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | HIGH | 2 | |
HIGH severity: <a name="N"></a>[NMissing checks for `address(0)` when assigning values to address state variables. *Instances (4)*: | File: LSSVMPairFactory.sol
110: _caller = _NOT_ENTERED;
349: _caller = _NOT_ENTERED;
File: lib/OwnableWithTransferCallback.sol
25: _owner = initialOwner;
71: _owner = newOwner; | function _updateAllUserState(IncentivizedPoolId id, address account) internal virtual {
if(!userLiquiditySynced[id][account]) {
_syncUserLiquidity(id, account);
userLiquiditySynced[id][account] = true;
}
address[] memory _tokens = poolRewards[id];
uint256 _length = _tokens.length;
f... | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | HIGH | 2 | |
HIGH severity: <a name="N"></a>[N`require()` / `revert()` statements should have descriptive reason strings. *Instances (1)*: | File: LSSVMPairETH.sol
126: require(msg.data.length == _immutableParamsLength()); | function initiateMigration(uint256 _amount) external {
- if (_amount == 0) revert InvalidAmount();
+ if (_amount < queueDepositMin) revert InvalidAmount();
(uint256 minStakeAmount, ) = communityPool.getStakerLimits();
if (_amount < minStakeAmount) revert InvalidAmount(); | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | HIGH | 2 | |
HIGH severity: <a name="N"></a>[NEvent is missing `indexed` fields. Index event fields make the field more quickly accessible to off-chain tools that parse events. However, note that each index field costs extra gas during emission, so it's not necessarily best to index the maximum allowed per event (three fields). Eac... | File: LSSVMPair.sol
82: event SwapNFTInPair(uint256 amountIn, uint256[] ids);
83: event SwapNFTInPair(uint256 amountIn, uint256 numNFTs);
84: event SwapNFTOutPair(uint256 amountOut, uint256[] ids);
85: event SwapNFTOutPair(uint256 amountOut, uint256 numNFTs);
86: event SpotPriceUpdate(uint128 n... | function _buildBoost(
address[] calldata partnerNFTs,
uint256[] calldata partnerNFTIds
) internal returns (Boost memory newUserBoost) {
uint256 magnitude;
Boost storage userBoost = boosts[msg.sender];
if(userBoost.expiry == 0) {
...
}
else {
address[] storage nfts = userBoost.partner... | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | HIGH | 2 | |
HIGH severity: <a name="N"></a>[NConstants should be defined rather than using magic numbers. *Instances (3)*: | File: settings/Splitter.sol
23: return _getArgAddress(20);
File: settings/StandardSettings.sol
70: return _getArgUint64(40);
77: return _getArgUint64(48); | contract IncentivizedERC20 is ERC20, Owned {
...
constructor(string memory name, string memory symbol, PoolId id) ERC20(name, symbol, 18) Owned(msg.sender) {
hook = msg.sender;
poolId = id;
}
...
}
function test_LessThan18Decimals() public {
MockERC20 token0WithLessDecimals = new Mo... | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | HIGH | 2 | |
HIGH severity: <a name="N"></a>[NFunctions not used internally could be marked external. *Instances (28)*: | File: LSSVMPair.sol
323: function getAssetRecipient() public view returns (address payable) {
344: function getFeeRecipient() public view returns (address payable _feeRecipient) {
File: LSSVMPairFactory.sol
342: function openLock() public {
347: function closeLock() public {
499: function getS... | function setPoolFee(uint16 _poolFee) external {
require(ISolidlyV2Factory(factory).isFeeSetter(msg.sender) || msg.sender == copilot, 'UA');
if (msg.sender == copilot) {
require(_poolFee >= ISolidlyV2Factory(factory).minFee() && !copilotRevoked); // minimum fee enforced for copilot
} else {
r... | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | HIGH | 2 | |
HIGH severity: <a name="N"></a>[NTypos. *Instances (84)*: | File: LSSVMPair.sol
- 52: // Sudoswap Royalty Engine
+ 52: // @notice Sudoswap Royalty Engine
- 60: // However, this should NOT be assumed, as bonding curves may use spotPrice in different ways.
+ 60: // @notice However, this should NOT be assumed, as bonding curves may use spotPrice in different ways... | modifier timeTransitions(uint256 marketId) {
if (block.timestamp > markets[marketId].closesAtTimestamp && markets[marketId].state == MarketState.open) {
_nextState(marketId);
}
_;
}
function testTradeRightAtMarketClose() public {
uint256 marketId = _createTestMarket();
// Get marke... | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | HIGH | 2 | |
LOW severity: <a name=""></a>`abi.encodePacked()` should not be used with dynamic types when passing the result to a hash function such as `keccak256()`. Use `abi.encode()` instead which will pad items to 32 bytes, which will [prevent hash collisions](https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.8.13/abi-spec.html#non-standard-... | File: property-checking/MerklePropertyChecker.sol
25: if (!MerkleProof.verify(proof, root, keccak256(abi.encodePacked(ids[i])))) { | while (toUnbondRemaining != 0) {
// Process vault[i]...
