instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
235k
| output
stringclasses 3
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation.
|
Code: void HostPortAllocatorSession::OnSessionRequestDone(
UrlFetcher* url_fetcher,
const net::URLRequestStatus& status,
int response_code,
const std::string& response) {
url_fetchers_.erase(url_fetcher);
delete url_fetcher;
if (response_code != net::HTTP_OK) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Received error when allocating relay session: "
<< response_code;
TryCreateRelaySession();
return;
}
ReceiveSessionResponse(response);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove UrlFetcher from remoting and use the one in net instead.
BUG=133790
TEST=Stop and restart the Me2Me host. It should still work.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10637008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143798 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,810
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation.
|
Code: static int get_siz(Jpeg2000DecoderContext *s)
{
int i;
int ncomponents;
uint32_t log2_chroma_wh = 0;
const enum AVPixelFormat *possible_fmts = NULL;
int possible_fmts_nb = 0;
if (bytestream2_get_bytes_left(&s->g) < 36)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
s->avctx->profile = bytestream2_get_be16u(&s->g); // Rsiz
s->width = bytestream2_get_be32u(&s->g); // Width
s->height = bytestream2_get_be32u(&s->g); // Height
s->image_offset_x = bytestream2_get_be32u(&s->g); // X0Siz
s->image_offset_y = bytestream2_get_be32u(&s->g); // Y0Siz
s->tile_width = bytestream2_get_be32u(&s->g); // XTSiz
s->tile_height = bytestream2_get_be32u(&s->g); // YTSiz
s->tile_offset_x = bytestream2_get_be32u(&s->g); // XT0Siz
s->tile_offset_y = bytestream2_get_be32u(&s->g); // YT0Siz
ncomponents = bytestream2_get_be16u(&s->g); // CSiz
if (ncomponents <= 0) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Invalid number of components: %d\n",
s->ncomponents);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (ncomponents > 4) {
avpriv_request_sample(s->avctx, "Support for %d components",
s->ncomponents);
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
s->ncomponents = ncomponents;
if (s->tile_width <= 0 || s->tile_height <= 0) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Invalid tile dimension %dx%d.\n",
s->tile_width, s->tile_height);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (bytestream2_get_bytes_left(&s->g) < 3 * s->ncomponents)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
for (i = 0; i < s->ncomponents; i++) { // Ssiz_i XRsiz_i, YRsiz_i
uint8_t x = bytestream2_get_byteu(&s->g);
s->cbps[i] = (x & 0x7f) + 1;
s->precision = FFMAX(s->cbps[i], s->precision);
s->sgnd[i] = !!(x & 0x80);
s->cdx[i] = bytestream2_get_byteu(&s->g);
s->cdy[i] = bytestream2_get_byteu(&s->g);
if (!s->cdx[i] || !s->cdy[i]) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Invalid sample seperation\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
log2_chroma_wh |= s->cdy[i] >> 1 << i * 4 | s->cdx[i] >> 1 << i * 4 + 2;
}
s->numXtiles = ff_jpeg2000_ceildiv(s->width - s->tile_offset_x, s->tile_width);
s->numYtiles = ff_jpeg2000_ceildiv(s->height - s->tile_offset_y, s->tile_height);
if (s->numXtiles * (uint64_t)s->numYtiles > INT_MAX/sizeof(*s->tile)) {
s->numXtiles = s->numYtiles = 0;
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
}
s->tile = av_mallocz_array(s->numXtiles * s->numYtiles, sizeof(*s->tile));
if (!s->tile) {
s->numXtiles = s->numYtiles = 0;
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
for (i = 0; i < s->numXtiles * s->numYtiles; i++) {
Jpeg2000Tile *tile = s->tile + i;
tile->comp = av_mallocz(s->ncomponents * sizeof(*tile->comp));
if (!tile->comp)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
/* compute image size with reduction factor */
s->avctx->width = ff_jpeg2000_ceildivpow2(s->width - s->image_offset_x,
s->reduction_factor);
s->avctx->height = ff_jpeg2000_ceildivpow2(s->height - s->image_offset_y,
s->reduction_factor);
if (s->avctx->profile == FF_PROFILE_JPEG2000_DCINEMA_2K ||
s->avctx->profile == FF_PROFILE_JPEG2000_DCINEMA_4K) {
possible_fmts = xyz_pix_fmts;
possible_fmts_nb = FF_ARRAY_ELEMS(xyz_pix_fmts);
} else {
switch (s->colour_space) {
case 16:
possible_fmts = rgb_pix_fmts;
possible_fmts_nb = FF_ARRAY_ELEMS(rgb_pix_fmts);
break;
case 17:
possible_fmts = gray_pix_fmts;
possible_fmts_nb = FF_ARRAY_ELEMS(gray_pix_fmts);
break;
case 18:
possible_fmts = yuv_pix_fmts;
possible_fmts_nb = FF_ARRAY_ELEMS(yuv_pix_fmts);
break;
default:
possible_fmts = all_pix_fmts;
possible_fmts_nb = FF_ARRAY_ELEMS(all_pix_fmts);
break;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < possible_fmts_nb; ++i) {
if (pix_fmt_match(possible_fmts[i], ncomponents, s->precision, log2_chroma_wh, s->pal8)) {
s->avctx->pix_fmt = possible_fmts[i];
break;
}
}
if (s->avctx->pix_fmt == AV_PIX_FMT_NONE) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Unknown pix_fmt, profile: %d, colour_space: %d, "
"components: %d, precision: %d, "
"cdx[1]: %d, cdy[1]: %d, cdx[2]: %d, cdy[2]: %d\n",
s->avctx->profile, s->colour_space, ncomponents, s->precision,
ncomponents > 2 ? s->cdx[1] : 0,
ncomponents > 2 ? s->cdy[1] : 0,
ncomponents > 2 ? s->cdx[2] : 0,
ncomponents > 2 ? s->cdy[2] : 0);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The get_siz function in libavcodec/jpeg2000dec.c in FFmpeg before 2.1 does not ensure the expected sample separation, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds array access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted JPEG2000 data.
Commit Message: avcodec/jpeg2000dec: Check cdx/y values more carefully
Some invalid values where not handled correctly in the later pixel
format matching code.
Fixes out of array accesses
Fixes Ticket2848
Found-by: Piotr Bandurski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
|
Medium
| 165,923
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation.
|
Code: int PreProcessingFx_Command(effect_handle_t self,
uint32_t cmdCode,
uint32_t cmdSize,
void *pCmdData,
uint32_t *replySize,
void *pReplyData)
{
preproc_effect_t * effect = (preproc_effect_t *) self;
int retsize;
int status;
if (effect == NULL){
return -EINVAL;
}
switch (cmdCode){
case EFFECT_CMD_INIT:
if (pReplyData == NULL || *replySize != sizeof(int)){
return -EINVAL;
}
if (effect->ops->init) {
effect->ops->init(effect);
}
*(int *)pReplyData = 0;
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_SET_CONFIG: {
if (pCmdData == NULL||
cmdSize != sizeof(effect_config_t)||
pReplyData == NULL||
*replySize != sizeof(int)){
ALOGV("PreProcessingFx_Command cmdCode Case: "
"EFFECT_CMD_SET_CONFIG: ERROR");
return -EINVAL;
}
#ifdef DUAL_MIC_TEST
uint32_t enabledMsk = effect->session->enabledMsk;
if (gDualMicEnabled) {
effect->session->enabledMsk = 0;
}
#endif
*(int *)pReplyData = Session_SetConfig(effect->session, (effect_config_t *)pCmdData);
#ifdef DUAL_MIC_TEST
if (gDualMicEnabled) {
effect->session->enabledMsk = enabledMsk;
}
#endif
if (*(int *)pReplyData != 0) {
break;
}
if (effect->state != PREPROC_EFFECT_STATE_ACTIVE) {
*(int *)pReplyData = Effect_SetState(effect, PREPROC_EFFECT_STATE_CONFIG);
}
} break;
case EFFECT_CMD_GET_CONFIG:
if (pReplyData == NULL ||
*replySize != sizeof(effect_config_t)) {
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : PreProcessingFx_Command cmdCode Case: "
"EFFECT_CMD_GET_CONFIG: ERROR");
return -EINVAL;
}
Session_GetConfig(effect->session, (effect_config_t *)pReplyData);
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_SET_CONFIG_REVERSE:
if (pCmdData == NULL ||
cmdSize != sizeof(effect_config_t) ||
pReplyData == NULL ||
*replySize != sizeof(int)) {
ALOGV("PreProcessingFx_Command cmdCode Case: "
"EFFECT_CMD_SET_CONFIG_REVERSE: ERROR");
return -EINVAL;
}
*(int *)pReplyData = Session_SetReverseConfig(effect->session,
(effect_config_t *)pCmdData);
if (*(int *)pReplyData != 0) {
break;
}
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_GET_CONFIG_REVERSE:
if (pReplyData == NULL ||
*replySize != sizeof(effect_config_t)){
ALOGV("PreProcessingFx_Command cmdCode Case: "
"EFFECT_CMD_GET_CONFIG_REVERSE: ERROR");
return -EINVAL;
}
Session_GetReverseConfig(effect->session, (effect_config_t *)pCmdData);
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_RESET:
if (effect->ops->reset) {
effect->ops->reset(effect);
}
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_GET_PARAM:{
if (pCmdData == NULL ||
cmdSize < (int)sizeof(effect_param_t) ||
pReplyData == NULL ||
*replySize < (int)sizeof(effect_param_t)){
ALOGV("PreProcessingFx_Command cmdCode Case: "
"EFFECT_CMD_GET_PARAM: ERROR");
return -EINVAL;
}
effect_param_t *p = (effect_param_t *)pCmdData;
memcpy(pReplyData, pCmdData, sizeof(effect_param_t) + p->psize);
p = (effect_param_t *)pReplyData;
int voffset = ((p->psize - 1) / sizeof(int32_t) + 1) * sizeof(int32_t);
if (effect->ops->get_parameter) {
p->status = effect->ops->get_parameter(effect, p->data,
&p->vsize,
p->data + voffset);
*replySize = sizeof(effect_param_t) + voffset + p->vsize;
}
} break;
case EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM:{
if (pCmdData == NULL||
cmdSize < (int)sizeof(effect_param_t) ||
pReplyData == NULL ||
*replySize != sizeof(int32_t)){
ALOGV("PreProcessingFx_Command cmdCode Case: "
"EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM: ERROR");
return -EINVAL;
}
effect_param_t *p = (effect_param_t *) pCmdData;
if (p->psize != sizeof(int32_t)){
ALOGV("PreProcessingFx_Command cmdCode Case: "
"EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM: ERROR, psize is not sizeof(int32_t)");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (effect->ops->set_parameter) {
*(int *)pReplyData = effect->ops->set_parameter(effect,
(void *)p->data,
p->data + p->psize);
}
} break;
case EFFECT_CMD_ENABLE:
if (pReplyData == NULL || *replySize != sizeof(int)){
ALOGV("PreProcessingFx_Command cmdCode Case: EFFECT_CMD_ENABLE: ERROR");
return -EINVAL;
}
*(int *)pReplyData = Effect_SetState(effect, PREPROC_EFFECT_STATE_ACTIVE);
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_DISABLE:
if (pReplyData == NULL || *replySize != sizeof(int)){
ALOGV("PreProcessingFx_Command cmdCode Case: EFFECT_CMD_DISABLE: ERROR");
return -EINVAL;
}
*(int *)pReplyData = Effect_SetState(effect, PREPROC_EFFECT_STATE_CONFIG);
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_SET_DEVICE:
case EFFECT_CMD_SET_INPUT_DEVICE:
if (pCmdData == NULL ||
cmdSize != sizeof(uint32_t)) {
ALOGV("PreProcessingFx_Command cmdCode Case: EFFECT_CMD_SET_DEVICE: ERROR");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (effect->ops->set_device) {
effect->ops->set_device(effect, *(uint32_t *)pCmdData);
}
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_SET_VOLUME:
case EFFECT_CMD_SET_AUDIO_MODE:
break;
#ifdef DUAL_MIC_TEST
case PREPROC_CMD_DUAL_MIC_ENABLE: {
if (pCmdData == NULL|| cmdSize != sizeof(uint32_t) ||
pReplyData == NULL || replySize == NULL) {
ALOGE("PreProcessingFx_Command cmdCode Case: "
"PREPROC_CMD_DUAL_MIC_ENABLE: ERROR");
*replySize = 0;
return -EINVAL;
}
gDualMicEnabled = *(bool *)pCmdData;
if (gDualMicEnabled) {
effect->aux_channels_on = sHasAuxChannels[effect->procId];
} else {
effect->aux_channels_on = false;
}
effect->cur_channel_config = (effect->session->inChannelCount == 1) ?
CHANNEL_CFG_MONO : CHANNEL_CFG_STEREO;
ALOGV("PREPROC_CMD_DUAL_MIC_ENABLE: %s", gDualMicEnabled ? "enabled" : "disabled");
*replySize = sizeof(int);
*(int *)pReplyData = 0;
} break;
case PREPROC_CMD_DUAL_MIC_PCM_DUMP_START: {
if (pCmdData == NULL|| pReplyData == NULL || replySize == NULL) {
ALOGE("PreProcessingFx_Command cmdCode Case: "
"PREPROC_CMD_DUAL_MIC_PCM_DUMP_START: ERROR");
*replySize = 0;
return -EINVAL;
}
pthread_mutex_lock(&gPcmDumpLock);
if (gPcmDumpFh != NULL) {
fclose(gPcmDumpFh);
gPcmDumpFh = NULL;
}
char *path = strndup((char *)pCmdData, cmdSize);
gPcmDumpFh = fopen((char *)path, "wb");
pthread_mutex_unlock(&gPcmDumpLock);
ALOGV("PREPROC_CMD_DUAL_MIC_PCM_DUMP_START: path %s gPcmDumpFh %p",
path, gPcmDumpFh);
ALOGE_IF(gPcmDumpFh <= 0, "gPcmDumpFh open error %d %s", errno, strerror(errno));
free(path);
*replySize = sizeof(int);
*(int *)pReplyData = 0;
} break;
case PREPROC_CMD_DUAL_MIC_PCM_DUMP_STOP: {
if (pReplyData == NULL || replySize == NULL) {
ALOGE("PreProcessingFx_Command cmdCode Case: "
"PREPROC_CMD_DUAL_MIC_PCM_DUMP_STOP: ERROR");
*replySize = 0;
return -EINVAL;
}
pthread_mutex_lock(&gPcmDumpLock);
if (gPcmDumpFh != NULL) {
fclose(gPcmDumpFh);
gPcmDumpFh = NULL;
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&gPcmDumpLock);
ALOGV("PREPROC_CMD_DUAL_MIC_PCM_DUMP_STOP");
*replySize = sizeof(int);
*(int *)pReplyData = 0;
} break;
case EFFECT_CMD_GET_FEATURE_SUPPORTED_CONFIGS: {
if(!gDualMicEnabled) {
return -EINVAL;
}
if (pCmdData == NULL|| cmdSize != 2 * sizeof(uint32_t) ||
pReplyData == NULL || replySize == NULL) {
ALOGE("PreProcessingFx_Command cmdCode Case: "
"EFFECT_CMD_GET_FEATURE_SUPPORTED_CONFIGS: ERROR");
*replySize = 0;
return -EINVAL;
}
if (*(uint32_t *)pCmdData != EFFECT_FEATURE_AUX_CHANNELS ||
!effect->aux_channels_on) {
ALOGV("PreProcessingFx_Command feature EFFECT_FEATURE_AUX_CHANNELS not supported by"
" fx %d", effect->procId);
*(uint32_t *)pReplyData = -ENOSYS;
*replySize = sizeof(uint32_t);
break;
}
size_t num_configs = *((uint32_t *)pCmdData + 1);
if (*replySize < (2 * sizeof(uint32_t) +
num_configs * sizeof(channel_config_t))) {
*replySize = 0;
return -EINVAL;
}
*((uint32_t *)pReplyData + 1) = CHANNEL_CFG_CNT;
if (num_configs < CHANNEL_CFG_CNT ||
*replySize < (2 * sizeof(uint32_t) +
CHANNEL_CFG_CNT * sizeof(channel_config_t))) {
*(uint32_t *)pReplyData = -ENOMEM;
} else {
num_configs = CHANNEL_CFG_CNT;
*(uint32_t *)pReplyData = 0;
}
ALOGV("PreProcessingFx_Command EFFECT_CMD_GET_FEATURE_SUPPORTED_CONFIGS num config %d",
num_configs);
*replySize = 2 * sizeof(uint32_t) + num_configs * sizeof(channel_config_t);
*((uint32_t *)pReplyData + 1) = num_configs;
memcpy((uint32_t *)pReplyData + 2, &sDualMicConfigs, num_configs * sizeof(channel_config_t));
} break;
case EFFECT_CMD_GET_FEATURE_CONFIG:
if(!gDualMicEnabled) {
return -EINVAL;
}
if (pCmdData == NULL|| cmdSize != sizeof(uint32_t) ||
pReplyData == NULL || replySize == NULL ||
*replySize < sizeof(uint32_t) + sizeof(channel_config_t)) {
ALOGE("PreProcessingFx_Command cmdCode Case: "
"EFFECT_CMD_GET_FEATURE_CONFIG: ERROR");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (*(uint32_t *)pCmdData != EFFECT_FEATURE_AUX_CHANNELS || !effect->aux_channels_on) {
*(uint32_t *)pReplyData = -ENOSYS;
*replySize = sizeof(uint32_t);
break;
}
ALOGV("PreProcessingFx_Command EFFECT_CMD_GET_FEATURE_CONFIG");
*(uint32_t *)pReplyData = 0;
*replySize = sizeof(uint32_t) + sizeof(channel_config_t);
memcpy((uint32_t *)pReplyData + 1,
&sDualMicConfigs[effect->cur_channel_config],
sizeof(channel_config_t));
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_SET_FEATURE_CONFIG: {
ALOGV("PreProcessingFx_Command EFFECT_CMD_SET_FEATURE_CONFIG: "
"gDualMicEnabled %d effect->aux_channels_on %d",
gDualMicEnabled, effect->aux_channels_on);
if(!gDualMicEnabled) {
return -EINVAL;
}
if (pCmdData == NULL|| cmdSize != (sizeof(uint32_t) + sizeof(channel_config_t)) ||
pReplyData == NULL || replySize == NULL ||
*replySize < sizeof(uint32_t)) {
ALOGE("PreProcessingFx_Command cmdCode Case: "
"EFFECT_CMD_SET_FEATURE_CONFIG: ERROR\n"
"pCmdData %p cmdSize %d pReplyData %p replySize %p *replySize %d",
pCmdData, cmdSize, pReplyData, replySize, replySize ? *replySize : -1);
return -EINVAL;
}
*replySize = sizeof(uint32_t);
if (*(uint32_t *)pCmdData != EFFECT_FEATURE_AUX_CHANNELS || !effect->aux_channels_on) {
*(uint32_t *)pReplyData = -ENOSYS;
ALOGV("PreProcessingFx_Command cmdCode Case: "
"EFFECT_CMD_SET_FEATURE_CONFIG: ERROR\n"
"CmdData %d effect->aux_channels_on %d",
*(uint32_t *)pCmdData, effect->aux_channels_on);
break;
}
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < CHANNEL_CFG_CNT;i++) {
if (memcmp((uint32_t *)pCmdData + 1,
&sDualMicConfigs[i], sizeof(channel_config_t)) == 0) {
break;
}
}
if (i == CHANNEL_CFG_CNT) {
*(uint32_t *)pReplyData = -EINVAL;
ALOGW("PreProcessingFx_Command EFFECT_CMD_SET_FEATURE_CONFIG invalid config"
"[%08x].[%08x]", *((uint32_t *)pCmdData + 1), *((uint32_t *)pCmdData + 2));
} else {
effect->cur_channel_config = i;
*(uint32_t *)pReplyData = 0;
ALOGV("PreProcessingFx_Command EFFECT_CMD_SET_FEATURE_CONFIG New config"
"[%08x].[%08x]", sDualMicConfigs[i].main_channels, sDualMicConfigs[i].aux_channels);
}
} break;
#endif
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple heap-based buffer overflows in libeffects in the Audio Policy Service in mediaserver in Android before 5.1.1 LMY48I allow attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted application, aka internal bug 21953516.
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
|
High
| 173,353
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation.
|
Code: static int fsck_gitmodules_fn(const char *var, const char *value, void *vdata)
{
struct fsck_gitmodules_data *data = vdata;
const char *subsection, *key;
int subsection_len;
char *name;
if (parse_config_key(var, "submodule", &subsection, &subsection_len, &key) < 0 ||
!subsection)
return 0;
name = xmemdupz(subsection, subsection_len);
if (check_submodule_name(name) < 0)
data->ret |= report(data->options, data->obj,
FSCK_MSG_GITMODULES_NAME,
"disallowed submodule name: %s",
name);
if (!strcmp(key, "url") && value &&
looks_like_command_line_option(value))
data->ret |= report(data->options, data->obj,
FSCK_MSG_GITMODULES_URL,
"disallowed submodule url: %s",
value);
free(name);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Git before 2.14.5, 2.15.x before 2.15.3, 2.16.x before 2.16.5, 2.17.x before 2.17.2, 2.18.x before 2.18.1, and 2.19.x before 2.19.1 allows remote code execution during processing of a recursive *git clone* of a superproject if a .gitmodules file has a URL field beginning with a '-' character.
Commit Message: fsck: detect submodule paths starting with dash
As with urls, submodule paths with dashes are ignored by
git, but may end up confusing older versions. Detecting them
via fsck lets us prevent modern versions of git from being a
vector to spread broken .gitmodules to older versions.
Compared to blocking leading-dash urls, though, this
detection may be less of a good idea:
1. While such paths provide confusing and broken results,
they don't seem to actually work as option injections
against anything except "cd". In particular, the
submodule code seems to canonicalize to an absolute
path before running "git clone" (so it passes
/your/clone/-sub).
2. It's more likely that we may one day make such names
actually work correctly. Even after we revert this fsck
check, it will continue to be a hassle until hosting
servers are all updated.
On the other hand, it's not entirely clear that the behavior
in older versions is safe. And if we do want to eventually
allow this, we may end up doing so with a special syntax
anyway (e.g., writing "./-sub" in the .gitmodules file, and
teaching the submodule code to canonicalize it when
comparing).
So on balance, this is probably a good protection.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
|
High
| 170,160
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation.
|
Code: static int __init big_key_crypto_init(void)
{
int ret = -EINVAL;
/* init RNG */
big_key_rng = crypto_alloc_rng(big_key_rng_name, 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(big_key_rng)) {
big_key_rng = NULL;
return -EFAULT;
}
/* seed RNG */
ret = crypto_rng_reset(big_key_rng, NULL, crypto_rng_seedsize(big_key_rng));
if (ret)
goto error;
/* init block cipher */
big_key_skcipher = crypto_alloc_skcipher(big_key_alg_name,
0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(big_key_skcipher)) {
big_key_skcipher = NULL;
ret = -EFAULT;
goto error;
}
return 0;
error:
crypto_free_rng(big_key_rng);
big_key_rng = NULL;
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: security/keys/big_key.c in the Linux kernel before 4.8.7 mishandles unsuccessful crypto registration in conjunction with successful key-type registration, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and panic) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted application that uses the big_key data type.
Commit Message: KEYS: Sort out big_key initialisation
big_key has two separate initialisation functions, one that registers the
key type and one that registers the crypto. If the key type fails to
register, there's no problem if the crypto registers successfully because
there's no way to reach the crypto except through the key type.
However, if the key type registers successfully but the crypto does not,
big_key_rng and big_key_blkcipher may end up set to NULL - but the code
neither checks for this nor unregisters the big key key type.
Furthermore, since the key type is registered before the crypto, it is
theoretically possible for the kernel to try adding a big_key before the
crypto is set up, leading to the same effect.
Fix this by merging big_key_crypto_init() and big_key_init() and calling
the resulting function late. If they're going to be encrypted, we
shouldn't be creating big_keys before we have the facilities to do the
encryption available. The key type registration is also moved after the
crypto initialisation.
The fix also includes message printing on failure.
If the big_key type isn't correctly set up, simply doing:
dd if=/dev/zero bs=4096 count=1 | keyctl padd big_key a @s
ought to cause an oops.
Fixes: 13100a72f40f5748a04017e0ab3df4cf27c809ef ('Security: Keys: Big keys stored encrypted')
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
cc: Peter Hlavaty <[email protected]>
cc: Kirill Marinushkin <[email protected]>
cc: Artem Savkov <[email protected]>
cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
|
High
| 166,893
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation.
|
Code: MagickExport MemoryInfo *AcquireVirtualMemory(const size_t count,
const size_t quantum)
{
MemoryInfo
*memory_info;
size_t
extent;
if (CheckMemoryOverflow(count,quantum) != MagickFalse)
return((MemoryInfo *) NULL);
memory_info=(MemoryInfo *) MagickAssumeAligned(AcquireAlignedMemory(1,
sizeof(*memory_info)));
if (memory_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
ThrowFatalException(ResourceLimitFatalError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) ResetMagickMemory(memory_info,0,sizeof(*memory_info));
extent=count*quantum;
memory_info->length=extent;
memory_info->signature=MagickSignature;
if (AcquireMagickResource(MemoryResource,extent) != MagickFalse)
{
memory_info->blob=AcquireAlignedMemory(1,extent);
if (memory_info->blob != NULL)
{
memory_info->type=AlignedVirtualMemory;
return(memory_info);
}
}
RelinquishMagickResource(MemoryResource,extent);
if (AcquireMagickResource(MapResource,extent) != MagickFalse)
{
/*
Heap memory failed, try anonymous memory mapping.
*/
memory_info->blob=MapBlob(-1,IOMode,0,extent);
if (memory_info->blob != NULL)
{
memory_info->type=MapVirtualMemory;
return(memory_info);
}
if (AcquireMagickResource(DiskResource,extent) != MagickFalse)
{
int
file;
/*
Anonymous memory mapping failed, try file-backed memory mapping.
If the MapResource request failed, there is no point in trying
file-backed memory mapping.
*/
file=AcquireUniqueFileResource(memory_info->filename);
if (file != -1)
{
MagickOffsetType
offset;
offset=(MagickOffsetType) lseek(file,extent-1,SEEK_SET);
if ((offset == (MagickOffsetType) (extent-1)) &&
(write(file,"",1) == 1))
{
memory_info->blob=MapBlob(file,IOMode,0,extent);
if (memory_info->blob != NULL)
{
(void) close(file);
memory_info->type=MapVirtualMemory;
return(memory_info);
}
}
/*
File-backed memory mapping failed, delete the temporary file.
*/
(void) close(file);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(memory_info->filename);
*memory_info->filename='\0';
}
}
RelinquishMagickResource(DiskResource,extent);
}
RelinquishMagickResource(MapResource,extent);
if (memory_info->blob == NULL)
{
memory_info->blob=AcquireMagickMemory(extent);
if (memory_info->blob != NULL)
memory_info->type=UnalignedVirtualMemory;
}
if (memory_info->blob == NULL)
memory_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(memory_info);
return(memory_info);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: magick/memory.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via vectors involving *too many exceptions,* which trigger a buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Suspend exception processing if there are too many exceptions
|
Medium
| 168,544
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation.
|
Code: void SVGStyleElement::DidNotifySubtreeInsertionsToDocument() {
if (StyleElement::ProcessStyleSheet(GetDocument(), *this) ==
StyleElement::kProcessingFatalError)
NotifyLoadedSheetAndAllCriticalSubresources(
kErrorOccurredLoadingSubresource);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A use after free in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 69.0.3497.81 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Do not crash while reentrantly appending to style element.
When a node is inserted into a container, it is notified via
::InsertedInto. However, a node may request a second notification via
DidNotifySubtreeInsertionsToDocument, which occurs after all the children
have been notified as well. *StyleElement is currently using this
second notification.
This causes a problem, because *ScriptElement is using the same mechanism,
which in turn means that scripts can execute before the state of
*StyleElements are properly updated.
This patch avoids ::DidNotifySubtreeInsertionsToDocument, and instead
processes the stylesheet in ::InsertedInto. The original reason for using
::DidNotifySubtreeInsertionsToDocument in the first place appears to be
invalid now, as the test case is still passing.
[email protected], [email protected]
Bug: 853709, 847570
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2;master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel
Change-Id: Ic0b5fa611044c78c5745cf26870a747f88920a14
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1104347
Commit-Queue: Anders Ruud <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Rune Lillesveen <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#568368}
|
Medium
| 173,173
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation.
|
Code: gre_print_0(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *bp, u_int length)
{
u_int len = length;
uint16_t flags, prot;
/* 16 bits ND_TCHECKed in gre_print() */
flags = EXTRACT_16BITS(bp);
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Flags [%s]",
bittok2str(gre_flag_values,"none",flags)));
len -= 2;
bp += 2;
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, 2);
if (len < 2)
goto trunc;
prot = EXTRACT_16BITS(bp);
len -= 2;
bp += 2;
if ((flags & GRE_CP) | (flags & GRE_RP)) {
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, 2);
if (len < 2)
goto trunc;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", sum 0x%x", EXTRACT_16BITS(bp)));
bp += 2;
len -= 2;
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, 2);
if (len < 2)
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", off 0x%x", EXTRACT_16BITS(bp)));
bp += 2;
len -= 2;
}
if (flags & GRE_KP) {
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, 4);
if (len < 4)
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", key=0x%x", EXTRACT_32BITS(bp)));
bp += 4;
len -= 4;
}
if (flags & GRE_SP) {
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, 4);
if (len < 4)
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", seq %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(bp)));
bp += 4;
len -= 4;
}
if (flags & GRE_RP) {
for (;;) {
uint16_t af;
uint8_t sreoff;
uint8_t srelen;
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, 4);
if (len < 4)
goto trunc;
af = EXTRACT_16BITS(bp);
sreoff = *(bp + 2);
srelen = *(bp + 3);
bp += 4;
len -= 4;
if (af == 0 && srelen == 0)
break;
if (!gre_sre_print(ndo, af, sreoff, srelen, bp, len))
goto trunc;
if (len < srelen)
goto trunc;
bp += srelen;
len -= srelen;
}
}
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", proto %s (0x%04x)",
tok2str(ethertype_values,"unknown",prot),
prot));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", length %u",length));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag < 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": ")); /* put in a colon as protocol demarc */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t")); /* if verbose go multiline */
switch (prot) {
case ETHERTYPE_IP:
ip_print(ndo, bp, len);
break;
case ETHERTYPE_IPV6:
ip6_print(ndo, bp, len);
break;
case ETHERTYPE_MPLS:
mpls_print(ndo, bp, len);
break;
case ETHERTYPE_IPX:
ipx_print(ndo, bp, len);
break;
case ETHERTYPE_ATALK:
atalk_print(ndo, bp, len);
break;
case ETHERTYPE_GRE_ISO:
isoclns_print(ndo, bp, len, ndo->ndo_snapend - bp);
break;
case ETHERTYPE_TEB:
ether_print(ndo, bp, len, ndo->ndo_snapend - bp, NULL, NULL);
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "gre-proto-0x%x", prot));
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The ISO CLNS parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-isoclns.c:isoclns_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12897/ISO CLNS: Use ND_TTEST() for the bounds checks in isoclns_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Don't pass the remaining caplen - that's too hard to get right, and we
were getting it wrong in at least one case; just use ND_TTEST().