++i;
if (i >= vaults.length) i = 0;
}
validatorWithdrawalIndex = i; // @audit This happens regardless of whether unbonding occurred on the last processed vault or not | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | LOW | 2 | |
LOW severity: <a name=""></a>Empty Function Body - Consider commenting why. *Instances (32)*: | File: LSSVMPairETH.sol
130: function _preCallCheck(address) internal pure override {}
File: LSSVMPairFactory.sol
373: } catch {}
375: } catch {}
379: } catch {}
384: } catch {}
385: } catch {}
390: } catch {}
391: } catch {}
398: ... | it('Should demonstrate orphaned entity relationships after role removal', async function() {
const [owner, entityOwner, operator, resource] = await hre.ethers.getSigners();
const { trustService } = await loadFixture(deployDSTokenRegulated);
// Step 1: Give entityOwner ISSUER role
await trustSer... | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | LOW | 2 | |
LOW severity: <a name=""></a>Initializers could be front-run. Initializers could be front-run, allowing an attacker to either set their own values, take ownership of the contract, and in the best case forcing a re-deployment
*Instances (10)*: | File: LSSVMPair.sol
132: function initialize(
140: __Ownable_init(_owner);
File: LSSVMPairFactory.sol
568: _pair.initialize(msg.sender, _assetRecipient, _delta, _fee, _spotPrice);
596: _pair.initialize(msg.sender, _assetRecipient, _delta, _fee, _spotPrice);
625: _pair.initializ... | uint256 _feeInUSD = _feeAmount * _tokenPrice / 10**18;
total = 1e6 (USDT) + 1e18 (DAI) = 1000000000001000000 wei-USD
uint8 decimals = IERC20Metadata(token).decimals(); // OZ ERC20Metadata
uint256 scale = 10 ** decimals; // token’s native unit
// feeAmount is already in token-units
... | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | LOW | 2 | |
HIGH severity: <a name=""></a>Unsafe ERoperation(s). *Instances (7)*: | File: LSSVMPairFactory.sol
576: _nft.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(_pair), _initialNFTIDs[i]);
606: _nft.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(_pair), _initialNFTIDs[i]);
673: _nft.transferFrom(msg.sender, recipient, ids[i]);
File: LSSVMRouter.sol
525: nft.transferFrom(fro... | function cancelProposal(uint256 id) external {
require(msg.sender == babelCore.guardian(), "Only guardian can cancel proposals");
require(id < proposalData.length, "Invalid ID");
Action[] storage payload = proposalPayloads[id];
require(!_containsSetGuardianPayload(payload.length, payload), "Guardian re... | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | HIGH | 2 | |
MEDIUM severity: <a name=""></a>Centralization Risk for trusted owners. **Impact:**
Contracts have owners with privileged rights to perform admin tasks and need to be trusted to not perform malicious updates or drain funds.
*Instances (23)*: | File: LSSVMPair.sol
582: function changeSpotPrice(uint128 newSpotPrice) external onlyOwner {
595: function changeDelta(uint128 newDelta) external onlyOwner {
610: function changeFee(uint96 newFee) external onlyOwner {
625: function changeAssetRecipient(address payable newRecipient) external onlyOwne... | // Validate vest duration is within bounds
// require!(dur_secs >= min_secs, ErrorCode::VestDurationTooShort);
// require!(dur_secs <= max_secs, ErrorCode::VestDurationTooLong); | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | MEDIUM | 2 | |
MEDIUM severity: <a name=""></a>Solmate's SafeTransferLib does not check for token contract's existence. There is a subtle difference between the implementation of solmate’s SafeTransferLib and OZ’s SafeERC20: OZ’s SafeERC20 checks if the token is a contract or not, solmate’s SafeTransferLib does not.
https://github.co... | File: LSSVMPairERC20.sol
90: token_.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, _assetRecipient, inputAmountExcludingRoyalty - protocolFee);
94: token_.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, royaltyRecipients[i], royaltyAmounts[i]);
102: token_.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(factory()), prot... | function forceUpdateNodes(
address operator,
uint256 limitStake
) external updateStakeCache(getCurrentEpoch(), PRIMARY_ASSET_CLASS) onlyDuringFinalWindowOfEpoch updateGlobalNodeStakeOncePerEpoch {
// ... validation and setup code ...