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
High
| 167,946
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation.
|
Code: init_validate_info(validate_info *vi, gamma_display *dp, png_const_structp pp,
int in_depth, int out_depth)
{
PNG_CONST unsigned int outmax = (1U<<out_depth)-1;
vi->pp = pp;
vi->dp = dp;
if (dp->sbit > 0 && dp->sbit < in_depth)
{
vi->sbit = dp->sbit;
vi->isbit_shift = in_depth - dp->sbit;
}
else
{
vi->sbit = (png_byte)in_depth;
vi->isbit_shift = 0;
}
vi->sbit_max = (1U << vi->sbit)-1;
/* This mimics the libpng threshold test, '0' is used to prevent gamma
* correction in the validation test.
*/
vi->screen_gamma = dp->screen_gamma;
if (fabs(vi->screen_gamma-1) < PNG_GAMMA_THRESHOLD)
vi->screen_gamma = vi->screen_inverse = 0;
else
vi->screen_inverse = 1/vi->screen_gamma;
vi->use_input_precision = dp->use_input_precision;
vi->outmax = outmax;
vi->maxabs = abserr(dp->pm, in_depth, out_depth);
vi->maxpc = pcerr(dp->pm, in_depth, out_depth);
vi->maxcalc = calcerr(dp->pm, in_depth, out_depth);
vi->maxout = outerr(dp->pm, in_depth, out_depth);
vi->outquant = output_quantization_factor(dp->pm, in_depth, out_depth);
vi->maxout_total = vi->maxout + vi->outquant * .5;
vi->outlog = outlog(dp->pm, in_depth, out_depth);
if ((dp->this.colour_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_ALPHA) != 0 ||
(dp->this.colour_type == 3 && dp->this.is_transparent))
{
vi->do_background = dp->do_background;
if (vi->do_background != 0)
{
PNG_CONST double bg_inverse = 1/dp->background_gamma;
double r, g, b;
/* Caller must at least put the gray value into the red channel */
r = dp->background_color.red; r /= outmax;
g = dp->background_color.green; g /= outmax;
b = dp->background_color.blue; b /= outmax;
# if 0
/* libpng doesn't do this optimization, if we do pngvalid will fail.
*/
if (fabs(bg_inverse-1) >= PNG_GAMMA_THRESHOLD)
# endif
{
r = pow(r, bg_inverse);
g = pow(g, bg_inverse);
b = pow(b, bg_inverse);
}
vi->background_red = r;
vi->background_green = g;
vi->background_blue = b;
}
}
else
vi->do_background = 0;
if (vi->do_background == 0)
vi->background_red = vi->background_green = vi->background_blue = 0;
vi->gamma_correction = 1/(dp->file_gamma*dp->screen_gamma);
if (fabs(vi->gamma_correction-1) < PNG_GAMMA_THRESHOLD)
vi->gamma_correction = 0;
vi->file_inverse = 1/dp->file_gamma;
if (fabs(vi->file_inverse-1) < PNG_GAMMA_THRESHOLD)
vi->file_inverse = 0;
vi->scale16 = dp->scale16;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
High
| 173,658
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation.
|
Code: set_text_distance(gs_point *pdist, double dx, double dy, const gs_matrix *pmat)
{
int code = gs_distance_transform_inverse(dx, dy, pmat, pdist);
double rounded;
if (code == gs_error_undefinedresult) {
/* The CTM is degenerate.
Can't know the distance in user space.
} else if (code < 0)
return code;
/* If the distance is very close to integers, round it. */
if (fabs(pdist->x - (rounded = floor(pdist->x + 0.5))) < 0.0005)
pdist->x = rounded;
if (fabs(pdist->y - (rounded = floor(pdist->y + 0.5))) < 0.0005)
pdist->y = rounded;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The set_text_distance function in devices/vector/gdevpdts.c in the pdfwrite component in Artifex Ghostscript through 9.22 does not prevent overflows in text-positioning calculation, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted PDF document.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,898
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation.
|
Code: GLboolean WebGLRenderingContextBase::isBuffer(WebGLBuffer* buffer) {
if (!buffer || isContextLost())
return 0;
if (!buffer->HasEverBeenBound())
return 0;
if (buffer->IsDeleted())
return 0;
return ContextGL()->IsBuffer(buffer->Object());
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Insufficient data validation in WebGL in Google Chrome prior to 68.0.3440.75 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Validate all incoming WebGLObjects.
A few entry points were missing the correct validation.
Tested with improved conformance tests in
https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2654 .
Bug: 848914
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ib98a61cc5bf378d1b3338b04acd7e1bc4c2fe008
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1086718
Reviewed-by: Kai Ninomiya <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#565016}
|
Medium
| 173,128
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation.
|
Code: static int sock_close(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
sock_release(SOCKET_I(inode));
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: In net/socket.c in the Linux kernel through 4.17.1, there is a race condition between fchownat and close in cases where they target the same socket file descriptor, related to the sock_close and sockfs_setattr functions. fchownat does not increment the file descriptor reference count, which allows close to set the socket to NULL during fchownat's execution, leading to a NULL pointer dereference and system crash.
Commit Message: socket: close race condition between sock_close() and sockfs_setattr()
fchownat() doesn't even hold refcnt of fd until it figures out
fd is really needed (otherwise is ignored) and releases it after
it resolves the path. This means sock_close() could race with
sockfs_setattr(), which leads to a NULL pointer dereference
since typically we set sock->sk to NULL in ->release().
As pointed out by Al, this is unique to sockfs. So we can fix this
in socket layer by acquiring inode_lock in sock_close() and
checking against NULL in sockfs_setattr().
sock_release() is called in many places, only the sock_close()
path matters here. And fortunately, this should not affect normal
sock_close() as it is only called when the last fd refcnt is gone.
It only affects sock_close() with a parallel sockfs_setattr() in
progress, which is not common.
Fixes: 86741ec25462 ("net: core: Add a UID field to struct sock.")
Reported-by: shankarapailoor <[email protected]>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
High
| 169,203
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation.
|
Code: static void mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event(struct cgroup *cgrp,
struct cftype *cft, struct eventfd_ctx *eventfd)
{
struct mem_cgroup *memcg = mem_cgroup_from_cont(cgrp);
struct mem_cgroup_thresholds *thresholds;
struct mem_cgroup_threshold_ary *new;
int type = MEMFILE_TYPE(cft->private);
u64 usage;
int i, j, size;
mutex_lock(&memcg->thresholds_lock);
if (type == _MEM)
thresholds = &memcg->thresholds;
else if (type == _MEMSWAP)
thresholds = &memcg->memsw_thresholds;
else
BUG();
/*
* Something went wrong if we trying to unregister a threshold
* if we don't have thresholds
*/
BUG_ON(!thresholds);
usage = mem_cgroup_usage(memcg, type == _MEMSWAP);
/* Check if a threshold crossed before removing */
__mem_cgroup_threshold(memcg, type == _MEMSWAP);
/* Calculate new number of threshold */
size = 0;
for (i = 0; i < thresholds->primary->size; i++) {
if (thresholds->primary->entries[i].eventfd != eventfd)
size++;
}
new = thresholds->spare;
/* Set thresholds array to NULL if we don't have thresholds */
if (!size) {
kfree(new);
new = NULL;
goto swap_buffers;
}
new->size = size;
/* Copy thresholds and find current threshold */
new->current_threshold = -1;
for (i = 0, j = 0; i < thresholds->primary->size; i++) {
if (thresholds->primary->entries[i].eventfd == eventfd)
continue;
new->entries[j] = thresholds->primary->entries[i];
if (new->entries[j].threshold < usage) {
/*
* new->current_threshold will not be used
* until rcu_assign_pointer(), so it's safe to increment
* it here.
*/
++new->current_threshold;
}
j++;
}
swap_buffers:
/* Swap primary and spare array */
thresholds->spare = thresholds->primary;
rcu_assign_pointer(thresholds->primary, new);
/* To be sure that nobody uses thresholds */
synchronize_rcu();
mutex_unlock(&memcg->thresholds_lock);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event function in mm/memcontrol.c in the Linux kernel before 3.2.10 does not properly handle multiple events that are attached to the same eventfd, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact by registering memory threshold events.
Commit Message: mm: memcg: Correct unregistring of events attached to the same eventfd
There is an issue when memcg unregisters events that were attached to
the same eventfd:
- On the first call mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event() removes all
events attached to a given eventfd, and if there were no events left,
thresholds->primary would become NULL;
- Since there were several events registered, cgroups core will call
mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event() again, but now kernel will oops,
as the function doesn't expect that threshold->primary may be NULL.
That's a good question whether mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event()
should actually remove all events in one go, but nowadays it can't
do any better as cftype->unregister_event callback doesn't pass
any private event-associated cookie. So, let's fix the issue by
simply checking for threshold->primary.
FWIW, w/o the patch the following oops may be observed:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000004
IP: [<ffffffff810be32c>] mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event+0x9c/0x1f0
Pid: 574, comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 3.3.0-rc4+ #9 Bochs Bochs
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810be32c>] [<ffffffff810be32c>] mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event+0x9c/0x1f0
RSP: 0018:ffff88001d0b9d60 EFLAGS: 00010246
Process kworker/0:2 (pid: 574, threadinfo ffff88001d0b8000, task ffff88001de91cc0)
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8107092b>] cgroup_event_remove+0x2b/0x60
[<ffffffff8103db94>] process_one_work+0x174/0x450
[<ffffffff8103e413>] worker_thread+0x123/0x2d0
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Anton Vorontsov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <[email protected]>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
High
| 165,643
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation.
|
Code: int EVP_EncryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
const unsigned char *in, int inl)
{
int i, j, bl;
if (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) {
i = ctx->cipher->do_cipher(ctx, out, in, inl);
if (i < 0)
return 0;
else
*outl = i;
return 1;
}
if (inl <= 0) {
*outl = 0;
return inl == 0;
}
if (ctx->buf_len == 0 && (inl & (ctx->block_mask)) == 0) {
if (ctx->cipher->do_cipher(ctx, out, in, inl)) {
*outl = inl;
return 1;
} else {
*outl = 0;
return 0;
}
}
i = ctx->buf_len;
bl = ctx->cipher->block_size;
OPENSSL_assert(bl <= (int)sizeof(ctx->buf));
if (i != 0) {
if (i + inl < bl) {
memcpy(&(ctx->buf[i]), in, inl);
ctx->buf_len += inl;
*outl = 0;
return 1;
} else {
j = bl - i;
memcpy(&(ctx->buf[i]), in, j);
if (!ctx->cipher->do_cipher(ctx, out, ctx->buf, bl))
return 0;
inl -= j;
in += j;
out += bl;
*outl = bl;
}
} else
*outl = 0;
i = inl & (bl - 1);
inl -= i;
if (inl > 0) {
if (!ctx->cipher->do_cipher(ctx, out, in, inl))
return 0;
*outl += inl;
}
if (i != 0)
memcpy(ctx->buf, &(in[inl]), i);
ctx->buf_len = i;
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer overflow in the EVP_EncryptUpdate function in crypto/evp/evp_enc.c in OpenSSL before 1.0.1t and 1.0.2 before 1.0.2h allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap memory corruption) via a large amount of data.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 165,216
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation.
|
Code: int btsock_thread_post_cmd(int h, int type, const unsigned char* data, int size, uint32_t user_id)
{
if(h < 0 || h >= MAX_THREAD)
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("invalid bt thread handle:%d", h);
return FALSE;
}
if(ts[h].cmd_fdw == -1)
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("cmd socket is not created. socket thread may not initialized");
return FALSE;
}
sock_cmd_t cmd = {CMD_USER_PRIVATE, 0, type, size, user_id};
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("post cmd type:%d, size:%d, h:%d, ", type, size, h);
sock_cmd_t* cmd_send = &cmd;
int size_send = sizeof(cmd);
if(data && size)
{
size_send = sizeof(cmd) + size;
cmd_send = (sock_cmd_t*)alloca(size_send);
if(cmd_send)
{
*cmd_send = cmd;
memcpy(cmd_send + 1, data, size);
}
else
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("alloca failed at h:%d, cmd type:%d, size:%d", h, type, size_send);
return FALSE;
}
}
return send(ts[h].cmd_fdw, cmd_send, size_send, 0) == size_send;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
Medium
| 173,462
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation.
|
Code: DataPipeProducerDispatcher::Deserialize(const void* data,
size_t num_bytes,
const ports::PortName* ports,
size_t num_ports,
PlatformHandle* handles,
size_t num_handles) {
if (num_ports != 1 || num_handles != 1 ||
num_bytes != sizeof(SerializedState)) {
return nullptr;
}
const SerializedState* state = static_cast<const SerializedState*>(data);
if (!state->options.capacity_num_bytes || !state->options.element_num_bytes ||
state->options.capacity_num_bytes < state->options.element_num_bytes) {
return nullptr;
}
NodeController* node_controller = Core::Get()->GetNodeController();
ports::PortRef port;
if (node_controller->node()->GetPort(ports[0], &port) != ports::OK)
return nullptr;
auto region_handle = CreateSharedMemoryRegionHandleFromPlatformHandles(
std::move(handles[0]), PlatformHandle());
auto region = base::subtle::PlatformSharedMemoryRegion::Take(
std::move(region_handle),
base::subtle::PlatformSharedMemoryRegion::Mode::kUnsafe,
state->options.capacity_num_bytes,
base::UnguessableToken::Deserialize(state->buffer_guid_high,
state->buffer_guid_low));
auto ring_buffer =
base::UnsafeSharedMemoryRegion::Deserialize(std::move(region));
if (!ring_buffer.IsValid()) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to deserialize shared buffer handle.";
return nullptr;
}
scoped_refptr<DataPipeProducerDispatcher> dispatcher =
new DataPipeProducerDispatcher(node_controller, port,
std::move(ring_buffer), state->options,
state->pipe_id);
{
base::AutoLock lock(dispatcher->lock_);
dispatcher->write_offset_ = state->write_offset;
dispatcher->available_capacity_ = state->available_capacity;
dispatcher->peer_closed_ = state->flags & kFlagPeerClosed;
if (!dispatcher->InitializeNoLock())
return nullptr;
dispatcher->UpdateSignalsStateNoLock();
}
return dispatcher;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Missing validation in Mojo in Google Chrome prior to 69.0.3497.81 allowed a remote attacker to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [mojo-core] Validate data pipe endpoint metadata
Ensures that we don't blindly trust specified buffer size and offset
metadata when deserializing data pipe consumer and producer handles.
Bug: 877182
Change-Id: I30f3eceafb5cee06284c2714d08357ef911d6fd9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1192922
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586704}
|
Medium
| 173,177
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation.
|
Code: name_parse(u8 *packet, int length, int *idx, char *name_out, int name_out_len) {
int name_end = -1;
int j = *idx;
int ptr_count = 0;
#define GET32(x) do { if (j + 4 > length) goto err; memcpy(&t32_, packet + j, 4); j += 4; x = ntohl(t32_); } while (0)
#define GET16(x) do { if (j + 2 > length) goto err; memcpy(&t_, packet + j, 2); j += 2; x = ntohs(t_); } while (0)
#define GET8(x) do { if (j >= length) goto err; x = packet[j++]; } while (0)
char *cp = name_out;
const char *const end = name_out + name_out_len;
/* Normally, names are a series of length prefixed strings terminated */
/* with a length of 0 (the lengths are u8's < 63). */
/* However, the length can start with a pair of 1 bits and that */
/* means that the next 14 bits are a pointer within the current */
/* packet. */
for (;;) {
u8 label_len;
if (j >= length) return -1;
GET8(label_len);
if (!label_len) break;
if (label_len & 0xc0) {
u8 ptr_low;
GET8(ptr_low);
if (name_end < 0) name_end = j;
j = (((int)label_len & 0x3f) << 8) + ptr_low;
/* Make sure that the target offset is in-bounds. */
if (j < 0 || j >= length) return -1;
/* If we've jumped more times than there are characters in the
* message, we must have a loop. */
if (++ptr_count > length) return -1;
continue;
}
if (label_len > 63) return -1;
if (cp != name_out) {
if (cp + 1 >= end) return -1;
*cp++ = '.';
}
if (cp + label_len >= end) return -1;
memcpy(cp, packet + j, label_len);
cp += label_len;
j += label_len;
}
if (cp >= end) return -1;
*cp = '\0';
if (name_end < 0)
*idx = j;
else
*idx = name_end;
return 0;
err:
return -1;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The name_parse function in evdns.c in libevent before 2.1.6-beta allows remote attackers to have unspecified impact via vectors involving the label_len variable, which triggers an out-of-bounds stack read.
Commit Message: evdns: name_parse(): fix remote stack overread
@asn-the-goblin-slayer:
"the name_parse() function in libevent's DNS code is vulnerable to a buffer overread.
971 if (cp != name_out) {
972 if (cp + 1 >= end) return -1;
973 *cp++ = '.';
974 }
975 if (cp + label_len >= end) return -1;
976 memcpy(cp, packet + j, label_len);
977 cp += label_len;
978 j += label_len;
No check is made against length before the memcpy occurs.
This was found through the Tor bug bounty program and the discovery should be credited to 'Guido Vranken'."
Reproducer for gdb (https://gist.github.com/azat/e4fcf540e9b89ab86d02):
set $PROT_NONE=0x0
set $PROT_READ=0x1
set $PROT_WRITE=0x2
set $MAP_ANONYMOUS=0x20
set $MAP_SHARED=0x01
set $MAP_FIXED=0x10
set $MAP_32BIT=0x40
start
set $length=202
# overread
set $length=2
# allocate with mmap to have a seg fault on page boundary
set $l=(1<<20)*2
p mmap(0, $l, $PROT_READ|$PROT_WRITE, $MAP_ANONYMOUS|$MAP_SHARED|$MAP_32BIT, -1, 0)
set $packet=(char *)$1+$l-$length
# hack the packet
set $packet[0]=63
set $packet[1]='/'
p malloc(sizeof(int))
set $idx=(int *)$2
set $idx[0]=0
set $name_out_len=202
p malloc($name_out_len)
set $name_out=$3
# have WRITE only mapping to fail on read
set $end=$1+$l
p (void *)mmap($end, 1<<12, $PROT_NONE, $MAP_ANONYMOUS|$MAP_SHARED|$MAP_FIXED|$MAP_32BIT, -1, 0)
set $m=$4
p name_parse($packet, $length, $idx, $name_out, $name_out_len)
x/2s (char *)$name_out
Before this patch:
$ gdb -ex 'source gdb' dns-example
$1 = 1073741824
$2 = (void *) 0x633010
$3 = (void *) 0x633030
$4 = (void *) 0x40200000
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
__memcpy_sse2_unaligned () at memcpy-sse2-unaligned.S:33
After this patch:
$ gdb -ex 'source gdb' dns-example
$1 = 1073741824
$2 = (void *) 0x633010
$3 = (void *) 0x633030
$4 = (void *) 0x40200000
$5 = -1
0x633030: "/"
0x633032: ""
(gdb) p $m
$6 = (void *) 0x40200000
(gdb) p $1
$7 = 1073741824
(gdb) p/x $1
$8 = 0x40000000
(gdb) quit
P.S. plus drop one condition duplicate.
Fixes: #317
|
High
| 168,493
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation.
|
Code: spnego_gss_init_sec_context(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_cred_id_t claimant_cred_handle,
gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
gss_name_t target_name,
gss_OID mech_type,
OM_uint32 req_flags,
OM_uint32 time_req,
gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings,
gss_buffer_t input_token,
gss_OID *actual_mech,
gss_buffer_t output_token,
OM_uint32 *ret_flags,
OM_uint32 *time_rec)
{
send_token_flag send_token = NO_TOKEN_SEND;
OM_uint32 tmpmin, ret, negState;
gss_buffer_t mechtok_in, mechListMIC_in, mechListMIC_out;
gss_buffer_desc mechtok_out = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
spnego_gss_cred_id_t spcred = NULL;
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t spnego_ctx = NULL;
dsyslog("Entering init_sec_context\n");
mechtok_in = mechListMIC_out = mechListMIC_in = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
negState = REJECT;
/*
* This function works in three steps:
*
* 1. Perform mechanism negotiation.
* 2. Invoke the negotiated or optimistic mech's gss_init_sec_context
* function and examine the results.
* 3. Process or generate MICs if necessary.
*
* The three steps share responsibility for determining when the
* exchange is complete. If the selected mech completed in a previous
* call and no MIC exchange is expected, then step 1 will decide. If
* the selected mech completes in this call and no MIC exchange is
* expected, then step 2 will decide. If a MIC exchange is expected,
* then step 3 will decide. If an error occurs in any step, the
* exchange will be aborted, possibly with an error token.
*
* negState determines the state of the negotiation, and is
* communicated to the acceptor if a continuing token is sent.
* send_token is used to indicate what type of token, if any, should be
* generated.
*/
/* Validate arguments. */
if (minor_status != NULL)
*minor_status = 0;
if (output_token != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) {
output_token->length = 0;
output_token->value = NULL;
}
if (minor_status == NULL ||
output_token == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER ||
context_handle == NULL)
return GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE;
if (actual_mech != NULL)
*actual_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
/* Step 1: perform mechanism negotiation. */
spcred = (spnego_gss_cred_id_t)claimant_cred_handle;
if (*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
ret = init_ctx_new(minor_status, spcred,
context_handle, &send_token);
if (ret != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
goto cleanup;
}
} else {
ret = init_ctx_cont(minor_status, context_handle,
input_token, &mechtok_in,
&mechListMIC_in, &negState, &send_token);
if (HARD_ERROR(ret)) {
goto cleanup;
}
}
/* Step 2: invoke the selected or optimistic mechanism's
* gss_init_sec_context function, if it didn't complete previously. */
spnego_ctx = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)*context_handle;
if (!spnego_ctx->mech_complete) {
ret = init_ctx_call_init(
minor_status, spnego_ctx, spcred,
target_name, req_flags,
time_req, mechtok_in,
actual_mech, &mechtok_out,
ret_flags, time_rec,
&negState, &send_token);
/* Give the mechanism a chance to force a mechlistMIC. */
if (!HARD_ERROR(ret) && mech_requires_mechlistMIC(spnego_ctx))
spnego_ctx->mic_reqd = 1;
}
/* Step 3: process or generate the MIC, if the negotiated mech is
* complete and supports MICs. */
if (!HARD_ERROR(ret) && spnego_ctx->mech_complete &&
(spnego_ctx->ctx_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) {
ret = handle_mic(minor_status,
mechListMIC_in,
(mechtok_out.length != 0),
spnego_ctx, &mechListMIC_out,
&negState, &send_token);
}
cleanup:
if (send_token == INIT_TOKEN_SEND) {
if (make_spnego_tokenInit_msg(spnego_ctx,
0,
mechListMIC_out,
req_flags,
&mechtok_out, send_token,
output_token) < 0) {
ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
} else if (send_token != NO_TOKEN_SEND) {
if (make_spnego_tokenTarg_msg(negState, GSS_C_NO_OID,
&mechtok_out, mechListMIC_out,
send_token,
output_token) < 0) {
ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
}
gss_release_buffer(&tmpmin, &mechtok_out);
if (ret == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
/*
* Now, switch the output context to refer to the
* negotiated mechanism's context.
*/
*context_handle = (gss_ctx_id_t)spnego_ctx->ctx_handle;
if (actual_mech != NULL)
*actual_mech = spnego_ctx->actual_mech;
if (ret_flags != NULL)
*ret_flags = spnego_ctx->ctx_flags;
release_spnego_ctx(&spnego_ctx);
} else if (ret != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
if (spnego_ctx != NULL) {
gss_delete_sec_context(&tmpmin,
&spnego_ctx->ctx_handle,
GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
release_spnego_ctx(&spnego_ctx);
}
*context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
}
if (mechtok_in != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) {
gss_release_buffer(&tmpmin, mechtok_in);
free(mechtok_in);
}
if (mechListMIC_in != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) {
gss_release_buffer(&tmpmin, mechListMIC_in);
free(mechListMIC_in);
}
if (mechListMIC_out != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) {
gss_release_buffer(&tmpmin, mechListMIC_out);
free(mechListMIC_out);
}
return ret;
} /* init_sec_context */
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-18
Summary: lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.14 relies on an inappropriate context handle, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (incorrect pointer read and process crash) via a crafted SPNEGO packet that is mishandled during a gss_inquire_context call.
Commit Message: Fix SPNEGO context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2695]
The SPNEGO mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
mechanism context handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the SPNEGO context structure after context
establishment and refer to it in all GSS methods. Add initiate and
opened flags to the SPNEGO context structure for use in
gss_inquire_context() prior to context establishment.
CVE-2015-2695:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established SPNEGO context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. This bug may go unnoticed, because
the most common SPNEGO authentication scenario establishes the context
after just one call to gss_accept_sec_context(). Java server
applications using the native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this
bug. A carefully crafted SPNEGO packet might allow the
gss_inquire_context() call to succeed with attacker-determined
results, but applications should not make access control decisions
based on gss_inquire_context() results prior to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[[email protected]: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup
|
High
| 166,660
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation.
|
Code: static pdf_creator_t *new_creator(int *n_elements)
{
pdf_creator_t *daddy;
static const pdf_creator_t creator_template[] =
{
{"Title", ""},
{"Author", ""},
{"Subject", ""},
{"Keywords", ""},
{"Creator", ""},
{"Producer", ""},
{"CreationDate", ""},
{"ModDate", ""},
{"Trapped", ""},
};
daddy = malloc(sizeof(creator_template));
memcpy(daddy, creator_template, sizeof(creator_template));
if (n_elements)
*n_elements = sizeof(creator_template) / sizeof(creator_template[0]);
return daddy;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: An issue was discovered in PDFResurrect before 0.18. pdf_load_pages_kids in pdf.c doesn't validate a certain size value, which leads to a malloc failure and out-of-bounds write.
Commit Message: Zero and sanity check all dynamic allocs.
This addresses the memory issues in Issue #6 expressed in
calloc_some.pdf and malloc_some.pdf
|
Medium
| 169,570
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType TIFFWritePhotoshopLayers(Image* image,
const ImageInfo *image_info,EndianType endian,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
BlobInfo
*blob;
CustomStreamInfo
*custom_stream;
Image
*base_image,
*next;
ImageInfo
*clone_info;
MagickBooleanType
status;
PhotoshopProfile
profile;
PSDInfo
info;
StringInfo
*layers;
base_image=CloneImage(image,0,0,MagickFalse,exception);
if (base_image == (Image *) NULL)
return(MagickTrue);
clone_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
if (clone_info == (ImageInfo *) NULL)
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
profile.offset=0;
profile.quantum=MagickMinBlobExtent;
layers=AcquireStringInfo(profile.quantum);
if (layers == (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
}
profile.data=layers;
profile.extent=layers->length;
custom_stream=TIFFAcquireCustomStreamForWriting(&profile,exception);
if (custom_stream == (CustomStreamInfo *) NULL)
{
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
layers=DestroyStringInfo(layers);
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
}
blob=CloneBlobInfo((BlobInfo *) NULL);
if (blob == (BlobInfo *) NULL)
{
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
layers=DestroyStringInfo(layers);
custom_stream=DestroyCustomStreamInfo(custom_stream);
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
}
DestroyBlob(base_image);
base_image->blob=blob;
next=base_image;
while (next != (Image *) NULL)
next=SyncNextImageInList(next);
AttachCustomStream(base_image->blob,custom_stream);
InitPSDInfo(image,&info);
base_image->endian=endian;
WriteBlobString(base_image,"Adobe Photoshop Document Data Block");
WriteBlobByte(base_image,0);
WriteBlobString(base_image,base_image->endian == LSBEndian ? "MIB8ryaL" :
"8BIMLayr");
status=WritePSDLayers(base_image,clone_info,&info,exception);
if (status != MagickFalse)
{
SetStringInfoLength(layers,(size_t) profile.offset);
status=SetImageProfile(image,"tiff:37724",layers,exception);
}
next=base_image;
while (next != (Image *) NULL)
{
CloseBlob(next);
next=next->next;
}
layers=DestroyStringInfo(layers);
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
custom_stream=DestroyCustomStreamInfo(custom_stream);
return(status);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-772
Summary: ImageMagick 7.0.8-6 has a memory leak vulnerability in the TIFFWritePhotoshopLayers function in coders/tiff.c.
Commit Message: Fixed possible memory leak reported in #1206
|
Medium
| 169,043
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation.
|
Code: static struct nfs4_state *nfs4_do_open(struct inode *dir, struct path *path, int flags, struct iattr *sattr, struct rpc_cred *cred)
{
struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
struct nfs4_state *res;
int status;
do {
status = _nfs4_do_open(dir, path, flags, sattr, cred, &res);
if (status == 0)
break;
/* NOTE: BAD_SEQID means the server and client disagree about the
* book-keeping w.r.t. state-changing operations
* (OPEN/CLOSE/LOCK/LOCKU...)
* It is actually a sign of a bug on the client or on the server.
*
* If we receive a BAD_SEQID error in the particular case of
* doing an OPEN, we assume that nfs_increment_open_seqid() will
* have unhashed the old state_owner for us, and that we can
* therefore safely retry using a new one. We should still warn
* the user though...
*/
if (status == -NFS4ERR_BAD_SEQID) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "NFS: v4 server %s "
" returned a bad sequence-id error!\n",
NFS_SERVER(dir)->nfs_client->cl_hostname);
exception.retry = 1;
continue;
}
/*
* BAD_STATEID on OPEN means that the server cancelled our
* state before it received the OPEN_CONFIRM.
* Recover by retrying the request as per the discussion
* on Page 181 of RFC3530.
*/
if (status == -NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID) {
exception.retry = 1;
continue;
}
if (status == -EAGAIN) {
/* We must have found a delegation */
exception.retry = 1;
continue;
}
res = ERR_PTR(nfs4_handle_exception(NFS_SERVER(dir),
status, &exception));
} while (exception.retry);
return res;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The encode_share_access function in fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.29 allows local users to cause a denial of service (BUG and system crash) by using the mknod system call with a pathname on an NFSv4 filesystem.