// ... stake calculation logic ...
uint256 newStake = previo... | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | MEDIUM | 2 | |
MEDIUM severity: Calls to `LimitOrderRegistry::newOrder` might revert due to overflow. **Description:** Reasonable input could cause an arithmetic overflow when opening new orders because large multiplications are performed on variables defined as `uint128` instead of `uint256`. Specifically, in `LimitOrderRegistry::_m... | uint128 amount0Min = amount0 == 0 ? 0 : (amount0 * 0.9999e18) / 1e18;
uint128 amount1Min = amount1 == 0 ? 0 : (amount1 * 0.9999e18) / 1e18;
function test_OverflowingNewOrder() public {
uint96 amount = 340_316_398_560_794_542_918;
address msgSender = 0xE0b906ae06BfB1b54fad61E222b2E324D51e1da6;
deal(address(... | for (uint256 i = 0; i < proposers.length; i++) {
timelock.grantRole(timelock.PROPOSER_ROLE(), proposers[i]);
}
for (uint256 i = 0; i < executors.length; i++) {
timelock.grantRole(timelock.EXECUTOR_ROLE(), executors[i]);
}
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.26;
import "forge-std/Test.sol";
i... | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | MEDIUM | 2 | |
MEDIUM severity: New orders on a given pool in the opposite direction, separated by zero/one tick space, are not possible until previous `BatchOrder` is removed from the order book. **Description:** New order creation will revert with `LimitOrderRegistry__DirectionMisMatch()` if the direction opposes any existing order... | function testOppositeOrders() external {
uint256 amount = 1_000e6;
deal(address(USDC), address(this), amount);
// Current tick 204332
// 204367
// Current block 16371089
USDC.approve(address(registry), amount);
registry.newOrder(USDC_WETH_05_POOL, 204910, uint96(amount), true, 0);
// M... | function calculateCCSendTokenFeeAndMessage(
uint64 destinationChainSelector,
address messageReceiver,
address sender,
address recipient,
uint value,
bytes calldata extraArgs
)
public
view
returns (uint256 fee, Client.EVM2AnyMessage memory evm2A... | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | MEDIUM | 2 | |
MEDIUM severity: Calls to `LimitOrderRegistry::cancelOrder` might revert due to overflow. **Description:** Reasonable input could cause an arithmetic overflow when cancelling orders because large multiplications are performed on variables defined as `uint128` instead of `uint256`. Specifically, when calculating the liq... | uint128 depositAmount = batchIdToUserDepositAmount[batchId][sender];
if (depositAmount == 0) revert LimitOrderRegistry__UserNotFound(sender, batchId);
// Remove one from the userCount.
order.userCount--;
// Zero out user balance.
delete batchIdToUserDepositAmount[batchId][sender];
uint128 orderAmount;
if (order.dire... | if (bal0 > 0) {
amount0 = bal0 * price() / PRECISION;
} | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | MEDIUM | 2 | |
MEDIUM severity: A malicious user can cancel an ITM order at a given target tick by calling `LimitOrderRegistry::cancelOrder` with the opposite direction, separated by one tick space. **Description:** Users are able to cancel their limit orders by calling `LimitOrderRegistry::cancelOrder`. By internally calling `_getOr... | function cancelOrder(
UniswapV3Pool pool,
int24 targetTick,
bool direction //@audit don't validate order.direction == direction
) external returns (uint128 amount0, uint128 amount1, uint128 batchId) {
uint256 positionId;
{
// Make sure order is OTM.
(,... | function cancelProposal(uint256 id) external {
require(msg.sender == babelCore.guardian(), "Only guardian can cancel proposals");
require(id < proposalData.length, "Invalid ID");
Action[] storage payload = proposalPayloads[id];
require(!_containsSetGuardianPayload(payload.length, payload), "Guardian re... | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | MEDIUM | 2 | |
LOW severity: Perform additional validation on Chainlink fast gas feed. **Description:** When consuming data feeds provided by Chainlink, it is important to validate a number of thresholds and return values. Without this, it is possible for a consuming contract to use stale or otherwise incorrect/invalid data. `LimitOr... | require(signedGasPrice > 0, "Negative gas price");
require(signedGasPrice < maxGasPrice, "Upper gas price bound breached");
require(signedGasPrice > minGasPrice, "Lower gas price bound breached");
require(answeredInRound >= roundID, "Round incomplete"); | if is_new_account(asset_token_acc) {
let decimals = *asset_mint
.data
.borrow()
.get(MINT_DECIMALS_OFFSET)
.ok_or_else(|| drv_err!(DeriverseErrorKind::InvalidClientDataFormat))?
as u32;
if !(MIN_DECS_COUNT..=MAX_DECS_COUNT).contains(&decimals)... | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | LOW | 2 | |
LOW severity: Withdrawing native assets may revert if wrapped native balance is zero. **Description:** The function `LimitOrderRegistry::withdrawNative` allows the owner to withdraw native and wrapped native assets from the contract. If balances of both are zero, calls to this function revert as there is nothing to wit... | /**
* @notice Allows owner to withdraw wrapped native and native assets from this contract.