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
|
Medium
| 165,692
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation.
|
Code: void * calloc(size_t n, size_t lb)
{
# if defined(GC_LINUX_THREADS) /* && !defined(USE_PROC_FOR_LIBRARIES) */
/* libpthread allocated some memory that is only pointed to by */
/* mmapped thread stacks. Make sure it's not collectable. */
{
static GC_bool lib_bounds_set = FALSE;
ptr_t caller = (ptr_t)__builtin_return_address(0);
/* This test does not need to ensure memory visibility, since */
/* the bounds will be set when/if we create another thread. */
if (!EXPECT(lib_bounds_set, TRUE)) {
GC_init_lib_bounds();
lib_bounds_set = TRUE;
}
if (((word)caller >= (word)GC_libpthread_start
&& (word)caller < (word)GC_libpthread_end)
|| ((word)caller >= (word)GC_libld_start
&& (word)caller < (word)GC_libld_end))
return GC_malloc_uncollectable(n*lb);
/* The two ranges are actually usually adjacent, so there may */
/* be a way to speed this up. */
}
# endif
return((void *)REDIRECT_MALLOC(n*lb));
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in the (1) GC_generic_malloc and (2) calloc functions in malloc.c, and the (3) GC_generic_malloc_ignore_off_page function in mallocx.c in Boehm-Demers-Weiser GC (libgc) before 7.2 make it easier for context-dependent attackers to perform memory-related attacks such as buffer overflows via a large size value, which causes less memory to be allocated than expected.
Commit Message: Fix calloc() overflow
* malloc.c (calloc): Check multiplication overflow in calloc(),
assuming REDIRECT_MALLOC.
|
Medium
| 165,592
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation.
|
Code: static void calc_coeff(double mu[4], const int index[4], int prefilter, double r2, double mul)
{
double mul2 = mul * mul, mul3 = mul2 * mul;
double kernel[] = {
(5204 + 2520 * mul + 1092 * mul2 + 3280 * mul3) / 12096,
(2943 - 210 * mul - 273 * mul2 - 2460 * mul3) / 12096,
( 486 - 924 * mul - 546 * mul2 + 984 * mul3) / 12096,
( 17 - 126 * mul + 273 * mul2 - 164 * mul3) / 12096,
};
double mat_freq[13];
memcpy(mat_freq, kernel, sizeof(kernel));
memset(mat_freq + 4, 0, sizeof(mat_freq) - sizeof(kernel));
int n = 6;
coeff_filter(mat_freq, n, kernel);
for (int k = 0; k < 2 * prefilter; ++k)
coeff_blur121(mat_freq, ++n);
double vec_freq[13];
n = index[3] + prefilter + 3;
calc_gauss(vec_freq, n, r2);
memset(vec_freq + n + 1, 0, sizeof(vec_freq) - (n + 1) * sizeof(vec_freq[0]));
n -= 3;
coeff_filter(vec_freq, n, kernel);
for (int k = 0; k < prefilter; ++k)
coeff_blur121(vec_freq, --n);
double mat[4][4];
calc_matrix(mat, mat_freq, index);
double vec[4];
for (int i = 0; i < 4; ++i)
vec[i] = mat_freq[0] - mat_freq[index[i]] - vec_freq[0] + vec_freq[index[i]];
for (int i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
double res = 0;
for (int j = 0; j < 4; ++j)
res += mat[i][j] * vec[j];
mu[i] = FFMAX(0, res);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the calc_coeff function in libass/ass_blur.c in libass before 0.13.4 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Fix blur coefficient calculation buffer overflow
Found by fuzzer test case id:000082,sig:11,src:002579,op:havoc,rep:8.
Correctness should be checked, but this fixes the overflow for good.
|
Medium
| 168,775
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation.
|
Code: const service_manager::Manifest& GetChromeContentBrowserOverlayManifest() {
static base::NoDestructor<service_manager::Manifest> manifest {
service_manager::ManifestBuilder()
.ExposeCapability("gpu",
service_manager::Manifest::InterfaceList<
metrics::mojom::CallStackProfileCollector>())
.ExposeCapability("renderer",
service_manager::Manifest::InterfaceList<
chrome::mojom::AvailableOfflineContentProvider,
chrome::mojom::CacheStatsRecorder,
chrome::mojom::NetBenchmarking,
data_reduction_proxy::mojom::DataReductionProxy,
metrics::mojom::CallStackProfileCollector,
#if defined(OS_WIN)
mojom::ModuleEventSink,
#endif
rappor::mojom::RapporRecorder,
safe_browsing::mojom::SafeBrowsing>())
.RequireCapability("ash", "system_ui")
.RequireCapability("ash", "test")
.RequireCapability("ash", "display")
.RequireCapability("assistant", "assistant")
.RequireCapability("assistant_audio_decoder", "assistant:audio_decoder")
.RequireCapability("chrome", "input_device_controller")
.RequireCapability("chrome_printing", "converter")
.RequireCapability("cups_ipp_parser", "ipp_parser")
.RequireCapability("device", "device:fingerprint")
.RequireCapability("device", "device:geolocation_config")
.RequireCapability("device", "device:geolocation_control")
.RequireCapability("device", "device:ip_geolocator")
.RequireCapability("ime", "input_engine")
.RequireCapability("mirroring", "mirroring")
.RequireCapability("nacl_broker", "browser")
.RequireCapability("nacl_loader", "browser")
.RequireCapability("noop", "noop")
.RequireCapability("patch", "patch_file")
.RequireCapability("preferences", "pref_client")
.RequireCapability("preferences", "pref_control")
.RequireCapability("profile_import", "import")
.RequireCapability("removable_storage_writer",
"removable_storage_writer")
.RequireCapability("secure_channel", "secure_channel")
.RequireCapability("ui", "ime_registrar")
.RequireCapability("ui", "input_device_controller")
.RequireCapability("ui", "window_manager")
.RequireCapability("unzip", "unzip_file")
.RequireCapability("util_win", "util_win")
.RequireCapability("xr_device_service", "xr_device_provider")
.RequireCapability("xr_device_service", "xr_device_test_hook")
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
.RequireCapability("multidevice_setup", "multidevice_setup")
#endif
.ExposeInterfaceFilterCapability_Deprecated(
"navigation:frame", "renderer",
service_manager::Manifest::InterfaceList<
autofill::mojom::AutofillDriver,
autofill::mojom::PasswordManagerDriver,
chrome::mojom::OfflinePageAutoFetcher,
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
chromeos_camera::mojom::CameraAppHelper,
chromeos::cellular_setup::mojom::CellularSetup,
chromeos::crostini_installer::mojom::PageHandlerFactory,
chromeos::crostini_upgrader::mojom::PageHandlerFactory,
chromeos::ime::mojom::InputEngineManager,
chromeos::machine_learning::mojom::PageHandler,
chromeos::media_perception::mojom::MediaPerception,
chromeos::multidevice_setup::mojom::MultiDeviceSetup,
chromeos::multidevice_setup::mojom::PrivilegedHostDeviceSetter,
chromeos::network_config::mojom::CrosNetworkConfig,
cros::mojom::CameraAppDeviceProvider,
#endif
contextual_search::mojom::ContextualSearchJsApiService,
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_EXTENSIONS)
extensions::KeepAlive,
#endif
media::mojom::MediaEngagementScoreDetailsProvider,
media_router::mojom::MediaRouter,
page_load_metrics::mojom::PageLoadMetrics,
translate::mojom::ContentTranslateDriver,
downloads::mojom::PageHandlerFactory,
feed_internals::mojom::PageHandler,
new_tab_page::mojom::PageHandlerFactory,
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
explore_sites_internals::mojom::PageHandler,
#else
app_management::mojom::PageHandlerFactory,
#endif
#if defined(OS_WIN) || defined(OS_MACOSX) || defined(OS_LINUX) || \
defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
discards::mojom::DetailsProvider, discards::mojom::GraphDump,
#endif
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
add_supervision::mojom::AddSupervisionHandler,
#endif
mojom::BluetoothInternalsHandler,
mojom::InterventionsInternalsPageHandler,
mojom::OmniboxPageHandler, mojom::ResetPasswordHandler,
mojom::SiteEngagementDetailsProvider,
mojom::UsbInternalsPageHandler,
snippets_internals::mojom::PageHandlerFactory>())
.PackageService(prefs::GetManifest())
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
.PackageService(chromeos::multidevice_setup::GetManifest())
#endif // defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
.Build()
};
return *manifest;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Inappropriate implementation of the web payments API on blob: and data: schemes in Web Payments in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Mac, Windows, Linux, and Android allowed a remote attacker to spoof the contents of the Omnibox via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Revert "Creates a WebUI-based Crostini Upgrader"
This reverts commit 29c8bb394dd8b8c03e006efb39ec77fc42f96900.
Reason for revert:
Findit (https://goo.gl/kROfz5) identified CL at revision 717476 as the
culprit for failures in the build cycles as shown on:
https://analysis.chromium.org/waterfall/culprit?key=ag9zfmZpbmRpdC1mb3ItbWVyRAsSDVdmU3VzcGVjdGVkQ0wiMWNocm9taXVtLzI5YzhiYjM5NGRkOGI4YzAzZTAwNmVmYjM5ZWM3N2ZjNDJmOTY5MDAM
Sample Failed Build: https://ci.chromium.org/b/8896211200981346592
Sample Failed Step: compile
Original change's description:
> Creates a WebUI-based Crostini Upgrader
>
> The UI is behind the new crostini-webui-upgrader flag
> (currently disabled by default)
>
> The main areas for review are
>
> calamity@:
> html/js - chrome/browser/chromeos/crostini_upgrader/
> mojo and webui glue classes - chrome/browser/ui/webui/crostini_upgrader/
>
> davidmunro@
> crostini business logic - chrome/browser/chromeos/crostini/
>
> In this CL, the optional container backup stage is stubbed, and will be
> in a subsequent CL.
>
> A suite of unit/browser tests are also currently lacking. I intend them for
> follow-up CLs.
>
>
> Bug: 930901
> Change-Id: Ic52c5242e6c57232ffa6be5d6af65aaff5e8f4ff
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1900520
> Commit-Queue: Nicholas Verne <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Sam McNally <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: calamity <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#717476}
Change-Id: I704f549216a7d1dc21942fbf6cf4ab9a1d600380
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 930901
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1928159
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#717481}
|
Medium
| 172,350
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation.
|
Code: gst_asf_demux_process_ext_content_desc (GstASFDemux * demux, guint8 * data,
guint64 size)
{
/* Other known (and unused) 'text/unicode' metadata available :
*
* WM/Lyrics =
* WM/MediaPrimaryClassID = {D1607DBC-E323-4BE2-86A1-48A42A28441E}
* WMFSDKVersion = 9.00.00.2980
* WMFSDKNeeded = 0.0.0.0000
* WM/UniqueFileIdentifier = AMGa_id=R 15334;AMGp_id=P 5149;AMGt_id=T 2324984
* WM/Publisher = 4AD
* WM/Provider = AMG
* WM/ProviderRating = 8
* WM/ProviderStyle = Rock (similar to WM/Genre)
* WM/GenreID (similar to WM/Genre)
* WM/TrackNumber (same as WM/Track but as a string)
*
* Other known (and unused) 'non-text' metadata available :
*
* WM/EncodingTime
* WM/MCDI
* IsVBR
*
* We might want to read WM/TrackNumber and use atoi() if we don't have
* WM/Track
*/
GstTagList *taglist;
guint16 blockcount, i;
gboolean content3D = FALSE;
struct
{
const gchar *interleave_name;
GstASF3DMode interleaving_type;
} stereoscopic_layout_map[] = {
{
"SideBySideRF", GST_ASF_3D_SIDE_BY_SIDE_HALF_RL}, {
"SideBySideLF", GST_ASF_3D_SIDE_BY_SIDE_HALF_LR}, {
"OverUnderRT", GST_ASF_3D_TOP_AND_BOTTOM_HALF_RL}, {
"OverUnderLT", GST_ASF_3D_TOP_AND_BOTTOM_HALF_LR}, {
"DualStream", GST_ASF_3D_DUAL_STREAM}
};
GST_INFO_OBJECT (demux, "object is an extended content description");
taglist = gst_tag_list_new_empty ();
/* Content Descriptor Count */
if (size < 2)
goto not_enough_data;
blockcount = gst_asf_demux_get_uint16 (&data, &size);
for (i = 1; i <= blockcount; ++i) {
const gchar *gst_tag_name;
guint16 datatype;
guint16 value_len;
guint16 name_len;
GValue tag_value = { 0, };
gsize in, out;
gchar *name;
gchar *name_utf8 = NULL;
gchar *value;
/* Descriptor */
if (!gst_asf_demux_get_string (&name, &name_len, &data, &size))
goto not_enough_data;
if (size < 2) {
g_free (name);
goto not_enough_data;
}
/* Descriptor Value Data Type */
datatype = gst_asf_demux_get_uint16 (&data, &size);
/* Descriptor Value (not really a string, but same thing reading-wise) */
if (!gst_asf_demux_get_string (&value, &value_len, &data, &size)) {
g_free (name);
goto not_enough_data;
}
name_utf8 =
g_convert (name, name_len, "UTF-8", "UTF-16LE", &in, &out, NULL);
if (name_utf8 != NULL) {
GST_DEBUG ("Found tag/metadata %s", name_utf8);
gst_tag_name = gst_asf_demux_get_gst_tag_from_tag_name (name_utf8);
GST_DEBUG ("gst_tag_name %s", GST_STR_NULL (gst_tag_name));
switch (datatype) {
case ASF_DEMUX_DATA_TYPE_UTF16LE_STRING:{
gchar *value_utf8;
value_utf8 = g_convert (value, value_len, "UTF-8", "UTF-16LE",
&in, &out, NULL);
/* get rid of tags with empty value */
if (value_utf8 != NULL && *value_utf8 != '\0') {
GST_DEBUG ("string value %s", value_utf8);
value_utf8[out] = '\0';
if (gst_tag_name != NULL) {
if (strcmp (gst_tag_name, GST_TAG_DATE_TIME) == 0) {
guint year = atoi (value_utf8);
if (year > 0) {
g_value_init (&tag_value, GST_TYPE_DATE_TIME);
g_value_take_boxed (&tag_value, gst_date_time_new_y (year));
}
} else if (strcmp (gst_tag_name, GST_TAG_GENRE) == 0) {
guint id3v1_genre_id;
const gchar *genre_str;
if (sscanf (value_utf8, "(%u)", &id3v1_genre_id) == 1 &&
((genre_str = gst_tag_id3_genre_get (id3v1_genre_id)))) {
GST_DEBUG ("Genre: %s -> %s", value_utf8, genre_str);
g_free (value_utf8);
value_utf8 = g_strdup (genre_str);
}
} else {
GType tag_type;
/* convert tag from string to other type if required */
tag_type = gst_tag_get_type (gst_tag_name);
g_value_init (&tag_value, tag_type);
if (!gst_value_deserialize (&tag_value, value_utf8)) {
GValue from_val = { 0, };
g_value_init (&from_val, G_TYPE_STRING);
g_value_set_string (&from_val, value_utf8);
if (!g_value_transform (&from_val, &tag_value)) {
GST_WARNING_OBJECT (demux,
"Could not transform string tag to " "%s tag type %s",
gst_tag_name, g_type_name (tag_type));
g_value_unset (&tag_value);
}
g_value_unset (&from_val);
}
}
} else {
/* metadata ! */
GST_DEBUG ("Setting metadata");
g_value_init (&tag_value, G_TYPE_STRING);
g_value_set_string (&tag_value, value_utf8);
/* If we found a stereoscopic marker, look for StereoscopicLayout
* metadata */
if (content3D) {
guint i;
if (strncmp ("StereoscopicLayout", name_utf8,
strlen (name_utf8)) == 0) {
for (i = 0; i < G_N_ELEMENTS (stereoscopic_layout_map); i++) {
if (g_str_equal (stereoscopic_layout_map[i].interleave_name,
value_utf8)) {
demux->asf_3D_mode =
stereoscopic_layout_map[i].interleaving_type;
GST_INFO ("find interleave type %u", demux->asf_3D_mode);
}
}
}
GST_INFO_OBJECT (demux, "3d type is %u", demux->asf_3D_mode);
} else {
demux->asf_3D_mode = GST_ASF_3D_NONE;
GST_INFO_OBJECT (demux, "None 3d type");
}
}
} else if (value_utf8 == NULL) {
GST_WARNING ("Failed to convert string value to UTF8, skipping");
} else {
GST_DEBUG ("Skipping empty string value for %s",
GST_STR_NULL (gst_tag_name));
}
g_free (value_utf8);
break;
}
case ASF_DEMUX_DATA_TYPE_BYTE_ARRAY:{
if (gst_tag_name) {
if (!g_str_equal (gst_tag_name, GST_TAG_IMAGE)) {
GST_FIXME ("Unhandled byte array tag %s",
GST_STR_NULL (gst_tag_name));
break;
} else {
asf_demux_parse_picture_tag (taglist, (guint8 *) value,
value_len);
}
}
break;
}
case ASF_DEMUX_DATA_TYPE_DWORD:{
guint uint_val = GST_READ_UINT32_LE (value);
/* this is the track number */
g_value_init (&tag_value, G_TYPE_UINT);
/* WM/Track counts from 0 */
if (!strcmp (name_utf8, "WM/Track"))
++uint_val;
g_value_set_uint (&tag_value, uint_val);
break;
}
/* Detect 3D */
case ASF_DEMUX_DATA_TYPE_BOOL:{
gboolean bool_val = GST_READ_UINT32_LE (value);
if (strncmp ("Stereoscopic", name_utf8, strlen (name_utf8)) == 0) {
if (bool_val) {
GST_INFO_OBJECT (demux, "This is 3D contents");
content3D = TRUE;
} else {
GST_INFO_OBJECT (demux, "This is not 3D contenst");
content3D = FALSE;
}
}
break;
}
default:{
GST_DEBUG ("Skipping tag %s of type %d", gst_tag_name, datatype);
break;
}
}
if (G_IS_VALUE (&tag_value)) {
if (gst_tag_name) {
GstTagMergeMode merge_mode = GST_TAG_MERGE_APPEND;
/* WM/TrackNumber is more reliable than WM/Track, since the latter
* is supposed to have a 0 base but is often wrongly written to start
* from 1 as well, so prefer WM/TrackNumber when we have it: either
* replace the value added earlier from WM/Track or put it first in
* the list, so that it will get picked up by _get_uint() */
if (strcmp (name_utf8, "WM/TrackNumber") == 0)
merge_mode = GST_TAG_MERGE_REPLACE;
gst_tag_list_add_values (taglist, merge_mode, gst_tag_name,
&tag_value, NULL);
} else {
GST_DEBUG ("Setting global metadata %s", name_utf8);
gst_structure_set_value (demux->global_metadata, name_utf8,
&tag_value);
}
g_value_unset (&tag_value);
}
}
g_free (name);
g_free (value);
g_free (name_utf8);
}
gst_asf_demux_add_global_tags (demux, taglist);
return GST_FLOW_OK;
/* Errors */
not_enough_data:
{
GST_WARNING ("Unexpected end of data parsing ext content desc object");
gst_tag_list_unref (taglist);
return GST_FLOW_OK; /* not really fatal */
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The gst_asf_demux_process_ext_content_desc function in gst/asfdemux/gstasfdemux.c in gst-plugins-ugly in GStreamer allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds heap read) via vectors involving extended content descriptors.
Commit Message: asfdemux: Check that we have enough data available before parsing bool/uint extended content descriptors
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777955
|
Medium
| 168,378
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation.
|
Code: bool inode_capable(const struct inode *inode, int cap)
{
struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
return ns_capable(ns, cap) && kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The capabilities implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.14.8 does not properly consider that namespaces are inapplicable to inodes, which allows local users to bypass intended chmod restrictions by first creating a user namespace, as demonstrated by setting the setgid bit on a file with group ownership of root.
Commit Message: fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
Medium
| 166,323
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation.
|
Code: parse_netscreen_packet(FILE_T fh, struct wtap_pkthdr *phdr, Buffer* buf,
char *line, int *err, gchar **err_info)
{
int sec;
int dsec;
char cap_int[NETSCREEN_MAX_INT_NAME_LENGTH];
char direction[2];
guint pkt_len;
char cap_src[13];
char cap_dst[13];
guint8 *pd;
gchar *p;
int n, i = 0;
guint offset = 0;
gchar dststr[13];
phdr->rec_type = REC_TYPE_PACKET;
phdr->presence_flags = WTAP_HAS_TS|WTAP_HAS_CAP_LEN;
if (sscanf(line, "%9d.%9d: %15[a-z0-9/:.-](%1[io]) len=%9u:%12s->%12s/",
&sec, &dsec, cap_int, direction, &pkt_len, cap_src, cap_dst) < 5) {
*err = WTAP_ERR_BAD_FILE;
*err_info = g_strdup("netscreen: Can't parse packet-header");
return -1;
}
if (pkt_len > WTAP_MAX_PACKET_SIZE) {
/*
* Probably a corrupt capture file; don't blow up trying
* to allocate space for an immensely-large packet.
*/
*err = WTAP_ERR_BAD_FILE;
*err_info = g_strdup_printf("netscreen: File has %u-byte packet, bigger than maximum of %u",
pkt_len, WTAP_MAX_PACKET_SIZE);
return FALSE;
}
/*
* If direction[0] is 'o', the direction is NETSCREEN_EGRESS,
* otherwise it's NETSCREEN_INGRESS.
*/
phdr->ts.secs = sec;
phdr->ts.nsecs = dsec * 100000000;
phdr->len = pkt_len;
/* Make sure we have enough room for the packet */
ws_buffer_assure_space(buf, pkt_len);
pd = ws_buffer_start_ptr(buf);
while(1) {
/* The last packet is not delimited by an empty line, but by EOF
* So accept EOF as a valid delimiter too
*/
if (file_gets(line, NETSCREEN_LINE_LENGTH, fh) == NULL) {
break;
}
/*
* Skip blanks.
* The number of blanks is not fixed - for wireless
* interfaces, there may be 14 extra spaces before
* the hex data.
*/
for (p = &line[0]; g_ascii_isspace(*p); p++)
;
/* packets are delimited with empty lines */
if (*p == '\0') {
break;
}
n = parse_single_hex_dump_line(p, pd, offset);
/* the smallest packet has a length of 6 bytes, if
* the first hex-data is less then check whether
* it is a info-line and act accordingly
*/
if (offset == 0 && n < 6) {
if (info_line(line)) {
if (++i <= NETSCREEN_MAX_INFOLINES) {
continue;
}
} else {
*err = WTAP_ERR_BAD_FILE;
*err_info = g_strdup("netscreen: cannot parse hex-data");
return FALSE;
}
}
/* If there is no more data and the line was not empty,
* then there must be an error in the file
*/
if (n == -1) {
*err = WTAP_ERR_BAD_FILE;
*err_info = g_strdup("netscreen: cannot parse hex-data");
return FALSE;
}
/* Adjust the offset to the data that was just added to the buffer */
offset += n;
/* If there was more hex-data than was announced in the len=x
* header, then then there must be an error in the file
*/
if (offset > pkt_len) {
*err = WTAP_ERR_BAD_FILE;
*err_info = g_strdup("netscreen: too much hex-data");
return FALSE;
}
}
/*
* Determine the encapsulation type, based on the
* first 4 characters of the interface name
*
* XXX convert this to a 'case' structure when adding more
* (non-ethernet) interfacetypes
*/
if (strncmp(cap_int, "adsl", 4) == 0) {
/* The ADSL interface can be bridged with or without
* PPP encapsulation. Check whether the first six bytes
* of the hex data are the same as the destination mac
* address in the header. If they are, assume ethernet
* LinkLayer or else PPP
*/
g_snprintf(dststr, 13, "%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
pd[0], pd[1], pd[2], pd[3], pd[4], pd[5]);
if (strncmp(dststr, cap_dst, 12) == 0)
phdr->pkt_encap = WTAP_ENCAP_ETHERNET;
else
phdr->pkt_encap = WTAP_ENCAP_PPP;
}
else if (strncmp(cap_int, "seri", 4) == 0)
phdr->pkt_encap = WTAP_ENCAP_PPP;
else
phdr->pkt_encap = WTAP_ENCAP_ETHERNET;
phdr->caplen = offset;
return TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: wiretap/netscreen.c in the NetScreen file parser in Wireshark 1.12.x before 1.12.12 and 2.x before 2.0.4 mishandles sscanf unsigned-integer processing, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: Don't treat the packet length as unsigned.
The scanf family of functions are as annoyingly bad at handling unsigned
numbers as strtoul() is - both of them are perfectly willing to accept a
value beginning with a negative sign as an unsigned value. When using
strtoul(), you can compensate for this by explicitly checking for a '-'
as the first character of the string, but you can't do that with
sscanf().
So revert to having pkt_len be signed, and scanning it with %d, but
check for a negative value and fail if we see a negative value.
Bug: 12396
Change-Id: I54fe8f61f42c32b5ef33da633ece51bbcda8c95f
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15220
Reviewed-by: Guy Harris <[email protected]>
|
Medium
| 169,962
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation.
|
Code: main(int ac, char **av)
{
int c_flag = 0, d_flag = 0, D_flag = 0, k_flag = 0, s_flag = 0;
int sock, fd, ch, result, saved_errno;
u_int nalloc;
char *shell, *format, *pidstr, *agentsocket = NULL;
fd_set *readsetp = NULL, *writesetp = NULL;
struct rlimit rlim;
extern int optind;
extern char *optarg;
pid_t pid;
char pidstrbuf[1 + 3 * sizeof pid];
struct timeval *tvp = NULL;
size_t len;
mode_t prev_mask;
ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */
/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
sanitise_stdfd();
/* drop */
setegid(getgid());
setgid(getgid());
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
#endif
while ((ch = getopt(ac, av, "cDdksE:a:t:")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
case 'E':
fingerprint_hash = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(optarg);
if (fingerprint_hash == -1)
fatal("Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\"", optarg);
break;
case 'c':
if (s_flag)
usage();
c_flag++;
break;
case 'k':
k_flag++;
break;
case 's':
if (c_flag)
usage();
s_flag++;
break;
case 'd':
if (d_flag || D_flag)
usage();
d_flag++;
break;
case 'D':
if (d_flag || D_flag)
usage();
D_flag++;
break;
case 'a':
agentsocket = optarg;
break;
case 't':
if ((lifetime = convtime(optarg)) == -1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid lifetime\n");
usage();
}
break;
default:
usage();
}
}
ac -= optind;
av += optind;
if (ac > 0 && (c_flag || k_flag || s_flag || d_flag || D_flag))
usage();
if (ac == 0 && !c_flag && !s_flag) {
shell = getenv("SHELL");
if (shell != NULL && (len = strlen(shell)) > 2 &&
strncmp(shell + len - 3, "csh", 3) == 0)
c_flag = 1;
}
if (k_flag) {
const char *errstr = NULL;
pidstr = getenv(SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
if (pidstr == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s not set, cannot kill agent\n",
SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
exit(1);
}
pid = (int)strtonum(pidstr, 2, INT_MAX, &errstr);
if (errstr) {
fprintf(stderr,
"%s=\"%s\", which is not a good PID: %s\n",
SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstr, errstr);
exit(1);
}
if (kill(pid, SIGTERM) == -1) {
perror("kill");
exit(1);
}
format = c_flag ? "unsetenv %s;\n" : "unset %s;\n";
printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
printf(format, SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
printf("echo Agent pid %ld killed;\n", (long)pid);
exit(0);
}
parent_pid = getpid();
if (agentsocket == NULL) {
/* Create private directory for agent socket */
mktemp_proto(socket_dir, sizeof(socket_dir));
if (mkdtemp(socket_dir) == NULL) {
perror("mkdtemp: private socket dir");
exit(1);
}
snprintf(socket_name, sizeof socket_name, "%s/agent.%ld", socket_dir,
(long)parent_pid);
} else {
/* Try to use specified agent socket */
socket_dir[0] = '\0';
strlcpy(socket_name, agentsocket, sizeof socket_name);
}
/*
* Create socket early so it will exist before command gets run from
* the parent.
*/
prev_mask = umask(0177);
sock = unix_listener(socket_name, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG, 0);
if (sock < 0) {
/* XXX - unix_listener() calls error() not perror() */
*socket_name = '\0'; /* Don't unlink any existing file */
cleanup_exit(1);
}
umask(prev_mask);
/*
* Fork, and have the parent execute the command, if any, or present
* the socket data. The child continues as the authentication agent.
*/
if (D_flag || d_flag) {
log_init(__progname,
d_flag ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO,
SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 1);
format = c_flag ? "setenv %s %s;\n" : "%s=%s; export %s;\n";
printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name,
SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
printf("echo Agent pid %ld;\n", (long)parent_pid);
fflush(stdout);
goto skip;
}
pid = fork();
if (pid == -1) {
perror("fork");
cleanup_exit(1);
}
if (pid != 0) { /* Parent - execute the given command. */
close(sock);
snprintf(pidstrbuf, sizeof pidstrbuf, "%ld", (long)pid);
if (ac == 0) {
format = c_flag ? "setenv %s %s;\n" : "%s=%s; export %s;\n";
printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name,
SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
printf(format, SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstrbuf,
SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
printf("echo Agent pid %ld;\n", (long)pid);
exit(0);
}
if (setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name, 1) == -1 ||
setenv(SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstrbuf, 1) == -1) {
perror("setenv");
exit(1);
}
execvp(av[0], av);
perror(av[0]);
exit(1);
}
/* child */
log_init(__progname, SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 0);
if (setsid() == -1) {
error("setsid: %s", strerror(errno));
cleanup_exit(1);
}
(void)chdir("/");
if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) {
/* XXX might close listen socket */
(void)dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO);
(void)dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO);
(void)dup2(fd, STDERR_FILENO);
if (fd > 2)
close(fd);
}
/* deny core dumps, since memory contains unencrypted private keys */
rlim.rlim_cur = rlim.rlim_max = 0;
if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rlim) < 0) {
error("setrlimit RLIMIT_CORE: %s", strerror(errno));
cleanup_exit(1);
}
skip:
cleanup_pid = getpid();
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
pkcs11_init(0);
#endif
new_socket(AUTH_SOCKET, sock);
if (ac > 0)
parent_alive_interval = 10;
idtab_init();
signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
signal(SIGINT, (d_flag | D_flag) ? cleanup_handler : SIG_IGN);
signal(SIGHUP, cleanup_handler);
signal(SIGTERM, cleanup_handler);
nalloc = 0;
if (pledge("stdio cpath unix id proc exec", NULL) == -1)
fatal("%s: pledge: %s", __progname, strerror(errno));
while (1) {
prepare_select(&readsetp, &writesetp, &max_fd, &nalloc, &tvp);
result = select(max_fd + 1, readsetp, writesetp, NULL, tvp);
saved_errno = errno;
if (parent_alive_interval != 0)
check_parent_exists();
(void) reaper(); /* remove expired keys */
if (result < 0) {
if (saved_errno == EINTR)
continue;
fatal("select: %s", strerror(saved_errno));
} else if (result > 0)
after_select(readsetp, writesetp);
}
/* NOTREACHED */
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-426
Summary: Untrusted search path vulnerability in ssh-agent.c in ssh-agent in OpenSSH before 7.4 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary local PKCS#11 modules by leveraging control over a forwarded agent-socket.