*/
function withdrawNative() external onlyOwner {
uint256 wrappedNativeBalance = WRAPPED_NATIVE.balanceOf(address(this));
uint256 nativeBalance = address(this).balance;
// Make sure there is something to withdraw.
... | function test_InvalidTickRangeCreation() public {
int24 lowerTick = -90;
int24 upperTick = 90;
// Pool with 20 tick spacing
initPool(key2.currency0, key2.currency1, IHooks(address(multiRange)), 1000, SQRT_PRICE_1_1);
rangeKey = RangeKey(id2, lowerTick, upperTick);
rangeId = rangeKey.toId();
... | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | LOW | 2 | |
LOW severity: Fee-on-transfer/deflationary tokens will not be supported. **Description:** When creating a new order, `LimitOrderRegistry::newOrder` assumes that the amount of deposited tokens is equal to the
function parameter plus the balance before the deposit. For tokens which take a fee on every transfer, this assu... | uint128 amount0Min = amount0 == 0 ? 0 : (amount0 * 0.9999e18) / 1e18; | address _token0 = IHypervisor(_hypervisor).token0();
address _unwantedToken = IHypervisor(_hypervisor).token0() == _wantedToken ?
IHypervisor(_hypervisor).token1() :
_token0; | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | LOW | 2 | |
HIGH severity: Improvements to use of ternary operator. There is currently one [instance](https://github.com/crispymangoes/uniswap-v3-limit-orders/blob/83f5db9cb90926c11ee6ce872dc165b7f600f3d8/src/LimitOrderRegistry.sol#L903) of ternary operator usage that can be simplified, with the boolean expression being evaluated ... | bool direction = targetTick > node.tickUpper ? true : false;
if (direction)
assetIn = poolToData[pool].token0;
else assetIn = poolToData[pool].token1;
assetIn = direction ? poolToData[pool].token0 : poolToData[pool].token1; | function recordBurn(address _who, uint256 _value) internal override returns (bool) {
if (compareInvestorBalance(_who, _value, _value)) {
adjustTotalInvestorsCounts(_who, CommonUtils.IncDec.Decrease);
}
return true;
} | same_firm_diff_protocol | Solodit | HIGH | 2 |
End of preview. Expand in Data Studio
SCAR Training Pairs
7,552 human-auditor contrastive pairs for training sparse retrieval models on smart contract vulnerability detection. This is the curated training set used for all final SCAR checkpoints.
Format
| Column | Description |
|---|---|
query |
Audit finding: "SEVERITY: [title]. [description]" |
positive |
Vulnerable Solidity code snippet |
hard_negative |
Different vulnerability from same protocol |
source |
Dataset origin (Solodit, FORGE, DeFiHackLabs, etc.) |
severity |
HIGH / MEDIUM / LOW / CRITICAL |
vuln_type |
Vulnerability category |
Sources
Drawn from professional audit findings across nine public corpora:
Solodit · msc-audits-with-reasons · msc-smart-contract-auditing · DeFiHackLabs · FORGE-Artifacts · FORGE-Curated-v2 · EVuLLM · SmartBugs-Curated · GitmateAI
Hard negatives are mined using a same-report strategy when available: for each finding, we select code from a different vulnerability in the same audit report, ensuring lexical similarity (same protocol, similar coding style) but different vulnerability semantics.
Usage
from datasets import load_dataset
ds = load_dataset("Farseen0/scar-pairs", split="train")
Related
- 🗂️ All SCAR artifacts (Collection)
scar-eval— 838 held-out eval pairsscar-pairs-extended— 11,961 expanded pairs (lower quality; not used for final models)scar-corpus— 231k contract corpusscar-weights— trained model weights
Paper
This dataset accompanies SCAR: Sparse Code Audit Retriever via SAE-LoRA Adaptation (Farseen Shaikh, 2026).
- Paper: OpenReview submission (under review at EMNLP 2026, ACL ARR March cycle)
- Code: github.com/FarseenSh/scar-retrieval
- Model: Farseen0/scar-weights
Citation
@inproceedings{shaikh2026scar,
title = {SCAR: Sparse Code Audit Retriever via SAE-LoRA Adaptation},
author = {Shaikh, Farseen},
year = {2026},
note = {Under review at EMNLP 2026 (ACL ARR March cycle)},
url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=moD8Hxq9hN}
}
License
Apache 2.0 — free for research and commercial use with attribution.
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