Commit Message: add a whitelist of paths from which ssh-agent will load (via
ssh-pkcs11-helper) a PKCS#11 module; ok markus@
|
High
| 168,663
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation.
|
Code: static size_t _php_mb_regex_get_option_string(char *str, size_t len, OnigOptionType option, OnigSyntaxType *syntax)
{
size_t len_left = len;
size_t len_req = 0;
char *p = str;
char c;
if ((option & ONIG_OPTION_IGNORECASE) != 0) {
if (len_left > 0) {
--len_left;
*(p++) = 'i';
}
++len_req;
}
if ((option & ONIG_OPTION_EXTEND) != 0) {
if (len_left > 0) {
--len_left;
*(p++) = 'x';
}
++len_req;
}
if ((option & (ONIG_OPTION_MULTILINE | ONIG_OPTION_SINGLELINE)) ==
(ONIG_OPTION_MULTILINE | ONIG_OPTION_SINGLELINE)) {
if (len_left > 0) {
--len_left;
*(p++) = 'p';
}
++len_req;
} else {
if ((option & ONIG_OPTION_MULTILINE) != 0) {
if (len_left > 0) {
--len_left;
*(p++) = 'm';
}
++len_req;
}
if ((option & ONIG_OPTION_SINGLELINE) != 0) {
if (len_left > 0) {
--len_left;
*(p++) = 's';
}
++len_req;
}
}
if ((option & ONIG_OPTION_FIND_LONGEST) != 0) {
if (len_left > 0) {
--len_left;
*(p++) = 'l';
}
++len_req;
}
if ((option & ONIG_OPTION_FIND_NOT_EMPTY) != 0) {
if (len_left > 0) {
--len_left;
*(p++) = 'n';
}
++len_req;
}
c = 0;
if (syntax == ONIG_SYNTAX_JAVA) {
c = 'j';
} else if (syntax == ONIG_SYNTAX_GNU_REGEX) {
c = 'u';
} else if (syntax == ONIG_SYNTAX_GREP) {
c = 'g';
} else if (syntax == ONIG_SYNTAX_EMACS) {
c = 'c';
} else if (syntax == ONIG_SYNTAX_RUBY) {
c = 'r';
} else if (syntax == ONIG_SYNTAX_PERL) {
c = 'z';
} else if (syntax == ONIG_SYNTAX_POSIX_BASIC) {
c = 'b';
} else if (syntax == ONIG_SYNTAX_POSIX_EXTENDED) {
c = 'd';
}
if (c != 0) {
if (len_left > 0) {
--len_left;
*(p++) = c;
}
++len_req;
}
if (len_left > 0) {
--len_left;
*(p++) = '\0';
}
++len_req;
if (len < len_req) {
return len_req;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: Double free vulnerability in the _php_mb_regex_ereg_replace_exec function in php_mbregex.c in the mbstring extension in PHP before 5.5.37, 5.6.x before 5.6.23, and 7.x before 7.0.8 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (application crash) by leveraging a callback exception.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72402: _php_mb_regex_ereg_replace_exec - double free
|
High
| 167,118
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation.
|
Code: spnego_gss_get_mic(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
gss_qop_t qop_req,
const gss_buffer_t message_buffer,
gss_buffer_t message_token)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_get_mic(minor_status,
context_handle,
qop_req,
message_buffer,
message_token);
return (ret);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-18
Summary: lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.14 relies on an inappropriate context handle, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (incorrect pointer read and process crash) via a crafted SPNEGO packet that is mishandled during a gss_inquire_context call.
Commit Message: Fix SPNEGO context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2695]
The SPNEGO mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
mechanism context handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the SPNEGO context structure after context
establishment and refer to it in all GSS methods. Add initiate and
opened flags to the SPNEGO context structure for use in
gss_inquire_context() prior to context establishment.
CVE-2015-2695:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established SPNEGO context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. This bug may go unnoticed, because
the most common SPNEGO authentication scenario establishes the context
after just one call to gss_accept_sec_context(). Java server
applications using the native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this
bug. A carefully crafted SPNEGO packet might allow the
gss_inquire_context() call to succeed with attacker-determined
results, but applications should not make access control decisions
based on gss_inquire_context() results prior to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[[email protected]: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup
|
High
| 166,656
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation.
|
Code: void ServiceWorkerContextCore::OnReportConsoleMessage(
ServiceWorkerVersion* version,
blink::mojom::ConsoleMessageSource source,
blink::mojom::ConsoleMessageLevel message_level,
const base::string16& message,
int line_number,
const GURL& source_url) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
const bool is_builtin_component = HasWebUIScheme(source_url);
LogConsoleMessage(ConsoleMessageLevelToLogSeverity(message_level), message,
line_number, is_builtin_component, wrapper_->is_incognito(),
base::UTF8ToUTF16(source_url.spec()));
observer_list_->Notify(
FROM_HERE, &ServiceWorkerContextCoreObserver::OnReportConsoleMessage,
version->version_id(),
ConsoleMessage(source, message_level, message, line_number, source_url));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A use after free in Google Chrome prior to 56.0.2924.76 for Linux, Windows and Mac, and 56.0.2924.87 for Android, allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
|
Medium
| 172,487
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation.
|
Code: static int parseOperand(RAsm *a, const char *str, Operand *op, bool isrepop) {
size_t pos, nextpos = 0;
x86newTokenType last_type;
int size_token = 1;
bool explicit_size = false;
int reg_index = 0;
op->type = 0;
while (size_token) {
pos = nextpos;
last_type = getToken (str, &pos, &nextpos);
if (!r_str_ncasecmp (str + pos, "ptr", 3)) {
continue;
} else if (!r_str_ncasecmp (str + pos, "byte", 4)) {
op->type |= OT_MEMORY | OT_BYTE;
op->dest_size = OT_BYTE;
explicit_size = true;
} else if (!r_str_ncasecmp (str + pos, "word", 4)) {
op->type |= OT_MEMORY | OT_WORD;
op->dest_size = OT_WORD;
explicit_size = true;
} else if (!r_str_ncasecmp (str + pos, "dword", 5)) {
op->type |= OT_MEMORY | OT_DWORD;
op->dest_size = OT_DWORD;
explicit_size = true;
} else if (!r_str_ncasecmp (str + pos, "qword", 5)) {
op->type |= OT_MEMORY | OT_QWORD;
op->dest_size = OT_QWORD;
explicit_size = true;
} else if (!r_str_ncasecmp (str + pos, "oword", 5)) {
op->type |= OT_MEMORY | OT_OWORD;
op->dest_size = OT_OWORD;
explicit_size = true;
} else if (!r_str_ncasecmp (str + pos, "tbyte", 5)) {
op->type |= OT_MEMORY | OT_TBYTE;
op->dest_size = OT_TBYTE;
explicit_size = true;
} else { // the current token doesn't denote a size
size_token = 0;
}
}
if (str[pos] == '[') {
if (!op->type) {
op->type = OT_MEMORY;
}
op->offset = op->scale[0] = op->scale[1] = 0;
ut64 temp = 1;
Register reg = X86R_UNDEFINED;
bool first_reg = true;
while (str[pos] != ']') {
if (pos > nextpos) {
break;
}
pos = nextpos;
if (!str[pos]) {
break;
}
last_type = getToken (str, &pos, &nextpos);
if (last_type == TT_SPECIAL) {
if (str[pos] == '+' || str[pos] == '-' || str[pos] == ']') {
if (reg != X86R_UNDEFINED) {
op->regs[reg_index] = reg;
op->scale[reg_index] = temp;
++reg_index;
} else {
op->offset += temp;
op->regs[reg_index] = X86R_UNDEFINED;
}
temp = 1;
reg = X86R_UNDEFINED;
} else if (str[pos] == '*') {
}
}
else if (last_type == TT_WORD) {
ut32 reg_type = 0;
if (reg != X86R_UNDEFINED) {
op->type = 0; // Make the result invalid
}
nextpos = pos;
reg = parseReg (a, str, &nextpos, ®_type);
if (first_reg) {
op->extended = false;
if (reg > 8) {
op->extended = true;
op->reg = reg - 9;
}
first_reg = false;
} else if (reg > 8) {
op->reg = reg - 9;
}
if (reg_type & OT_REGTYPE & OT_SEGMENTREG) {
op->reg = reg;
op->type = reg_type;
parse_segment_offset (a, str, &nextpos, op, reg_index);
return nextpos;
}
if (!explicit_size) {
op->type |= reg_type;
}
op->reg_size = reg_type;
op->explicit_size = explicit_size;
if (!(reg_type & OT_GPREG)) {
op->type = 0; // Make the result invalid
}
}
else {
char *p = strchr (str, '+');
op->offset_sign = 1;
if (!p) {
p = strchr (str, '-');
if (p) {
op->offset_sign = -1;
}
}
char * plus = strchr (str, '+');
char * minus = strchr (str, '-');
char * closeB = strchr (str, ']');
if (plus && minus && plus < closeB && minus < closeB) {
op->offset_sign = -1;
}
char *tmp;
tmp = malloc (strlen (str + pos) + 1);
strcpy (tmp, str + pos);
strtok (tmp, "+-");
st64 read = getnum (a, tmp);
free (tmp);
temp *= read;
}
}
} else if (last_type == TT_WORD) { // register
nextpos = pos;
RFlagItem *flag;
if (isrepop) {
op->is_good_flag = false;
strncpy (op->rep_op, str, MAX_REPOP_LENGTH - 1);
op->rep_op[MAX_REPOP_LENGTH - 1] = '\0';
return nextpos;
}
op->reg = parseReg (a, str, &nextpos, &op->type);
op->extended = false;
if (op->reg > 8) {
op->extended = true;
op->reg -= 9;
}
if (op->type & OT_REGTYPE & OT_SEGMENTREG) {
parse_segment_offset (a, str, &nextpos, op, reg_index);
return nextpos;
}
if (op->reg == X86R_UNDEFINED) {
op->is_good_flag = false;
if (a->num && a->num->value == 0) {
return nextpos;
}
op->type = OT_CONSTANT;
RCore *core = a->num? (RCore *)(a->num->userptr): NULL;
if (core && (flag = r_flag_get (core->flags, str))) {
op->is_good_flag = true;
}
char *p = strchr (str, '-');
if (p) {
op->sign = -1;
str = ++p;
}
op->immediate = getnum (a, str);
} else if (op->reg < X86R_UNDEFINED) {
strncpy (op->rep_op, str, MAX_REPOP_LENGTH - 1);
op->rep_op[MAX_REPOP_LENGTH - 1] = '\0';
}
} else { // immediate
op->type = OT_CONSTANT;
op->sign = 1;
char *p = strchr (str, '-');
if (p) {
op->sign = -1;
str = ++p;
}
op->immediate = getnum (a, str);
}
return nextpos;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: In radare2 prior to 3.1.1, the parseOperand function inside libr/asm/p/asm_x86_nz.c may allow attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash in libr/util/strbuf.c via a stack-based buffer over-read) by crafting an input file, a related issue to CVE-2018-20455.
Commit Message: Fix #12372 and #12373 - Crash in x86 assembler (#12380)
0 ,0,[bP-bL-bP-bL-bL-r-bL-bP-bL-bL-
mov ,0,[ax+Bx-ax+Bx-ax+ax+Bx-ax+Bx--
leA ,0,[bP-bL-bL-bP-bL-bP-bL-60@bL-
leA ,0,[bP-bL-r-bP-bL-bP-bL-60@bL-
mov ,0,[ax+Bx-ax+Bx-ax+ax+Bx-ax+Bx--
|
Medium
| 168,956
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation.
|
Code: ext4_ext_handle_uninitialized_extents(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_map_blocks *map,
struct ext4_ext_path *path, int flags,
unsigned int allocated, ext4_fsblk_t newblock)
{
int ret = 0;
int err = 0;
ext4_io_end_t *io = ext4_inode_aio(inode);
ext_debug("ext4_ext_handle_uninitialized_extents: inode %lu, logical "
"block %llu, max_blocks %u, flags %x, allocated %u\n",
inode->i_ino, (unsigned long long)map->m_lblk, map->m_len,
flags, allocated);
ext4_ext_show_leaf(inode, path);
trace_ext4_ext_handle_uninitialized_extents(inode, map, allocated,
newblock);
/* get_block() before submit the IO, split the extent */
if ((flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_PRE_IO)) {
ret = ext4_split_unwritten_extents(handle, inode, map,
path, flags);
if (ret <= 0)
goto out;
/*
* Flag the inode(non aio case) or end_io struct (aio case)
* that this IO needs to conversion to written when IO is
* completed
*/
if (io)
ext4_set_io_unwritten_flag(inode, io);
else
ext4_set_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_DIO_UNWRITTEN);
if (ext4_should_dioread_nolock(inode))
map->m_flags |= EXT4_MAP_UNINIT;
goto out;
}
/* IO end_io complete, convert the filled extent to written */
if ((flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CONVERT)) {
ret = ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio(handle, inode,
path);
if (ret >= 0) {
ext4_update_inode_fsync_trans(handle, inode, 1);
err = check_eofblocks_fl(handle, inode, map->m_lblk,
path, map->m_len);
} else
err = ret;
goto out2;
}
/* buffered IO case */
/*
* repeat fallocate creation request
* we already have an unwritten extent
*/
if (flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_UNINIT_EXT)
goto map_out;
/* buffered READ or buffered write_begin() lookup */
if ((flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CREATE) == 0) {
/*
* We have blocks reserved already. We
* return allocated blocks so that delalloc
* won't do block reservation for us. But
* the buffer head will be unmapped so that
* a read from the block returns 0s.
*/
map->m_flags |= EXT4_MAP_UNWRITTEN;
goto out1;
}
/* buffered write, writepage time, convert*/
ret = ext4_ext_convert_to_initialized(handle, inode, map, path);
if (ret >= 0)
ext4_update_inode_fsync_trans(handle, inode, 1);
out:
if (ret <= 0) {
err = ret;
goto out2;
} else
allocated = ret;
map->m_flags |= EXT4_MAP_NEW;
/*
* if we allocated more blocks than requested
* we need to make sure we unmap the extra block
* allocated. The actual needed block will get
* unmapped later when we find the buffer_head marked
* new.
*/
if (allocated > map->m_len) {
unmap_underlying_metadata_blocks(inode->i_sb->s_bdev,
newblock + map->m_len,
allocated - map->m_len);
allocated = map->m_len;
}
/*
* If we have done fallocate with the offset that is already
* delayed allocated, we would have block reservation
* and quota reservation done in the delayed write path.
* But fallocate would have already updated quota and block
* count for this offset. So cancel these reservation
*/
if (flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_DELALLOC_RESERVE) {
unsigned int reserved_clusters;
reserved_clusters = get_reserved_cluster_alloc(inode,
map->m_lblk, map->m_len);
if (reserved_clusters)
ext4_da_update_reserve_space(inode,
reserved_clusters,
0);
}
map_out:
map->m_flags |= EXT4_MAP_MAPPED;
if ((flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_KEEP_SIZE) == 0) {
err = check_eofblocks_fl(handle, inode, map->m_lblk, path,
map->m_len);
if (err < 0)
goto out2;
}
out1:
if (allocated > map->m_len)
allocated = map->m_len;
ext4_ext_show_leaf(inode, path);
map->m_pblk = newblock;
map->m_len = allocated;
out2:
if (path) {
ext4_ext_drop_refs(path);
kfree(path);
}
return err ? err : allocated;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in fs/ext4/extents.c in the Linux kernel before 3.4.16 allows local users to obtain sensitive information from a deleted file by reading an extent that was not properly marked as uninitialized.
Commit Message: ext4: race-condition protection for ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio
We assumed that at the time we call ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio()
extent in question is fully inside [map.m_lblk, map->m_len] because
it was already split during submission. But this may not be true due to
a race between writeback vs fallocate.
If extent in question is larger than requested we will split it again.
Special precautions should being done if zeroout required because
[map.m_lblk, map->m_len] already contains valid data.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Monakhov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
|
Low
| 165,532
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation.
|
Code: int get_devices_from_authfile(const char *authfile, const char *username,
unsigned max_devs, int verbose, FILE *debug_file,
device_t *devices, unsigned *n_devs) {
char *buf = NULL;
char *s_user, *s_token;
int retval = 0;
int fd = -1;
struct stat st;
struct passwd *pw = NULL, pw_s;
char buffer[BUFSIZE];
int gpu_ret;
FILE *opwfile = NULL;
unsigned i, j;
/* Ensure we never return uninitialized count. */
*n_devs = 0;
fd = open(authfile, O_RDONLY, 0);
if (fd < 0) {
if (verbose)
D(debug_file, "Cannot open file: %s (%s)", authfile, strerror(errno));
goto err;
}
if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) {
if (verbose)
D(debug_file, "Cannot stat file: %s (%s)", authfile, strerror(errno));
goto err;
}
if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
if (verbose)
D(debug_file, "%s is not a regular file", authfile);
goto err;
}
if (st.st_size == 0) {
if (verbose)
D(debug_file, "File %s is empty", authfile);
goto err;
}
gpu_ret = getpwuid_r(st.st_uid, &pw_s, buffer, sizeof(buffer), &pw);
if (gpu_ret != 0 || pw == NULL) {
D(debug_file, "Unable to retrieve credentials for uid %u, (%s)", st.st_uid,
strerror(errno));
goto err;
}
if (strcmp(pw->pw_name, username) != 0 && strcmp(pw->pw_name, "root") != 0) {
if (strcmp(username, "root") != 0) {
D(debug_file, "The owner of the authentication file is neither %s nor root",
username);
} else {
D(debug_file, "The owner of the authentication file is not root");
}
goto err;
}
opwfile = fdopen(fd, "r");
if (opwfile == NULL) {
if (verbose)
D(debug_file, "fdopen: %s", strerror(errno));
goto err;
}
buf = malloc(sizeof(char) * (DEVSIZE * max_devs));
if (!buf) {
if (verbose)
D(debug_file, "Unable to allocate memory");
goto err;
}
retval = -2;
while (fgets(buf, (int)(DEVSIZE * (max_devs - 1)), opwfile)) {
char *saveptr = NULL;
if (buf[strlen(buf) - 1] == '\n')
buf[strlen(buf) - 1] = '\0';
if (verbose)
D(debug_file, "Authorization line: %s", buf);
s_user = strtok_r(buf, ":", &saveptr);
if (s_user && strcmp(username, s_user) == 0) {
if (verbose)
D(debug_file, "Matched user: %s", s_user);
retval = -1; // We found at least one line for the user
for (i = 0; i < *n_devs; i++) {
free(devices[i].keyHandle);
free(devices[i].publicKey);
devices[i].keyHandle = NULL;
devices[i].publicKey = NULL;
}
*n_devs = 0;
i = 0;
while ((s_token = strtok_r(NULL, ",", &saveptr))) {
devices[i].keyHandle = NULL;
devices[i].publicKey = NULL;
if ((*n_devs)++ > MAX_DEVS - 1) {
*n_devs = MAX_DEVS;
if (verbose)
D(debug_file, "Found more than %d devices, ignoring the remaining ones",
MAX_DEVS);
break;
}
if (verbose)
D(debug_file, "KeyHandle for device number %d: %s", i + 1, s_token);
devices[i].keyHandle = strdup(s_token);
if (!devices[i].keyHandle) {
if (verbose)
D(debug_file, "Unable to allocate memory for keyHandle number %d", i);
goto err;
}
s_token = strtok_r(NULL, ":", &saveptr);
if (!s_token) {
if (verbose)
D(debug_file, "Unable to retrieve publicKey number %d", i + 1);
goto err;
}
if (verbose)
D(debug_file, "publicKey for device number %d: %s", i + 1, s_token);
if (strlen(s_token) % 2 != 0) {
if (verbose)
D(debug_file, "Length of key number %d not even", i + 1);
goto err;
}
devices[i].key_len = strlen(s_token) / 2;
if (verbose)
D(debug_file, "Length of key number %d is %zu", i + 1, devices[i].key_len);
devices[i].publicKey =
malloc((sizeof(unsigned char) * devices[i].key_len));
if (!devices[i].publicKey) {
if (verbose)
D(debug_file, "Unable to allocate memory for publicKey number %d", i);
goto err;
}
for (j = 0; j < devices[i].key_len; j++) {
unsigned int x;
if (sscanf(&s_token[2 * j], "%2x", &x) != 1) {
if (verbose)
D(debug_file, "Invalid hex number in key");
goto err;
}
devices[i].publicKey[j] = (unsigned char)x;
}
i++;
}
}
}
if (verbose)
D(debug_file, "Found %d device(s) for user %s", *n_devs, username);
retval = 1;
goto out;
err:
for (i = 0; i < *n_devs; i++) {
free(devices[i].keyHandle);
free(devices[i].publicKey);
devices[i].keyHandle = NULL;
devices[i].publicKey = NULL;
}
*n_devs = 0;
out:
if (buf) {
free(buf);
buf = NULL;
}
if (opwfile)
fclose(opwfile);
else if (fd >= 0)
close(fd);
return retval;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: In Yubico pam-u2f 1.0.7, when configured with debug and a custom debug log file is set using debug_file, that file descriptor is not closed when a new process is spawned. This leads to the file descriptor being inherited into the child process; the child process can then read from and write to it. This can leak sensitive information and also, if written to, be used to fill the disk or plant misinformation.
Commit Message: Do not leak file descriptor when doing exec
When opening a custom debug file, the descriptor would stay
open when calling exec and leak to the child process.
Make sure all files are opened with close-on-exec.
This fixes CVE-2019-12210.
Thanks to Matthias Gerstner of the SUSE Security Team for reporting
the issue.
|
Medium
| 169,663
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation.
|
Code: void CairoOutputDev::drawSoftMaskedImage(GfxState *state, Object *ref, Stream *str,
int width, int height,
GfxImageColorMap *colorMap,
Stream *maskStr,
int maskWidth, int maskHeight,
GfxImageColorMap *maskColorMap)
{
ImageStream *maskImgStr;
maskImgStr = new ImageStream(maskStr, maskWidth,
maskColorMap->getNumPixelComps(),
maskColorMap->getBits());
maskImgStr->reset();
int row_stride = (maskWidth + 3) & ~3;
unsigned char *maskBuffer;
maskBuffer = (unsigned char *)gmalloc (row_stride * maskHeight);
unsigned char *maskDest;
cairo_surface_t *maskImage;
cairo_pattern_t *maskPattern;
Guchar *pix;
int y;
for (y = 0; y < maskHeight; y++) {
maskDest = (unsigned char *) (maskBuffer + y * row_stride);
pix = maskImgStr->getLine();
maskColorMap->getGrayLine (pix, maskDest, maskWidth);
}
maskImage = cairo_image_surface_create_for_data (maskBuffer, CAIRO_FORMAT_A8,
maskWidth, maskHeight, row_stride);
delete maskImgStr;
maskStr->close();
unsigned char *buffer;
unsigned int *dest;
cairo_surface_t *image;
cairo_pattern_t *pattern;
ImageStream *imgStr;
cairo_matrix_t matrix;
cairo_matrix_t maskMatrix;
int is_identity_transform;
buffer = (unsigned char *)gmalloc (width * height * 4);
/* TODO: Do we want to cache these? */
imgStr = new ImageStream(str, width,
colorMap->getNumPixelComps(),
colorMap->getBits());
imgStr->reset();
/* ICCBased color space doesn't do any color correction
* so check its underlying color space as well */
is_identity_transform = colorMap->getColorSpace()->getMode() == csDeviceRGB ||
(colorMap->getColorSpace()->getMode() == csICCBased &&
((GfxICCBasedColorSpace*)colorMap->getColorSpace())->getAlt()->getMode() == csDeviceRGB);
for (y = 0; y < height; y++) {
dest = (unsigned int *) (buffer + y * 4 * width);
pix = imgStr->getLine();
colorMap->getRGBLine (pix, dest, width);
}
image = cairo_image_surface_create_for_data (buffer, CAIRO_FORMAT_RGB24,
width, height, width * 4);
if (image == NULL) {
delete imgStr;
return;
}
pattern = cairo_pattern_create_for_surface (image);
maskPattern = cairo_pattern_create_for_surface (maskImage);
if (pattern == NULL) {
delete imgStr;
return;
}
LOG (printf ("drawSoftMaskedImage %dx%d\n", width, height));
cairo_matrix_init_translate (&matrix, 0, height);
cairo_matrix_scale (&matrix, width, -height);
cairo_matrix_init_translate (&maskMatrix, 0, maskHeight);
cairo_matrix_scale (&maskMatrix, maskWidth, -maskHeight);
cairo_pattern_set_matrix (pattern, &matrix);
cairo_pattern_set_matrix (maskPattern, &maskMatrix);
cairo_pattern_set_filter (pattern, CAIRO_FILTER_BILINEAR);
cairo_pattern_set_filter (maskPattern, CAIRO_FILTER_BILINEAR);
cairo_set_source (cairo, pattern);
cairo_mask (cairo, maskPattern);
if (cairo_shape) {
#if 0
cairo_rectangle (cairo_shape, 0., 0., width, height);
cairo_fill (cairo_shape);
#else
cairo_save (cairo_shape);
/* this should draw a rectangle the size of the image
* we use this instead of rect,fill because of the lack
* of EXTEND_PAD */
/* NOTE: this will multiply the edges of the image twice */
cairo_set_source (cairo_shape, pattern);
cairo_mask (cairo_shape, pattern);
cairo_restore (cairo_shape);
#endif
}
cairo_pattern_destroy (maskPattern);
cairo_surface_destroy (maskImage);
cairo_pattern_destroy (pattern);
cairo_surface_destroy (image);
free (buffer);
free (maskBuffer);
delete imgStr;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Multiple integer overflows in Poppler 0.10.5 and earlier allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted PDF file, related to (1) glib/poppler-page.cc; (2) ArthurOutputDev.cc, (3) CairoOutputDev.cc, (4) GfxState.cc, (5) JBIG2Stream.cc, (6) PSOutputDev.cc, and (7) SplashOutputDev.cc in poppler/; and (8) SplashBitmap.cc, (9) Splash.cc, and (10) SplashFTFont.cc in splash/. NOTE: this may overlap CVE-2009-0791.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,607
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation.
|
Code: bool AXLayoutObject::isSelected() const {
if (!getLayoutObject() || !getNode())
return false;
const AtomicString& ariaSelected = getAttribute(aria_selectedAttr);
if (equalIgnoringCase(ariaSelected, "true"))
return true;
AXObject* focusedObject = axObjectCache().focusedObject();
if (ariaRoleAttribute() == ListBoxOptionRole && focusedObject &&
focusedObject->activeDescendant() == this) {
return true;
}
if (isTabItem() && isTabItemSelected())
return true;
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89 does not ensure that the auto-open list omits all dangerous file types, which makes it easier for remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by providing a crafted file and leveraging a user's previous *Always open files of this type* choice, related to download_commands.cc and download_prefs.cc.
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
|
Medium
| 171,905
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation.
|
Code: void *Sys_LoadDll(const char *name, qboolean useSystemLib)
{
void *dllhandle;
if(useSystemLib)
Com_Printf("Trying to load \"%s\"...\n", name);
if(!useSystemLib || !(dllhandle = Sys_LoadLibrary(name)))
{
const char *topDir;
char libPath[MAX_OSPATH];
topDir = Sys_BinaryPath();
if(!*topDir)
topDir = ".";
Com_Printf("Trying to load \"%s\" from \"%s\"...\n", name, topDir);
Com_sprintf(libPath, sizeof(libPath), "%s%c%s", topDir, PATH_SEP, name);
if(!(dllhandle = Sys_LoadLibrary(libPath)))
{
const char *basePath = Cvar_VariableString("fs_basepath");
if(!basePath || !*basePath)
basePath = ".";
if(FS_FilenameCompare(topDir, basePath))
{
Com_Printf("Trying to load \"%s\" from \"%s\"...\n", name, basePath);
Com_sprintf(libPath, sizeof(libPath), "%s%c%s", basePath, PATH_SEP, name);
dllhandle = Sys_LoadLibrary(libPath);
}
if(!dllhandle)
Com_Printf("Loading \"%s\" failed\n", name);
}
}
return dllhandle;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-269
Summary: In ioquake3 before 2017-03-14, the auto-downloading feature has insufficient content restrictions. This also affects Quake III Arena, OpenArena, OpenJK, iortcw, and other id Tech 3 (aka Quake 3 engine) forks. A malicious auto-downloaded file can trigger loading of crafted auto-downloaded files as native code DLLs. A malicious auto-downloaded file can contain configuration defaults that override the user's. Executable bytecode in a malicious auto-downloaded file can set configuration variables to values that will result in unwanted native code DLLs being loaded, resulting in sandbox escape.
Commit Message: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s.
|
High
| 170,090
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation.
|
Code: bool ContentBrowserClient::ShouldSwapProcessesForNavigation(
const GURL& current_url,
const GURL& new_url) {
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Isolated Sites feature in Google Chrome before 26.0.1410.43 does not properly enforce the use of separate processes, which makes it easier for remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 171,438
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation.
|
Code: static void ConvertLoopSlice(ModSample &src, ModSample &dest, SmpLength start, SmpLength len, bool loop)
{
if(!src.HasSampleData()) return;
dest.FreeSample();
dest = src;
dest.nLength = len;
dest.pSample = nullptr;
if(!dest.AllocateSample())
{
return;
}
if(len != src.nLength)
MemsetZero(dest.cues);
std::memcpy(dest.pSample8, src.pSample8 + start, len);
dest.uFlags.set(CHN_LOOP, loop);
if(loop)
{
dest.nLoopStart = 0;
dest.nLoopEnd = len;
} else
{
dest.nLoopStart = 0;
dest.nLoopEnd = 0;
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: soundlib/Load_stp.cpp in OpenMPT through 1.27.04.00, and libopenmpt before 0.3.6, has an out-of-bounds read via a malformed STP file.
Commit Message: [Fix] STP: Possible out-of-bounds memory read with malformed STP files (caught with afl-fuzz).
git-svn-id: https://source.openmpt.org/svn/openmpt/trunk/OpenMPT@9567 56274372-70c3-4bfc-bfc3-4c3a0b034d27
|
Medium
| 169,338
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation.
|
Code: bool Chapters::ExpandEditionsArray()
{
if (m_editions_size > m_editions_count)
return true; // nothing else to do
const int size = (m_editions_size == 0) ? 1 : 2 * m_editions_size;
Edition* const editions = new (std::nothrow) Edition[size];
if (editions == NULL)
return false;
for (int idx = 0; idx < m_editions_count; ++idx)
{
m_editions[idx].ShallowCopy(editions[idx]);
}
delete[] m_editions;
m_editions = editions;
m_editions_size = size;
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
High
| 174,276
|
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